diff --git a/blog/authors.yml b/blog/authors.yml
index 168555de..cd15f114 100644
--- a/blog/authors.yml
+++ b/blog/authors.yml
@@ -52,3 +52,8 @@ mateo:
   title: AI Engineer, LiteLLM
   url: https://www.linkedin.com/in/mateo-wang
   image_url: /img/mateo.jpeg
+
+mubashir:
+  name: Mubashir Osmani
+  url: https://www.linkedin.com/in/mubashirosmani
+  image_url: https://github.com/mubashir1osmani.png
diff --git a/blog/mistral_supply_chain_attack_2026/index.md b/blog/mistral_supply_chain_attack_2026/index.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3be8e49e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/blog/mistral_supply_chain_attack_2026/index.md
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+---
+slug: mistral-supply-chain-attack-may-2026
+title: "Security Update: Mistral AI PyPI Supply Chain Attack — LiteLLM Not Impacted"
+date: 2026-05-12T10:00:00
+authors:
+  - mubashir
+description: "On May 11, 2026, a malicious version of the mistralai PyPI package was published as part of a coordinated supply chain attack. LiteLLM is not affected — we call Mistral exclusively via httpx, never by importing the mistralai SDK."
+tags: [security, supply-chain, mistral, incident-report]
+hide_table_of_contents: false
+---
+
+On May 11, 2026, security researchers at [Aikido Security](https://www.aikido.dev/blog/mini-shai-hulud-is-back-tanstack-compromised) discovered a coordinated supply chain attack dubbed **"Mini Shai-Hulud"** that published malicious versions of over 170 npm packages and 2 PyPI packages, including `mistralai==2.4.6`. 
+
+**LiteLLM is not impacted.** We call Mistral's API directly over HTTP via `httpx` and do not import the `mistralai` Python SDK anywhere in the codebase.
+
+## TLDR;
+
+- **LiteLLM does not install or import the `mistralai` package.** We call Mistral's API the same way we call every other provider (via `httpx`). The compromised package is never executed in any LiteLLM environment.
+- **No LiteLLM user credentials were at risk from this attack.** The malware runs at `import mistralai` time. Since LiteLLM never reaches that import, the payload never fires.
+- **No action is required from LiteLLM users.** If you have separately installed `mistralai==2.4.6` in the same environment for your own application code, you should follow [Mistral AI's guidance](https://docs.mistral.ai/resources/security-advisories) immediately.
+
+{/* truncate */}
+
+---
+
+## What happened
+
+TeamPCP published `mistralai==2.4.6` to PyPI — a version Mistral AI never released. The package contained a backdoor injected into `src/mistralai/client/__init__.py` that fires at import time on Linux hosts. When triggered, it downloads a file named `transformers.pyz` from a hardcoded attacker-controlled IP address (`83.142.209.194`) and executes it as a detached background process.
+
+The filename was deliberately chosen to resemble Hugging Face's widely used `transformers` library, giving it cover in ML environments.
+
+The payload functions as a **credential stealer**, targeting secrets stored on the host — cloud credentials, CI/CD tokens, GitHub access tokens, and API keys. Researchers also found a geofenced destructive branch with a 1-in-6 probability of running `rm -rf /` on systems detected to be in certain regions.
+
+PyPI has since quarantined the entire `mistralai` project. The attack was part of a broader campaign that hit TanStack (42 packages), UiPath (65 packages), Guardrails AI, OpenSearch, and others across both npm and PyPI.
+
+---
+
+## What to check if you use LiteLLM
+
+No LiteLLM-specific action is needed. If you want to be thorough:
+
+1. **Confirm `mistralai` is not in your environment.**
+   ```bash
+   pip show mistralai
+   ```
+   If the output shows version `2.4.6`, remove it immediately and follow [Mistral AI's security advisory](https://docs.mistral.ai/resources/security-advisories).
+
+2. **Check your environment for the dropper.**
+   Look for `/tmp/transformers.pyz` on any Linux hosts that had `mistralai==2.4.6` installed, and for unexpected outbound connections to `83.142.209.194`.
+
+3. **Rotate credentials if you were affected.**
+   If `mistralai==2.4.6` was installed and imported in your environment, treat all secrets present on that host as compromised: cloud credentials, API keys, CI/CD tokens, and GitHub tokens.
+
+---
+
+## Our broader approach to dependency security
+
+If you discover a security issue in LiteLLM, please report it through our [bug bounty program](https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/security). We pay out for P0 (supply chain) and P1 (unauthenticated proxy access) issues.
+
+---
+
+**References**
+
+- [Aikido Security — Mini Shai-Hulud Is Back](https://www.aikido.dev/blog/mini-shai-hulud-is-back-tanstack-compromised)
+- [The Hacker News — Mini Shai-Hulud Worm Compromises TanStack, Mistral AI, Guardrails AI & More](https://thehackernews.com/2026/05/mini-shai-hulud-worm-compromises.html)
+- [Wiz Blog — Mini Shai-Hulud Strikes Again](https://www.wiz.io/blog/mini-shai-hulud-strikes-again-tanstack-more-npm-packages-compromised)
+- [Mistral AI Security Advisories](https://docs.mistral.ai/resources/security-advisories)
+- [GitHub Issue #523 — mistralai/client-python](https://github.com/mistralai/client-python/issues/523)
+- [SafeDep — Mass Supply Chain Attack Hits TanStack, Mistral AI](https://safedep.io/mass-npm-supply-chain-attack-tanstack-mistral/)