From 353bc2d42ca1a7d284d1b6aa52d29c9e3abeed3a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: vak2ve Date: Tue, 9 Nov 2021 17:10:41 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 01/34] closer edits based on new guidelines Fixes applied throughout including examples drawn from these volumes for new guidelines/visual style guide. --- volumes/frus1958-60v02.xml | 652 ++++++++++---------- volumes/frus1964-68v03.xml | 1092 +++++++++++++++++---------------- volumes/frus1969-76v33.xml | 215 +++---- volumes/frus1969-76v35.xml | 280 +++++---- volumes/frus1969-76v37.xml | 380 +++++++----- volumes/frus1977-80v09Ed2.xml | 23 +- 6 files changed, 1402 insertions(+), 1240 deletions(-) diff --git a/volumes/frus1958-60v02.xml b/volumes/frus1958-60v02.xml index e01cbe330..ab49cd1cc 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1958-60v02.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1958-60v02.xml @@ -2168,8 +2168,8 @@ target="#t_UN1">UN premature before promulgation federation constitution. - Dulles + Dulles
GA at least until mid-June, following last year’s precedent.

- Dulles + Dulles
SYG be notified of this intention at earliest opportunity. - Dulles + Dulles
Lodge observed, obviously felt the Arab Union should have only one vote. (Department of State, Central Files, 310.386/5–1358)

- Lodge + Lodge
Lodge reported on his conversation with Hammarskjöld in telegram 1376, May 23. (ibid., 310.386/5–2358)

- Dulles + Dulles
AU does assume full constitutional responsibility for foreign affairs in due course.

- Dulles + Dulles
ibid., 330/6–1958)

- Lodge + Lodge
Malik would be excellent GA President rather than connected primarily with current developments in Lebanese situation.

- Dulles + Dulles
For text of the August 2 U.S. announcement recognizing the Republic of Iraq, see Department of State Bulletin, August 18, 1958, p. 273.

- Dulles + Dulles
- Dulles + Dulles
Ibid.)

- Wadsworth + Wadsworth
FYI.

- Dulles + Dulles

Should GOS approach you on this matter, you may make preliminary reply along foregoing lines.

- Dulles + Dulles
Malik candidacy has now been publicly endorsed by Lebanese President-elect. Report reaction soonest.

- Dulles + Dulles
Lodge. (ibid., 320/9–2458) - Lodge + Lodge
ibid., 320/10–258)

- Dulles + Dulles
ibid., 320/10–258)

- Dulles + Dulles
- Dulles + Dulles

Yours ever,

- SelwynPrinted from a - copy that bears this typed - signature. + SelwynPrinted from + a copy that bears this typed signature.
ibid., 310.2/11–2958)

- Dulles + Dulles
Mansfield and Hickenlooper to gain their support for the U.S. efforts. (Ibid.)

[Here follows paragraph 3 concerning an unrelated subject.]

- Dulles + Dulles

Sincerely yours,

- FosterTelegram 5478 - bears this typed signature. + FosterTelegram 5478 + bears this typed signature.

Sincerely yours,

- FosterTelegram 6999 - bears this typed signature. + FosterTelegram 6999 + bears this typed signature.
- Lodge + Lodge
UNEF payments.

- Dillon + Dillon
UK willing take initiative on question with India without indicating action taken at US request.

- Dulles + Dulles
- Selwyn - LloydPrinted from a - copy that bears this typed - signature. + Selwyn + LloydPrinted + from a copy that bears this typed + signature.

Sincerely yours,

- H.C. - Lodge + H.C. + Lodge

With warm regards,

- SelwynPrinted from a - copy that bears this typed signature. Telegram 9106 to - London, April 14, transmitted a letter from Herter thanking - Lloyd for - reconsidering the issue and noting that a separate vote and - the proposed British statement were acceptable to the United - States. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: - Lot 66 D 204) + SelwynPrinted from + a copy that bears this typed signature. Telegram 9106 to London, + April 14, transmitted a letter from Herter thanking Lloyd for reconsidering the + issue and noting that a separate vote and the proposed British + statement were acceptable to the United States. (Department of + State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D + 204)
Lodge agreed with this recommendation.(ibid., 320/6–859)

- Murphy + Murphy
ibid., 320/5–1259)

End FYI.

- Dillon + Dillon
C.D. Jackson, Arthur Goldsmith, etc. - Lodge + Lodge
Nosek without lot of blood on floor.

- Lodge + Lodge
U.N. Secretariat, would appear to be speaking for the Secretary-General. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/8–1459)

- Dillon + Dillon
ibid., 310.2/8–359.

- Dillon + Dillon
- Douglas - Dillon + Douglas + Dillon
ROK or US such move inappropriate at such time.

- Dillon + Dillon
- Barco + Barco
Ibid.)

- Dillon + Dillon
@@ -11581,8 +11580,8 @@ scheduled become independent during 1960) if VN then desires and in absence unforeseen developments making such move contrary our mutual interests.

- Dillon + Dillon
A/4354. For a record of the debate and vote on this issue, see U.N. docs. A/PV.800–803.

- Dillon + Dillon
GA Pres should help in defeating Czech initiative and is additional reason for getting Boland in race now.

- Lodge + Lodge

With kind personal regards.

Yours sincerely,

- Howard - GreenPrinted from a - copy that bears this typed - signature. + Howard + GreenPrinted + from a copy that bears this typed + signature.
SC seat.

- Henderson + Henderson
Ibid., 320/12–3059)

- Lodge + Lodge
@@ -13728,8 +13727,8 @@ specific actions he suggested in paragraphs 4 and 5. (Ibid.) - Barco + Barco
ibid., 320/1–2060)

- Merchant + Merchant
ibid.) - Merchant + Merchant
Ibid., 320/3–2360) - Lodge + Lodge

With all good wishes,

Sincerely,

- Livingston T. - MerchantPrinted from - a copy that bears this typed - signature. + Livingston T. + MerchantPrinted + from a copy that bears this typed + signature.
ROK application, only US spoke in GA deploring failure SC act favorably.

- Dillon + Dillon
Ibid., 303/8–2660)

- Dillon + Dillon
Hung but Kadar can go to the United States”.

- Ackerson + Ackerson
Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International Series, U.N.)

- Thompson + Thompson
ibid., 320/8–2460. End FYI.

- Dillon + Dillon
Castro should be equated to those on Kadar and Shehu rather than Khrushchev.

- Dillon + Dillon
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–1961, p. 702.

- Douglas - Dillon + Douglas + Dillon
NY before determining exact procedure those three approaches. End FYI.

- Dillon + Dillon
- Wadsworth + Wadsworth
Bomboko.

- Dillon + Dillon
- Dillon + Dillon
Menzies to come to New York for a short visit.

- Dillon + Dillon

- Dillon + Dillon
- Dillon + Dillon
SYG and UN.

We hope Mr. Macmillan will use his influence with French to encourage them to modify their position.

- Dillon + Dillon
GA in manner deemed most likely assure their implementation.

- Dillon + Dillon
The Government of the United States believes that the General Assembly should consider the serious situation resulting from these actions of the Soviet Union.”

- Dillon + Dillon
Dept’s reactions to this and other telegrams reporting this subject as soon as possible, because of need to combat it before it picks up momentum.

- Wadsworth + Wadsworth
Slim had received instructions to abstain. (ibid., 303/10–560)

- Dillon + Dillon

Above course of action approved by Secretary.

- Wadsworth + Wadsworth
- Dillon + Dillon
Sukarno’s visit.]

- Dillon + Dillon
- Wadsworth + Wadsworth
- Wadsworth + Wadsworth
- Wadsworth + Wadsworth
Ibid., p. 742)

- Douglas - DillonPrinted + Douglas + DillonPrinted from a copy that bears this stamped signature.
@@ -25096,8 +25095,8 @@ target="#t_UAR1">UAR, Mali, Indonesia, Soviets, probably Morocco and undoubtedly some others. Would appreciate Department’s urgent views this subject.

- Wadsworth + Wadsworth
Delegation faces vote possibly today or tomorrow on resolution concerning transmission of political information; therefore, request immediate reply this subject.

- Wadsworth + Wadsworth
UN document prior to Credentials Committee meeting.

- Dillon + Dillon
UN.

- Dillon + Dillon
- Dillon + Dillon
- Dillon + Dillon
- Wadsworth + Wadsworth
This is added reason for taking early step.

Urgently request Dept authorize us do so.

- Wadsworth + Wadsworth
Wadsworth did so.” (December 15, 1960, p. A1)

- Wadsworth + Wadsworth
- Dulles + Dulles
- Earl H. - LuboeanskyOffice of - Inter-AmericanRegional Political - Affairs - + Earl H. + LuboeanskyOffice of + Inter-AmericanRegional Political + Affairs +

For the U.S. Representative:

- George H. - OwenPrinted from a - copy that bears this typed signature.Alternate - Representative + George H. + OwenPrinted + from a copy that bears this typed signature.Alternate Representative

For the U.S. Representative:

- Wayne W. - FisherSecretary + Wayne W. + FisherSecretary

For the U.S. Representative:

- Wayne W. - FisherSecretary - + Wayne W. + FisherSecretary +
UK proposal. This request was adopted.

For the U.S. Representative:

- Wayne W. - FisherSecretary - + Wayne W. + FisherSecretary +

For the U.S. Representative:

- Wayne W. - FisherSecretary + Wayne W. + FisherSecretary

For the U.S. Representative:

- Wayne W. - FisherSecretary + Wayne W. + FisherSecretary

For the U.S. Representative:

- Wayne W. - FisherSecretary - + Wayne W. + FisherSecretary +

For the U.S. Representative:

- Wayne W. - FisherSecretary + Wayne W. + FisherSecretary

For the U.S. Representative:

- Wayne W. - FisherSecretary + Wayne W. + FisherSecretary

For the U.S. Representative:

- Wayne W. - FisherSecretary + Wayne W. + FisherSecretary

For the U.S. Representative:

- Wayne W. - FisherSecretary + Wayne W. + FisherSecretary
The matter was left to be taken up tomorrow; the Soviet delegate agreed to submit the Soviet position in the form of a proposal.

For the U.S. Representative:

- Wayne W. - FisherSecretary + Wayne W. + FisherSecretary
It was agreed that the Heads of Delegations would meet again tomorrow at 3:00 P.M.

For the U.S. Representative:

- Wayne W. - FisherSecretary + Wayne W. + FisherSecretary
Phleger authorizing the deletion of paragraph 3. (Ibid.)

- Herman - Phleger + Herman + Phleger
McElroy’s understanding.

Sincerely yours,

- Neil H. - McElroy + Neil H. + McElroy

- Dulles + Dulles

With warm regard,

Yours ever,

- HaroldTelegram 6362 bears this typed - signature. + HaroldTelegram 6362 bears this typed + signature.

As ever,

- HaroldTelegram 6481 bears this typed - signature. + HaroldTelegram 6481 bears this typed + signature.
Not further identified. Cable report discussion soonest.Copies of the replies are in Department of State, Central File 399.731.

- Dulles + Dulles

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

- Arleigh - Burke + Arleigh + Burke
U.K. Delegations at Geneva. (Telegram 5740 from London; Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3–3158)

- Dulles + Dulles
Pelly stated impossible to get the Congressmen together until after recess. He feels meeting would be helpful. We will act accordingly.

- Dulles + Dulles

Meanwhile, Canadian proposal needs strong support in order avert result with graver economic and security consequences.

- Dulles + Dulles
FYI We would prefer conference break up without agreement rather than adopting anything more drastic.

- Dulles + Dulles

Info addressees: Can raise the matter if it would prove useful purpose.

- Dulles + Dulles
Ibid., 399.731/4–1658)

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

- Arleigh - Burke + Arleigh + Burke

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

- N.F. - TwiningN.F. + TwiningPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.ChairmanJoint Chiefs of Staff @@ -41736,8 +41734,8 @@ rights as matter of international law even though they are to be limited and are to be phased out. - Whitney + Whitney
(15) Expressed desire to work closely with us at all stages. - Whitney + Whitney

With best wishes and warm personal regard,

Sincerely,

- Dwight D. - EisenhowerTelegram - 3014 bears this typed - signature. + Dwight D. + EisenhowerTelegram 3014 bears this typed + signature.

Sincerely yours,

- Elmer F. - Bennett + Elmer F. + Bennett
Dillon’s letter of March 14 is in Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3–1460.

Sincerely yours,

- Douglas - DillonPrinted from a - copy that bears this typed - signature. + Douglas + DillonPrinted + from a copy that bears this typed + signature.

Sincerely yours,

- Thomas S. - Gates + Thomas S. + Gates

Sincerely,

- Thomas M. - Pelly - Warren G. - Magnuson + Thomas M. + Pelly + Warren G. + Magnuson
I assure you that we continue to have the interests of the United States fishing industry fully in mind, both here and in Geneva.

Sincerely yours,

- Douglas - DillonPrinted from a - copy that bears this typed signature. The enclosed text of - the U.S.-Canadian proposal as amended by the proposal of - Brazil, Cuba, and Uruguay is not - printed. + Douglas + DillonPrinted + from a copy that bears this typed signature. The enclosed text + of the U.S.-Canadian proposal as amended by the proposal of + Brazil, Cuba, and Uruguay is not + printed.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

- Douglas - DillonPrinted from a - copy that bears this typed - signature. + Douglas + DillonPrinted + from a copy that bears this typed + signature.
Delga 419, November 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 320.11/11–1358)

- Lodge + Lodge

Instructions requested urgently so that we can talk with Russians and cosponsors tomorrow.

- Lodge + Lodge
Delga 493 from USUN, November 21; ibid.)

- Lodge + Lodge

- Lodge + Lodge
USSR failure participate might be interpreted as display intransigence and petulance and publicly demonstrate real lack interest furthering peaceful uses outer space.

- Dulles + Dulles
Lodge was informed that the United States planned no additional approaches to the Soviet Union. (Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/3–1959)

- Lodge + Lodge
The Department requests appropriate reporting concerning local activities in the outer space field and significant local reaction to United States and Soviet Union outer space efforts.

- Dillon + Dillon
- Lodge + Lodge
USUN, November 16; ibid., 320.5701/11–1659) - Lodge + Lodge
Gadel 146; Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/11–2459) - Lodge + Lodge
UK did not like Albania but would go along. - Lodge + Lodge
- Lodge + Lodge
- Lodge + Lodge
- Lodge + Lodge
1 sentence (31 words) not declassified] - Lodge + Lodge
American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 1396–1397.

- Lodge + Lodge
- William Z. SlanyThe HistorianBureau of Public - Affairs + William Z. SlanyWilliam + Z. SlanyThe HistorianBureau of Public Affairs

October 1995

 @@ -673,7 +673,7 @@ Notes on telephone conversations, 1963-1966 McGeorge - Bundy Papers + Bundy Papers Notes of meetings, 1963-1966 @@ -798,7 +798,7 @@ The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers. Austin, Texas, 1983.

Johnson, Walter, ed. The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson. Boston, 1972.

+ >Adlai E. Stevenson. Boston, 1972.

The Pentagon Papers: The Department of Defense History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, The Senator Gravel Edition. 4 vols. Boston, 1971.

@@ -2612,8 +2612,8 @@ progressive look in SVN Govt.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S)

- Johnson% + Johnson
NODIS-LOR, Vol. II (A)) + >LOR, Vol. II + (A)) Saigon, June 17, 1965. @@ -2946,8 +2947,8 @@ that the Viet Cong will take every action possible to undermine GVN prestige and to bolster the appearance of strength and legitimacy of the Liberation Front.

- Taylor + Taylor

The above suggestions are of the most preliminary kind. I am sure that other possibilities could be developed.

- George W. - Ball + George W. + Ball
Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the - President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XI. No classification marking. A - handwritten notation on the source text indicates that the President - saw the memorandum. + President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XI. No classification marking. A handwritten notation on + the source text indicates that the President saw the + memorandum. Washington, June 19, 1965. @@ -3322,7 +3324,7 @@ corresp="#p_LMR1">Melvin R. Laird, Republican Representative from Wisconsin. people just wouldn’t understand it.

- McG. B.McG. B.Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
@@ -3604,8 +3606,8 @@ implement selected program having real importance to people, and (4) extent to which government succeeds in handling opposition groupings.

- Taylor + Taylor
Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos - to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XI. No classification - marking. Attached is a note, dated June 21, which indicates that the - President instructed his secretary to put Senator Wayne Morse’s - memorandum on his desk the next day, because “I’ve got to read that - memorandum tomorrow.” + to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XI. No classification marking. Attached is a note, dated + June 21, which indicates that the President instructed his secretary + to put Senator Wayne Morse’s memorandum on his desk the next day, + because “I’ve got to read that memorandum tomorrow.” Washington, June 21, 1965, 10 a.m. @@ -3638,8 +3640,8 @@ Harlan Cleveland so that in anything we do we can take account of the possibility of flanking fire from Morse.

- McG. - B. + McG. + B. AttachmentNo classification @@ -4023,8 +4025,8 @@ pitfalls. We are sending a cable shortly on this subject which I hope will be called to your attention.Not further identified.

- Taylor + Taylor
14. Agenda Prepared by the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the - President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XI. Secret. Bundy sent this - annotated agenda to the President at 4:15 p.m., under cover of a - brief memorandum describing it. + President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XI. Secret. Bundy sent this annotated agenda to the + President at 4:15 p.m., under cover of a brief memorandum describing + it. Washington,

[Here follows brief discussion of the Dominican Republic.]

- Richard - HelmsPrinted + Richard + HelmsPrinted from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original.Deputy Director @@ -4505,8 +4508,8 @@ >Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos - to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XI. - Confidential. + to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XI. Confidential. Washington, June 24, 1965, 9:40 a.m. @@ -4577,7 +4580,7 @@ (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) - McG. B.McG. B.Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
@@ -4589,8 +4592,8 @@ >Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos - to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XI. No classification - marking. + to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XI. No classification marking. Washington, June 24, 1965, 1:05 p.m. @@ -4636,8 +4639,8 @@ Vietnam, through any of the agencies of the United Nations, the United States will be the first to work for UN action.

- McG. - B. + McG. + B.
Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos - to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XI. Secret. + to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XI. Secret. Washington, June 27, 1965. @@ -5096,8 +5100,8 @@ thing again. With a “neutralist” government it would be quite possible to move in this direction. - McG. - B. + McG. + B. Attachment @@ -5232,8 +5236,8 @@ it fails to discharge its role of leadership there is no other free world power capable of taking its place. - George W. - Ball + George W. + Ball
See vol. II, - Documents 173, 200, 228, 229, and 242. The Mission - Council in Saigon then assigned a scale of priorities to these projects. - This is a report on those actions as they relate to broader, overall - Mission programming in major areas of activity.

+ Documents 173, 200, 228, 229, and + 242. The Mission Council in + Saigon then assigned a scale of priorities to these projects. This is a + report on those actions as they relate to broader, overall Mission + programming in major areas of activity.

INTERNAL SECURITY

Population and Resources Control

@@ -5432,8 +5435,8 @@ GVN has yet to make use of this facility. Nor has the GVN responded to the critical need for an effective external information program.

- McGeorge - BundyPrinted from a + McGeorge + BundyPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
@@ -5703,9 +5706,9 @@ >Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos - to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XI. Confidential. The source - text is marked with an indication that the President saw it on June - 28. + to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XI. Confidential. The source text is marked with an + indication that the President saw it on June 28. Washington, June 28, 1965, 1:05 p.m. @@ -5823,8 +5826,8 @@ the ground forces can transform the Viet Cong from hunters into hunted, defeat them decisively, and establish complete control and security over the population.”

- McG. - B. + McG. + B.
carrier and thereafter bring him back to Saigon in time to meet with Mr. Black and his party.

- Taylor + Taylor
of the new Cabinet. If they are kept in place a few months, we think we can make progress with them.

- Taylor + Taylor
Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos - to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XI. - Confidential. + to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XI. Confidential. Washington, June 30, 1965. @@ -6643,8 +6646,8 @@ yet. At home we remain politically strong and, in general, politically united. Options, both military and political, remain to us that were no longer available to the French.

- McGeorge - BundyPrinted from a + McGeorge + BundyPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
@@ -6988,8 +6991,8 @@ thousand men to cover an eventual retreat? Can we not do that just as well where we are? - McG. - B. + McG. + B.
Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos - to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XI. Secret. + to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XI. Secret. Washington, June 30, 1965, 7:15 p.m. @@ -7048,8 +7052,8 @@ it, the more I think the time of Lodge’s takeover should be nearer 1 August than 1 September.

- McG. - B. + McG. + B.

Sincerely yours,

- Maxwell D. - TaylorPrinted + Maxwell D. + TaylorPrinted from a copy that indicates Taylor signed the original. @@ -7697,8 +7701,8 @@ target="#t_PAVN1">PAVN assault on the South. This is a less likely option in the circumstances we have posited, but still a contingency for which the US must be prepared.

- Robert S. - McNamara + Robert S. + McNamara
- George W. - Ball + George W. + Ball Attachment ATop Secret.

PROBABLE REACTIONS TO THE CUTTING OF OUR LOSSES IN @@ -8319,7 +8323,8 @@ >Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos - to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII. Secret. + to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XII. Secret. Washington, July 1, 1965, 5:50 p.m. @@ -8366,8 +8371,8 @@ meeting.Two options were typed below Bundy’s initials: “OK, Keep the meeting small” and “Speak to me.” The President checked the first.

- McG. - B. + McG. + B.
Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos - to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII. Top - Secret. + to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XII. Top Secret. Washington, July 1, 1965, 8:20 p.m. @@ -8451,8 +8456,8 @@

Friday’s meetingJuly 2; see Document 44. is not, repeat not, for decisions, but for sharpening of the issues that you want studied.

- McG. - B. + McG. + B.
- Richard - HelmsPrinted + Richard + HelmsPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
@@ -8706,8 +8711,8 @@

Your comments on foregoing plan for approach to NLF urgently requested.

- Rusk + Rusk

Your early comments requested on proposal for approach to DRV on lines set forth above.

- Rusk + Rusk
Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos - to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII. Secret; Exdis. There is an indication on the - source text that the President saw the memorandum. + to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XII. Secret; Exdis. + There is an indication on the source text that the President saw the + memorandum. Washington, July 3, 1965, 3:15 p.m. @@ -8876,8 +8882,8 @@ summary slightly optimistic, but it remains important and encouraging.

- McG. - B. + McG. + B.
Johnson, in TexasSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS-LOR, Vol. II(B). - Top Secret; Nodis; Eyes - Only. + >NODIS-LOR, Vol. II(B). Top Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only. Washington, July 4, 1965, 12:30 p.m. @@ -9047,8 +9053,8 @@

With regard to specifics within the two proposals, we have further comments which we would like to make if, in spite of the reasons set forth above, it is decided to pursue one or both of these proposals.

- Taylor + Taylor
Needless to say, we are looking forward to Bob McNamara’s visit and the opportunity to discuss directly with him the important problems which lie ahead.

- Taylor + Taylor
Johnson on July 4, is ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President, - McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII. He flatly denied having made any - such statement and reiterated that the Soviet Union did not think that - the Security Council was the proper forum to take up any such proposal. - We must anticipate, therefore, that the Soviet Union would not only - oppose such a Security Council resolution but would be cast in the - position of a harsh advocate of the Hanoi position. There is obvious - disadvantage in our forcing the Soviet Union into an even more extreme - position than they have taken, since we know there is still some - flexibility in the Soviet view of negotiation.

+ McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII. + He flatly denied having made any such statement and reiterated that the + Soviet Union did not think that the Security Council was the proper + forum to take up any such proposal. We must anticipate, therefore, that + the Soviet Union would not only oppose such a Security Council + resolution but would be cast in the position of a harsh advocate of the + Hanoi position. There is obvious disadvantage in our forcing the Soviet + Union into an even more extreme position than they have taken, since we + know there is still some flexibility in the Soviet view of + negotiation.

Today I discussed further UN action with Ambassador Stevenson.Rusk had a luncheon meeting with unless you believe that he should be provided a written reply to his informal memorandum (Tab A).Not printed.

- Dean - Rusk + Dean + Rusk
Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos - to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII. Top - Secret. + to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XII. Top Secret. Washington, July 7, 1965, 11 a.m. @@ -9331,8 +9338,8 @@ beginning of contacts among Vietnamese in the South that could be helpful. - McG. - B. + McG. + B.
Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS-LOR, Vol. II(A). Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by McNamara. Repeated to CINCPAC with instructions to pass - to General Westmoreland, who - was visiting CINCPAC - headquarters. The source text contains handwritten revisions by - McNamara; see footnotes 2–4 - below. + >LOR, Vol. II(A). Top + Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted + by McNamara. Repeated to + CINCPAC with instructions to + pass to General Westmoreland, who was visiting CINCPAC headquarters. The source + text contains handwritten revisions by McNamara; see footnotes + 2–4 below. Washington, July 7, 1965, 11:52 p.m. @@ -9892,8 +9899,8 @@ >VC dominated and provided each operation offers significant military gain.

- Taylor + Taylor
(U) At Tabs A through D are more detailed discussion of specific aspects.None printed. - Earle G. - WheelerChairman Joint + Earle G. + WheelerChairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
+ McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XII) Moscow, July 15, 1965. @@ -11147,8 +11155,8 @@ corresp="#p_HGC1">Hertz case cooking. CAS more optimistic of release (perhaps this week) than any time since February.

- Taylor + Taylor
Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos - to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII. No classification - marking. The President put a line through the entire memorandum, - crossed out the third point, and wrote at the bottom, “Rewrite - eliminating 3.” Bundy submitted the rewritten memorandum to - President Johnson on July 23 - under a covering memorandum stating: “This is a revised version of - an earlier paper, but it may clearly be out-of-date.” The revised - version was identical to the memorandum printed here except for the - omission of the third point. (Ibid.) + to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XII. No classification marking. The President put a line + through the entire memorandum, crossed out the third point, and + wrote at the bottom, “Rewrite eliminating 3.” Bundy submitted the + rewritten memorandum to President Johnson on July 23 under a covering memorandum + stating: “This is a revised version of an earlier paper, but it may + clearly be out-of-date.” The revised version was identical to the + memorandum printed here except for the omission of the third point. + (Ibid.) Washington, July 19, 1965, 8:15 p.m. @@ -11197,8 +11206,8 @@ full effort in Vietnam for the rest of the calendar year, at least. - McG. - B. + McG. + B.
Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos - to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII. No classification - marking. + to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XII. No classification marking. Washington, July 19, 1965, 8:25 p.m. @@ -11275,8 +11284,8 @@ revised in Bundy’s hand after his conversation with the President. The Marvin to whom he refers is Marvin Watson, a Special Assistant to the President.

- McG. - B. + McG. + B. Tab BTop Secret. The source text bears the date “7/19/65” in the top right corner. @@ -11415,8 +11424,8 @@

The main question of the public mind is, “What will the U.S. do next as a result of the McNamara visit?”

- Taylor + Taylor
McNamara to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National - Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII. Top - Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. A list of - comments on the memorandum, prepared by Vol. XII. Top Secret. The source + text bears no drafting information. A list of comments on the + memorandum, prepared by Lodge in Saigon on July 19, indicates that it was drafted by McNaughton on July 18. (Washington National Records Center, - Robert S. - McNamara + Robert S. + McNamara
This looks like an excellent military concept, but the other half of the equation is equally important—an intense program to win over the peasant population and the Viet Cong irregulars, themselves.

- Dick + Dick AttachmentTop Secret. The full report is 128 pages long. For information on the background of the @@ -12634,8 +12644,8 @@ >Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos - to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII. No classification - marking. + to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XII. No classification marking. Washington, July 21, 1965, 10:20 a.m. @@ -12673,9 +12683,10 @@ >Helms, Rowan, and Marks. (Johnson Library, National Security File, - Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII) with - the exception of Goodpaster - and Yarmolinsky. I removed them because Bob McNamara expressed very + Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII) with the + exception of Goodpaster and + Yarmolinsky. I removed them because Bob McNamara expressed very strong feeling that there would be resentment among the JCS if junior officers were brought over while they were not. This does no immediate damage. I @@ -12714,8 +12725,8 @@ your program, and Lodge himself wants a last few days of rest.

I will know more after the 10:30 meeting.

- McG.B. + McG. + B.

The meeting adjourned at 5:30.

- CLC + CLC
McNamara approach can succeed without such accompanying non-military planning.

- C + C
Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos - to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII. No classification - marking. + to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XII. No classification marking. Washington, July 21, 1965, 8 p.m. @@ -13717,8 +13728,8 @@ if he was trying to pull a fast one.

I have not told Bob that I am reporting his worry to you; don’t give me away.

- McG.B. + McG. + B.

- Horace - BusbyPrinted + Horace + BusbyPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
@@ -14271,11 +14282,12 @@ frus:doc-dateTime-max="1965-07-22T14:00:00-05:00"> 77. Meeting AgendaSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, - McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII. No classification marking. The source text - bears no drafting information, but the agenda was apparently drafted - by McGeorge Bundy between the noon and 3 p.m. meetings; see Documents 76 and 78. + McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII. No + classification marking. The source text bears no drafting + information, but the agenda was apparently drafted by McGeorge Bundy + between the noon and 3 p.m. meetings; see Documents 76 and 78. Washington, The great problem is our own eager beavers who do not consider the mood of our own people come the next election, and whose political teat is not in the wringer.

- J.K. - GalbraithPrinted + J.K. + GalbraithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature. The covering memorandum is signed “Ken.” @@ -14575,12 +14587,13 @@ President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Johnson Library, National - Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII. No - classification marking. McGeorge Bundy forwarded this memorandum to - President Johnson at 7:45 - p.m. on July 22, noting in his covering memorandum that it was the - “quick and dirty report” on calling up the reserves that he had - mentioned on the telephone. + Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII. No classification + marking. McGeorge Bundy forwarded this memorandum to President + Johnson at 7:45 p.m. on + July 22, noting in his covering memorandum that it was the “quick + and dirty report” on calling up the reserves that he had mentioned + on the telephone. Washington, July 22, 1965. @@ -14616,8 +14629,8 @@

Finally, in light of experience we should think about including limitations on the maximum number of Reservists to be called up and the duration of active service under a Congressional Joint Resolution.

- Harry + Harry
Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos - to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII. Secret. + to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XII. Secret. Washington, July 24, 1965, 8:20 p.m. @@ -15117,9 +15131,9 @@ the two Latin Americans. I believe that strong diplomacy would give us Jordan, the Ivory Coast, and Malaysia as well—all three of them owe us a lot in different ways.

- McG.B.Printed from a copy that bears these typed - initials. + McG. + B.Printed from a + copy that bears these typed initials. EnclosureSecret. Washington, @@ -15272,10 +15286,10 @@ major deployments. After all, we have not yet had even a company-level engagement with Viet Cong forces which choose to stand their ground and fight.

- McG.B.Printed from a copy that bears these typed - initials. + McG. + B.Printed + from a copy that bears these typed + initials.
Ky as a suggested public release.

- Taylor + Taylor
As I understand it, the President bought the State Department view. - GC + GC
+ President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XII) No record of such a meeting has been + found. Washington, July 26, @@ -15981,8 +15996,8 @@ toward a settlement, which we construe as consistent with GVN position as stated by Tran Van Do in June.

- Rusk + Rusk
- Rusk + Rusk
Throughout our discussion we strongly emphasized sensitivity of draft statement contained Deptel 237 and fact that it was still in draft stage.

- Taylor + Taylor
Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos - to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII. Top - Secret. + to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XII. Top Secret. Washington, July 27, 1965, 4:30 p.m. @@ -16578,8 +16593,8 @@ circles as well. Yet there is no weakness in them. And I repeat that Taylor has obtained Saigon’s approval for them.

- McG.B. + McG. + B.

- Bromley - Smith + Bromley + Smith
Details of replies received to date are given in the attached memorandum.Attached but not printed.

- William P. - BundyPrinted + William P. + BundyPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
@@ -17748,8 +17763,8 @@ security to Southeast Asia. All three letters are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 892-894.

- Goldberg + Goldberg

- Robert S. - McNamara + Robert S. + McNamara Tab A @@ -18348,8 +18363,8 @@ that you will want to recommend a tax cut next year. But it remains a possibility that shouldn’t be ruled out.

- Gardner - Ackley + Gardner + Ackley
Lodge) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National - Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XIII. No - classification marking. McGeorge Bundy sent this memorandum to the - President on August 3, under cover of a memorandum in which he - observed: “Lansdale appears - quite ready to take over MACV—and - yet he’s not all wrong. Can we afford some creative + Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XIII. No classification + marking. McGeorge Bundy sent this memorandum to the President on + August 3, under cover of a memorandum in which he observed: + “Lansdale appears quite + ready to take over MACV—and yet + he’s not all wrong. Can we afford some creative tension?” Washington, August 3, @@ -18618,7 +18634,7 @@ Viet-Nam, and not base our action on “minimum needs” or a weak strike program against the North, but to “swamp them.” - G.G.Lt. General, U.S.A.
@@ -18924,8 +18940,8 @@ ibid.) See also Document 117. - GC + GC
Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos - to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XIII. - Confidential. + to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XIII. Confidential. Washington, August 4, 1965, 9:30 a.m. @@ -18992,8 +19008,8 @@ been our best defender in the UK, but there is a fishy smell to this one. - McG.B. + McG. + B.
VC. We should now identify the best sites and channels for such direct conversations (this problem will be the subject of a subsequent memorandum).

- C + C
Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos - to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XIII. Secret. + to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XIII. Secret. Washington, August 5, 1965, 2:45 p.m. @@ -19284,8 +19301,8 @@

I am afraid this memorandum is not as evenly balanced as I would like, but that defect at least shows you where I myself come out.

- McG.B. + McG. + B.
- Chester L. - CooperPrinted + Chester L. + CooperPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
@@ -19482,16 +19499,17 @@ danger—not because they are Communists but because they are nationalists and imperialists. On Vietnam, he offered no proposals as to how to end the war.

- Bromley - Smith + Bromley + Smith
111. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos - to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XIII. Confidential. Drafted - by McGeorge Bundy on August 11. + to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XIII. Confidential. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy on August + 11. Washington, Vol. + XIII) Johnson replied on August 13 in a letter in + which he encouraged Nkrumah again to undertake his mission to Hanoi. He stated, however, that he felt a meeting in Washington was unnecessary until it developed that a firm basis for negotiations had been established. (Ibid.) - McG.B.Printed - from a copy that bears these typed - initials. + McG. + B.Printed from a + copy that bears these typed initials.
Eisenhower Briefing) - H.C. - Lodge + H.C. + Lodge
POL 27 VIET S)

- Goldberg + Goldberg
- Johnson + Johnson
UN and public opinion generally of Article I of the Charter.

- Lodge + Lodge
Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos - to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XIII. No classification - marking. + to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XIII. No classification marking. Washington, August 24, 1965, 8 p.m. @@ -21589,8 +21607,8 @@ detailed and comprehensive set of criticisms which could be made if one wanted to make them. - McG.B. + McG. + B.
- Lodge + Lodge
+ National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XIII) Washington, August 27, 1965, 1:41 p.m. @@ -22248,8 +22266,8 @@ whether the Chinese, North Vietnamese, or Viet Cong had accepted the copies of the proposal, which he had sent to them through a “second channel.” (Ibid.)

- Rusk + Rusk
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:Earle G. WheelerChairman Joint Chiefs of Staff + corresp="#p_WGEG1">Earle G. + WheelerChairman + Joint Chiefs of Staff Appendix

OVER-ALL US CONCEPT FOR VIETNAM (U)

@@ -22810,8 +22829,8 @@ Viet-Nam—which are not worth much when signed.

With warm and respectful regards,

Faithfully yours,

- Cabot - L. + Cabot + L.
I further recommend that no announcement be made at this time of the decision to deploy additional forces, but that announcements be made only as forces arrive in the theater.

- Robert S. - McNamara + Robert S. + McNamara
Thi continues to support status quo. - Lodge + Lodge
- Maxwell D. - Taylor + Maxwell D. + Taylor

Copies of the referenced JCSM have been provided to Bill Bundy and to McGeorge Bundy.

- John T. - McNaughton + John T. + McNaughton
GVN is focusing on better diplomatic representation abroad; agrement has been requested for a new and effective Ambassador to Washington.

- C + C

[Here follows discussion of South Asia and Europe.]

- McG. - B. + McG. + B.
[Here follow an extensive discussion of South Asia and a short report by Ball on a trip to Europe.]

- JA - Califano, Jr.Special - Assistant to the President + JA Califano, + Jr.Special Assistant + to the President
- Rusk + Rusk

- Robert S. - McNamaraPrinted + Robert S. + McNamaraPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
@@ -24461,8 +24480,8 @@ preparation as do our military campaigns. - Lodge + Lodge
Hope you will keep Honolulu date open for a while, as it may be that late October would be bad from the standpoint of the work here and that mid-November would be better.

- Lodge + Lodge
Wheeler plans to be there at Christmastime. - Creighton W. - AbramsGeneral, United - States ArmyActing Chief of Staff + + + Creighton W. Abrams + + General, United States ArmyActing Chief of + Staff + +
- Lodge + Lodge
McNamara to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National - Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XV. - Secret. + Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XV. Secret. Washington, September 22, 1965. @@ -25000,8 +25024,8 @@

If you approve, the Department of State will send a message to all posts informing them of the decision and providing public affairs guidance.

- Robert S. - McNamara + Robert S. + McNamara
- Robert S. - McNamara + Robert S. + McNamara
Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos - to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XV. Secret. + to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XV. Secret. Washington, September 23, 1965, 3 p.m. @@ -25624,8 +25649,8 @@ n="3" xml:id="d150fn3">Next to the “Yes” recommendation on this memorandum is a handwritten note that reads: “Returned per our conversation.”

- McG.B. + McG. + B.
Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos - to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XV. Top Secret. There is an - indication on the source text that the President saw the - memorandum. + to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XV. Top Secret. There is an indication on the source text + that the President saw the memorandum. Washington, September 23, 1965. @@ -25748,8 +25773,8 @@ down. We also agree on the necessity to keep a watchful eye on any potential coups and to encourage Ky to generate more positive popular support.

- McG.B. + McG. + B.
- CLC + CLC
BKS.” See Document 155.

- BKS + BKS
The meeting was held from 12:29 to 1:20 p.m. in the Cabinet Room of the White House. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary) An agenda for the meeting is ibid., Memos to the - President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XV. + President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XV.

Level of Forces in Vietnam

McNamara reviewed his memorandum @@ -26029,8 +26055,9 @@ reading the statement and might consider releasing it in conjunction with publicity for Dr. Howard Rusk’s mission to Vietnam. (Johnson Library, National - Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XV) The - statement was not issued.

+ Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XV) The statement was not + issued.

[Here follows discussion of the Dominican Republic, foreign visitors to Washington, India-Pakistan, foreign aid, and Cuba.]

@@ -26074,8 +26101,8 @@ corresp="#p_MNRS1">McNamara, Ball, Bundy, et al. on the reasons for Hanoi’s hardening attitude.

- Joseph A. - Califano, Jr. + Joseph A. + Califano, Jr.
+ the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XV) Saigon, September 30, 1965. @@ -26298,8 +26326,8 @@ manage to get credit for many others and to involve all the leading men in Vietnam personally in the plan’s success. - Lodge + Lodge
Ky has seen fit to engage in this fruitful exchange of views and to seek our advice before his ideas jelled any further.

- Lodge + Lodge
Rusk to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos - to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XV. Top Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only. Also sent to Acting - Secretary Ball. There is an - indication on the source text that the President saw this - memorandum. Rusk and Gromyko - were at the United Nations for the 20th session of the General - Assembly. + to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XV. Top Secret; Nodis; + Eyes Only. Also sent to Acting Secretary Ball. There is an indication on the source text that + the President saw this memorandum. Rusk and Gromyko were at the United Nations + for the 20th session of the General Assembly. New York, September 30, 1965. @@ -26618,8 +26646,8 @@ that could impair our freedom of action or the President’s freedom of choice on future actions.

Sincerely,

- William P. - BundyPrinted + William P. + BundyPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
@@ -27071,8 +27099,8 @@ will have to pay for; or in general, of giving up something and really getting nothing back. - Lodge + Lodge

—Coordination, especially in Saigon, of U.S. voluntary efforts must be strengthened.

- C + C
- Lodge + Lodge
A. Vietnamese popular attitudes during the week reflected continuing feeling that the war was going badly for the Viet Cong and increasing concern over economic matters.

- Lodge + Lodge
DRV’s obligation under Geneva Convention. - Rusk + Rusk
- Lodge + Lodge

The high cost of living continued to dominate much Vietnamese thinking throughout the country.

- Lodge + Lodge
by political intrigue what they have not been able to obtain in other ways.

- Lodge + Lodge
VC. - Lodge + Lodge
GVN that will permit the U.S. and the GVN to proceed in tandem.

- C + C

Sincerely yours,

- Arthur J. - GoldbergPrinted + Arthur J. + GoldbergPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
@@ -28948,8 +28976,8 @@ our reaction to the next move—if it comes—will be on the same level of excellence. - Porter + Porter

Department repeat as desired.

- Bohlen + Bohlen
GVN. But I am convinced that each of these are being tackled aggressively.

We will keep you informed periodically.

- McGeorge - BundyPrinted from a + McGeorge + BundyPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
- McG. - B. + McG. + B.
- Lodge + Lodge
+ the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XVI) Saigon, November 3, 1965. @@ -31022,8 +31051,8 @@

I also used the opportunity to have a long private talk with the Corps Commander (one of four political satraps in this country) about the importance of national unity and of everyone pulling together.

- Lodge + Lodge
Lodge) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National - Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XVI. - Secret. McGeorge Bundy sent this letter to the President under cover - of a November 8 memorandum that reads as follows: “Here is a - letter which has just come in from Cabot Lodge for you. I have - taken the liberty of giving copies to Rusk and McNamara only, because - Lodge’s views are - deeply relevant to the discussions now going forward. I have not - sent a copy to Arthur - Goldberg because I am afraid it would only stir - him to a very strong reaction. On the other hand, it may be - useful for Arthur to know Saigon’s thinking. Which do you - prefer?” The memorandum, which has an indication that - Johnson saw it, did not show the President’s preference. (Ibid., - Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLII, Memos (B)) + Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XVI. Secret. McGeorge Bundy + sent this letter to the President under cover of a November 8 + memorandum that reads as follows: “Here is a letter which has + just come in from Cabot Lodge for you. I have taken the liberty + of giving copies to Rusk and McNamara only, because Lodge’s views are deeply + relevant to the discussions now going forward. I have not sent a + copy to Arthur Goldberg + because I am afraid it would only stir him to a very strong + reaction. On the other hand, it may be useful for Arthur to know + Saigon’s thinking. Which do you prefer?” The memorandum, + which has an indication that Johnson saw it, did not show the + President’s preference. (Ibid., Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLII, + Memos (B)) Saigon, November 3, 1965. @@ -31225,8 +31255,8 @@

With warm and respectful regards,

Faithfully yours,

- Cabot - L. + Cabot + L.
- Robert S. - McNamaraPrinted + Robert S. + McNamaraPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
@@ -32139,9 +32169,10 @@ >Bundy) to President Johnson, in TexasSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos - to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XV. Top Secret; Eyes - Only;Nodis. The President was - at the LBJ Ranch. + to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XV. Top Secret; Eyes Only;Nodis. The President was at the LBJ Ranch. Washington, November 7, 1965, 2:33 p.m. @@ -32385,8 +32416,8 @@ the Viet Cong would take note of my experience at the United Nations and my interminable negotiations with Communists and might think that my presence here might give a way out.

- Lodge + Lodge
- John T. - McNaughtonJohn T. + McNaughtonPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
@@ -33680,8 +33711,8 @@

I’m sending a copy of this letter to Tom Hughes in INR.

Sincerely,

- Edward E. - RicePrinted from a + Edward E. + RicePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

- Dean RuskPrinted from a copy that bears this typed - signature. + Dean RuskPrinted from a copy that bears this typed + signature.
- Lodge + Lodge

- Rusk + Rusk
+ McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XVI) Saigon, November 17, 1965. @@ -34235,8 +34267,8 @@ that Minister Thang is not impulsive and is a careful, thorough, though energetic, man. And I conclude that maybe we can’t go much faster at this stage.

- Lodge + Lodge
- McG.B.Printed - from a copy that bears these typed - initials. + McG. + B.Printed from a + copy that bears these typed initials.
- Rusk + Rusk
- C + C

The Bombing Pause and the Diplomatic Peace Initiative. November 17-December 31

- IO—Joseph J. - SiscoPrinted - from a copy that bears this typed - signature. + IO—Joseph J. SiscoPrinted from a copy that bears this typed + signature.
@@ -34946,8 +34977,8 @@ >McNamara on this?The source text does not indicate the President’s decision on this question.

- McG. - B. + McG. + B. Tab ATop Secret. As Bundy noted in the covering memorandum, this attachment comprises sections III @@ -34957,7 +34988,8 @@ II was “Possible Date-Time Scenario of a Second Pause.” Section III, printed here, was entitled “Pros and Cons of a Second Pause.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the - President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XVII) + President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XVII)

III.

PROS AND CONS

Pros

@@ -35111,8 +35143,8 @@ undertaken. This is also entirely consistent with our public position and maintains what he feels is our present favorable international posture.

- George W. - BallActing + George W. + BallActing Secretary @@ -35591,8 +35623,8 @@ objectives lies in a pause followed, if it fails, by the deployments mentioned above. - Robert S. - McNamara + Robert S. + McNamara
Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos - to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XVII. Top Secret; Sensitive; - Eyes Only. There is an indication on the source text that this - memorandum was received at the LBJ - Ranch in Texas at 11 a.m. on December 4, and that the President saw - it. + to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XVII. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. There is an + indication on the source text that this memorandum was received at + the LBJ Ranch in Texas at 11 a.m. on + December 4, and that the President saw it. Washington, December 4, 1965. @@ -35986,8 +36018,8 @@ central elements of what will be the most urgent question before us when we meet with you. - McG. - B. + McG. + B.

Respectfully submitted,

- Arthur J. - GoldbergPrinted + Arthur J. + GoldbergPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
@@ -36168,8 +36200,8 @@ Delegate are constantly watched, but I think I can find a place which is not watched and where I can meet this man. - Lodge + Lodge

With warm regards.

- Rusk + Rusk
- Lodge + Lodge
Dobrynin said to me!See Document 223.

- McG. - B + McG. + B Attachment Washington, @@ -37573,10 +37605,11 @@ >Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos - to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XVII. Confidential. Received - at the LBJ Ranch at noon on December - 10. There is an indication on the source text that the President saw - the memorandum + to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XVII. Confidential. Received at the LBJ Ranch at noon on December 10. There + is an indication on the source text that the President saw the + memorandum Washington, December 9, 1965. @@ -37626,8 +37659,8 @@ a pause beforehand. I find that Komer strongly shares this view, and that Califano seems to be shifting toward it. - McG. - B. + McG. + B. Attachment Washington, @@ -37919,8 +37952,8 @@ required. - Robert S. - McNamaraRobert S. + McNamaraPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature. @@ -38115,9 +38148,9 @@ >Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos - to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XVII. Top Secret; Sensitive. - There is an indication on the source text that the President saw the - memorandum. + to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XVII. Top Secret; Sensitive. There is an indication on the + source text that the President saw the memorandum. Washington, December 14, 1965, 7:45 p.m. @@ -38207,8 +38240,8 @@ corresp="#p_WGWC1">Westmoreland and Eisenhower and if they are with us, I do not fear those who are against us.

- McG. - B. + McG. + B.

P. S. George Ball made an interesting argument this afternoon to the effect that it would be a @@ -38368,8 +38401,8 @@ vein of this commentary was generally one of loathing and hatred for the Viet Cong for having perpetrated this attack which produced so many civilian casualties.

- Lodge + Lodge
- Lodge + Lodge
Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos - to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XVII. No classification - marking. There is an indication on the source text that the - President saw the memorandum. + to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XVII. No classification marking. There is an indication on + the source text that the President saw the memorandum. Washington, December 19, 1965, 5 p.m. @@ -39721,8 +39754,8 @@ and punch in it, and I will have another look at that problem this evening. But I send you these papers now because I know how hard and steadily you are thinking about this whole business.

- McG. - B. + McG. + B. Tab A Washington, @@ -39812,8 +39845,8 @@ and Hanoi’s continuing hope that they can somehow succeed on the battlefield. - Dean - Rusk + Dean + Rusk
- Averell + Averell
It is wholly possible that they will not be willing to make direct contact with us; but, especially if we plan to increase the heat on Hanoi-Haiphong, it is appropriate to try.

- Walt + Walt
Chou En-Lai’s speech.” - Tubby + Tubby
Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos - to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XVII. No classification - marking. There is an indication on the source text that the - President saw the memorandum. + to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XVII. No classification marking. There is an indication on + the source text that the President saw the memorandum. Washington, December 27, 1965, 5:30 p.m. @@ -41821,10 +41854,11 @@ post until February 28, 1966. (Memorandum from Bundy to Johnson, Deceamber 4, with attached letter of resignation; Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, - McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XVII) I can easily cancel this visit - if you wish, and of course, I can be reached on the telephone - through the White House Board at all times. Bob Komer will cover - here and is fully briefed. + McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XVII) I can easily cancel this visit if you wish, + and of course, I can be reached on the telephone through the White + House Board at all times. Bob Komer will cover here and is fully + briefed.

With warm regards for a New Year which will bring its share of glory,

Respectfully,

- Maxwell D. - Taylor + Maxwell D. + Taylor
Bundy) to President Johnson, in TexasSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos - to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XVII. Secret. + to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. + XVII. Secret. Washington, December 27, 1965. @@ -42121,8 +42156,8 @@

The President expressed his determination not to be caught and to resume bombing within a few days as soon as he had given our opponents a reasonable chance to respond to the extension of the cease-fire.

- MDT + MDT
- Rusk + Rusk
POL 27-14 VIET/XYZ)

End text.

- Rusk + Rusk

Regards to you both,

- Taylor + Taylor
- W.A.H. + W.A.H.
F. I am also interested in your paragraph 6 about differences existing between the Viet Cong and Hanoi. As my conversations with Palmas have shown, we suspect this also.

- Lodge + Lodge
DRV.

- Byroade + Byroade
- Gronouski + Gronouski
The memorandum of this conversation was transmitted in telegram 1069 from Warsaw, December 30. (Ibid.)

- Gronouski + Gronouski
- Rusk + Rusk

Warm regards.

- Rusk + Rusk
- SK + SK
- Reinhardt + Reinhardt
- Martin + Martin
- Gronouski + Gronouski
GVN as sole legitimate government of SVN.

- Rusk + Rusk
- Lodge + Lodge
- Elbrick + Elbrick
- McBride + McBride
diff --git a/volumes/frus1969-76v33.xml b/volumes/frus1969-76v33.xml index 387885830..31c18283a 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1969-76v33.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1969-76v33.xml @@ -2977,8 +2977,8 @@ weights, we will be in a superior negotiating posture if we have made these objectives clear and firm.

- Melvin R. - Laird + Melvin R. Laird
- Henry A. - Kissinger + Henry A. Kissinger
@@ -3358,8 +3358,8 @@ target="#t_SALT_1">SALT talks 1969–1972.

Respectfully,

- Gerard - Smith + Gerard Smith
I am prepared to recommend candidates for these positions and initiate staff support.

- Melvin R. - Laird + Melvin R. Laird
@@ -4555,8 +4555,8 @@

The President wishes to emphasize the continued importance of avoiding leaks on SALT.

- Henry A. - Kissinger + Henry A. Kissinger @@ -5339,8 +5339,8 @@ base by permitting full freedom to modernize US strategic forces.

- T.H. - Moorer + T.H. Moorer
The President has asked me to emphasize once again the importance of avoiding leaks on this subject.

- Henry A. - Kissinger + Henry A. Kissinger
- Henry A. - KissingerScowcroft signed for Kissinger above this typed - signature. + Henry A. KissingerScowcroft signed for + Kissinger above this + typed signature.
@@ -7671,8 +7671,8 @@ full exposition but refrain from expressing any U.S. views until receipt of instructions.

- Henry A. - Kissinger + Henry A. Kissinger
.

Sincerely yours,

- Henry M. - Jackson + Henry M. Jackson
@@ -12630,8 +12630,8 @@ the development of a common approach to these major concepts and that it prefers to set aside for the present discussion of other issues.

- Henry A. - Kissinger + Henry A. Kissinger @@ -12711,8 +12711,8 @@

With continued good wishes,

Sincerely,

- Richard - Nixon + Richard Nixon
- Henry A. - KissingerScowcroft signed for Kissinger above this typed - signature. + Henry A. KissingerScowcroft signed for + Kissinger above this + typed signature.
@@ -23077,8 +23077,8 @@ facs="0438" xml:id="pg_409"/> Washington approval draft treaty provisions which could be proposed to the Soviets.

- Henry A. - Kissinger + Henry A. Kissinger
JDT the Delegation should explore alternative formulae.

- Henry A. - Kissinger + Henry A. Kissinger
- Henry A. - Kissinger + Henry A. Kissinger
ICBM currently possessing the largest throw weight.

- Brent - Scowcroft + Brent Scowcroft

- Brent - Scowcroft + Brent Scowcroft
@@ -34942,7 +34942,8 @@ our part to satisfy Soviet concerns. We cannot make progress in SALT now unless the Soviets move.

- John Lehman + John Lehman @@ -35596,8 +35597,8 @@ U.S. could propose at this stage of the negotiations, including alternatives for long-range approaches, will be identified and analyzed.

- Zbigniew - Brzezinski + Zbigniew Brzezinski @@ -36163,8 +36164,8 @@ Union.

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to SALT II.]

- L. - Brezhnev + L. + Brezhnev @@ -36407,8 +36408,8 @@ constructive development of the relations between our countries.

Sincerely,

- L. - Brezhnev + L. + Brezhnev
km.

- Zbigniew - Brzezinski + Zbigniew Brzezinski
SALT: Chronology: 3/25/77–5/9/77)

- Cyrus R. - Vance + Cyrus R. Vance Paul C. @@ -40358,8 +40359,8 @@ Gromyko in Vienna in September.

- Jimmy - Carter + Jimmy Carter
@@ -41245,8 +41246,8 @@ modifications during the ABM Treaty review.

- Zbigniew - Brzezinski + Zbigniew Brzezinski @@ -41331,8 +41332,8 @@ >NSC–20 of September 9, 1977.Document 179.

- Jimmy - Carter + Jimmy Carter

11. Your instructions on all other outstanding issues remain in force.

- Zbigniew - Brzezinski + Zbigniew Brzezinski
- Zbigniew - Brzezinski + Zbigniew Brzezinski
@@ -43649,8 +43650,8 @@ would call into question both the acceptability of an agreement on the merits and the likelihood of its being ratified.

- Harold - Brown + Harold Brown @@ -43726,8 +43727,8 @@ single-RV ICBM exemption.

- Zbigniew - Brzezinski + Zbigniew Brzezinski
[Omitted here is information unrelated to SALT II.]

Sincerely,

- Jimmy - Carter + Jimmy Carter
@@ -44533,8 +44534,8 @@ period of the agreement to 1985 (Trident I as well as SS–NX–18 would be considered existing SLBMs).

- Zbigniew - Brzezinski + Zbigniew Brzezinski @@ -44697,8 +44698,8 @@ relationship and we shall develop our response by Friday morning our time. Brzezinski.”

- Vance + Vance
Gromyko proposed that we meet in private. That meeting is reported separately.

- Vance + Vance
Carter approved the instructions. (Ibid.)

- Zbigniew - Brzezinski + Zbigniew Brzezinski
2. US positions on other unresolved issues should be maintained in accord with earlier instructions.

- Zbigniew - Brzezinski + Zbigniew Brzezinski
- Harold - Brown + Harold Brown
@@ -47059,10 +47060,10 @@ Ambassador Warnke’s trip to Moscow.

- Zbigniew - BrzezinskiPrinted from a - copy that bears Brzezinski’s - typed signature. + Zbigniew BrzezinskiPrinted from a copy that bears Brzezinski’s typed signature.
ICBM new types definition—the Soviet-proposed definition; ICCMs—no limits.

- Zbigniew - Brzezinski + Zbigniew Brzezinski

—The emphasis on conventional cruise missiles.

- Harold - Brown + Harold Brown
- Vance + Vance
- Vance + Vance
@@ -49116,8 +49117,8 @@ issues or procedural arrangements.

Sincerely,

- Jimmy - Carter + Jimmy Carter
- Zbigniew - Brzezinski + Zbigniew Brzezinski
B–1 bomber was raised, current instructions stood. (Ibid.)

- Vance + Vance
7. Gromyko agreed to 10 RVs being permitted on ASBMs.

- Vance + Vance
- Vance + Vance
@@ -50418,8 +50419,8 @@ agreement and have our long delayed meeting.

Sincerely,

- Jimmy - Carter + Jimmy Carter
Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pp. 21–24.

Sincerely,

- Jimmy - Carter + Jimmy Carter
diff --git a/volumes/frus1969-76v35.xml b/volumes/frus1969-76v35.xml index c02c7757a..e1f2e35f6 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1969-76v35.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1969-76v35.xml @@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases - underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and + underlined in the source text are printed in italic. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as Secto) is printed at the @@ -411,13 +411,12 @@ Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D. - - Historian - + + Historian + - - Bureau of Public Affairs - + + Bureau of Public Affairs March 2014 @@ -4331,8 +4330,11 @@

[Omitted here is Section IV, dealing with manpower issues.]

- Gardiner L. Tucker - Assistant Secretary of Defense + Gardiner L. + Tucker + + Assistant Secretary of + Defense @@ -4448,7 +4450,8 @@ relations.

- Henry A. Kissinger + Henry A. + Kissinger @@ -4517,7 +4520,8 @@ Council.

- Henry A. Kissinger + Henry A. + Kissinger @@ -4602,7 +4606,8 @@ chaired by a representative of the Department of Defense.

- Henry A. Kissinger + Henry A. + Kissinger @@ -5501,7 +5506,8 @@ contingency operation will also be considered at that time.

- Henry A. Kissinger + Henry A. + Kissinger @@ -5588,7 +5594,8 @@ 1969–1972. is hereby rescinded.

- Henry A. Kissinger + Henry A. + Kissinger @@ -8912,7 +8919,8 @@

- Henry A. Kissinger + Henry A. + Kissinger @@ -11571,7 +11579,8 @@ the Verification Panel by March 31, 1974.

- Richard Nixon + Richard + Nixon @@ -11652,7 +11661,8 @@

- Richard Nixon + Richard + Nixon @@ -11736,7 +11746,8 @@ Group by March 29, 1974.

- Henry A. Kissinger + Henry A. + Kissinger @@ -11824,7 +11835,8 @@ President.

- Henry A. Kissinger + Henry A. + Kissinger @@ -12389,7 +12401,8 @@ >Kissinger and the President.

- D. R. Cotter + D. R. + Cotter Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) @@ -14564,8 +14577,9 @@ comparisons in choosing among options and measures.

- Joseph J. Sisco - Acting Secretary + Joseph J. + Sisco + Acting Secretary @@ -16280,10 +16294,11 @@ in light of unanticipated inflation or cost growth.

- James R. SchlesingerPrinted from a copy with a confirmation - that Schlesinger signed - the original. + James R. + SchlesingerPrinted from a copy with a confirmation that Schlesinger signed the + original. @@ -17877,7 +17892,8 @@ prior to consideration by the President.

- Henry A. Kissinger + Henry A. + Kissinger @@ -18151,7 +18167,8 @@ consideration by the President.

- Henry A. Kissinger + Henry A. + Kissinger @@ -18217,7 +18234,7 @@ Increase - January 1975—President’s Budget: + January 1975—President’s Budget : 105 117 12 @@ -18226,15 +18243,15 @@ October 1975: - Defense Budget Submission: + Defense Budget Submission : 98 122 24 - OMB Proposed - Alternative: + OMB Proposed Alternative + : 98 110 12 @@ -19885,7 +19902,8 @@ transmittal to the President.

- Brent Scowcroft + Brent + Scowcroft @@ -22086,7 +22104,8 @@ Request.

- Donald H. Rumsfeld + Donald H. + Rumsfeld @@ -24280,7 +24299,8 @@ soon as possible, but no later than June 1, 1976.

- Brent Scowcroft + Brent + Scowcroft @@ -25666,7 +25686,8 @@ should be submitted to the President no later than November 30, 1976.

- Brent Scowcroft + Brent Scowcroft @@ -27019,7 +27040,8 @@ Group prior to consideration by the President.

- Brent Scowcroft + Brent + Scowcroft @@ -27861,8 +27883,8 @@ significantly the implementation of U.S. Strategic Stockpile Policy.

- Brent Scowcroft + Brent + Scowcroft Hyland signed for Scowcroft. @@ -28017,7 +28039,8 @@ 1976.

- Gerald R. Ford + Gerald R. + Ford @@ -29554,8 +29577,10 @@ target="#t_B1_1">B–1 White Paper.

- C. Arthur Borg - Executive Secretary + C. Arthur + Borg + Executive + Secretary @@ -30749,7 +30774,8 @@ advisers.

- Donald Rumsfeld + Donald + Rumsfeld @@ -37058,7 +37084,8 @@ target="#t_FY_1">FY 1978 budget.

- Donald Rumsfeld + Donald + Rumsfeld @@ -37238,7 +37265,8 @@ proposed where necessary.

- Brent Scowcroft + Brent + Scowcroft @@ -37488,7 +37516,8 @@ management arrangements, and recodification of Executive Orders.

- Donald Rumsfeld + Donald + Rumsfeld @@ -39676,7 +39705,8 @@ not delay the acquisition actions called for in this memorandum.

- Brent Scowcroft + Brent + Scowcroft @@ -39840,7 +39870,8 @@ enhancing overall stability and advancing world peace.

- Gerald R. Ford + Gerald R. + Ford @@ -39908,7 +39939,8 @@

- Henry A. Kissinger + Henry A. + Kissinger @@ -40320,7 +40352,8 @@ Net Assessment Standing Committee.

- Henry A. Kissinger + Henry A. + Kissinger @@ -41324,9 +41357,10 @@

Respectfully yours,

- George W. Anderson, Jr. - Admiral, USN (Ret.) - Chairman + George W. Anderson, + Jr. + Admiral, USN (Ret.) Chairman @@ -42043,7 +42077,8 @@ U.S. and Soviet design philosophies for armored vehicles.

- Andrew W. Marshall + Andrew W. + Marshall @@ -42447,7 +42482,8 @@

- James R. Schlesinger + James R. + Schlesinger @@ -43799,9 +43835,10 @@

Respectfully,

- George W. Anderson, Jr. - Admiral, USN (Ret.) - Chairman + George W. Anderson, + Jr. + Admiral, USN (Ret.) Chairman @@ -43841,8 +43878,8 @@ recommendations and the proposed trial run.

- Henry A. Kissinger + Henry A. + Kissinger Scowcroft signed for Kissinger. @@ -44078,8 +44115,8 @@ >See Document 155. regarding NIE 11–3/8–74.

- [name not declassified] - Executive Secretary + [name not declassified] Executive Secretary @@ -44732,7 +44769,8 @@ intelligence product.

- W. E. Colby + W. E. + Colby @@ -44802,7 +44840,8 @@

Sincerely,

- W. E. Colby + W. E. + Colby @@ -45155,20 +45194,17 @@ recommendations to the President for changing the process for preparation of NIEs on Soviet strategic forces. Board members attending were:

- - Adm. George W. Anderson, - Chairman - Mr. Leo Cherne - Dr. Edward Teller - Mrs. Clare Boothe - Luce - Dr. John S. Foster, - Jr. - Mr. Gordon Gray - Mr. Robert W. - Galvin - Dr. William D. Baker - +

:u200 Adm. George W. Anderson, + Chairman :u2020 Mr. Leo Cherne +

+

:u200 Dr. Edward Teller :u2020 + Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce +

+

:u200 Dr. John S. Foster, Jr. + :u2020 Mr. Gordon Gray +

+

:u200 Mr. Robert W. Galvin :u2020 + Dr. William D. Baker

Also attending were Wheaton Byers, Executive Secretary of the PFIAB and his assistant, Commander Lionel Olmer.

@@ -45629,8 +45665,9 @@ NIE 11–3/8–75 was an excellent job.

- Henson R. BeBruler Assistant National Intelligence - Officer for Strategic Programs + Henson R. BeBruler Assistant + National Intelligence Officer for Strategic + Programs @@ -46851,7 +46888,9 @@ there have been important improvements in both the quality and quantity of information available to US intelligence.

- + +

Appendix D

@@ -47265,8 +47304,9 @@

Sincerely,

- Leo Cherne - Chairman + Leo + Cherne + Chairman @@ -48259,7 +48299,8 @@ Intelligence Community.

- George Bush + George + Bush @@ -49731,7 +49772,8 @@ basic understanding of this important issue than to assist it.

- George Bush + George + Bush @@ -51237,7 +51279,8 @@ that may be used.

- George Bush + George + Bush @@ -51602,7 +51645,8 @@ 1975.

- Henry A. Kissinger + Henry A. + Kissinger @@ -51719,8 +51763,8 @@ disclosure of the Soviet intercept problem.

- Henry A. Kissinger + Henry A. + Kissinger Scowcroft signed for Kissinger. @@ -52185,7 +52229,8 @@ November 1976.

- Brent Scowcroft + Brent + Scowcroft @@ -52638,7 +52683,8 @@ a plan for public disclosure and the elicitation of public support.

- Brent Scowcroft + Brent + Scowcroft @@ -52843,10 +52889,11 @@ cooperative way.

- Richard HelmsPrinted from a copy that bears a typed - signature with an indication that Helms signed the original. + Richard + HelmsPrinted from a + copy that bears a typed signature with an indication that + Helms signed the + original. @@ -52919,8 +52966,8 @@

- W. E. Colby - Chairman + W. E. + Colby Chairman @@ -53029,8 +53076,10 @@ supported in detail in Annexes A through E.

- John T. Hughes - Chairman Ad Hoc Committee + John T. + Hughes + Chairman Ad Hoc + Committee @@ -53947,10 +53996,11 @@

- Rob Roy Ratliff + Rob Roy + Ratliff - Executive Secretary The 40 - Committee + Executive Secretary The 40 + Committee @@ -54233,11 +54283,13 @@ recovery of either hull section is attempted.

- John T. HughesPrinted from a copy that bears Hughes’ typed signature and an - indication that he signed the original. - Chairman Ad Hoc Committee + John T. + HughesPrinted from + a copy that bears Hughes’ typed signature and an indication that he + signed the original. + Chairman Ad Hoc + Committee @@ -54291,7 +54343,8 @@ less value than the original estimate. [3 lines not declassified]

- Bruce A. Lowe Executive Secretary + Bruce A. Lowe Executive + Secretary @@ -54468,7 +54521,8 @@

- W. P. Clements, Jr. + W. P. Clements, + Jr. @@ -55141,9 +55195,10 @@

- W. E. Colby + W. E. + Colby - Director + Director @@ -55396,7 +55451,8 @@ persuasive.

- Rob Roy Ratliff + Rob Roy + Ratliff diff --git a/volumes/frus1969-76v37.xml b/volumes/frus1969-76v37.xml index ae230f815..13cad1dc4 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1969-76v37.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1969-76v37.xml @@ -244,15 +244,14 @@ index.

- Dr. Stephen Randolph + Dr. Stephen Randolph The Historian - - Bureau of Public Affairs - - October 2012 + + Bureau of Public Affairs + October 2012
- Akins + Akins
FYI.

- Kissinger + Kissinger
@@ -6424,7 +6424,7 @@ French to participate in official discussions of U.S. proposals.

- Irwin + Irwin @@ -6722,7 +6722,8 @@ would study the French proposals and be back in touch with them.

- Ingersoll + Ingersoll @@ -6870,7 +6871,8 @@ authority to take a hard-nosed non-committal stance in those talks.

- Ingersoll + Ingersoll @@ -7143,7 +7145,8 @@ multilateral producer/consumer contacts should also be studied.

- Ingersoll + Ingersoll @@ -7276,7 +7279,8 @@

- Kissinger + Kissinger @@ -7439,7 +7443,8 @@

- Kissinger + Kissinger @@ -7606,7 +7611,8 @@

- Kissinger + Kissinger @@ -7928,7 +7934,7 @@ without delay.

- Rush + Rush @@ -9318,7 +9324,8 @@

- Kissinger + Kissinger @@ -9393,7 +9400,8 @@ regards, Gerald R. Ford.”

- Kissinger + Kissinger @@ -9615,7 +9623,8 @@

9. Please report host government reactions.

- Kissinger + Kissinger @@ -9907,7 +9916,8 @@

- Kissinger + Kissinger @@ -12079,7 +12089,8 @@

- Kissinger + Kissinger @@ -12224,7 +12235,8 @@

- Kissinger + Kissinger @@ -13225,7 +13237,8 @@

- Kissinger + Kissinger @@ -13353,7 +13366,8 @@ that we are all adequately prepared.

- Kissinger + Kissinger @@ -14178,7 +14192,8 @@

- Kissinger + Kissinger @@ -15550,7 +15565,8 @@

Sincerely,

- Gerald R. Ford + Gerald R. + Ford @@ -16178,7 +16194,8 @@ ASAP.

- Ingersoll + Ingersoll @@ -16231,7 +16248,8 @@

- J.M. Dunn + J.M. + Dunn @@ -17005,7 +17023,8 @@ conference.]

- Kissinger + Kissinger @@ -17308,7 +17327,8 @@ which we would want before proceeding with this program.

- Ingersoll + Ingersoll @@ -17607,7 +17627,8 @@

- Ingersoll + Ingersoll @@ -17730,7 +17751,8 @@ Kissinger.”

- Kissinger + Kissinger @@ -19098,7 +19120,8 @@

- Kissinger + Kissinger @@ -19292,7 +19315,7 @@ Foreign Policy Files, P850036–2606)

- Akins + Akins
- Kissinger + Kissinger
@@ -19721,7 +19745,8 @@

- Kissinger + Kissinger @@ -19815,7 +19840,8 @@

- Kissinger + Kissinger @@ -19938,7 +19964,8 @@ septel.

- Kissinger + Kissinger @@ -20188,7 +20215,7 @@

- Rush + Rush @@ -20323,7 +20350,7 @@ to provide you with effective coordination of U.S. international economic policies.

- Stoessel + Stoessel
- Ingersoll + Ingersoll
@@ -22048,7 +22076,8 @@ regards.”

- Robinson + Robinson @@ -22242,21 +22271,23 @@ March 15, 1976.

- John M. Dunn - - - Acting Executive Director + + John M. + Dunn - Council on International Economic Policy - - - - Brent Scowcroft - - - Assistant to the President for National - Security Affairs - + Acting Executive Director + + Council on International Economic + Policy + + Brent + Scowcroft + + + Assistant to the President for National + Security Affairs + + @@ -23503,7 +23534,8 @@ septels.

- Robinson + Robinson @@ -24625,7 +24657,8 @@

- Robinson + Robinson @@ -24850,7 +24883,7 @@

- Katz + Katz @@ -25600,7 +25633,8 @@

Sincerely,

- Gerald R. Ford + Gerald R. + Ford @@ -26371,7 +26405,8 @@ is being made toward a Middle East peace settlement.

- Robinson + Robinson @@ -26450,7 +26485,8 @@

With warm good wishes,

- Gerald R. Ford + Gerald R. + Ford @@ -26791,7 +26827,7 @@ protecting the political position of the US and the West in the Middle East.

- Maestrone + Maestrone @@ -27090,7 +27126,8 @@

Sincerely,

- Jimmy Carter + Jimmy + Carter @@ -27213,7 +27250,8 @@ issues in CIEC.

- Christopher + Christopher @@ -27626,7 +27664,7 @@

- Turner + Turner @@ -27881,7 +27919,7 @@ world economic stability and thus stability in the price of oil.

- Vance + Vance @@ -27982,7 +28020,7 @@ collective progress toward that goal.

- Vance + Vance @@ -28083,7 +28121,7 @@

- Vance + Vance @@ -28146,7 +28184,8 @@ 1977.

- Zbigniew Brzezinski + Zbigniew + Brzezinski @@ -29196,7 +29235,8 @@ policy.

- Zbigniew Brzezinski + Zbigniew + Brzezinski @@ -29440,7 +29480,7 @@ approaches in Washington.

- Vance + Vance @@ -29558,7 +29598,8 @@

- Christopher + Christopher @@ -29991,9 +30032,10 @@

Best personal wishes to you—

- J.C.President Carter added the initialed - postscript by hand. + J.C.President Carter added the initialed postscript by + hand. @@ -30075,7 +30117,7 @@ target="#t_FYI_1">FYI.

- Vance + Vance @@ -30734,7 +30776,8 @@

- Zbigniew Brzezinski + Zbigniew + Brzezinski @@ -30962,7 +31005,8 @@ meeting of the Policy Review Committee.

- Zbigniew Brzezinski + Zbigniew + Brzezinski @@ -32385,8 +32429,8 @@

Yours,

- Stansfield Turner + Stansfield + Turner Turner signed “Stan” above this typed signature. @@ -33302,7 +33346,8 @@

- Christopher + Christopher @@ -33530,7 +33575,7 @@ as compared to the fourth quarter of 1978.

- Vance + Vance @@ -34115,7 +34160,8 @@ U.S.-Mexican relations.

- Zbigniew Brzezinski + Zbigniew + Brzezinski @@ -34530,10 +34576,11 @@

Sincerely,

- James R. SchlesingerPrinted from a copy with Schlesinger’s typed signature - and an indication that he signed the original. + James R. + SchlesingerPrinted from a copy with Schlesinger’s typed signature and an indication + that he signed the original. @@ -35156,7 +35203,8 @@ of the present price freeze.

- Christopher + Christopher @@ -36025,7 +36073,8 @@ making an approach at this time.

- Newsom + Newsom @@ -36182,7 +36231,7 @@

- West + West @@ -37017,7 +37066,7 @@ scheduled for January 31.

Sincerely,

- Harold + Harold @@ -37997,7 +38046,7 @@ corresp="#p_YSAZ_1">Yamani.

- Vance + Vance @@ -38103,7 +38152,8 @@ of the supply equation?

- Chambers + Chambers @@ -38796,7 +38846,8 @@

- Christopher + Christopher @@ -39149,7 +39200,7 @@ use “Jimmy Carter”.

- Vance + Vance @@ -39375,7 +39426,8 @@

Sincerely,

- Jimmy Carter + Jimmy + Carter @@ -39603,7 +39655,8 @@

- Christopher + Christopher @@ -40119,8 +40172,8 @@ demand and increase production.

- Henry Owen + Henry + Owen Owen initialed “HO” above this typed signature. @@ -41162,7 +41215,8 @@ purposes.

- Zbigniew Brzezinski + Zbigniew + Brzezinski @@ -41592,7 +41646,7 @@ discussed at Summit preparatory meeting scheduled for June 15–16.

- Vance + Vance @@ -41760,9 +41814,9 @@ Bank.

- Harry E. Bergold, Jr.Printed from a copy with this typed - signature. + Harry E. Bergold, + Jr.Printed from + a copy with this typed signature. @@ -42132,7 +42186,8 @@ >IEA group.

- Christopher + Christopher @@ -42283,7 +42338,7 @@ Secretary Cooper.

- Vance + Vance @@ -44053,7 +44108,8 @@ possible.

- Peter Tarnoff + Peter + Tarnoff @@ -44122,7 +44178,8 @@ >Strauss along with this message.

- Christopher + Christopher @@ -44809,7 +44866,7 @@ participated in the drafting of this message and approved it prior to his departure on leave.

- Ryan + Ryan
- Vance + Vance
@@ -44972,7 +45029,8 @@

- Cooper + Cooper @@ -45589,7 +45647,7 @@ message for your info only at this time.

- Vance + Vance @@ -46011,7 +46069,7 @@ discuss implementation of Summit decisions.

- Vance + Vance @@ -46809,7 +46867,8 @@

Sincerely,

- Jimmy Carter + Jimmy + Carter @@ -46917,7 +46976,8 @@ directly on the aspects of the campaign within its purview.

- Peter Tarnoff + Peter + Tarnoff @@ -46951,8 +47011,8 @@ 196: Iran, 11/07/79) On November 4, a group of university students had seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and taken most of its staff hostage. Documentation on the Iranian hostage crisis is scheduled - for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume XI, Part 1 + for publication in Foreign Relations, + 1977–1980, volume XI, Part 1 and Part 2, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–January 1981. @@ -47315,7 +47375,7 @@ Files, D790533–0827)

- Ryan + Ryan
- Vance + Vance
@@ -47575,7 +47635,7 @@ 1980. (Ibid., D800447–0495)

- Brewster + Brewster
- Luers + Luers
@@ -48520,8 +48580,8 @@ then in interagency fora. I’d value your personal reactions.

- R.W. Komer + R.W. + Komer Komer initialed “RWK” above this typed signature. @@ -48621,8 +48681,8 @@ Security Council guidance to the Intelligence Community.

- Leslie J. Goldman + Leslie J. + Goldman Goldman initialed “LJG” above this typed signature. @@ -48990,7 +49050,7 @@ II research reactor.

- Vance + Vance @@ -49130,7 +49190,7 @@ clarification.

- Vance + Vance @@ -49713,8 +49773,8 @@ issues plus one administrative assistant serving the entire office.

- Ellen L. Frost + Ellen L. + Frost Frost signed “Ellen” above this typed signature. @@ -50219,7 +50279,7 @@ be able to provide additional background information.

- Vance + Vance @@ -50281,7 +50341,8 @@

- Maurice C. Ernst + Maurice C. + Ernst @@ -51069,7 +51130,7 @@ to what should be done.

- Vance + Vance @@ -51265,10 +51326,11 @@

- Leslie J. GoldmanPrinted from a copy with this typed signature - and an indication that Goldman signed the original. + Leslie J. + GoldmanPrinted + from a copy with this typed signature and an indication that + Goldman signed the + original. @@ -51357,7 +51419,8 @@ seek expanded production.

- Christopher + Christopher @@ -51433,7 +51496,8 @@ Emirates.

- Christopher + Christopher @@ -51710,8 +51774,8 @@ impact of the energy bind.

- R.W. Komer + R.W. + Komer Komer signed “Bob” above this typed signature. @@ -51863,7 +51927,7 @@ arise.

- Muskie + Muskie @@ -52264,7 +52328,7 @@

- Muskie + Muskie @@ -52578,7 +52642,7 @@

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to energy.]

- Muskie + Muskie @@ -52705,7 +52769,7 @@

- Muskie + Muskie @@ -53039,8 +53103,8 @@

We have coordinated the draft with Major General Boverie.

- Ellen L. Frost + Ellen L. + Frost Frost signed “Ellen” above this typed signature. @@ -53385,7 +53449,8 @@ be focused on the program.

- Christopher + Christopher @@ -53561,7 +53626,7 @@

- Muskie + Muskie @@ -53861,10 +53926,10 @@ change their course.

- Leslie J. GoldmanPeter Borré signed for Goldman above this typed - signature. + Leslie J. + GoldmanPeter + Borré signed for Goldman + above this typed signature. @@ -55180,7 +55245,7 @@

- Muskie + Muskie @@ -55285,7 +55350,8 @@

- Christopher + Christopher @@ -56213,7 +56279,7 @@

- Muskie + Muskie @@ -56294,7 +56360,7 @@

- Muskie + Muskie @@ -56374,7 +56440,7 @@ Persian Gulf producers.

- Muskie + Muskie diff --git a/volumes/frus1977-80v09Ed2.xml b/volumes/frus1977-80v09Ed2.xml index f1c9245d4..b114ba8a7 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1977-80v09Ed2.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1977-80v09Ed2.xml @@ -8208,7 +8208,7 @@

Subject: Sinai and handling settlements problem.

-

Memcon—Tab ______.

+

Memcon—Tab .

September 12, 1978—Tuesday

0815According to the President’s Daily Diary, Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United - States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to ______, 1978, and - have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. - They invite other parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to adhere to - it.

+ States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to , 1978, and have + agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They + invite other parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to adhere to it.

Preamble

The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:

@@ -42152,10 +42151,16 @@

(22) Increase Israel status in National Disclosure Policy (from CONFIDENTIAL to SECRET or TOP SECRET)

- David E. - McGiffert - Assistant Secretary of Defense - International Security Affairs + David E. McGiffert + + + Assistant Secretary of + Defense + + International Security + Affairs + From ec1f07b290f243d9b218337c225ac30b57daca8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: vak2ve Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2021 19:16:59 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 02/34] Update frus1981-88v05.xml Fixes applied throughout to address inconsistencies in closer content noted by @KerryHite Mid-word line breaks also fixed --- volumes/frus1981-88v05.xml | 1040 ++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 528 insertions(+), 512 deletions(-) diff --git a/volumes/frus1981-88v05.xml b/volumes/frus1981-88v05.xml index 10d3b15fd..218f074b5 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1981-88v05.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1981-88v05.xml @@ -148,14 +148,14 @@ records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government - engaged in foreign policy - formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State - historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign - policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most - of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume were located at the - Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California, the Department of - State in Washington, and the National Archives and Records Administration - (Archives II) in College Park, Maryland

+ engaged in foreign policy formulation, + execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State historians by + providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy + decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the + sources consulted in the preparation of this volume were located at the Ronald + Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California, the Department of State + in Washington, and the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives + II) in College Park, Maryland

The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) @@ -230,9 +230,9 @@ footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document and its original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also - provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy - advisers read the document.

+ provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major + policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, @@ -270,21 +270,21 @@ paragraph in 18 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process - described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and + described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of the Reagan administration’s policy toward the Soviet Union.

- - Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. - - The Historian - - - Kathleen B. Rasmussen, Ph.D. - - General Editor - + + + Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. + + The Historian + Kathleen B. Rasmussen, + Ph.D. + + General Editor + Foreign Service Institute @@ -475,11 +475,10 @@ Division. Kerry Hite performed the copy and technical editing under the supervision of Mandy Chalou, Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division.

- - Elizabeth C. Charles, Ph.D. - - Historian - + Elizabeth C. Charles, + Ph.D. + + Historian @@ -2136,8 +2135,8 @@ community as a whole.

Sincerely,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan @@ -2446,8 +2445,8 @@ future. End summary.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the telegram.]

- Kampelman + Kampelman
31. No distribution without approval of Charles Hill.

- Hartman + Hartman
ently supplied by + rockets apparently supplied by Libya to Iran had struck Baghdad dramatically underscored this concern.

10. Finally, I noted that there were bilateral problems we could usefully @@ -3781,8 +3780,8 @@ implement the payrolling plan is a good sign. We will know how good April 1.

- Hartman + Hartman
@@ -3987,8 +3986,8 @@ question of the place and time for the meeting.

Sincerely,

- M. - Gorbachev + M. Gorbachev @@ -4250,8 +4249,8 @@ American military men and demands that necessary measures be taken so that the provisions of the Agreement of 1947 be strictly enforced.

- Dam + Dam

Sincerely,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan
@@ -4903,8 +4902,8 @@ has not enhanced the prestige of the Soviet military establishment with the political leadership.

These are, of course, no more than straws in the wind, and one should not - base policy on inferences drawn from them. But they provide some evidence that some evidence that Gorbachev could conceivably judge it to be in his political interest to respond positively to a U.S. initiative which provides the prospect for eased relations—at least for @@ -4951,12 +4950,11 @@ increase military pressure on Pakistan or try some form of armed intervention in Iran.)

Additionally, we might consider making a suggestion which goes further in - regard to some specific situation, such as, for example, assistance in obtaining - “no-intervention” commitments from interested parties as part of a - negotiated withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan or, perhaps, - some understanding in regard to parallel action to end the Iran-Iraq - war.

+ regard to some specific situation, such as, for example, assistance in obtaining “no-intervention” + commitments from interested parties as part of a negotiated withdrawal + of Soviet forces from Afghanistan or, perhaps, some understanding in + regard to parallel action to end the Iran-Iraq war.

(b) Arms Control: Here we will need to offer enough to be interesting—and to provide a basis for arguing that we have taken Soviet SDI concerns into @@ -5474,9 +5472,9 @@ Dobrynin back-pedalled, saying that his comments had been in response to a question, and that he had only been speculating about the possibility of US scientists visiting the radar after its completion 2–3 years hence—in the - context, he added, of better relations than we have now.US scientists visiting the radar after its completion 2–3 years hence—in the context, + he added, of better relations than we have now.In an April 16 article, Pincus wrote on “Dobrynin’s remark Friday that American scientists would be invited to examine the installation @@ -5927,8 +5925,8 @@ have increased tension between our countries.

Sincerely,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan @@ -6202,8 +6200,8 @@ people were withdrawing their savings to put them in stocks of vodka—soon to be as valuable as hard currency.

- Hartman + Hartman @@ -6290,7 +6288,8 @@ will welcome any suggestions you may have in this regard.

Sincerely,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
US would agree with that, were it not trying to achieve dominance. The US side was trying to argue that it - was engaged in scientific research. In fact, however, it was talking about large-scale systems - which would radically alter the strategic situation. This was quite - different from the research permitted by the ABM Treaty. After all, US - and Soviet scientists and politicians know that in some areas scientific - research involved something on the order of 92 or 95 percent of the - effort needed to develop a new weapons system. After that there remained - nothing but testing and deployment. The US arguments did not impress the Soviet side. Perhaps the - US was impressed by these arguments. - After all, modern psychology made it possible to become convinced of the - most implausible things. Still, that was no way to reach an agreement - with the USSR.

+ was engaged in scientific research. In fact, however it was talking about large-scale systems which + would radically alter the strategic situation. This was quite different + from the research permitted by the ABM + Treaty. After all, US and Soviet + scientists and politicians know that in some areas scientific research + involved something on the order of 92 or 95 percent of the effort needed + to develop a new weapons system. After that there remained nothing but + testing and deployment. The US arguments + did not impress the Soviet side. Perhaps the US was impressed by these arguments. After all, modern + psychology made it possible to become convinced of the most implausible + things. Still, that was no way to reach an agreement with the USSR.

Gromyko noted that the Secretary had not mentioned the moratoria proposed by the Soviet side—specifically in a speech by Gorbachev.USSR advocated the independence of Israel, but it was opposed to Israeli aggression and - advocated liberation of the + advocated liberation of the occupied Arab territories, believing that this cause was just. We would see whether Israel was serious about withdrawing from Lebanon, about leaving no Israeli military personnel there. We would see how things @@ -7960,8 +7959,8 @@ which would be restricted to practical measures, rather than philosophical issues, measures which basically have been agreed upon. The Secretary thought that this would open the door to other things. We - understood that the Soviet Union had conducted productive negotiations with Pan American on + understood that the Soviet Union had conducted productive negotiations + with Pan American on resuming air service. We welcomed that. We were ready to discuss our civil aviation agreement, that is Aeroflot issues. At the same time we had under discussion the question of consulates in Kiev and New York. @@ -8221,9 +8220,9 @@

9. Exchanges on other arms control issues were only marginally better. I reiterated the four proposals to enhance confidence you put forward in your Strasbourg speech, but Gromyko commented negatively in response.See footnote 2, Document 27. The four + >Gromyko commented negatively in response.See + footnote 2, Document 27. The four proposals were: exchange of military observers at military exercises, regular high-level contacts between U.S. and Soviet military leaders, prompt CDE action @@ -8296,8 +8295,8 @@ allies’ agreement to attendance at Foreign Ministers’ level before announcing a decision.

- Shultz + Shultz
S)

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan
- Hartman + Hartman
Gorbachev would move on Gromyko before the Party Congress in February next year. I am not distributing this report unless - you want me to.” The memorandum - explained that Ryzhkov, [ explained that Ryzhkov, [text not declassified] stated that “Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko is being excluded from all planning and preparations for a summit @@ -9755,10 +9754,10 @@

Don asked that this debrief be held to senior officials of the Department.

- Kenneth W. DamDam initialed “KWD” above his typed - signature. + Kenneth W. + DamDam initialed “KWD” above his + typed signature.
@@ -10268,8 +10267,8 @@ the meeting. For our part, we are entirely for this.

Sincerely,

- M. - Gorbachev + M. Gorbachev @@ -11039,8 +11038,8 @@ President, we see an attempt by the United States, taking advantage of geographic factors, to gain a virtual monopoly on the use of weapons in a situation for which our country has no analogue. I know - that on your side the need for some regional balance is sometimes cited. But even in + that on your side the need for some regional balance is sometimes + cited. But even in that case it is incomprehensible why the U.S. refuses to resolve this issue in a manner which would establish in the zone of Europe a balance of medium-range missiles, whereby the

Sincerely,

- M. - Gorbachev + M. + Gorbachev @@ -11411,8 +11410,8 @@ middle level officials of the bureaucracy who were frustrated by the stagnation of the Brezhnev era. The public as well has responded favorably to his style, judging by - initial reaction filtering back through Western sources. His aggressiveness has placed the + initial reaction filtering back through Western sources. His + aggressiveness has placed the opposition on the defensive. His opponents are probably biding their time hoping he makes a major misstep. [portion marking not declassified]

@@ -12042,7 +12041,8 @@ summary.

[Omitted here is the body of the telegram.]

- Hartman + Hartman @@ -12209,9 +12209,10 @@ points? When you have an opportunity, I would like to discuss this with you.

- Paul - NitzePrinted from a copy - with this typed signature. + Paul NitzePrinted from a copy with this typed + signature. @@ -12446,8 +12447,8 @@ colleagues who have met him in Georgia say that he has always had a big interest in foreign affairs and spoke knowledgeably from a brief.

- Hartman + Hartman @@ -13135,8 +13136,8 @@ identified.

10. I will take no action until instructed by you.

- Armacost + Armacost
Charlie Wick (!?) and Palmer. On the Soviet side, Gorbachev, Alexandrov and - Gromyko were covered. According to this system, - Palmer—if so + Gromyko + were covered. According to + this system, Palmer—if so authorized—could pass messages to McSweeney, who would then communicate with Bruk by the Occidental telex, using the code names provided.

That was the extent of the message itself, but McSweeney mentioned to @@ -14080,10 +14081,10 @@ expectations which then led to a big letdown when results were not soon forthcoming.Johnson met with Soviet Premier Kosygin in Glassboro, - New Jersey, in June 1967. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, Documents 228–236. Most important to + target="frus1964-68v15#d236">236. Most important to avoid is another summit along the lines of 1973, when a weakened President sought to create an illusory sense of progress and accomplishment only to communicate a sense to the Soviets that we needed @@ -14519,8 +14520,8 @@ incentives for both sides to hold earlier and regular summits to obtain more substantive progress.

- Whitehead + Whitehead
@@ -14655,8 +14656,8 @@

But you will also want to cite obstacles to progress beyond small steps—our continuing concerns resulting from the Nicholson case; the Berlin air corridors, as a case which still has dangerous potential; the - bleak human rights picture; Soviet pressures on Pakistan. As an example of mixed and unnecessarily + bleak human rights picture; Soviet pressures on Pakistan. As an example + of mixed and unnecessarily ambiguous behavior, you could cite the combination during the TWA hijacking of welcome Soviet statements against terrorism with inflammatory propaganda about US @@ -14942,7 +14943,7 @@ P850139–1123)

Peace,

- John Denver + John Denver @@ -15843,8 +15844,8 @@ appears possible.” To me that opens us to being leveraged to make concessions because of our self-imposed deadline. I preferred the approach of saying that their leadership has changed; that warrants the - setting of a foundation of viewpoints between our leadership centered upon exchanges, first at + setting of a foundation of viewpoints between our leadership centered + upon exchanges, first at Helsinki but then followed by analogous dialogue between Reagan and Gorbachev on how each side views its @@ -16032,8 +16033,8 @@ President’s Daily Diary).

Sincerely,

- M. - Gorbachev + M. Gorbachev @@ -16288,8 +16289,8 @@

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

- Shultz + Shultz @@ -16623,10 +16624,10 @@ of the century.

It’s worth a shot.

- Richard - BurtBurt signed “Rick” above his - typed signature. + Richard BurtBurt + signed “Rick” above his typed signature.
- Shultz + Shultz
@@ -18204,8 +18205,8 @@ the Assistant to the President for National Security shall deem necessary. (S)

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan @@ -18516,8 +18517,8 @@ world.

While the people are largely passive in regard to foreign policy formulation and play none of the direct role that publics do in - democracies, their - views are not unimportant to the leadership. To act contrary to + democracies, their views + are not unimportant to the leadership. To act contrary to deeply-held popular views risks damaging public morale, which is already quite low, and provides ammunition for potential rival factions in the party.

@@ -18859,8 +18860,8 @@ Assistant for National Security Affairs by August 23, 1985. (S)

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan

Respectfully yours,

- William J. - CaseyCasey signed “Bill Casey” above his - typed signature. + William J. CaseyCasey signed “Bill Casey” above his typed + signature.
@@ -19449,7 +19451,7 @@ Matlock Chron September 1985 (2/6)) A “special meeting of selected presidential advisors” was held; see Document 86. After - re-reading them, he commented + re-reading them, he commented that maybe the elements could satisfy the President’s requirement.

—Bud said what was necessary was a clear indication by the President of what he wanted, then the community would fall in to get it done. He @@ -19784,7 +19786,8 @@ a final document could be best organized.

Sincerely yours,

- M. Gorbachev + M. + Gorbachev @@ -19981,12 +19984,12 @@ doubtless some.Robert O. Anderson, Chairman and CEO of Atlantic-Richfield Oil Company, proposed the project to Velikhov during a trip - to the Soviet Union in May 1984. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. - IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 244, - footnote 3. Although it could have considerable - symbolic value, I am inclined to think we don’t have time to staff it - properly.

+ to the Soviet Union in May 1984. See Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January + 1983–March 1985, Document 244, footnote 3. Although + it could have considerable symbolic value, I am inclined to think we + don’t have time to staff it properly.

—A proposal to cooperate in developing microcomputer educational software for secondary school instruction might be a relatively safe one which has Soviet interest (Velikhov @@ -20216,7 +20219,7 @@ >McFarlane’s position. He said we should try to develop a formula where we could continue testing, and we had to be careful not to give anybody a veto power over deployment if the testing works out. He - did say that large reductions + did say that large reductions would make us safer and we should work to see what we can give to get large reductions.

Secretary Weinberger developed @@ -20303,13 +20306,12 @@ Both Bill Casey and I think it is an excellent piece of work and commend it to you.

- Robert M. GatesGates signed “Bob” above his typed - signature. + Robert M. + GatesGates signed “Bob” above his + typed signature. - Deputy Director for - Intelligence + Deputy Director for Intelligence @@ -20393,8 +20395,8 @@ notwithstanding Moscow’s pulling out all the stops and SDI has not been halted or slowed by Soviet threats and recriminations. Rather the lesson appears to be - that these programs have prospered if only because of Soviet behavior. Meanwhile if only because of Soviet behavior. Meanwhile SDI threatens at a minimum to upset the pace of the strategic competition, one which Moscow is comfortable with, and add much uncertainty to where the “correlation @@ -21749,8 +21751,10 @@ know. I cannot overemphasize how closely I want this work held. (S)

- ORIGINAL SIGNED - Ronald Reagan + ORIGINAL SIGNED + + Ronald + Reagan @@ -23162,8 +23166,8 @@ strategic modernization program, if funded and executed, would provide sufficient forces to implement our national strategy for at least the near-term against known and currently forecast Soviet offensive forces. - However, public and Congressional attitudes call into question our ability to maintain + However, public and Congressional attitudes call into question our ability to maintain necessary full funding of this critical program. (S)

What is more, Soviet defensive activities (which are largely unmatched by @@ -23273,9 +23277,9 @@

Conclusions about Question 1b. In short, a Soviet proposal along the lines suggested at Tab A would not provide a basis for an acceptable agreement that would be in the - long-term U.S. national interest. Provisions that would adversely affect our security include the - following: (TS/O)

+ long-term U.S. national interest. Provisions that would adversely affect our security + include the following: (TS/O)

—Constraints on SDI. The Soviets will press for restraints on research now permitted by the ABM Treaty, a @@ -23332,12 +23336,12 @@

The U.S. SDI program is presently designed to be compatible with traditional interpretations of the ABM Treaty’s limitations, recognizing that - this commitment has cost and schedule implications for the program. At present, it is - believed that—having paid those costs—sufficient work can be conducted - within these interpretations to permit reasonable feasibility judgments - on full scale development and deployment to be made. However, several - important caveats to this statement are in order.

+ this commitment has cost and schedule implications for the program. At present, it is believed + that—having paid those costs—sufficient work can be conducted within + these interpretations to permit reasonable feasibility judgments on full + scale development and deployment to be made. However, several important + caveats to this statement are in order.

(1) As the SDI program proceeds, technical difficulties may be encountered which invalidate this assessment.

@@ -23921,13 +23925,13 @@

14. This report is being made available to the chief US arms control negotiators in Geneva.

- Clair E. - GeorgeAn unknown hand - signed for George above - this typed signature. + Clair E. GeorgeAn unknown hand signed for George above this typed + signature. - Deputy Director for - Operations + Deputy Director for Operations @@ -25114,8 +25118,8 @@ issues being covered in the Geneva arms control talks.

I gave Shevardnadze an extensive presentation of our views on how to enhance nuclear stability, stressing - that the underlying assumptions - of the ABM Treaty and of the ABM Treaty and SALT I have been undermined. I made clear that we now need to get on with the process of radical reductions in offensive arms, reversing the erosion of the

• After the meeting Korniyenko asserted that it was unfortunate that I had quoted Agreed Statement - D without reference to the introductory wording of that statement: “In order to insure - fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in - Article III of the Treaty. . . .”

+ D without reference to the introductory wording of that statement: “In order to + insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components + except as provided in Article III of the Treaty. . . .”

I pointed out to Korniyenko that Article III deals only with the undertaking not to deploy. I said I had emphasized that Agreed Statement D prohibits deployment of systems based @@ -25269,12 +25273,11 @@ in rebuttal of Korniyenko’s point.

- - Paul H. Nitze - - Special Advisor to the President and - the Secretary of State on Arms Control - Matters + Paul H. + Nitze + + Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary + of State on Arms Control Matters @@ -25510,11 +25513,10 @@ President of the United States.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

- John W. Vessey, - Jr. + John W. Vessey, Jr. - ChairmanJoint Chiefs of - Staff + ChairmanJoint Chiefs of Staff @@ -25989,7 +25991,7 @@ pp. 975–976. For Gorbachev’s letter to Reagan announcing the moratorium, see Document 68. He - was interested in a sentence + was interested in a sentence which the President uttered at that time which he did not believe was accidental. It was to the effect that the United States has a projected program and after this program is completed, can revisit the problem. He @@ -26018,8 +26020,8 @@ target="#t_SS_1">S/S)

Every country has its pride and identity and those things which are sacred to it. We for example would be pleased to pay tribute to - George Washington—even our - first-graders know about George + George Washington—even our + first-graders know about George Washington and the role he played in American history—but you know we are very much offended by some of the things that have been said about Lenin. We haven’t done that sort of thing to you. Explaining @@ -27219,7 +27221,7 @@ establish a basis for currying favor with Gorbachev, but a Kissinger connection would not necessarily accomplish - that. If ultimately you decide + that. If ultimately you decide to establish a private channel, I would not recommend that it be through Kissinger. (S)

@@ -28115,8 +28117,8 @@ Anatoly F. Dobrynin.

Sincerely yours,

- M. - Gorbachev + M. Gorbachev @@ -28268,8 +28270,8 @@ desire to announce new cooperative programs in Geneva when the general exchanges agreement is signed.

- Shultz + Shultz @@ -28457,9 +28459,9 @@ n="4" xml:id="d118fn4">See footnote 2, Document 112 and footnote 6, Document 114. - Akhromeyev provides a strong endorsement of - the Soviet proposals and accuses U.S. spokesmen of efforts to discredit + Akhromeyev provides a strong endorsement of the + Soviet proposals and accuses U.S. spokesmen of efforts to discredit Moscow’s initiatives. The Chief of Staff also provides detailed, although standard, refutations of major U.S. criticisms of the Soviet proposals.

@@ -28558,8 +28560,8 @@ clear a statement of military concern as we are likely to see in the Soviet context.

- Hartman + Hartman

Sincerely,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan
@@ -29329,8 +29331,8 @@ purpose was to review what they had been able to do and how to go about making the Summit successful and meeting the hopes for the future. The day before he had mentioned to the President that the Soviets had taken - certain steps. On the one hand, they had made some large-scale proposals with regard to security. + certain steps. On the one hand, they had made some large-scale proposals + with regard to security. For example, they had proposed a prohibition on space-strike weapons, deep cuts on strategic weapons, as well as addressing medium-ranged weapons in Europe. That is how they see the proposals which they are @@ -29876,8 +29878,8 @@ target="#t_US_1">US has blocked out an approach. Shevardnadze had given some suggested language. So the Secretary would give him some of ours (Secretary hands - over draft joint communique).Neither draft was + over draft joint + communique).Neither draft was found. It may be that in the end we may decide not to do this. So this is not given to the Soviet side as finally decided. With that in mind and noting that there are lots of brackets to be filled in, @@ -30402,8 +30404,8 @@ proposals prior to the U.S. and Soviet delegations departing Geneva. (S)

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan

Sincerely,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan
@@ -30967,8 +30969,8 @@ between our two countries on a more constructive course.

Sincerely yours,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan
matic + the world’s diplomatic stage and cement Moscow’s international standing. From the 1963 signing of the Partial Test-Ban Agreement through the mid-1970s when agreements were concluded on a host of arms control issues, Soviet @@ -31341,7 +31343,7 @@ example. But this concept is worth pursuing in my judgment. Is this the sort of thing you had in mind?

- Bud + Bud @@ -32088,8 +32090,8 @@ we about strategy and military power, including nuclear power. Study of the Soviet buildup, of Soviet military exercises and command structures, of their military writings (including very sensitive - documents collected clandestinely) has taught us a great deal about Soviet strategy and + documents collected clandestinely) has taught us a great deal about Soviet strategy and military thinking. It underscores some important differences from our own.

This shouldn’t have been surprising to us. After all, the Soviets are @@ -32506,25 +32508,25 @@ their first agreement. He said perhaps it would be possible to present briefly U.S. thoughts on the Geneva negotiations. U.S. negotiators had presented proposals there, and the U.S. believes they offer a real - opportunity to make progress. U.S. negotiators in Geneva have presented a new and comprehensive - proposal designed to build upon positive elements in the Soviet Union’s - recent counter-proposal, to bridge the positions of the two sides. That, - he observed, was how the U.S. had worked. Shultz pointed out that at the same time, he wanted to - emphasize that previous U.S. negotiating positions remain on the table - for Soviet consideration as well. He said that as had been noted, the - U.S. proposal deals with all three areas under discussion in the Geneva - talks, because the U.S. believes a relationship exists between the - areas. The U.S. proposal has been shaped to achieve deep reductions. The - U.S. agreed and agrees to focus on areas and weapons which are more - de-stabilizing. In the area of strategic offensive arms, the U.S. - focused on the 50 percent reduction principle contained in the - counterproposal of the Soviet side. The U.S. proposal also incorporates - reductions which would result in a total of 6,000 ballistic missile - warheads and ALCMs. The U.S., too, - attempted to use that number, and like the Soviet side, to address - itself as well to re-entry vehicles on land-based ballistic + opportunity to make progress. U.S. negotiators in Geneva have presented a new and + comprehensive proposal designed to build upon positive elements in the + Soviet Union’s recent counter-proposal, to bridge the positions of the + two sides. That, he observed, was how the U.S. had worked. Shultz pointed out that at the same + time, he wanted to emphasize that previous U.S. negotiating positions + remain on the table for Soviet consideration as well. He said that as + had been noted, the U.S. proposal deals with all three areas under + discussion in the Geneva talks, because the U.S. believes a relationship + exists between the areas. The U.S. proposal has been shaped to achieve + deep reductions. The U.S. agreed and agrees to focus on areas and + weapons which are more de-stabilizing. In the area of strategic + offensive arms, the U.S. focused on the 50 percent reduction principle + contained in the counterproposal of the Soviet side. The U.S. proposal + also incorporates reductions which would result in a total of 6,000 + ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs. + The U.S., too, attempted to use that number, and like the Soviet side, + to address itself as well to re-entry vehicles on land-based ballistic missiles.

Shultz said he had been speaking about what the U.S. agreed with. Now, he would address things the U.S. @@ -32997,7 +32999,7 @@ >Gorbachev during a September 3 meeting. (Telegram 12144 from Moscow, September 3; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850623–0169) The - Secretary suggested that U.S. + Secretary suggested that U.S. and Soviet experts meet to explore this and other ideas which could reduce the risk of military confrontation.

The Secretary noted that he had already outlined the new U.S. tionship—both philosophically and operationally so that we have some - idea before it becomes truly operational how we handle it.

+ addressed now—in its interrelationship —both philosophically and operationally so that we have + some idea before it becomes truly operational how we handle it.

Korniyenko interrupted to ask a clarifying question “to facilitate” the Secretary’s reply. What the Secretary had said, - Shultz + Shultz

@@ -35054,8 +35056,8 @@ given up his optimism and he looks forward to the meeting with the President and sends him his best regards.

- Hartman + Hartman @@ -35375,14 +35377,14 @@ connection with the Geneva summit.

15. On regional issues, said Shevardnadze, you have spoken broadly about geographical - regions and about the bilateral consultations we have conducted. You have spoken favorably about - continuing these. I believe we could make a general statement on this - matter, and I understand our experts did some work on this last night. - It would hardly be possible to produce a joint statement on individual - regions. The Soviet side favors political settlements in every part of - the world; we also favor continuing these consultations on a more - systematic basis.

+ regions and about the bilateral consultations we have conducted. You have spoken favorably + about continuing these. I believe we could make a general statement on + this matter, and I understand our experts did some work on this last + night. It would hardly be possible to produce a joint statement on + individual regions. The Soviet side favors political settlements in + every part of the world; we also favor continuing these consultations on + a more systematic basis.

16. Shevardnadze then turned to bilateral questions. We are near agreement on a number of issues, he said. While only final steps remain, we understand that such steps are @@ -35607,8 +35609,8 @@ decisive stage in preparing for the summit and we approached all of the matters under discussion in that light.

- Hartman + Hartman @@ -37353,8 +37355,9 @@ boost to the Soviet political offensive against our SDI program.

- Fred C. IklePrinted from a copy - that bears this typed signature. + Fred C. IklePrinted from a copy that bears this typed + signature.
ity even if they were classified as defensive. - People would not be in a position to determine what it was that would be - placed into space and would surely regard it as an additional threat, - thereby creating crisis situations. If the goal was to get rid of - nuclear weapons, why start an arms race in another sphere?

+ unreliable because of their maneuverability and mobility even if they were classified + as defensive. People would not be in a position to determine what it was + that would be placed into space and would surely regard it as an + additional threat, thereby creating crisis situations. If the goal was + to get rid of nuclear weapons, why start an arms race in another + sphere?

The President asked Gorbachev to remember that these were not weapons that kill people or destroy cities, these were weapons that destroy nuclear @@ -41632,7 +41636,8 @@ xml:id="d161fn9">An unknown hand wrote “DOE” at the end of the point.

- Mark Palmer + Mark + Palmer
@@ -41964,7 +41969,8 @@ something of our country next year.

Sincerely Yours,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan @@ -42251,8 +42257,8 @@ up Geneva issues. To date we have received nothing from Washington on either matter.

- Hartman + Hartman @@ -42391,8 +42397,8 @@ target="#t_US_1">US Administration.

Sincerely,

- M. - Gorbachev + M. Gorbachev @@ -42523,16 +42529,16 @@ us in other areas.

At Geneva, I noted our pleasure that our embassy had been informed that a number of separated spouses would be allowed to leave the Soviet Union - to join their husbands or wives. Some unfortunately have yet to hear this officially. - Moreover, we have difficulty reconciling your number of ten spouses - being held for a limited time because of security concerns with the - longer list of such people who we know seek to be united with their - loved ones. One of these cases involves a blind Soviet woman in her - sixties who has been separated from her husband for almost thirty years. - Another longtime case involves a Soviet man driven by desperation into - two life-threatening hunger strikes in an effort to join his wife and - small children in the United States. Several other cases have remained + to join their husbands or wives. Some unfortunately have yet to hear this officially. Moreover, we + have difficulty reconciling your number of ten spouses being held for a + limited time because of security concerns with the longer list of such + people who we know seek to be united with their loved ones. One of these + cases involves a blind Soviet woman in her sixties who has been + separated from her husband for almost thirty years. Another longtime + case involves a Soviet man driven by desperation into two + life-threatening hunger strikes in an effort to join his wife and small + children in the United States. Several other cases have remained unresolved for many years.

We have provided your government with a list of 17 names in addition to those we have already been informed will be released; they all deserve @@ -42587,8 +42593,8 @@ back.

Sincerely,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan
Baldrige was accompanied by Under Secretary Smart, Ambassador Hartman and DCM + corresp="#p_HAA_1">Hartman + and DCM Combs (notetaker). Gorbachev’s overall approach was moderate and relaxed throughout the 95 minute meeting. End @@ -43029,8 +43036,8 @@ corresp="#p_GMS_1">Gorbachev accepted the gift with thanks.

- Hartman + Hartman

7. You might brief the Secretary along these lines.

- Whitehead + Whitehead
PNET). (S)

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan
@@ -43440,8 +43447,8 @@ to you and your spouse our warmest wishes.

Respectfully,

- M. - Gorbachev + M. Gorbachev
.

Sincerely,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan
@@ -43765,8 +43772,8 @@ future. I think, the chances are not bad here.

Sincerely,

- M. - Gorbachev + M. Gorbachev @@ -43912,8 +43919,8 @@ January 15; the electronic text of telegrams 12554, 12553, and 12552 was corrupted. (U)

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan

Sincerely,

- M. - Gorbachev + M. Gorbachev
@@ -44555,9 +44562,10 @@ the Congress and issue a press statement along the lines of the one the Secretary had given him.

- Paul H. - NitzePrinted from a copy - with this typed signature. + Paul H. NitzePrinted from a copy with this typed + signature. @@ -44649,10 +44657,10 @@ Secretariat Sensitive (01/16/1986–01/17/1986); NLR–775–15–7–3–5)

- Ed - RownyRowny signed “Ed” above his - typed signature. + Ed RownyRowny + signed “Ed” above his typed signature. @@ -44853,10 +44861,10 @@ in Europe, Soviet agreement to redress the imbalance in conventional forces in Europe would be of overriding importance.

- H. Allen - HolmesHolmes signed “Allen” above - his typed signature. + H. Allen HolmesHolmes + signed “Allen” above his typed signature.
The Soviet “plan” narrows the focus on the total elimination of all nuclear weapons by 1999, making that a goal in itself. It does not address the corresponding deterrence and stability rationale for - weapons or the - associated mechanisms including equitable reductions, compliance and - SDI, that will be needed either - to eliminate these underlying security requirements or replace the + weapons or the associated + mechanisms including equitable reductions, compliance and SDI, that will be needed either to + eliminate these underlying security requirements or replace the contribution now made by the nuclear weapons. It offers no schedule for the resolution of existing regional conflicts and differences and, in the process, sets up a situation in which, if the @@ -46806,8 +46814,8 @@ of the feasibility of an international effort to build a prototype fusion power plant. (C)

7. Cancer Research: The Secretary of Health and Human Services, in - cooperation with the National Institutes of Health, shall be responsible for developing a + cooperation with the National Institutes of Health, shall be responsible + for developing a cooperative program in this area, utilizing the U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Medical Science and Public Health as a framework for @@ -46830,8 +46838,8 @@ with General Secretary Gorbachev will be scheduled for this year. (C)

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan
Jack Matlock agrees with this approach.

- Mark PalmerPalmer - signed “MP” above his typed signature. + Mark + PalmerPalmer signed “MP” above his + typed signature. @@ -47082,10 +47091,10 @@ Gorbachev as more assertive and characterized by a greater willingness to expand its military involvement in regional disputes. Sokolov’s own sense of Gorbachev’s approach was that - the new leader saw no Soviet interest in getting more deeply engaged - in these areas of conflict. Sokolov’s own sense of Gorbachev’ + approach was that the + new leader saw no Soviet interest in getting more deeply engaged in + these areas of conflict. Sokolov claimed to reflect the view in Moscow in asserting that since Geneva the U.S. seemed to be reverting to a more belligerent stance on regional questions. In what may have been @@ -47366,8 +47375,8 @@ (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 707)

- Burt + Burt
@@ -48156,8 +48165,8 @@ countries, and a safer world.

Sincerely,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan @@ -48615,10 +48624,10 @@ matter.

Sincerely yours,

- George P. - ShultzShultz signed “George” above - his typed signature. + George P. ShultzShultz + signed “George” above his typed signature. @@ -48924,8 +48933,8 @@ bilateral relations. However, we must make it clear that we are prepared to respond to Soviet retaliation firmly and appropriately. Our goal will be to make clear our determination to stand by our decision on the SMUN - reduction without unnecessarily - accelerating the cycle of retaliation. At the same time, we will warn + reduction without unnecessarily accelerating the cycle of retaliation. At the same time, we will warn the Soviets that if they choose to begin retaliation, we will not accept an outcome which results in a significant imbalance in our respective bilateral presence. We have obtained White House authorization to @@ -49147,8 +49156,8 @@

Ronald Reagan

End text.

- Shultz + Shultz

As the meeting was breaking up, Ryzhkov stressed with some feeling the need for - continued work on the full range of issues, including the question of a future meeting. The - Soviet position, he said, was that no doors should be closed with - respect to such a meeting.

+ continued work on the full range of issues, including the question of a future + meeting. The Soviet position, he said, was that no doors should be + closed with respect to such a meeting.

The two superpowers had a responsibility for the future of the entire world. He hoped the meeting could conclude on that note. The Secretary agreed.

@@ -49997,11 +50006,15 @@ first presentation to Dobrynin.

- Mark - Palmer - Charles ThomasPalmer signed “Mark” and - Thomas signed “T” above their typed signatures. + + Mark + Palmer + Charles + ThomasPalmer + signed “Mark” and Thomas signed “T” above their typed + signatures. + @@ -50352,8 +50365,8 @@ can be expected when Dobrynin meets with the President April 8.

- Whitehead + Whitehead
@@ -50519,8 +50532,8 @@

I will be looking forward with interest to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

- M. - Gorbachev + M. Gorbachev
- Hartman + Hartman
@@ -51085,7 +51098,8 @@ the official rationale for the initiative.

I would greatly appreciate it if you will give this memorandum to the President, since it embodies a matter I think is very important.

- Cap + Cap @@ -51846,8 +51860,8 @@ Gorbacheva.

Sincerely,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan @@ -52405,10 +52419,10 @@ Sokolov’s own sense that Moscow is anxious to limit damage to the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

- Rozanne L. - RidgwayRidgway signed “RR” above her typed + Rozanne L. RidgwayRidgway + signed “RR” above her typed signature. @@ -53021,8 +53035,8 @@ international implications may result, we would appreciate any additional details you can provide on the Chernobyl accident.

- Whitehead + Whitehead
- Whitehead + Whitehead
- Whitehead + Whitehead
- Whitehead + Whitehead
@@ -53611,8 +53625,8 @@ corresp="#p_YB_1">Yel’tsin has overstepped his leash. We suspect the former, but cannot exclude the latter.

- Hartman + Hartman @@ -53747,8 +53761,8 @@ positive way.

End text.

- Whitehead + Whitehead
Shultz.

- Hartman + Hartman
Kohl had proposed this. End FYI.

- Armacost + Armacost
@@ -54176,12 +54190,12 @@ to divert Western attention from the Soviet performance during the accident.

- Nicholas - PlattKenneth Quinn - signed for Platt. + Nicholas PlattKenneth Quinn signed for Platt. - Executive - Secretary + Executive Secretary @@ -54247,10 +54261,10 @@ get things off dead center. I will send you some specific ideas in the next few days.

- Roz - RidgwayRidgway signed “Roz” above her - typed signature. + Roz RidgwayRidgway + signed “Roz” above her typed signature. @@ -54503,8 +54517,8 @@ did not say he could not accept the invitation and certainly did not close the door on the possibility.

- Combs + Combs

Sincerely yours,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan
@@ -55218,8 +55232,8 @@ arms control negotiations.” He asserted that the Soviet Union had always taken a serious approach and wanted progress in arms control.

- Hartman + Hartman

Warm regards.

- Kampelman + Kampelman
@@ -55518,20 +55532,20 @@ the year should be: restore the budget cuts to defense and international functions, work on alliance relationships, and go for a good arms control agreement.” (Ibid.) We have a chance to - look at things desirable—reduce and ______ weapons.This and all other omissions are in the - original. There is real negotiating going on at Geneva. He - perceives both U.S. and the Soviets struggling to find the next - direction. Again held forth on the victory of freedom. The value of free and open markets, - negotiating with entrepeneurs. He cited China, the recent meeting of the - African nations—Soviets have lost ideological battle. Their position is - based only on military strength. He thinks we have greater military and - doubts that they could have pulled off the Libya raid. They have two - bases outside Libya. We have lots of bases. Only Soviet advantage is in - Lenin based strength. U.S. not as good as Soviets particularly because - we are not good at ______. It would be to our advantage to reduce this - advantage of the Soviets. Soviets are floundering.

+ look at things desirable—reduce and weapons.This and all other omissions are in the original. There is + real negotiating going on at Geneva. He perceives both U.S. and the + Soviets struggling to find the next direction. Again held forth on the + victory of freedom. The value + of free and open markets, negotiating with entrepeneurs. He cited China, + the recent meeting of the African nations—Soviets have lost ideological + battle. Their position is based only on military strength. He thinks we + have greater military and doubts that they could have pulled off the + Libya raid. They have two bases outside Libya. We have lots of bases. + Only Soviet advantage is in Lenin based strength. U.S. not as good as + Soviets particularly because we are not good at . It would be to our + advantage to reduce this advantage of the Soviets. Soviets are + floundering.

3. He then went into historical deductions. In the Nixon years of linkage, linkage did not work. The Soviets took advantage of opportunity—Afghanistan and @@ -55542,11 +55556,10 @@ furor over the KAL shootdown. The tension separated the two countries at the Geneva negotiations. They were sent back with the message that arms control is important in - itself. The allies liked this. They did not recognize ______, namely, - that we are pursuing our own interests independent of the Soviets. - Shultz mentioned his Rand - speech.See footnote 2, Document - 2. + itself. The allies liked this. They did not recognize , namely, that we + are pursuing our own interests independent of the Soviets. Shultz mentioned his Rand speech.See footnote 2, Document 2. Shultz says that all the Soviets have been able to do is to cite violation in the spirit of Geneva. There is no spirit in Geneva. The two have different concepts of the @@ -55570,8 +55583,8 @@ on the other hand if an agreement could be struck with Reagan, he will be able to make it stick better than the next President may be likely to do. Finally, the - next President will take time to sort out a ______ and figure out his - strategy and he would not be ready for dealing until sometime in 1990. Meanwhile, military and economic pressures on Gorbachev are great. A lot going on in defense area. This is the first time we @@ -55699,9 +55712,10 @@ the gas mask to protect against mad men.” The bottom line was we should recognize and appreciate what the Soviets have put forward.

- William J. - CaseyPrinted from a copy - that bears his typed signature. + William J. CaseyPrinted from a copy that bears his typed + signature.
- Hartman + Hartman
@@ -56787,10 +56801,10 @@ year, but no agreement until the eve of his departure from office.

Regarding other matters, the President’s people have made clear that they would like progress on a chemical weapons ban and are prepared to - negotiate agreements on Afghanistan and a range of bilateral matters. We now believe - that there is a real possibility of progress in Vienna and on taking - some confidence-building measures.

+ negotiate agreements on Afghanistan and a range of bilateral matters. We now believe that + there is a real possibility of progress in Vienna and on taking some + confidence-building measures.

We think there are possibilities in all five of these areas. The President and Shultz have persistently pushed the idea that in 1986 we need agreements on the key @@ -57470,7 +57484,8 @@ and U.S., about which I spoke to you at the beginning of my letter.

End text of letter

- Whitehead + Whitehead @@ -58193,8 +58208,8 @@

Moscow.

End text.

- Shultz + Shultz @@ -58317,8 +58332,8 @@ n="1032"/> judgment, but it’s hard not to see here both a challenge and an opportunity demanding an extra effort on our part.

- Fritz W. - Ermarth + Fritz W. Ermarth

Sincerely yours,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan
@@ -60585,8 +60600,8 @@

Gorbachev is now actively searching for leverage points on issues that would give him a positive Summit outcome. In this regard, there were several dimensions of your - discussion yesterday with Bessmertnykh that seem particularly significant, more for what was + discussion yesterday with Bessmertnykh that seem particularly significant, more for what was implied rather than directly stated.See Document 257.

Gorbachev Tries @@ -60803,10 +60818,10 @@

On NST, the Soviets were waiting for the Moscow exchanges before proceeding further on Gorbachev’s response to the - President’s proposals, and at - least some of them were disappointed that the delegations (both) turned - out as they did, since the final composition made frank exchanges less - likely than they had hoped.See and + at least some of them were disappointed that the delegations (both) + turned out as they did, since the final composition made frank exchanges + less likely than they had hoped.See Document 263. The work program format calls for two meetings on each topic, and the idea of choosing a smaller group for the second NST @@ -61079,9 +61094,9 @@ corresp="#p_PRN_1">Perle, and Special Assistant to the President Col. Robert Linhard. Karpov, Obukhov, Chervov, Detinov, and Tarasenko (Special Assistant to - Shevardnadze) participated + corresp="#p_OAA_1">Obukhov, Chervov, Detinov, and + Tarasenko (Special Assistant + to Shevardnadze) participated both days on the Soviet side.In his memoir, Shultz recalled: “Paul Nitze headed a @@ -61187,8 +61202,8 @@ continued. We anticipate that these experts will meet again in the near future, with a date to be set in diplomatic channels.

- Shultz + Shultz @@ -61380,8 +61395,8 @@ guidance, should be submitted for my approval not later than September 9, 1986. (C)

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan @@ -61617,10 +61632,10 @@

10. If ACIS may do more to assist you here, please call. (U)

- Douglas - GeorgeGeorge signed “Doug” above his - typed signature. + Douglas GeorgeGeorge signed “Doug” + above his typed signature. @@ -61740,8 +61755,8 @@ target="#t_TASS_1">TASS announcement to that effect would be released later August 30.

- Combs + Combs @@ -61853,8 +61868,8 @@ upsetting our plans for this fall. We will keep you informed as we work with Justice and the Soviets.

- Whitehead + Whitehead @@ -61992,8 +62007,8 @@ corresp="#p_DN_1">Daniloff once the Soviets have made a decision to tough it out.

- Whitehead + Whitehead

Sincerely,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan
- Lynn + Lynn

Sincerely,

- M. - Gorbachev + M. Gorbachev
@@ -62952,8 +62967,8 @@ enable us to put this issue definitively behind us and create a positive climate for work in the weeks ahead.

- Shultz + Shultz @@ -63599,8 +63614,8 @@

I look forward to your early reply.

Respectfully,

- M. - Gorbachev + M. Gorbachev @@ -64151,10 +64166,10 @@ certain practice in this area. Lists had been presented by the Secretary, Ambassador Hartman and The President. Shevardnadze - did not exclude the continuation of this practice. These lists would be carefully examined, - as had been previously done. If Soviet law permitted, appropriate - decisions would be taken.

+ did not exclude the continuation of this practice. These lists would be carefully examined, as + had been previously done. If Soviet law permitted, appropriate decisions + would be taken.

The Secretary indicated that if progress were to be made in defusing the situation, an understanding would need to be reached about this before matters could proceed further.

@@ -64605,9 +64620,9 @@ high. We believed that a 10,000 man level for notification, and a 15,000 level for observers would make agreement meaningful.

On inspection, we had been forthcoming on the nationality of aircraft. - For observer missions to be meaningful, however, the observing side needed to have its - own cameras and navigation equipment. The observing side needed to have + For observer missions to be meaningful, however, the observing side needed to have its own + cameras and navigation equipment. The observing side needed to have someone on the flight deck with communications with inspectors on the ground. There needed to be communications with people on the ground. There had to be a choice between various modes of inspection: @@ -65270,11 +65285,11 @@ (a) foreswear a ballistic missile defense; (b) eliminate nuclear weapons; and (c) develop a cooperative system which would rule out the emergence of any threat from third countries. This was a realistic - approach. Shevardnadze agreed - that some countries had not adhered to the NPT due to the possession by other countries of nuclear - weapons. If nuclear weapons were abolished, it would strengthen the - NPT regime.

+ approach. Shevardnadze + agreed that some countries had not adhered to the NPT due to the possession by other + countries of nuclear weapons. If nuclear weapons were abolished, it + would strengthen the NPT regime.

Shevardnadze emphasized Moscow was not calling for an end to research. Laboratory work, even the development of mock-ups, could go on as insurance against the @@ -66446,9 +66461,9 @@

Shevardnadze agreed. Our representatives at the CD had been cooperating well and had - generated some important momentum. Shevardnadze put down a marker that the Soviets - viewed challenge inspections as reserved for extreme circumstances. + generated some important momentum. Shevardnadze put down a marker that the Soviets viewed + challenge inspections as reserved for extreme circumstances. Nonetheless, to advance the conclusion of a CW convention, the Soviets could accept mutually acceptable procedures which would satisfy verification concerns without threatening @@ -66495,13 +66510,12 @@

Shevardnadze said he was aware that NATO experts were studying recent Soviet proposals for a fresh approach to the problem of conventional - arms in Europe. He felt these proposals deserved careful attention, calling attention to - the fact that they represented a comprehensive package involving - inspections not only of reductions but of residual forces. This was a - fundamental move by the East and warranted the most careful - consideration by the U.S. and NATO.

+ arms in Europe. He felt these proposals deserved careful attention, calling attention to the + fact that they represented a comprehensive package involving inspections + not only of reductions but of residual forces. This was a fundamental + move by the East and warranted the most careful consideration by the + U.S. and NATO.

Soviet concern over next steps in European security was the reason Moscow was prepared to give an impetus to its delegates in the Stockholm conference. After that meeting, it would be necessary to decide where @@ -68483,16 +68497,16 @@ location would impact on the Soviet view about timing.

The Secretary continued that the President was very interested in having additional people released, and that there be specific knowledge about - them, so that we would know where we were going. The Secretary had assured the - President that the Foreign Minister had spoken in good faith, had taken - the U.S. list, had promised to look at it seriously and do the right - thing. The U.S. side would like the Soviet side to do that, and to tell - the U.S. side what it thought was the right thing, so that the U.S. - would know where it was going. The U.S. side had proposed a number of - names to choose from. The Soviet side could let it know the decision it - had taken on specific names, especially since some of the people were - quite ill and no threat to the Soviet Union.

+ them, so that we would know where we were going. The Secretary had assured the President + that the Foreign Minister had spoken in good faith, had taken the U.S. + list, had promised to look at it seriously and do the right thing. The + U.S. side would like the Soviet side to do that, and to tell the U.S. + side what it thought was the right thing, so that the U.S. would know + where it was going. The U.S. side had proposed a number of names to + choose from. The Soviet side could let it know the decision it had taken + on specific names, especially since some of the people were quite ill + and no threat to the Soviet Union.

Shevardnadze replied that he could not promise to do any more than he had indicated. He had said that the maximum had been done. One side had made all the concessions, and the @@ -70920,11 +70934,11 @@ >TTBT/PNET is ratified. The President would make clear that progress in such negotiations would depend on progress in arms reductions, but would - explicitly commit to begin them. Negotiations would have two objectives: agreement on exactly what - limitations would be applied in a step-by-step fashion and detailed - agreement on verification measures, which would have to be in place - before any limits were implemented. This approach downplays the + explicitly commit to begin them. Negotiations would have two objectives: agreement on + exactly what limitations would be applied in a step-by-step fashion and + detailed agreement on verification measures, which would have to be in + place before any limits were implemented. This approach downplays the essential requirement in the President’s approach for a program of reductions and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. (S/S)

@@ -71377,7 +71391,8 @@ learning.

Respectfully yours,

- Cap + Cap
SRINF at least at current Soviet levels, with a U.S. right to match at whatever level, and the lower the better. The Soviets had suggested this. It was in their INF draft treaty. Reluctance now to constrain these + target="#t_INF_1">INF draft treaty. Reluctance now to constrain these short-range systems was troublesome, he said.

The President said he welcomed the fact that Gorbachev’s remarks that morning had addressed @@ -73095,9 +73110,10 @@ were very close together, an international conference might not be necessary; if they were far apart (as they were now), it was hard to see how an international conference would do any good. The U.S. was prepared - to consider how an international framework of some kind could help promote negotiations in the - right circumstances. However, this seemed premature at this point.

+ to consider how an international framework of some kind could help promote negotiations in + the right circumstances. However, this seemed premature at this + point.

Rodman continued that the U.S. had other concerns about an international conference, some having to do with our analysis of the negotiating process and some having to do with @@ -73249,8 +73265,8 @@ the Soviet Union also had its own perceptions of human rights in the United States” and that “this issue would be present in our relations.” (See footnote 1, above) the Soviet - representatives responded that during the first discussion held between held between Gorbachev and President Reagan, Gorbachev had noted specifically where the President had @@ -73716,8 +73732,8 @@ weapons and the need to test them.

The U.S.-proposed language was as follows:

“The U.S. and Soviet Union will begin negotiations on nuclear testing. - The agenda for these negotiations will first be to resolve remaining verification issues + The agenda for these negotiations will first be to resolve remaining verification issues associated with existing treaties. With this resolved, the U.S. and USSR will immediately proceed, in parallel with the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, to From 0150d42fd7e2babffa70e969868bb15cc8217918 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: vak2ve Date: Fri, 12 Nov 2021 15:13:36 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 03/34] Revert "Update frus1981-88v05.xml" This reverts commit ec1f07b290f243d9b218337c225ac30b57daca8b. --- volumes/frus1981-88v05.xml | 1040 ++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 512 insertions(+), 528 deletions(-) diff --git a/volumes/frus1981-88v05.xml b/volumes/frus1981-88v05.xml index 218f074b5..10d3b15fd 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1981-88v05.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1981-88v05.xml @@ -148,14 +148,14 @@ records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government - engaged in foreign policy formulation, - execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State historians by - providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy - decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the - sources consulted in the preparation of this volume were located at the Ronald - Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California, the Department of State - in Washington, and the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives - II) in College Park, Maryland

+ engaged in foreign policy + formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State + historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign + policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most + of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume were located at the + Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California, the Department of + State in Washington, and the National Archives and Records Administration + (Archives II) in College Park, Maryland

The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) @@ -230,9 +230,9 @@ footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document and its original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also - provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major - policy advisers read the document.

+ provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy + advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, @@ -270,21 +270,21 @@ paragraph in 18 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process - described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and + described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of the Reagan administration’s policy toward the Soviet Union.

- - - Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. - - The Historian - Kathleen B. Rasmussen, - Ph.D. - - General Editor - + + Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. + + The Historian + + + Kathleen B. Rasmussen, Ph.D. + + General Editor + Foreign Service Institute @@ -475,10 +475,11 @@ Division. Kerry Hite performed the copy and technical editing under the supervision of Mandy Chalou, Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division.

- Elizabeth C. Charles, - Ph.D. - - Historian + + Elizabeth C. Charles, Ph.D. + + Historian +
@@ -2135,8 +2136,8 @@ community as a whole.

Sincerely,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan @@ -2445,8 +2446,8 @@ future. End summary.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the telegram.]

- Kampelman + Kampelman
31. No distribution without approval of Charles Hill.

- Hartman + Hartman
supplied by + rockets apparently supplied by Libya to Iran had struck Baghdad dramatically underscored this concern.

10. Finally, I noted that there were bilateral problems we could usefully @@ -3780,8 +3781,8 @@ implement the payrolling plan is a good sign. We will know how good April 1.

- Hartman + Hartman
@@ -3986,8 +3987,8 @@ question of the place and time for the meeting.

Sincerely,

- M. Gorbachev + M. + Gorbachev @@ -4249,8 +4250,8 @@ American military men and demands that necessary measures be taken so that the provisions of the Agreement of 1947 be strictly enforced.

- Dam + Dam

Sincerely,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -4902,8 +4903,8 @@ has not enhanced the prestige of the Soviet military establishment with the political leadership.

These are, of course, no more than straws in the wind, and one should not - base policy on inferences drawn from them. But they provide some evidence that vide some evidence that Gorbachev could conceivably judge it to be in his political interest to respond positively to a U.S. initiative which provides the prospect for eased relations—at least for @@ -4950,11 +4951,12 @@ increase military pressure on Pakistan or try some form of armed intervention in Iran.)

Additionally, we might consider making a suggestion which goes further in - regard to some specific situation, such as, for example, assistance in obtaining “no-intervention” - commitments from interested parties as part of a negotiated withdrawal - of Soviet forces from Afghanistan or, perhaps, some understanding in - regard to parallel action to end the Iran-Iraq war.

+ regard to some specific situation, such as, for example, assistance in obtaining + “no-intervention” commitments from interested parties as part of a + negotiated withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan or, perhaps, + some understanding in regard to parallel action to end the Iran-Iraq + war.

(b) Arms Control: Here we will need to offer enough to be interesting—and to provide a basis for arguing that we have taken Soviet SDI concerns into @@ -5472,9 +5474,9 @@ Dobrynin back-pedalled, saying that his comments had been in response to a question, and that he had only been speculating about the possibility of US scientists visiting the radar after its completion 2–3 years hence—in the context, - he added, of better relations than we have now.US scientists visiting the radar after its completion 2–3 years hence—in the + context, he added, of better relations than we have now.In an April 16 article, Pincus wrote on “Dobrynin’s remark Friday that American scientists would be invited to examine the installation @@ -5925,8 +5927,8 @@ have increased tension between our countries.

Sincerely,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan @@ -6200,8 +6202,8 @@ people were withdrawing their savings to put them in stocks of vodka—soon to be as valuable as hard currency.

- Hartman + Hartman @@ -6288,8 +6290,7 @@ will welcome any suggestions you may have in this regard.

Sincerely,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan
US would agree with that, were it not trying to achieve dominance. The US side was trying to argue that it - was engaged in scientific research. In fact, however it was talking about large-scale systems which - would radically alter the strategic situation. This was quite different - from the research permitted by the ABM - Treaty. After all, US and Soviet - scientists and politicians know that in some areas scientific research - involved something on the order of 92 or 95 percent of the effort needed - to develop a new weapons system. After that there remained nothing but - testing and deployment. The US arguments - did not impress the Soviet side. Perhaps the US was impressed by these arguments. After all, modern - psychology made it possible to become convinced of the most implausible - things. Still, that was no way to reach an agreement with the USSR.

+ was engaged in scientific research. In fact, however, it was talking about large-scale systems + which would radically alter the strategic situation. This was quite + different from the research permitted by the ABM Treaty. After all, US + and Soviet scientists and politicians know that in some areas scientific + research involved something on the order of 92 or 95 percent of the + effort needed to develop a new weapons system. After that there remained + nothing but testing and deployment. The US arguments did not impress the Soviet side. Perhaps the + US was impressed by these arguments. + After all, modern psychology made it possible to become convinced of the + most implausible things. Still, that was no way to reach an agreement + with the USSR.

Gromyko noted that the Secretary had not mentioned the moratoria proposed by the Soviet side—specifically in a speech by Gorbachev.USSR advocated the independence of Israel, but it was opposed to Israeli aggression and - advocated liberation of the + advocated liberation of the occupied Arab territories, believing that this cause was just. We would see whether Israel was serious about withdrawing from Lebanon, about leaving no Israeli military personnel there. We would see how things @@ -7959,8 +7960,8 @@ which would be restricted to practical measures, rather than philosophical issues, measures which basically have been agreed upon. The Secretary thought that this would open the door to other things. We - understood that the Soviet Union had conducted productive negotiations - with Pan American on + understood that the Soviet Union had conducted productive negotiations with Pan American on resuming air service. We welcomed that. We were ready to discuss our civil aviation agreement, that is Aeroflot issues. At the same time we had under discussion the question of consulates in Kiev and New York. @@ -8220,9 +8221,9 @@

9. Exchanges on other arms control issues were only marginally better. I reiterated the four proposals to enhance confidence you put forward in your Strasbourg speech, but Gromyko commented negatively in response.See - footnote 2, Document 27. The four + >Gromyko commented negatively in response.See footnote 2, Document 27. The four proposals were: exchange of military observers at military exercises, regular high-level contacts between U.S. and Soviet military leaders, prompt CDE action @@ -8295,8 +8296,8 @@ allies’ agreement to attendance at Foreign Ministers’ level before announcing a decision.

- Shultz + Shultz
S)

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
- Hartman + Hartman
Gorbachev would move on Gromyko before the Party Congress in February next year. I am not distributing this report unless - you want me to.” The memorandum explained that Ryzhkov, [dum + explained that Ryzhkov, [text not declassified] stated that “Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko is being excluded from all planning and preparations for a summit @@ -9754,10 +9755,10 @@

Don asked that this debrief be held to senior officials of the Department.

- Kenneth W. - DamDam initialed “KWD” above his - typed signature. + Kenneth W. DamDam initialed “KWD” above his typed + signature.
@@ -10267,8 +10268,8 @@ the meeting. For our part, we are entirely for this.

Sincerely,

- M. Gorbachev + M. + Gorbachev @@ -11038,8 +11039,8 @@ President, we see an attempt by the United States, taking advantage of geographic factors, to gain a virtual monopoly on the use of weapons in a situation for which our country has no analogue. I know - that on your side the need for some regional balance is sometimes - cited. But even in + that on your side the need for some regional balance is sometimes cited. But even in that case it is incomprehensible why the U.S. refuses to resolve this issue in a manner which would establish in the zone of Europe a balance of medium-range missiles, whereby the

Sincerely,

- M. - Gorbachev + M. + Gorbachev @@ -11410,8 +11411,8 @@ middle level officials of the bureaucracy who were frustrated by the stagnation of the Brezhnev era. The public as well has responded favorably to his style, judging by - initial reaction filtering back through Western sources. His - aggressiveness has placed the + initial reaction filtering back through Western sources. His aggressiveness has placed the opposition on the defensive. His opponents are probably biding their time hoping he makes a major misstep. [portion marking not declassified]

@@ -12041,8 +12042,7 @@ summary.

[Omitted here is the body of the telegram.]

- Hartman + Hartman @@ -12209,10 +12209,9 @@ points? When you have an opportunity, I would like to discuss this with you.

- Paul NitzePrinted from a copy with this typed - signature. + Paul + NitzePrinted from a copy + with this typed signature. @@ -12447,8 +12446,8 @@ colleagues who have met him in Georgia say that he has always had a big interest in foreign affairs and spoke knowledgeably from a brief.

- Hartman + Hartman @@ -13136,8 +13135,8 @@ identified.

10. I will take no action until instructed by you.

- Armacost + Armacost
Charlie Wick (!?) and Palmer. On the Soviet side, Gorbachev, Alexandrov and - Gromyko - were covered. According to - this system, Palmer—if so + Gromyko were covered. According to this system, + Palmer—if so authorized—could pass messages to McSweeney, who would then communicate with Bruk by the Occidental telex, using the code names provided.

That was the extent of the message itself, but McSweeney mentioned to @@ -14081,10 +14080,10 @@ expectations which then led to a big letdown when results were not soon forthcoming.Johnson met with Soviet Premier Kosygin in Glassboro, - New Jersey, in June 1967. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, Documents 228–236. Most important to + target="frus1964-68v14#d236">236. Most important to avoid is another summit along the lines of 1973, when a weakened President sought to create an illusory sense of progress and accomplishment only to communicate a sense to the Soviets that we needed @@ -14520,8 +14519,8 @@ incentives for both sides to hold earlier and regular summits to obtain more substantive progress.

- Whitehead + Whitehead
@@ -14656,8 +14655,8 @@

But you will also want to cite obstacles to progress beyond small steps—our continuing concerns resulting from the Nicholson case; the Berlin air corridors, as a case which still has dangerous potential; the - bleak human rights picture; Soviet pressures on Pakistan. As an example - of mixed and unnecessarily + bleak human rights picture; Soviet pressures on Pakistan. As an example of mixed and unnecessarily ambiguous behavior, you could cite the combination during the TWA hijacking of welcome Soviet statements against terrorism with inflammatory propaganda about US @@ -14943,7 +14942,7 @@ P850139–1123)

Peace,

- John Denver + John Denver @@ -15844,8 +15843,8 @@ appears possible.” To me that opens us to being leveraged to make concessions because of our self-imposed deadline. I preferred the approach of saying that their leadership has changed; that warrants the - setting of a foundation of viewpoints between our leadership centered - upon exchanges, first at + setting of a foundation of viewpoints between our leadership centered upon exchanges, first at Helsinki but then followed by analogous dialogue between Reagan and Gorbachev on how each side views its @@ -16033,8 +16032,8 @@ President’s Daily Diary).

Sincerely,

- M. Gorbachev + M. + Gorbachev @@ -16289,8 +16288,8 @@

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

- Shultz + Shultz @@ -16624,10 +16623,10 @@ of the century.

It’s worth a shot.

- Richard BurtBurt - signed “Rick” above his typed signature. + Richard + BurtBurt signed “Rick” above his + typed signature.
- Shultz + Shultz
@@ -18205,8 +18204,8 @@ the Assistant to the President for National Security shall deem necessary. (S)

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan @@ -18517,8 +18516,8 @@ world.

While the people are largely passive in regard to foreign policy formulation and play none of the direct role that publics do in - democracies, their views - are not unimportant to the leadership. To act contrary to + democracies, their + views are not unimportant to the leadership. To act contrary to deeply-held popular views risks damaging public morale, which is already quite low, and provides ammunition for potential rival factions in the party.

@@ -18860,8 +18859,8 @@ Assistant for National Security Affairs by August 23, 1985. (S)

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan

Respectfully yours,

- William J. CaseyCasey signed “Bill Casey” above his typed - signature. + William J. + CaseyCasey signed “Bill Casey” above his + typed signature.
@@ -19451,7 +19449,7 @@ Matlock Chron September 1985 (2/6)) A “special meeting of selected presidential advisors” was held; see Document 86. After - re-reading them, he commented + re-reading them, he commented that maybe the elements could satisfy the President’s requirement.

—Bud said what was necessary was a clear indication by the President of what he wanted, then the community would fall in to get it done. He @@ -19786,8 +19784,7 @@ a final document could be best organized.

Sincerely yours,

- M. - Gorbachev + M. Gorbachev @@ -19984,12 +19981,12 @@ doubtless some.Robert O. Anderson, Chairman and CEO of Atlantic-Richfield Oil Company, proposed the project to Velikhov during a trip - to the Soviet Union in May 1984. See Foreign - Relations, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January - 1983–March 1985, Document 244, footnote 3. Although - it could have considerable symbolic value, I am inclined to think we - don’t have time to staff it properly.

+ to the Soviet Union in May 1984. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. + IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 244, + footnote 3. Although it could have considerable + symbolic value, I am inclined to think we don’t have time to staff it + properly.

—A proposal to cooperate in developing microcomputer educational software for secondary school instruction might be a relatively safe one which has Soviet interest (Velikhov @@ -20219,7 +20216,7 @@ >McFarlane’s position. He said we should try to develop a formula where we could continue testing, and we had to be careful not to give anybody a veto power over deployment if the testing works out. He - did say that large reductions + did say that large reductions would make us safer and we should work to see what we can give to get large reductions.

Secretary Weinberger developed @@ -20306,12 +20303,13 @@ Both Bill Casey and I think it is an excellent piece of work and commend it to you.

- Robert M. - GatesGates signed “Bob” above his - typed signature. + Robert M. GatesGates signed “Bob” above his typed + signature. - Deputy Director for Intelligence + Deputy Director for + Intelligence @@ -20395,8 +20393,8 @@ notwithstanding Moscow’s pulling out all the stops and SDI has not been halted or slowed by Soviet threats and recriminations. Rather the lesson appears to be - that these programs have prospered if only because of Soviet behavior. Meanwhile pered if only because of Soviet behavior. Meanwhile SDI threatens at a minimum to upset the pace of the strategic competition, one which Moscow is comfortable with, and add much uncertainty to where the “correlation @@ -21751,10 +21749,8 @@ know. I cannot overemphasize how closely I want this work held. (S)

- ORIGINAL SIGNED - - Ronald - Reagan + ORIGINAL SIGNED + Ronald Reagan @@ -23166,8 +23162,8 @@ strategic modernization program, if funded and executed, would provide sufficient forces to implement our national strategy for at least the near-term against known and currently forecast Soviet offensive forces. - However, public and Congressional attitudes call into question our ability to maintain + However, public and Congressional attitudes call into question our ability to maintain necessary full funding of this critical program. (S)

What is more, Soviet defensive activities (which are largely unmatched by @@ -23277,9 +23273,9 @@

Conclusions about Question 1b. In short, a Soviet proposal along the lines suggested at Tab A would not provide a basis for an acceptable agreement that would be in the - long-term U.S. national interest. Provisions that would adversely affect our security - include the following: (TS/O)

+ long-term U.S. national interest. Provisions that would adversely affect our security include the + following: (TS/O)

—Constraints on SDI. The Soviets will press for restraints on research now permitted by the ABM Treaty, a @@ -23336,12 +23332,12 @@

The U.S. SDI program is presently designed to be compatible with traditional interpretations of the ABM Treaty’s limitations, recognizing that - this commitment has cost and schedule implications for the program. At present, it is believed - that—having paid those costs—sufficient work can be conducted within - these interpretations to permit reasonable feasibility judgments on full - scale development and deployment to be made. However, several important - caveats to this statement are in order.

+ this commitment has cost and schedule implications for the program. At present, it is + believed that—having paid those costs—sufficient work can be conducted + within these interpretations to permit reasonable feasibility judgments + on full scale development and deployment to be made. However, several + important caveats to this statement are in order.

(1) As the SDI program proceeds, technical difficulties may be encountered which invalidate this assessment.

@@ -23925,13 +23921,13 @@

14. This report is being made available to the chief US arms control negotiators in Geneva.

- Clair E. GeorgeAn unknown hand signed for George above this typed - signature. + Clair E. + GeorgeAn unknown hand + signed for George above + this typed signature. - Deputy Director for Operations + Deputy Director for + Operations @@ -25118,8 +25114,8 @@ issues being covered in the Geneva arms control talks.

I gave Shevardnadze an extensive presentation of our views on how to enhance nuclear stability, stressing - that the underlying assumptions of the ABM Treaty and tions + of the ABM Treaty and SALT I have been undermined. I made clear that we now need to get on with the process of radical reductions in offensive arms, reversing the erosion of the

• After the meeting Korniyenko asserted that it was unfortunate that I had quoted Agreed Statement - D without reference to the introductory wording of that statement: “In order to - insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components - except as provided in Article III of the Treaty. . . .”

+ D without reference to the introductory wording of that statement: “In order to insure + fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in + Article III of the Treaty. . . .”

I pointed out to Korniyenko that Article III deals only with the undertaking not to deploy. I said I had emphasized that Agreed Statement D prohibits deployment of systems based @@ -25273,11 +25269,12 @@ in rebuttal of Korniyenko’s point.

- Paul H. - Nitze - - Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary - of State on Arms Control Matters + + Paul H. Nitze + + Special Advisor to the President and + the Secretary of State on Arms Control + Matters @@ -25513,10 +25510,11 @@ President of the United States.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

- John W. Vessey, Jr. + John W. Vessey, + Jr. - ChairmanJoint Chiefs of Staff + ChairmanJoint Chiefs of + Staff @@ -25991,7 +25989,7 @@ pp. 975–976. For Gorbachev’s letter to Reagan announcing the moratorium, see Document 68. He - was interested in a sentence + was interested in a sentence which the President uttered at that time which he did not believe was accidental. It was to the effect that the United States has a projected program and after this program is completed, can revisit the problem. He @@ -26020,8 +26018,8 @@ target="#t_SS_1">S/S)

Every country has its pride and identity and those things which are sacred to it. We for example would be pleased to pay tribute to - George Washington—even our - first-graders know about George + George Washington—even our + first-graders know about George Washington and the role he played in American history—but you know we are very much offended by some of the things that have been said about Lenin. We haven’t done that sort of thing to you. Explaining @@ -27221,7 +27219,7 @@ establish a basis for currying favor with Gorbachev, but a Kissinger connection would not necessarily accomplish - that. If ultimately you decide + that. If ultimately you decide to establish a private channel, I would not recommend that it be through Kissinger. (S)

@@ -28117,8 +28115,8 @@ Anatoly F. Dobrynin.

Sincerely yours,

- M. Gorbachev + M. + Gorbachev @@ -28270,8 +28268,8 @@ desire to announce new cooperative programs in Geneva when the general exchanges agreement is signed.

- Shultz + Shultz @@ -28459,9 +28457,9 @@ n="4" xml:id="d118fn4">See footnote 2, Document 112 and footnote 6, Document 114. - Akhromeyev provides a strong endorsement of the - Soviet proposals and accuses U.S. spokesmen of efforts to discredit + Akhromeyev provides a strong endorsement of + the Soviet proposals and accuses U.S. spokesmen of efforts to discredit Moscow’s initiatives. The Chief of Staff also provides detailed, although standard, refutations of major U.S. criticisms of the Soviet proposals.

@@ -28560,8 +28558,8 @@ clear a statement of military concern as we are likely to see in the Soviet context.

- Hartman + Hartman

Sincerely,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -29331,8 +29329,8 @@ purpose was to review what they had been able to do and how to go about making the Summit successful and meeting the hopes for the future. The day before he had mentioned to the President that the Soviets had taken - certain steps. On the one hand, they had made some large-scale proposals - with regard to security. + certain steps. On the one hand, they had made some large-scale proposals with regard to security. For example, they had proposed a prohibition on space-strike weapons, deep cuts on strategic weapons, as well as addressing medium-ranged weapons in Europe. That is how they see the proposals which they are @@ -29878,8 +29876,8 @@ target="#t_US_1">US has blocked out an approach. Shevardnadze had given some suggested language. So the Secretary would give him some of ours (Secretary hands - over draft joint - communique).Neither draft was + over draft joint communique).Neither draft was found. It may be that in the end we may decide not to do this. So this is not given to the Soviet side as finally decided. With that in mind and noting that there are lots of brackets to be filled in, @@ -30404,8 +30402,8 @@ proposals prior to the U.S. and Soviet delegations departing Geneva. (S)

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan

Sincerely,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -30969,8 +30967,8 @@ between our two countries on a more constructive course.

Sincerely yours,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
+ the world’s diplomatic stage and cement Moscow’s international standing. From the 1963 signing of the Partial Test-Ban Agreement through the mid-1970s when agreements were concluded on a host of arms control issues, Soviet @@ -31343,7 +31341,7 @@ example. But this concept is worth pursuing in my judgment. Is this the sort of thing you had in mind?

- Bud + Bud @@ -32090,8 +32088,8 @@ we about strategy and military power, including nuclear power. Study of the Soviet buildup, of Soviet military exercises and command structures, of their military writings (including very sensitive - documents collected clandestinely) has taught us a great deal about Soviet strategy and + documents collected clandestinely) has taught us a great deal about Soviet strategy and military thinking. It underscores some important differences from our own.

This shouldn’t have been surprising to us. After all, the Soviets are @@ -32508,25 +32506,25 @@ their first agreement. He said perhaps it would be possible to present briefly U.S. thoughts on the Geneva negotiations. U.S. negotiators had presented proposals there, and the U.S. believes they offer a real - opportunity to make progress. U.S. negotiators in Geneva have presented a new and - comprehensive proposal designed to build upon positive elements in the - Soviet Union’s recent counter-proposal, to bridge the positions of the - two sides. That, he observed, was how the U.S. had worked. Shultz pointed out that at the same - time, he wanted to emphasize that previous U.S. negotiating positions - remain on the table for Soviet consideration as well. He said that as - had been noted, the U.S. proposal deals with all three areas under - discussion in the Geneva talks, because the U.S. believes a relationship - exists between the areas. The U.S. proposal has been shaped to achieve - deep reductions. The U.S. agreed and agrees to focus on areas and - weapons which are more de-stabilizing. In the area of strategic - offensive arms, the U.S. focused on the 50 percent reduction principle - contained in the counterproposal of the Soviet side. The U.S. proposal - also incorporates reductions which would result in a total of 6,000 - ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs. - The U.S., too, attempted to use that number, and like the Soviet side, - to address itself as well to re-entry vehicles on land-based ballistic + opportunity to make progress. U.S. negotiators in Geneva have presented a new and comprehensive + proposal designed to build upon positive elements in the Soviet Union’s + recent counter-proposal, to bridge the positions of the two sides. That, + he observed, was how the U.S. had worked. Shultz pointed out that at the same time, he wanted to + emphasize that previous U.S. negotiating positions remain on the table + for Soviet consideration as well. He said that as had been noted, the + U.S. proposal deals with all three areas under discussion in the Geneva + talks, because the U.S. believes a relationship exists between the + areas. The U.S. proposal has been shaped to achieve deep reductions. The + U.S. agreed and agrees to focus on areas and weapons which are more + de-stabilizing. In the area of strategic offensive arms, the U.S. + focused on the 50 percent reduction principle contained in the + counterproposal of the Soviet side. The U.S. proposal also incorporates + reductions which would result in a total of 6,000 ballistic missile + warheads and ALCMs. The U.S., too, + attempted to use that number, and like the Soviet side, to address + itself as well to re-entry vehicles on land-based ballistic missiles.

Shultz said he had been speaking about what the U.S. agreed with. Now, he would address things the U.S. @@ -32999,7 +32997,7 @@ >Gorbachev during a September 3 meeting. (Telegram 12144 from Moscow, September 3; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850623–0169) The - Secretary suggested that U.S. + Secretary suggested that U.S. and Soviet experts meet to explore this and other ideas which could reduce the risk of military confrontation.

The Secretary noted that he had already outlined the new U.S. —both philosophically and operationally so that we have - some idea before it becomes truly operational how we handle it.

+ addressed now—in its interrelationship—both philosophically and operationally so that we have some + idea before it becomes truly operational how we handle it.

Korniyenko interrupted to ask a clarifying question “to facilitate” the Secretary’s reply. What the Secretary had said, - Shultz + Shultz

@@ -35056,8 +35054,8 @@ given up his optimism and he looks forward to the meeting with the President and sends him his best regards.

- Hartman + Hartman @@ -35377,14 +35375,14 @@ connection with the Geneva summit.

15. On regional issues, said Shevardnadze, you have spoken broadly about geographical - regions and about the bilateral consultations we have conducted. You have spoken favorably - about continuing these. I believe we could make a general statement on - this matter, and I understand our experts did some work on this last - night. It would hardly be possible to produce a joint statement on - individual regions. The Soviet side favors political settlements in - every part of the world; we also favor continuing these consultations on - a more systematic basis.

+ regions and about the bilateral consultations we have conducted. You have spoken favorably about + continuing these. I believe we could make a general statement on this + matter, and I understand our experts did some work on this last night. + It would hardly be possible to produce a joint statement on individual + regions. The Soviet side favors political settlements in every part of + the world; we also favor continuing these consultations on a more + systematic basis.

16. Shevardnadze then turned to bilateral questions. We are near agreement on a number of issues, he said. While only final steps remain, we understand that such steps are @@ -35609,8 +35607,8 @@ decisive stage in preparing for the summit and we approached all of the matters under discussion in that light.

- Hartman + Hartman @@ -37355,9 +37353,8 @@ boost to the Soviet political offensive against our SDI program.

- Fred C. IklePrinted from a copy that bears this typed - signature. + Fred C. IklePrinted from a copy + that bears this typed signature.
even if they were classified - as defensive. People would not be in a position to determine what it was - that would be placed into space and would surely regard it as an - additional threat, thereby creating crisis situations. If the goal was - to get rid of nuclear weapons, why start an arms race in another - sphere?

+ unreliable because of their maneuverability and mobility even if they were classified as defensive. + People would not be in a position to determine what it was that would be + placed into space and would surely regard it as an additional threat, + thereby creating crisis situations. If the goal was to get rid of + nuclear weapons, why start an arms race in another sphere?

The President asked Gorbachev to remember that these were not weapons that kill people or destroy cities, these were weapons that destroy nuclear @@ -41636,8 +41632,7 @@ xml:id="d161fn9">An unknown hand wrote “DOE” at the end of the point.

- Mark - Palmer + Mark Palmer
@@ -41969,8 +41964,7 @@ something of our country next year.

Sincerely Yours,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan @@ -42257,8 +42251,8 @@ up Geneva issues. To date we have received nothing from Washington on either matter.

- Hartman + Hartman @@ -42397,8 +42391,8 @@ target="#t_US_1">US Administration.

Sincerely,

- M. Gorbachev + M. + Gorbachev @@ -42529,16 +42523,16 @@ us in other areas.

At Geneva, I noted our pleasure that our embassy had been informed that a number of separated spouses would be allowed to leave the Soviet Union - to join their husbands or wives. Some unfortunately have yet to hear this officially. Moreover, we - have difficulty reconciling your number of ten spouses being held for a - limited time because of security concerns with the longer list of such - people who we know seek to be united with their loved ones. One of these - cases involves a blind Soviet woman in her sixties who has been - separated from her husband for almost thirty years. Another longtime - case involves a Soviet man driven by desperation into two - life-threatening hunger strikes in an effort to join his wife and small - children in the United States. Several other cases have remained + to join their husbands or wives. Some unfortunately have yet to hear this officially. + Moreover, we have difficulty reconciling your number of ten spouses + being held for a limited time because of security concerns with the + longer list of such people who we know seek to be united with their + loved ones. One of these cases involves a blind Soviet woman in her + sixties who has been separated from her husband for almost thirty years. + Another longtime case involves a Soviet man driven by desperation into + two life-threatening hunger strikes in an effort to join his wife and + small children in the United States. Several other cases have remained unresolved for many years.

We have provided your government with a list of 17 names in addition to those we have already been informed will be released; they all deserve @@ -42593,8 +42587,8 @@ back.

Sincerely,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
Baldrige was accompanied by Under Secretary Smart, Ambassador Hartman - and DCM + corresp="#p_HAA_1">Hartman and DCM Combs (notetaker). Gorbachev’s overall approach was moderate and relaxed throughout the 95 minute meeting. End @@ -43036,8 +43029,8 @@ corresp="#p_GMS_1">Gorbachev accepted the gift with thanks.

- Hartman + Hartman

7. You might brief the Secretary along these lines.

- Whitehead + Whitehead
PNET). (S)

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -43447,8 +43440,8 @@ to you and your spouse our warmest wishes.

Respectfully,

- M. Gorbachev + M. + Gorbachev
.

Sincerely,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -43772,8 +43765,8 @@ future. I think, the chances are not bad here.

Sincerely,

- M. Gorbachev + M. + Gorbachev @@ -43919,8 +43912,8 @@ January 15; the electronic text of telegrams 12554, 12553, and 12552 was corrupted. (U)

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan

Sincerely,

- M. Gorbachev + M. + Gorbachev
@@ -44562,10 +44555,9 @@ the Congress and issue a press statement along the lines of the one the Secretary had given him.

- Paul H. NitzePrinted from a copy with this typed - signature. + Paul H. + NitzePrinted from a copy + with this typed signature. @@ -44657,10 +44649,10 @@ Secretariat Sensitive (01/16/1986–01/17/1986); NLR–775–15–7–3–5)

- Ed RownyRowny - signed “Ed” above his typed signature. + Ed + RownyRowny signed “Ed” above his + typed signature. @@ -44861,10 +44853,10 @@ in Europe, Soviet agreement to redress the imbalance in conventional forces in Europe would be of overriding importance.

- H. Allen HolmesHolmes - signed “Allen” above his typed signature. + H. Allen + HolmesHolmes signed “Allen” above + his typed signature.
The Soviet “plan” narrows the focus on the total elimination of all nuclear weapons by 1999, making that a goal in itself. It does not address the corresponding deterrence and stability rationale for - weapons or the associated - mechanisms including equitable reductions, compliance and SDI, that will be needed either to - eliminate these underlying security requirements or replace the + weapons or the + associated mechanisms including equitable reductions, compliance and + SDI, that will be needed either + to eliminate these underlying security requirements or replace the contribution now made by the nuclear weapons. It offers no schedule for the resolution of existing regional conflicts and differences and, in the process, sets up a situation in which, if the @@ -46814,8 +46806,8 @@ of the feasibility of an international effort to build a prototype fusion power plant. (C)

7. Cancer Research: The Secretary of Health and Human Services, in - cooperation with the National Institutes of Health, shall be responsible - for developing a + cooperation with the National Institutes of Health, shall be responsible for developing a cooperative program in this area, utilizing the U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Medical Science and Public Health as a framework for @@ -46838,8 +46830,8 @@ with General Secretary Gorbachev will be scheduled for this year. (C)

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
Jack Matlock agrees with this approach.

- Mark - PalmerPalmer signed “MP” above his - typed signature. + Mark PalmerPalmer + signed “MP” above his typed signature. @@ -47091,10 +47082,10 @@ Gorbachev as more assertive and characterized by a greater willingness to expand its military involvement in regional disputes. Sokolov’s own sense of Gorbachev’ - approach was that the - new leader saw no Soviet interest in getting more deeply engaged in - these areas of conflict. Sokolov’s own sense of Gorbachev’s approach was that + the new leader saw no Soviet interest in getting more deeply engaged + in these areas of conflict. Sokolov claimed to reflect the view in Moscow in asserting that since Geneva the U.S. seemed to be reverting to a more belligerent stance on regional questions. In what may have been @@ -47375,8 +47366,8 @@ (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 707)

- Burt + Burt
@@ -48165,8 +48156,8 @@ countries, and a safer world.

Sincerely,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan @@ -48624,10 +48615,10 @@ matter.

Sincerely yours,

- George P. ShultzShultz - signed “George” above his typed signature. + George P. + ShultzShultz signed “George” above + his typed signature. @@ -48933,8 +48924,8 @@ bilateral relations. However, we must make it clear that we are prepared to respond to Soviet retaliation firmly and appropriately. Our goal will be to make clear our determination to stand by our decision on the SMUN - reduction without unnecessarily accelerating the cycle of retaliation. At the same time, we will warn + reduction without unnecessarily + accelerating the cycle of retaliation. At the same time, we will warn the Soviets that if they choose to begin retaliation, we will not accept an outcome which results in a significant imbalance in our respective bilateral presence. We have obtained White House authorization to @@ -49156,8 +49147,8 @@

Ronald Reagan

End text.

- Shultz + Shultz

As the meeting was breaking up, Ryzhkov stressed with some feeling the need for - continued work on the full range of issues, including the question of a future - meeting. The Soviet position, he said, was that no doors should be - closed with respect to such a meeting.

+ continued work on the full range of issues, including the question of a future meeting. The + Soviet position, he said, was that no doors should be closed with + respect to such a meeting.

The two superpowers had a responsibility for the future of the entire world. He hoped the meeting could conclude on that note. The Secretary agreed.

@@ -50006,15 +49997,11 @@ first presentation to Dobrynin.

- - Mark - Palmer - Charles - ThomasPalmer - signed “Mark” and Thomas signed “T” above their typed - signatures. - + Mark + Palmer + Charles ThomasPalmer signed “Mark” and + Thomas signed “T” above their typed signatures. @@ -50365,8 +50352,8 @@ can be expected when Dobrynin meets with the President April 8.

- Whitehead + Whitehead
@@ -50532,8 +50519,8 @@

I will be looking forward with interest to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

- M. Gorbachev + M. + Gorbachev
- Hartman + Hartman
@@ -51098,8 +51085,7 @@ the official rationale for the initiative.

I would greatly appreciate it if you will give this memorandum to the President, since it embodies a matter I think is very important.

- Cap + Cap @@ -51860,8 +51846,8 @@ Gorbacheva.

Sincerely,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan @@ -52419,10 +52405,10 @@ Sokolov’s own sense that Moscow is anxious to limit damage to the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

- Rozanne L. RidgwayRidgway - signed “RR” above her typed + Rozanne L. + RidgwayRidgway signed “RR” above her typed signature. @@ -53035,8 +53021,8 @@ international implications may result, we would appreciate any additional details you can provide on the Chernobyl accident.

- Whitehead + Whitehead
- Whitehead + Whitehead
- Whitehead + Whitehead
- Whitehead + Whitehead
@@ -53625,8 +53611,8 @@ corresp="#p_YB_1">Yel’tsin has overstepped his leash. We suspect the former, but cannot exclude the latter.

- Hartman + Hartman @@ -53761,8 +53747,8 @@ positive way.

End text.

- Whitehead + Whitehead
Shultz.

- Hartman + Hartman
Kohl had proposed this. End FYI.

- Armacost + Armacost
@@ -54190,12 +54176,12 @@ to divert Western attention from the Soviet performance during the accident.

- Nicholas PlattKenneth Quinn signed for Platt. + Nicholas + PlattKenneth Quinn + signed for Platt. - Executive Secretary + Executive + Secretary @@ -54261,10 +54247,10 @@ get things off dead center. I will send you some specific ideas in the next few days.

- Roz RidgwayRidgway - signed “Roz” above her typed signature. + Roz + RidgwayRidgway signed “Roz” above her + typed signature. @@ -54517,8 +54503,8 @@ did not say he could not accept the invitation and certainly did not close the door on the possibility.

- Combs + Combs

Sincerely yours,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -55232,8 +55218,8 @@ arms control negotiations.” He asserted that the Soviet Union had always taken a serious approach and wanted progress in arms control.

- Hartman + Hartman

Warm regards.

- Kampelman + Kampelman
@@ -55532,20 +55518,20 @@ the year should be: restore the budget cuts to defense and international functions, work on alliance relationships, and go for a good arms control agreement.” (Ibid.) We have a chance to - look at things desirable—reduce and weapons.This and all other omissions are in the original. There is - real negotiating going on at Geneva. He perceives both U.S. and the - Soviets struggling to find the next direction. Again held forth on the - victory of freedom. The value - of free and open markets, negotiating with entrepeneurs. He cited China, - the recent meeting of the African nations—Soviets have lost ideological - battle. Their position is based only on military strength. He thinks we - have greater military and doubts that they could have pulled off the - Libya raid. They have two bases outside Libya. We have lots of bases. - Only Soviet advantage is in Lenin based strength. U.S. not as good as - Soviets particularly because we are not good at . It would be to our - advantage to reduce this advantage of the Soviets. Soviets are - floundering.

+ look at things desirable—reduce and ______ weapons.This and all other omissions are in the + original. There is real negotiating going on at Geneva. He + perceives both U.S. and the Soviets struggling to find the next + direction. Again held forth on the victory of freedom. The value of free and open markets, + negotiating with entrepeneurs. He cited China, the recent meeting of the + African nations—Soviets have lost ideological battle. Their position is + based only on military strength. He thinks we have greater military and + doubts that they could have pulled off the Libya raid. They have two + bases outside Libya. We have lots of bases. Only Soviet advantage is in + Lenin based strength. U.S. not as good as Soviets particularly because + we are not good at ______. It would be to our advantage to reduce this + advantage of the Soviets. Soviets are floundering.

3. He then went into historical deductions. In the Nixon years of linkage, linkage did not work. The Soviets took advantage of opportunity—Afghanistan and @@ -55556,10 +55542,11 @@ furor over the KAL shootdown. The tension separated the two countries at the Geneva negotiations. They were sent back with the message that arms control is important in - itself. The allies liked this. They did not recognize , namely, that we - are pursuing our own interests independent of the Soviets. Shultz mentioned his Rand speech.See footnote 2, Document 2. + itself. The allies liked this. They did not recognize ______, namely, + that we are pursuing our own interests independent of the Soviets. + Shultz mentioned his Rand + speech.See footnote 2, Document + 2. Shultz says that all the Soviets have been able to do is to cite violation in the spirit of Geneva. There is no spirit in Geneva. The two have different concepts of the @@ -55583,8 +55570,8 @@ on the other hand if an agreement could be struck with Reagan, he will be able to make it stick better than the next President may be likely to do. Finally, the - next President will take time to sort out a and figure out his strategy - and he would not be ready for dealing until sometime in 1990. Meanwhile, military and economic pressures on Gorbachev are great. A lot going on in defense area. This is the first time we @@ -55712,10 +55699,9 @@ the gas mask to protect against mad men.” The bottom line was we should recognize and appreciate what the Soviets have put forward.

- William J. CaseyPrinted from a copy that bears his typed - signature. + William J. + CaseyPrinted from a copy + that bears his typed signature.
- Hartman + Hartman
@@ -56801,10 +56787,10 @@ year, but no agreement until the eve of his departure from office.

Regarding other matters, the President’s people have made clear that they would like progress on a chemical weapons ban and are prepared to - negotiate agreements on Afghanistan and a range of bilateral matters. We now believe that - there is a real possibility of progress in Vienna and on taking some - confidence-building measures.

+ negotiate agreements on Afghanistan and a range of bilateral matters. We now believe + that there is a real possibility of progress in Vienna and on taking + some confidence-building measures.

We think there are possibilities in all five of these areas. The President and Shultz have persistently pushed the idea that in 1986 we need agreements on the key @@ -57484,8 +57470,7 @@ and U.S., about which I spoke to you at the beginning of my letter.

End text of letter

- Whitehead + Whitehead @@ -58208,8 +58193,8 @@

Moscow.

End text.

- Shultz + Shultz @@ -58332,8 +58317,8 @@ n="1032"/> judgment, but it’s hard not to see here both a challenge and an opportunity demanding an extra effort on our part.

- Fritz W. Ermarth + Fritz W. + Ermarth

Sincerely yours,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -60600,8 +60585,8 @@

Gorbachev is now actively searching for leverage points on issues that would give him a positive Summit outcome. In this regard, there were several dimensions of your - discussion yesterday with Bessmertnykh that seem particularly significant, more for what was + discussion yesterday with Bessmertnykh that seem particularly significant, more for what was implied rather than directly stated.See Document 257.

Gorbachev Tries @@ -60818,10 +60803,10 @@

On NST, the Soviets were waiting for the Moscow exchanges before proceeding further on Gorbachev’s response to the - President’s proposals, and - at least some of them were disappointed that the delegations (both) - turned out as they did, since the final composition made frank exchanges - less likely than they had hoped.See als, and at + least some of them were disappointed that the delegations (both) turned + out as they did, since the final composition made frank exchanges less + likely than they had hoped.See Document 263. The work program format calls for two meetings on each topic, and the idea of choosing a smaller group for the second NST @@ -61094,9 +61079,9 @@ corresp="#p_PRN_1">Perle, and Special Assistant to the President Col. Robert Linhard. Karpov, Obukhov, Chervov, Detinov, and - Tarasenko (Special Assistant - to Shevardnadze) participated + corresp="#p_OAA_1">Obukhov, Chervov, Detinov, and Tarasenko (Special Assistant to + Shevardnadze) participated both days on the Soviet side.In his memoir, Shultz recalled: “Paul Nitze headed a @@ -61202,8 +61187,8 @@ continued. We anticipate that these experts will meet again in the near future, with a date to be set in diplomatic channels.

- Shultz + Shultz @@ -61395,8 +61380,8 @@ guidance, should be submitted for my approval not later than September 9, 1986. (C)

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan @@ -61632,10 +61617,10 @@

10. If ACIS may do more to assist you here, please call. (U)

- Douglas GeorgeGeorge signed “Doug” - above his typed signature. + Douglas + GeorgeGeorge signed “Doug” above his + typed signature. @@ -61755,8 +61740,8 @@ target="#t_TASS_1">TASS announcement to that effect would be released later August 30.

- Combs + Combs @@ -61868,8 +61853,8 @@ upsetting our plans for this fall. We will keep you informed as we work with Justice and the Soviets.

- Whitehead + Whitehead @@ -62007,8 +61992,8 @@ corresp="#p_DN_1">Daniloff once the Soviets have made a decision to tough it out.

- Whitehead + Whitehead

Sincerely,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
- Lynn + Lynn

Sincerely,

- M. Gorbachev + M. + Gorbachev
@@ -62967,8 +62952,8 @@ enable us to put this issue definitively behind us and create a positive climate for work in the weeks ahead.

- Shultz + Shultz @@ -63614,8 +63599,8 @@

I look forward to your early reply.

Respectfully,

- M. Gorbachev + M. + Gorbachev @@ -64166,10 +64151,10 @@ certain practice in this area. Lists had been presented by the Secretary, Ambassador Hartman and The President. Shevardnadze - did not exclude the continuation of this practice. These lists would be carefully examined, as - had been previously done. If Soviet law permitted, appropriate decisions - would be taken.

+ did not exclude the continuation of this practice. These lists would be carefully examined, + as had been previously done. If Soviet law permitted, appropriate + decisions would be taken.

The Secretary indicated that if progress were to be made in defusing the situation, an understanding would need to be reached about this before matters could proceed further.

@@ -64620,9 +64605,9 @@ high. We believed that a 10,000 man level for notification, and a 15,000 level for observers would make agreement meaningful.

On inspection, we had been forthcoming on the nationality of aircraft. - For observer missions to be meaningful, however, the observing side needed to have its own - cameras and navigation equipment. The observing side needed to have + For observer missions to be meaningful, however, the observing side needed to have its + own cameras and navigation equipment. The observing side needed to have someone on the flight deck with communications with inspectors on the ground. There needed to be communications with people on the ground. There had to be a choice between various modes of inspection: @@ -65285,11 +65270,11 @@ (a) foreswear a ballistic missile defense; (b) eliminate nuclear weapons; and (c) develop a cooperative system which would rule out the emergence of any threat from third countries. This was a realistic - approach. Shevardnadze - agreed that some countries had not adhered to the NPT due to the possession by other - countries of nuclear weapons. If nuclear weapons were abolished, it - would strengthen the NPT regime.

+ approach. Shevardnadze agreed + that some countries had not adhered to the NPT due to the possession by other countries of nuclear + weapons. If nuclear weapons were abolished, it would strengthen the + NPT regime.

Shevardnadze emphasized Moscow was not calling for an end to research. Laboratory work, even the development of mock-ups, could go on as insurance against the @@ -66461,9 +66446,9 @@

Shevardnadze agreed. Our representatives at the CD had been cooperating well and had - generated some important momentum. Shevardnadze put down a marker that the Soviets viewed - challenge inspections as reserved for extreme circumstances. + generated some important momentum. Shevardnadze put down a marker that the Soviets + viewed challenge inspections as reserved for extreme circumstances. Nonetheless, to advance the conclusion of a CW convention, the Soviets could accept mutually acceptable procedures which would satisfy verification concerns without threatening @@ -66510,12 +66495,13 @@

Shevardnadze said he was aware that NATO experts were studying recent Soviet proposals for a fresh approach to the problem of conventional - arms in Europe. He felt these proposals deserved careful attention, calling attention to the - fact that they represented a comprehensive package involving inspections - not only of reductions but of residual forces. This was a fundamental - move by the East and warranted the most careful consideration by the - U.S. and NATO.

+ arms in Europe. He felt these proposals deserved careful attention, calling attention to + the fact that they represented a comprehensive package involving + inspections not only of reductions but of residual forces. This was a + fundamental move by the East and warranted the most careful + consideration by the U.S. and NATO.

Soviet concern over next steps in European security was the reason Moscow was prepared to give an impetus to its delegates in the Stockholm conference. After that meeting, it would be necessary to decide where @@ -68497,16 +68483,16 @@ location would impact on the Soviet view about timing.

The Secretary continued that the President was very interested in having additional people released, and that there be specific knowledge about - them, so that we would know where we were going. The Secretary had assured the President - that the Foreign Minister had spoken in good faith, had taken the U.S. - list, had promised to look at it seriously and do the right thing. The - U.S. side would like the Soviet side to do that, and to tell the U.S. - side what it thought was the right thing, so that the U.S. would know - where it was going. The U.S. side had proposed a number of names to - choose from. The Soviet side could let it know the decision it had taken - on specific names, especially since some of the people were quite ill - and no threat to the Soviet Union.

+ them, so that we would know where we were going. The Secretary had assured the + President that the Foreign Minister had spoken in good faith, had taken + the U.S. list, had promised to look at it seriously and do the right + thing. The U.S. side would like the Soviet side to do that, and to tell + the U.S. side what it thought was the right thing, so that the U.S. + would know where it was going. The U.S. side had proposed a number of + names to choose from. The Soviet side could let it know the decision it + had taken on specific names, especially since some of the people were + quite ill and no threat to the Soviet Union.

Shevardnadze replied that he could not promise to do any more than he had indicated. He had said that the maximum had been done. One side had made all the concessions, and the @@ -70934,11 +70920,11 @@ >TTBT/PNET is ratified. The President would make clear that progress in such negotiations would depend on progress in arms reductions, but would - explicitly commit to begin them. Negotiations would have two objectives: agreement on - exactly what limitations would be applied in a step-by-step fashion and - detailed agreement on verification measures, which would have to be in - place before any limits were implemented. This approach downplays the + explicitly commit to begin them. Negotiations would have two objectives: agreement on exactly what + limitations would be applied in a step-by-step fashion and detailed + agreement on verification measures, which would have to be in place + before any limits were implemented. This approach downplays the essential requirement in the President’s approach for a program of reductions and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. (S/S)

@@ -71391,8 +71377,7 @@ learning.

Respectfully yours,

- Cap + Cap
SRINF at least at current Soviet levels, with a U.S. right to match at whatever level, and the lower the better. The Soviets had suggested this. It was in their INF draft treaty. Reluctance now to constrain these + target="#t_INF_1">INF draft treaty. Reluctance now to constrain these short-range systems was troublesome, he said.

The President said he welcomed the fact that Gorbachev’s remarks that morning had addressed @@ -73110,10 +73095,9 @@ were very close together, an international conference might not be necessary; if they were far apart (as they were now), it was hard to see how an international conference would do any good. The U.S. was prepared - to consider how an international framework of some kind could help promote negotiations in - the right circumstances. However, this seemed premature at this - point.

+ to consider how an international framework of some kind could help promote negotiations in the + right circumstances. However, this seemed premature at this point.

Rodman continued that the U.S. had other concerns about an international conference, some having to do with our analysis of the negotiating process and some having to do with @@ -73265,8 +73249,8 @@ the Soviet Union also had its own perceptions of human rights in the United States” and that “this issue would be present in our relations.” (See footnote 1, above) the Soviet - representatives responded that during the first discussion held between cussion held between Gorbachev and President Reagan, Gorbachev had noted specifically where the President had @@ -73732,8 +73716,8 @@ weapons and the need to test them.

The U.S.-proposed language was as follows:

“The U.S. and Soviet Union will begin negotiations on nuclear testing. - The agenda for these negotiations will first be to resolve remaining verification issues + The agenda for these negotiations will first be to resolve remaining verification issues associated with existing treaties. With this resolved, the U.S. and USSR will immediately proceed, in parallel with the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, to From 240fa19c296b978cba942260f7f3b04e70d236f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: vak2ve Date: Fri, 12 Nov 2021 15:48:39 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 04/34] Update frus1981-88v05.xml Fixes applied throughout to address inconsistencies in closer content noted by @KerryHite Mid-word line breaks reinstated. Thanks @joewiz! --- volumes/frus1981-88v05.xml | 484 +++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 250 insertions(+), 234 deletions(-) diff --git a/volumes/frus1981-88v05.xml b/volumes/frus1981-88v05.xml index 10d3b15fd..a66e5e875 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1981-88v05.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1981-88v05.xml @@ -275,16 +275,16 @@ reliable record of the Reagan administration’s policy toward the Soviet Union.

- - Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. - - The Historian - - - Kathleen B. Rasmussen, Ph.D. - - General Editor - + + + Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. + + The Historian + Kathleen B. Rasmussen, + Ph.D. + + General Editor + Foreign Service Institute @@ -476,10 +476,11 @@ supervision of Mandy Chalou, Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division.

- Elizabeth C. Charles, Ph.D. - - Historian - + + Elizabeth C. Charles, Ph.D. + + + Historian
@@ -2136,8 +2137,8 @@ community as a whole.

Sincerely,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan @@ -2446,8 +2447,8 @@ future. End summary.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the telegram.]

- Kampelman + Kampelman
31. No distribution without approval of Charles Hill.

- Hartman + Hartman
- Hartman + Hartman
@@ -3987,8 +3988,8 @@ question of the place and time for the meeting.

Sincerely,

- M. - Gorbachev + M. Gorbachev @@ -4250,8 +4251,8 @@ American military men and demands that necessary measures be taken so that the provisions of the Agreement of 1947 be strictly enforced.

- Dam + Dam

Sincerely,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan
@@ -5927,8 +5928,8 @@ have increased tension between our countries.

Sincerely,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan @@ -6202,8 +6203,8 @@ people were withdrawing their savings to put them in stocks of vodka—soon to be as valuable as hard currency.

- Hartman + Hartman @@ -6290,7 +6291,8 @@ will welcome any suggestions you may have in this regard.

Sincerely,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
- Shultz + Shultz
S)

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan
- Hartman + Hartman
Don asked that this debrief be held to senior officials of the Department.

- Kenneth W. DamDam initialed “KWD” above his typed - signature. + Kenneth W. + DamDam initialed “KWD” above his + typed signature.
@@ -10268,8 +10270,8 @@ the meeting. For our part, we are entirely for this.

Sincerely,

- M. - Gorbachev + M. Gorbachev @@ -11169,8 +11171,8 @@ strengthen the foundations of peace.

Sincerely,

- M. - Gorbachev + M. + Gorbachev @@ -12042,7 +12044,8 @@ summary.

[Omitted here is the body of the telegram.]

- Hartman + Hartman @@ -12209,9 +12212,10 @@ points? When you have an opportunity, I would like to discuss this with you.

- Paul - NitzePrinted from a copy - with this typed signature. + Paul NitzePrinted from a copy with this typed + signature. @@ -12446,8 +12450,8 @@ colleagues who have met him in Georgia say that he has always had a big interest in foreign affairs and spoke knowledgeably from a brief.

- Hartman + Hartman @@ -13135,8 +13139,8 @@ identified.

10. I will take no action until instructed by you.

- Armacost + Armacost
- Whitehead + Whitehead
@@ -16032,8 +16036,8 @@ President’s Daily Diary).

Sincerely,

- M. - Gorbachev + M. Gorbachev @@ -16288,8 +16292,8 @@

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

- Shultz + Shultz @@ -16623,10 +16627,10 @@ of the century.

It’s worth a shot.

- Richard - BurtBurt signed “Rick” above his - typed signature. + Richard BurtBurt + signed “Rick” above his typed signature.
- Shultz + Shultz
@@ -18204,8 +18208,8 @@ the Assistant to the President for National Security shall deem necessary. (S)

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan @@ -18859,8 +18863,8 @@ Assistant for National Security Affairs by August 23, 1985. (S)

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan

Respectfully yours,

- William J. - CaseyCasey signed “Bill Casey” above his - typed signature. + William J. CaseyCasey signed “Bill Casey” above his typed + signature.
@@ -19784,7 +19789,8 @@ a final document could be best organized.

Sincerely yours,

- M. Gorbachev + M. + Gorbachev @@ -20303,10 +20309,10 @@ Both Bill Casey and I think it is an excellent piece of work and commend it to you.

- Robert M. GatesGates signed “Bob” above his typed - signature. + Robert M. + GatesGates signed “Bob” above his + typed signature. Deputy Director for Intelligence @@ -21750,7 +21756,8 @@ target="#t_S_1">S)

ORIGINAL SIGNED - Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan @@ -23921,10 +23928,11 @@

14. This report is being made available to the chief US arms control negotiators in Geneva.

- Clair E. - GeorgeAn unknown hand - signed for George above - this typed signature. + Clair E. GeorgeAn unknown hand signed for George above this typed + signature. Deputy Director for Operations @@ -25270,11 +25278,11 @@ point.

- Paul H. Nitze + Paul H. + Nitze - Special Advisor to the President and - the Secretary of State on Arms Control - Matters + Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary + of State on Arms Control Matters @@ -25510,11 +25518,10 @@ President of the United States.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

- John W. Vessey, - Jr. + John W. Vessey, Jr. - ChairmanJoint Chiefs of - Staff + ChairmanJoint Chiefs of Staff @@ -28115,8 +28122,8 @@ Anatoly F. Dobrynin.

Sincerely yours,

- M. - Gorbachev + M. Gorbachev @@ -28268,8 +28275,8 @@ desire to announce new cooperative programs in Geneva when the general exchanges agreement is signed.

- Shultz + Shultz @@ -28558,8 +28565,8 @@ clear a statement of military concern as we are likely to see in the Soviet context.

- Hartman + Hartman

Sincerely,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan
@@ -30402,8 +30409,8 @@ proposals prior to the U.S. and Soviet delegations departing Geneva. (S)

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan

Sincerely,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan
@@ -30967,8 +30974,8 @@ between our two countries on a more constructive course.

Sincerely yours,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan
- Shultz + Shultz
@@ -35054,8 +35061,8 @@ given up his optimism and he looks forward to the meeting with the President and sends him his best regards.

- Hartman + Hartman @@ -35607,8 +35614,8 @@ decisive stage in preparing for the summit and we approached all of the matters under discussion in that light.

- Hartman + Hartman @@ -41632,7 +41639,8 @@ xml:id="d161fn9">An unknown hand wrote “DOE” at the end of the point.

- Mark Palmer + Mark + Palmer @@ -41964,7 +41972,8 @@ something of our country next year.

Sincerely Yours,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan @@ -42251,8 +42260,8 @@ up Geneva issues. To date we have received nothing from Washington on either matter.

- Hartman + Hartman @@ -42391,8 +42400,8 @@ target="#t_US_1">US Administration.

Sincerely,

- M. - Gorbachev + M. Gorbachev @@ -42587,8 +42596,8 @@ back.

Sincerely,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan
Gorbachev accepted the gift with thanks.

- Hartman + Hartman

7. You might brief the Secretary along these lines.

- Whitehead + Whitehead
PNET). (S)

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan
@@ -43440,8 +43449,8 @@ to you and your spouse our warmest wishes.

Respectfully,

- M. - Gorbachev + M. Gorbachev
.

Sincerely,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan
@@ -43765,8 +43774,8 @@ future. I think, the chances are not bad here.

Sincerely,

- M. - Gorbachev + M. Gorbachev @@ -43912,8 +43921,8 @@ January 15; the electronic text of telegrams 12554, 12553, and 12552 was corrupted. (U)

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan

Sincerely,

- M. - Gorbachev + M. Gorbachev
@@ -44555,9 +44564,10 @@ the Congress and issue a press statement along the lines of the one the Secretary had given him.

- Paul H. - NitzePrinted from a copy - with this typed signature. + Paul H. NitzePrinted from a copy with this typed + signature. @@ -44649,10 +44659,10 @@ Secretariat Sensitive (01/16/1986–01/17/1986); NLR–775–15–7–3–5)

- Ed - RownyRowny signed “Ed” above his - typed signature. + Ed RownyRowny + signed “Ed” above his typed signature. @@ -44853,10 +44863,10 @@ in Europe, Soviet agreement to redress the imbalance in conventional forces in Europe would be of overriding importance.

- H. Allen - HolmesHolmes signed “Allen” above - his typed signature. + H. Allen HolmesHolmes + signed “Allen” above his typed signature.
Gorbachev will be scheduled for this year. (C)

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan
Jack Matlock agrees with this approach.

- Mark PalmerPalmer - signed “MP” above his typed signature. + Mark + PalmerPalmer signed “MP” above his + typed signature. @@ -47366,8 +47377,8 @@ (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 707)

- Burt + Burt
@@ -48156,8 +48167,8 @@ countries, and a safer world.

Sincerely,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan @@ -48615,10 +48626,10 @@ matter.

Sincerely yours,

- George P. - ShultzShultz signed “George” above - his typed signature. + George P. ShultzShultz + signed “George” above his typed signature. @@ -49147,8 +49158,8 @@

Ronald Reagan

End text.

- Shultz + Shultz
Dobrynin.

- Mark - Palmer - Charles ThomasPalmer signed “Mark” and - Thomas signed “T” above their typed signatures. + + + Mark + Palmer + Charles + ThomasPalmer + signed “Mark” and Thomas signed “T” above their typed + signatures. + @@ -50352,8 +50368,8 @@ can be expected when Dobrynin meets with the President April 8.

- Whitehead + Whitehead
@@ -50519,8 +50535,8 @@

I will be looking forward with interest to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

- M. - Gorbachev + M. Gorbachev
- Hartman + Hartman
@@ -51846,8 +51862,8 @@ Gorbacheva.

Sincerely,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan @@ -52405,8 +52421,8 @@ Sokolov’s own sense that Moscow is anxious to limit damage to the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

- Rozanne L. - RidgwayRozanne L. + RidgwayRidgway signed “RR” above her typed signature. @@ -53021,8 +53037,8 @@ international implications may result, we would appreciate any additional details you can provide on the Chernobyl accident.

- Whitehead + Whitehead
- Whitehead + Whitehead
- Whitehead + Whitehead
- Whitehead + Whitehead
@@ -53611,8 +53627,8 @@ corresp="#p_YB_1">Yel’tsin has overstepped his leash. We suspect the former, but cannot exclude the latter.

- Hartman + Hartman @@ -53747,8 +53763,8 @@ positive way.

End text.

- Whitehead + Whitehead
Shultz.

- Hartman + Hartman
Armacost + >Armacost
@@ -54176,8 +54192,8 @@ to divert Western attention from the Soviet performance during the accident.

- Nicholas - PlattKenneth Quinn + Nicholas + PlattKenneth Quinn signed for Platt. Executive @@ -54247,8 +54263,8 @@ get things off dead center. I will send you some specific ideas in the next few days.

- Roz - RidgwayRoz + RidgwayRidgway signed “Roz” above her typed signature. @@ -54504,7 +54520,7 @@ close the door on the possibility.

Combs + >Combs

Sincerely yours,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan
@@ -55218,8 +55234,8 @@ arms control negotiations.” He asserted that the Soviet Union had always taken a serious approach and wanted progress in arms control.

- Hartman + Hartman
Warm regards.

Kampelman + >Kampelman
@@ -55699,8 +55715,8 @@ the gas mask to protect against mad men.” The bottom line was we should recognize and appreciate what the Soviets have put forward.

- William J. - CaseyPrinted from a copy + William J. + CaseyPrinted from a copy that bears his typed signature. @@ -56341,8 +56357,8 @@ colleagues in Eastern Europe and other suitable venues will give us a hand.

- Hartman + Hartman @@ -57470,7 +57486,7 @@ and U.S., about which I spoke to you at the beginning of my letter.

End text of letter

- Whitehead + Whitehead @@ -58193,8 +58209,8 @@

Moscow.

End text.

- Shultz + Shultz @@ -58317,8 +58333,8 @@ n="1032"/> judgment, but it’s hard not to see here both a challenge and an opportunity demanding an extra effort on our part.

- Fritz W. - Ermarth + Fritz W. + Ermarth

Sincerely yours,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan
@@ -61187,8 +61203,8 @@ continued. We anticipate that these experts will meet again in the near future, with a date to be set in diplomatic channels.

- Shultz + Shultz @@ -61380,8 +61396,8 @@ guidance, should be submitted for my approval not later than September 9, 1986. (C)

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan @@ -61617,8 +61633,8 @@

10. If ACIS may do more to assist you here, please call. (U)

- Douglas - GeorgeDouglas + GeorgeGeorge signed “Doug” above his typed signature. @@ -61741,7 +61757,7 @@ released later August 30.

Combs + >Combs @@ -61853,8 +61869,8 @@ upsetting our plans for this fall. We will keep you informed as we work with Justice and the Soviets.

- Whitehead + Whitehead @@ -61992,8 +62008,8 @@ corresp="#p_DN_1">Daniloff once the Soviets have made a decision to tough it out.

- Whitehead + Whitehead

Sincerely,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald Reagan

Sincerely,

- M. - Gorbachev + M. Gorbachev
@@ -62952,8 +62968,8 @@ enable us to put this issue definitively behind us and create a positive climate for work in the weeks ahead.

- Shultz + Shultz @@ -63599,8 +63615,8 @@

I look forward to your early reply.

Respectfully,

- M. - Gorbachev + M. Gorbachev From 230ac6ac041e220b74aa230e5849ad5fd0fedb08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joe Wicentowski Date: Mon, 15 Nov 2021 12:58:06 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 05/34] Start of a query for batch fixing signatures Requires accompanying commit in hsg-project with the associated transformation scenario --- schema/fix-signatures.xq | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 60 insertions(+) create mode 100644 schema/fix-signatures.xq diff --git a/schema/fix-signatures.xq b/schema/fix-signatures.xq new file mode 100644 index 000000000..375839a4c --- /dev/null +++ b/schema/fix-signatures.xq @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +xquery version "3.1"; + +(: + +Fixes common problems with signatures in FRUS. + +This is designed to be run from an oXygen Transformation Scenario, with saxon-configuration.xml enabled. + +Run on a volume. Perform format & indent between each run. + +Do not commit the automatically generated .bak file to git. + +:) + +declare namespace tei="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0"; +declare namespace frus="http://history.state.gov/frus/ns/1.0"; + +declare variable $path external; +declare variable $vol := doc($path); + +(: 1. Fix missing hi/@rend="strong" on signatures :) + +(: + +find signatures with persNames lacking hi: + + + Hartman + + +and insert hi into the persName, making this into: + + + Hartman + + +:) + +for $persName in $vol//tei:signed/tei:persName[not(tei:hi)] +return + replace node $persName with + element + { QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "persName") } + { + $persName/@*, + element + { QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "hi") } + { + attribute rend { "strong" }, + $persName/string() + } + } + +, + +(: 2. Delete @corresp from signed elements :) + +for $signed in $vol//tei:signed[@corresp][tei:persName/@corresp] +return + delete node $signed/@corresp From 38571e449b680666f7664c1c6b2cf681a9020108 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: vak2ve Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2021 15:06:49 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 06/34] Update fix-signatures.xq more scenarios to file --- schema/fix-signatures.xq | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+) diff --git a/schema/fix-signatures.xq b/schema/fix-signatures.xq index 375839a4c..1e411b6ef 100644 --- a/schema/fix-signatures.xq +++ b/schema/fix-signatures.xq @@ -58,3 +58,20 @@ return for $signed in $vol//tei:signed[@corresp][tei:persName/@corresp] return delete node $signed/@corresp + + +(: 3. Insert signed elements in closers where none exist. empty persName elements in signed elements where none exist + +//tei:signed[tei:persName] + +:) + +(: 4. Delete affiliation from signed elements :) + +(: 5. Insert :) + +(: 6. Insert hi rend="italic" for affiliation type content :) + +(: 7. empty persName elements in signed elements where none exist :) + + From 7be5ebd724946420b0e9f5b6660fc91b3353e976 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: vak2ve Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2021 17:09:30 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 07/34] Update fix-signatures.xq closer error pattern fixes ongoing --- schema/fix-signatures.xq | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/schema/fix-signatures.xq b/schema/fix-signatures.xq index 1e411b6ef..f5db77b30 100644 --- a/schema/fix-signatures.xq +++ b/schema/fix-signatures.xq @@ -59,19 +59,47 @@ for $signed in $vol//tei:signed[@corresp][tei:persName/@corresp] return delete node $signed/@corresp - -(: 3. Insert signed elements in closers where none exist. empty persName elements in signed elements where none exist +, -//tei:signed[tei:persName] +(: 3. Insert signed elements in closers where none exist. + + + + Inman, Akers and Inman + + :) -(: 4. Delete affiliation from signed elements :) +for $closer in $vol//tei:closer//tei:persName[not(ancestor::tei:signed)] -(: 5. Insert :) +return + insert node tei:signed as first into $closer -(: 6. Insert hi rend="italic" for affiliation type content :) +, + +(: 4. Delete affiliation from closers :) + +for $affiliation in $vol//tei:closer +return + delete node $affiliation + +, + +(: 5. empty persName elements in signed elements where none exist + + + + Cutler + + +:) + +for $signed in $vol//tei:closer//tei:signed[not(child::tei:persName)] -(: 7. empty persName elements in signed elements where none exist :) +return + insert node tei:persName as first into $signed + +(: 6. Insert and hi rend="italic" for post-persName content :) From 37547a7a09da35c0fea36bc3f50ce199cbfda7d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: vak2ve Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2021 15:39:38 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 08/34] Update fix-signatures.xq --- schema/fix-signatures.xq | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/schema/fix-signatures.xq b/schema/fix-signatures.xq index f5db77b30..5dd2094f0 100644 --- a/schema/fix-signatures.xq +++ b/schema/fix-signatures.xq @@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ Do not commit the automatically generated .bak file to git. :) -declare namespace tei="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0"; -declare namespace frus="http://history.state.gov/frus/ns/1.0"; +declare namespace tei = "http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0"; +declare namespace frus = "http://history.state.gov/frus/ns/1.0"; declare variable $path external; declare variable $vol := doc($path); @@ -38,18 +38,19 @@ and insert hi into the persName, making this into: for $persName in $vol//tei:signed/tei:persName[not(tei:hi)] return - replace node $persName with - element - { QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "persName") } + replace node $persName + with + element + {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "persName")} + { + $persName/@*, + element + {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "hi")} { - $persName/@*, - element - { QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "hi") } - { - attribute rend { "strong" }, - $persName/string() - } + attribute rend {"strong"}, + $persName/string() } + } , @@ -58,7 +59,7 @@ return for $signed in $vol//tei:signed[@corresp][tei:persName/@corresp] return delete node $signed/@corresp - + , (: 3. Insert signed elements in closers where none exist. @@ -73,17 +74,24 @@ return for $closer in $vol//tei:closer//tei:persName[not(ancestor::tei:signed)] -return - insert node tei:signed as first into $closer +return + insert node tei:signed + as first into $closer , -(: 4. Delete affiliation from closers :) +(: 4. Delete affiliation from closers and replace with content italicized :) for $affiliation in $vol//tei:closer return - delete node $affiliation - + replace node $affiliation + with + element + {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "hi")} + { + attribute rend {"italic"} + + } , (: 5. empty persName elements in signed elements where none exist @@ -94,12 +102,13 @@ return :) - + for $signed in $vol//tei:closer//tei:signed[not(child::tei:persName)] -return - insert node tei:persName as first into $signed - -(: 6. Insert and hi rend="italic" for post-persName content :) +return + insert node tei:persName + as first into $signed + + (: 6. Insert and hi rend="italic" for post-persName content :) + - From 0a31638b98e8de8f07da8b20057dcc33e6a733ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: vak2ve Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2021 18:03:27 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 09/34] renamed xquery for signature fixes --- schema/{fix-signatures.xq => fix-signature-structure.xq} | 0 1 file changed, 0 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) rename schema/{fix-signatures.xq => fix-signature-structure.xq} (100%) diff --git a/schema/fix-signatures.xq b/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq similarity index 100% rename from schema/fix-signatures.xq rename to schema/fix-signature-structure.xq From 2cc39a54586a1d069363ac1d3bde99213f34f3c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: vak2ve Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2021 17:25:09 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 10/34] Update fix-signature-structure.xq xquery fixes for closer issues, ongoing --- schema/fix-signature-structure.xq | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq b/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq index 5dd2094f0..7ee791f95 100644 --- a/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq +++ b/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq @@ -75,25 +75,40 @@ return for $closer in $vol//tei:closer//tei:persName[not(ancestor::tei:signed)] return - insert node tei:signed - as first into $closer + replace node $closer + with + element + {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "closer")} + { + $closer/*, + element + {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "signed")} + { + + $closer/string() + } + } + + , -(: 4. Delete affiliation from closers and replace with content italicized :) +(: 4. Delete affiliation from closers and keep italicized content + +for $affiliation in $vol//tei:closer//tei:signed//tei:affiliation -for $affiliation in $vol//tei:closer return replace node $affiliation - with + with element - {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "hi")} - { - attribute rend {"italic"} - - } -, + {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "hi")} + { + attribute rend {"italic"} + + } + , +:) (: 5. empty persName elements in signed elements where none exist @@ -103,12 +118,23 @@ return :) -for $signed in $vol//tei:closer//tei:signed[not(child::tei:persName)] +for $signed in $vol//tei:closer//tei:signed[not(descendant::tei:persName)] return - insert node tei:persName - as first into $signed + replace node $signed + with + element + {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "signed")} + { + $signed/*, + element + {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "persName")} + { + + $signed/node() + } + } + (: 6. Insert and hi rend="italic" for post-persName content :) - From 7113789d93cce53d86ef98247c3ec1a55af31723 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: vak2ve Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2021 17:23:02 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 11/34] Update fix-signature-structure.xq closer fix queries ongoing --- schema/fix-signature-structure.xq | 135 ++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 73 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-) diff --git a/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq b/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq index 7ee791f95..3a8d953ef 100644 --- a/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq +++ b/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq @@ -18,51 +18,9 @@ declare namespace frus = "http://history.state.gov/frus/ns/1.0"; declare variable $path external; declare variable $vol := doc($path); -(: 1. Fix missing hi/@rend="strong" on signatures :) -(: - -find signatures with persNames lacking hi: - - - Hartman - - -and insert hi into the persName, making this into: - - - Hartman - - -:) - -for $persName in $vol//tei:signed/tei:persName[not(tei:hi)] -return - replace node $persName - with - element - {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "persName")} - { - $persName/@*, - element - {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "hi")} - { - attribute rend {"strong"}, - $persName/string() - } - } - -, - -(: 2. Delete @corresp from signed elements :) - -for $signed in $vol//tei:signed[@corresp][tei:persName/@corresp] -return - delete node $signed/@corresp - -, -(: 3. Insert signed elements in closers where none exist. +(: 1. Insert signed elements in closers where none exist. @@ -72,6 +30,15 @@ return :) + + +(: for $closer in $vol//tei:closer//tei:persName[not(ancestor::tei:signed)] +let $signed := $signed + +return + insert node $signed as first into $closer :) + + for $closer in $vol//tei:closer//tei:persName[not(ancestor::tei:signed)] return @@ -80,12 +47,12 @@ return element {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "closer")} { - $closer/*, + $closer/ element {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "signed")} { - $closer/string() + $closer/node() } } @@ -93,23 +60,8 @@ return , -(: 4. Delete affiliation from closers and keep italicized content -for $affiliation in $vol//tei:closer//tei:signed//tei:affiliation - -return - replace node $affiliation - with - element - {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "hi")} - { - attribute rend {"italic"} - - } - , - -:) -(: 5. empty persName elements in signed elements where none exist +(: 2. empty persName elements in signed elements where none exist @@ -126,7 +78,7 @@ return element {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "signed")} { - $signed/*, + $signed/ element {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "persName")} { @@ -135,6 +87,65 @@ return } } + , +(: 3. Fix missing hi/@rend="strong" on signatures :) + +(: + +find signatures with persNames lacking hi: + + + Hartman + + +and insert hi into the persName, making this into: + + + Hartman + + +:) + for $persName in $vol//tei:signed/tei:persName[not(tei:hi)] +return + replace node $persName + with + element + {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "persName")} + { + $persName/@*, + element + {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "hi")} + { + attribute rend {"strong"}, + $persName/node() + } + } + +, + +(: 4. Delete @corresp from signed elements :) + +for $signed in $vol//tei:signed[@corresp][tei:persName/@corresp] +return + delete node $signed/@corresp + + (: 5. Delete affiliation from closers and keep italicized content + +for $affiliation in $vol//tei:closer//tei:signed//tei:affiliation + +return + replace node $affiliation + with + element + {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "hi")} + { + attribute rend {"italic"} + + } + , + +:) + (: 6. Insert and hi rend="italic" for post-persName content :) From 7fb518072beec7b265b0cea8a1b0b7d9d7d6b721 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: vak2ve Date: Tue, 23 Nov 2021 12:46:53 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 12/34] Update fix-signature-structure.xq signature-structures xquery in progress --- schema/fix-signature-structure.xq | 48 +++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq b/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq index 3a8d953ef..11b94541e 100644 --- a/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq +++ b/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq @@ -31,15 +31,17 @@ declare variable $vol := doc($path); :) - + (: for $closer in $vol//tei:closer//tei:persName[not(ancestor::tei:signed)] let $signed := $signed return insert node $signed as first into $closer :) - -for $closer in $vol//tei:closer//tei:persName[not(ancestor::tei:signed)] + + +for $closer in $vol//tei:closer[.//tei:persName and not(child::tei:signed)] + return replace node $closer @@ -78,7 +80,7 @@ return element {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "signed")} { - $signed/ + $signed/ element {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "persName")} { @@ -86,9 +88,9 @@ return $signed/node() } } - - , - + +, + (: 3. Fix missing hi/@rend="strong" on signatures :) (: @@ -106,7 +108,7 @@ and insert hi into the persName, making this into: :) - for $persName in $vol//tei:signed/tei:persName[not(tei:hi)] +for $persName in $vol//tei:signed/tei:persName[not(tei:hi)] return replace node $persName with @@ -129,23 +131,25 @@ return for $signed in $vol//tei:signed[@corresp][tei:persName/@corresp] return delete node $signed/@corresp - - (: 5. Delete affiliation from closers and keep italicized content -for $affiliation in $vol//tei:closer//tei:signed//tei:affiliation +, +(: 5. Delete affiliation from closers and keep italicized content :) + +for $affiliation in $vol//tei:closer//tei:signed//tei:affiliation[not(child::tei:hi)] + return replace node $affiliation - with + with element - {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "hi")} - { - attribute rend {"italic"} - - } - , - -:) - + {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "hi")} + { + + attribute rend {"italic"} + + } + + + + (: 6. Insert and hi rend="italic" for post-persName content :) - From fb06390bac5cbe7f974a7fed2f5df9b41f81b587 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joe Wicentowski Date: Tue, 23 Nov 2021 13:33:10 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 13/34] add a function to prevent saxon adding namespaces --- schema/fix-signature-structure.xq | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq b/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq index 11b94541e..ceb7d8d50 100644 --- a/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq +++ b/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq @@ -19,6 +19,14 @@ declare variable $path external; declare variable $vol := doc($path); +(: reconstruct a node with computed element constructor to avoid saxon inserting unwanted namespace declarations :) +declare function local:reconstruct-node($nodes as node()*) { + for $node in $nodes + return + typeswitch ($node) + case element() return element { node-name($node) } { $node/@*, local:reconstruct-node($node/node()) } + default return $node +}; (: 1. Insert signed elements in closers where none exist. From 08cdf9e12dd0bb3bf778f16217357e89bf024d5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: vak2ve Date: Tue, 23 Nov 2021 16:42:47 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 14/34] minor edits typo and minor rend fixes to match new guidelines --- volumes/frus1865p2.xml | 2 +- volumes/frus1977-80v19.xml | 9 +++++---- volumes/frus1977-80v29.xml | 6 ++++-- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/volumes/frus1865p2.xml b/volumes/frus1865p2.xml index a6a3cea2d..0d6b626ba 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1865p2.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1865p2.xml @@ -15501,7 +15501,7 @@

Faithfully your friend,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD. - The Eight Hon. Lord + The Right Hon. Lord Lyons.
Carter administration’s policy toward the South Asia region.

- Adam M. Howard, Ph.D.The Historian - - Foreign Service Institute + Adam M. Howard, + Ph.D.The Historian + + Foreign Service Institute - August 2019 + August 2019
diff --git a/volumes/frus1977-80v29.xml b/volumes/frus1977-80v29.xml index ca3da16c1..86366406c 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1977-80v29.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1977-80v29.xml @@ -37734,9 +37734,11 @@ mission to Panama be considered for late 1980 or 1981.

- Luther H. Hodges, Jr. + Luther H. Hodges, + Jr. - Under Secretary of Commerce + Under Secretary of + Commerce From 9441687f59a65009af3028b913b9db81ed2427cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: vak2ve Date: Tue, 23 Nov 2021 19:41:51 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 15/34] Update frus1861.xml xquery scripts test run on early frus volumes --- volumes/frus1861.xml | 932 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 494 insertions(+), 438 deletions(-) diff --git a/volumes/frus1861.xml b/volumes/frus1861.xml index f92ccd3af..4a7fa9ba5 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1861.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1861.xml @@ -690,10 +690,11 @@ to-day—it is for a vast future also. With a reliance on Providence, all the more firm and earnest, let us proceed in the great task which events have devolved upon us.

- ABRAHAM LINCOLN.Washington, December - 3, 1861. + ABRAHAM LINCOLN.Washington, December 3, + 1861.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- J. S. BLACK. + J. S. BLACK.

John Appleton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -2722,7 +2723,7 @@ you may receive on the subject of the attempts which have suggested this communication.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

W. Preston, Esq., Madrid.

@@ -2901,7 +2902,7 @@ greater one offered to the maritime nations by the President of the United States.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -3047,7 +3048,7 @@ for his Majesty and the people of Prussia.

* * * * * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Norman B. Judd, Esq, &c., @@ -3086,7 +3087,7 @@ * *

I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your very obedient servant,

- JOSEPH A. WRIGHT. + JOSEPH A. WRIGHT.

His Excellency Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, @@ -3128,7 +3129,7 @@ forwarded copies to several already.

* * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JOSEPH A. WRIGHT. + JOSEPH A. WRIGHT.

His Excellency Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, @@ -3178,7 +3179,7 @@ confederation of States, and not a national union.

* * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JOSEPH A. WRIGHT. + JOSEPH A. WRIGHT.

His Excellency Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, @@ -3210,7 +3211,7 @@ associations in negotiations hostile to the United States.

* * * * *

I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JOSEPH A. WRIGHT. + JOSEPH A. WRIGHT.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington, D C.

@@ -3244,7 +3245,7 @@ spirit is with the United States government.

Mr. Judd is expected on the 27th instant.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JOSEPH A. WRIGHT. + JOSEPH A. WRIGHT.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington City.

@@ -3378,7 +3379,7 @@ soon as may be, could officially inform me that the overtures and propositions which you are commissioned to make to the administration have found a favorable reception.

- SCHLEINITZ. + SCHLEINITZ.

His Excellency Baron Von Gerolt, &c., &c., &c., @@ -3511,7 +3512,7 @@ humanity.

The undersigned offers to Baron Gerolt renewed assurances of his high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Baron Fr. Gerolt, &c., &c., &c.,

The undersigned seizes this occasion to renew to the honorable W. H. Seward the protestations of his most distinguished consideration.

- FR. VON GEROLT. + FR. VON GEROLT.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State of the United States, @@ -3619,7 +3620,7 @@ relations with the ministers of state and the several diplomatic functionaries residing at this court.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- N. B. JUDD. + N. B. JUDD.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -3691,7 +3692,7 @@ communication.

* * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- N. B. JUDD. + N. B. JUDD.

Hon. W. H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -3726,7 +3727,7 @@ Prussia.

The undersigned avails himself of this opportunity to assure your excellency of his high and distinguished consideration.

- N. B. JUDD. + N. B. JUDD.

His Excellency Baron Von Schleinitz,Minister of Foreign @@ -3761,7 +3762,7 @@

We have put all the candidates recommended to us by Baron Schleinitz into military employment.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Norman B. Judd, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Berlin.

@@ -3788,7 +3789,7 @@ * * * * * *

* * * * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Norman B. Judd, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -3828,7 +3829,7 @@ there is concerted action, with England at the head.

* * * * * *

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- N. B. JUDD. + N. B. JUDD.

Hon. W. H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -3855,7 +3856,7 @@ I have no word or note from the Prussian government on the subject.

* * * * *

I have the honor to be, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- N. B. JUDD. + N. B. JUDD.

Hon. W. H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -3886,7 +3887,7 @@ its ability to defend and save itself. More, perhaps, ought not to be wished; certainly it could not be reasonably expected.

I am, &c.,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

N. B Judd, Esq.,&c., &c., &c., Berlin.

@@ -4006,7 +4007,7 @@ frequently, and you will receive prompt instructions in every new emergency.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Henry S. Sanford, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -4059,7 +4060,7 @@ manifested by his Majesty.

* * * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- H. S. SANFORD. + H. S. SANFORD.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -4142,7 +4143,7 @@ southern States.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- H. S. SANFORD. + H. S. SANFORD.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -4207,7 +4208,7 @@

* * * * * *

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- H. S. SANFORD. + H. S. SANFORD.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -4255,7 +4256,7 @@

* * * * * *

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- H. S. SANFORD. + H. S. SANFORD. [Translation.]

Belgium has given its adhesion to the principles laid down in the @@ -4307,7 +4308,7 @@ herewith send you a full power and a draft of the proposed convention.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Henry S. Sanford, Esq., &c., &c., Brussels.

@@ -4347,7 +4348,7 @@ and the beneficial result that two months ago seemed problematical is now regarded as only a question of time.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

H. S. Sanford, Esq., &c., &c., Brussels.

@@ -4373,7 +4374,7 @@ been received. We see no reason to doubt the propriety of that communication.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Henry S. Sanford, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Brussels.

@@ -4442,7 +4443,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most humble servant,

- H. S. SANFORD. + H. S. SANFORD.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -4471,7 +4472,7 @@ last despatch on this subject to Mr. Dayton. It may serve as a guide to your own conduct in relation to the subject.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Henry S. Sanford, Esq., Brussels.

@@ -4508,7 +4509,7 @@ attention of the minister.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- H. S. SANFORD. + H. S. SANFORD.

Hon. William H Seward,Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -4535,7 +4536,7 @@ President to close the ports that have been seized by the insurgents.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Henry S. Sanford, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Brussels.

@@ -4580,7 +4581,7 @@ great powers have decided upon a course of action in this matter.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- H. S. SANFORD. + H. S. SANFORD.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -4588,7 +4589,7 @@

P. S.—I open my despatch to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches Nos. 12, 13, and 14, with their respective enclosures, which will have immediate action.

- H. S. S. + H. S. S.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Henry S. Sanford, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Brussels.

@@ -4640,7 +4641,7 @@ of vigilance in regard to the movements of disaffected citizens of our own country travelling in Europe.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Henry S. Sanford, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Brussels.

@@ -4673,7 +4674,7 @@ them to anticipate her own final decision upon the case, as it is presented to all alike.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Henry S. Sanford, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Brussels.

@@ -4957,7 +4958,7 @@ the prosperity and happiness of both nations, and ultimately auspicious to all other republican States throughout the world.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Thomas Corwin, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -4994,7 +4995,7 @@ protected by promise of aid from the United States.

* * * * * * * *

I am, &c.,

- THOMAS CORWIN. + THOMAS CORWIN.

Hon. W. H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -5032,7 +5033,7 @@ cession of territory which was a consequence of our war with them.

* * * * * * * *

I am, &c.,

- THOMAS CORWIN. + THOMAS CORWIN.

Hon. W. H. Seward,Secretary of State, U. S., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -5598,7 +5599,7 @@ distinguished as the leaders of the nations in the ways of civilization and humanity.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

- G. M. DALLAS. + G. M. DALLAS.

The Hon. the Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -5678,7 +5679,7 @@ the opportunity is allowed me.

* * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- G. M. DALLAS. + G. M. DALLAS.

The Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State

@@ -5734,7 +5735,7 @@ instant a motion favoring the recognition will be pressed by Mr. W. H. Gregory, member for Galway.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

- G. M. DALLAS. + G. M. DALLAS.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -5826,7 +5827,7 @@ possibly indicating a policy that this government would be obliged to deem injurious to its rights and derogating from its dignity.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

C. F. Adams, Esq.,&c., &c., &c.

@@ -5879,7 +5880,7 @@

The motion, therefore, of Mr. Gregory may be further postponed, at his lordship’s suggestion.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

- G. M. DALLAS. + G. M. DALLAS.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -6095,7 +6096,8 @@ of cotton pressed between decks, could be made to sustain guns, and thus be efficient instruments in closing the southern ports.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -6283,7 +6285,7 @@ simply oh the principle of self preservation, and that our cause will involve the independence of nations and the rights of human nature.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -6616,7 +6618,8 @@

* * * * * *

* * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -6678,7 +6681,8 @@ some general observations on the subject for a separate despatch in the early part of next week.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -6773,7 +6777,7 @@ until we shall have your own report of the attitude of the British government as defined by itself for our consideration,

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -6852,7 +6856,8 @@ steamer.

* * * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Hon. WilliamH. Seward,Secretary of State, @@ -6877,7 +6882,7 @@ British government may entertain in regard to our recognition of a rule of international law which they may deem important.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -6908,7 +6913,8 @@

The papers which accompanied your note are herewith returned.

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, your lordship’s most obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. + SEWARD.

The Right Honorable Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -7098,7 +7104,7 @@ spirit which has thus far marked the deportment and conversation of the British government in your official intercourse with it.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -7118,7 +7124,7 @@ Gregory’s movement.

Subsequent events only can now do anything to improve the prospect of the confederates at this court. Yours, &c.,

- C. F. ADAMS. + C. F. ADAMS.

Hon. W. H. Seward, Washington, D. C.

@@ -7289,7 +7295,8 @@ any of the ports blockaded, unless from some urgent necessity to protect British persons or property.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -7555,7 +7562,8 @@ but it is not now likely to happen, under any other condition than the preceding assent of the United States.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -7612,7 +7620,8 @@ as it indicates the establishment of a policy that will keep us at peace during the continuance of the present convulsion.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -7709,7 +7718,7 @@ inflexibly maintain and preserve the just rights and the honor of the United States.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -7760,7 +7769,8 @@ answer will be forwarded so soon as it is received.

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -7870,7 +7880,8 @@ ready to act here so soon as this difficulty shall have been removed elsewhere.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -7909,7 +7920,8 @@

Seizing the occasion to renew the assurance of my highest consideration,

I have the honor to be your lordship’s most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

The Right Honorable Lord John Russell,&c., &c., @@ -7948,7 +7960,7 @@ the purpose of receiving that project.

I request you to receive the assurance of my highest consideration, and have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

- J. RUSSELL. + J. RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -7991,7 +8003,7 @@ signed simultaneously and on the same day.

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- J. RUSSELL. + J. RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -8283,7 +8295,7 @@ which trade between the United States and Great Britain, as it has hitherto flourished, can ever again spring up.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -8443,7 +8456,7 @@

It is not likely that anything will now be done here, hastily or inconsiderately, affecting our foreign relations.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -8480,7 +8493,7 @@

Some important points in your despatch will be treated of in another paper.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -8508,7 +8521,8 @@ to take the necessary measures for a simultaneous negotiation as soon as the customary arrangements with the French government can be made

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -8593,7 +8607,8 @@ philanthropic as Great Britain.

Renewing the assurances of my highest consideration, I have the honor to be your lordship’s most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

The Right Hon. Lord John Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -8649,7 +8664,7 @@ done.

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- J. RUSSELL. + J. RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -8685,7 +8700,7 @@

All those powers are understood to be awaiting the action of the government of Great Britain,

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -8719,7 +8734,7 @@ former basis, the disunion sentiment would languish and perish within a year.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -8783,7 +8798,8 @@ especially instructed to do otherwise.

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -8934,7 +8950,7 @@ in any way to compromise their own national integrity, safety, or honor.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -9085,7 +9101,7 @@ not in any way compromised by any assent given to my proceedings, or by any opinion expressed by him or asked from him.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -9121,7 +9137,7 @@ fill it, who will not pervert his functions to hostilities against the United States.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -9159,7 +9175,8 @@ more readily that I am informed by Mr. Dayton that you have ceased to consider the matter as one of any urgent importance.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -9185,7 +9202,7 @@ that which you propose to sign with me.

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most, obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

C. F. Adams, Esq., The sentiment of disunion is losing its expansive force, and every day it grows weaker as a physical power.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- F. W. SEWARD, + F. W. SEWARD, Assistant Secretary.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq.,

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -9526,7 +9544,8 @@

The undersigned prays Lord Russell to receive the assurances of the most distinguished consideration with which he is his obedient servant.

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -9647,7 +9666,7 @@ guaranty of the safety of our cause, and is a fact too important to be misunderstood in the political circle in which you are moving.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -9822,7 +9841,7 @@ the peace of the two countries, and, through that way, the peace of all nations.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD + WILLIAM H. SEWARD

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -9864,7 +9883,8 @@ them to me at the conference.

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -9999,7 +10019,7 @@ Majesty has deliberately sanctioned.

The undersigned requests Mr. Adams to accept the assurance of his highest consideration.

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10181,7 +10201,7 @@ view to protect from wrong and injury the trade and the property and persons of British subjects.

I am, &c., &c., &c.,

- J. RUSSELL. + J. RUSSELL.

The Lord Lyons.

 @@ -10233,7 +10253,8 @@ great desire that he should take charge of his despatches as soon as possible.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -10383,7 +10404,8 @@

I pray your lordship to accept the assurances of the highest consideration with which I have the honor to be your lordship’s most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

The Right Honorable Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10425,7 +10447,8 @@ injury to the rights and the interests of the United States.

The undersigned avails himself of this occasion to renew to Lord Russell the assurances of his highest consideration.

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

The Right Honorable Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10457,7 +10480,7 @@

For your satisfaction, I state that a new consul has been appointed at Trinidad, and that he is now on his way to that island.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10500,7 +10523,7 @@

* * * * * *

* * * * * *

I am, sir, your most obedient servant,

- FRANCIS BERNARD. + FRANCIS BERNARD.

The Secretary of State of the United States.

@@ -10538,7 +10561,7 @@ Russell, and request that proper instructions in regard to it may be given to the colonial authorities.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams, Esq.

 @@ -10561,7 +10584,7 @@ and will explain the reasons when we meet. You need not write me at all on the subject.

Hoping soon to see you, I remain your friend,

- JNO. P. BALDWIN. + JNO. P. BALDWIN.

Henry Adderley, Esq.,Nassau, N. P., Bahamas.

@@ -10590,7 +10613,7 @@ government whose flag they will be perverting to such unfriendly uses.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10661,7 +10684,7 @@ subject to Lord Lyons.

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10732,7 +10755,7 @@ Confederate States as a separate and independent State.

The undersigned requests Mr. Adams to accept the assurance of his highest consideration.

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10759,7 +10782,8 @@ United States.

The undersigned requests Earl Russell to accept the assurance of his highest consideration.

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Honorable Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10793,7 +10817,7 @@ a copy of which you enclose, was read to me by Lord Lyons, pursuant to instructions from Lord Russell.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10821,7 +10845,7 @@ and enables us to put our own authorities here in a way of vigilant surveillance which promises good results.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10863,7 +10887,7 @@ manifesting her wishes for the success of this government in suppressing the insurrection as speedily as possible.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10890,7 +10914,7 @@ shall be able to defeat on this side the enterprises of the insurgents which we have been unable to prevent on the other.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10925,7 +10949,8 @@ be taken in similar cases.

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -10967,7 +10992,8 @@ of next month, after which I anticipate no delay, like the late one, in the transaction of important business.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -10998,7 +11024,8 @@ and the other of the following day, touching these questions.

* * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -11046,7 +11073,8 @@ already on his way to occupy his post.

The undersigned begs to renew to Earl Russell the assurances of his highest consideration.

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

The Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11082,7 +11110,8 @@

I pray your lordship to accept the assurances of the highest consideration, with which I have the honor to be your lordship’s most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

The Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11113,7 +11142,8 @@ susceptible of a very different construction in the popular mind.

* * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -11156,7 +11186,7 @@ ship “Cadmus.”

The undersigned requests Mr. Adams to accept the assurance of his highest consideration.

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11253,7 +11283,7 @@ resort to a measure which is indispensable to complete our ability to fulfil it.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD, + WILLIAM H. SEWARD,

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11399,7 +11429,7 @@ offend, and to which exception is now especially taken, finds no support in the communication of Earl Russell.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11467,7 +11497,7 @@ view of the gravity of the question, may deem the subject worthy of a deliberate reconsideration.

I am, sir, your most obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11501,7 +11531,7 @@ to.

I avail myself of this occasion to offer to your lordship a renewed assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

To the Right Honorable Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11547,7 +11577,7 @@ authorities of their own countries.

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

I have the honor to be, sir, with the highest consideration, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c.

@@ -11789,7 +11819,7 @@ people, for whom alone that Constitution was established.

I avail myself of this opportunity to offer to your lordship a renewed assurance of my very high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

The Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c.

@@ -11821,7 +11851,7 @@ agents of those powers in blockaded ports.

I avail myself of this occasion to offer to your lordship a renewed assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

The Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11849,7 +11879,7 @@ naval forces of the United States.

I avail myself of this occasion to offer to your lordship a renewed assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

The Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11879,7 +11909,7 @@ agents of the same powers in the southern States.

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

The Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11902,7 +11932,7 @@ in blockaded ports, as well as that of British authorities with their agents, might be sent by British vessels of war.

I am, &c.,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

The Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11929,7 +11959,7 @@ receive with regard to the seizure of the despatches in question.

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS. Mr. Bernal to Lord Lyons. @@ -11952,7 +11982,7 @@ Seward. In order that there should be no mistake, I repeated my question, and received the same answer.

I have, &c.,

- F. BERNAL. + F. BERNAL.

I avail myself of this occasion to offer to your lordship a renewed assurance of my very high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

To Lord Lyons.

 @@ -12030,7 +12060,7 @@ may be awarded to the sufferers.

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -12097,7 +12127,7 @@ explanation.

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. W. H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -12210,8 +12240,8 @@ ships, and at the same time obtain for me the reasonable and fair compensation I claim.

I have, &c.

- WILLIAM GRAY,Owner - of the ship “Perthshire.” + WILLIAM GRAY,Owner of the ship “Perthshire.”

The Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -12237,7 +12267,8 @@

I will thank you to furnish me with such information upon the subject as will enable me to reply to the note of Lord Lyons.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. + SEWARD.

Hon. Gideon Welles,Secretary of the Navy.

@@ -12265,7 +12296,8 @@ in communicating to your lordship the result of the investigation.

Accept, my lord, the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. + SEWARD.

The Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -12289,7 +12321,7 @@ “Perthshire” by the United States steamer Massachusetts, and her subsequent release by order of Captain McKean.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- GIDEON WELLES. + GIDEON WELLES.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -12344,8 +12376,8 @@ had fully intended reporting the circumstances to you, but it escaped my memory.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. W. McKEAN, Captain. + WM. W. McKEAN, Captain.

Flag Officer William Mervine,Commanding Gulf @@ -12385,7 +12417,8 @@ to clear, according to the notification of blockade, had not expired.

Very respectfully,

- MELANCTON SMITH,MELANCTON + SMITH,Commander.

The Commanding OfficerAt the time the Perthshire was boarded from this ship and ordered off from Pensacola there was no blockade of Mobile or the Mississippi river.

- H. A. ADAMS,Captain - U. S. Frigate “Sabine.” + H. A. ADAMS,Captain U. S. Frigate + “Sabine.” @@ -12436,7 +12470,8 @@ complained.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. + SEWARD.

The Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -12756,7 +12791,7 @@ ultimately bring them to the enjoyment of the rights of self-government. When that patience disappears, anarchy must come upon the earth.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Anson Burlingame, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -12796,7 +12831,7 @@ resumed.

* * * * * * * * *

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- J. GLANCY JONES. + J. GLANCY JONES.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -12861,7 +12896,7 @@ looking to the disruption of our confederacy, or weakening its power.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- J. GLANCY JONES. + J. GLANCY JONES.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -12883,7 +12918,7 @@ rights of neutrals in time of war; and he takes this opportunity to renew his offer of high consideration to the honorable Secretary of State

- HULSEMANN + HULSEMANN

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State of the United States.

@@ -12943,7 +12978,7 @@

You will, I hope, carry this important question through to a favorable close, and I present you the assurances of my cordial sympathies.

- RECHBERG. + RECHBERG.

His Excellency the Chevalier Hulsemann, &c., &c., &c., @@ -13002,7 +13037,7 @@

The undersigned avails himself of this occasion to tender assurances of the good will of this government towards the government of Austria, and of his distinguished consideration for Mr. Hülsemann personally.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

The Chevalier Hulsemann, &c., &c., &c.,

@@ -13059,7 +13094,7 @@

It shall be our purpose to cultivate the best understanding with all nations which respect our rights as Austria does.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

J. Glancy Jones, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -13091,7 +13126,7 @@ present administration is regarded by the government of the United States.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

J. Lothrop Motley, Esq., &c., &c., Vienna.

@@ -13130,7 +13165,7 @@

You will inform Count Rechberg that the friendly sentiments of this government towards Austria remain unchanged.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

J. Lothrop Motley, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Vienna.

@@ -13552,7 +13587,7 @@ the United States are guaranteed by the necessities, and, therefore, by the sympathies of mankind.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. William L. Dayton, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -13735,7 +13770,7 @@ them as suggestions to elicit more fully the views and instructions of the government.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- CHAS. J. FAULKNER. + CHAS. J. FAULKNER.

Hon. Jeremiah S. Black,Secretary of State.

@@ -13857,7 +13892,7 @@ peaceable acquiescence in the assertion of their claims to a separate sovereignty. * * * * * * * * *

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- CHAS. J. FAULKNER + CHAS. J. FAULKNER

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -13958,7 +13993,7 @@ never entered into the mind of any candid statesman here, and it is high time that it be dismissed by statesmen in Europe.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Wm. L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -14158,7 +14193,7 @@ promptly with your department as I would have desired.

* * * * * * * *

Your very obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -14257,7 +14292,7 @@ advice of his brother diplomatists, owing to matter confidentially communicated from Vienna.

With much consideration, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -14279,7 +14314,7 @@ to have a conference with your excellency at such time as your excellency may indicate.

With great respect, I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Mr. Thouvenel, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

@@ -14301,7 +14336,7 @@ has doubtless had notice.

With much respect, I have the honor to be your excellency’s obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Mr. Thouvenel, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

@@ -14333,8 +14368,9 @@

Accept, sir, the assurance of the most distinguished consideration with which I have the honor to be your very humble and very obedient servant,

- RANDON,Le Marechal de - France, Ministre Secretaire d’etat de la Guerre. + RANDON,Le Marechal de France, Ministre Secretaire d’etat + de la Guerre. @@ -14369,7 +14405,7 @@ the State of Virginia.

I beg to assure you, sir, of the high consideration with which I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Mons. le Marechal Comte Randon,Minister de la Guerre.

@@ -14402,7 +14438,8 @@

We pray your excellency to accept, in entram, the expression of the profound gratitude and our distinguished consideration of your excellency’s most obedient servants,

- SHELBERT, KANE & CO.,8 Place de la + SHELBERT, KANE & + CO.,8 Place de la Bourse.

His Excellency Mr. Dayton,

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -14610,7 +14647,7 @@ proceedings of a large and enthusiastic meeting of Americans yesterday at the Hotel du Louvre.

With high consideration, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -14714,7 +14751,7 @@

* * * * * * * * * *

* * * * * * * * * *

With much respect, I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon William H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -14805,7 +14842,7 @@ can act here.

* * * * * * * * *

With high consideration, I have, &c.,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -14887,7 +14924,7 @@ discussed, which were referred to us through the conversation which took place at the time of your reception.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Paris.

@@ -14966,7 +15003,7 @@

* * * * * *

With high consideration, I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -14993,7 +15030,7 @@ be promptly ratified and confirmed by my government.

With much respect, I have the honor to be your very obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency Monsieur Thouvenel,Minister of Foreign @@ -15305,7 +15342,7 @@ existence, and which will preserve them united until the common destiny which it opened to them shall be fully and completely realized.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -15363,7 +15400,7 @@ perform all we have offered.

This despatch is strictly confidential.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

With high consideration, I am yours, very truly,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -15435,7 +15472,7 @@ anything of interest occurring here at an early day, unless something shall occur in America which shall give rise to it.

With much respect, I am yours, very truly,

- WM. L. DAYTON + WM. L. DAYTON

Hon. Wm. H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -15495,7 +15532,7 @@ appointment as minister to China. His delay at Paris is approved in consideration of the peculiar circumstances of the case.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -15660,7 +15697,7 @@ indirection in its intercourse with the enlightened and friendly government of France.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -15698,7 +15735,7 @@ government in this as in other matters. I have already said I should await further instructions from your department on this subject.

With much respect, I have the honor to be, truly yours,

- WILLIAM L DAYTON. + WILLIAM L DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -15754,7 +15791,7 @@ essential to carry us through the troubles of our present position. * * *

With much respect, I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -15786,7 +15823,7 @@ matter.

* * * * * * * * *

I am, &c.,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -15817,7 +15854,7 @@ have been possible. The heart of the country is sound. Its temper is now more favorable to the counsels of deliberation and wisdom.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -15880,7 +15917,7 @@ Paris. I missed, however, the mail by the steamer of last week, which I much regretted.

With much respect, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency Wm. H. Seward.

 @@ -15924,7 +15961,7 @@ signed simultaneously and on the same day.

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- J. RUSSELL. + J. RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -15982,7 +16019,7 @@ French government, and, as soon as heard from, advise you of its reply.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency Chas. F. Adams.

 @@ -16018,7 +16055,7 @@ hereunto annexed, that I have already moved in the matter here.

* * * * * * * *

With much respect, I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -16078,7 +16115,7 @@ Russell.

With much respect, I have the honor to be your very obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Monsieur le Ministre.

 @@ -16109,7 +16146,7 @@ Mr. Thouvenel himself when he shall have become advised of the new and singular position assumed by Lord John Russell.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Wm. L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16138,7 +16175,7 @@ now grows manifestly stronger every day. Let us see how Great Britain will explain.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16167,7 +16204,7 @@

In communications which have preceded this I have already said all that the despatch now before me seems to require.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16208,7 +16245,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

* * * * * * * * *

With much respect, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

William H. Seward, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16243,7 +16280,7 @@ much relieved in this negotiation by the specific character of my instructions.

With great respect, I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

The Hon, William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16346,7 +16383,7 @@ being clearly within my instructions. I shall await his answer before I communicate further with the French government. With much respect, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward,Secretary of State, &c., &c.

@@ -16373,7 +16410,7 @@ Adams.

Accept the assurances of the high consideration with which I have the honor to be, sir, your very humble and very obedient servant,

- THOUVENEL. + THOUVENEL.

Mr. Dayton,Minister of the United States at Paris.

@@ -16421,7 +16458,7 @@ France would themselves have assented to proceed with the execution of the convention in the face of such declaration.

With much respect, I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward,Secretary of State, &c., &c.

@@ -16577,7 +16614,8 @@

I avail myself of the opportunity to renew to your excellency assurances of the high consideration with which I have the honor to be, sir, your very humble and obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. + DAYTON.

Monsieur Thouvenel,Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.

@@ -16606,7 +16644,7 @@ raised in the negotiation at London.

Those explanations have not yet been received here.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16647,7 +16685,7 @@

The exequatur of James Lesley, appointed consul of the United States to Lyons, was applied for immediately on the receipt of his commission.

With much respect, I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward,Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -16691,7 +16729,7 @@ in reference to this matter, but it is necessary that we know what they mean as we go along.

With much respect, I am yours truly,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency Chas. F. Adams,United States Minister.

@@ -16884,7 +16922,7 @@ that you are instructed for the present to desist from further negotiation on the subject involved.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Wm. L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16910,7 +16948,7 @@ treaty on record.

* * * * * * * * *

With much respect, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward,Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -17001,7 +17039,7 @@ States.

Accept the assurances of the high consideration with which I have the honor to be, sir, your very humble and very obedient servant,

- THOUVENEL. + THOUVENEL.

Mr. Dayton,Minister of the United States at Paris.

@@ -17027,7 +17065,7 @@ remains to be said in regard to them, that your conduct therein is fully approved

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William. L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17055,7 +17093,7 @@ Thouvenel, and your proceedings in that respect are entirely approved.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17086,7 +17124,7 @@ correspondence, as well for the government of the United States as could be desired.

With much respect, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward,Secretary of State, &c., &c.

@@ -17111,7 +17149,7 @@ learned, however, from the press, before this paper shall reach you, that the crises he apprehended were unreal.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17138,7 +17176,7 @@ remove the premature objections of the French consul to which you allude.

I am your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Wm. L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c.

@@ -17166,7 +17204,7 @@ importance except that you may have in your department the entire correspondence upon this important subject.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward,Secretary of State, &c., &c.

@@ -17189,7 +17227,7 @@ you have made me acquainted.

Accept the assurances of the high consideration with which I have the honor to be, sir, your very humble and very obedient servant,

- THOUVENEL. + THOUVENEL.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Seward, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17253,7 +17291,7 @@ been reached at a much earlier day than an intimation of such intended proposition led me to anticipate.

I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17291,7 +17329,7 @@

Thus far we have no official notice from Europe of the proceedings there in regard to Mexico.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17481,7 +17519,7 @@ necessary.

* * * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Carl Schurz, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17523,7 +17561,7 @@ existing circumstances.

* * * * * * * *

I have the honor to remain your obedient servant,

- W. PRESTON. + W. PRESTON.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -17555,7 +17593,7 @@ probably come until the question has been determined by the cabinets of London or Paris. * * * * * * *

I have the honor to remain your obedient servant,

- W. PRESTON. + W. PRESTON.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, &c., &c., Washington, @@ -17701,7 +17739,7 @@ make you the same announcement on the part of his government.

* * * * * * * * *

With sentiments of the highest respect, sir, your obedient servant,

- HORATIO J. PERRY. + HORATIO J. PERRY.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -17737,7 +17775,7 @@

The preamble also is less objectionable than some other documents which have seen the light in Europe.

With the highest respect, sir, your obedient servant,

- HORATIO J. PERRY. + HORATIO J. PERRY.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -17796,8 +17834,8 @@ calendar="gregorian">the seventeenth of June, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one.SIGNED WITH THE ROYAL HAND.The minister of - state,SATURNINO CALDERON - COLLANTES. + state,SATURNINO CALDERON + COLLANTES.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Carl Schurz, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Madrid.

@@ -17899,7 +17937,7 @@

Should any change of circumstances lead you to recur to this subject, it will perhaps be useful to know that such an arrangement can be made.

With the highest respect, sir, your obedient servant,

- HORATIO J. PERRY. + HORATIO J. PERRY.

Hon, William H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -17968,7 +18006,7 @@ our official and social intercourse will be of the most cordial nature.

I am, sir, your obedient servant, &c., &c.,

- C. SCHURZ. + C. SCHURZ.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -18101,7 +18139,7 @@ copy of the royal decree to which reference has been made.

The undersigned avails himself of this occasion to offer to Mr. Tassara renewed assurances of his high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Señor Don Gabriel Garcia y Tassara, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -18134,7 +18172,7 @@

This government does not doubt that the Spanish government will promptly direct the release of the vessels, with their cargoes.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Carl Schurz, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Madrid.

@@ -18172,7 +18210,7 @@ for a change in the restrictive system of duties upon our commerce with their colonies.

With the highest respect, sir, your obedient servant,

- C. SCHURZ. + C. SCHURZ.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -18216,7 +18254,7 @@ be joined by the whole diplomatic corps.

* * * * * *

I am, sir, with high esteem, your obedient servant,

- C. SCHURZ. + C. SCHURZ.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -18256,7 +18294,7 @@ loyally and promptly carried into effect.

I have the honor to remain, with sentiments of distinguished consideration, your excellency’s obedient servant,

- C. SCHURZ. + C. SCHURZ.

His Excellency Don Saturnino Calderon Collantes,First Secretary of @@ -18283,7 +18321,7 @@

Your speech was discreet in its points and felicitous in expression. The Queen’s reply is entirely satisfactory.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Carl Schurz, Esq., &c., &c., &c. Madrid.

@@ -18311,7 +18349,7 @@ unlawful circumstances.

The undersigned avails of this occasion to reiterate to the Hon. William H. Seward the assurances of his highest consideration.

- GABRIEL G. TASSARA. + GABRIEL G. TASSARA.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State of the United States.

@@ -18364,7 +18402,7 @@ itself through a series of years, and in its intercourse with foreign states.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Carl Schurz, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Madrid.

@@ -18389,7 +18427,7 @@ right direction, and, as such, will be very gratifying to the people of the United States. Due publicity to the regulation has been given.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Carl Schurz, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -18420,7 +18458,7 @@

Your attention to my request concerning certain matters in Paris is highly appreciated.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Carl Schurz, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -18455,7 +18493,7 @@ when it is passed, our prosperity will be greater and more assured than ever.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Carl Schurz, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Madrid.

@@ -18547,7 +18585,7 @@ Spanish authorities, or any infraction of their consular authority in those ports.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Carl Schurz, Esq., &c., &c., Madrid.

@@ -18608,9 +18646,9 @@ Madrid.

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- THOS. SAVAGE, Jr.,U. S Vice-Consul - General. + THOS. SAVAGE, Jr.,U. S + Vice-Consul General.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward,Secretary of State of the United States, @@ -18689,16 +18727,17 @@ communicate to this consulate.

I have the honor to be, sir, with profound respect, your obedient servant,

- THOMAS SAVAGE, Jr.,Vice-Consul - General + THOMAS SAVAGE, Jr.,Vice-Consul General

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State of the United States, Washington.

N. B.—I accompany also registers and crew-lists of the Bamberg and A. A. Chapman.

- THOMAS SAVAGE. + THOMAS + SAVAGE. - THOMAS SAVAGE,In - charge of the Consulate General. + THOMAS SAVAGE,In charge of the Consulate + General.

His Excellency the Governor, Captain General of Cuba, &c., @@ -18798,8 +18838,8 @@

I avail myself of this occasion to renew to your excellency the assurances of respect and consideration with which I am your obedient servant,

- THOS. SAVAGE,In - charge of Consulate General. + THOS. SAVAGE,In charge of Consulate General.

His Excellency the Governor, Captain General of Cuba, &c., @@ -18834,8 +18874,9 @@ the crews of both vessels.

I have much pleasure in repeating myself your very obedient servant,

- THOS. SAVAGE,In - charge of the Consulate General. + THOS. SAVAGE,In charge of the Consulate + General.

His Excellency the Brigadier Captain @@ -18865,9 +18906,10 @@

With this motive, I have the honor of offering to you the assurance of consideration with which I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- ANSELMO DE VILLAESCUSA,First Chief of Bureau, in the office of the - Secretary of the Superior Civil Government. + ANSELMO DE + VILLAESCUSA,First + Chief of Bureau, in the office of the Secretary of the + Superior Civil Government.

Thomas Savage, Esq.

Note.—The above, although appearing @@ -18915,7 +18957,7 @@

I have great satisfaction in offering to you the respects of the highest consideration.

God preserve you many years.

- BLAS G. DE QUESADA. + BLAS G. DE QUESADA. Havana, @@ -19004,8 +19046,9 @@ trouble I have caused you with this annoying affair, I renew the assurances of respect and esteem with which I am your excellency’s obedient servant,

- THOS. SAVAGE,In - charge of the Consulate General. + THOS. SAVAGE,In charge of the Consulate + General.

His Excellency Brigadier Don Blas G. de Quesada,Captain of this @@ -19061,8 +19104,8 @@ from there.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- THOS. SAVAGE,Vice - Consul General. + THOS. SAVAGE,Vice Consul General.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State of the United States, @@ -19140,7 +19183,8 @@ high qualities in all respects I take pleasure in acknowledging.

God preserve you many years.

- F’co SERRANO. + F’co + SERRANO. Havana,

Most excellent sir, in the absence of his excellency the commanding general, the 2d in command.

- MANUEL SIVILA. + MANUEL + SIVILA.

His Excellency The Governor,Captain General of @@ -19325,7 +19370,7 @@ the captain general of Cuba.

* * * * * * * * *

I am, sir, with the greatest respect, your obedient servant,

- C. SCHURZ. + C. SCHURZ.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -19366,7 +19411,7 @@ consideration.

* * * * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- C. SCHURZ. + C. SCHURZ.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -19519,7 +19564,7 @@ government towards the United States, and of its firm determination to adhere faithfully to the principles laid down in the royal decree.

I am, sir, with high respect, your obedient servant,

- C. SCHURZ. + C. SCHURZ.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -19547,8 +19592,8 @@ understanding in Europe of the real character and determination of the American people.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- F. W. SEWARD,Acting - Secretary. + F. W. SEWARD,Acting Secretary.

Carl Schurz, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Madrid.

@@ -19618,8 +19663,8 @@ with us upon this ground if she thinks it sufficient. We can only regret it, and wait for her to reconsider the subject.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- F. W. SEWARD,Acting - Secretary. + F. W. SEWARD,Acting Secretary.

Carl Schurz, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19645,7 +19690,7 @@ Collantes on the occasion you have described, we shall be able to avert serious embarrassments of our affairs in the colonies of Spain.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Carl Schurz, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19675,7 +19720,7 @@ the government in restoring its authority at home, I look to see less disposition to treat it with disrespect abroad.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Carl Schurz, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19736,7 +19781,7 @@ continue hereafter, as hitherto, to be the home of civil and religious liberty, and an asylum for the exiled and the oppressed.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Rufus King, Esq., &c., &c., Rome.

@@ -19763,7 +19808,7 @@ desirable that the views therein expressed should be communicated to the Papal government without delay.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

John P. Stockton, Esq., &c., &c., Rome.

@@ -19814,8 +19859,8 @@ consideration I had always received from him, and with sentiments of the highest regard and esteem for his character.

I have the honor to remain, very truly yours,

- JOHN P. STOCKTON,Late United - States Minister at Rome. + JOHN P. STOCKTON,Late United States Minister at Rome.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -20074,7 +20119,7 @@

The high character of the government of Russia warrants these moderate and just expectations.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Cassius M. Clay, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -20199,7 +20244,7 @@ whose folly and wickedness it will have been accomplished.

* * * * * * * * *

I am, very respectfully, yours,

- JOHN APPLETON. + JOHN APPLETON.

Hon. J. S. Black,Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -20295,7 +20340,7 @@ also upon my best efforts to prevent and counteract them.

* * * * * * * * *

I am, very respectfully, yours,

- JOHN APPLETON. + JOHN APPLETON.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -20330,7 +20375,7 @@ that of the ports of the States mentioned in the proclamation of the 19th instant.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

- JOHN APPLETON. + JOHN APPLETON.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -20369,7 +20414,7 @@

Mr. Appleton’s judicious and energetic conduct in this connexion is approved and appreciated by the President.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.
* * * * * *

* * * * * *

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JOHN APPLETON. + JOHN APPLETON.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -20426,9 +20471,10 @@ by the decision of our local authorities, in the same manner as foreigners whose governments have no representatives in our empire.

- General Major GREIG,Director of the Chancellery of the Ministry of - Marine. + General Major + GREIG,Director of the Chancellery of the Ministry of + Marine. Circular addressed to the custom-houses on the @@ -20441,7 +20487,8 @@ hitherto, according to the treaty of 1832, should even their ships papers not be in order, which may occur in consequence of the present political condition of the United States of America.

- General Lieutenant PASHKOFF,General Lieutenant + PASHKOFF,Director of the Department of Foreign Trade,SORNIN, Chief of Section, &c. @@ -20481,7 +20528,7 @@ to our Union.

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- C. M. CLAY + C. M. CLAY

Hon. W. H. Seward,Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -20513,7 +20560,7 @@ guide to your own action on that subject.

* * * * * * * * *

I am, sir, &c.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

C. M. Clay, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -20649,7 +20696,7 @@ once more that glorious old banner restored. “Liberty and union, now and forever—one and inseparable.”

I have the honor to be your most obedient servant,

- C. M. CLAY. + C. M. CLAY.

Hon. W. H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., Washington, D. C.

@@ -20681,7 +20728,7 @@ information he gives. We learn your high appreciation of his conduct in his mission with pleasure.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Cassius M. Clay, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -20729,7 +20776,7 @@

* * * * * *

* * * * * *

I am, very truly, your obedient servant,

- C. M. CLAY. + C. M. CLAY.

Hon. W. H. Seward.

 @@ -20764,7 +20811,7 @@ will already have commenced before this communication shall have reached St. Petersburg.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Cassius M. Clay, &c., &c., &c

@@ -20819,7 +20866,7 @@ President’s wishes in regard to your own mission, and leave you, as to the rest, to await ultimate, and yet seasonable, developments.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Cassius M. Clay, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -20915,7 +20962,7 @@ it is passing through at present.

Receive, sir, the expression of my very distinguished consideration.

- GORTCHACOW. + GORTCHACOW.

Mr. De Stoeckl, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -20946,7 +20993,7 @@ United States.

The Secretary of State offers to Mr. De Stoeckl renewed assurances of his high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Edward de Stoeckl, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -21069,7 +21116,7 @@ stronger, so that the other evil will be, as we trust, effectually prevented. * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Bradford R. Wood, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -21103,7 +21150,7 @@ herewith send you a full power and a draft of the proposed convention.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Bradford R. Wood, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Copenhagen.

@@ -21132,7 +21179,7 @@ return to Copenhagen before the last of this month or the beginning of next.

I have the honor to remain your obedient servant,

- BRADFORD R. WOOD. + BRADFORD R. WOOD.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -21165,7 +21212,7 @@ formality of a presentation to the King, should be considered a compliment to that government.

I have the honor to remain your obedient servant,

- BRADFORD R. WOOD. + BRADFORD R. WOOD.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -21189,7 +21236,7 @@ explanation of the views of the Danish government given to you by Mr. Hall, the minister for foreign affairs, is very satisfactory.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Bradford R. Wood, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Copenhagen.

@@ -21223,7 +21270,7 @@ Europe of clothing and arms for the United States, has been communicated to the Secretary of War.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Bradford R. Wood, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Copenhagen.

@@ -21259,7 +21306,7 @@ against the government in our country, based as it is on the rights of man and his capacity for self-government.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Bradford R. Wood, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Copenhagen.

@@ -21382,7 +21429,7 @@ remove all remaining distrust of its durability and its adaptation to the universal wants of mankind.

I am, sir, your most obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

George P. Marsh, Esq., &c., &c., Turin.

@@ -21414,7 +21461,7 @@ the theatre of his labors is remote from our own. If it shall seem proper to you, you may express these sentiments to his Majesty.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

George P. Marsh, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Turin.

@@ -21482,7 +21529,7 @@ soon completed, in continuation of the Cavour policy.

Mr. Marsh has arrived at Turin.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- ROMAINE DILLON. + ROMAINE DILLON.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -21500,8 +21547,8 @@ public means of declaring that he has no knowledge, official or non-official, of any instructions of his government authorizing any such enlistments out of the United States.

- ROMAINE DILLON,Chargé - d’Affaires, &c. + ROMAINE DILLON,Chargé d’Affaires, &c.

* * * * * *

I am, sir, respectfully yours,

- GEO. P. MARSH. + GEO. P. MARSH.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -21699,7 +21746,7 @@ perpetuation.

* * * * * * * * *

I am, sir, respectfully yours,

- GEORGE P. MARSH. + GEORGE P. MARSH.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -21727,7 +21774,7 @@ armaments at Genoa.

Renewing my best wishes for the prosperity of Italy under the new ministry so happily inaugurated, I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

George P. Marsh, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Turin.

@@ -21761,7 +21808,7 @@ as patriotism has been received at a severe cost; but, perhaps, it was necessary. It is certain that we are improving upon it.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

George P. Marsh, Esq., &c., &c., Turin.

@@ -21800,7 +21847,7 @@ be instructed hereafter.

I have the honor to be, sir, with high respect, your obedient servant,

- GEORGE P. MARSH. + GEORGE P. MARSH.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -21904,7 +21951,7 @@

The undersigned avails himself of this occasion to renew to his excellency the minister of foreign affairs the assurance of his most distinguished consideration.

- GEORGE P. MARSH. + GEORGE P. MARSH.

His Excellency Baron Ricasoli,President of the Council and Minister of @@ -21944,7 +21991,7 @@ otherwise than friendly to us, no matter what treaty relations exist or fail to be made.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

George P. Marsh, Esq., &c., &c., Turin.

@@ -21993,7 +22040,7 @@ we will receive from Europe those who may come.

A consul will be appointed for Ancona.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

George P. Marsh, Esq., &c., &c., Turin.

@@ -22142,7 +22189,7 @@ subject in relation to which your predecessor has had much correspondence with that government.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

George G. Fogg, Esq.,&c., &c., &c., Berne.

@@ -22204,7 +22251,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, with the highest consideration, your obedient servant,

- THEO. S. FAY. + THEO. S. FAY.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State of the United States of @@ -22235,7 +22282,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, with the highest consideration, your obedient servant,

- THEO. S. FAY. + THEO. S. FAY.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State of the United States of @@ -22275,7 +22322,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, with the highest consideration, your obedient servant,

- THEO. S. FAY. + THEO. S. FAY.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State of the United States of @@ -22335,7 +22382,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, with the highest consideration, your obedient servant,

- THEO. S. FAY. + THEO. S. FAY.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State of the United States of @@ -22606,7 +22653,7 @@ government and the integrity of our national Union, I have the honor to subscribe myself, with the highest consideration, your obedient servant,

- GEORGE G. FOGG. + GEORGE G. FOGG.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State of the United States of @@ -22637,7 +22684,7 @@ relations so auspiciously established.

* * * * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

George G. Fogg, Esq., &c., &c., Berne.

@@ -22668,7 +22715,7 @@ the changes of existing relations between us and other countries, Switzerland and the United States will always remain friends.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

George G. Fogg, Esq., &c., &c., Berne.

@@ -22706,7 +22753,7 @@ result in a removal of the odious restrictions and a recognition of the just rights of those citizens.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

George G. Fogg, Esq., &c., &c., Berne

@@ -22824,7 +22871,7 @@ propositions, the material one being in effect the same as the treaty stipulations to which I have thus referred.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -22864,7 +22911,7 @@ Baron T. P. P. de Zueglen de Nyevelt—not the late minister of the same name, though he occupied the same post a number of years since.

I have the honor to be, sir, yours respectfully,

- HEN. C. MURPHY. + HEN. C. MURPHY.

I have the honor to be, sir, yours respectfully,

- HENRY C. MURPHY. + HENRY C. MURPHY.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -23087,7 +23134,7 @@

The undersigned embraces this occasion to renew to his excellency Baron Van Zuylen Van Nijevelt the assurance of his high consideration.

- HENRY C. MURPHY. + HENRY C. MURPHY.

I am, sir, yours respectfully,

- HENRY C. MURPHY. + HENRY C. MURPHY.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -23234,7 +23281,8 @@ Netherlands.

The undersigned seizes this occasion to reiterate to Mr. Murphy the assurances of his high consideration.

- DE ZUYLEN DE NIJEVELT. + DE ZUYLEN DE + NIJEVELT.
@@ -23283,7 +23331,7 @@ important of which are those relating to the budget and the reorganization of the judiciary.

I have the honor, sir, to be yours respectfully,

- HEN. C. MURPHY. + HEN. C. MURPHY.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -23357,7 +23405,7 @@ pleasure to bear this testimony in his behalf, and to the highly honorable position which I believe him to hold among his colleagues.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -23445,7 +23493,7 @@

* * * * * *

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -23497,7 +23545,7 @@ would take advantage of its temporary embarrassments.

I have the honor to be, with high respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward.Secretary of State.

@@ -23531,7 +23579,7 @@ disturbance in our country, which, happily, now daily loses something of the formidable character which it at first assumed.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -23569,7 +23617,7 @@

* * * * * *

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward.Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -23653,7 +23701,7 @@ gratified by your confirmation of the high opinion we had formed of the fidelity and diligence of your predecessor.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -23722,7 +23770,7 @@ great work devolved upon them.

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE + JAMES S. PIKE

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -23746,7 +23794,7 @@ satisfaction. Your proceedings in the various matters mentioned in that communication are approved.

I am, sir, respectfully your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -23785,7 +23833,7 @@ Dayton clearly intelligible to you.

These latter remarks you will consider as confidential.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -23812,7 +23860,7 @@ predecessor’s communication of the 8th of April last.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -23851,7 +23899,7 @@

I send you, confidentially, a copy of my most recent despatch to Mr. Adams.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -23906,7 +23954,7 @@ which we have lived on terms of unbroken friendship for three quarters of a century.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -23962,7 +24010,7 @@ affecting our foreign relations.”

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE + JAMES S. PIKE

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -24010,7 +24058,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant.

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c.

@@ -24140,7 +24188,7 @@ Dutch colonies within two years.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- James S. Pike + James S. Pike

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -24165,7 +24213,8 @@ subject.

Be pleased, sir, to accept the renewed assurance of my high consideration,

- DE ZUYLEN DE NIJEVELT. + DE ZUYLEN DE + NIJEVELT.

Mr. Pike,Minister Resident of the United States of America.

@@ -24204,7 +24253,7 @@ finding military employment.

With a high appreciation of your discretion and vigilance, I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24370,7 +24419,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -24409,7 +24458,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -24434,7 +24483,7 @@ the same time with very great confidence that it will be conformable to the good and friendly relations existing between the two countries.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c..

@@ -24553,7 +24602,7 @@ seas from the haunts they infest, and in bringing them to condign punishment.

“I have the honor, &c., &c.

- “JAMES S. PIKE. + “JAMES S. PIKE.

“Baron Van Zuylen, &c., &c.”

@@ -24602,7 +24651,8 @@ rend="italic">&c., &c.”

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. + PIKE. @@ -25007,7 +25057,8 @@ the disappearance of the slightest trace of misunderstanding between the cabinets of the Hague and of Washington.

Accept, sir, the renewed assurance of my high consideration.

- DE ZUYLEN DE NIJVELT. + DE ZUYLEN DE + NIJVELT.

Mr. Pike, Minister Resident of the United States of America.

@@ -25037,7 +25088,7 @@ the conduct of the authorities if they have been correctly reported to this department.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25080,7 +25131,7 @@ this government may determine what is required for the protection of its national rights in the Dutch American forts.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25116,7 +25167,7 @@ coal and refit. I used my best endeavors to prevent it without avail.

“I am, &c.,

- “HENRY SAWYER.” + “HENRY SAWYER.”

Immediately on the receipt of it I addressed the following note to the minister of foreign affairs.

@@ -25184,7 +25235,8 @@ probably drive them elsewhere.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. + PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25293,7 +25345,7 @@ should have arisen between the two governments.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -25347,7 +25399,7 @@ that of the 11th on the 14th, which was in regular order.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward,

Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -25475,7 +25527,8 @@ supplies at Trinidad as any vessel belonging to the navy of the northern States.

Accept, sir, the fresh assurance of my high consideration.

- DE ZUYLEN DE NIJEVELT. + DE ZUYLEN DE + NIJEVELT.

Mr. Pike,Minister Resident of the United States of America.

@@ -25641,7 +25694,7 @@ take to protect, in the ports of the Netherlands, national rights which cannot be surrendered or compromised.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25729,7 +25782,7 @@ have already given my attention.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25781,7 +25834,7 @@ the Netherlands. Awaiting with same solicitude more definite information,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25812,7 +25865,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -25865,7 +25918,8 @@ instructions transmitted to the colonial authorities.

Be pleased, sir, to accopt the renewed assurance of my high consideration.

- DE ZUYLEN DE NIJEVELT. + DE ZUYLEN DE + NIJEVELT.

Mr. Pike,Minister Resident of the United States of America.

@@ -25905,7 +25959,7 @@

I am directed by the President to express his approval of the diligence and discretion you have practiced in this important transaction.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25933,7 +25987,7 @@ so that nothing remains to be said on the subject which you have had occasion to discuss in the despatch now before me.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -26011,7 +26065,7 @@ States of America.

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- JOHN P. BROWN. + JOHN P. BROWN.

I have the honor to be, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JOHN P. BROWN. + JOHN P. BROWN.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -26065,7 +26119,7 @@ fidelity to the Union I have every confidence.

I have the honor to be, sir, with much respect, your obedient servant,

- JOHN P. BROWN. + JOHN P. BROWN.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, United States of @@ -26093,8 +26147,8 @@ negotiating with the government or individuals for purposes hostile to the republic.

I remain sir, with high respect, your obedient servant,

- D. P. HEAP,Consul - General. + D. P. HEAP,Consul General.

John P. Brown, Esq.,Chargé d’Affaires of the United States of @@ -26146,7 +26200,7 @@ will meet with your approbation.

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- JOHN P. BROWN. + JOHN P. BROWN.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, United States of @@ -26183,8 +26237,8 @@

I avail myself, also, of the present occasion to renew to your highness assurances of my high respect and very distinguished consideration.

- JOHN P. BROWN,Chargé - d’Affaires ad int. + JOHN P. BROWN,Chargé d’Affaires ad int. [Translation.] @@ -26207,7 +26261,7 @@ respective governments.

I take occasion to offer renewed assurances of my high respect and perfect consideration.

- AALI. + AALI.

I hasten also to assure your highness of my perfect respect and most distinguished consideration.

- JOHN P. BROWN. + JOHN P. BROWN.
Mr. Brown’s account of the favorable sentiments of his Majesty towards the United States is especially gratifying.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD + WILLIAM H. SEWARD

E. Joy Morris, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Constantinople.

@@ -26303,7 +26357,7 @@ purpose of fitting out privateers.

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

- B. F. ANGEL. + B. F. ANGEL.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- BENJ. F. ANGEL. + BENJ. F. ANGEL.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward,Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -26352,7 +26406,7 @@ of his Majesty’s government, and I avail myself of the occasion to offer to your excellency the renewed assurance of my high consideration.

- BENJ. F. ANGEL. + BENJ. F. ANGEL.

His Excellency Count Manderstrom,Minister of Foreign @@ -26382,7 +26436,7 @@ agents are here from the seceded States for any purpose whatever. * * * * *

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- B. F. ANGEL. + B. F. ANGEL.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c., @@ -26416,7 +26470,7 @@ conservatives on this side the Atlantic.

* * * * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- B. F. ANGEL. + B. F. ANGEL.

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, with respect, your obedient servant,

- J. S. HALDEMAN. + J. S. HALDEMAN.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward,Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -26491,7 +26545,7 @@ officers are eminent military engineers.

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- J. S. HALDEMAN. + J. S. HALDEMAN.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -26518,7 +26572,7 @@ present embarrassment in our domestic affairs, is especially gratifying.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Jacob S. Haldeman, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -26548,7 +26602,7 @@ United States entertain the highest consideration and cherish the best wishes for his Majesty and the Swedish people.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Jacob S. Haldeman, Esq.,&c., &c., &c., Stockholm.

@@ -26592,7 +26646,7 @@ esteem; no one now seems to doubt of the speedy triumph of the government.

I remain, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- J. S. HALDEMAN. + J. S. HALDEMAN.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c., @@ -26631,7 +26685,7 @@ government of Sweden may desire us to accept.

* * * * * * * * *

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Jacob S. Haldeman, Esq.,&c., &c., &c., Stockholm.

@@ -26663,7 +26717,7 @@ no opportunity will be neglected of strengthening the ties of amity between the government of his Majesty and that of the United States.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Jacob S. Haldeman, Esq.,&c., &c., &c., Stockholm.

@@ -26692,7 +26746,7 @@ in its power to favor the safety and freedom of the commerce of Sweden in the ports of the United States not closed by the blockade.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Jacob S. Haldeman, Esq.,&c., &c., &c., Stockholm.

@@ -26727,7 +26781,7 @@ will, I have no doubt, vindicate its character and win back the confidence of the country and its friends.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Jacob S. Haldeman, Esq.,&c., &c., &c., Stockholm.

@@ -26764,7 +26818,7 @@ established fact.

* * * * * * * *

With high respect, I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- GEORGE W. MORGAN. + GEORGE W. MORGAN.

Hon. W. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -26799,7 +26853,7 @@ our nation will be more powerful and more glorious, more loved and more feared, than ever before in our history as a nation.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- GEORGE W. MORGAN. + GEORGE W. MORGAN.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -26860,7 +26914,7 @@

It affords me great pleasure to renew to your excellency the assurance of my most distinguished consideration.

- GORGE W. MORGAN. + GEORGE W. MORGAN.

His Excellency M. Antonio José d’Avila,Secretary of State for @@ -26949,7 +27003,7 @@ the same footing with privateers. As I have acted upon my own motion in this matter, I submit it to your approbation.

With high respect, your obedient servant.

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -26985,7 +27039,7 @@ seemingly urgent tone of my note, which I thought demanded by the necessity of the case.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

Hon. W. H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -27072,7 +27126,7 @@ the United States.

The undersigned avails himself of this occasion to renew the assurances of his most distinguished consideration.

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.
@@ -27130,7 +27184,7 @@ this action, which, in a country where diplomacy is proverbially slow, exhibits unusual promptitude.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

Hon. W. H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington City.

@@ -27211,7 +27265,7 @@

The undersigned begs leave to return the rough draft of the proclamation, and to repeat his assurances of respect and distinguished consideration.

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY. No. 2. @@ -27278,7 +27332,7 @@ satisfaction with which his conduct in the mission, so far as it has been reported to me, is regarded by the government.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James E. Harvey, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Lisbon.

@@ -27308,7 +27362,7 @@ satisfactory reply as our good relations and treaties with the government of Portugal authorize us to expect.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James E. Harvey, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Lisbon.

@@ -27333,7 +27387,7 @@

We trust that you may find it easy to keep the relations between the two countries on a basis of mutual and cordial friendship.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James E. Harvey, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Lisbon.

@@ -27359,7 +27413,7 @@ concerning the proposed proclamation of the government of Portugal. We look with much confidence for good results from it.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James E. Harvey, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Lisbon.

@@ -27411,7 +27465,7 @@ principle of the treaty of Paris, and is not open to the objections urged against those issued by England, France, or Spain.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully,

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

Hon. W. H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -27470,7 +27524,7 @@ when="1861-07-29" calendar="gregorian">July 29, 1861. - KING. + KING.

@@ -27571,7 +27625,7 @@ republic of Peru, and with other sister states on the American continent.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Christopher Robinson, Esq., &c., &c., &c.,

@@ -27605,7 +27659,7 @@ of the southern States, and maintain the Union in all its integrity.

* * * * * * * * * *

I have the honor, &c.,

- E. O. CROSBY. + E. O. CROSBY.

Hon. W. H. Seward,Secretary of State.

@@ -27715,7 +27769,7 @@ be encouraged to rely on the sympathy and support of the United States if she shall at any time come to need them.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD, + WILLIAM H. SEWARD,

A. B. Dickinson, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -27852,7 +27906,7 @@ when the progress of armies made their localities significant to the whole world.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM S. THAYER. + WILLIAM S. THAYER.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -28089,8 +28143,8 @@ commemorated.

* * * * * * * * * *

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WM. S. THAYER,U. S. Consul - General for Egypt. + WM. S. THAYER,U. S. Consul General for Egypt.

Hon. W. H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -28175,7 +28229,7 @@ and by the consuls general representing other nations in Egypt, is very gratifying.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. H. SEWARD. + WM. H. SEWARD.

William S. Thayer, Esq.,Consul General of the United States, Alexandria, @@ -28210,7 +28264,7 @@ denunciation as pirates.

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor, &c.,

- E. A. TURPIN. + E. A. TURPIN.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -28241,7 +28295,7 @@ secretary of foreign relations of Chili, dated July 31, 1861.

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JOHN BIGLER. + JOHN BIGLER.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State of the United States.

@@ -28299,7 +28353,7 @@

The undersigned avails himself of this occasion to renew to your excellency assurances of his sincere respect and high consideration.

- JOHN BIGLER. + JOHN BIGLER.

His Excel’y the Secretary of Foreign @@ -28336,7 +28390,7 @@ you.”

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JOHN BIGLER. + JOHN BIGLER.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State of the United States.

@@ -28392,7 +28446,7 @@

In the mean time will your excellency be pleased to accept the assurances of my distinguished consideration, with which I remain your excellency’s most obedient servant,

- ANTONIO VARAS. + ANTONIO VARAS.

The Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary @@ -28421,7 +28475,7 @@ which note formed enclosure A in my despatch No. 138.”

* * * * * *

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JOHN BIGLER. + JOHN BIGLER. Mr. Bigler to @@ -28451,7 +28505,7 @@

The undersigned avails himself of this occasion to renew to your excellency the earnest assurances of his distinguished consideration and respect.

- JOHN BIGLER. + JOHN BIGLER.

His Excellency the Secretary of Foreign Relations @@ -28529,7 +28583,7 @@ dominions.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- THOMAS J. DRYER. + THOMAS J. DRYER.

His Excellency R. C. Wyllie,His Hawaiian Majesty’s Minister of Foreign @@ -28638,7 +28692,7 @@ assured of the high respect and very distinguished consideration with which I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- R. C. WYLLIE. + R. C. WYLLIE.

Hon. Thomas J. Dryer, Com’r of the United States to the Hawaiian @@ -28679,8 +28733,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servants,

- ELISHA H. ALLEN. - G. M. ROBERTSON + ELISHA H. ALLEN. + G. M. ROBERTSON . @@ -28711,7 +28765,7 @@

I have only time to make a copy, which please find enclosed, and which I send for the information of the government at Washington.

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- THOMAS J. DRYER. + THOMAS J. DRYER.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -28753,11 +28807,11 @@ August, A. D. 1861, and the seventh of our reign. - KAMEHAMEHA. + KAMEHAMEHA. By the King. - KAAHUMANU. + KAAHUMANU. By the King and Kuhina Nui. - R. C. WYLLIE. + R. C. WYLLIE. @@ -28822,8 +28876,8 @@ them, in a forcible manner, the great danger that will arise from any want of firm action on their part at this juncture.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- TOWNSEND HARRIS,Minister - Resident. + TOWNSEND HARRIS,Minister Resident.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -28873,9 +28927,9 @@ my colleagues, should you feel disposed to favor me with your views.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

- RUTHERFORD ALCOCK,Her - Britannic Majesty’s Envoy Extraordinary and Minister - Plenipotentiary in Japan. + RUTHERFORD ALCOCK,Her Britannic Majesty’s Envoy Extraordinary and + Minister Plenipotentiary in Japan.

Townsend Harris, Esq.,Resident Minister of the United States in @@ -28929,8 +28983,9 @@ I will enter more largely into details than I can do in a letter.

Stated with respect and courtesy.

- TOWNSEND HARRIS,Minister - Resident of the United States in Japan. + TOWNSEND HARRIS,Minister Resident of the United States in + Japan.

Their Excellencies Kudsi Yamato Nokami and Ando Fusima Nokami,I renew to you my cordial congratulations on your truly providential escape from a daring and almost successful attempt on your life.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

- TOWNSEND HARRIS,Minister - resident of the United States in Japan. + TOWNSEND HARRIS,Minister resident of the United States in + Japan.

Rutherford Alcock, Esq., C. B.,Her Britannic Majesty’s Envoy Ext’y and @@ -29033,9 +29089,9 @@ induce me to postpone an interview. If you wish to see the ministers, therefore, I beg I may not be a cause of delay.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

- RUTHERFORD ALCOCK,Her - Britannic Majesty’s Envoy Ext’y and Minister Plent’y in - Japan. + RUTHERFORD ALCOCK,Her Britannic Majesty’s Envoy Ext’y and Minister + Plent’y in Japan.

Townsend Harris, Esq., &c., &c., &c.,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Townsend Harris, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Yedo.

From 81a01329bc44ece16c1b94dde698af5f4f4c7621 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: vak2ve Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2021 14:30:16 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 16/34] xquery scripts and schematron warnings tests on reagan-era and early FRUS volumes --- volumes/frus1862.xml | 2844 ++-- volumes/frus1863p1.xml | 3560 ++--- volumes/frus1863p2.xml | 2342 ++-- volumes/frus1864p1.xml | 2789 ++-- volumes/frus1951-54Iran.xml | 23812 +++++++++++----------------------- volumes/frus1981-88v03.xml | 563 +- volumes/frus1981-88v04.xml | 506 +- volumes/frus1981-88v05.xml | 452 +- volumes/frus1981-88v06.xml | 194 +- volumes/frus1981-88v13.xml | 1241 +- volumes/frus1981-88v41.xml | 774 +- 11 files changed, 15343 insertions(+), 23734 deletions(-) diff --git a/volumes/frus1862.xml b/volumes/frus1862.xml index c0c6f6436..9ac7c5b3c 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1862.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1862.xml @@ -91,8 +91,8 @@ frus:doc-dateTime-min="1862-12-01T00:00:00-05:00" frus:doc-dateTime-max="1862-12-01T23:59:59-05:00"> Message. -

Fellow-citizens of the Senate and House of Representatives - :

+

Fellow-citizens of the Senate and House of + Representatives:

Since your last annual assembling another year of health and bountiful harvests has passed. And while it has not pleased the Almighty to bless us with a return of peace, we can but press on, guided by the best light He gives us, trusting @@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ usefully and safely maintained.

Is there, then, any other mode in which the necessary provision for the public wants can be made, and the great advantages of a safe and uniform currency - secured ?

+ secured?

I know of none which promises so certain results, and is, at the same time, so unobjectionable, as the organization of banking associations, under a general act of Congress, well guarded in its provisions. To such associations the @@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ united people.

In the inaugural address I briefly pointed out the total inadequacy of disunion, as a remedy for the differences between the people of the two sections. I did so - in language which I cannot improve, and which, therefore, I beg to repeat :

+ in language which I cannot improve, and which, therefore, I beg to repeat:

“One section of our country believes slavery is right, and ought to be extended, while the other believes it is wrong, and ought not to be extended. This is the only substantial @@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ to face; and intercourse, either amicable or hostile, must continue between them. Is it possible, then, to make that intercourse more advantageous, or more satisfactory, after separation than before ? Can aliens make treaties, easier than friends can make laws? + >before? Can aliens make treaties, easier than friends can make laws? Can treaties be more faithfully enforced between aliens, than laws can among friends? Suppose you go to war, you cannot fight always; and when, after much loss on both sides, and no gain on either, you cease fighting, the identical old @@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ we all use cotton and sugar, and share the profits of dealing in them, it may not be quite safe to say, that the south has been more responsible than the north, for its continuance. If, then, for a common object, this property is to - be sacrificed, is it not just that it be done at a common charge ?

+ be sacrificed, is it not just that it be done at a common charge?

And if, with less money, or money more easily paid, we can preserve the benefits of the Union by this means, than we can by the war alone, is it not also economical to do it? Let us consider it then. Let us ascertain the sum we have @@ -813,13 +813,13 @@ numerous? Equally distributed among the whites of the whole country, and there would be but one colored, to seven whites. Could the one, in any way, greatly disturb the seven? There are many communities now, having more than one free - colored person, to seven whites; and this, without any apparent consciousness - of evil from it. The District of Columbia, and the States of Maryland and - Delaware, are all in this condition. The District has more than one free colored - to six whites; and yet, in its frequent petitions to Congress, I believe it has - never presented the presence of free colored persons as one of its grievances. - But why should emancipation south, send the freed people north? People, of any - color, seldom run, unless there be something to run from. Heretofore colored people, to some extent, have fled north from bondage; and now, perhaps, from both bondage and destitution. But if gradual emancipation and deportation be adopted, they will @@ -828,7 +828,7 @@ labor for the wages, till new homes can be found for them, in congenial climes, and with people of their own blood and race. This proposition can be trusted on the mutual interests involved. And, in any event, cannot the north decide for - itself, whether to receive them ?

+ itself, whether to receive them?

Again, as practice proves more than theory, in any case, has there been any irruption of colored people northward, because of the abolishment of slavery in this District last spring?

@@ -897,7 +897,7 @@ generous, just—a way which, if followed, the world will forever applaud, and God must forever bless.

- ABRAHAM LINCOLN. + ABRAHAM LINCOLN. Mar. 6 The blockade. Its admited results the true test of its efficiency. Rapid failure of the resources of the insurgents. What; benefit does - Great Britain derive from her position ? + Great Britain derive from her position? 42 @@ -5809,7 +5809,7 @@ Mr. Pike to Mr. Seward. April 30 Iron-clad ships. The cotton supply. Condition of manufacturing - districts. Emancipation . + districts. Emancipation. 606 @@ -8239,7 +8239,7 @@ subject, a copy of which I have the honor to transmit herewith.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -8384,7 +8384,8 @@ of the highest consideration with which he is his lordship’s most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

The Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.,

@@ -8416,7 +8417,7 @@ Lord Lyons and yourself.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -8455,7 +8456,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq, &c., &c., &c.,

@@ -8497,7 +8498,7 @@ my mission.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -8642,7 +8643,7 @@

The undersigned requests Mr. Adams to accept the assurance of his highest consideration.

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, &c., &c., &c.,

@@ -8827,7 +8828,8 @@

The undersigned prays Earl Russell to receive the assurances of his most distinguished consideration.

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c.

@@ -8853,7 +8855,7 @@ the late consul at Charleston is approved.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -8880,7 +8882,7 @@ welfare of the United States.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -8895,8 +8897,8 @@ No. 95.] - Legation of the United States - ,London, + Legation of the United States, + London, December 27, 1861. @@ -8979,7 +8981,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -9093,7 +9095,7 @@ otherwise appear an omission of duty on my part.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -9186,7 +9188,7 @@ consequences of this great struggle.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -9221,7 +9223,7 @@ limit of twenty-four hours’ stay be soon adopted.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -9291,7 +9293,7 @@ were regarded as so demonstrative in Great Britain.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.,

@@ -9333,7 +9335,7 @@ to the authorities there.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c.,&c.

@@ -9405,7 +9407,7 @@ they occur.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -9458,20 +9460,20 @@ Cadiz and Southampton could never have occurred? Toward what end have these and all other such unhappy occurrences led but the prolongation of a strife now only less injurious to European interests than to our own, - while it is demoralizing political society in all nations ?

+ while it is demoralizing political society in all nations?

Now, when passion and alarm are subsiding in Europe, may there not be found in the government and in the Parliament of Great Britain statesmen who will see that the true path to peace is in retracing the steps which only lead through disastrous conflict upon the soil of this continent between this truly popular and long-established government and those who would subject it all to the power of slavery rather than conform their - political institutions to the spirit of the age ?

+ political institutions to the spirit of the age?

You are not expected to present these suggestions formally to the British government, but, being just in themselves, you will use them, in your discretion, to promote the great interests of both countries.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -9544,7 +9546,7 @@ mischief, and given me what was worthy of consideration.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -9611,7 +9613,7 @@ make it the subject of a particular communication.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -9684,7 +9686,7 @@ estimates for the ensuing year to be laid before you. They have been framed with a due regard to prudent economy and to the efficiency of the public service.

-

My Lords and Gentlemen :

+

My Lords and Gentlemen:

Her Majesty commands us to inform you that measures for the improvement of the law will be laid before you, and among them will be a bill for rendering the title to land more simple, and its @@ -9753,7 +9755,7 @@ impossible sound to us when they reach this side of the Atlantic.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -9829,7 +9831,7 @@ * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -10224,14 +10226,14 @@ often, would it be believed that a warlike people, brought to bay, a portion of their fleet destroyed, and the remaining portion blockaded, would not have recourse to all means to repel the - opposing power? They would do so, of course, and one way of doing - so to which they would resort would be to issue letters of marque, + opposing power? They would do so, of course, and one way of doing so + to which they would resort would be to issue letters of marque, authorizing privateers to destroy the commerce of the enemy. He wished further to know whether the noble earl was in a position to give any information respecting the assassination of Dr. McCarthy at Pisa, who was stabbed in his own house by an Italian corsair, and who had escaped in consequence of the gross neglect and indifference - of the Italian authorities ?

+ of the Italian authorities?

Earl Russell said her Majesty’s government felt sensible of the support given by the noble earl opposite (Earl Derby) on the first night of the session to them respecting their conduct with regard to @@ -10288,7 +10290,7 @@ to him, would have so injurious an effect on foreign powers, coming as it did from one who had filled the office of secretary of state for foreign affairs, that he put it to him whether he had not, in - the heat of debate, somewhat overstated the matter ?

+ the heat of debate, somewhat overstated the matter?

The Earl of Malmesbury said, what he intended to say was this: that supposing a great country like this or France, after a desperate war, driven to the last extremity, and struggling with other powers @@ -10353,18 +10355,18 @@ the Queen’s proclamation commands? Will they stand by and see the Bermuda again fitted out with munitions and arms by British subjects, to be employed by insurgents in their attempts to overthrow the government - of the United States ?

+ of the United States?

When Spain refuses shelter to the Sumter, is Great Britain willing that she shall rest from her work of destruction, and repair in the harbor of - Gibraltar ?

+ Gibraltar?

These indulgences extended to pirates, who are destroying our commerce, must, sooner or later, give rise to the questions, What wrong have the - United States done or even meditated against Great Britain? What duty - of neutrality, or even friendship, which they owed to Great Britain have - they failed to perform? What fault have they committed in their - national conduct? They, indeed, are involved in a domestic strife, but - it is a strife which, while they are fighting for their own existence, - is, at the same time, purely a war of self-defence.

+ United States done or even meditated against Great Britain? What duty of + neutrality, or even friendship, which they owed to Great Britain have + they failed to perform? What fault have they committed in their national + conduct? They, indeed, are involved in a domestic strife, but it is a + strife which, while they are fighting for their own existence, is, at + the same time, purely a war of self-defence.

In your own way please bring these views to the attention of Earl Russell. Meantime, I shall refer the matter you mention relative to the Bermuda and the Sumter to the Secretary of the Navy. I doubt not that, @@ -10374,7 +10376,7 @@ success:

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10406,7 +10408,7 @@ for his perfidy.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c., London.

@@ -10456,7 +10458,7 @@ possible.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10497,7 +10499,7 @@ foreign as well as domestic trade.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10542,7 +10544,7 @@ whether it would not have been able to recover its former strength had the slaveholding States acquiesced in the election and avoided civil war. But what ground is there to fear such a renewal of strength after - having been defeated in arms against the Union ?

+ having been defeated in arms against the Union?

What is the operation of the war? We have entered Virginia, and already five thousand slaves, emancipated simply by the appearance of our forces, are upon the hands of the federal government there. We have @@ -10560,23 +10562,23 @@ country or the world is ripe for such a revolution, so that it must certainly be successful? What, if inaugurating such a revolution, slavery, protesting against its ferocity and inhumanity, should prove - the victor ?

+ the victor?

Who says this administration is false to human freedom? Does it not acknowledge the citizenship as well as the manhood of men without - respect to color ?

+ respect to color?

Has it not made effective arrangements with Great Britain to suppress the slave trade on the coast of Africa? Has it not brought into life the federal laws against the African slave trade, and is it not executing their severest penalties? Besides, is it not an object worthy of practical men to confine slavery within existing bounds, instead of suffering it to be spread over the whole unoccupied portion of this vast - continent ?

+ continent?

Is it not favoring emancipation in the federal District, to be accomplished at the government cost, and without individual injustice or - oppression ?

+ oppression?

Does it not receive all who come into the federal camps to offer their services to the Union, and hold and protect them against disloyal - claimants? Does it not favor the recognition of Hayti and Liberia ?

+ claimants? Does it not favor the recognition of Hayti and Liberia?

The tale that Mr. Cameron was required to give up his place because of his decided opposition to slavery is without foundation; that distinguished gentleman resigned his place only because he could be @@ -10588,7 +10590,7 @@ usual way to the government to which you are accredited.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10619,7 +10621,7 @@ judgment.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq.,

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -10695,7 +10697,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

The Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10722,7 +10725,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10753,7 +10756,7 @@ intended for the use of Messrs. Thomas Brothers, of Palermo, one of that firm having frequently visited the vessel during the process of building.

-

The Oreto is pierced for four guns, [6 ?] but she has yet taken +

The Oreto is pierced for four guns, [6?] but she has yet taken nothing on board but coals and ballast. She is not at present fitted for the reception of guns, nor are the builders aware that she is to be supplied with guns whilst she remains in this @@ -10768,10 +10771,11 @@ the officers at Liverpool to watch the movements of the vessel, and that we will not fail to report forthwith any circumstances which may occur worthy of your lordship’s cognizance.

- - THOS. F. FREEMANTLE. - - GRENVILLE C. L. BERKELEY. + + THOS. F. FREEMANTLE. + GRENVILLE C. L. + BERKELEY. +

The Lords Commissioners of her Majesty’s Treasury.

@@ -10811,7 +10815,7 @@ unnecessarily conceded, as we conceive, to the insurgents.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10841,7 +10845,7 @@ lordship announcing a reference for information.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -10877,7 +10881,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

The Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10961,21 +10966,21 @@ her position. It was a position taken in haste, and in anticipation of the probable success of the revolution. The failure of that revolution is sufficiently apparent. Why should not the position be relinquished, - and the peace of our country thus be allowed to be restored ?

+ and the peace of our country thus be allowed to be restored?

Do you think Earl Russell, astute and well-informed as he is, could name one single benefit that Great Britain derives from maintaining a position which, although unintentionally, is so unfriendly and so injurious to us, or that he could designate one evil that would probably result to the country of whose foreign interests he is the guardian from the resumption of her long-established relations towards the United - States? Is it not worth your pains to suggest to him the inquiry - whether it would not be wiser and better to remove the necessity for our + States? Is it not worth your pains to suggest to him the inquiry whether + it would not be wiser and better to remove the necessity for our blockade than to keep the two nations, and even the whole world, in debate about the rightfulness or the expediency of attempting to break - it, with all the consequences of so hostile a measure ?

+ it, with all the consequences of so hostile a measure?

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11029,7 +11034,7 @@ President’s conclusions, upon the record.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11094,7 +11099,7 @@ Kearsarge.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -11158,7 +11163,7 @@ country, and all their troubles will come to a speedy end.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11195,7 +11200,7 @@ information you will require.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11276,7 +11281,7 @@ it might lead to the possibility of a corresponding reverse.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -11332,7 +11337,8 @@ consideration, I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11370,7 +11376,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11405,7 +11411,7 @@ advantage to the great material interests of that country.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11436,7 +11442,7 @@ either for purposes of war or of commerce.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11465,7 +11471,7 @@ having, it is to be hoped, ceased to exist.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq.

(Same to all of the diplomatic and consular agents of the United @@ -11543,7 +11549,7 @@ in the way of their continued domination of the sea. Can it be wondered at if, under these circumstances, the notion of a permanent separation of this power into two parts, one of which can be played off against the - other, were not altogether unwelcome to their hearts ?

+ other, were not altogether unwelcome to their hearts?

To considerations of a similar kind are we indebted for the security that has been afforded to us in our present contest against interference with the blockade. That there has @@ -11560,7 +11566,8 @@ fancy. Neither are the relations with Russia so friendly as to render a voluntary release of the main instrument to keep her in check, a proposition to be entertained with favor. For these reasons no - countenance will be given to any remonstrance against our blockade; neither will the general reasoning of Mr. Cobden, in favor of limiting + countenance will be given to any remonstrance against our blockade; + neither will the general reasoning of Mr. Cobden, in favor of limiting neither will the general reasoning of Mr.Cobden, in favor of limiting the right of blockade, find much response among people in authority. Even the admissions rendered necessary to establish a position in @@ -11579,7 +11586,7 @@ rule of action it thinks proper to abide by.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -11620,10 +11627,10 @@ warfare even more hopeless than privateering has proved to be, How much longer can the European states resist the ideas concerning this war which we submitted to them a year ago, and which they then so - inconsiderately rejected ?

+ inconsiderately rejected?

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11647,47 +11654,46 @@

It will have come to your knowledge, by the reception of my despatch No. 131, of the 13th of March, that I had already acted in conformity with the suggestions contained in your No. 207, dated on the 11th, by - addressing, a note to Earl Russell in remonstrance against the - notorious activity of the subjects of Great Britain in efforts to set at - nought the blockade. To that communication I have not yet received a - reply. The reception of a letter from Mr. Dudley, the consul at - Liverpool, containing additional information to the same effect, - supplied me with a new occasion to write to his lordship in the spirit - of your despatch No. 196, of the 27th of February. A copy of this latest - note, dated the 26th instant, is herewith transmitted. After a full - conversation with Mr. Morse, we both arrived at the conclusion that the - evidence in our possession would not sustain so broad a position as that - contemplated in your letter; for, whatever may have been the purposes of - the confederate emissaries and their friends pending the difficulties - connected with the Trent case—and I am inclined to believe they went to - the full extent indicated—I fancy they have shrunk within much smaller - compass since that speck of war has disappeared. The activity is now - mainly directed to the expediting of every species of supply through the - means of steam vessels, which may themselves be turned to some account - in the way of illicit trade or of piratical warfare. Of these last the - Oreto seems to be the only one likely to prove formidable. I thought it, - therefore, a good opportunity to place upon his lordship the - responsibility of the consequences of permitting himself to be deluded - by what I cannot help thinking the wilful blindness and credulous - partiality of the British authorities at Liverpool. From the experience - of the past, I have little or no confidence in the success of any - application that may be made of the kind. It is not the less important, - for all that, to perpetuate the testimony for future use. That Great - Britain did, in the most terrible moment of our domestic trial in - struggling with a monstrous social evil she had earnestly professed to - abhor, coldly and at once assume our inability to master it, and then - become the only foreign nation steadily contributing in every indirect - way possible to verify its prejudgment, will probably be the verdict - made up against her by posterity on a calm comparison of the evidence. I - do not mean to say that such has been the course of the whole people. A - considerable portion of them in all classes have been actuated by nobler - views. There is, throughout England, a great deal of warm though passive - sympathy with America. But there is likewise an extraordinary amount of - fear as well as of jealousy. And it is these last passions which have - pervaded the mass of the governing classes, until they have inscribed for the whole nation a moral and - political record which no subsequent action will ever avail to - obliterate.

+ addressing, a note to Earl Russell in remonstrance against the notorious + activity of the subjects of Great Britain in efforts to set at nought + the blockade. To that communication I have not yet received a reply. The + reception of a letter from Mr. Dudley, the consul at Liverpool, + containing additional information to the same effect, supplied me with a + new occasion to write to his lordship in the spirit of your despatch No. + 196, of the 27th of February. A copy of this latest note, dated the 26th + instant, is herewith transmitted. After a full conversation with Mr. + Morse, we both arrived at the conclusion that the evidence in our + possession would not sustain so broad a position as that contemplated in + your letter; for, whatever may have been the purposes of the confederate + emissaries and their friends pending the difficulties connected with the + Trent case—and I am inclined to believe they went to the full extent + indicated—I fancy they have shrunk within much smaller compass since + that speck of war has disappeared. The activity is now mainly directed + to the expediting of every species of supply through the means of steam + vessels, which may themselves be turned to some account in the way of + illicit trade or of piratical warfare. Of these last the Oreto seems to + be the only one likely to prove formidable. I thought it, therefore, a + good opportunity to place upon his lordship the responsibility of the + consequences of permitting himself to be deluded by what I cannot help + thinking the wilful blindness and credulous partiality of the British + authorities at Liverpool. From the experience of the past, I have little + or no confidence in the success of any application that may be made of + the kind. It is not the less important, for all that, to perpetuate the + testimony for future use. That Great Britain did, in the most terrible + moment of our domestic trial in struggling with a monstrous social evil + she had earnestly professed to abhor, coldly and at once assume our + inability to master it, and then become the only foreign nation steadily + contributing in every indirect way possible to verify its prejudgment, + will probably be the verdict made up against her by posterity on a calm + comparison of the evidence. I do not mean to say that such has been the + course of the whole people. A considerable portion of them in all + classes have been actuated by nobler views. There is, throughout + England, a great deal of warm though passive sympathy with America. But + there is likewise an extraordinary amount of fear as well as of + jealousy. And it is these last passions which have pervaded the mass of + the governing classes, until + they have inscribed for the whole nation a moral and political record + which no subsequent action will ever avail to obliterate.

I am bound to notice, in several of your late despatches, a strong disposition to press upon the British government an argument for a retraction of its original error in granting to the rebels the rights of @@ -11712,7 +11718,7 @@ of the quasi belligerent of their own creation.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -11835,7 +11841,8 @@ with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11877,7 +11884,7 @@ Madeira and Nassau.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- THOMAS H. DUDLEY. + THOMAS H. DUDLEY.

Hon. Charles F. Adams, United States Minister.

@@ -11914,7 +11921,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -11964,7 +11971,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -12086,7 +12093,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -12177,7 +12184,7 @@ no interest or ambition permanently conflicting with our own.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -12222,7 +12229,7 @@ government and British society.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -12264,7 +12271,7 @@ Oreto has sailed from Liverpool.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.

@@ -12341,7 +12348,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -12374,7 +12381,7 @@ occupation of the insurrectionary ports.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., + against their own gains from a hostile and unlawful trade?

The President does not believe that the British government are consciously tolerating the injurious practices of which I have complained. But I am instructed to ask you once more to bring these @@ -12436,7 +12443,7 @@ period.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -12480,7 +12487,7 @@ sacrifices it exacts.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -12518,7 +12525,7 @@ conference.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -12577,10 +12584,10 @@ of the Cunard steamers and another vessel which saluted the Annie Childs on her arrival, the masters of the several vessels being known to one another.

- - THOS. F. FREEMANTLE. - - GRENVILLE C. BERKELEY. + + THOS. F. FREEMANTLE. + GRENVILLE C. BERKELEY. +

VICTUALLING BILL.

Pilot, ————, granted number, (662.)

@@ -12754,9 +12761,9 @@ Cleared March 4, 1862. - SAMUEL WAKEHUM, Broker. - Residence, No. 17 Park - Lane. + SAMUEL WAKEHUM, Broker. Residence, No. 17 Park Lane. @@ -12947,7 +12954,7 @@ enjoyed.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -13128,7 +13135,7 @@

I concluded the conversation by saying that I had only done my duty.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -13177,7 +13184,7 @@ despatch, induces us to hope that such a time is near at hand.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -13222,7 +13229,7 @@ hereafter.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -13277,7 +13284,7 @@ of this country towards the United States during their day of trial.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -13341,7 +13348,8 @@

Renewing to your lordship the assurance of my highest consideration, I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -13392,7 +13400,7 @@ it, send supplies even to hell, at the risk of burning their sails.”

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -13431,7 +13439,7 @@ concluded to adopt as a result of your conference with Mr. Dayton.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -13461,10 +13469,10 @@

We are prepared to meet them. But the reflection occurs, are the maritime powers of Europe willing that the suppression of this insurrection shall be forever associated in the memory of mankind with the conviction that - the sympathies of Europe were lent to the abortive revolution ?

+ the sympathies of Europe were lent to the abortive revolution?

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -13493,7 +13501,7 @@ them.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -13543,7 +13551,7 @@ irritation between us.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -13585,7 +13593,7 @@ Liverpool under my directions awaiting a decision of the question.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -13644,7 +13652,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -13733,7 +13741,8 @@

Renewing to your lordship the assurances of my highest consideration, I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c.

@@ -13757,7 +13766,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -13820,7 +13829,7 @@ the evil on the part of the maritime powers.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -13899,7 +13908,7 @@ calmly to await the issue.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward. Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -13955,7 +13964,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -14054,7 +14063,8 @@

Renewing to your lordship the assurances of my highest consideration, I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Lord John Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -14088,7 +14098,7 @@ week.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -14132,7 +14142,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -14160,7 +14170,7 @@ early and just consideration.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -14212,7 +14222,7 @@ restoration of the American Union.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -14236,7 +14246,7 @@ received, but will immediately follow.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

C. F. Adams, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -14278,7 +14288,7 @@ United States the eighty-sixth.[L. S.] - ABRAHAM LINCOLN. + ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

By the President: William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -14378,7 +14388,7 @@ thus far chosen to assume during this struggle. * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -14413,7 +14423,7 @@ despatch.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -14513,7 +14523,8 @@ highest consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c.,&c.

@@ -14564,7 +14575,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -14679,7 +14690,8 @@

Renewing to your lordship the assurances of my highest consideration, I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c.

@@ -14740,7 +14752,7 @@ foreign enemies to settle domestic strifes.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -14776,7 +14788,7 @@ the proceedings.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -14802,7 +14814,7 @@ from the Secretary of the Navy.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -14823,7 +14835,7 @@ recapture of the Emily St. Pierre.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- GIDEON WELLES. + GIDEON WELLES.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -14851,9 +14863,9 @@ contrary to law.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- S. F. DUPONT, Flag-Officer commanding - South Atlantic Blockading - Squadron. + S. F. DUPONT, + Flag-Officer commanding South Atlantic + Blockading Squadron.

Hon. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, @@ -14952,7 +14964,7 @@ one, to which I shall advert in another despatch.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -14990,7 +15002,7 @@ the more powerful of the two contending parties.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams.

 @@ -15051,7 +15063,7 @@ the withdrawal of the two powers.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -15085,7 +15097,7 @@ given up.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -15180,7 +15192,7 @@ presumptuous, then, for us to ask European statesmen to review, in the light of the events of the war, the opinion which they formed at so early a stage of it, that the opinion itself might, perhaps, properly be - deemed a prejudice ?

+ deemed a prejudice?

Of course, in such a review, the observer would not overlook the contrast between the position which the federal government held a year ago and its present situation. Then it had been practically expelled, with all @@ -15217,7 +15229,8 @@ and find it desirable, they can maintain it there without nailing, while it will be more convenient to lower it if they shall find themselves unable or no longer desirous to keep it flying. But, speaking - practically, what has been the result, thus far, in the present case? Has disloyalty been found an indomitable sentiment in this war? It + practically, what has been the result, thus far, in the present case? + Has disloyalty been found an indomitable sentiment in this war? It pervaded even this capital and this District at the beginning of the strife. It no longer exists here. It divided Maryland, and provoked conflict there. The Union is now as strong in that State as in any one @@ -15362,7 +15375,7 @@ everywhere fully understood.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -15401,7 +15414,7 @@ to satisfy it, and it has been promptly conferred and exercised.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -15433,7 +15446,7 @@ and charge the expense in your accounts.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -15520,7 +15533,7 @@ pursuance of the proclamation of the President, heretofore issued.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -15574,7 +15587,7 @@ in regard to each other after that event shall have occurred.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -15617,7 +15630,7 @@ Russell.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -15659,7 +15672,7 @@ wisely disregarded.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -15691,7 +15704,7 @@ President for his further directions.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -15717,7 +15730,7 @@ for violating the blockade but to put the officers in irons.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -15844,7 +15857,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -15872,7 +15885,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -15940,7 +15954,7 @@ the directions contained in your despatch No. 257.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS,

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -15974,7 +15988,8 @@

Renewing the assurances of my highest consideration, I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -15999,7 +16014,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16051,7 +16066,7 @@ doubtless go out in the steamer that carries this despatch.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -16088,7 +16103,7 @@ satisfied with performing: treaty stipulations without reciprocity.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16121,8 +16136,9 @@ the department.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES J. McDOUGAL, Lieut. U. S. navy, in - charge of U. S. steamer Saginaw. + CHARLES J. McDOUGAL, + Lieut. U. S. navy, in charge of U. S. steamer + Saginaw.

Hon. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. @@ -16150,8 +16166,9 @@ colony of Hong Kong and its dependencies.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

- H. G. THOMSETT, Harbor-Master, - &c. + H. G. THOMSETT, + Harbor-Master, + &c.

The Officer Commanding United States sloop-of-war @@ -16210,7 +16227,7 @@ domination, with endless war.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16248,7 +16265,7 @@ advise him of the fact.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -16325,7 +16342,7 @@ these infatuated men.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -16388,7 +16405,7 @@ government.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16458,8 +16475,8 @@ Union.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- F. W. SEWARD. Acting - Secretary. + F. W. SEWARD. + Acting Secretary.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16522,8 +16539,8 @@ in the armies of the Union.

I am, sir, your very obedient servant,

- F. W. SEWARD, Acting - Secretary. + F. W. SEWARD, + Acting Secretary.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16633,7 +16650,7 @@ result.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -16666,7 +16683,7 @@ departure of the mail.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16796,7 +16813,7 @@ upon them.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16824,7 +16841,7 @@ advise and consent to the ratification of the treaty.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16873,7 +16890,7 @@ civil war brings upon us.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16900,7 +16917,7 @@ send it to us or direct our search for it.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16958,7 +16975,7 @@ in the case of the Emily St. Pierre have since been silent.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -17007,7 +17024,8 @@

Renewing the assurances of my highest consideration, I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17031,7 +17049,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17058,7 +17076,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq.,&c., &c., &c.

@@ -17133,9 +17151,11 @@ watch on the vessel, and that any further information that may be obtained concerning her will be forthwith reported.

- THOS. F. FREMANTLE. + THOS. F. + FREMANTLE. - GRENVILLE C. L. BERKELEY. + GRENVILLE C. L. + BERKELEY.

The Lords Commissioners of her Majesty’s Treasury.

@@ -17165,7 +17185,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17193,7 +17214,8 @@ another way at this point.

I have the honor to be, &c,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Henry Wilding, Esq., United States Vice-Consul, Liverpool.

@@ -17270,21 +17292,21 @@ Thouvenel.

The points to be remembered are, first, whether any proceeding in the matter shall be adopted by the United States, with the assent and - acquiescence of the British and French governments ?

+ acquiescence of the British and French governments?

Secondly, what should be the force and extent of the aid to be rendered - to the Granadian confederation ?

+ to the Granadian confederation?

Thirdly, whether these governments will unite with the United States in guaranteeing the safety of the transit under the authority of the Granadian confederation, or either of these objects, and the form and manner in which the parties - shall carry out such agreement ?

+ shall carry out such agreement?

I hardly need say that this government is not less anxious to avoid any such independent or hasty action in the matter as would seem to indicate a desire for exclusive or especial advantages in New Granada than the British government can be that we shall abstain from such a course.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17343,7 +17365,7 @@ by mail, via Queenstown.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -17430,7 +17452,7 @@ which the insurgents have gained.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17468,7 +17490,7 @@ for that purpose only.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17494,7 +17516,7 @@ country, and in assuring the stability of the Union.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17607,7 +17629,7 @@ report of it by the steamer of Saturday.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -17651,7 +17673,7 @@ day or two.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -17682,7 +17704,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17717,7 +17739,8 @@ consideration, I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17745,7 +17768,7 @@ of June, relating to that subject, accompanied my note.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -17782,7 +17805,8 @@ consideration, I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17868,7 +17892,7 @@ the struggle.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -17892,7 +17916,7 @@ Russell on the subject of the slave trade treaty.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -17975,7 +17999,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -18122,7 +18146,7 @@ it.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -18156,7 +18180,7 @@ you on that subject; and you may even invite that inquiry.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -18181,8 +18205,9 @@ returned.

I have the honor to be,

- S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the - Treasury. + S. P. CHASE, + Secretary of the + Treasury.

Hon. William H. Seward.

 @@ -18247,8 +18272,8 @@

The papers enclosed in your letter are herewith returned.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- HIRAM BARNEY, Collector. + HIRAM BARNEY, + Collector.

Hon. S. P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury,

@@ -18290,8 +18315,9 @@ rebels.

I have the honor to be, sir, &c,

- SAM. WHITING, United States - Consul. + SAM. WHITING, + United States + Consul.

Hon. Hiram Barney, Collector of the port, New @@ -18321,7 +18347,7 @@ printed by Gales & Seaton, pages 576 to 581.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -18353,7 +18379,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq.

 @@ -18380,7 +18406,8 @@ foreign affairs.

I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Earl Russell.

 @@ -18410,7 +18437,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq.

 @@ -18500,7 +18527,8 @@ arrangement.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

- TIMOTHY PICKERING. + TIMOTHY + PICKERING.

Robert Liston, Esq.

 @@ -18549,7 +18577,7 @@ vessel, if possible, should she be permitted to depart.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -18607,7 +18635,7 @@ to pursue, during which time the vessel might escape, I advise the more prompt remedy.

- R. P. COLLIER. + R. P. COLLIER. No. 2. @@ -18641,7 +18669,8 @@ assurance of my highest consideration, and am, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

The Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -18673,7 +18702,8 @@ consideration, I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

The Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -18729,7 +18759,7 @@ to escape, the federal government would not have serious grounds of remonstrance.

- R. P. COLLIER. + R. P. COLLIER. @@ -18758,7 +18788,7 @@ the secretary of the board of customs.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

- A. F. SQUARRY. + A. F. SQUARRY.

His Excellency The American Minister, 5 Portland @@ -18812,7 +18842,7 @@ may receive immediate attention.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

- A. F. SQUARRY. + A. F. SQUARRY.

Secretary of H. M. Board of Customs, @@ -18841,7 +18871,7 @@ opinion they would be guided as to seizing the vessel.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- A. F. SQUARRY. + A. F. SQUARRY.

His Excellency The American Minister.

@@ -19078,7 +19108,7 @@ territories of the United States.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19165,7 +19195,7 @@ commanders concerned therein.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19270,7 +19300,7 @@ standing lesson against the repetition of such mistakes.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -19295,7 +19325,7 @@ warning to leave the port of Hong Kong.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -19329,7 +19359,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest considerations, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19376,7 +19406,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

The Right Hon. Earl Russell.

 @@ -19411,7 +19442,7 @@ In these respects he is left entirely to his own discretion.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -19538,7 +19569,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -19570,7 +19601,7 @@ me mention the subject to you.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -19625,8 +19656,8 @@ encourages our eager enemies, wherever they may be, to hope for our signal and complete overthrow. Did ever any nation, at once so presumptuous, yet so unwise, and so apparently unfortunate, secure the - absolute forbearance of a rival it had boldly challenged? Certainly - not, and therefore I reckon not upon any sentimental forbearance of the + absolute forbearance of a rival it had boldly challenged? Certainly not, + and therefore I reckon not upon any sentimental forbearance of the British government. The American people understand, as well as their government does, that none is to be expected or even desired. Still the disfavor of Great @@ -19714,17 +19745,17 @@ and so fatal, which you may possibly find suitable occasion for suggesting to the rulers of Great Britain. For what was this great continent, brought up, as it were, from the depths of what before had - been known as “the dark and stormy ocean ?” Did the European states - which found and occupied it, almost without effort, then understand its - real destiny and purposes? Have they ever yet fully understood and - accepted them? Has anything but disappointment upon disappointment, and - disaster upon disaster, resulted from their misapprehensions? After - near four hundred years of such disappointments and disasters is the way - of Providence in regard to America still so mysterious that it cannot be + been known as “the dark and stormy ocean?” Did the European states which + found and occupied it, almost without effort, then understand its real + destiny and purposes? Have they ever yet fully understood and accepted + them? Has anything but disappointment upon disappointment, and disaster + upon disaster, resulted from their misapprehensions? After near four + hundred years of such disappointments and disasters is the way of + Providence in regard to America still so mysterious that it cannot be understood and confessed. Columbus, it was said, had given a new world to the kingdoms of Castile and Leon. What has become of the sovereignty - of Spain in America? Richelieu occupied and fortified a large portion - of the continent, extending from the Gulf of Mexico to the Straits of + of Spain in America? Richelieu occupied and fortified a large portion of + the continent, extending from the Gulf of Mexico to the Straits of Belleisle. Does France yet retain that important appendage to the crown of her sovereign? Great Britain acquired a dominion here surpassing, by an hundred fold in length and breadth, the native realm. Has not a large @@ -19733,20 +19764,20 @@ Swedes, been resigned but to American nations, the growth of European colonists, and exiles who have come hither bringing with them the arts, the civilization, and the virtues of Europe? Has not the change been - beneficial to society on this continent? Has it not been more - beneficial even to Europe itself than continued European domination, if - it had been possible, could have been? The American nations which have - grown up here are free and self-governing. They have made themselves so - from inherent vigor and in obedience to an absolute necessity. Is it - possible for European states to plunge them again into a colonial state - and hold them there? Would it be desirable for them and for Europe, if - it were possible? The balance of power among the nations of Europe is - maintained not without numerous strong armies and frequent conflicts, - while the sphere of political ambition there is bounded by the ocean - which surrounds that continent. Would it be possible to maintain it at - all if this vast continent, with all its populations, their resources, - and their forces, should once again be brought within that sphere. If - we, who rightfully dwell on this continent, with all the inducements to + beneficial to society on this continent? Has it not been more beneficial + even to Europe itself than continued European domination, if it had been + possible, could have been? The American nations which have grown up here + are free and self-governing. They have made themselves so from inherent + vigor and in obedience to an absolute necessity. Is it possible for + European states to plunge them again into a colonial state and hold them + there? Would it be desirable for them and for Europe, if it were + possible? The balance of power among the nations of Europe is maintained + not without numerous strong armies and frequent conflicts, while the + sphere of political ambition there is bounded by the ocean which + surrounds that continent. Would it be possible to maintain it at all if + this vast continent, with all its populations, their resources, and + their forces, should once again be brought within that sphere. If we, + who rightfully dwell on this continent, with all the inducements to peace, harmony, and good order which so fortunate a position creates, cannot remain at peace among ourselves, even when free from foreign interference, does Europe @@ -19760,9 +19791,9 @@ United States. Now, when the social system of the United States is convulsed with the agony of slavery here, is it desirable that slavery should be revived and perpetuated, and the republic perish for refusing - it unbounded expansion and duration? Is it wise for Europe to attempt - to rescue slavery? Is it possible, if the attempt shall be made? On - the contrary of all these suppositions, is it not manifest that these + it unbounded expansion and duration? Is it wise for Europe to attempt to + rescue slavery? Is it possible, if the attempt shall be made? On the + contrary of all these suppositions, is it not manifest that these American nations were called into existence to be the home of freemen; that the states of Europe have been trusted by Providence with their tutelage, but that tutelage and all its responsibilities and powers are @@ -19775,7 +19806,7 @@ principal sufferers.

I am, sir, your obedient servant.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19817,7 +19848,7 @@ Halleck’s correspondence.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19843,7 +19874,7 @@

Your proceedings in these matters are entirely approved.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19915,7 +19946,7 @@ shall not attempt anything of the kind again.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward,Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -19946,7 +19977,7 @@ enclosure.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -20041,7 +20072,7 @@ that proclamation.

I am, sir, &c.,

- A. H. LAYARD. + A. H. LAYARD.

T. B. Horsfall, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -20074,7 +20105,7 @@ to be acted upon. The government has no legal authority to offer any pecuniary inducements to the advent of industrious foreigners.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.
- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -20166,8 +20197,9 @@ directed Mr. Slidell to instruct Mr. Mason to make another formal appeal to Earl Russell preliminary to his own separate and exclusive action seems improbable. Could the cupidity of British merchants resist the - temptation to keep peace with us if France should go to war alone? Could France propose to go to war with us without Great Britain as an - ally? Is France more ready for hazards of war than Great Britain ?

+ temptation to keep peace with us if France should go to war alone? Could + France propose to go to war with us without Great Britain as an ally? Is + France more ready for hazards of war than Great Britain?

While we are making ourselves ready, as far as possible, for whatever emergency may happen in our foreign relations, and while we sensibly feel that the present apparent condition of suspended activity in our @@ -20211,7 +20243,7 @@ the apparently sedentary forces in their camps.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -20256,7 +20288,7 @@ are entirely satisfactory to the President.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -20289,7 +20321,7 @@ nations, as well as the United States.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -20318,7 +20350,7 @@ Earl Russell.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -20467,7 +20499,7 @@ ultimately makes the peace; and hence it has happened that hardly one out of a hundred attempted revolutions has ever been successful. Is not this the instruction of the civil wars of England, France, and San - Domingo ?

+ Domingo?

The consideration that this is a republican state has been heretofore impressed upon the correspondence of this department, and it cannot be too steadily kept in view by our representatives in Europe. Precisely @@ -20498,7 +20530,7 @@

Will they claim that European powers are so much more enlightened, more just, and more humane than we are, that they can regulate not only their own affairs but ours also, more wisely, and more beneficially than we - have done? How and where have they proved this superiority ?

+ have done? How and where have they proved this superiority?

I cannot avoid thinking that the ideas of intervention and mediation have their source in an imperfect conception in Europe of the independence of the American nation. Although actual foreign authority has so long @@ -20512,21 +20544,22 @@ justify their dislike. That independence was lawfully won, and it has been universally acknowledged.

-

Is our peculiar form of government an offence? It was chosen by - ourselves and for our own benefit, and it has not been enforced by us, - nor can it in any case be enforced, upon any other people. Our own - experience has proved its felicitous adaptation to our condition, and - the judgment of mankind has pronounced that its influences upon other - nations are beneficent. The severest censure has found no defect in it, - except that it is too good to endure.

+

Is our peculiar form of government an offence? It was chosen by ourselves + and for our own benefit, and it has not been enforced by us, nor can it + in any case be enforced, upon any other people. Our own experience has + proved its felicitous adaptation to our condition, and the judgment of + mankind has pronounced that its influences upon other nations are + beneficent. The severest censure has found no defect in it, except that + it is too good to endure.

What plea for intervention or mediation remains? Only this, that our civil war is inconvenient to foreign states. But the inconvenience they suffer is only incidental, and must be brief; while their intervention or mediation might be fatal to the United States. Are not all civil wars necessarily inconvenient to foreign nations? Must every state, when it has the misfortune to fall into civil war, forego its independence and - compromise its sovereignty because the war affects its foreign commerce? Would not the practice upon that principal result in the dissolution - of all political society ?

+ compromise its sovereignty because the war affects its foreign commerce? + Would not the practice upon that principal result in the dissolution of + all political society?

But it is urged that the war is protracted. What if it were so? Do our national rights depend on the time that an insurrection may maintain itself? It has been a war of fifteen months. The battle field is as @@ -20559,7 +20592,7 @@ foreign interference may recur.

I am, sir, your obedient servant.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -20663,7 +20696,7 @@ earlier delay and of the later action.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -20688,7 +20721,7 @@ the late treaty in suppression of the slave trade.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -20723,7 +20756,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -20752,7 +20786,7 @@ President with much satisfaction.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -20815,7 +20849,7 @@ experience.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -20901,7 +20935,7 @@ be ready to attend to any business I might desire to present.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -20926,7 +20960,8 @@

Renewing the assurances of my highest consideration, I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -20953,7 +20988,7 @@ slave trade.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -20979,7 +21014,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -21013,7 +21048,7 @@ coals.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -21039,7 +21074,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -21082,9 +21117,9 @@ favored with your lords’ further instructions as to the person who should be directed to proceed to Nassau.

- F. GOULBURN. + F. GOULBURN. - R. H. GREY. + R. H. GREY. - S. PRICE EDWARDS. + S. PRICE EDWARDS. Statement of Mr. Ed. Morgan, surveyor in her @@ -21132,8 +21167,8 @@ any goods were taken on board; but in reply to my frequent inquiries they stated nothing was put in the ship but coal.

- ED. MORGAN, Surveyor. + ED. MORGAN, + Surveyor. Statement of Mr. Henry Lloyd, examining @@ -21150,8 +21185,8 @@ kind taken on board, and we are perfectly satisfied that none such was taken on board during her stay in the river.

- H. LLOYD, Examining - Officer. + H. LLOYD, + Examining Officer. Statement, on oath, of Mr. Wm. Parry, master @@ -21174,14 +21209,14 @@ Mr. Lloyd, the tide surveyor, alongside the ship while in the river.

- WM. PARRY. + WM. PARRY. Sworn before me at the custom-house, Liverpool, this 23d day, 1862. - S. PRICE EDWARDS, Collector. + S. PRICE EDWARDS, + Collector. @@ -21280,7 +21315,7 @@ until, without fault on our part, it shall have been broken.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -21395,7 +21430,7 @@ Here it is viewed in the light of a disaster, and great efforts are made to discredit it. I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -21436,7 +21471,7 @@ new complaints in regard to other vessels of a similar character now being built in England. I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -21479,8 +21514,8 @@ Bullock will, upon your application, supply them.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- S. H. MALLORY, Secretary of the - Navy. + S. H. MALLORY, + Secretary of the Navy.

Commander James H. North, C. S. N., London, England.

@@ -21511,7 +21546,7 @@ two armies at the present moment.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -21544,7 +21579,7 @@ government they may succeed in establishing there.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -21569,7 +21604,7 @@ the cotton market in New Orleans.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -21595,7 +21630,7 @@ fled during the night. McClellan is in pursuit.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -21621,7 +21656,7 @@ empire.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -21683,7 +21718,7 @@ whatever.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -21734,7 +21769,7 @@ and importance.

I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD. By the President of the United States of @@ -21850,7 +21885,7 @@ eighty-seventh.[l.s.] - ABRAHAM LINCOLN. + ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

By the President: William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -21875,7 +21910,7 @@ the Navy.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -21904,7 +21939,7 @@ renewed, either at this department or at a legation or consulate abroad, within one year from its date.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -22021,7 +22056,7 @@ injury to our commerce.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -22055,7 +22090,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS. [Untitled] @@ -22100,7 +22136,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -22210,7 +22246,7 @@ opposed themselves to both.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD + WILLIAM H. SEWARD

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -22326,7 +22362,7 @@ effect.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -22352,8 +22388,9 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- BENJAMIN MORAN, Assistant Secretary of - Legation. + BENJAMIN MORAN, + Assistant Secretary of + Legation.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -22456,7 +22493,7 @@ designated as the land of the free.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -22497,7 +22534,7 @@ provisions of the law in regard to that vessel.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -22558,7 +22595,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -22592,7 +22630,7 @@ Louisiana and in North Carolina.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -22615,7 +22653,7 @@ the gunboat 290 in British waters, as there recited, are approved.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -22671,7 +22709,7 @@ people in their determined purpose of maintaining the federal Union.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -22740,7 +22778,7 @@ direction, the ultimate issue could not be doubtful.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -22764,7 +22802,7 @@ kingdom.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS,

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -22795,7 +22833,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -22837,7 +22875,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c.

@@ -22864,7 +22903,7 @@ my anticipation of the subject discussed in your despatches.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -22992,7 +23031,7 @@ now endanger the Union that he is sworn to maintain and preserve.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &., &c., &c.

@@ -23046,7 +23085,7 @@ exigency which has occurred.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -23070,7 +23109,7 @@ is herewith appended.

I am your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -23099,7 +23138,7 @@ time.

I remain, sir, your most obedient,

- WILLIAM H. DABNEY. + WILLIAM H. DABNEY.

Horatio J. Perry, Esq.,United States Legation, Madrid.

@@ -23125,7 +23164,7 @@ You may make any use of this despatch which you may deem advisable.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Frances Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -23154,7 +23193,7 @@ which that paper contains.

I am sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -23218,7 +23257,7 @@ Mitchell will not long be idle before Charleston.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -23250,7 +23289,7 @@ hereafter.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -23295,7 +23334,7 @@ made on the mind of the President.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -23325,7 +23364,7 @@ this date.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -23363,7 +23402,7 @@

Resolved, That this chamber has heard with profound emotion the graphic account given by Captain Hager of the burning of his ship Brilliant on the 3d day of October instant, a - portion of which is in the following words :

+ portion of which is in the following words:

“At sunset the Brilliant was fired—at 7. p.m. was in flames fore and aft, the E. F. lying about a mile from her. The ship continued to burn all night. In the morning the steamer was close at hand, and @@ -23432,7 +23471,9 @@

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the resolutions from the minutes of the chamber.

- JOHN AUSTIN STEVENS, Jr., + JOHN AUSTIN STEVENS, Jr., + Secretary.
@@ -23457,7 +23498,7 @@ record which may be of use at some future day.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -23487,7 +23528,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -23511,7 +23552,7 @@ &c., to the gunboat No. 290.

I am, &c.,

- GEO. A. HAMILTON. + GEO. A. HAMILTON. - F. GOULHURA. + F. GOULHURA. - W. R. CREY. + W. R. CREY.

To the Lords, &c., &c.

@@ -23674,7 +23715,7 @@ to lay them faithfully before you in my next.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -23710,7 +23751,7 @@ the next attack will be made on the California steamers.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -23737,7 +23778,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -23856,7 +23897,7 @@ short of a very decisive victory in Virginia will avail to check it.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, V. C.

@@ -23884,7 +23925,7 @@ this country do much harm to the national character.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -23921,7 +23962,7 @@ beneficial.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -24083,7 +24124,7 @@ lordship’s answer as definitively closing the matter.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -24118,7 +24159,7 @@ the result of the investigation shall give them a right to expect.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24141,8 +24182,8 @@ about to fit out there under the rebel flag.

Very respectfully,

- GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the - Navy. + GIDEON WELLES, + Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -24174,8 +24215,9 @@ a few hours at Bermuda.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES WILKES, Rear Admiral, - Commanding West India Squadron. + CHARLES WILKES, + Rear Admiral, Commanding West India + Squadron.

Hon. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. @@ -24280,7 +24322,7 @@ ports to make war on a peaceful and friendly nation.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24310,7 +24352,7 @@ be agreed.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24358,7 +24400,7 @@ but they can do no more.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24391,7 +24433,7 @@ the effect of this despatch to his lordship.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24467,7 +24509,7 @@ you have already been advised, were imposed.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24535,7 +24577,7 @@ itself shall be saved.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, &c., &c., &c., London.

@@ -24569,7 +24611,7 @@ again hear complaints of too great rigor.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24599,7 +24641,7 @@ accord.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24634,7 +24676,7 @@ friendly and cordial welcome.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24678,7 +24720,7 @@ discouragement.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c,. &c., &c.

@@ -24719,7 +24761,7 @@ dissatisfaction with his declination of our proposition.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24766,7 +24808,7 @@ in anticipation of an expected attack on that point.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -24797,7 +24839,7 @@ respect has not been made known to you in London.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24962,7 +25004,7 @@ of my high consideration.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24990,7 +25032,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25063,7 +25105,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25093,7 +25135,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25120,7 +25162,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25147,7 +25189,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, & c., &c., &c.

@@ -25180,7 +25222,7 @@ &c.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- GIDEON WELLES. + GIDEON WELLES.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -25222,8 +25264,9 @@ enterprise or interfere with the legitimate object of the United States government in suppressing the rebellion. * * * * * *

- M. WOODHULL, Commander United States - Navy. + M. WOODHULL, + Commander United States + Navy.

Hon. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, Washington @@ -25261,7 +25304,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons.

 @@ -25286,7 +25329,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25321,8 +25364,9 @@ flag in any way whatever. I was wrong for so doing, and truly hope the department will forgive me. * * * * *

- JOHN BAKER, Acting Master United States - Navy. + JOHN BAKER, + Acting Master United States + Navy.

Commodore Paulding.

 @@ -25361,7 +25405,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25463,7 +25507,7 @@ State.

I am, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25527,7 +25571,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25553,7 +25597,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25629,7 +25673,7 @@ violated his duty by bearing despatches, which, as far as he can know, may be presumed to be of an innocent nature, and in the maintenance of a pacific connexion.”

-

And he continues, shortly afterwards :

+

And he continues, shortly afterwards:

“It is to be considered, also, with regard to this question, what may be due to the convenience of the neutral state, for its interests may require that the intercourse of correspondence with the enemy’s country @@ -25738,7 +25782,7 @@ right to stop him on such a voyage.

The sole object which Sir William Scott had in view was to explain the extent and limits of the doctrine of the inviolability of ambassadors in - virtue of that character; for he says :

+ virtue of that character; for he says:

“The limits that are assigned to the operations of war against them, by Vattel and other writers upon these subjects, are, that you may exercise your right of war against them @@ -25895,7 +25939,7 @@ it.

I am, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.
I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the expression of my high consideration.

- F. W. SEWARD, Acting - Secretary. + F. W. SEWARD, + Acting Secretary.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons.

 @@ -25947,7 +25991,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25972,7 +26016,7 @@ them.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

- GIDEON WELLES. + GIDEON WELLES.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -25996,8 +26040,9 @@ Lieutenant Commanding Bankhead, and Lieutenant Weaver.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

- S. F. DUPONT, Flag-Officer Com’g South - Atlantic Block Squadron. + S. F. DUPONT, + Flag-Officer Com’g South Atlantic Block + Squadron.

Hon. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, @@ -26029,8 +26074,8 @@ one from Lieutenant Weaver, of this ship.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- J. L. LARDNER, Captain. + J. L. LARDNER, + Captain.

Flag-Officer S. F. DuPont, Com’g South Atlantic Blockading @@ -26072,8 +26117,9 @@ men in their situation were entitled to.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

- J. P. BANKHEAD, Lieutenant - Commanding. + J. P. BANKHEAD, + Lieutenant + Commanding.

Captain James L. Lardner, Commanding United States Steamer @@ -26103,8 +26149,8 @@ Susquehanna, Port Royal, S. C.

Forwarded respectfully.

- J. L. LARDNER, Captain. + J. L. LARDNER, + Captain. @@ -26168,7 +26214,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -26193,7 +26239,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -26233,7 +26279,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -26254,7 +26300,7 @@ last, respecting the bag of despatches taken from Mr. J. P. Crosse, at Baltimore, I beg to inform you that her Majesty’s government have obtained from her Majesty’s acting consul at Richmond a description of - the bag as it left his hands. That description is as follows :

+ the bag as it left his hands. That description is as follows:

“The bag in question was of canvas, as usual, and was closed in such a manner as to prevent access to its contents without cutting the tape or cord, which was sealed through parchment with the seal of this @@ -26268,7 +26314,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -26321,7 +26367,7 @@

In the note of the 19th of March, which is now before me, you state that her Majesty’s government have obtained from her Majesty’s acting consul at Richmond a description of the bag as it was when it left his hands; - that this description is as follows :

+ that this description is as follows:

“The bag in question was of canvas, as usual, and was closed in such a manner as to prevent access to its contents without cutting the tape or cord, which was sealed through parchment with the seal of this @@ -26382,7 +26428,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -26489,8 +26535,8 @@ unquestioned.

I have, &c., &c.,

- P. EDWARDS, Acting - Consul. + P. EDWARDS, + Acting Consul.

Lord Lyons.

 @@ -26517,7 +26563,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward.

 @@ -26542,8 +26588,8 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- F. W. SEWARD, Acting - Secretary. + F. W. SEWARD, + Acting Secretary.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -26572,7 +26618,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. William Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -26605,8 +26651,9 @@

The despatch of the acting consul is returned.

With great respect,

- S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the - Treasury. + S. P. CHASE, + Secretary of the + Treasury.

Hon. W. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -26646,8 +26693,8 @@ returned.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- HIRAM BARNEY, Collector. + HIRAM BARNEY, + Collector.

Hon. S. P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury,

@@ -26768,7 +26815,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. William Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -26798,7 +26845,7 @@ subject to General Butler.

I have the honor to be, sir, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. William Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -26861,7 +26908,7 @@

I avail myself of this occasion to renew to you the assurance of my highest consideration.

- W. STUART. + W. STUART.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -26888,8 +26935,8 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to offer to you, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

- F. W. SEWARD, Acting - Secretary. + F. W. SEWARD, + Acting Secretary.

Hon. William Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -26911,7 +26958,7 @@ captured by the United States forces, were serving against their will in the ranks of the rebels, and asking that such cases may be “ inquired into fairly and dealt with leniently,” and to submit to you - the following reply :

+ the following reply:

The department has no information upon this subject other than that gathered from the note of Lord Lyons; and as that fails to mention the name of any British subject supposed to have been captured while @@ -26927,8 +26974,9 @@ ground was urged.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- C. P. WOLCOTT, Assistant Secretary of - War. + C. P. WOLCOTT, + Assistant Secretary of + War.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -26956,7 +27004,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. William Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -27006,7 +27054,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. William Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -27343,7 +27391,7 @@ used for purposes treasonable against this government.

Respectfully submitted.

- FRANCIS H. RUGGLES. + FRANCIS H. RUGGLES.

The Secretary of State.

 @@ -27379,7 +27427,7 @@ reference to transit trade through ports within their jurisdiction.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. William Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -27465,7 +27513,7 @@

I avail myself of this occasion to renew to you the assurances of my highest consideration.

- W. STUART. + W. STUART.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -27511,7 +27559,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. William Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -27534,8 +27582,9 @@ the approbation of this department.

With great respect,

- S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the - Treasury. + S. P. CHASE, + Secretary of the + Treasury.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -27706,8 +27755,8 @@

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- HIRAM BARNEY, Collector. + HIRAM BARNEY, + Collector.

Hon. S. P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury

@@ -27735,7 +27784,7 @@

Supercargo to be furnished with a first class passage, free of charge.

- J. L. + J. L.

P. S.—Payment of freight and insurance to be paid by bill of four months drawn on Jorss & Worth.

@@ -27767,7 +27816,7 @@

Underwriter’s name shall be such as may be satisfactory to insured.

- A. T. C. + A. T. C.

Yours, faithfully,

- A. T. CLARK. + A. T. CLARK.

Mr. F. North.

 @@ -27811,8 +27860,9 @@ £3,655 15s. 3d

- A. T. CLARK & CO., Broker for - Pacific. + A. T. CLARK & CO., + Broker for + Pacific.

Adieu,

- JO. LAWSON. + JO. LAWSON. in the confederacy as if he himself had signed the contract or given a through set of bills of - lading? If this be not sufficient, is he not then - committed, by receiving the acceptances of Jorss & North - for £3,655—being at the rate of £3,655—being at the rate of £13 per ton, same as stipulated by L., and the current rate charged for a confederate port? If bound by this contract, then he must carry the goods through @@ -27887,7 +27937,7 @@ pretence,” be restrained from using the papers? The greater part are in his possession.

- J. N. BEACH. + J. N. BEACH. appointed time, you will reach - there first, via New York; and - should he not start at all, but send - out an agent by the Liverpool steamer, where will you be - then, if you wait for him? My advice is, carry out your own - plan, independent of him. Your duties at Nassau will be very - light and pleasant if Clark obtains the insurance and takes - the ship over to a confederate port; but if you leave on + there first, via New York; and should + he not start at all, but send out an + agent by the Liverpool steamer, where will you be then, if + you wait for him? My advice is, carry out your own plan, + independent of him. Your duties at Nassau will be very light + and pleasant if Clark obtains the insurance and takes the + ship over to a confederate port; but if you leave on Saturday, and the arrangement is not perfected before you go, your course will be one of some anxiety. With all due deference to your good - judgment, I submit the following for your consideration - :

+ judgment, I submit the following for your consideration:

Being advised by Mr. North you will, of course, know your legal rights and the better way of securing them. If not in conflict with his views, I would first call upon Messrs. @@ -27946,18 +27995,18 @@ To-morrow I will write to you at the “Adelphi Hotel.” Bache will do £3,000 on freight and £5,000 on merchandise. How will you - do about paying him the premium? I wish to send F., T. - & Co. their policy for £5,000, - also the Galbraith policy as per my agreement. If Clark does - not settle with - us, I presume Mr. North will commence proceedings as soon as - you leave. I do not think of anything else at present. If - you wish to write to me, address to Davison’s care; and if - not here, he will forward it to me. I should not advise - sending the money to Bache direct, - but by draft or some other way. You have, my dear Jorss, my - sincere wishes for a pleasant, - safe, and prosperous voyage, a successful issue from these + do about paying him the premium? I wish to send F., T. & + Co. their policy for £5,000, also the + Galbraith policy as per my agreement. If Clark does not + settle with us, I + presume Mr. North will commence proceedings as soon as you + leave. I do not think of anything else at present. If you + wish to write to me, address to Davison’s care; and if not + here, he will forward it to me. I should not advise sending + the money to Bache direct, but by + draft or some other way. You have, my dear Jorss, my sincere wishes for a pleasant, safe, + and prosperous voyage, a successful issue from these difficulties at Nassau, and a speedy return to your dear wife and friends. Should you visit the south, I need only commend you to Root’s care; in him you will find a friend @@ -27965,7 +28014,7 @@ prosperity is the wish of

Your attached friend,

- BEACH. + BEACH. + hereinafter appears:

1. That the said Beach & Root shall, on the signing of this agreement, pay to the said Jorss & North the sum of three thousand pounds, either in cash or by acceptances, @@ -28121,7 +28170,8 @@ Bookkeeper, No. 2 Lower Mosley street, Manchester.

- FREDERICK NORTH. + FREDERICK + NORTH.

Signed, sealed, and delivered by the within named Frederick North, in presence of—

@@ -28160,7 +28210,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. William Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -28227,7 +28277,7 @@

* * * * * *

I have the honor to be, with high regard, your obedient servant,

- REVERDY JOHNSON. + REVERDY JOHNSON.
I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. William Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -28278,8 +28328,8 @@ the Secretary of State on the 16th of last month, and to be, with high consideration, sir, your obedient servant,

- F. W. SEWARD, Acting - Secretary. + F. W. SEWARD, + Acting Secretary.

Hon. Wm. Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -28308,7 +28358,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- WILLIAM STUART. + WILLIAM STUART.

Hon. William H. Seward.

 @@ -28351,7 +28401,8 @@ cruisers in the gulf,

We remain, &c., &c.,

- MURPHY &. TWINING. + MURPHY &. + TWINING.

Sir A. Milne, K. C. B., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -28380,7 +28431,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

- W. STUART. + W. STUART.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -28407,7 +28458,7 @@ towards punishing those engaged in it.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. William Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -28438,7 +28489,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. Wm. Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -28467,7 +28518,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. Wm. Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -28549,7 +28600,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- W. STUART. + W. STUART.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -28577,7 +28628,7 @@ would use all proper and loyal means to overcome.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. William Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -28631,7 +28682,7 @@ could not expect to maintain itself if it allowed such mischievous license to American citizens. Can the case be different when the dangerous person is a foreigner living under the protection of this - government ?

+ government?

I can conceive only one ground upon which his release can be ordered, and that is that he may be too unimportant and too passionate a person to be heeded in his railings against the government. But you will bear in mind @@ -28647,7 +28698,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. Wm. Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -28709,7 +28760,7 @@

I avail myself of this occasion to renew to you the assurance of my highest consideration.

- WILLIAM STUART. + WILLIAM STUART.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -28742,7 +28793,7 @@ be sent, is, at present, as stated in the enclosed list.

I am, &c.,

- W. G. ROMAINE. + W. G. ROMAINE. I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. Wm. Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -29159,8 +29210,8 @@ followed, I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- L. C. TURNER, Judge - Advocate. + L. C. TURNER, + Judge Advocate.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -29322,7 +29373,7 @@

The undersigned avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Secretary of State the assurance of his highest consideration.

- W. STUART. + W. STUART.
The undersigned avails himself of this occasion to offer to Mr. Stuart a renewed assurance of his very high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. William Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -29606,7 +29657,7 @@ day of July, 1815, and which was renewed by the convention of the 6th August, 1817, which, in the absence of reference by Mr. Stuart, are assumed to be those to which Mr. Stuart alludes. The first of these is - in the words following :

+ in the words following:

Article 1. There shall be, between the territories of the United States of America and all the territories of his Britannic Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty of commerce. The @@ -29646,7 +29697,7 @@ proceedings complained of are to be tried, the undersigned proceeds to examine those proceedings themselves.

On the 20th of May, 1862, the Congress of the United States enacted a law - the first three sections of which are as follows :

+ the first three sections of which are as follows:

“Section 1. That the Secretary of the Treasury, in addition to the powers conferred upon him by the act of the 13th of July, 1861, be, and he is hereby, authorized to refuse a clearance to @@ -29883,7 +29934,7 @@

The undersigned avails himself of this opportunity to renew to Mr. Stuart the assurance of his high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. William Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -29910,7 +29961,7 @@

The undersigned avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Hon. William H. Seward the assurance of his high consideration.

- W. STUART. + W. STUART. Earl Russell to Mr. Stuart. @@ -30014,7 +30065,7 @@

You will furnish Mr. Seward with a copy of this dispatch.

I am, with great truth, &c., &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Hon. William Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -30063,7 +30114,7 @@

* * * * * * * * * *

With much respect, I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c.

@@ -30106,7 +30157,7 @@ countrymen. It is well that it should be so.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -30136,7 +30187,7 @@ further prosecution of the subject opened in those papers.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -30161,7 +30212,7 @@ concerned.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -30187,7 +30238,7 @@ Thouvenel’s confidential conversation.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -30244,7 +30295,7 @@ quarter.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -30454,7 +30505,7 @@ the country and its institutions can support themselves.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -30491,7 +30542,7 @@ the blockade.

With much respect, I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -30586,7 +30637,7 @@ propriety.

I am, sir, with much respect, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -30737,7 +30788,7 @@ him this paper, and give him a copy if he shall desire it.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -30770,7 +30821,7 @@

* * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -30823,7 +30874,7 @@ contraband) the trade would not seriously affect our interests.

I am, sir, with much respect, your obedient servant,

- WM L. DAYTON. + WM L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -30927,7 +30978,7 @@ you to communicate them to him.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -30997,7 +31048,7 @@ of the Union.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -31072,7 +31123,7 @@ monarch in Europe.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -31133,7 +31184,7 @@ anomalous position she now occupies.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -31228,7 +31279,7 @@ realized.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -31266,7 +31317,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -31427,7 +31478,7 @@ complete restoration of the authority of the United States.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -31504,7 +31555,7 @@

* * * * * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -31536,7 +31587,7 @@

We expect success, and after it we shall seek to restore commerce.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -31569,7 +31620,7 @@ our former preponderating influence in favor of neutral rights.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -31768,7 +31819,7 @@ discretion on your part.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -31792,11 +31843,11 @@

You will learn with pleasure that the suggestion lately made by the President in his special message to Congress, touching the co-operation of Congress with the States in measures for the gradual removal of - slavery, has been approved by both houses of Congress, and has also - been received with much favor by the country.

+ slavery, has been approved by both houses of Congress, and has also been + received with much favor by the country.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Wm. L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -31875,7 +31926,7 @@ upon this and other matters.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -31922,7 +31973,7 @@ and the demand for cotton consequently most urgent.

I am, sir, your most obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -31974,7 +32025,7 @@ Hülsemann thinks he can go home; Mr. Schleiden has gone.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -32020,7 +32071,7 @@ conspirators?

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -32070,7 +32121,7 @@ all nations.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -32115,7 +32166,7 @@ trusts that you may succeed.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -32144,7 +32195,7 @@ public safety.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -32232,7 +32283,7 @@ nations.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -32302,7 +32353,7 @@ perceive that it ought to be accepted?

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -32331,7 +32382,7 @@ proceeding.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -32392,7 +32443,7 @@ force.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -32529,7 +32580,7 @@ anything in that direction.

I am, sir, your very obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -32589,7 +32640,7 @@ done for them.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -32685,7 +32736,7 @@ England.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -32851,7 +32902,7 @@ France.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -32909,7 +32960,7 @@ are, have been volunteered by them, not demanded by us.

I am, sir, your very obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -32962,7 +33013,7 @@ certainty must so soon be developed.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -33024,7 +33075,7 @@ intention of the government?

I am, sir, your very obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -33076,7 +33127,7 @@ is or lately was.

I am, sir, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward,Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -33232,7 +33283,8 @@ which their remoteness from the scene and their long-cherished prejudices shall render necessary.

In three-fourths of the territory over which our Constitution has been - extended the federal authority has never been disturbed, and has been, peacefully maintained. Throughout the half of the other fourth it is + extended the federal authority has never been disturbed, and has been, + peacefully maintained. Throughout the half of the other fourth it is maintained successfully by military power, while at the same time the opposing political authority which has been attempted to be set up there is daily losing ground, vigor, and vitality.

@@ -33247,7 +33299,7 @@ be deplored, and a crime never again to be repeated.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -33289,7 +33341,7 @@ reciprocal liberality on their part.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. William L. Dayton, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -33358,7 +33410,7 @@ in all respects such as the President desired.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -33390,7 +33442,7 @@ Washington.

I am, sir, your very obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -33420,7 +33472,7 @@ subject.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -34368,7 +34420,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -34465,7 +34517,7 @@ slavery.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -34517,7 +34569,7 @@ well, increase her power and advance her prosperity and happiness.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -34551,7 +34603,7 @@ here.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -34584,7 +34636,7 @@

You will apprise Mr. Thouvenel of this enactment.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Wm. L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -34631,7 +34683,7 @@ subject.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -34663,7 +34715,7 @@ stated.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -34693,7 +34745,7 @@ to myself, showing how cotton is coming from Columbus.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -34726,7 +34778,7 @@ present, and where I know Mr. Slidell was not.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -34754,7 +34806,7 @@ letter are entirely approved.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -34798,7 +34850,7 @@ possibly the communication may be important to you.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -34838,7 +34890,7 @@ as earnest as it is now.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -34874,7 +34926,7 @@ may be well for you to state these facts to Mr. Thouvenel.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -34907,7 +34959,7 @@ the spirit which that change indicates.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.,

@@ -35012,7 +35064,7 @@ interests of peace and order throughout the world.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c. &c.

@@ -35038,7 +35090,7 @@ received. It is hoped that they will not long be delayed.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c,

@@ -35095,7 +35147,7 @@ this note, if asked for, will doubtless be supplied by Mr. Mercier.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

His Excellency Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -35122,7 +35174,7 @@ President.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -35147,7 +35199,7 @@ into Virginia.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -35173,7 +35225,7 @@ ever exhibited such voluntary armies.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -35257,7 +35309,7 @@ communicated to you without delay.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -35283,7 +35335,7 @@ their part towards the United States.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Wm. L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -35307,7 +35359,7 @@ therein mentioned, to Mr. Thouvenel.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -35330,7 +35382,7 @@ therein recited, to Mr. Thouvenel are approved by the President.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -35359,7 +35411,7 @@ measure proposed may be promptly effected.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Wm. L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -35389,7 +35441,7 @@ return this week.

I am, sir, your very obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -35451,7 +35503,7 @@ dine with the minister of foreign affairs.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -35494,7 +35546,7 @@ week.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -35568,7 +35620,7 @@ with us.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -35612,7 +35664,7 @@ your department.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -35656,7 +35708,7 @@ incidents would be more than filled up by current immigration.

I am, sir, your very obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -35695,7 +35747,7 @@ despatch No. 185, dated 29th of August last.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -35728,7 +35780,7 @@ making the communication above referred to.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -35801,7 +35853,7 @@ right to do so. * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -35845,7 +35897,7 @@ suggesting a remedy.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -35899,7 +35951,7 @@ hundred fold in the results.

Very truly, yours,

- J. McCLINTOCK. + J. McCLINTOCK.

Hon. W. L. Dayton.

 @@ -35945,7 +35997,7 @@ writer.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -35993,7 +36045,7 @@ while for our consul to throw them in the face of these powers.

I am your very obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.,

@@ -36022,7 +36074,7 @@ friends of constitutional freedom throughout the world.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.,

@@ -36053,7 +36105,7 @@ from Vera Cruz.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -36124,7 +36176,7 @@ to property, liberty, and life.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -36150,7 +36202,7 @@ and give him a copy of it if he should desire one.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -36191,7 +36243,7 @@ conscience of the Christian world.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -36252,7 +36304,7 @@ certain extent, facilitate our official intercourse.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -36480,7 +36532,7 @@ they were endeavoring to improve the condition of the human race.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -36557,7 +36609,7 @@ corps diplomatique.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -36667,7 +36719,7 @@ military events.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -36698,7 +36750,7 @@ candid explanations have made upon the mind of the President.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -36734,7 +36786,7 @@ for Mr. Thouvenel, I am happy to be the organ.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c, &c.

@@ -36783,7 +36835,7 @@ and the sacrifices are theirs, the benefits will belong to mankind.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -36811,7 +36863,7 @@ change the policy they seem now to be pursuing.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Wm. L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -36840,7 +36892,7 @@ nation; and hoping that all his measures may redound to its prosperity and advancement, I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Wm. L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -36880,7 +36932,7 @@ it can safely preserve peace.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD, + WILLIAM H. SEWARD,

Wm. L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -36948,7 +37000,7 @@ conversation was very satisfactory, and I send it to you at once.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -36976,7 +37028,7 @@ may communicate to him the substance of this despatch.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -37020,7 +37072,7 @@

I profit by this occasion to repeat to you, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

- HENRI MERCIER. + HENRI MERCIER.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -37064,7 +37116,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Henry Mercier, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -37103,7 +37155,7 @@

I seize this occasion, sir, to renew to you the assurances of my high consideration.

- HENRI MERCIER. + HENRI MERCIER.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -37131,7 +37183,7 @@

I avail myself of this occasion to renew to you, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Henry Mercier, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -37193,7 +37245,7 @@

I embrace this occasion, sir, to renew to you the assurances of my high consideration.

- HENRI MERCIER. + HENRI MERCIER.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -37227,7 +37279,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Henry Mercier, &c., &c., &c.,

@@ -37258,7 +37310,7 @@ France in defence of the same principles.

Receive, sir, the assurances of my high consideration.

- THOUVENEL. + THOUVENEL.

Mr. Henri Mercier, Minister of France at Washington.

@@ -37337,7 +37389,7 @@ consequences cannot now escape his penetration.

Receive, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

- THOUVENEL. + THOUVENEL.

Mons. Mercier, Minister of France at Washington.

@@ -37372,7 +37424,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Henry Mercier, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -37414,7 +37466,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Henry Mercier, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -37488,7 +37540,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD + WILLIAM H. SEWARD

Mr. Henry Mercier, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -37517,7 +37569,7 @@ answer which on my part I believed it my duty to make.

Accept, &c,

- H. PELISSIER. + H. PELISSIER.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs.

 @@ -37553,7 +37605,7 @@ position to render to my government a satisfactory report.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- JAMES DE LONG. + JAMES DE LONG.

Mr. H. Pelissier, Chargé d’ Affaires of France, ad interim, at @@ -37602,7 +37654,7 @@ answering your communication. I transmit, moreover, to my government, a copy of your letter and my answer.

- H. PELISSIER. + H. PELISSIER.

Accept, &c,

- THOUVENEL. + THOUVENEL.

Mr. H. Mercier, Minister of France at Washington.

@@ -37694,7 +37746,7 @@ example.

Receive, &c,

- THOUVENEL. + THOUVENEL. [Translation.] The Acting Consul General of France in @@ -37813,7 +37865,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Henry Mercier, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -37890,7 +37942,7 @@

I seize on this occasion, sir, to renew to you the assurances of my very high consideration.

- HENRI MERCIER. + HENRI MERCIER.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.,

@@ -37957,7 +38009,8 @@ deserves.

We are, &c., &c.,

- The President, BROSSET VINI. + The President, BROSSET + VINI.

The Secretary, H. Jame.

True copy:

@@ -37984,7 +38037,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Henri Mercier, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -38009,7 +38062,7 @@

Be pleased, sir, to accept the renewed assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Henri Mercier, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -38042,8 +38095,9 @@ interests of other nations.

With great respect,

- S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the - Treasury. + S. P. CHASE, + Secretary of the + Treasury.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -38075,8 +38129,9 @@ Lyons.

With great respect,

- S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the - Treasury. + S. P. CHASE, + Secretary of the + Treasury.

Hon. Thaddeus Stevens, Chairman Com. of Ways and Means, House of @@ -38302,7 +38357,7 @@ honor to be, Mr. Minister, your excellency’s very humble and most obedient servant,

- C. MEJAN. + C. MEJAN.

His Excellency Mr. Thouvenel, Minister for Foreign Affairs, @@ -38380,8 +38435,8 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your obedient servant,

- F. W. SEWARD, Acting - Secretary. + F. W. SEWARD, + Acting Secretary.

Mr. Henry Mercier, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -38411,8 +38466,9 @@ coming properly under this head, are permitted to be shipped.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the - Treasury. + S. P. CHASE, + Secretary of the + Treasury.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -38482,8 +38538,9 @@ marine machinery, or for the armor of vessels.

I am, very respectfully,

- S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the - Treasury, + S. P. CHASE, + Secretary of the + Treasury,

Hiram Barney, Esq., Collector, &c., New York.

@@ -38586,7 +38643,7 @@

Be pleased, Mr. Minister, to accept the assurances of my high consideration,

- COUNT MEJAN. + COUNT MEJAN.

Count H. Mercier, Envoy Ex. and Min. Plenipo. of France in the United States, @@ -38657,7 +38714,8 @@ may arise therefrom.

We have the honor to be, count, your very obedient servants,

- E. DUPASSEUR & CO. + E. DUPASSEUR & + CO.

The Count Mejan, Consul of France at New Orleans.

@@ -38831,7 +38889,7 @@ a French subject.

I remain, very respectfully, pour copie conforme,

- EDWARD DUPASSEUR. + EDWARD DUPASSEUR.

For the minister and by authority:

- VTE. JULES TREILHARD, First Secretary of the - Legation, + VTE. JULES TREILHARD, + First Secretary of the + Legation,
I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Viscount Treilhard, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -38941,7 +39000,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

The Viscount Treilhard, &c, &c., &c.

@@ -39018,7 +39077,7 @@

* * * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, with high regard, your obedient servant,

- REVERDY JOHNSON. + REVERDY JOHNSON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. @@ -39048,8 +39107,8 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

- F. W. SEWARD, Acting - Secretary. + F. W. SEWARD, + Acting Secretary.

The Viscount Treilhard, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -39076,8 +39135,9 @@ the mails as proposed.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

- P. H. WATSON, Assistant Secretary of - War. + P. H. WATSON, + Assistant Secretary of + War.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -39112,8 +39172,9 @@ high consideration.

For the minister, and by authority:

- VTE. JULES TREILHARD, First Secretary of the - Legation. + VTE. JULES TREILHARD, + First Secretary of the + Legation.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -39216,7 +39277,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Viscount Jules Treilhard, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -39294,8 +39355,9 @@ high consideration.

For the minister:

- VTE. JULES TREILHARD, First Secretary of the - Legation. + VTE. JULES TREILHARD, + First Secretary of the + Legation. No. 1. [Translation.] @@ -39343,7 +39405,8 @@ up a few days longer.

Be pleased to accept, &c.,

- RICHARD ALDIGE & CO. + RICHARD ALDIGE & + CO. [Translation]

Twenty-five hogsheads of sugar, marked “Esperance,” weighing @@ -39364,7 +39427,8 @@ its delivery, and, also, compensation for all losses which may occur in consequence of the detention of said sugar

- GOODCHAUX BROTHERS. + GOODCHAUX + BROTHERS. @@ -39454,7 +39518,7 @@ which it has been the victim.

I have the honor to be, Mr. Consul, &c,

- CH. HARISPE. + CH. HARISPE.

[Here follows General Butler’s order and Collector Dennison’s certificate, both in English.]

@@ -39521,7 +39585,7 @@ taking away the stock, which is necessary to its cultivation.

We have the honor, &c., &c.,

- PAUL VIDAL. + PAUL VIDAL.

The Consul of France at New Orleans.

@@ -39693,7 +39757,7 @@

Eighty-six thousand two hundred and forty-three dollars and fifty cents.

- PAUL VIDAL. + PAUL VIDAL.
@@ -39843,7 +39907,7 @@ And may God save the commonweath.

Very truly, your obedient servant,

- C. M. CLAY. + C. M. CLAY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. G.

@@ -39921,7 +39985,7 @@ apology.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- C. M. CLAY. + C. M. CLAY.

Hon. W. H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -39957,7 +40021,7 @@ no lodgement whatever in our own minds.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Cassius M. Clay, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -40039,7 +40103,7 @@ imperial family.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- SIMON CAMERON. + SIMON CAMERON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -40120,7 +40184,7 @@ States.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Simon Cameron, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -40220,7 +40284,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with sentiments of the highest respect, your obedient servant,

- SIMON CAMERON. + SIMON CAMERON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State,

@@ -40252,7 +40316,7 @@ sterner duties of the field.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Simon Cameron, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -40310,7 +40374,7 @@ to report in relation to the proposed telegraphic enterprise.

I have the honor to be, with high respect, your obedient servant,

- SIMON CAMERON. + SIMON CAMERON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -40392,7 +40456,7 @@ from the capital.

I have the honor to be, with high respect, your obedient servant,

- SIMON CAMERON. + SIMON CAMERON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -40489,7 +40553,7 @@ friendship with the United States.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Simon Cameron, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -40596,7 +40660,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with sentiments of the highest respect, your obedient servant,

- SIMON CAMERON. + SIMON CAMERON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -40629,7 +40693,7 @@ daily becoming deeper and more enduring.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Simon Cameron, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -40694,7 +40758,7 @@ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Simon Cameron, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -40775,7 +40839,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,

- SIMON CAMERON. + SIMON CAMERON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -40866,7 +40930,7 @@ may result in the speedy ruin of their always desperate cause.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Simon Cameron, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -41050,8 +41114,8 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,

- BAYARD TAYLOR, Chargé d’ - Affaires. + BAYARD TAYLOR, + Chargé d’ Affaires.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -41215,8 +41279,8 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,

- BAYARD TAYLOR, Charge - d’Affaires. + BAYARD TAYLOR, + Charge d’Affaires.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -41304,7 +41368,7 @@ disappointed.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Bayard Taylor, Esq.,&c., &c., &c.

@@ -41339,7 +41403,7 @@ both countries in its results.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Bayard Taylor, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -41378,7 +41442,7 @@ gains important advantages.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Horatio J. Perry, Esq., &c., &c., &c. Madrid.

@@ -41412,7 +41476,7 @@ invincible, which the insurgents have so carefully fostered.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Horatio J. Perry, Esq., &c., &c., &c. Madrid.

@@ -41448,7 +41512,7 @@ danger. Felicitating you upon this pleasing condition of affairs,

I remain, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Horatio J. Perry, Esq., &c., &c., &c. Madrid.

@@ -41495,7 +41559,7 @@ harmony and friendship between the two countries.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Horatio J. Perry, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Madrid.

@@ -41534,7 +41598,7 @@ civilization.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Horatio J. Perry, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Madrid.

@@ -41578,7 +41642,7 @@ departure until the expiration of about six weeks.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Horatio J. Perry, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Madrid.

@@ -41619,7 +41683,7 @@ government.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Horatio J. Perry, Esq., &c., &c., &c. Madrid.

@@ -41669,7 +41733,7 @@ the services of so enlightened and honorable a cabinet.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Horatio J. Perry, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Madrid.

@@ -41704,7 +41768,7 @@ of it for Mr. Calderon, as you have requested.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD + WILLIAM H. SEWARD

Horatio J. Perry, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Madrid.

@@ -41736,7 +41800,7 @@ nations, as it purposes to maintain its own.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Horatio J. Perry, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Madrid,

@@ -41784,7 +41848,7 @@ rest in abeyance.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Gustavus Koerner, Esq., &c., &c., &c.,

@@ -41834,7 +41898,7 @@ suspected by ingenuous parties whom they address.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Gustavus Koerner, Esq., &c., &c., &c. Madrid.

@@ -41861,7 +41925,7 @@ of War to the subject of your purchase of 340 rifled muskets.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Horatio J. Perry, Esq.,&c., &c., &c. Madrid.

@@ -41929,7 +41993,7 @@ promptly afforded.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Gustavus Koerner, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -41981,7 +42045,7 @@ the government of the United States.

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- C. SCHURZ. + C. SCHURZ.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. G.

@@ -42054,7 +42118,7 @@ governmental machinery by factious manoeuvres.

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- C. SCHURZ. + C. SCHURZ.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. G.

@@ -42326,7 +42390,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, sir, your obedient servant,

- HORATIO J. PERRY, + HORATIO J. PERRY,

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -42379,7 +42443,7 @@

But the news of the victory at Fort Donelson had preceded him.

With the highest respect, sir, your obedient servant,

- HORATIO J. PERRY. + HORATIO J. PERRY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -42533,7 +42597,7 @@ Spanish government in regard to the throne,

And remain, sir, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,

- HORATIO J. PERRY. + HORATIO J. PERRY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -42812,7 +42876,7 @@ B, of your instruction.

With sentiments of the highest respect, sir, your obedient servant,

- HORATIO G. PERRY. + HORATIO G. PERRY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -42914,7 +42978,7 @@ of the occasion to renew to your excellency the assurances of my most distinguished consideration.

- HORATIO J. PERRY. + HORATIO J. PERRY.

His Excellency The Minister of State of H. C. M.

@@ -43090,7 +43154,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, sir, your obedient servant,

- HORATIO J. PERRY. + HORATIO J. PERRY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. G.

@@ -43144,7 +43208,7 @@

I have the honor to remain, with the highest respect, sir, your obedient servant,

- HORATIO J. PERRY. + HORATIO J. PERRY.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., Washington.

@@ -43162,7 +43226,7 @@

Semmes, with nine others from the Sumter, started last night for Southampton, on an English steamer.

- SPRAGUE. + SPRAGUE. B. @@ -43179,8 +43243,8 @@ officers of the steamer Sumter, in a destitute condition. Be pleased to telegraph me your instructions.

- MANUEL BARCENA, Consul. + MANUEL BARCENA, + Consul.

The Minister of the United States, Madrid.

@@ -43202,7 +43266,7 @@ unfortunate persons.

The letter of credit will go by the mail to-night.

- HORATIO J. PERRY. + HORATIO J. PERRY.

Manuel Barcena y Franco, Consul of the United States at Vigo.

@@ -43232,7 +43296,7 @@ circumstances.

Your obedient servant,

- HORATIO J. PERRY. + HORATIO J. PERRY.

Manuel Barcena, Esq., Consul of the United States, Vigo.

@@ -43257,8 +43321,8 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, your most obedient, humble servant,

- MANUEL BARCENA Y FRANCO, Consul. + MANUEL BARCENA Y FRANCO, + Consul.

His Excellency the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of @@ -43307,7 +43371,7 @@ repentant.

Truly yours, &c., &c.,

- HORATIO J. PERRY. + HORATIO J. PERRY.

Manuel Barcena, Esq., United States Consul, Vigo.

@@ -43344,7 +43408,8 @@

I return the bill you enclosed in your letter, and remain your most obedient, humble servant,

- MANUEL BARCENA Y FRANCO. + MANUEL BARCENA Y + FRANCO.

Horatio J. Perry, Esq,

 @@ -43504,7 +43569,7 @@

I have the honor to remain, with the highest respect, sir, your obedient servant,

- HORATIO J. PERRY. + HORATIO J. PERRY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -43914,7 +43979,7 @@ to his country

Most respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

- HORATIO J. PERRY. + HORATIO J. PERRY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington,

@@ -44063,7 +44128,7 @@ action of General Prim in Mexico.

With sentiments of the highest respect, sir, your obedient servant,

- HORATIO J. PERRY. + HORATIO J. PERRY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -44119,7 +44184,7 @@ thought it interesting; and have the honor to remain, sir, your obedient servant,

- HORATIO J. PERRY. + HORATIO J. PERRY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -44193,7 +44258,7 @@ will take hereafter is yet to be seen.

With sentiments of highest respect, sir, your obedient servant,

- HORATIO J. PERRY. + HORATIO J. PERRY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -44242,7 +44307,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

With the highest respect, sir, your obedient servant,

- HORATIO J. PERRY. + HORATIO J. PERRY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -44317,8 +44382,8 @@ blockade.

I am, sir, your most obedient servant,

- JOHN ALBRO LITTLE, Consul. + JOHN ALBRO LITTLE, + Consul.

Horatio J. Perry, Esq., Chargé d’ Affaires, United States Legation, @@ -44364,7 +44429,7 @@ where her description would have preceded her.

Respectfully, &c, your obedient servant,

- HORATIO J. PERRY. + HORATIO J. PERRY.

John Albro Little, Esq., United States Consul, Barcelona.

@@ -44441,7 +44506,7 @@ to-morrow.

With sentiments of the highest respect, sir, your obedient servant,

- HORATIO J. PERRY. + HORATIO J. PERRY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -44610,7 +44675,7 @@ and to God the issue.

With sentiments of the highest respect, sir, your obedient servant,

- HORATIO J. PERRY. + HORATIO J. PERRY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -44693,7 +44758,7 @@

I avail myself of this occasion to offer to you renewed assurances of my very high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Señor Don Gabriel Garcia y Tassara, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -44703,7 +44768,7 @@
- [Translation ] + [Translation] Mr. Tassara to Mr. Seward. @@ -44758,7 +44823,7 @@ honorable Secretary of State the assurance of his highest consideration.

- GABRIEL G. TASSARA. + GABRIEL G. TASSARA.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States.

@@ -44804,7 +44869,7 @@

The undersigned avails himself of this occasion to offer to Mr. Tassara a renewed assurance of his very high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Señor Don Gabriel Garcia y Tassara, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -44966,7 +45031,7 @@

The undersigned avails of this occasion to renew to the Hon. Secretary of State the assurances of his highest consideration.

- GABRIEL G. TASSARA. + GABRIEL G. TASSARA.

Hon. William H. Seward. Secretary of State of the United States,

@@ -45013,7 +45078,7 @@

The undersigned avails himself of this occasion to offer to Mr. Tassara a renewed assurance of his very high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Señor Don Gabriel Garcia y Tassara, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -45070,7 +45135,7 @@ avails himself of this occasion to repeat to the honorable Secretary of State the assurance of his highest consideration.

- GABRIEL G. TASSARA. + GABRIEL G. TASSARA.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States,

@@ -45109,7 +45174,7 @@ honorable Secretary of State the assurance of his highest consideration.

- GABRIEL G. TASSARA. + GABRIEL G. TASSARA.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States.

@@ -45281,7 +45346,7 @@

The undersigned offers to Mr. Tassara renewed assurances of his high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Sénor Don Gabriel Garcia y Tassara, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -45334,7 +45399,7 @@

I avail myself of this occasion to offer to you renewed assurances of my very high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Sénor Don Gabriel Garcia y Tassara, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -45370,7 +45435,7 @@ Secretary of State of the United States the assurance of his highest consideration.

- GABRIEL G. TASSARA. + GABRIEL G. TASSARA.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States.

@@ -45492,14 +45557,14 @@ her Majesty which your excellency so worthily represents in this island.

- J. M. MIRALES. + J. M. MIRALES. Havana, July 26, 1862. - [Translation ] + [Translation] Administration of the Cuban General Steam Navigation Company. @@ -45541,7 +45606,8 @@ twenty-two days, at the port of New Orleans, of their steamer Cardenas.

- SAN PELAZIO PARDO & CO. + SAN PELAZIO PARDO & + CO.

Certified.

 @@ -45575,7 +45641,7 @@

The undersigned avails himself of this occasion to renew to the honorable Secretary of State the assurance of his most high consideration.

- GABRIEL G. TASSARA. + GABRIEL G. TASSARA.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States, &c., &c, @@ -45613,7 +45679,7 @@

The undersigned avails himself of the occasion to offer to Mr. Tassara renewed assurances of his very high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Señor Don Gabriel Garcia y Tassara, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -45784,7 +45850,7 @@ honorable Secretary of State the assurance of his highest consideration.

- GABRIEL G. TASSARA. + GABRIEL G. TASSARA.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States.

@@ -45817,8 +45883,9 @@ Havana, October 8, - 1862.A copy. ANSELMO DE - VILLAESCUSA, Secretary. + 1862.A copy. + ANSELMO DE VILLAESCUSA, + Secretary. A true copy. @@ -45860,8 +45927,8 @@ calendar="gregorian">October 7, 1862. A copy. - ANSELMO VILLAESCUSA, Secretary. + ANSELMO VILLAESCUSA, + Secretary. A true copy. @@ -45910,8 +45977,8 @@ >Havana, October 8, 1862.A copy. - ANSELMO DE VILLAESCUSA, Secretary. + ANSELMO DE VILLAESCUSA, + Secretary. A true copy.
@@ -45978,7 +46045,7 @@

The undersigned avails himself of this occasion to renew to Señor Tassara the assurances of his highest consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Señor Don Gabriel Garcia y Tassara, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -46235,7 +46302,7 @@

The undersigned avails himself of the opportunity to offer to Mr. Tassara renewed assurances of his very high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Señor Bon Gabriel Garcia y Tassara, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -46282,7 +46349,7 @@ prosperity, welfare, and freedom of a great and enlightened people.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Norman B. Judd, Esq., &c., &c., Berlin.

@@ -46320,7 +46387,7 @@ we have been passing.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Norman B. Judd, Esq., &c., &c., Berlin.

@@ -46354,7 +46421,7 @@ communication.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

H. Kreismann, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Berlin.

@@ -46435,7 +46502,7 @@

* * * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- N. B. JUDD. + N. B. JUDD.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -46479,7 +46546,7 @@ rise to not again be disappointed.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- N. B. JUDD. + N. B. JUDD.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. G.

@@ -46528,7 +46595,7 @@ the matter upon your attention.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- H. KREISMANN. + H. KREISMANN.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -46608,7 +46675,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity of renewing to you the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Baron Fr. Von Gerolt, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -46637,7 +46704,7 @@ occasion to offer to you renewed assurances of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Baron Von Gerolt, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -46682,7 +46749,7 @@ will become as hopeful as it is just.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

J. Lothrop Motley, Esq., &c., &c., &c, Vienna.

@@ -46734,7 +46801,7 @@ Europe.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

J. Lothrop Motley, Esq. &c., &c., &c, Vienna.

@@ -46786,7 +46853,7 @@ question. * * * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

J. Lothrop Motley, Esq., &c., &c,. &c. Vienna.

@@ -46834,7 +46901,7 @@ shall have become public here.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

J. Lothrop Motley, Esq., &c., &c., &c. Vienna.

@@ -46964,7 +47031,7 @@ the exigencies of a vigorous and decisive conflict.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

J. Lothrop Motley, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -47274,7 +47341,7 @@ state of parties to avow.

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- J. LOTHROP MOTLEY. + J. LOTHROP MOTLEY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -47422,7 +47489,7 @@

* * * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- J. LOTHROP MOTLEY. + J. LOTHROP MOTLEY.

William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -47673,7 +47740,7 @@

* * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- J. LOTHROP MOTLEY. + J. LOTHROP MOTLEY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -47703,7 +47770,7 @@ to refer you to my private letter of this day’s date.

I remain, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

- J. LOTHROP MOTLEY. + J. LOTHROP MOTLEY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -47751,7 +47818,7 @@ those whom it now most maligns.

I have the honor to be your most obedient servant,

- J. LOTHROP MOTLEY. + J. LOTHROP MOTLEY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -47777,7 +47844,7 @@ United States in regard to foreign and friendly nations.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

John Lothrop Motley, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -47829,7 +47896,7 @@ commission as consul at Vienna is withdrawn.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD + WILLIAM H. SEWARD

T. Canisius, Esq., United States Consulate, Vienna.

@@ -47871,7 +47938,7 @@ stability of the government.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

J. Lothrop Motley, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Vienna.

@@ -47965,10 +48032,10 @@ slavery.” If I spare his life and condemn him to a state so contrary to the nature of man, I still continue with him the state of war. He lies under no obligation to me, for what is life without - freedom ? If any one counts life a favor when the grant of it - is attended with chains, be it so. * * * * I shall dwell no longer on - the subject; and, indeed, that disgrace to humanity is happily banished - from Europe.”

+ freedom? If any one counts life a favor when the grant of it is + attended with chains, be it so. * * * * I shall dwell no longer on the + subject; and, indeed, that disgrace to humanity is happily banished from + Europe.”

From the tone of the liberal portion of the English press, and from private correspondence, I am disposed to feel comparatively at ease in regard to the possibility of immediate foreign intervention. Of course, @@ -48152,9 +48219,9 @@

They that have done this deed are honorable,”

says the Roman.

“Why, gentlemen, they are our kin; they were, at any rate, if they are - not now, our customers ; and we hope that they - will be our customers again!” says the - chancellor of the exchequer.

+ not now, our customers; and we hope that they will be our customers again!” says the chancellor + of the exchequer.

A people struggling for its life against the most tremendous oligarchy that the world has ever seen awakens not his respect, but his pity. He is anxious, therefore, that a people so humiliated should be treated @@ -48280,7 +48347,7 @@ therefore conclude these desultory remarks.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- J. LOTHROP MOTLEY. + J. LOTHROP MOTLEY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -48322,7 +48389,7 @@ insurrection, however great they may be. * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

George P. Marsh, Esq., &c., &c., Turin.

@@ -48362,7 +48429,7 @@ taken place.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

George P. Marsh, Esq., &c., &c., Turin.

@@ -48428,7 +48495,7 @@ speculations would be crossing the Atlantic.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

George P. Marsh, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -48483,7 +48550,7 @@ Italy.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

George P. Marsh, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Turin.

@@ -48561,7 +48628,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir your obedient servant,

- GEORGE P. MARSH. + GEORGE P. MARSH.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -48611,7 +48678,7 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- GEORGE P. MARSH. + GEORGE P. MARSH.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -48651,7 +48718,7 @@ this question, in that city, within the last few days.

I am, sir, with high respect, your obedient servant,

- GEORGE P. MARSH. + GEORGE P. MARSH.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -48711,7 +48778,7 @@

Accept, Mr. Minister, the assurance of my very distinguished consideration.

- RICASOLI. + RICASOLI.

The Chevalier BertinattiMinister of Italy at Washington

@@ -48762,7 +48829,7 @@

Be pleased to accept, sir, the renewed assurance of my very high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD + WILLIAM H. SEWARD

Chevalier J. Bertinatti, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -48812,7 +48879,7 @@ * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- GEORGE P. MARSH. + GEORGE P. MARSH.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -48840,7 +48907,7 @@ unhappy affairs of the American people.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

George P. Marsh, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -48884,7 +48951,7 @@ invigoration which European emigration would afford.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James E. Harvey, Esq., &c. &c, &c, Lisbon.

@@ -48927,7 +48994,7 @@ American people.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James E. Harvey, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Lisbon.

@@ -48959,7 +49026,7 @@ brought into this continent.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James E. Harvey, Esq., &c., &c.,&c., Lisbon.

@@ -48985,7 +49052,7 @@ receive the most deliberate consideration.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James E. Harvey, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Lisbon.

@@ -49019,7 +49086,7 @@ himself a monument more enduring than brass.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -49098,7 +49165,7 @@ results.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -49130,7 +49197,7 @@ its commerce and relations with other countries.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -49212,7 +49279,7 @@ proposed by self-sufficient empiricism.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -49281,7 +49348,7 @@ say, without egotism, at least energetically if not wisely.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -49344,7 +49411,7 @@ view of the situation.

Yours, very truly,

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

Captain Thatcher, United States Ship Constellation.

@@ -49461,7 +49528,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to reiterate the assurances of my most distinguished consideration.

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

His Excellency the Viscount Sa da Bandeira, @@ -49540,7 +49607,7 @@ progress of events.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

Captain Pickering, United States Ship Kearsarge, Azores.

@@ -49578,7 +49645,7 @@ relief had already been anticipated and adopted.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -49631,7 +49698,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -49681,7 +49748,7 @@ with such questionable prospect of benefits to themselves.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -49751,7 +49818,7 @@ is safe to lend.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq,&c., &c., &c.

@@ -49784,7 +49851,7 @@ most important part of our affairs.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c.,&c.

@@ -49826,7 +49893,7 @@ belligerent rights to the insurgents on their own part?

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -49853,7 +49920,7 @@ country is sound.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c, &c.,&c.

@@ -49913,7 +49980,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -49969,7 +50036,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -50044,7 +50111,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -50069,7 +50136,7 @@ procuring its submission to Congress.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c, &c, &c.

@@ -50093,7 +50160,7 @@ (No. 42.)

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq.,&c., &c., &c.

@@ -50147,7 +50214,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -50178,7 +50245,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -50265,7 +50332,7 @@ by excluding their vessels from its ports, by treating them, in a word, as pirates, apply to them a treatment from which the United States themselves have recoiled, as has been observed in the - despatch of December 14, 1861 ? The northern States have not + despatch of December 14, 1861? The northern States have not condemned as pirates the privateers of the southern confederates, but have considered them as lawful combatants. We cannot do more than the government of the Union. This is what caused the remark, so @@ -50331,7 +50398,8 @@ exists between the two peoples and their respective governments.

Accept, sir, the renewed assurance of my high consideration.

- G. VANDER MAESEN DE SOMBREFF. + G. VANDER MAESEN DE + SOMBREFF.

Mr. Pike, Minister Resident of the United States of @@ -50370,10 +50438,10 @@ prejudices according to the results of that investigation. Is it well for a state which is greatest in its colonies, like the Netherlands, to disregard the good will of a chief maritime power, whose commerce with - those countries is intimate and important ?

+ those countries is intimate and important?

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c, &c, &c.

@@ -50400,7 +50468,7 @@ been received.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -50463,7 +50531,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -50497,7 +50565,7 @@ shall have been admitted.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -50547,7 +50615,7 @@ foreign affairs.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -50580,7 +50648,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -50636,7 +50704,7 @@ the world.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c, &c, &c.

@@ -50696,7 +50764,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant.

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -50721,7 +50789,7 @@ vessels.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD + WILLIAM H. SEWARD

James S. Pike, Esq., &c, &c, &c.

@@ -50765,7 +50833,7 @@ of a sudden collapse.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -50792,12 +50860,12 @@

I do not wonder that Europe fails to apprehend the policy of France in regard to Mexico. Embarrassments often result from the misemployment of standing armies abroad. Yet what is to be done with such armies when - they are without occupation at home ?

+ they are without occupation at home?

I imagine that our policy, which practically dispenses with standing armies in time of peace, will prove to be the wisest one.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq.,&c., &c., &c.

@@ -50833,7 +50901,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -50878,7 +50946,7 @@ without producing disaster or greater distress.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -50930,7 +50998,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -51001,7 +51069,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -51043,7 +51111,7 @@ sought through the overthrow of the American Union.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -51109,7 +51177,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -51165,7 +51233,7 @@ dependencies.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq.,

 @@ -51200,7 +51268,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -51238,7 +51306,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -51310,7 +51378,7 @@ safe either to hold or to let go.

I have the honor to be your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington,

@@ -51347,7 +51415,7 @@ possible.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -51412,7 +51480,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq.,&c.,&c, &c.

@@ -51452,7 +51520,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -51487,7 +51555,7 @@ Union cause, as well as of the physical strength which it commands.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &., &c.

@@ -51528,7 +51596,7 @@ seemingly are, with results of the highest importance.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -51556,7 +51624,7 @@ Mississippi, need no explanations to show their importance.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -51590,7 +51658,7 @@ to be either divided or to lose its invaluable institutions.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c, &c., &c.

@@ -51665,7 +51733,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -51723,18 +51791,18 @@ the questions which would arise in the British colonies lying northward of us if this Union of ours is divided 1 What shall come up in place of our existing relations of amity and commercial - reciprocity? What shall become of the policy of extinguishing slavery - in the West India colonies of Europe after a slaveholding nation shall - have been established on the shores of the Gulf of Mexico? What is to - be the effect of such an establishment upon the African slave trade when - the new slaveholding nation desires to grasp not only Mexico, but also - even the islands of all the European states within the Gulf. I know that + reciprocity? What shall become of the policy of extinguishing slavery in + the West India colonies of Europe after a slaveholding nation shall have + been established on the shores of the Gulf of Mexico? What is to be the + effect of such an establishment upon the African slave trade when the + new slaveholding nation desires to grasp not only Mexico, but also even + the islands of all the European states within the Gulf. I know that these questions have not yet presented themselves in Europe, but it is quite another thing to suppose that they will be left to sleep while the question of intervention is considered by the governments concerned.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -51782,7 +51850,7 @@ them.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -51892,7 +51960,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Roest Van Limburg, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -52019,7 +52087,7 @@ avail myself of this new opportunity to reiterate to you the assurances of my high consideration.

- ROEST VAN LIMBURG. + ROEST VAN LIMBURG.

Hon. Mr. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States of @@ -52083,7 +52151,7 @@ avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you the assurances of my high consideration.

- ROEST VAN LIMBURG. + ROEST VAN LIMBURG.

Hon. Mr. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States of @@ -52146,7 +52214,7 @@ profit by this new opportunity to reiterate to you the assurances of my high consideration.

- ROEST VAN LIMBURG. + ROEST VAN LIMBURG.

Hon. Mr. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States of @@ -52182,7 +52250,7 @@

I avail myself of this occasion, sir, to offer to you a renewed assurance of my very high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Roest Van Limburg, &c.,&c., &c.

@@ -52212,7 +52280,7 @@

I offer to you, sir, a renewed assurance of my very high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Roest Van Limburg, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -52241,7 +52309,7 @@ it to the judgment of the government of the King, and I have the honor to renew to you the assurances of my high consideration.

- ROEST VAN LIMBURG. + ROEST VAN LIMBURG.

Hon. Mr. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States.

@@ -52282,7 +52350,7 @@ Major General Butler to submit them to you, without delay, to justify the seizure of funds of which you now know that they were in deposit at the house of the Netherlands consul, for account of the honorable house - of Hope & Company, of Amsterdam ?

+ of Hope & Company, of Amsterdam?

Thus, from the moment it shall appear that Major General Butler has actually seized, without having had well-founded reasons and proofs to justify a step so-serious as the carrying off (removal) of a deposit @@ -52296,7 +52364,7 @@

I have the honor, sir, to reiterate to you the assurances of my high consideration.

- ROEST VAN LIMBURG. + ROEST VAN LIMBURG.

Hon. Mr. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States of @@ -52324,7 +52392,7 @@

I avail myself of this occasion, sir, to offer to you a renewed assurance of my very high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Roest Van Limburg, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -52387,7 +52455,7 @@

I have the honor, sir, to renew to you the assurance of my high consideration.

- ROEST VAN LIMBURG. + ROEST VAN LIMBURG.

Hon. Mr. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States of @@ -52434,7 +52502,7 @@

I seize this fresh occasion, sir, to repeat the assurances of my high consideration.

- ROEST VAN LIMBURG. + ROEST VAN LIMBURG.

Hon. Mr. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States of @@ -52472,7 +52540,7 @@ business on the part of the government of the United States.

I am, sir, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD + WILLIAM H. SEWARD

Mr. Roest Van Limburg, &c., &c., &c. Detroit.

@@ -52548,7 +52616,7 @@

I have the honor, Mr. Secretary of State, to renew to you the assurance of my high consideration.

- ROEST VAN LIMBURG. + ROEST VAN LIMBURG.

Hon. Mr. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States of @@ -52694,7 +52762,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, sir, the assurance of my very high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Please to accept, sir, the fresh assurance of my high consideration.

- ROEST VAN LIMBURG. + ROEST VAN LIMBURG.

Hon. Mr. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States of @@ -52771,7 +52839,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Roest Van Limburg, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -52914,7 +52982,7 @@

I have the honor, sir, to renew to you the assurances of my high consideration.

- ROEST VAN LIMBURG. + ROEST VAN LIMBURG.

Mr. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States, &c., @@ -52942,10 +53010,11 @@ it respected so debased.

I am, officially, your obedient servant,

- BENJAMIN F. BUTLER, Major General - Commanding, + BENJAMIN F. BUTLER, + Major General + Commanding, - Per GEORGE BROWN. + Per GEORGE BROWN.

The Consul of the Netherlands.

[Erasure conformable to the original.]—Am. @@ -53082,7 +53151,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Roest Van Limburg.

 @@ -53126,7 +53195,7 @@

I have the honor, sir, to renew to you the assurances of my high consideration.

- ROEST VAN LIMBURG. + ROEST VAN LIMBURG.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the U. S, of America.

@@ -53153,7 +53222,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Roest Van Limburg, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -53189,7 +53258,7 @@

The undersigned has the honor to renew to the honorable Mr. Seward the assurances of his high consideration.

- ROEST VAN LIMBURG. + ROEST VAN LIMBURG.

Hon. Mr. Seward, Secretary of State of the U. S. of America, @@ -53229,8 +53298,8 @@ before his excellency our minister at Washington.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- GEO. H. ZEIGLER, Consul. + GEO. H. ZEIGLER, + Consul.

R. O. BURLAGE, Consul General, New York.

@@ -53300,7 +53369,7 @@

I embrace this new opportunity, sir, to reiterate to you the assurances of my high consideration.

- ROEST VAN LIMBURG. + ROEST VAN LIMBURG.

Hon. Mr. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States of @@ -53355,7 +53424,7 @@

I have the honor of being, with the highest esteem, your excellency’s obedient servant,

- RUD. C. BURLAGE. + RUD. C. BURLAGE.

His Excellency Roest Van Limburg, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister @@ -53432,7 +53501,7 @@

According to your wish, I have enclosed a memorandum of my fees, and remain, sir, your most obedient and humble servant,

- CHARLES EDWARDS. + CHARLES EDWARDS. September 3, 1862. - CHARLES EDWARDS, By J. P. CAMPBELL. + CHARLES EDWARDS, By J. P. + CAMPBELL.
@@ -53509,7 +53579,7 @@ the advice and consent of the Senate.

I have the honor to be, sir, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Roest Van Limburg, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -53541,7 +53611,7 @@

The undersigned avails himself of this occasion to offer to Mr. Van Limburg a renewed assurance of his very high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

M. Roest Van Limburg.

 @@ -53549,7 +53619,7 @@
- [Translation ] + [Translation] Mr. Van Limburg to Mr. Seward. @@ -53602,7 +53672,7 @@ I have the honor, sir, to renew to you the assurances of my high consideration.

- ROEST VAN LIMBURG + ROEST VAN LIMBURG

Hon. Mr. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States of @@ -53613,7 +53683,7 @@

- [Translation ] + [Translation] Mr. Van Limburg to Mr. Seward. @@ -53637,7 +53707,7 @@

Abstaining from any reflection in this respect, I have the honor, sir, to reiterate to you the assurances of my consideration.

- ROEST VAN LIMBURG. + ROEST VAN LIMBURG.

Hon. Mr. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States of @@ -53692,7 +53762,7 @@ United States.

I remain, dear sir, very respectfully your obedient servant,

- GEO. K. ZEIGLER. + GEO. K. ZEIGLER.

His Excellency Mr. Roest Van Limburg, Envoy Extraordinary, Minister Plenipotentiary @@ -53737,7 +53807,7 @@ the evils it has inflicted at home and abroad.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

H. S. Sanford, Esq.,&c., &c., &c. Brussels.

@@ -53783,7 +53853,7 @@ European powers.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD + WILLIAM H. SEWARD

H. S. Sanford, Esq.,&c., &c., &c., Brussels.

@@ -53829,7 +53899,7 @@ of slavery is either near at hand or can ever occur.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

H. S. Sanford, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Brussels.

@@ -53936,7 +54006,7 @@ insurgent States every day cast off their bondage, and cease to be instruments auxiliary to those systems forever. They are of both sexes and of all ages. How long will the slave production of cotton endure - this rapid process of disorganization ?

+ this rapid process of disorganization?

If the western nations had been careful to lend no direct or indirect aid to the revolution, the United States, through the agency of merely political motives, would have early restored the federal authority @@ -53962,7 +54032,7 @@ forward to the end; an end in which the war ceases with anarchy substituted for the social system that existed when the war began. What will then have become of the interests which carried Europe to the side - which was at once the wrong side and the losing one ?

+ which was at once the wrong side and the losing one?

Only a perfect withdrawal of all favor from the insurrection can now save those interests in any degree. The insurrectionary States, left hopeless of foreign intervention, will be content to stop in their career of @@ -53992,7 +54062,7 @@ the cause of human nature.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

H. S. Sanford, Esq., .&c., &c., &c., Brussels.

@@ -54075,7 +54145,7 @@ country.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Aaron Goodrich, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Brussels.

@@ -54130,7 +54200,7 @@ have ever entered the field in any country.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Henry S. Sanford, Esq.,&c., &c., &c., Brussels.

@@ -54168,7 +54238,7 @@ averted, and in that case the trial is already approaching its end.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Henry S. Sanford, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Brussels.

@@ -54207,20 +54277,19 @@ temporary and ever uncertain truces. The condition of things existing in Europe may pass away, but ours will not.

How could we attempt to regulate the press of Europe when we cannot - regulate our own? Where are the funds which would be necessary? Who - the agent that could be trusted with them? What an endless chapter of + regulate our own? Where are the funds which would be necessary? Who the + agent that could be trusted with them? What an endless chapter of political intrigues should we be opening! Who in our country has the - skill to conduct them? No, no. Let us trust in the mighty interests - this nation has at stake, the enduring principles it maintains, the - noble sentiments the struggle inspires, and the intelligence and virtue - of a people who have a higher and happier destiny before them than was - ever set before any other portion of mankind. The interest of Europe is - to let us alone, and the sentiments of mankind will not allow - interference which is at once wrong and pernicious to the world’s - peace.

+ skill to conduct them? No, no. Let us trust in the mighty interests this + nation has at stake, the enduring principles it maintains, the noble + sentiments the struggle inspires, and the intelligence and virtue of a + people who have a higher and happier destiny before them than was ever + set before any other portion of mankind. The interest of Europe is to + let us alone, and the sentiments of mankind will not allow interference + which is at once wrong and pernicious to the world’s peace.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Henry S. Sanford, Esq.,&c., &c., Brussels.

@@ -54261,7 +54330,7 @@ wantonly waged against the Union.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Henry S. Sanford, Esq.,&c., &c., &c., Brussels.

@@ -54318,7 +54387,7 @@ their own affairs, and arbitrate their own domestic conflicts.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Henry S. Sanford, Esq., &C., &C., &C., Brussels.

@@ -54363,7 +54432,7 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- H. S. SANFORD. + H. S. SANFORD.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -54415,7 +54484,7 @@ since the Ball Run affair.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- H. S. SANFORD. + H. S. SANFORD.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -54424,7 +54493,7 @@
- [Extract ] + [Extract] Mr. Sanford to Mr. Seward. @@ -54447,7 +54516,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- H. S. SANFORD. + H. S. SANFORD.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -54482,7 +54551,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- H. S. SANFORD. + H. S. SANFORD.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -54537,8 +54606,8 @@ regarded with favor. I did not perceive why they might not labor as freed men as well in the southern States as in a condition of slavery. - They were found, as slaves, to be a source of great profit to their - masters; why could not their labor be turned to their own profit? It - was certain that the white man could not be employed to advantage in + masters; why could not their labor be turned to their own profit? It was + certain that the white man could not be employed to advantage in tropical cultivation, and it seemed to me that the negro, or some other tropical race, would always be needed there to cultivate the free cotton and rice, to take hereafter the place of slave-grown cotton and rice. I @@ -54570,7 +54639,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- H. S. SANFORD. + H. S. SANFORD.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -54662,7 +54731,7 @@ progress and of liberal institutions everywhere.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- H. S. SANFORD. + H. S. SANFORD.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -54732,7 +54801,7 @@ the dismemberment of the Union.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- H. S. SANFORD. + H. S. SANFORD.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -54951,7 +55020,7 @@ increased value of property, at this time less than half that. By law of 9th March, 1848, the principal of real estate tax was divided among the nine provinces of the kingdom according to the result of the cadastre ; and the law further provided that the + rend="italic">cadastre; and the law further provided that the amount of taxable revenue arrived at on the 31st December, 1843, should be the basis of this tax, until a new revision of the cadastral operations. The whole amount thus fixed for the kingdom is $3,188,905, @@ -56664,7 +56733,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- H. S. SANFORD. + H. S. SANFORD.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -56699,7 +56768,7 @@ nation into a self-defensive military and naval power.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Henry S. Sanford, Esq., &c., &c.,&c., Brussels.

@@ -57031,7 +57100,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- J. WATSON WEBB. + J. WATSON WEBB.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -57108,8 +57177,9 @@ government and execute the laws thereof. So help me God.”

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- J. WATSON WEBB, Envoy Ex’ y and Minister - Plenipo’ y for the United States. + J. WATSON WEBB, + Envoy Ex’ y and Minister Plenipo’ y for the + United States.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James Watson Webb, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -57171,7 +57241,7 @@ country.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James Watson Webb, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -57386,10 +57456,10 @@ suitable for immediate cultivation at the expense of the company; and the emancipated colonist also to have bestowed upon him certain agricultural implements and——dollars in money.

-

Is this feasible? I have not a doubt of it; and if feasible, then, - beyond all peradventure, it is a project well worthy the consideration - of the philanthropist, the capitalist, and the governments of the United - States and Brazil.

+

Is this feasible? I have not a doubt of it; and if feasible, then, beyond + all peradventure, it is a project well worthy the consideration of the + philanthropist, the capitalist, and the governments of the United States + and Brazil.

1st. Brazil should, and no doubt would, willingly set apart a tract of country in a healthy locality or localities on the shores of the Amazon or in that region, and convey in fee to the company at least one hundred @@ -57464,8 +57534,8 @@ emancipated after a certain probationary term of labor in his new home.

2d. The United States could and should transport all her liberated slaves - .as “apprentices” to an eligible country, where, by their own labor, - they can remunerate those who confer upon them this blessing.

+ as “apprentices” to an eligible country, where, by their own labor, they + can remunerate those who confer upon them this blessing.

3d. The knowledge of this fact, demonstrated by discussion and experiment, would hasten the entire abolition of slavery in the United States.

@@ -57553,7 +57623,7 @@ to the better judgments and more deliberate consideration of those in authority, by their obedient servant,

- J. WATSON WEBB. + J. WATSON WEBB.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -57908,7 +57978,7 @@ public councils.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James Watson Webb, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -57937,7 +58007,7 @@ department, and I forward herewith a copy of my despatch.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

- J. WATSON WEBB. + J. WATSON WEBB.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States.

@@ -57970,7 +58040,7 @@ of the opportunity to reiterate to him the assurances of his high consideration.

- MARQUIS D’ABRANTES. + MARQUIS D’ABRANTES.

Mr. James Watson Webb.

 @@ -58076,7 +58146,7 @@ Imperial Majesty that the government of the United States, standing “upon the position heretofore assumed,” declare “that the proceedings of the governor of Maranham are - intolerable ; and we cannot further debate at Rio, nor can + intolerable; and we cannot further debate at Rio, nor can we change the field of the discussion from that capital to Washington.”

And how are these complaints, remonstrances, and friendly intimations @@ -58201,7 +58271,7 @@ to your excellency the expression of his personal regard and most distinguished consideration.

- J. WATSON WEBB. + J. WATSON WEBB.

His Excellency the Marquis d’Abrantes, Counsellor to his Imperial Majesty the @@ -58295,7 +58365,7 @@ so. Its friendly tenor cannot fail to be acceptable.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- J. WATSON WEBB. + J. WATSON WEBB.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States.

@@ -58450,7 +58520,7 @@ foreign affairs the renewed assurances of his great personal regard and most distinguished consideration.

- J. WATSON WEBB. + J. WATSON WEBB.

His Excellency the Marquis D’Abrantes, Counsellor to his Imperial Majesty, Minister @@ -58531,7 +58601,7 @@ undersigned avails himself of the opportunity to reiterate to him the assurances of his high consideration.

- MARQUIS D’ABHANTES. + MARQUIS D’ABHANTES.

Mr. James Watson Webb

 @@ -58566,7 +58636,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- J. WATSON WEBB. + J. WATSON WEBB.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -58750,7 +58820,7 @@ assurances of his cordial esteem and most profound consideration.

- J. WATSON WEBB. + J. WATSON WEBB.

His Excellency the Marquis D’Abrantes, Counsellor of his Imperial Majesty, Minister @@ -58785,7 +58855,7 @@ by me. In either event you will have nothing further to do. But should the sale be about to proceed without any such notice from the government, you will then read to the auctioneer and public in - attendance the following protest and notice :

+ attendance the following protest and notice:

“You, Mr. Auctioneer, and you gentlemen in attendance on the advertised sale of the American vessels Abigail, Ann E. Grant, Virginia, and Fanny Crenshaw, will please to take notice that I, F. @@ -58826,7 +58896,7 @@ it, and report the same to me without delay.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- J. WATSON WEBB. + J. WATSON WEBB.

F. A. Cordeiro, Esq.

 @@ -58850,7 +58920,7 @@ measure.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- J. WATSON WEBB. + J. WATSON WEBB.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States.

@@ -58906,7 +58976,7 @@ refusal to adjust them.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James Watson Webb, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -58945,7 +59015,7 @@ will end in entire satisfaction of all foreign claims, and produce substantial good to this country.

- THOMAS CORWIN. + THOMAS CORWIN.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States, Washington.

@@ -58984,8 +59054,8 @@ of Tabasco.

I am, sir, yours, very respectfully,

- R. PRECIAT, United States - Consul. + R. PRECIAT, + United States Consul.

N. L. Wilson, Esq., United States Consul, Tabasco.

@@ -59061,7 +59131,7 @@ Cruz, who leaves on the 25th instant.

I am your obedient servant,

- THOS. CORWIN. + THOS. CORWIN.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States, Washington, D. @@ -59114,7 +59184,7 @@ Mexico, February 23, 1862. - TERAN. + TERAN. [Translation.] @@ -59176,11 +59246,13 @@

I approve these preliminaries, in virtue of the ample powers with which I am invested.

- BENITO JUAREZ, President of the - Republic, + BENITO JUAREZ, + President of the + Republic, - JESUS TERAN, Minister of Foreign and Home - Affairs. + JESUS TERAN, + Minister of Foreign and Home + Affairs.
- THOS. CORWIN. + THOS. CORWIN.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States, Washington, D. @@ -59329,7 +59401,7 @@ events of the next month.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- THOMAS CORWIN. + THOMAS CORWIN.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States, Washington, D. @@ -59366,8 +59438,8 @@

Begging a speedy reply, I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

- D. B. VAN BRUNT, United States - Consul. + D. B. VAN BRUNT, + United States Consul.

Hon. Thos. Corwin, United States Minister, Mexico.

@@ -59475,7 +59547,7 @@ of reclamation if he chooses, but in my judgment such payment would form no just ground of claim on the Mexican government.

- THOMAS CORWIN. + THOMAS CORWIN.

D. B. Van Brunt, Esq., United States Consul, Acapulco.

@@ -59511,7 +59583,7 @@

The undersigned renews to your excellency the assurances of his high consideration.

- THOMAS CORWIN. + THOMAS CORWIN.

His Excellency El Sn. Don Manuel Doblado, @@ -59550,7 +59622,7 @@ excellency Mr. Corwin, it is gratifying to the undersigned to renew to him the assurances of his very distinguished consideration.

- MANUEL DOBLADO. + MANUEL DOBLADO.

His Excellency Thomas Corwin, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister @@ -59614,7 +59686,7 @@

The undersigned takes great pleasure in renewing to your excellency the assurance of my distinguished consideration.

- THOMAS CORWIN. + THOMAS CORWIN.

His Excellency El Sn. Don Manuel Doblado, @@ -59662,7 +59734,7 @@ his excellency Mr. Thomas Corwin the assurances of his very distinguished consideration.

- MANUEL DOBLADO. + MANUEL DOBLADO.

His Excellency Thomas Corwin, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister @@ -59730,7 +59802,7 @@ Juarez government.

Very respectfully,

- THOMAS CORWIN. + THOMAS CORWIN.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States, Washington, D. @@ -59739,7 +59811,7 @@ here on the 6th an imperative necessity to Mexico. It will also insure the United States against incalculable future danger.

- THOS. CORWIN. + THOS. CORWIN.

Hon. W. H. Seward, @@ -59772,7 +59844,7 @@ Cordoba has written to me in a private letter that they are to arrive at Huatusco.

Liberty and independence.

- F. TALAVERA. + F. TALAVERA. The general-in-chief of the army of the east, Ixtapa. @@ -59781,8 +59853,8 @@ April 22, 1862. This is a copy. - LAZARO GARZA AYALA, Secretary. + LAZARO GARZA AYALA, + Secretary. No. 2. @@ -59832,9 +59904,9 @@ all upright men hail it as a friendly banner; let the insensate dare to attack it!

- E. JURIEN, A. DE SALIGNY, Plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor of the French, - in Mexico. + E. JURIEN, A. DE SALIGNY, + Plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor + of the French, in Mexico. Cordoba, @@ -59859,15 +59931,15 @@ have to inform your excellency that on the afternoon of the 19th this place will be entirely evacuated by our troops and materiel. God preserve your excellency many years.

- COUNT DE REUS. + COUNT DE REUS. His Excellency Señor Don J. Zaragoza. April 22, 1862. This is a true copy. - LAZARO GARZA AYALA, Secretary. + LAZARO GARZA AYALA, + Secretary. @@ -59892,7 +59964,7 @@ the French troops residing in Cordoba will order the escort to which I refer to retire, protesting to him the assurances of my personal consideration. Liberty and reform.

- J. ZARAGOZA. + J. ZARAGOZA. His Excellency the General-in-chief of the French Army, Cordoba. @@ -59901,8 +59973,8 @@ calendar="gregorian">April 22, 1862. This is a true copy. - LAZARO GARZA AYALA, Secretary. + LAZARO GARZA AYALA, + Secretary. No. 5. @@ -59924,7 +59996,7 @@

I avail myself of this present occasion to renew to the general-in-chief of the eastern army the assurances of my distinguished consideration.

- E. JURIEN. + E. JURIEN. The General-in-chief of the Army of the East. @@ -59933,8 +60005,8 @@ calendar="gregorian">April 22, 1862. This is a copy. - LAZARO GARZA AYALA, Secretary. + LAZARO GARZA AYALA, + Secretary. @@ -59956,15 +60028,15 @@ general-in-chief of the French expeditionary body begs General Zaragoza to accept the assurances of his distinguished consideration.

- GENERAL COUNT DE LORENCEZ. + GENERAL COUNT DE LORENCEZ. Aculzingo, April 22, 1862. This is a copy. - LAZARO GARZA AYALA, Secretary. + LAZARO GARZA AYALA, + Secretary. No. 7. @@ -60011,7 +60083,7 @@ geographical situation, I have thought it necessary to hasten to it to explain to you these good intentions, which also embrace the philanthropic idea of establishing forever the independence, - nationality, and integrity of the Mexican territory !

+ nationality, and integrity of the Mexican territory!

For the assuring, then, of a new order of things, you should confide in the efficacious co-operation of France, whose illustrious sovereign makes his beneficial influence felt in every place where a @@ -60026,8 +60098,8 @@ necessities, and religious belief.

This is the assurance of your best friend and fellow-citizen,

- JUAN N. ALMONTE.JUAN N. ALMONTE.Cordoba, April 16, 1862. @@ -60074,9 +60146,9 @@ foreign relations the assurances of their distinguished consideration.

- A. DE SALIGNY. + A. DE SALIGNY. - E. JURIEN. + E. JURIEN.

His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Relations.

@@ -60126,7 +60198,7 @@ Mexico, April 20, 1862. - JESUS TERAN. + JESUS TERAN.

Their Excellencies the Commissioners of his Majesty the Emperor of the French, @@ -60162,7 +60234,8 @@ April 16, 1862. - A. DE SALIGNY. E. JURIEN. + A. DE SALIGNY. E. + JURIEN.

His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Relations, @@ -60196,7 +60269,7 @@ Mexico, April 20, 1862. - JESUS TERAN. + JESUS TERAN.

Their Excellencies the Commissioners of his Majesty the Emperor of the French, @@ -60236,7 +60309,7 @@ convictions of expediency and justice.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Thomas Corwin, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -60290,7 +60363,7 @@ republic.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Thomas Corwin, Esq., &c, &c., &c.

@@ -60318,7 +60391,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- THOMAS CORWIN. + THOMAS CORWIN.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States, Washington, D. @@ -60358,7 +60431,7 @@ confidential manner, for their due consideration.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Thomas Corwin, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -60419,7 +60492,7 @@ generous spirit as well as the great ability which they manifest.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Thomas Corwin, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -60486,7 +60559,7 @@ here with the liveliest satisfaction. This government expects the best results from it. Your obedient servant,

- THOS. CORWIN. + THOS. CORWIN.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States, Washington, D. @@ -60514,7 +60587,7 @@ regiment on the frontier of Texas and the Mexican authorities.

I am, sir, your obedient servant.

- THOS. CORWIN. + THOS. CORWIN.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States, Washington, D. @@ -60544,7 +60617,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your excellency the assurances of my very distinguished consideration.

- MANUEL DOBLADO. + MANUEL DOBLADO.

Mr. Thomas Corwin, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister @@ -60610,7 +60683,7 @@ Monterey, May 18, 1862. - SANTIAGO VIDAURRI. + SANTIAGO VIDAURRI.

The Citizen Minister of Foreign Relations and of the Interior, @@ -60672,7 +60745,7 @@ June 2, 1862.

True copies.

- JUAN Á D. ARIAS. + JUAN Á D. ARIAS. @@ -60701,7 +60774,7 @@

The undersigned renews to your excellency the assurance of his distinguished consideration.

- THOMAS CORWIN. + THOMAS CORWIN.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Thomas Corwin, Esq., &C., &C., &C.

@@ -60800,7 +60873,7 @@ leave Almonte and his few associates to their fate.

Your obedient servant,

- THOS. CORWIN. + THOS. CORWIN.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States, @@ -60913,7 +60986,7 @@ hope from Europe also.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- THOS. CORWIN. + THOS. CORWIN.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States, @@ -61073,7 +61146,7 @@ government.

God, etc.

- S. CALDERON COLLANTES. + S. CALDERON COLLANTES.

God, etc.

- S. CALDERON COLLANTES. + S. CALDERON COLLANTES.
April 15, 1862. - A. DE SALIGNY. + A. DE SALIGNY. - E. JURIEN. + E. JURIEN.

Correct.

- J. A. L. DE CABALLOS. + J. A. L. DE CABALLOS.
@@ -61425,7 +61498,7 @@ excellency for your knowledge and effects.

God, &c.

- S. CALDERON COLLANTES. + S. CALDERON COLLANTES.
- E. J. + E. J.
+ General Doblado has not arrived, what could we do with the others?

The ministers of finance and justice have arrived, but I have made known to them that we cannot set out on account of Sir Charles Wycke’s illness, and I have invited them to come here, if they carry sufficient @@ -61670,7 +61743,7 @@

Come, then; for here, in your house, I expect you, and I extend to you the hand of a true friend.

- PRIM. + PRIM.

It is a correct translation.

 @@ -61751,7 +61824,7 @@ earnestly hope she may be successful in surmounting them.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Thomas Corwin, Esq., &c., &c., &c.,

@@ -61848,7 +61921,7 @@ of either friendly feelings or aid from any quarter.

Your obedient servant,

- THOMAS CORWIN. + THOMAS CORWIN.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States, @@ -61902,15 +61975,18 @@

The undersigned avail themselves of this occasion to offer to your excellency the assurances of their distinguished consideration.

- THOS. CORWIN. + THOS. CORWIN. - FRAN’CO DE P. PASTOR. + FRAN’CO DE P. PASTOR. - AUG. V. KINT DE ROUDENBECK. + AUG. V. KINT DE + ROUDENBECK. - MANUEL NICHOLAS CORPAUCK. + MANUEL NICHOLAS + CORPAUCK. - NARCISO DE F’CO MARTIN. + NARCISO DE F’CO + MARTIN. @@ -61946,7 +62022,7 @@ excellency Mr. Corwin, and to his worthy colleagues, the assurances of his very distinguished consideration.

- JUAN DE D. ARIAS. + JUAN DE D. ARIAS.

His Excellency Thomas Corwin, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister @@ -61975,7 +62051,7 @@ excellency Thomas Corwin the assurances of his very distinguished consideration.

- JUAN DE D. ARIAS. + JUAN DE D. ARIAS.

His Excellency Thomas Corwin, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister @@ -62002,13 +62078,13 @@ penalties, to consent to the circulation of any printed matter before the censor shall have received the first copy which may be printed. Liberty and reform. Mexico, August 15, 1862.

- F. LAZO ESTRADA. + F. LAZO ESTRADA. Mexico, August 16, 1862. A true copy. - JUAN DE D. ARIAS. + JUAN DE D. ARIAS.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Thomas Corwin, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Mexico.

@@ -62114,7 +62190,7 @@ everywhere on the earth.

I am your obedient servant,

- THOMAS CORWIN. + THOMAS CORWIN.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States, @@ -62158,7 +62234,7 @@ no nation free from its desolating effects.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Thomas Corwin, Esq., &C., &C., &C., Mexico

@@ -62197,7 +62273,7 @@ upon States less disloyal than themselves.

I am, sir, your obedient, servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

George G. Fogg, Esq., &c, &c, Berne.

@@ -62252,7 +62328,7 @@ months in America shut their mouths.

With the highest respect, your obedient servant,

- GEORGE G. FOGG. + GEORGE G. FOGG.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States of @@ -62287,7 +62363,7 @@ is becoming irresistible.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD + WILLIAM H. SEWARD

Bradford R. Wood, Esq., &c, &c, Copenhagen.

@@ -62312,7 +62388,7 @@ modify the adverse opinions existing abroad.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Bradford R. Wood, Esq., &c., &c., Copenhagen.

@@ -62352,7 +62428,7 @@ world.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Bradford R. Wood, Esq., &c., &c., Copenhagen.

@@ -62391,7 +62467,7 @@ then we shall be able to reappear as reformers among the nations.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Bradford R. Wood, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Copenhagen.

@@ -62442,7 +62518,7 @@ indulged by those who were representing it abroad.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Bradford R. Wood, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Copenhagen.

@@ -62470,7 +62546,7 @@ matters in that quarter.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Bradford R. Wood, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -62515,8 +62591,8 @@

* * * * * * * *

I have the honor to remain your obedient servant,

- BRADFORD R. WOOD, Minister Resident, - &C. + BRADFORD R. WOOD, + Minister Resident, &C.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -62558,7 +62634,7 @@ entire press in Sweden and Norway. * * ** * * * * * * *

I remain your obedient servant,

- J. S. HALDEMAN. + J. S. HALDEMAN.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -62585,7 +62661,7 @@ ability.

I remain your obedient servant,

- J. S. HALDEMAN. + J. S. HALDEMAN.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -62623,7 +62699,7 @@ para sites of success. * * * * * *

I remain your obedient servant,

- J. S. HALDEMAN. + J. S. HALDEMAN.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -62653,7 +62729,7 @@ the “ancient and natural frontiers of France.” * * * * * *

I remain your obedient servant,

- J. S. HALDEMAN. + J. S. HALDEMAN.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c.

@@ -62696,7 +62772,7 @@ desired.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Edward Joy Morris, Esq., &c., &c., Constantinople.

@@ -62742,7 +62818,7 @@ prejudices of past generations.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD + WILLIAM H. SEWARD

Edward Joy Morris, Esq., &c &c., Constantinople.

@@ -62787,7 +62863,7 @@ duties of your important mission.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Edward J. Morris, Esq., &c,&c., Constantinople.

@@ -62859,7 +62935,7 @@ perseverance in the same course.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.
* * * * * * * * * *

With great respect, your obedient servant,

- E. JOY MORRIS. + E. JOY MORRIS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -62995,7 +63071,7 @@ arms.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- EDWARD JOY MORRIS. + EDWARD JOY MORRIS.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -63032,7 +63108,7 @@ a man-of-war.* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

With great respect, your obedient servant,

- E. JOY MORRIS. + E. JOY MORRIS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -63069,7 +63145,7 @@ importation of gunpowder, &c. * * * * *

With great respect, your obedient servant,

- E. JOY MORRIS. + E. JOY MORRIS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -63131,7 +63207,7 @@

Be pleased, sir, to accept assurances of my perfect consideration.

- AALI. + AALI.

Hon. E. Joy Morris, Minister Resident from the United States of @@ -63214,7 +63290,7 @@ propositions into effect would disturb the peace of the world.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

- E. JOY MORRIS. + E. JOY MORRIS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -63255,7 +63331,7 @@ spectators, he underwent the punishment of his crime. Not a single word was uttered by any spectator against the execution, and many, in sign of their approbation of it, exclaimed aloud, “Padishah - sagh olsoun !”—“May the Sultan live!”

+ sagh olsoun!”—“May the Sultan live!”

The confederate assassin, Kaleel, is secreted in the territory governed by Mustapha Pasha, kaimakan of Payas. As he does not appear to be acting in good faith, in redeeming his promises to deliver him up, I have sent @@ -63288,7 +63364,7 @@ powers.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

- E. JOY MORRIS. + E. JOY MORRIS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -63326,7 +63402,7 @@ are authorized to express that approbation to the consul.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

E. J. Morris, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -63423,7 +63499,7 @@ the transmission of my despatches to you.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- TOWNSEND HARRIS. + TOWNSEND HARRIS.

Hon. Lewis Cass, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -63488,8 +63564,9 @@

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- TOWNSEND HARRIS, Minister Resident in - Japan. + TOWNSEND HARRIS, + Minister Resident in + Japan.

Hon. Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -63685,8 +63762,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- TOWNSEND HARRIS, Minister Resident in - Japan. + TOWNSEND HARRIS, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -63710,9 +63787,9 @@ calendar="gregorian">the 26th day of the 4th month of the 1st year of Bunkin, (June 5, 1861.) - KUDSI YAMATO NO KAMI. + KUDSI YAMATO NO KAMI. - ANDO TSUSIMA NO KAMI. + ANDO TSUSIMA NO KAMI. Translation of sentence.

Sudzuki Dzennodzio, Kondou Nawosaburo, Adzime Konkichi, dismissed @@ -63723,8 +63800,8 @@ to serve again in that capacity.

A true translation.

- A. L. O. PORTMAN, Interpreter. + A. L. O. PORTMAN, + Interpreter.
@@ -63760,8 +63837,8 @@ behalf before that period actually arrives.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- TOWNSEND HARRIS, Minister - Resident. + TOWNSEND HARRIS, + Minister Resident.

Honorable the Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -63795,7 +63872,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- TOWNSEND HARRIS, Minister Resident. + TOWNSEND HARRIS, + Minister Resident.

Hon. William H. Seward, @@ -63882,8 +63960,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- TOWNSEND HARRIS, Minister - Resident. + TOWNSEND HARRIS, + Minister Resident.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -63921,8 +63999,9 @@ in this matter.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- TOWNSEND HARRIS, Minister Resident of the - United States in Japan. + TOWNSEND HARRIS, + Minister Resident of the United States in + Japan.

Rutherford Alcock, Esq., C. B., H. B. M.’s Minister Plenipo’y and Envoy @@ -63952,8 +64031,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- TOWNSEND HARRIS, Minister - Resident. + TOWNSEND HARRIS, + Minister Resident.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -63981,7 +64060,7 @@ leave Yedo temporarily in the beginning of this year.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- J. K. DE WITT. + J. K. DE WITT.

Townsend Harris, Esq., Minister Resident of the United States m @@ -64020,8 +64099,9 @@ murder of the lamented Mr. Heusken, of this legation.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- TOWNSEND HARRIS, Minister Resident of the - United States in Japan, + TOWNSEND HARRIS, + Minister Resident of the United States in + Japan,

His Excellency J. K. De Witt, His Netherlands Majesty’s Consul General in @@ -64059,8 +64139,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- TOWNSEND HARRIS, Minister - Resident. + TOWNSEND HARRIS, + Minister Resident.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -64094,10 +64174,11 @@ year of Runkin, (the 7th of October, 1861.) - KUDSI YAMATO NO KAMI. + KUDSI YAMATO NO KAMI. - ANDO TSUSIMA NO KAMI. - A true translation.A. L. C. PORTMAN. + ANDO TSUSIMA NO KAMI. + A true translation.A. L. C. + PORTMAN. Translation of an agreement between fourteen @@ -64136,7 +64217,7 @@

14. Kurosawa Goro.

A true translation.

- A. L. C. PORTMAN. + A. L. C. PORTMAN.

REMARKS.

@@ -64274,8 +64355,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- TOWNSEND HARRIS, Minister - Resident. + TOWNSEND HARRIS, + Minister Resident.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -64348,7 +64429,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- TOWNSEND HARRIS, Minister Resident. + TOWNSEND HARRIS, + Minister Resident.

Hon. William H. Seward, @@ -64383,8 +64465,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- TOWNSEND HARRIS, Minister - Resident. + TOWNSEND HARRIS, + Minister Resident.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -64429,8 +64511,9 @@ and regard with which I have the honor to be your excellency’s most obedient, humble servant,

- TOWNSEND HARRIS, Minister Resident of the - United States in Japan. + TOWNSEND HARRIS, + Minister Resident of the United States in + Japan.

His Excellency J. K. De Witt, His Netherlands Majesty’s Consul General in @@ -64482,8 +64565,9 @@ inclined to view the Japanese proposition favorably.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- TOWNSEND HARRIS, Minister Resident of the - United States in Japan. + TOWNSEND HARRIS, + Minister Resident of the United States in + Japan.

Rutherford Alcock, Esq., C. B., H. B. M.’s Envoy Extraordinary and Minister @@ -64541,8 +64625,9 @@ distinguished consideration with which I have the honor to be your excellency’s most obedient, humble servant,

- TOWNSEND HARRIS, Minister Resident of the - United States in Japan. + TOWNSEND HARRIS, + Minister Resident of the United States in + Japan.

His Excellency Ducheme de Bellecourt, H. L Majesty’s Minister Plenipotentiary in @@ -64579,7 +64664,7 @@ questions at issue.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUTHERFORD ALCOCK, + RUTHERFORD ALCOCK, H. B. Majesty’s Envoy Extraordinary Minister Plenipotentiary, &c., &c., in Japan. @@ -64622,14 +64707,15 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, your excellency’s most obedient, humble servant,

- DUOHEME DE BELLECOURT. + DUOHEME DE + BELLECOURT.

His Excellency Townsend Harris, Minister of the United States, &c., &c., in Japan.

A true translation.

- A. L. C. PORTMAN. + A. L. C. PORTMAN.
@@ -64661,8 +64747,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -64694,8 +64780,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -64739,8 +64825,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -64769,8 +64855,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, @@ -64810,11 +64896,11 @@ the 4th month of the 2d year of Runkin (the 5th May, 1862.) - KUDZE YAMATO NO KAMI. + KUDZE YAMATO NO KAMI. - ANDO ISUSIMA NO KAMI. + ANDO ISUSIMA NO KAMI. A true translation. - A. L. C. PORTMAN. + A. L. C. PORTMAN.

-

To which his Majesty replied as follows :

+

To which his Majesty replied as follows:

“Have learned what you stated on delivering the letter. The friendship between the two countries shall be increased more and more. To come so great a distance must have been wearisome to you.”

@@ -64862,8 +64948,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -64906,7 +64992,7 @@ on the best and surest foundations.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Townsend Harris, Esq., &c., &c., Yedo.

@@ -65056,7 +65142,7 @@ accompany this despatch.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Townsend Harris, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Yedo.

@@ -65087,7 +65173,7 @@ with high approbation.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Townsend Harris, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Yedo.

@@ -65125,7 +65211,7 @@ the discharge of official duties until relieved by his arrival.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Townsend Harris, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Yedo.

@@ -65218,7 +65304,7 @@ civilization.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -65249,7 +65335,7 @@ together by the ties of amity and good understanding.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Townsend Harris, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Yedo.

@@ -65282,7 +65368,7 @@ a friendly power.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Albany, N. Y.

@@ -65329,7 +65415,7 @@ foothold of foreign nations already acquired in the empire of Japan.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -65358,7 +65444,7 @@ the presence of a representative of so respected a power in Yedo.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -65389,7 +65475,7 @@ of the Tycoon, and so conducive to the peace of his empire.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., &c. Yedo.

@@ -65416,7 +65502,7 @@ hands of their excellencies without delay.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., &c. Yedo.

@@ -65443,7 +65529,7 @@ if he shall yet be remaining at Yedo.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Yedo.

@@ -65478,7 +65564,7 @@ enlightened ministers.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Yedo.

@@ -65516,7 +65602,7 @@

I offer to your excellencies the assurance of my very high and distinguished consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD. Department of State, Washington, A. LINCOLN,

President of the United States of America.

-

To his Majesty the Tycoon of Japan :

+

To his Majesty the Tycoon of Japan:

Great and good Friend: I have received the letter which you have addressed to me on the subject of a desired extension of the time stipulated by treaty for the opening of certain @@ -65552,8 +65638,9 @@ Written at the city of Washington this 1st day of August, - 1861. Your good friend,A. - LINCOLN. + 1861. Your good + friend,A. + LINCOLN.

By the President:

William H. Seward, @@ -65590,7 +65677,7 @@

I pray your excellencies to accept the assurance of my highest consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD. Department of State, Washington, Wishing you health and prosperity, I assure your excellencies of my highest consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD. Department of State, Washington,

Your obedient servant,

- A. BURLINGAME. + A. BURLINGAME.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -65750,7 +65837,7 @@

I send copies of letters from the English and Russian ministers.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- A. BURLINGAME. + A. BURLINGAME.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -65814,8 +65901,9 @@ pursue.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM BRECK, Acting United States - Consul, Ningpo. + WILLIAM BRECK, + Acting United States Consul, + Ningpo.

Hon. Anson Burlingame, United States Minister,&c., &c., @@ -65892,17 +65980,18 @@

Done at Ningpo, at her Britannic Majesty’s consulate, at the time and place above given.

- WILLIAM BRECK, United States - Consul, + WILLIAM BRECK, + United States Consul, - L. OBRY, Capitaine du - Confucius. + L. OBRY, + Capitaine du Confucius. - FREDERICK HARVEYHer Majesty’s - Consul. + FREDERICK HARVEY, + Her Majesty’s Consul. - HENRY HAXHAM, Com’g Her Majesty’s Steamer - Kestrel. + HENRY HAXHAM, + Com’g Her Majesty’s Steamer + Kestrel. @@ -65963,7 +66052,7 @@ per annexed.

Pursuant to the heavenly edict (of) the Taiping heavenly realm, (of) the heavenly dynasty from the royal city, (literally, nine gates, - epithet of division of the army of Nankin ?) + epithet of division of the army of Nankin?) the founder of the dynasty, (from his) royal official residence, the commander of the left division, the Paout-an nyi, (probably a title of nobility,) (Wong) makes this communication to the American @@ -66049,7 +66138,7 @@ excellency to agree the high consideration, sir, of your most obedient servant.

- L. D. BALLUZEEH. + L. D. BALLUZEEH.

His Excellency Mr. A. Burlingame, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister @@ -66084,7 +66173,8 @@

I avail myself of this occasion to express to your excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

- FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE. + FREDERICK W. A. + BRUCE.
* * * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- A. BURLINGAME. + A. BURLINGAME.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -66171,8 +66261,9 @@ you.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- HOPE, Vice Admiral, - Commander-in-Chief. + HOPE, + Vice Admiral, + Commander-in-Chief.

Hon. Anson Burlingame, United States Minister in China.

@@ -66261,7 +66352,7 @@ government.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- A. BURLINGAME. + A. BURLINGAME.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -66290,7 +66381,7 @@ undersigned, as the only representatives of foreign powers at this port, have this day met together at the United States consulate, and have, after consultation, agreed and determined upon the following - three articles :

+ three articles:

1. That that tract of land or country or promontory known as the Keang Pih-Sete, and comprised within the boundaries or limits drawn by the Yung river, the Yu Yau, a branch of the said river, the @@ -66312,17 +66403,19 @@ ministers and officers of the nations to which the undersigned respectively pertain and belong.

- WILLIE P. MANGUM, United States - Consul. + WILLIE P. MANGUM, + United States Consul. - FREDERICK HARVEY, Her Majesty’s - Consul. + FREDERICK HARVEY, + Her Majesty’s Consul. - JOHN CORBETT, Her Majesty’s steamer - Scout. + JOHN CORBETT, + Her Majesty’s steamer + Scout. - LEON OBRY, Captain His Imperial Majesty’s - steamer Confucius and French Consul. + LEON OBRY, + Captain His Imperial Majesty’s steamer + Confucius and French Consul. B. @@ -66369,7 +66462,7 @@

Begging pardon for the liberty I have taken, believe me, dear sir, with much respect, yours most truly,

- M. S. COLBERTSON. + M. S. COLBERTSON.

Hon. Anson Burlingame, Minister Plenipotentiary from the United @@ -66408,21 +66501,22 @@ Shau-hing, and Ningpo. Our armies beseiged Hang-chow two months and took it without effort. The southern regions being quiet, the Chung-wong is leading his troops by five roads to take Shanghai. - This is only a little corner of a place; how can it give trouble? Having already taken Su-chaw and Chi-kiang, how can we be prevented - from taking Shanghai? This is not mere boasting, as you may see - from what I have said above. The sea-coast in this region is a place - for foreign trade. As we are now sending forward troops, the two - parties should make terms of peace. I have therefore thought it best - to send you information beforehand. The ground occupied by the - troops is not necessary for you. As to the houses of foreign - traders, we shall not assuredly molest them. If, however, you should - foolishly be intent on gain, then not only this little corner but - the whole world shall be ours. You ought not to listen to the imps, - but clean your hearts and return to your obedience, and thus you - shall not only secure your trade, but promote your own and the - public welfare. Consider it speedily; I am now with my soldiers at - Kia-ding; quickly return and answer, and do not delay, lest you - should afterwards repent. A special communication.

+ This is only a little corner of a place; how can it give trouble? + Having already taken Su-chaw and Chi-kiang, how can we be prevented + from taking Shanghai? This is not mere boasting, as you may see from + what I have said above. The sea-coast in this region is a place for + foreign trade. As we are now sending forward troops, the two parties + should make terms of peace. I have therefore thought it best to send + you information beforehand. The ground occupied by the troops is not + necessary for you. As to the houses of foreign traders, we shall not + assuredly molest them. If, however, you should foolishly be intent + on gain, then not only this little corner but the whole world shall + be ours. You ought not to listen to the imps, but clean your hearts + and return to your obedience, and thus you shall not only secure + your trade, but promote your own and the public welfare. Consider it + speedily; I am now with my soldiers at Kia-ding; quickly return and + answer, and do not delay, lest you should afterwards repent. A + special communication.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Anson Burlingame, Esq., &c., &c., &c.,

@@ -66773,7 +66867,7 @@ treaty ports, and that these should not be mere adventurers.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- A. BURLINGAME. + A. BURLINGAME.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -66922,7 +67016,7 @@ overlooked.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Anson Burlingame, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -66954,7 +67048,7 @@ heretofore tranquil and united country.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Anson Burlingame, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -67095,7 +67189,8 @@ disposal. If set apart to the payment of subsequent claims as they arise, will they then have any control as to what claims shall be taken from it, or is it intended to pay chiefly those claims which they - decline to admit, but which the United States government regard as just? These questions have occurred to me, and others, too, as to the policy + decline to admit, but which the United States government regard as just? + These questions have occurred to me, and others, too, as to the policy of laying up a surplus at all to the credit of a government like this. It has yet no settled policy in its foreign relations, but is beginning to learn what they are, as exhibited by foreign representatives, and @@ -67150,7 +67245,7 @@ people.

I have the honor to remain, yours, obediently,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -67195,7 +67290,7 @@ former ages, to be a chief fertilizer on both continents.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Anson Burlingame, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -67243,7 +67338,7 @@ will establish the first American mission in Peking.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -67283,7 +67378,7 @@ of our respective nations.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Hon. F. W. A. Bruce, C. B.,Her Britannic Majesty’s Envoy, &c., @@ -67311,7 +67406,7 @@ order to make known to his highness that he has come to this place.

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

His Imperial Highness Prince Kung.

 @@ -67343,7 +67438,8 @@ disposal.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE. + FREDERICK W. A. + BRUCE.

A. BURLINGAME, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -67368,8 +67464,9 @@ receive increased benefit.

It is for this purpose that I write this reply.

- His Excellency Anson - Burlingame, + His Excellency Anson + Burlingame, + Envoy Extraordinary, &c., &c., U. S. A. @@ -67417,7 +67514,7 @@ among those who wish well to the human race.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Vice-Admiral Sir James Hope.

 @@ -67436,7 +67533,7 @@ sincere regard; and, meanwhile, I avail myself of this opportunity to respectfully wish you the enjoyment of every happiness.

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.
@@ -67460,7 +67557,7 @@ known to Congress at the commencement of the next session.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD + WILLIAM H. SEWARD

Anson Burlingame, Esq., &c., &c., &c.,

@@ -67559,7 +67656,7 @@ think, still holds in its keeping the best hopes of the human race.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Richard M. Blatchford, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -67595,7 +67692,7 @@ become more tranquil and confident of ultimate success. I am your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Richard M. Blatchford, Esq., &c, &c., &c. Rome.

@@ -67679,7 +67776,7 @@ viceroy.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. S. THAYER. + WM. S. THAYER.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -67720,7 +67817,7 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WM. S. THAYER. + WM. S. THAYER.

Hon. W. H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -67751,7 +67848,7 @@ afflict it.

Your most devoted friend,

- MOHAMMED SAID. + MOHAMMED SAID.

Hon. Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of @@ -67781,8 +67878,9 @@

Be pleased to accept, monsieur le consul general, the assurances of my high consideration

- TOULFIKAE PACHA, The Minister of Foreign - Affairs. + TOULFIKAE PACHA, + The Minister of Foreign + Affairs.

Monsieur Wm. L. Thayer, Consul General of the United States of @@ -67853,7 +67951,7 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WM. S. THAYER. + WM. S. THAYER.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -67884,7 +67982,7 @@ successful.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Wm. S. Thayer, Esq., &c., &c., &c. Alexandria.

@@ -67914,7 +68012,7 @@ conducted. Wishing you great prosperity and success, I am your friend,

- ABRAHAM LINCOLN. + ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

His Highness Mohammed Said Pacha, Viceroy of Egypt and its Dependencies, &c., @@ -68002,7 +68100,7 @@

Hoping the government will approve of what I have done in this matter, I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- JAMES DE LONG. + JAMES DE LONG.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -68106,7 +68204,7 @@ acted their part bravely to sustain the honor of the American flag.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES DE LONG. + JAMES DE LONG.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -68145,8 +68243,8 @@

Given under my hand and seal of the United States consulate at Tangier, Morocco, Africa, the day and year above written.

- JAMES DE LONG, United States - Consul. + JAMES DE LONG, + United States Consul.

The Commander of the United States Steam Sloop-of-war @@ -68215,7 +68313,7 @@ accomplish some deep plot. I want the presence of a federal man-of-war in this bay.

- J.D.L. + J.D.L.

The Commander of the Tuscarora.

@@ -68242,11 +68340,11 @@

Will you please send me a written statement of the particular circumstances which caused you to apprehend them; how long they had been on shore in Tangier at the time of their arrest, and what they - were doing there ?

+ were doing there?

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- J. AUG. CRAVEN, Commander. + J. AUG. CRAVEN, + Commander.

James De Long, Esq., United States Consul, Tangier.

@@ -68287,7 +68385,7 @@ answer. God bless you.

The employed of the throne elevated by God.

- MOHAMED BARGASH. + MOHAMED BARGASH.

God may protect him.

 @@ -68343,14 +68441,14 @@ pirate.

Shall seventy-six years of uninterrupted friendship that has existed between your government and that of the United States be brought to - an end for the sake of pirates ?

+ an end for the sake of pirates?

I trust in this brief note to your excellency that, after the explanation given, no impediment will be offered to my embarking the prisoners on board of the American man-of-war now in your harbor.

Very truly, your most sincere friend,

- JAMES DE LONG. + JAMES DE LONG.

His Excellency Sied Mohamed Bargash, Moorish Minister of Foreign Affairs.

@@ -68397,7 +68495,7 @@ faithful friend.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES DE LONG. + JAMES DE LONG.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -68411,7 +68509,7 @@ Christian consul. But thank God that I have overcome all, and sustained the honor of the American flag.

- J. D. L. + J. D. L.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES DE LONG, United States - Consul, + JAMES DE LONG, + United States Consul,

John Hay Drummond Hay, Esq., Her Britannic Majesty’s Minister Resident, @@ -68518,7 +68616,7 @@ consul.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient humble servant,

- J. H. DRUMMOND HAY. + J. H. DRUMMOND HAY. [Translation] @@ -68545,7 +68643,7 @@ never towards you, representing a foreign power.

Accept, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

- S. D’EHRENHOFF. + S. D’EHRENHOFF.

Mr. De Long, Consul General of the “United States in @@ -68586,7 +68684,7 @@ or censure me.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- GUISEPPE DE MARTINO. + GUISEPPE DE MARTINO.

Mr. De Long, Consul General of the United States in @@ -68649,7 +68747,8 @@ States the expression of his sentiments of distinguished consideration.

- FRANCISCO MERY Y COLOM. + FRANCISCO MERY Y + COLOM.

The Consul General of the United States of America.

@@ -68696,7 +68795,7 @@ opportunity to reiterate to you, sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.

- JOSE MANUEL COLACO. + JOSE MANUEL COLACO.

Hon. J. De Long, Consul General of the United States of America @@ -68738,7 +68837,8 @@ when he heard of the mob, made the remark—“what the devil have the Christians to do with the American consul’s prisoners.”

During the short time I have been here my whole time and attention has - been devoted to the interest of my government, and what is my reward! Last evening three letters came to this place addressed to different + been devoted to the interest of my government, and what is my reward! + Last evening three letters came to this place addressed to different parties, from Brown, my late predecessor, informing them “that the Senate had not confirmed my appointment, and that the President had appointed a Mr. McMath, of Ohio, in my place, and that he would be here @@ -68759,7 +68859,7 @@ Algeciras.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES DE LONG. + JAMES DE LONG.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -68774,8 +68874,8 @@

Pray take the Tangier prisoners in custody aboard your ship if it can be done without losing sight of the Sumter.

- HORATIO J. PERRY, Charge d’ - Affaires. + HORATIO J. PERRY, + Charge d’ Affaires.

Captain Craven, Abordo vapor Tuscarora, Algeciras.

@@ -68824,8 +68924,9 @@ please find copy enclosed.

Respectfully your obedient servant,

- HORATIO J. PERRY, United States Charge d’ - Affaires. + HORATIO J. PERRY, + United States Charge d’ + Affaires.

Captain Craven, Commanding United States steam corvette @@ -68903,7 +69004,7 @@ flag-officer, whoever he may be, and believe me, sir, with much respect, your most obedient servant,

- HORATIO J. PERRY. + HORATIO J. PERRY.

Captain T. Augustus Craven, Commanding United States War Steamer @@ -68951,7 +69052,7 @@ good service of our country.

Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

- HORATIO J. PERRY, + HORATIO J. PERRY,

James De Long, Esq., United States Consul, Tangier.

@@ -68985,7 +69086,7 @@ received.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James De Long, Esq., &c., &c., &c., @@ -69073,9 +69174,9 @@ have been unnecessarily harsh or severe, the proper remedies will be immediately applied.

Secondly. How is the case affected by the relations existing between the - United States and Morocco? The empire of Morocco, like all the - Mahomedan and Pagan powers, is regarded by Christian nations as a State - only partially enlightened, or partially civilized. The traditional + United States and Morocco? The empire of Morocco, like all the Mahomedan + and Pagan powers, is regarded by Christian nations as a State only + partially enlightened, or partially civilized. The traditional jealousies of Christian nations have induced them to treat such States as being exceptional ones, to which, in many respects, the law of nations, as recognized by Christian powers, does not apply. Thus all @@ -69271,7 +69372,7 @@ Long committed in this case.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Jesse H. McMath, Esq.,&c., &c., &c.

@@ -69313,7 +69414,7 @@ were as unfounded as they were untrue.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient and humble servant,

- JAMES DE LONG. + JAMES DE LONG.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -69360,8 +69461,8 @@

I have the honor to be your royal highness’s most obedient and humble servant,

- JAMES DE LONG, United States - Consul. + JAMES DE LONG, + United States Consul.

The Viceroy, Prince Muley Abbas.

 @@ -69371,7 +69472,7 @@

PRAISE TO THE ONE GOD.

To the clever and wise gentleman, consul general for the American nation, James De Long, esq., - which premised :

+ which premised:

We continue to make inquiries regarding your welfare, and praying God that you are well. We are deeply penetrated with the expressions of gratitude made use of at your interview with us, as well as in the @@ -69415,8 +69516,9 @@ calendar="gregorian hijri">the 14 “Dalkahada,” year 1278, (corresponding to May 14, 1862.) - EL ABBAS, Son of the Prince of the - Believers. + EL ABBAS, + Son of the Prince of the + Believers.

May he rest in glory.

 @@ -69456,8 +69558,8 @@ the President and people of the United States.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- F. W. SEWARD, Acting - Secretary. + F. W. SEWARD, + Acting Secretary.

Jesse H. McMath, Esq., United States Consul, Tangier.

@@ -69556,7 +69658,7 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- E. O. CROSBY. + E. O. CROSBY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -69588,7 +69690,7 @@ wishes.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

E. O. Crosby, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -69643,7 +69745,7 @@ the Secretary of State of the United States of America the assurances of his highest consideration.

- A. J. DE YRISARRI. + A. J. DE YRISARRI.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States of @@ -69701,7 +69803,7 @@

The undersigned avails himself of this occasion to offer to Mr. Yrisarri renewed assurances of his high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Señor Don Antonio Jose De Yrisarri, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -69784,7 +69886,7 @@ excellency the Secretary of State of the United States of America the assurances of his highest consideration.

- A. J. DE YRISARRI. + A. J. DE YRISARRI.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States of @@ -69836,7 +69938,7 @@ Relations.

A true copy.

- A. J. DE YRISARRI. + A. J. DE YRISARRI.
The undersigned avails himself of this occasion to renew to Mr. Yrisarri the assurances of his high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Señor Don Antonio Jose De Yrisarri, &c., &c., &c. Brooklyn.

@@ -69923,7 +70025,7 @@ with its views.

I have the honor to be, sir, yours, most obediently,

- C. N. RIOTTE. + C. N. RIOTTE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -69956,7 +70058,7 @@

Hon. C. N. Riotte.

The above is a true copy and a correct translation.

- C. N. RIOTTE. + C. N. RIOTTE.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles N. Riotte, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -70077,7 +70179,7 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- C. N. RIOTTE. + C. N. RIOTTE.

Hon. Willtam H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -70108,7 +70210,7 @@

P. S.—I enclose also a copy of my letter to the Secretary of the Interior, on the subject of colonization.

- W. H. S. + W. H. S.

Charles N. Riotte, Esq., &c., &c., &c. Costa Rica.

@@ -70134,7 +70236,7 @@ tropics.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles N. Riotte, Esq., &c., &c., &c. Costa Rica.

@@ -70209,8 +70311,9 @@ Official Gazette of Honduras.

Your obedient servant,

- JAMES R. PARTRIDGE, United States Minister - Resident, + JAMES R. PARTRIDGE, + United States Minister + Resident,

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -70268,7 +70371,7 @@ regarded as conclusive by this government.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James R. Partridge, &c., &c., &c. Honduras.

@@ -70322,7 +70425,8 @@

“The last steamer from Central America conveyed us the news of a perfect panic prevailing over Nicaragua and Honduras on account of a dreadful deluge of negro emigration into these two countries from the United - States. Permit me to ask you what is at the foundation of these rumors? The contagion of fear has spread already here, and spoiled a project + States. Permit me to ask you what is at the foundation of these rumors? + The contagion of fear has spread already here, and spoiled a project which, for a number of months, I was considering, with the government, with the view of facilitating and securing the establishment of freed negro colonies by an act of congress. I take the liberty of begging your @@ -70353,10 +70457,10 @@ the way it is and will continue to be received here until the idea is distinctly disavowed by the highest authority.

The great disturbing question of this country is, which of these races - shall maintain the political supremacy? It is a question more - intimately and ineradicably engrafted into the social and political - system of these states, and even more difficult of solution, than the - slavery question in the United States.

+ shall maintain the political supremacy? It is a question more intimately + and ineradicably engrafted into the social and political system of these + states, and even more difficult of solution, than the slavery question + in the United States.

It is a question in which the whole civilized world, and especially the United States, is most deeply interested, for more than one half of the American continent is now peopled by mixed races, one or the other of @@ -70374,7 +70478,7 @@ upon here.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- A. B. DICKINSON. + A. B. DICKINSON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States, @@ -70398,7 +70502,7 @@ wishes of the people of these states.

I am, sir, with high respect, your excellency’s obedient servant,

- A. B. DICKINSON. + A. B. DICKINSON.

Señor Don Pedro Zeledon, Minister of Foreign Relations of the Republic @@ -70439,7 +70543,7 @@ between our two governments.

Very respectfully, your friend and servant,

- A.B. DICKINSON. + A.B. DICKINSON.

Señor Don Pedro Zeledon, Minister of Foreign Relations, &c., @@ -70544,7 +70648,7 @@ yet answered their request.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- A. B. DICKINSON. + A. B. DICKINSON.

Hon. C. N. Riotte, United States Minister, Costa Rica.

@@ -70571,7 +70675,7 @@ to negro colonization within the borders of the republic.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- A.B. DICKINSON. + A.B. DICKINSON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -70607,7 +70711,7 @@

I have the honor to remain, with sentiments of respect and esteem, your excellency’s obedient servant,

- PEDRO ZELEDON. + PEDRO ZELEDON. [Translation.] @@ -70646,7 +70750,7 @@

I take the present occasion to present to your excellency my most distinguished regards, and remain your obedient servant.

- PEDRO ZELEDON. + PEDRO ZELEDON.

Mr. A. B. Dickinson, Minister resident of the United @@ -70677,7 +70781,7 @@ the Interior on the same subject.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

A. B. Dickinson, Esq., &c., &c., &c. Nicaragua.

@@ -70709,7 +70813,7 @@ the tropics.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Andrew B. Dickinson, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Nicaragua.

@@ -70908,7 +71012,7 @@ entitled “Information for persons proposing to join the free colored colony to Central America,” published and subscribed, as from the pamphlet it appears, by the honorable senator and commissioner, S. C. - Pomeroy, in which are to be found the following statements :

+ Pomeroy, in which are to be found the following statements:

“And as an effort is now to be made by these people to found a settlement and a country of their own, I have consented to aid them in the selection of a locality and overcoming some of the obstacles incident to @@ -70980,7 +71084,7 @@ consideration and distinguished esteem with which I subscribe myself your excellency’s very obedient servant.

- LUIS MOLINA. + LUIS MOLINA.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States, @@ -71068,7 +71172,7 @@

I avail myself of this occasion to offer to you, sir, renewed assurances of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Senor Luis Molina, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -71145,7 +71249,7 @@ distinguished esteem with which I am your excellency’s obedient servant.

- LUIS MOLINA. + LUIS MOLINA.

His Excellency Mr. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -71179,7 +71283,7 @@

I have the honor to renew to your excellency the assurances of my distinguished consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Señor Luis Molina, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -71208,7 +71312,7 @@ distinguished consideration with which I am your excellency’s very obedient servant.

- LUIS MOLINA. + LUIS MOLINA.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States.

@@ -71295,7 +71399,7 @@ befalling me of subscribing myself your excellency’s obedient servant.

- PEDRO ZELEDON. + PEDRO ZELEDON.

His Excellency Señor Don Luis Molina, Minister Plenipotentiary of Nicaragua, @@ -71327,7 +71431,7 @@

I avail myself of this occasion to renew to your excellency the assurances of my distinguished consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Señor Luis Molina, &c., &c., &c. Washington, D. @@ -71365,7 +71469,7 @@ whether you consider the proposition as deserving further attention or not, I have the honor to remain your most obedient servant,

- F. HASSAUREK. + F. HASSAUREK.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -71445,7 +71549,7 @@

Availing myself of this opportunity to offer my services to you, I have the honor to remain, &c., &c., &c.,

- BENIGNO MALO. + BENIGNO MALO.

F. Hassaurek, Esq., &c., &c., &c. Quito.

@@ -71478,7 +71582,7 @@ proposition like Mr. Malo’s could be considered.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Frederick Hassaurek, Esq., &c., &c., &c. Ecuador.

diff --git a/volumes/frus1863p1.xml b/volumes/frus1863p1.xml index 327bb04e0..34fb219db 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1863p1.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1863p1.xml @@ -5921,8 +5921,8 @@
Message. -

Fellow citizens of the Senate and House of Representatives - :

+

Fellow citizens of the Senate and House of + Representatives:

Another year of health, and of sufficiently abundant harvests, has passed. For these, and especially for the improved condition of our national affairs, our renewed and profoundest gratitude to God is due.

@@ -6446,7 +6446,8 @@ whom, more than to others, the world must stand indebted for the home of freedom disenthralled, regenerated, enlarged, and perpetuated.

- ABRAHAM LINCOLN. + ABRAHAM LINCOLN. + December 8, 1863.
@@ -6556,7 +6557,7 @@ independence of the United States of America the eighty-eighth. [l. s.] - ABRAHAM LINCOLN. + ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

By the President: William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -6625,7 +6626,7 @@ without its influence upon their determination.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -6659,7 +6660,7 @@ again think we are beginning to see an approaching end.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -6719,7 +6720,7 @@ gain a more complete insight into this.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -6758,7 +6759,7 @@ are now making here, with a good prospect of success, for a more effective organization of the anti-slavery sentiment in our behalf.

Since writing the above I have received the following telegram, - purporting to give the substance of the Russian answer :

+ purporting to give the substance of the Russian answer:

“St. Petersburgh, November 15.

“The ‘Journal de St. Petersburgh’ of to-day contains the reply of Prince @@ -6776,7 +6777,7 @@ colleagues, if not official aid, at least moral support.’”

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -6856,7 +6857,7 @@ this current.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -7044,7 +7045,8 @@

I pray your lordship to receive the assurances of the very high consideration with which I remain your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Honorable Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -7117,7 +7119,7 @@ the consideration of her Majesty’s government.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State Washington, D C.

@@ -7137,7 +7139,7 @@

It shall receive the immediate attention of the government.

I remain your faithful servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

C. F. Adams, Esq.

 @@ -7174,7 +7176,7 @@ the remonstrance.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -7208,7 +7210,7 @@

The undersigned requests Mr. Adams to receive the assurance of his highest consideration.

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL. Mr. Adams to The undersigned requests Earl Russell to receive the assurances of his highest consideration.

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -7307,7 +7310,7 @@ it would have seemed presumptuous to expect.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -7376,7 +7379,7 @@ happiness of everybody else.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -7496,7 +7499,7 @@ are not well-advised friends of either of them.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -7590,7 +7593,7 @@ leave the affair for the present in your own able hands.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -7669,7 +7672,7 @@

* * * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -7711,7 +7714,7 @@ jurisdiction and laws.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -7784,7 +7787,7 @@ its exertions for her capture.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -7877,7 +7880,7 @@ here to break the blockade of little worth.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -8158,7 +8161,7 @@ dispute the right of the southern confederacy to a separate existence, which she has equally maintained by the success of her armies in the field and by the regular administration of the laws - and constituted authorities at home ?

+ and constituted authorities at home?

Under these circumstances it becomes important to see what has been the action of England towards the Confederate States. From the very commencement of this war of independence, every newspaper, every @@ -8278,7 +8281,8 @@ &c., &c., would give labor for 4,000,000 of artisans. Is not such a commerce worthy of consideration? Is not such an ally worthy of being saved - from annihilation, which is brutal, and is threatened to be total? But not only is the sympathy of England claimed on account of the + from annihilation, which is brutal, and is threatened to be total? + But not only is the sympathy of England claimed on account of the natural rights of freemen, on an appreciation of the mutual interests of both countries, on their consanguinity and the de jure as well as de @@ -8351,8 +8355,8 @@ and to bring their present protracted struggle to a successful issue.

- FREDERICK NURSE, Secretary pro. - tem. + FREDERICK NURSE, + Secretary pro. tem.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -8398,7 +8402,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -8427,7 +8431,7 @@ month of September last.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -8464,7 +8468,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -8494,7 +8498,7 @@ Greeks whilst engaged, in 1826, in their war with the Turks.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. G.

@@ -8565,8 +8569,9 @@ Washington.

I have the honor, &c., &c.,

- HORATIO J. SPRAGUE, United States - Consul. + HORATIO J. SPRAGUE, + United States + Consul.

His Excellency Charles Francis Adams, @@ -8588,8 +8593,8 @@ authority from Commissioner Mason. The party has telegraphed for it.

- SPRAGUE, Consulate. + SPRAGUE, + Consulate. @@ -8625,8 +8630,9 @@ annex copy of my telegram to you of last evening.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- HORATIO J. SPRAGUE, United States - Consul. + HORATIO J. SPRAGUE, + United States + Consul.

His Excellency C. F. Adams, United States Minister, &c., &c., @@ -8647,8 +8653,8 @@

By instructions of our minister at Madrid, have protested to British governor against Sumter being sold here.

- SPRAGUE, Consul. + SPRAGUE, + Consul. No. 5conditions of sale may be seen on board any time previous to the sale, or at—

- WM. SHERWILL. + WM. SHERWILL. + December 8, 1862. @@ -8708,8 +8715,9 @@ this city, with the concurrence of the British authorities.

I have the honor to be your excellency’s obedient servant,

- HORATIO J. SPRAGUE, United States - Consul + HORATIO J. SPRAGUE, + United States + Consul

His Excellency Sir Wm. Codrington, K. C. B., Governor of Gibraltar, @@ -8742,8 +8750,8 @@ sale.

I am, respectfully, &c., your obedient servant,

- C. W. PICKERING, Captain. + C. W. PICKERING, + Captain.

Horatio J. Sprague, Esq., United States Consul, Gibraltar.

@@ -8797,8 +8805,9 @@ of the present communication with its enclosures, and accept, sir, the assurances of my high consideration and respect.

- HORATIO J. SPRAGUE, United States - Consul. + HORATIO J. SPRAGUE, + United States + Consul.

His Excellency C. F. Adams, United States Minister, &c., &c., @@ -8824,8 +8833,8 @@ justify his interference with a mercantile transaction.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- S. FREELING, Colonial - Secretary. + S. FREELING, + Colonial Secretary.

H. J. Sprague, Esq., United States Consul, &c., &c., @@ -8867,8 +8876,9 @@ thereto.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- HORATIO J. SPRAGUE, United States - Consul. + HORATIO J. SPRAGUE, + United States + Consul.

Captain S. Freeling, R. A., Colonial Secretary, &c., @@ -8899,8 +8909,8 @@ with the first which he received from you yesterday.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

- S. FREELING, Colonial - Secretary. + S. FREELING, + Colonial Secretary.

Horatio J. Sprague, Esq., United States Consul, Gibraltar.

@@ -8937,8 +8947,9 @@ the telegram.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- HORATIO J. SPRAGUE, United States - Consul. + HORATIO J. SPRAGUE, + United States + Consul.

Captain S. Freeling, R. A., Colonial Secretary, Gibraltar.

@@ -8964,8 +8975,8 @@ this protest to the public.

By command:

- S. FREELING, Colonial - Secretary. + S. FREELING, + Colonial Secretary. No. 14. @@ -8992,8 +9003,8 @@ Orleans by the confederate government.”

By command:

- S. FREELING, Colonial - Secretary. + S. FREELING, + Colonial Secretary. No. 15. @@ -9074,7 +9085,8 @@ and sent home for adjudication in the United States court.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Horatio J. Sprague, Esq., United States Consul, Gibraltar.

@@ -9093,8 +9105,8 @@ hundred dollars. Purchaser, an English engineer, arrived yesterday from Southampton.

- SPRAGUE, Gibraltar. + SPRAGUE, + Gibraltar.

Mr. Adams, American Minister, London.

@@ -9113,7 +9125,7 @@

Sumter flying British flag. Is loading. Probably be conveyed (convoyed?) to sea if necessary.

- SPRAGUE. + SPRAGUE.

Adams, American Minister, London.

@@ -9146,7 +9158,7 @@ impossible to get the papers ready.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -9428,7 +9440,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -9481,7 +9493,7 @@ engage its attention when it reassembles.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -9506,7 +9518,7 @@ note of the 19th of that month, which I sent forward last week.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -9952,7 +9964,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant.

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Honorable Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10126,7 +10139,7 @@ Dec. 1861 - W. S. Lindsay & Co , + W. S. Lindsay & Co, S. S. Princess Royal @@ -10253,8 +10266,8 @@ imperfect as I fear it is.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- F. H. MORSE, Consul. + F. H. MORSE, + Consul.

Hon. C. F. Adams, United States Minister at London.

@@ -10281,7 +10294,7 @@ which I have the honor to transmit.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -10316,7 +10329,8 @@

Renewing the assurances of my highest consideration, I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10422,7 +10436,7 @@ similar to those which belong to the case of the Emily St. Pierre.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10459,7 +10473,7 @@ vitiate the whole transaction.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -10488,7 +10502,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10509,8 +10523,9 @@ high seas if he can. He need not mind the twenty-four hour rule, if outside the jurisdiction.

- CHARLES F. ADAMS, United States - Minister, London. + CHARLES F. ADAMS, + United States Minister, + London.

Mr. Sprague, United States Consul, Gibraltar.

@@ -10529,7 +10544,7 @@ will not be recognized. Sumter quiet in port past week. Has ceased flying any flag.

- SPRAGUE. + SPRAGUE.

Adams, American Minister, London.

@@ -10557,7 +10572,7 @@ Ocmulgee, which were sent to me with that despatch.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -10580,8 +10595,9 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your obedient servant,

- BENJAMIN MORAN, Assistant Secretary of - Legation. + BENJAMIN MORAN, + Assistant Secretary of + Legation.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -10598,7 +10614,7 @@

Inform Mr. Seward the three assassins of Merriam were this day hung at Adrianople.

- MORRIS. + MORRIS.

B. Moran, Secretary of American Legation, London.

@@ -10651,7 +10667,7 @@ under consideration in the Senate.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10679,7 +10695,7 @@ heretofore submitted in regard to that important subject.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10733,7 +10749,7 @@ decisively for us.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -10793,7 +10809,7 @@ taken place.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10858,7 +10874,8 @@ Sec.”

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -10900,8 +10917,9 @@ through the proper authorities to his excellency the President of the United States.

- WM. J. CLEGG, Hon. Secretary to the - meeting. + WM. J. CLEGG, + Hon. Secretary to the + meeting. No. 3. @@ -10930,8 +10948,8 @@ James, with a request to him to have the kindness to forward it to the President of the United States.

- FRANCIS BISHOP, Chairman. + FRANCIS BISHOP, + Chairman. No. 1. @@ -11008,8 +11026,9 @@ and universal liberty.

Signed on behalf of the meeting,

- WM. J. CLEGG, Hon. Secretary to the - meeting. + WM. J. CLEGG, + Hon. Secretary to the + meeting.

His Excellency Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, @@ -11041,7 +11060,7 @@ shall endeavor to forward.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -11089,10 +11108,11 @@ and the gracious favor of Almighty God.”

By order of the committee,

- WILLIAM EVANS, Chairman. + WILLIAM EVANS, + Chairman. - F. W. CHESSON, Hon. - Secretary. + F. W. CHESSON, + Hon. Secretary. Mr. Moran to I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- BENJAMIN MORAN, Assistant Secretary of - Legation. + BENJAMIN MORAN, + Assistant Secretary of + Legation.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -11364,7 +11385,7 @@ evidence.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11556,9 +11577,9 @@ can be presented than is shown in the official despatch of General McClellan, in which, after falsely claiming a victory on the 17th instant, he actually felicitates his government that “Pennsylvania is - safe !” The newspapers of New York, too, are demanding the transfer of + safe!” The newspapers of New York, too, are demanding the transfer of the mint of the United States to that city, on the ground that it is - exposed to capture in Philadelphia !

+ exposed to capture in Philadelphia!

Herewith you will receive the President’s message and accompanying documents, including the measures taken for the repression of the enormities threatened by the enemy, under the command of General Pope. I @@ -11694,8 +11715,8 @@ secretary to Madrid, and that his office has thus been vacated.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- J. P. BENJAMIN, Secretary of - State. + J. P. BENJAMIN, + Secretary of State.

Hon. John Slidell, &c., &c., &c., @@ -11802,8 +11823,8 @@ without unnecessary delay.

I am, &c.,

- J. P. BENJAMIN, Secretary of - State. + J. P. BENJAMIN, + Secretary of State.

Hon. A. Dudley Mann, &c., &c., Brussels, Belgium.

@@ -11937,8 +11958,8 @@

I enclose to Mr. Mason, for his information, a copy of this communication.

Your obedient servant,

- J. P. BENJAMIN, Secretary of - State. + J. P. BENJAMIN, + Secretary of State.

Hon. John Slidell, Commissioner, &c., &c., Paris.

@@ -11963,8 +11984,8 @@ cabinet.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- J. P. BENJAMIN, Secretary of - State. + J. P. BENJAMIN, + Secretary of State.
@@ -11987,7 +12008,7 @@ threshold.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- F. R. LUBBOCK. + F. R. LUBBOCK.

His Excellency Jefferson Davis, President, &c., Richmond, Va.

@@ -12012,7 +12033,7 @@ the southern States was or was not another good or bad politic taken by the State? and

3d. The re-establishment of the old republic of Texas will or will - not be beneficial to our beloved adopted country ?

+ not be beneficial to our beloved adopted country?

Your answer to these questions, sir, will serve me as a guide in my political correspondence with the governments which I have the honor to represent.

@@ -12025,8 +12046,8 @@

I certify the above and foregoing to be a true copy of the original now on file in the executive department at Austin, Texas.

- JAMES PAUL, Private - Secretary. + JAMES PAUL, + Private Secretary. B. @@ -12056,8 +12077,8 @@ and Spanish Consul, Galveston.

True copy of the original.

- JAMES PAUL, Private - Secretary. + JAMES PAUL, + Private Secretary. B. @@ -12128,7 +12149,7 @@ the benefit of the entire confederacy.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- W. S. OLDHAM. + W. S. OLDHAM.

His Excellency Jefferson Davis, President, &c.

@@ -12159,8 +12180,8 @@ previous permission of this government.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- J. P. BENJAMIN, Secretary of - State. + J. P. BENJAMIN, + Secretary of State.

Mr. B. Theron, French Consular Agent, and Vice-Consul for Spain, @@ -12191,8 +12212,8 @@

Please acknowledge receipt of this communication.

Your obedient servant,

- J. P. BENJAMIN, Secretary of - State. + J. P. BENJAMIN, + Secretary of State.

Major General J. B. Magruder, Spottswood Hotel.

@@ -12225,8 +12246,8 @@ 18th instant.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- J. P. BENJAMIN, Secretary of - State. + J. P. BENJAMIN, + Secretary of State.

Monsieur Taboulle, Vice-Consul of France, Richmond.

@@ -12254,8 +12275,8 @@ remain at liberty to reside here as heretofore.

Your obedient servant,

- J. P. BENJAMIN, Secretary of - State. + J. P. BENJAMIN, + Secretary of State.

Monsieur Taboulle, at French Consulate, Richmond.

@@ -12297,8 +12318,8 @@ opportunity will offer in a few days for a full despatch.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- J. P. BENJAMIN, Secretary of - State. + J. P. BENJAMIN, + Secretary of State.

Hon. John Slidell, &c., &c., &c., Paris.

@@ -12347,8 +12368,8 @@ Europe more regularly and promptly.

Your obedient servant,

- J. P. BENJAMIN, Secretary of - State. + J. P. BENJAMIN, + Secretary of State.

Edwin de Leon, Esq., Care of Hon. John Slidell, &c., Paris.

@@ -12397,8 +12418,8 @@ conveyance.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- J. P. BENJAMIN, Secretary of - State. + J. P. BENJAMIN, + Secretary of State.

Hon. James M. Mason, &c., &c., &c., London.

@@ -12469,8 +12490,8 @@ your correspondence with Earl Russell.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- J. P. BENJAMIN, Secretary of - State. + J. P. BENJAMIN, + Secretary of State.

Hon. James M. Mason, &c., &c., &c., London.

@@ -12576,8 +12597,8 @@ deem proper.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

- C. G. MEMMINGER, Secretary of the - Treasury. + C. G. MEMMINGER, + Secretary of the Treasury.

Hon. J. M. Mason, Commissioner Canfederate States, London.

@@ -12882,8 +12903,8 @@ retained, subject to his order, and a bill drawn for the £25.

Respectfully, your obedient servant.

- C. G. MEMMINGER, Secretary of the - Treasury. + C. G. MEMMINGER, + Secretary of the Treasury.

Hon. J. M. Mason. Commissioner Confederate States, London.

@@ -12925,8 +12946,8 @@ important enterprise.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- S. R. MALLORY, Secretary of the - Navy. + S. R. MALLORY, + Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. James M. Mason, Commissioner, &c., No. 54 Devonshire @@ -12962,7 +12983,7 @@

No one is entitled to my suggestions until full time is given me to carry them out.

- GEORGE N. SANDERS. + GEORGE N. SANDERS.

Reid Sanders.

 @@ -13100,8 +13121,8 @@ adopted with regard to the cotton bonds.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- S. R. MALLORY, Secretary of the - Navy. + S. R. MALLORY, + Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. C. G. Memminger, Secretary of the Treasury.

@@ -13132,8 +13153,8 @@ ample.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

- C. G. MEMMINGER, Secretary of the - Treasury. + C. G. MEMMINGER, + Secretary of the Treasury.

[The “cotton certificates” enclosed in the foregoing letter are the same as those printed above.]

@@ -13165,8 +13186,8 @@ contracts, and I enclose herewith a copy.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- S. R. MALLORY, Secretary of the - Navy. + S. R. MALLORY, + Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. James M. Mason, Commissioner of the Confederate States to Great Britain, @@ -13185,8 +13206,9 @@ Spence is sent to you for your guidance and consideration.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

- C. G. MEMMINGER, Secretary of the - Treasury. + C. G. MEMMINGER, + Secretary of the + Treasury.

Messrs. Fraser, Trenholm & Co., Liverpool, Great Britain.

@@ -13234,8 +13256,8 @@ applied to the contracts, of which you have been advised.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

- C. G. MEMMINGER, Secretary of the - Treasury. + C. G. MEMMINGER, + Secretary of the Treasury.

James Spence, Esq., Liverpool, Great Britain.

@@ -13284,8 +13306,8 @@ get sundry details, of which I will advise you in another letter.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

- C. G. MEMMINGER, Secretary of the - Treasury. + C. G. MEMMINGER, + Secretary of the Treasury.

Messrs. Fraser, Trenholm & Co., Liverpool, Great Britain

@@ -13317,8 +13339,8 @@ given

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

- C. G. MEMMINGER, Secretary of the - Treasury. + C. G. MEMMINGER, + Secretary of the Treasury.

Messrs. Fraser, Trenholm & Co., Liverpool, Great Britain.

@@ -13361,8 +13383,9 @@ and Mining Bureau.

Approved:

- J. GORGAS, Colonel and Chief of - Ordnance. + J. GORGAS, + Colonel and Chief of + Ordnance.

Mr. Wm. K. Smith, London, England.

@@ -13389,7 +13412,7 @@ presence of the insurrectionary forces.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -13455,7 +13478,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -13488,8 +13511,8 @@ in the emancipation policy upon which they have entered, and the determination they show to root out slavery from their land.

- FRANCIS BISHOP, Chairman. + FRANCIS BISHOP, + Chairman. Salford Resolution. @@ -13516,8 +13539,8 @@ States.

Signed on behalf and by order of the meeting,

- THOMAS GARDNER LEE, Pastor, - Chairman. + THOMAS GARDNER LEE, + Pastor, Chairman. Surrey Resolutions. @@ -13540,8 +13563,8 @@ be forwarded to Mr. Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States.”

- BENJAMIN SCOTT, Chairman. + BENJAMIN SCOTT, + Chairman. Meeting at Crosshills. @@ -13660,7 +13683,7 @@ time.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -13712,7 +13735,8 @@ consideration, I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -13760,8 +13784,8 @@

The Georgiana will call at Queenstown for coal.

Your obedient servant,

- F. H. MORSE, Consul. + F. H. MORSE, + Consul.

Hon. Charles F. Adams, United States Minister.

@@ -13801,7 +13825,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -13825,7 +13849,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -13866,7 +13890,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -13905,7 +13929,7 @@ would warrant her being detained.

I am, &c., &c.,

- S. PRICE EDWARDS. + S. PRICE EDWARDS.

F. Goulburn, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -13949,8 +13973,8 @@ is in no way subject to detention.

Very respectfully,

- C. MORGAN, Surveyor. + C. MORGAN, + Surveyor.

The Collector.

 @@ -13982,7 +14006,7 @@ once and take your directions.

I am, &c.,

- FRED’K GOULBURN. + FRED’K GOULBURN. @@ -14010,7 +14034,7 @@ hand.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -14069,7 +14093,8 @@ highest consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Honorable Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -14096,7 +14121,7 @@ answer received last evening.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -14129,7 +14154,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -14163,7 +14188,7 @@

Your telegram communicated to our commanders. Sumter coaling again and provisioning to-day.

- SPRAGUE. + SPRAGUE.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -14224,7 +14249,7 @@ by General Grant.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -14249,7 +14274,7 @@ their way to me.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -14413,7 +14438,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -14531,7 +14556,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Honorable Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -14560,7 +14586,7 @@ 290.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -14606,7 +14632,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -14643,7 +14669,8 @@ magistrates to act in the case.

I am, &c.,

- H. WADDINGTON. + H. + WADDINGTON.

The Mayor of Liverpool.

@@ -14708,8 +14735,8 @@

The agents are Messrs. A. E. Byrne & Co., Tower Buildings, Liverpool.

- F. J. GREIG, H. - C. + F. J. GREIG, + H. C. @@ -14778,8 +14805,8 @@ consul the information they have obtained.

I have, &c.

- R. C. GARDNER, Mayor. + R. C. GARDNER, + Mayor.

H. Waddington, Esq., &c., &c.,&c.

@@ -14837,8 +14864,8 @@ this nineteenth day of January, 1863. - S. PRICE EDWARDS, Collector. + S. PRICE EDWARDS, + Collector. Report of Major Greig, head @@ -14875,8 +14902,8 @@ running the blockade. She has neither gun swivels nor ring-bolts on deck for firing cannon.

- J. J. GREIG, H. - C. + J. J. GREIG, + H. C. @@ -14919,7 +14946,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -14943,7 +14971,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -14980,7 +15008,7 @@ in that place the previous evening.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -15033,7 +15061,7 @@ toleration.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -15060,7 +15088,7 @@ the piratical steamer Alabama.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -15088,7 +15116,7 @@ expressed in their resolutions.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -15116,7 +15144,7 @@ Adams, 15th January, 1863.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -15159,7 +15187,7 @@ at the beginning of the contest.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -15207,7 +15235,7 @@ less likely than I could have anticipated some months ago.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -15254,8 +15282,9 @@ up in your well-being, is the prayer of

Yours, most truly,

- W. S. NICHOLS, Secretary of the - Meeting. + W. S. NICHOLS, + Secretary of the + Meeting.

His Excellency the Hon. C. F. Adams, London.

@@ -15281,7 +15310,8 @@ only solid foundation on which to rest the amity of nations.

I am, sir, &c., &c.,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

W. S. Nichols, Esq., Bradford, Yorkshire.

@@ -15324,8 +15354,9 @@ them to President Lincoln.

On behalf of the meeting,

- W. S. NICHOLS, Secretary to the - Meeting. + W. S. NICHOLS, + Secretary to the + Meeting. Great anti-slavery meeting. @@ -15371,8 +15402,8 @@ gratuitous supplies for our distressed operatives.

We are, with much respect, yours, &c.,

- JOHN SIBREE, M. A., - Chairman. + JOHN SIBREE, + M. A., Chairman. Great anti-slavery meeting. @@ -15412,8 +15443,8 @@ mother country, a more and more perfect amity will henceforth prevail between the people of the two nations.

- JOHN SIBREE, M. A., - Chairman. + JOHN SIBREE, + M. A., Chairman. Voice from London, England. @@ -15505,8 +15536,8 @@ entitles them to the cordial thanks of the friends of negro emancipation in all lands.

- L. A. CHAMERORZOW, Secretary. - + L. A. CHAMERORZOW, + Secretary. 27 New Broad Street, E. C., London,

Signed in behalf of the meeting—

- GEORGE THOMAS, Chairman.GEORGE THOMAS, + Chairman.Bristol, January 28, 1863. @@ -15637,10 +15668,13 @@ and earnest hope and prayer.

In name and by appointment of the meeting—

- WM. GOVAN, Jr., Chairman.City Hall, - Glasgow, WM. GOVAN, Jr., + Chairman.City Hall, + Glasgow, February 4, 1863. @@ -15685,8 +15719,11 @@ Thomson:

5. Vote of thanks to the chair.

- WM. GOVAN, Jr., Chairman. + WM. GOVAN, Jr., + Chairman.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16041,7 +16078,7 @@ of obtaining these contributions from other powers.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -16079,7 +16116,7 @@

* * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -16173,8 +16210,8 @@ in London, and that he be requested to transmit the same to his government.

- WM. H. PULLEN, Secretary pro. - tem. + WM. H. PULLEN, + Secretary pro. tem. - JEROME MURCH, Chairman of the - Meeting. + JEROME MURCH, + Chairman of the + Meeting. - WILLIAM TRATER, Chairman. + WILLIAM TRATER, + Chairman.
@@ -16326,7 +16364,7 @@ effective did not then appear.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -16356,7 +16394,7 @@ subjoined, is forwarded herewith.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -16408,7 +16446,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Honorable Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16465,7 +16504,7 @@ bound westward.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -16496,7 +16535,7 @@ British government.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16528,7 +16567,7 @@ London, Guildhall, E. C.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16555,7 +16594,7 @@ are approved.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16580,7 +16619,7 @@ inform you that your proceedings in the matter are approved.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16639,7 +16678,7 @@ to put the act in force against the insurgents of the United States.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16703,7 +16742,7 @@ of others.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -16726,7 +16765,7 @@ struggle.

I have the honor to remain your most obedient, humble servant,

- THOMAS WILLIAMS. + THOMAS WILLIAMS.

His Excellency Charles Francis Adams, Legation of the United States, @@ -16749,8 +16788,8 @@ a copy of this resolution be sent to his excellency the President of the United States.”

- THOMAS WILLIAMS, Chairman. + THOMAS WILLIAMS, + Chairman. Resolutions at Middleton, England. @@ -16773,7 +16812,7 @@ forwarded to the honorable C. F. Adams, minister at London for the United States.

- THOMAS B. WOOD. + THOMAS B. WOOD.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -16840,7 +16879,8 @@ her Majesty’s ships.

Renewing, &c., &c.

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Honorable Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16872,7 +16912,7 @@ depredations committed by No. 290.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -16892,7 +16932,8 @@ underwriters in New York.

Renewing assurances, &c.

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Honorable Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16917,7 +16958,7 @@ herewith.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -16951,7 +16992,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Honorable Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16984,7 +17026,7 @@ military achievements regarded as imminent.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17019,7 +17061,7 @@ the meeting of the Tower Hamlets.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17066,7 +17108,7 @@ the civil war.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17110,7 +17152,7 @@ him before they were identified at the department.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -17179,8 +17221,9 @@ to the American ambassador in London, to be forwarded by him to the President of the United States.”

- JOHN BEATON, Secretary of United - Trades Council. + JOHN BEATON, + Secretary of United Trades + Council. @@ -17200,8 +17243,8 @@ rather than have again to rely on slave-grown produce.

Signed on behalf of the meeting.

- JOSEPH BATTOMLEY, Chairman. + JOSEPH BATTOMLEY, + Chairman. [Memorandum accompanying the address from the inhabitants of @@ -17251,11 +17294,11 @@ salvation of the United States.

Signed on behalf of the meeting by

- W. EDWARDS, Chairman.February 18, - 1863. + W. EDWARDS, + Chairman.February + 18, 1863. @@ -17274,8 +17317,8 @@ south, but a national sympathy with the north.

Your honor’s most humble servant, &c.,

- W. EDWARDS, Independent Minister. - + W. EDWARDS, + Independent Minister. Meirion Cottage, Aberdane, South @@ -17323,11 +17366,12 @@ London.

Signed on behalf of the chairman,

- THOMAS EMMOTT, Esq., Belmont Terrace, - Middleton road, Oldham. + THOMAS EMMOTT, Esq., + Belmont Terrace, Middleton road, + Oldham. - GEORGE CROMPTON, Hon. - Secretary. + GEORGE CROMPTON, + Hon. Secretary. Resolution at Merthyr Tydfil, South Wales. @@ -17348,11 +17392,11 @@ the American soil, and that a copy of this resolution be sent to his excellency the President of the United States.”

- CHARLES H. JAMES, Chairman. + CHARLES H. JAMES, + Chairman. - BENJAMIN HAD WIN GILBANKS, Hon. - Sec’y. + BENJAMIN HAD WIN GILBANKS, + Hon. Sec’y. Address at Merthyr Tydfil. @@ -17395,8 +17439,8 @@ gratuitous supplies for our distressed operatives.

We are, with much respect, yours, &c.,

- CHARLES H. JAMES, Chairman. + CHARLES H. JAMES, + Chairman. @@ -17454,8 +17498,9 @@ American minister at London for transmission to his excellency the President of the United States.”

- DAVID CAMPBELL, Provost and Chief - Magistrate of Paisley. + DAVID CAMPBELL, + Provost and Chief Magistrate of + Paisley. Resolutions from Carlisle, England. @@ -17481,8 +17526,8 @@ States minister in London to be forwarded to the President of the United States.

- JAMES ROSS, Chairman. + JAMES ROSS, + Chairman. Resolutions from Rawtenstall, England. @@ -17525,8 +17570,8 @@ chairman, be forwarded to the honorable Charles Francis Adams, the American minister in London.

- PETER ORMEROD WHITEHEAD, Chairman. + PETER ORMEROD WHITEHEAD, + Chairman.
@@ -17549,7 +17594,7 @@ reclaimed by the British during the late war with Russia.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -17573,7 +17618,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17621,7 +17666,7 @@ of interested circles in any part of this kingdom.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -17649,7 +17694,7 @@ arrived at Liverpool with half a million of the money.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -17679,7 +17724,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17744,7 +17789,7 @@ more a crime to forsake or betray.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17781,7 +17826,7 @@ satisfaction.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17822,7 +17867,7 @@ inhabitants of Bradford in such manner as you shall deem proper.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17853,7 +17898,7 @@ interests of all nations.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17892,7 +17937,7 @@ government may think proper to put forth.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17925,7 +17970,7 @@ important to them than to all other nations.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17957,7 +18002,7 @@ remain in that relation.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17983,7 +18028,7 @@ which your despatch has transmitted.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -18016,7 +18061,7 @@ and happiness.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -18047,7 +18092,7 @@ in respect to her Majesty’s government.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -18072,7 +18117,7 @@ my No. 454, has been received. That proceeding is approved.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -18111,7 +18156,7 @@ continues to run strongly in the direction lately taken. * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -18165,8 +18210,8 @@ when="1863-02-10" calendar="gregorian">February 10, 1863. - JOSEPH COWEN, Jr., Chairman. + JOSEPH COWEN, Jr., + Chairman. An addresss from inhabitants of Liverpool, @@ -18286,10 +18331,10 @@ judgment of mankind and the gracious favor of Almighty God.”

Signed in behalf of the meeting.

- JOHN CROPPER, Chairman.Liverpool, JOHN CROPPER, + Chairman.Liverpool, February 19, 1863. @@ -18328,14 +18373,15 @@ President Lincoln.”

Carried unanimously.

- ISAAC ROBSON, Chairman. + ISAAC ROBSON, + Chairman. February 25, 1863. - JOSH. A. DEAR, Secretary to the - Meeting. + JOSH. A. DEAR, + Secretary to the Meeting. February 25, 1863. @@ -18505,14 +18551,18 @@

Signed on behalf of the Union and Emancipation Society of Manchester.

- THOMAS BAILEY POTTER, President. + THOMAS BAILEY POTTER, + President. - SAMUEL WATTS, Jr., Treasurer. + SAMUEL WATTS, Jr., + Treasurer. - JOHN C. EDWARDS, EDWARD OWEN GREENING, Honorary Secretaries. + JOHN C. EDWARDS, EDWARD OWEN + GREENING, + Honorary Secretaries. Office 51 Piccadilly,

1. Moved by the Rev. E. Minton, seconded by Mr. N. Radcliffe, - senior, and supported by Mr. J. A. Jackson :

+ senior, and supported by Mr. J. A. Jackson:

“That the revolt of the southern States against the federal government having avowedly originated not only to maintain but to extend slavery; having been followed by the organization of a @@ -18564,7 +18614,7 @@ and the people of the loyal States the assurance of fraternal sympathy in their noble struggle.”

3. Moved by Mr. J. Robinson, seconded by Mr. J. Rhodes, and - supported by Mr. J. C. Edwards :

+ supported by Mr. J. C. Edwards:

“That this meeting desires to express its grateful appreciation of the noble conduct of the people of the United States, who, whilst they themselves are - ROBERT HYDE BUCKLEY, Chairman. + ROBERT HYDE BUCKLEY, + Chairman. Memorial of the Leeds Workingmen’s Institute to the people of @@ -18628,8 +18678,8 @@ more eagerly offered than by the workingmen of England.

On behalf of the Leeds Workingmen’s Institute.

- DARNTON LUPTON, President. + DARNTON LUPTON, + President. Ashton resolutions. @@ -18641,7 +18691,7 @@ based on slavery.

Mr. James Broadbent moved the second resolution, which was as - follows :

+ follows:

That this meeting admires and approves of the emancipation policy which President Lincoln and his colleagues have adopted as the best means of destroying slavery, and delivering their country @@ -18676,7 +18726,7 @@ copy of my reply.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -18703,7 +18753,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Honorable Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -18751,7 +18802,7 @@ time to save us from its effects.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -18816,7 +18867,7 @@ solely tinder the influence of these just and generous sentiments.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H SEWARD. + WILLIAM H SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -18847,7 +18898,7 @@ is now before me.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -18872,7 +18923,7 @@ proceedings as therein stated are approved.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c,. &c., &c.

@@ -18897,7 +18948,7 @@ approved.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -18931,7 +18982,7 @@ obligations.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -18994,7 +19045,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c. &c., &c.

@@ -19030,7 +19081,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19063,7 +19114,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.
@@ -19086,7 +19137,7 @@

* * * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -19133,7 +19184,7 @@ United States are hostile in their feelings to each other.”

I remain, sir, your obedient servant,

- JN. BEECHAM. + JN. BEECHAM.

His Excellency C. F. Adams.

 @@ -19160,7 +19211,7 @@ complained of.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19218,7 +19269,7 @@ throughout the world.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19323,7 +19374,7 @@ secretary of state for foreign affairs.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19372,7 +19423,7 @@ accept such a mission. Happily, European credulity is becoming unable to bear the tests enforced upon it. I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19398,7 +19449,7 @@ for which you will make proper acknowledgments to Earl Russell.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19438,7 +19489,7 @@ take no part whatever in their proceedings.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -19479,8 +19530,8 @@ Charles Francis Adams, American minister, with a request that he will transmit them to the President of the United States.

- EDWARD PALK, Chairman. + EDWARD PALK, + Chairman. @@ -19514,8 +19565,8 @@ with a request that they be sent to President Lincoln, and that copies be also addressed to the members for the borough.”

- T. B. ATTENBOROUGH, Chairman. + T. B. ATTENBOROUGH, + Chairman.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D C.

@@ -19622,7 +19673,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Honorable Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19691,7 +19743,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19777,7 +19830,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -19840,7 +19893,7 @@ eminently to be desired.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19873,7 +19926,7 @@ imagine, considers—he does not yet decide.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19898,7 +19951,7 @@ insurgents there, are also the reputed owners of the Sumter.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19923,7 +19976,7 @@ your note is approved.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -20009,7 +20062,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -20046,7 +20099,7 @@ institutions in America.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washigton, D. C.

@@ -20214,7 +20267,7 @@ * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -20284,7 +20337,7 @@ perfectly spontaneous.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -20313,7 +20366,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -20345,7 +20398,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -20395,7 +20449,7 @@ time.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -20554,7 +20608,7 @@ government.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -20579,7 +20633,7 @@ at Nassau.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -20609,7 +20663,7 @@ dividing opinion in Great Britain.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS,

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -20675,7 +20729,7 @@ was also proved that the building of the vessel was superintended by Captain Butcher, the confederate agent. The next point to which he would allude was the opinion given by the honorable and learned - member for Plymouth, (Mr. Collier,) who wrote :

+ member for Plymouth, (Mr. Collier,) who wrote:

“I have perused the above affidavits, and I am of opinion that the collector of customs would be justified in detaining the vessel. Indeed, I think it is his duty to detain her, and that if, after the @@ -20695,7 +20749,7 @@ be employed in the service of the Confederate States; and he (Mr. Forster) should like to know why that long time elapsed before any steps were taken? [Hear, hear.] On the 22d September, some time - after the vessel sailed, Lord Russell wrote :

+ after the vessel sailed, Lord Russell wrote:

“The report of the law officers was not received until the 29th of July, and on the same day a telegraphic message was forwarded to her Majesty’s government, stating that the vessel had sailed that @@ -21040,8 +21094,8 @@ from well-known authorities, and those, he considered, constituted his answer to this complaint. What were those extracts? The first was an instruction to the collector of customs, issued by Alexander - Martin, the Secretary of the Treasury, August 4th, 1793, as follows - :

+ Martin, the Secretary of the Treasury, August 4th, 1793, as + follows:

“The purchasing and exporting from the United States, by way of merchandise, articles called contraband, being generally warlike instruments and stores, are free to all parties at war, and ought @@ -22093,9 +22147,9 @@ learned friend shows that we have done, with regard to the foreign enlistment act, everything which the law enabled and authorized us to do. Gentlemen have argued as if seizing a vessel were equivalent - to the condemnation of a vessel. It was said: “Why did you not - seize the Alabama? You were told that it was known or believed that - she was engaged for warlike purposes on the part of the Confederate + to the condemnation of a vessel. It was said: “Why did you not seize + the Alabama? You were told that it was known or believed that she + was engaged for warlike purposes on the part of the Confederate States.” Well, in the first place, you cannot seize a vessel under the foreign enlistment act unless you have obtained evidence upon oath authorizing just suspicions. We did not obtain such evidence. @@ -22238,7 +22292,7 @@ archives of the republic.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -22266,7 +22320,7 @@ that that guaranty may prove a substantial and reliable one.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -22313,7 +22367,7 @@ on the bankers of the United States at London.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -22337,7 +22391,7 @@ Yorkshire.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -22345,7 +22399,7 @@ Resolutions at Bingley, England.

To Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States - of America :

+ of America:

Mr. President: It gives us great pleasure to inform you that at a public meeting held in the town of Bingley, in the county of York, in the north of England, on the seventeenth @@ -22372,8 +22426,9 @@ them to President Lincoln.

Signed on behalf of the meeting by the—

- REV. E. S. HERON, Independent Minister and - Chairman of the Meeting. + REV. E. S. HERON, + Independent Minister and Chairman of the + Meeting.

We are yours, faithfully, for the committee,

- JOHN BAILEY, Secretary. + JOHN BAILEY, + Secretary. Resolutions at Woolwich, England. @@ -22428,8 +22483,9 @@ confederates.”

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- R. PADGHAM, Hon’y Sec’y to the Woolwich - Emancipation Society pro. tem. + R. PADGHAM, + Hon’y Sec’y to the Woolwich Emancipation + Society pro. tem.

Hon. Charles Francis Adams, United States Minister in London.

@@ -22484,7 +22540,7 @@ comment. The disappointment of the contrivers here is extreme.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -22525,7 +22581,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -22567,7 +22624,7 @@ satisfy this government.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- THOMAS H. DUDLEY. + THOMAS H. DUDLEY.

Hon. Charles Francis Adams, United States Minister.

@@ -22592,7 +22649,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -22632,7 +22689,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL, + RUSSELL,

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -22694,7 +22751,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS. [Enclosures.]

1. Mr. Dudley to Mr. Adams, about the Alexandra, March 28, @@ -22758,7 +22816,8 @@

If you can do anything, well and good.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS. Lord Russell to @@ -22780,7 +22839,7 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, sir, your faithful servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -22820,7 +22879,7 @@ misconstruction, without any attempt to fortify it by argument.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -22861,7 +22920,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -23206,8 +23265,9 @@ when="1863-04-02" calendar="gregorian">this 2d day of April, 1863, before me, - JOHN PAYNE, Acting Commissioner, - &c. + JOHN PAYNE, + Acting Commissioner, + &c. A. Officers and crew of the steamer @@ -23328,8 +23388,9 @@ when="1863-04-02" calendar="gregorian">this 2d day of April, 1863, before me. - JOHN PAYNE, Acting Commissioner, - &c. + JOHN PAYNE, + Acting Commissioner, + &c.
@@ -23362,7 +23423,7 @@ their disappointment I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -23371,7 +23432,7 @@ The seizure of the Peterhoff.

The following reply has been received from the foreign office by the owner of one of the British vessels recently captured by the federal - cruisers :

+ cruisers:

Foreign Office, April 3, 1863.

@@ -23428,7 +23489,7 @@ herself to exercise.

I am, &c.,

- E. HAMMOND. + E. HAMMOND.

—— Gourlay, Esq., &c.

@@ -23528,7 +23589,7 @@ reached the proper departments of the government.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -23549,7 +23610,7 @@

Sir: I send by this steams copies of two notes written to-day. I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -23596,7 +23657,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

The Right Honorable Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -23623,7 +23685,7 @@ town.

Very respectfully, yours,

- E. HAMMOND. + E. HAMMOND.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -23654,7 +23716,7 @@ this as in other similar cases.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -23733,7 +23795,7 @@ thought I had been for that time deceived.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. [Enclosures.]

1. Mr. Adams to Lord Russell, with Mr. Yonge’s deposition, dated @@ -23775,7 +23837,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -23812,7 +23875,7 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -23848,7 +23911,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -23885,7 +23949,8 @@ proceedings may be taken under the foreign enlistment act.”

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Thos. H. Dudley, Esq., United States Consul, Liverpool.

@@ -23916,7 +23981,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -23956,7 +24022,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -23992,7 +24058,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24027,7 +24094,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24056,7 +24123,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -24128,7 +24195,7 @@ belligerent (as it was substantially urged by Mexico against the United States last year) “that there is evidence of a deliberate attempt to establish within the limits of this kingdom a system - of action in direct hostility to their government ;” but the + of action in direct hostility to their government;” but the question really is, has there been any act done in England both contrary to the obligations of neutrality as recognized by Great Britain and the United States, and capable of being made the @@ -24217,7 +24284,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24327,7 +24394,8 @@ prosecuting these investigations.

I pray your lordship, &c.,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24354,7 +24422,7 @@ of the 3d instant.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -24411,7 +24479,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24441,7 +24509,7 @@ in the matter.

I have the honor to be, &c, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24474,7 +24542,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24549,7 +24618,7 @@ the knowledge of her Majesty’s government.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24558,7 +24627,7 @@
- [Extracts ] + [Extracts] Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams. No. 547.] @@ -24591,7 +24660,7 @@ all-sufficient censure of public opinion throughout the world.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24612,8 +24681,8 @@

Sir: I have laid before the President your despatch of March 26, (No. 355,) which communicates the debate in the House of Lords on Lord Campbell’s question concerning recognition of the - insurgents; that of March .27, (No. 356,) which relates a long, free, - and friendly conversation had between yourself and Earl Russell on the + insurgents; that of March 27, (No. 356,) which relates a long, free, and + friendly conversation had between yourself and Earl Russell on the general subject of our relations with Great Britain; that of March 27, (No. 357,) which gives us the two notes which have passed between his lordship and yourself touching the fitting out of certain armed vessels @@ -24655,7 +24724,7 @@

* * * * * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24683,7 +24752,7 @@ channel. The attention of the fleet is now engaged upon this point.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24714,7 +24783,7 @@

A copy of Lord Russell’s acknowledgment is appended.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -24750,7 +24819,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c.

@@ -24778,7 +24848,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24806,7 +24876,7 @@

* * * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c.

@@ -24836,15 +24906,15 @@ northern citizens to free themselves from the shame and guilt of slavery.

- SAMUEL BARNES, Chairman. + SAMUEL BARNES, + Chairman. [Untitled]

At a large and enthusiastic meeting held in the assembly rooms of the Corn Exchange, Preston, on Tuesday, April 7, the following - resolutions were passed, with but two dissentients :

+ resolutions were passed, with but two dissentients:

1. That the southern States of America having revolted from the United States government for the avowed purpose of extending and perpetuating slavery, this meeting views such a design with the @@ -24870,10 +24940,10 @@ Adams, the United States minister in London, and to Lord Russell, her Majesty’s secretary for foreign affairs.

- JOHN HASLAM, Chairman.Preston, JOHN HASLAM, + Chairman.Preston, April 9, 1863. @@ -24912,7 +24982,7 @@ operations will more than compensate the loss.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant.

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -24949,7 +25019,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24977,7 +25048,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25008,7 +25079,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25051,7 +25122,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25081,7 +25153,7 @@ send herewith. I add also a copy of his reply.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -25136,7 +25208,8 @@ attached by me to the rumor:

I pray your lordship to accept, &c.,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25158,7 +25231,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25188,7 +25261,7 @@ have been sent to you by Mr. Dudley, tell the whole story.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. W. H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -25225,7 +25298,8 @@ gun and four smaller ones, and is expected to return to her.

I pray your lordship to accept, &c.,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c.

@@ -25281,7 +25355,7 @@ taken to prevent any violation of the law.

I have the honor to be, &c., &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25318,7 +25392,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant.

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25356,7 +25431,7 @@ place.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25392,7 +25467,7 @@ embroil friendly States in the calamities of war.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25416,7 +25491,7 @@ approval of your own course in the matter.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25441,7 +25516,7 @@ submitted to the Secretary of the Navy.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25502,7 +25577,7 @@ other result of their present recklessness than absolute ruin.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -25525,7 +25600,7 @@ April. * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -25550,7 +25625,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant.

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq.

 @@ -25575,7 +25650,7 @@

I append a copy of my reply.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -25626,7 +25701,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25669,7 +25744,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell.

 @@ -25697,7 +25773,7 @@ after she was gone.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -25729,9 +25805,9 @@ anchorage early on the morning of the 2d instant with the ostensible purpose of trying her engines, intending to return, having on board several joiners, who were filling up her cabins. These men, who are - said to have been employed at a later time in filling up .a - magazine, were subsequently landed on some part of the coast lower - down the Clyde. 115 gals, spirits. 115 gals, spirits. 32 gals, wine 244 lbs. tea. 159 lbs. coffee. 212 lbs. tobacco. 10 @@ -25749,7 +25825,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq.

 @@ -25774,7 +25850,7 @@ which have passed on the subject.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -25821,7 +25897,7 @@

I have the honor to be. with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq.

 @@ -25877,7 +25953,8 @@ attention.

I pray your lordship to accept the assurances, &c., &c.,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell.

 @@ -25905,7 +25982,7 @@ President.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD + WILLIAM H. SEWARD

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25933,7 +26010,7 @@ his lordship are approved.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25988,7 +26065,7 @@ Woolwich, in Kent, and Bingley, in Yorkshire.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -26018,7 +26095,7 @@ perusal of Earl Russell.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -26033,7 +26110,7 @@ April 25, 1863.

To the citizens of London who were - convened in Exeter Hall on the 29th of January last :

+ convened in Exeter Hall on the 29th of January last:

The proceedings of a meeting of British subjects, citizens of London, in Exeter Hall, on the 29th of January last, which were transmitted to the undersigned, have, in compliance with a request contained @@ -26085,7 +26162,7 @@ Britain.

I have the honor to be your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -26167,7 +26244,8 @@ the courts.

I have, &c.,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell.

 @@ -26213,7 +26291,8 @@ the 20th instant.

Yours truly,

- DUNCAN, SQUAREY & BLACKMORE + DUNCAN, SQUAREY & + BLACKMORE

H. Welding, Esq., Vice-Consul U. S. A., Liverpool.

@@ -26285,7 +26364,8 @@ once come to town.

Yours, very truly,

- A. F. SQUAREY. + A. F. + SQUAREY.

F. J. Hamel, Esq., Solicitor to the Board of Customs, @@ -26323,7 +26403,7 @@ for publication, are now transmitted.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -26356,7 +26436,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq.

 @@ -26493,7 +26573,7 @@ subjects of a country to leave the territory, it was perfectly legitimate for another country to invite them to leave it, for the purpose of entering into its service. I quote the language of his - despatch to Mr. Crampton of the 16th November, 1855 :

+ despatch to Mr. Crampton of the 16th November, 1855:

“It is of course competent to any nation to enact a municipal law, such as actually exists in many countries, forbidding its subjects to leave its territory; but in such cases ‘civitas @@ -26537,7 +26617,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -26558,7 +26639,7 @@ shillings---------pence, provided the said Edward Davis shall sail in the said ship from the said river Clyde.

- JONES & CO. + JONES & CO.

Payable at 28 Chapel street.

 @@ -26661,7 +26742,7 @@

A copy of that note is herewith transmitted.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -26692,7 +26773,8 @@ circumstances fully set forth in the memorial itself.

Renewing, &c., &c.,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c.

@@ -26721,7 +26803,7 @@ forwarded.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -26756,7 +26838,8 @@ copy of which is likewise submitted, is now in my hands.

I pray, &c.,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c.

@@ -26781,8 +26864,8 @@ this city,

Very truly and respectfully, yours,

- WILLIAM H. ASPINWALL, Edwards’s - Hotel. + WILLIAM H. ASPINWALL, + Edwards’s Hotel.

His Excellency C. F. Adams, &c.

@@ -26806,7 +26889,8 @@ and Scotland.

Truly, yours,

- McANDREW & WANN. + McANDREW & + WANN.

James Henry, Esq., London.

@@ -26840,7 +26924,7 @@ our government as its cause or stimulant.

Very truly, yours,

- J. M. FORBES. + J. M. FORBES.

His Excellency Charles Francis Adams, &c., &c.

@@ -26867,7 +26951,7 @@ herewith transmitted.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -26917,7 +27001,8 @@ protraction of the struggle.

Renewing, &c.,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c.

@@ -26947,7 +27032,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -26983,7 +27068,7 @@ of the river will avail to defeat these machinations.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -27011,7 +27096,7 @@ similar transactions in future.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -27041,7 +27126,7 @@ deprives of his wise counsels and great administrative services.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -27078,7 +27163,7 @@ citizens of Leicester, Preston, and Coventry.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -27104,7 +27189,7 @@ kingdom, is entirely satisfactory to the President.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -27135,7 +27220,7 @@ advancing prosperously.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -27162,7 +27247,7 @@ person, ever come to the knowledge of the government.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -27186,7 +27271,7 @@ and is approved.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -27212,7 +27297,7 @@ will be conceded by her Majesty’s government.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -27259,7 +27344,7 @@

* * * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -27585,9 +27670,10 @@ north itself are believed to sympathize with the confederates. We are of opinion that feelings of this kind have entered into that complication of causes which has produced the war; but - what, upon this assumption, must be our necessary conclusion? We must conclude, perforce, that unmodified democracy can - provoke revolt as surely as the most oppressive despotism. We - must. admit that people can be roused to fight against such + what, upon this assumption, must be our necessary conclusion? We + must conclude, perforce, that unmodified democracy can provoke + revolt as surely as the most oppressive despotism. We must. + admit that people can be roused to fight against such institutions as those of the United States with as much desperation as has ever been witnessed in a struggle for political emancipation. The Poles @@ -27734,17 +27820,18 @@ pioneers of human progress, the champions of universal liberty.

- JOHN BRIGHT, Chairman. + JOHN BRIGHT, + Chairman. - WILLIAM CREMER, Secretary. + WILLIAM CREMER, + Secretary.
- [Extracts ] + [Extracts] Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward. No. 406.] @@ -27763,7 +27850,7 @@ foreign office.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c.

@@ -27816,7 +27903,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c.

@@ -27850,7 +27937,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c.

@@ -27877,7 +27965,7 @@ the 30th of April, relating to that subject.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -27904,7 +27992,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c.

@@ -27933,7 +28021,7 @@

A copy of that note is herewith transmitted.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -27966,7 +28054,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -27999,7 +28088,7 @@ instant, in a note a copy of which is herewith transmitted.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -28035,7 +28124,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c.

@@ -28062,7 +28151,7 @@ which is transmitted herewith.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c.

@@ -28084,7 +28173,7 @@ the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq.

 @@ -28130,7 +28219,7 @@ every artificial assistance.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -28169,7 +28258,7 @@ overcome even this embarrassment.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -28243,7 +28332,7 @@ industry in some respects to the altered condition of affairs.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -28270,7 +28359,7 @@ subject.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -28295,7 +28384,7 @@ correspondence.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -28325,7 +28414,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c.

@@ -28351,7 +28440,7 @@ DuPont.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -28379,7 +28468,7 @@ correspondence are approved.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -28405,7 +28494,7 @@ it is approved.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -28431,7 +28520,7 @@ vessels, to put a stop to the British trade to Matamoras altogether.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -28483,7 +28572,7 @@ greater.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -28523,7 +28612,7 @@ directness and earnestness.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -28554,7 +28643,7 @@ your later despatch No. 577, is now in process of transmission.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -28604,8 +28693,8 @@ affairs, and to the Honorable Charles Francis Adams, representative of the American government in this country.

- WILLIAM FOX CLARK, Lord - Mayor. + WILLIAM FOX CLARK, + Lord Mayor.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -28663,7 +28752,7 @@ responsibilities of its defence are confided.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -28695,7 +28784,7 @@ have received from Lord Russell.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -28717,7 +28806,8 @@ the attention of her Majesty’s government.

I pray, &c., &c.,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c.

@@ -28779,8 +28869,9 @@ Lancaster, the 14th day of May, 1863, before me. - ARTHUR ELLIS, a Commissioner, - &c. + ARTHUR ELLIS, + a Commissioner, + &c. Deposition of William Cozzens. @@ -28828,8 +28919,9 @@ Lancaster, the 14th day of May, 1863, before me. - ARTHUR ELLIS, Commissioner, - &c. + ARTHUR ELLIS, + Commissioner, + &c. @@ -28851,7 +28943,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -28874,7 +28966,8 @@ the steamer Phantom.

I pray your lordship, &c.,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c.

@@ -28925,8 +29018,9 @@ Lancaster, the 16th day of May, 1863, before me. - ARTHUR ELLIS, a Commissioner, - &c. + ARTHUR ELLIS, + a Commissioner, + &c. @@ -28946,7 +29040,7 @@ of her Majesty’s government.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -28970,7 +29064,8 @@ progress for the expediting of the Sumter from that port.

I pray your lordship, &c.,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c.

@@ -29003,9 +29098,10 @@ Lancaster, this 20th day of May, 1863, before me. - JAMES THORNELY, A Commissioner for - taking Affidavits in the Court of Exchequer at - Westminster. + JAMES THORNELY, + A Commissioner for taking Affidavits in + the Court of Exchequer at + Westminster. @@ -29025,7 +29121,7 @@ government.

I have the honor, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c.

@@ -29076,7 +29172,7 @@ would shake her to pieces.

I have the honor, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c.

@@ -29121,7 +29217,7 @@ intended to refit her as a vessel-of-war.

I have the honor, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c.

@@ -29149,7 +29245,8 @@ meet with the same fate.

I pray, &c.,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c.

@@ -29188,7 +29285,7 @@ to be a privateer.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- THOMAS H. DUDLEY. + THOMAS H. DUDLEY.

Hon. Charles Francis Adams, United States Minister,

@@ -29196,7 +29293,7 @@ Deposition of Henry Redden.

I, Henry Redden, of 16 Hook street, in Liverpool, mariner, do - solemnly declare and say as follows :

+ solemnly declare and say as follows:

I know the steamer Phantom, lately built by Messrs. W. C. Miller & Sons, at Liverpool. Said vessel went on a trial trip on Tuesday evening last, the 26th instant, and returned @@ -29227,8 +29324,9 @@ the 28th of May, 1863, before me. - J. PEARSON, a Commissioner, - &c. + J. PEARSON, + a Commissioner, + &c. Deposition of Matthew @@ -29254,8 +29352,9 @@ when="1863-05-28" calendar="gregorian">28th May, 1863, before me. - HENRY DUNCAN, a Commissioner, - &c. + HENRY DUNCAN, + a Commissioner, + &c. @@ -29273,7 +29372,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -29301,7 +29400,7 @@ to that steam vessel.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -29336,7 +29435,8 @@ escape of such a vessel.

I pray your lordship to accept, &c.,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell.

 @@ -29488,7 +29588,8 @@ solemn declaration, conscientiously believing the same to be true, &c., &c.

- J. BAXTER LANGLEY. + J. BAXTER LANGLEY. + Subscribed and declared at Stockholm, in the county of Durham, Deposition of Wm. M. Blakiston.

I, William Milburn Blakiston, of Middleboro’, engineer, do - hereby solemnly declare and affirm as follows :

+ hereby solemnly declare and affirm as follows:

That is to say, that I have passed frequently up and down the river Tees, in passenger boats running between Stockton and Middleboro’, and observed the building and fitting out of a @@ -29582,8 +29683,9 @@ &c., June 2, 1863, before me - J. DODDS, Commissioner, - &c. + J. DODDS, + Commissioner, + &c. @@ -29606,7 +29708,7 @@ forth in your letter.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c.

@@ -29637,7 +29739,8 @@ the character of that vessel on the high seas.

I pray, &c., &c.,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c.

@@ -29672,8 +29775,9 @@ when="1863-06-01" calendar="gregorian">the 1st day of June, 1863, before me - I. PEARSON, A Commissioner, - &c. + I. PEARSON, + A Commissioner, + &c. Deposition of John Markham. @@ -29696,8 +29800,9 @@ when="1863-06-02" calendar="gregorian">the 1st day of June, 1863, before - I. PEARSON, A Commissioner, - &c. + I. PEARSON, + A Commissioner, + &c. @@ -29728,7 +29833,7 @@ over which he presides.

I have the honor, &c., &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charges Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c.

@@ -29754,7 +29859,7 @@ forth in your letter.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c.

@@ -29790,7 +29895,7 @@ support.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -29825,7 +29930,7 @@ error referred to than you have done.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -29851,7 +29956,7 @@ acknowledgment of the resolutions on his behalf.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -29954,7 +30059,7 @@ use of all the means at its command, I do not for a moment doubt.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -30003,31 +30108,34 @@ sovereign, be any more tolerant of opposition from strangers in Europe than they now are of resistance by their own brethren in America? Would they enter into treaties with Great Britain to suppress the piracy, on - the continuance of which they must depend for their very existence? Would they recognize and execute the treaties to that effect which we have made for them? Certainly not. What, then, would be before the world as the first fruit + the continuance of which they must depend for their very existence? + Would they recognize and execute the treaties to that effect which we have made for them? + Certainly not. What, then, would be before the world as the first fruit of the sovereignty of the insurgents? The restoration of the African slave trade. Where would the wicked and devastating traffic end? Would - it be confined within the insurgent States? Would it turn aside from - the shores of the gulf? Would it brook opposition in the British islands? If this danger seem imaginary, it can seem so only because, - notwithstanding all the favor the insurgents are receiving in Europe, - the maritime powers on that continent expect, and justly expect, that - the United States will suppress the insurrection and maintain the - federal Union. But those powers and all other existing powers have the - same motives as the United States for preventing the renewal of the - African slave trade. The conjuncture is favorable. If it were either - liberal or just for other nations to increase the difficulties and - embarrassments of the United States, would such a course be wise? The - President has observed with much satisfaction that the anti-slave trade - conventions which we have recently entered into with Great Britain have - elicited ready approbation in the British legislature. This circumstance - has suggested the thought that British statesmen might not be now - altogether unprepared or unwilling to look at the possible tendency, - which I have indicated, of the very injurious naval preparations which - are going on in Great Britain with a design to overthrow the government - of the United States.

+ it be confined within the insurgent States? Would it turn aside from the + shores of the gulf? Would it brook opposition in the British islands? If + this danger seem imaginary, it can seem so only because, notwithstanding + all the favor the insurgents are receiving in Europe, the maritime + powers on that continent expect, and justly expect, that the United + States will suppress the insurrection and maintain the federal Union. + But those powers and all other existing powers have the same motives as + the United States for preventing the renewal of the African slave trade. + The conjuncture is favorable. If it were either liberal or just for + other nations to increase the difficulties and embarrassments of the + United States, would such a course be wise? The President has observed + with much satisfaction that the anti-slave trade conventions which we + have recently entered into with Great Britain have elicited ready + approbation in the British legislature. This circumstance has suggested + the thought that British statesmen might not be now altogether + unprepared or unwilling to look at the possible tendency, which I have + indicated, of the very injurious naval preparations which are going on + in Great Britain with a design to overthrow the government of the United + States.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -30058,7 +30166,7 @@ you most appropriate.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -30086,7 +30194,7 @@ cause it to disappear.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -30110,7 +30218,7 @@ read here with much satisfaction.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -30167,7 +30275,7 @@ considerably.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -30205,7 +30313,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq.

 @@ -30237,7 +30345,7 @@ comity, in the execution of its conceded rights.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -30271,7 +30379,7 @@ satisfactorily ascertained.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -30338,7 +30446,7 @@ permanent good understanding between the two nations.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -30462,7 +30570,7 @@ by the Irish members.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant.

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -32179,7 +32287,7 @@ they have thus far been unfruitful of any important results.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -32212,7 +32320,7 @@ authorized to take that course.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -32238,7 +32346,7 @@

* * * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -32268,7 +32376,7 @@ issued at Manchester, by way of challenge to such proceedings.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -32289,8 +32397,9 @@ hopes that the UNION may be firmly established by the total overthrow of negro slavery.

- JAMES JONES, Secretary, of Tanyvron, - Barmouthy Merionethshire + JAMES JONES, + Secretary, of Tanyvron, Barmouthy + Merionethshire

Hon. Charles Francis Adams, Minister to the United States.

@@ -32380,7 +32489,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c.

@@ -32419,7 +32528,7 @@ merely on that account.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -32484,7 +32593,7 @@ cheering aspect of the national cause.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq.,&c.,&c.,&c.

@@ -32547,7 +32656,7 @@ malevolence.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c.

@@ -32609,7 +32718,7 @@ fully as I can, to carry out the spirit of my instructions.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -32649,8 +32758,9 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- HENRY K. THATCHER, Commodore United Stales - Navy. + HENRY K. THATCHER, + Commodore United Stales + Navy.

Hon. Charles Francis Adams, United States Minister to the Court of St. @@ -32705,7 +32815,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq.

 @@ -32907,7 +33017,7 @@ military strength can hardly be deemed permanently formidable.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -32943,7 +33053,7 @@ seem most likely to compass the object desired.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -32966,7 +33076,7 @@ approved.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -32996,7 +33106,7 @@ adopt any measure in regard to it.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -33049,7 +33159,7 @@ much regret.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -33072,7 +33182,7 @@ Lee is retiring from the Potomac. The movement at Charleston has begun favorably.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -33107,7 +33217,7 @@ week.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -33152,7 +33262,7 @@ leanings of the higher classes.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -33291,7 +33401,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be your lordship’s obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c.

@@ -33317,7 +33428,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c.

@@ -33349,7 +33460,7 @@ answer of the 13th instant, are herewith transmitted.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -33398,7 +33509,8 @@ possibility of receiving instructions respecting it.

I pray your lordship, &c.,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c.

@@ -33430,7 +33542,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c. &c., &c.

@@ -33471,7 +33583,7 @@ Majesty’s government and that of France.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -33517,7 +33629,7 @@ motion of Mr. Roebuck.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -33547,7 +33659,7 @@ his grateful acknowledgment and appreciation.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD + WILLIAM H. SEWARD

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -33571,7 +33683,7 @@ the comment which the despatch would otherwise elicit.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -33595,7 +33707,7 @@ received.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -33663,7 +33775,7 @@ it.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -33691,7 +33803,7 @@ attended with the most serious consequences.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c.

@@ -33714,7 +33826,8 @@ the port; of Liverpool.

I pray your lordship to accept the assurances, &c., &c.

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c.

@@ -33743,7 +33856,7 @@ vessels.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- THOMAS H. DUDLEY. + THOMAS H. DUDLEY.

S. Price Edwards, Esq., Collector at Liverpool.

@@ -33773,7 +33886,7 @@ Lancaster, this 11th day of July, 1863, before me. - S. PRICE EDWARDS. + S. PRICE EDWARDS. @@ -33805,7 +33918,8 @@ when="1863-07-15" calendar="gregorian">this 15th day of July, 1863. - SAM. PRICE EDWARDS. + SAM. PRICE + EDWARDS.
@@ -33831,7 +33945,7 @@ strongly towards alienation and war.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -33858,7 +33972,7 @@ until they shall have attained a practical result.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -33890,7 +34004,7 @@ history.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -33916,7 +34030,7 @@ impropriety in it, to forward it to its address.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -33962,7 +34076,7 @@ exclusive foundations of African slavery.

I have the honor to be, sir, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Thomas Bayley Potter, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -34011,7 +34125,7 @@ make its contents known to Earl Russell.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -34036,7 +34150,7 @@ Virginia, as soon as it shall have been received.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -34232,18 +34346,18 @@ strong enough to garrison the American continent? Will they ever be prepared to guarantee the new slave State, and to hold its ambition for territory and its cupidity for slaves within bounds? And what are the - bounds to be prescribed? Shall that new slave State be allowed to - extend slavery and dominion only throughout the present territory of the - United States, or are the anomalous and hateful institutions to be - restored in Mexico and throughout Spanish America, including the West - India islands? It has required a term of fifty years and the - co-operating power of the United States to arrest the African slave - trade. How do the supposed allies now expect to prevent its renewal when - the United States shall have relapsed into accompliceship with that dreadful traffic? Or is the - arrested work of Christianizing Africa, through the missionary enginery - of the Middle Passage, to be renewed and carried on to its consummation - under the auspices of the supposed allies ?

+ bounds to be prescribed? Shall that new slave State be allowed to extend + slavery and dominion only throughout the present territory of the United + States, or are the anomalous and hateful institutions to be restored in + Mexico and throughout Spanish America, including the West India islands? + It has required a term of fifty years and the co-operating power of the + United States to arrest the African slave trade. How do the supposed + allies now expect to prevent its renewal when the United States shall + have relapsed into accompliceship with that dreadful traffic? Or is the arrested work of + Christianizing Africa, through the missionary enginery of the Middle + Passage, to be renewed and carried on to its consummation under the + auspices of the supposed allies?

Prudent states, even though strong in mutual alliance, must, nevertheless, always take into consideration all the chances of success and failure. Let us suppose, then, that the allies shall not succeed in @@ -34251,10 +34365,10 @@ the contest. Would there be nothing to apprehend from the temper of a people who had been, as it would then seem, wantonly brought into national conflict on no other pretext than their unwillingness to - surrender up their sovereignty and independence? Is there any - possession or any interest of France or of Great Britain, domestic or - colonial, that would be the better assured to its lawful sovereign after - such a war, than it has been heretofore assured, through the justice and + surrender up their sovereignty and independence? Is there any possession + or any interest of France or of Great Britain, domestic or colonial, + that would be the better assured to its lawful sovereign after such a + war, than it has been heretofore assured, through the justice and forbearance of the United States, so long as they had consituted a nation?

There is, moreover, a moral opinion that pervades the world, and when it @@ -34332,7 +34446,7 @@ thus discussed.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -34366,7 +34480,7 @@ guarded as usual.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -34416,7 +34530,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -34441,7 +34555,7 @@ collector.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- THOMAS H. DUDLEY. + THOMAS H. DUDLEY.

Hon. Charles Francis Adams, United States Minister, &c., @@ -34472,7 +34586,7 @@ Dated July 7, 1863. - T. H. DUDLEY. + T. H. DUDLEY.

Samuel Price Edwards, Collector of Customs, Liverpool.

@@ -34484,7 +34598,7 @@ the United States of America, master mariner, now at Liverpool, in the county of Lancaster, in England, and Joseph Ellis, of No. 161 Athol street, in Liverpool aforesaid, master shipwright, make oath - and say as follows :

+ and say as follows:

1. I, the said William Hayden Russell, for myself say, I have been in command of American merchant vessels for the last thirty years, and for the last eighteen years I have commanded packet ships trading @@ -34550,8 +34664,8 @@ Lancaster, the 7th day of July, 1863, before me. - S. PRICE EDWARDS, Collector, - Liverpool. + S. PRICE EDWARDS, + Collector, Liverpool. Deposition of Clarence R. Yonge. @@ -34694,7 +34808,7 @@ calendar="gregorian">this 6th day of April, 1863. - S. PRICE EDWARDS. + S. PRICE EDWARDS. Deposition of George T. Chapman. @@ -34832,14 +34946,15 @@ and commit hostilities against the government and citizens of the United States of America.

- THOMAS H. DUDLEY. + THOMAS H. DUDLEY. + Affirmed before me, at the custom-house, Liverpool, in the county of Lancaster, the 7th day of July, 1863. - S. PRICE EDWARDS, Collector. + S. PRICE EDWARDS, + Collector. @@ -34863,7 +34978,8 @@ to show clearly the precise nature of the pretence.

I pray your lordship, &c.,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell.

 @@ -34916,8 +35032,8 @@ intended.

Very respectfully, I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- HY. WILDING, Vice-Consul. + HY. WILDING, + Vice-Consul.

His Excellency Charles Francis Adams, &c., &c., @@ -34949,7 +35065,7 @@ suggested.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -34978,8 +35094,8 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I am, sir, with much respect, your most obedient servant,

- W. C. J. HYLAND, Vice-Consul. + W. C. J. HYLAND, + Vice-Consul.

The Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -35010,7 +35126,7 @@ good offices in bringing it before her Majesty’s government.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -35063,7 +35179,7 @@ easy reach, with the aid of railway and telegraph.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -35085,7 +35201,7 @@ to the steam-rams are approved.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -35576,7 +35692,7 @@ States.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c:

@@ -35605,7 +35721,7 @@ discretion concerning the matter.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -35654,7 +35770,7 @@ Dayton, which came enclosed with it.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -35730,7 +35846,7 @@ from the rebels all their remaining chances of escape.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -35771,7 +35887,7 @@ Department may generally depend upon their information.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -35795,7 +35911,7 @@ Liverpool, by Mr. Laird, for the use of the rebels.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -35828,7 +35944,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c.

@@ -35864,7 +35980,8 @@

I pray your lordship to receive the assurances of the high consideration with which I am your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c.

@@ -35917,7 +36034,7 @@ is to be launched on the 15th instant, to-morrow week.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- THOMAS H. DUDLEY. + THOMAS H. DUDLEY.

Charles F. Adams, Esq. United States Minister.

@@ -35948,8 +36065,9 @@ States.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- THOMAS H. DUDLEY, United States - Consul. + THOMAS H. DUDLEY, + United States + Consul.

S. Price Edwards, Esq., Collector at Liverpool.

@@ -36007,8 +36125,9 @@ when="1863-08-11" calendar="gregorian">this 11th day of August, 1863. - W. G. STEWART, Deputy Assistant - Collector. + W. G. STEWART, + Deputy Assistant + Collector. No. 6. @@ -36031,7 +36150,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- A. H. LAYARD. + A. H. LAYARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -36070,7 +36189,7 @@ on the offensive.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS,

Hon. Wm. H. Seward,, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -36116,10 +36235,11 @@ energy, integrity, and wisdom.”

Moved by Mr. Thomas H. Barker; seconded by Mr. J. R. Cooper.

- JOHN C. EDWARDS, - - EDWARD OWEN GREENING, Hon. - Sec’s. + + JOHN C. EDWARDS, + EDWARD OWEN GREENING, + Hon. Sec’s. +

Offices of the Union and Emancipation Society, 51 Piccadilly, @@ -36146,7 +36266,7 @@ Dudley.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -36183,7 +36303,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Chas. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -36210,7 +36330,7 @@ lordship’s reply.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -36248,7 +36368,8 @@ Majesty’s government.

I pray your lordship’s acceptance, &c.

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -36272,7 +36393,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -36306,8 +36427,8 @@ you.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- F. W. SEWARD, Acting - Secretary. + F. W. SEWARD, + Acting Secretary.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -36336,7 +36457,7 @@ bombardment has taken place accordingly.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -36389,7 +36510,7 @@ pleasing delusion.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -36415,13 +36536,13 @@ answered the purpose.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward. Secretary of State, &c.

 -

[Enclosure ]

+

[Enclosure]

Mr. Adams to Lord Russell about French mediation, August 22, 1863.

@@ -36460,7 +36581,8 @@ highest consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant.

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -36503,7 +36625,7 @@ immoderately.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -36534,7 +36656,7 @@ signal a service.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -36573,7 +36695,7 @@ herewith transmitted. I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -36620,7 +36742,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c.

@@ -36652,7 +36775,7 @@ the United States of America, with which government her Majesty the Queen is not now at war.

- THOMAS H. DUDLEY. + THOMAS H. DUDLEY.

Samuel Price Edwards, Collector of the Customs, Liverpool.

@@ -36733,13 +36856,13 @@ Lancaster, the 1st day of September, 1863, before me. - W. G. STEWART, Assistant - Collector, + W. G. STEWART, + Assistant Collector, Deposition of Joseph Ellis.

I, Joseph Ellis, of No. 161 Athol street, in Liverpool, in the county - of Lancaster, shipwright, make oath and say, as follows :

+ of Lancaster, shipwright, make oath and say, as follows:

1. I am well acquainted with the construction of iron-plated vessels-of-war, having assisted to build vessels of that description.

@@ -36809,15 +36932,15 @@ Lancaster, the 1st day of September, 1863, before me. - W. G. STEWART, Assistant - Collector. + W. G. STEWART, + Assistant Collector. Affidavit of Charles Prentis.

I, Charles Prentis, of New London, Connecticut, at present in Liverpool, formerly a master mariner, and now a merchant, in - business at New London, aforesaid, make oath and say, as follows - :

+ business at New London, aforesaid, make oath and say, as + follows:

1. I was formerly, for ten years, master of merchant vessels, and also of whaling vessels, and I have seen and examined many vessels-of-war, both of wood and iron. I have also examined the @@ -36852,8 +36975,8 @@ Liverpool, in the county of Lancaster, this 29th day of August, 1863, before me. - W. G. STEWART, Assistant - Collector. + W. G. STEWART, + Assistant Collector.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -36900,7 +37023,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -36933,7 +37056,7 @@ have fallen on the feeblest policy.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -36959,7 +37082,8 @@ to accept the assurances of the highest consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c.

@@ -36985,7 +37109,7 @@ detained.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- THOMAS H. DUDLEY. + THOMAS H. DUDLEY.

S. Price Edwards, Esq., Collector.

@@ -37014,7 +37138,8 @@ vessel in question.

We are, sir, your obedient servants,

- DUNCAN, SQUAREY & BLACKMORE. + DUNCAN, SQUAREY & + BLACKMORE.

S. Price Edwards, Esq., Collector of Customs, Liverpool.

@@ -37055,8 +37180,9 @@ Lancaster, the 2d day of September, 1863, before me. - W. G. STEWART, Assistant - Collector. + W. G. STEWART, + Assistant + Collector.
@@ -37080,7 +37206,7 @@

* * * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -37155,7 +37281,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -37181,7 +37307,7 @@ ordinary mail.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -37203,7 +37329,7 @@

I beg you to accept the assurances of the highest consideration with which I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c.

@@ -37231,7 +37357,7 @@ feelings of that respected association towards the United States.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -37257,7 +37383,7 @@ note will be placed on the files of this department.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -37290,7 +37416,7 @@ Great Britain.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -37357,7 +37483,7 @@ hands that will render peace impossible.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -37391,7 +37517,7 @@ armies are now being effectually augmented.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -37449,7 +37575,7 @@ treatment of the subject in America.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -37519,7 +37645,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Honorable Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -37542,7 +37669,8 @@ government.

I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHAELES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHAELES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

The Right Honorable Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -37616,7 +37744,7 @@ proposed in the interest of all the western powers.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -37639,7 +37767,7 @@ propriety and success the instruction therein mentioned.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -37708,7 +37836,7 @@ later reports.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -37736,7 +37864,7 @@ government.

I am, sir your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -37790,7 +37918,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward. Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -37981,7 +38109,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c.

@@ -38297,7 +38425,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c.

@@ -38325,7 +38454,7 @@ July.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C

@@ -38361,7 +38490,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -38388,7 +38517,7 @@ of furnishing me with new instructions.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -38432,7 +38561,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL. Mr. John Laird to

I am, &c.,

- JOHN LAIRD. + JOHN LAIRD. @@ -38492,7 +38621,8 @@ credence in any relating to his own.

I pray, &c,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -38537,7 +38667,7 @@ Russell, a copy of which you have transmitted.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -38563,7 +38693,7 @@ distinctly and unreservedly approved.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -38594,7 +38724,7 @@ telegraph.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -38623,7 +38753,7 @@ adopted in regard to the others.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -38656,7 +38786,7 @@ Georgia and. Alabama. Charleston is not neglected.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -38668,7 +38798,7 @@ frus:doc-dateTime-max="1863-09-28T23:59:59-05:00"> Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams. - No. 725 ] + No. 725] Department of State, Washington, @@ -38700,7 +38830,7 @@ neither nation any permanent cause of discontent.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -38734,7 +38864,7 @@ suit you to adopt.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. Lord Russell to Mr. Adams. @@ -38773,7 +38903,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -38828,7 +38958,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -38865,7 +38996,7 @@ your instructions before making a reply.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c.

@@ -38896,7 +39027,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -39106,8 +39238,9 @@ which Captain Semmes himself declined to take.

I have the honor, &c.,

- WALTER GRAHAM, United States - Consul. + WALTER GRAHAM, + United States + Consul. [Enclosure.] @@ -39140,7 +39273,7 @@ o’clock. He and his crew were immediately taken from his vessel and placed as prisoners on board the Alabama; the officers and crew put in irons. The position of the bark at - the time of capture was as follows :

+ the time of capture was as follows:

Green Point light-house bearing S. by E.

Robbin Island light-house bearing NE.

The said appearer did further protest against the illegal @@ -39288,7 +39421,7 @@ Consul.

His Excellency Philip E. Woodhouse.

-

On the same day I received the following :

+

On the same day I received the following:

Colonial Office, August 10, 1863.

Sir: I am directed by the governor @@ -39395,7 +39528,7 @@ right to hold them in British ports. Now, if he could not hold them in Simon’s bay, who else could hold them except those whose right to hold them was antecedent to his—that - is, the owners ?

+ is, the owners?

The Tuscaloosa remained in Simon’s bay seven days, with her original cargo of skins and wool on board. This cargo, I am informed by those who claimed to * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

- WALTER GRAHAM, U. S. - Consul. + WALTER GRAHAM, + U. S. Consul.

Hon. Charles Francis Adams,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -39605,7 +39738,7 @@ authorized to use them as you may think proper.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -39727,7 +39860,7 @@ a suitable occasion shall hereafter occur for renewing and urging prosecution of the claims, I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -39766,7 +39899,7 @@ whom they are made.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -39811,7 +39944,7 @@ have your excellency’s early and considerate attention.

I have, &c., &c.,

- HENRY WISE. + HENRY WISE.

Hon. William Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -39841,7 +39974,7 @@ a citizen of the United States.

I am, sir, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. William Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -39874,7 +40007,7 @@

I am, with great truth and esteem, my dear sir, your faithful servant,

- W. STUART. + W. STUART.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -39917,7 +40050,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you the assurance of my highest consideration.

- W. STUART. + W. STUART.

Hon. W. H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -40202,7 +40335,7 @@ hundred and sixty-two.

In premissorem fidem.

- CHARLES EDWARDS. + CHARLES EDWARDS.

Robert Hepburn,

George C. Mitchell,

@@ -40242,7 +40375,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you the assurance of my highest consideration,

- W. STUART. + W. STUART.

Hon. William H. Seward.

 @@ -40286,7 +40419,7 @@ seals.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy.

@@ -40312,7 +40445,7 @@ of the capturing vessels.

I have the honor to be, sir, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. William Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -40342,7 +40475,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. William Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -40374,7 +40507,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you the assurances of my highest consideration.

- W. STUART. + W. STUART.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, &c., &c.

@@ -40469,31 +40602,34 @@ eight hundred and sixty-two.

In pramissorem fidem.

- CHARLES EDWARDS. + CHARLES EDWARDS. - JOHN KIDD. + JOHN KIDD. - WILLIAM CALDWELL. + WILLIAM CALDWELL. - his + his - GEORGE + GREGG. + GEORGE + GREGG. - mark. + mark. - his + his - JOHN + McCLELLAND. + JOHN + McCLELLAND. - mark. + mark. - JAMES FRASER. + JAMES FRASER. - his + his - FRANCIS + PATTEN. + FRANCIS + PATTEN. - mark. + mark.
I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. William Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -40580,7 +40716,7 @@

I have the honour to be, with high consideration, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. William Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -40610,8 +40746,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- L. O. TURNER, Judge - Advocate. + L. O. TURNER, + Judge Advocate.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -40639,8 +40775,8 @@ or deed, to aid and encourage the rebels or the rebellion. By order of the Secretary of War:

- L. C. TURNER, Judge - Advocate. + L. C. TURNER, + Judge Advocate.

Colonel Martin Burke, Commanding at Fort Lafayette.

@@ -40686,7 +40822,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. William H. Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -40711,7 +40847,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &., &c.

@@ -40740,7 +40876,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, my lord, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -40778,7 +40914,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -40856,7 +40992,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. W. H. Seward, &c., &c.

@@ -40888,7 +41024,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -40930,7 +41066,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. W. H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -40973,7 +41109,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s humble servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -40998,7 +41134,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -41021,8 +41157,8 @@ statements, are herewith transmitted.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the - Navy. + GIDEON WELLES, + Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -41067,8 +41203,8 @@

Sir, I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JAS. F. ARMSTRONG, Commander, - commanding. + JAS. F. ARMSTRONG, + Commander, commanding.

Hon. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.

@@ -41090,8 +41226,8 @@ ten days, and I was four days and a half in making the passage.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FOLSOM, Acting - Master. + CHARLES FOLSOM, + Acting Master.

Commander James F. Armstrong, Commanding U. S. Steamer State of Georgia, @@ -41113,8 +41249,8 @@ circumstances attending her running the blockade.

Very respectfully,

- JAMES F. ARMSTRONG, Commander, - commanding. + JAMES F. ARMSTRONG, + Commander, commanding.

Lieutenant Commander H. N. T. Arnold, Commanding United States Steamer @@ -41153,14 +41289,15 @@ endeavoring to run the blockade.

Very respectfully, your obedient servants,

- H. N. T. ARNOLD, Lieutenant - Commander. + H. N. T. ARNOLD, + Lieutenant Commander. - CHARLES FOLSOM, Acting - Master. + CHARLES FOLSOM, + Acting Master. - JACOB D. RODGERS, Acting 3d Assistant - Engineer. + JACOB D. RODGERS, + Acting 3d Assistant + Engineer.

Commander James F. Armstrong, Commanding United States Steamer State of @@ -41197,8 +41334,8 @@

I certify that the above is a true copy of the remarks for the watch from 4 to 8 on the log-book of this ship.

- A. D. LITTLEFIELD, Acting - Master. + A. D. LITTLEFIELD, + Acting Master.
I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -41310,7 +41447,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -41337,7 +41474,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -41511,7 +41648,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -41538,7 +41675,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c.

@@ -41573,7 +41710,7 @@ is not advanced by this government.

I have the honor to be your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -41631,7 +41768,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -41659,7 +41796,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -41703,7 +41840,7 @@ herewith returned.

I have the honor to be, my lord, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -41741,8 +41878,9 @@ vessel.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- C. P. WOLCOTT, Assistant Secretary of - War. + C. P. WOLCOTT, + Assistant Secretary of + War.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -41775,7 +41913,7 @@ regulations in her Britannic Majesty’s possessions.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -41819,7 +41957,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -41845,7 +41983,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of Stale.

@@ -41875,7 +42013,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -41913,7 +42051,7 @@

I avail myself of the occasion to offer to your lordship a renewed assurance of my very high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -41946,7 +42084,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -41995,8 +42133,9 @@ ship-of-war of the nation off whose port the ship may have been then passing, would receive my severe censure.

- ALEX. MILNE, Vice-Admiral, and - Commander-in-Chief. + ALEX. MILNE, + Vice-Admiral, and + Commander-in-Chief.

Lord Lyons, J. C. B., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -42046,7 +42185,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -42109,8 +42248,9 @@

Further, I enclose copies of two notes on the subject, which have been just handed to me by Governor Bayley.

- ALEX. MILNE, Vice-Admiral, and - Commander-in-Chief. + ALEX. MILNE, + Vice-Admiral, and + Commander-in-Chief.

Lord Lyons.

 @@ -42221,8 +42361,9 @@ schooner Mary Rankin to convey this communication to yourself.

I have, &c.,

- J. NIBBS BROWN, Police Magistrate, - Abaco. + J. NIBBS BROWN, + Police Magistrate, + Abaco.

Hon. C. R. Nesbitt, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -42297,7 +42438,7 @@ court, to abide the issue of the decision by the court of appeal.

I have the honor, &c., &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -42326,7 +42467,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -42365,7 +42506,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -42389,7 +42530,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my highest consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -42434,7 +42575,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -42566,7 +42707,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -42596,7 +42737,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant.

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. W. H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -42655,7 +42796,7 @@ case.

I have the, &c.,

- GEORGE CRUMP. + GEORGE CRUMP.

Lord Lyons.

 @@ -42678,7 +42819,7 @@ reconsideration of the subject shall cheerfully be entered into.

I have the honor to be, my lord, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -42730,7 +42871,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -42754,7 +42895,7 @@ bank, within a mile of the shore.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -42786,7 +42927,8 @@ expense of defending her or not.

I have, &c.,

- AUBREY G. BUTTERFIELD. + AUBREY G. + BUTTERFIELD.

E. M. Archibald, Esq., H.B. M. Consul.

@@ -42916,7 +43058,7 @@

The undersigned avails himself of this opportunity to renew to Lord Lyons the assurance of his high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -42943,7 +43085,7 @@ refers.

I have the honor to be, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Honorable Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -42976,8 +43118,8 @@ of Great Britain.

Very respectfully, &c.,

- GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the - Navy. + GIDEON WELLES, + Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -43005,8 +43147,8 @@ from St. Mary’s, Georgia, and bound to Nassau. * * *

Very respectfully, &c.,

- N. COLLINS, Commander. + N. COLLINS, + Commander.

Hon. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.

@@ -43045,7 +43187,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Honorable Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -43078,7 +43220,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Honorable Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -43104,8 +43246,8 @@ protected by that government.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- J. P. USHER, Secretary. + J. P. USHER, + Secretary.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -43147,7 +43289,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, yours, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c.

@@ -43173,7 +43315,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -43200,7 +43342,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -43223,8 +43365,8 @@ copy of your note to Lord Lyons on the 5th ultimo.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the - Navy. + GIDEON WELLES, + Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -43290,8 +43432,9 @@ international law.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES WILKES, Acting Rear-Admiral, - Commanding West India Squadron. + CHARLES WILKES, + Acting Rear-Admiral, Commanding West India + Squadron.

Hon. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.

@@ -43320,7 +43463,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

The Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -43344,7 +43487,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, &c., &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -43373,7 +43516,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, &c., &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -43434,7 +43577,7 @@ approbation.

I have the honor, &c., &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -43460,7 +43603,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -43504,8 +43647,9 @@ taken from the decree of condemnation of the vessel.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- THOMAS J. BOYNTON, United States Attorney, - Southern District of Florida. + THOMAS J. BOYNTON, + United States Attorney, Southern District of + Florida.
I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -43557,7 +43701,7 @@ 6th instant, and to renew to you the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -43611,8 +43755,8 @@ Acting Rear-Admiral Wilkes’s despatch.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the - Navy. + GIDEON WELLES, + Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -43639,7 +43783,7 @@ it.

I have the honor, &c., &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. W. H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -43669,7 +43813,7 @@ authority to which Fort Garry is subject.

I have the honor, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. W. H. Seward.

 @@ -43706,7 +43850,7 @@ any of the Indian tribes.

I have, &c.,

- WM. McDOUGALL. + WM. McDOUGALL.
@@ -43729,7 +43873,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. W. H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -43754,7 +43898,7 @@ of it has been communicated to the Secretary of the Navy.

I have the honor to be, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -43780,7 +43924,7 @@ general court-martial now in session there.

I have the honor to be, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -43806,7 +43950,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -43830,7 +43974,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -43868,8 +44012,8 @@ Delaware.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of - War. + EDWIN M. STANTON, + Secretary of War.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -43903,7 +44047,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -43940,7 +44084,7 @@

I send copies to Earl Russell, and to Vice-Admiral Sir A. Milne.

I am, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

H. B. M. Consul, at—

@@ -43966,7 +44110,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -43995,7 +44139,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. W. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -44045,8 +44189,9 @@ Mackenzie, has been seized by the United States government, and is this day released by order of Rear-Admiral S. P. Lee.

- W.C. BRUCE, Acting Ensign in - charge. + W.C. BRUCE, + Acting Ensign in + charge.

On separate paper:

@@ -44158,7 +44303,7 @@ similar notice to you.

I have the honor to be, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -44181,7 +44326,7 @@ opportunity of repeating to you the assurance of the high consideration with which I am, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -44204,7 +44349,7 @@ which will perhaps interest you.

Believe me to be, my dear sir, your faithful servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. W. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -44235,7 +44380,7 @@ You are quite welcome to mention this information to Mr. Seward if you think it worth communicating to him.

- MONCK. + MONCK.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c.

@@ -44268,7 +44413,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -44411,7 +44556,7 @@

The undersigned avails himself of the opportunity to renew to Lord Lyons the assurances of his high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -44449,7 +44594,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -44474,7 +44619,7 @@ General Schenck has been advised thereof.

I have the honor to be, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -44501,7 +44646,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -44526,7 +44671,7 @@ that that vessel has been restored to the master and claimant.

I have the honor to be, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -44554,7 +44699,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -44587,8 +44732,8 @@ from Mr. Whiting’s despatch.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the - Navy. + GIDEON WELLES, + Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -44629,8 +44774,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- SAMUEL WHITING, U. S. - Consul. + SAMUEL WHITING, + U. S. Consul.

Hon. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, @@ -44670,7 +44815,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -44705,7 +44850,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -44730,7 +44875,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -44762,8 +44907,8 @@ Lord Lyons’s note.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the - Navy. + GIDEON WELLES, + Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -44808,7 +44953,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -44832,7 +44977,7 @@ the Interior for his information and consideration. I have the honor to be your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -44864,7 +45009,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, my lord, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -44891,7 +45036,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -44927,7 +45072,7 @@ recommend the case to your immediate consideration.

I have the honor, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -44997,7 +45142,7 @@ immediately set at liberty.

I have the honor, &c.,

- J. M. VERNON. + J. M. VERNON.

Lord Lyons.

 @@ -45038,7 +45183,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -45065,7 +45210,7 @@ appear to call for.

I have the honor to be your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -45093,7 +45238,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -45132,7 +45277,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -45158,7 +45303,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -45196,7 +45341,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -45231,7 +45376,7 @@ government. I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -45257,7 +45402,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -45284,8 +45429,9 @@ governments of her Majesty and the United States.

I am, sir, with much respect, your obedient servant,

- J. P. USHER, Secretary of the - Interior. + J. P. USHER, + Secretary of the + Interior.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -45310,7 +45456,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -45345,7 +45491,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -45387,7 +45533,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -45411,7 +45557,7 @@ their visits to the ports held by the insurgents. I am, with great respect, your humble servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right. Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -45478,7 +45624,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -45608,7 +45754,7 @@ Confederate States.

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, &c.

@@ -45636,7 +45782,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -45666,8 +45812,8 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- F. W. SEWARD, Assistant - Secretary. + F. W. SEWARD, + Assistant Secretary.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -45692,8 +45838,8 @@ Wilkes on the subject.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the - Navy. + GIDEON WELLES, + Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -45724,8 +45870,9 @@ Britain.

I am, respectfully, &c.,

- GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the - Navy. + GIDEON WELLES, + Secretary of the + Navy.

Acting Rear-Admiral Charles Wilkes, Comd’g West India Squadron, Havana, @@ -45754,7 +45901,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -45788,7 +45935,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

- LYONS, + LYONS,

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -45821,7 +45968,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -45855,7 +46002,7 @@ British territory in future.

I have, &c.,

- MONCK. + MONCK.
I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -45910,7 +46057,7 @@

I have the honor to be, my lord, with the highest consideration, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -45941,8 +46088,9 @@ a British subject need be apprehended in the premises.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- P. H. WATSON, Assistant Secretary of - War. + P. H. WATSON, + Assistant Secretary of + War.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -45978,8 +46126,9 @@ Michele, it shall be deemed null and void.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant - General. + E. D. TOWNSEND, + Assistant Adjutant + General.

Brigadier General W. F. Sherman, U. S. Volunteers, or Com’dg General, @@ -46015,7 +46164,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -46035,10 +46184,10 @@ ask me to inquire from you whether you will grant permits to British subjects to load ships with cotton in the Savannah river below the confederate obstructions. Will you be so kind as to tell me what answer - I should make ?

+ I should make?

Yours, faithfully,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -46063,7 +46212,7 @@ it.

I have the honor to be, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD, + WILLIAM H. SEWARD,

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -46088,7 +46237,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -46109,8 +46258,9 @@ the harbor for the purpose of obtaining the same.

I am, &c.,

- J. N. MAFFIT, Confederate States Navy, - Commanding. + J. N. MAFFIT, + Confederate States Navy, + Commanding.

His Excellency the Governor, New Providence.

@@ -46124,7 +46274,7 @@ make this request should be pointed out, and the pilot called on to explain how he permitted the Florida without my permission.

- C. J. BAYLEY. + C. J. BAYLEY.

I have, &c.,

- C. J. BAYLEY, Governor. + C. J. BAYLEY, + Governor.

Lord Lyons.

 @@ -46208,7 +46358,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -46277,8 +46427,8 @@ from Charleston.

I have, &c.,

- ARTHUR T. THRUPP, Commander. + ARTHUR T. THRUPP, + Commander. Vice-Admiral Alexander Milne to @@ -46343,8 +46493,9 @@ meeting.

I have, &c.,

- ALEXANDER MILNE, Vice-Admiral and - Commander-in-Chief. + ALEXANDER MILNE, + Vice-Admiral and + Commander-in-Chief.

Lord Lyons.

 @@ -46367,7 +46518,7 @@ command of her Majesty’s ships under his orders.

Yours, faithfully,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -46407,8 +46558,9 @@ and who are not engaged in trade.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- ALEX. MILNE, Vice-Admiral and - Commander-in-Chief. + ALEX. MILNE, + Vice-Admiral and + Commander-in-Chief.

To, —— ——, Her Majesty’s Ship ———

 @@ -46433,7 +46585,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -46466,8 +46618,9 @@ feeling between them.

I have, &c.,

- ALEX. MILNE, Vice-Admiral and - Commander-in-Chief. + ALEX. MILNE, + Vice-Admiral and + Commander-in-Chief.

Lord Lyons.

 @@ -46494,7 +46647,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -46527,7 +46680,7 @@ in regard to the grounds of the capture of the Peterhoff.

I have the honor to be, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -46551,7 +46704,7 @@ her Majesty’s government and those of the navy of the United States.

I have the honor to be, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -46576,7 +46729,7 @@ his orders.

I am, my dear Lord Lyons, very truly, yours,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -46632,7 +46785,7 @@ of the high consideration with which I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -46657,7 +46810,7 @@ the subject have been given to that officer.

I have the honor to be your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -46694,7 +46847,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -46726,7 +46879,7 @@ may not be committed, is submitted to your consideration.

I have the honor to be your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -46753,7 +46906,7 @@ suggestions on the subject.

I have the honor to be your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -46807,7 +46960,7 @@

I have the honor to be. with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -46978,7 +47131,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -47006,7 +47159,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -47040,7 +47193,7 @@ perusal of the officer in charge of the ship.

I have, &c.,

- E.M. ARCHIBALD. + E.M. ARCHIBALD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -47082,15 +47235,18 @@ and London, passenger to Matamoras.

The above is a correct statement of facts.

- STEPHEN JARMAN, Master. + STEPHEN JARMAN, + Master. - H. BOUND, Mate. + H. BOUND, + Mate. - SAMUEL J. REDGATE, Agent for Lloyds at - Matamoras, passenger. + SAMUEL J. REDGATE, + Agent for Lloyds at Matamoras, + passenger. - G. W. ALMOND, passenger. + G. W. ALMOND, + passenger.

E. M. Archibald, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -47153,12 +47309,14 @@ this letter to the British minister at Washington.

We have the honor, &c., &c.,

- SAMUEL J. REDGATE, Agent for Lloyds at - Matamoras, - - ROBERT BOWDEN, Late of Melbourne and - London, passengers per Peterhoff to - Matamoras. + + SAMUEL J. REDGATE, + Agent for Lloyds at + Matamoras + ROBERT BOWDEN, + Late of Melbourne and London, + passengers per Peterhoff to Matamoras. +

British Consul, New York.

@@ -47187,7 +47345,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -47213,7 +47371,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -47247,8 +47405,9 @@ enclosed despatch direct to the admiralty.

I have, &c.,

- ALEX. MILNE, Vice-Admiral and - Commander-in-Chief. + ALEX. MILNE, + Vice-Admiral and + Commander-in-Chief.

Lord Lyons.

 @@ -47296,8 +47455,9 @@ injury if such captures as the Peterhoff are continued.

I have, &c.,

- EDWARD TATHAM, Captain and Senior - Officer. + EDWARD TATHAM, + Captain and Senior + Officer.

I have, &c.,

- J. J. BALL, Acting - Consul. + J. J. BALL, + Acting Consul.

The President and Vice-Governor, &c., St. Thomas @@ -47352,7 +47512,7 @@ and that it is not in his power to give any explanation with regard to the said report.

- ROTHE. + ROTHE. @@ -47385,8 +47545,9 @@ high seas.

I have, &c.,

- EDWARD TATHAM, Captain and Senior - Officer. + EDWARD TATHAM, + Captain and Senior + Officer.

Rear-Admiral Wilkes, &c., &c.

@@ -47420,8 +47581,9 @@

Reciprocating your courteous expressions, and the pleasure of having made your acquaintance, I am, &c.,

- CHARLES WILKES, Rear-Admiral, Commanding - West India Squadron. + CHARLES WILKES, + Rear-Admiral, Commanding West India + Squadron.

Captain Edward Tatham, Senior Officer, Barbadoes Division.

@@ -47446,7 +47608,7 @@ which application has been made through the district attorney.

I have the honor to be, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -47473,7 +47635,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -47508,7 +47670,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -47548,13 +47710,13 @@ has sold supplies of various kinds to the government of the Confederate States, having had contracts with that government for such supplies.

- J. M. VERNON. + J. M. VERNON. Sworn before me, at Fort Lafayette, the 27th day of March, A. D. 1863. - E. M. ARCHIBALD. + E. M. ARCHIBALD. British Consulate, New York, .I certify the foregoing to be a true copy of the original affidavit remaining in my possession. [SEAL.] - E. M. ARCHIBALD, Her Britannic Majesty’s - Consul. + E. M. ARCHIBALD, + Her Britannic Majesty’s + Consul.

I have the honor to be, my lord, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -47613,7 +47776,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -47650,7 +47813,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -47684,7 +47847,7 @@ consisted, in part, of field-pieces and ammunition.

I have the honor to be, my lord, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons.

 @@ -47711,7 +47874,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons.

 @@ -47740,7 +47903,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -47766,7 +47929,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -47802,7 +47965,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -47954,13 +48117,14 @@

In witness whereof, the said appearers have hereunto subscribed their names.

- STEPHEN JARMAN, Master R. N. - R. - - H. BOUND, Mate. - - THOS. WEBBER, Steward. + + STEPHEN JARMAN, + Master R. N. R. + H. BOUND, + Mate. + THOS. WEBBER, + Steward. + - AUBREY G. BUTTERFIELD, H. B. M. - Vice-Consul. + AUBREY G. BUTTERFIELD, + H. B. M. Vice-Consul.

[l. s.]

- AUBREY G. BUTTERFIELD, H. B. M. - Vice-Consul. + AUBREY G. BUTTERFIELD, + H. B. M. Vice-Consul. . - AUBREY G. BUTTERFIELD, H. B. M. - Vice-Consul. + AUBREY G. BUTTERFIELD, + H. B. M. Vice-Consul. Copy of the official log of the British steamer @@ -48173,11 +48337,12 @@ on board for Matamoras; and as I am desirous of having them forwarded to their destination as quickly as possible, may I request you to cause them to be delivered to the British consul at St. - Thomas, to be disposed of by him ?

+ Thomas, to be disposed of by him?

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- S. JARMAN, Lieutenant R. N. R., Commanding - Steamship Peterhoff. + S. JARMAN, + Lieutenant R. N. R., Commanding Steamship + Peterhoff. - S. JARMAN, Captain. - - H. BOND, Mate. + + S. JARMAN, + Captain. + H. BOND, + Mate. +
I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -48305,8 +48473,9 @@ transmit the whole of the originals unmutilated to the judge of the district to which such prize is ordered to proceed.”

- THEODORUS BAILEY, Acting Rear-Admiral, - Commanding E. G. B. Squadron. + THEODORUS BAILEY, + Acting Rear-Admiral, Commanding E. G. B. + Squadron.

Aubrey J. Butterfield, H. B. M. Vice-Consul, Key West.

@@ -48326,7 +48495,8 @@ request that they may be sent on to Matamoras by the brigantine Magicunne, which vessel leaves this to-morrow.

- AUBREY J. BUTTERFIELD. + AUBREY J. + BUTTERFIELD.

Acting Rear-Admiral Bailey, Com’g E. G. B. Squadron, Flag-Ship St. @@ -48384,7 +48554,7 @@ proceed to break the seals and examine their contents.

I have, &c.,

- E. M. ARCHIBALD. + E. M. ARCHIBALD.

Lord Lyons.

 @@ -48733,7 +48903,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -48762,7 +48932,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient Servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -48789,7 +48959,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons.

 @@ -48915,8 +49085,8 @@

The papers transmitted are herewith returned.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

- GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the - Navy. + GIDEON WELLES, + Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -48944,7 +49114,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons.

 @@ -48971,9 +49141,9 @@ appeared and informed me that the court had directed that the mail parcels should be opened in order to see what letters were enclosed relating to the cargo on board the ship, and requested that I would open - the packages and select such letters as appeared to me to relate to - the cargo on board or to the consignees mentioned in the manifest, and - to take charge of the residue with a view to forwarding them to their + the packages and select such letters as appeared to me to relate to the + cargo on board or to the consignees mentioned in the manifest, and to + take charge of the residue with a view to forwarding them to their destination.

“With this application I refused to comply, protesting, first, against breaking the official seals of those packages; and objecting, secondly, @@ -49010,7 +49180,7 @@ to the gravity of any questions which may arise from the capture.

In haste, yours faithfully,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State,

@@ -49035,7 +49205,7 @@ taken in a full supply at Nassau only thirty days before.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -49064,8 +49234,8 @@

Hoping these infractions may receive particular consideration, I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

- GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the - Navy. + GIDEON WELLES, + Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -49092,7 +49262,7 @@ communicate with the colonial authorities there on the subject.

I have the honor to be, my lord, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons.

 @@ -49111,8 +49281,8 @@ instructions from home government? I am trying to get commanding naval officer to send a steamer to the sound.

- IRA P. RANKIN, Collector. + IRA P. RANKIN, + Collector.

Hon. W. H. Seward.

 @@ -49139,7 +49309,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons.

 @@ -49179,7 +49349,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -49203,7 +49373,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -49233,7 +49403,7 @@ in conformity with your request.

I have the honor to be, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons.

 @@ -49259,7 +49429,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -49286,7 +49456,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. W. H. Seward, &c., &c.

@@ -49319,7 +49489,7 @@ States government.

I have, &c.,

- E. M. ARCHIBALD. + E. M. ARCHIBALD.

Lord Lyons, &c., &c.

@@ -49345,7 +49515,7 @@ deparment to Mr. Adams, at London.

I have the honor to be, my lord, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons.

 @@ -49369,7 +49539,7 @@ the subject.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -49400,7 +49570,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -49427,7 +49597,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -49474,7 +49644,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant.

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -49502,7 +49672,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -49527,7 +49697,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -49602,7 +49772,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c,

@@ -49628,7 +49798,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. W. H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c.

@@ -49658,7 +49828,7 @@ it.

I have the honor to be your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -49688,7 +49858,7 @@ properly rebuked, with a view to prevent a repetition of such acts.

I have the honor to be, my lord, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -49716,8 +49886,13 @@ to do so by the department.

With great respect, I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- JOSHUA R. GIDDINGS, United States Consul - General, &JOSHUA R. GIDDINGS, + United States Consul General, &c.

Hon. W. H. Seward, warrants the immediate intervention of the American government. The facts are as - follows :

+ follows:

James Wilson and one McElreivy, both American citizens, and charged, upon rather strong evidence, with a case of larceny in the township of Moore, in this county, escaping to Port Huron @@ -49779,8 +49954,9 @@ are very poor.

I am, dear sir, your faithful servant,

- R. C. McMULLEN, United States - Commercial Agent. + R. C. McMULLEN, + United States Commercial + Agent.

Hon. J. R. Giddings, United States Consul General, British @@ -49815,7 +49991,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD + WILLIAM H. SEWARD

Right Hon. Lord Lyons.

 @@ -49857,7 +50033,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c.

@@ -49886,8 +50062,11 @@ calendar="gregorian">this 28th day of March, 1863. - HENRY E. GREEK [seal.] + HENRY E. GREEK [seal.] Sworn to and subscribed before me, and given under my hand and seal of office, at @@ -49896,8 +50075,8 @@ [notarial seal.] - HUME F. HILL, Notary - Public. + HUME F. HILL, + Notary Public. @@ -49936,8 +50115,11 @@ of Tennessee, United States of America. - A. G. HARTMAN. [seal.] + A. G. HARTMAN. [seal.] Sworn to and subscribed before me, and given under my hand and seal of office, at Memphis, [notarial seal.] - HUME F. HILL, Notary - Public. + HUME F. HILL, + Notary Public. - HENRY E. GREEN + HENRY E. GREEN Memphis, Tennessee, February 28, @@ -50068,8 +50250,8 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to offer to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM HUNTER, Acting - Secretary. + WILLIAM HUNTER, + Acting Secretary.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -50119,7 +50301,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, you most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -50149,8 +50331,8 @@ in conformity with your request.

I have the honor to be, your very obedient servant,

- W. HUNTER, Acting - Secretary. + W. HUNTER, + Acting Secretary.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -50177,8 +50359,8 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- W. HUNTER, Acting - Secretary. + W. HUNTER, + Acting Secretary.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -50203,8 +50385,8 @@ subject, in order that a stop may be put to the proceeding.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- W. HUNTER, Acting - Secretary. + W. HUNTER, + Acting Secretary.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -50236,7 +50418,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, you most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -50302,8 +50484,7 @@ legally cleared at Liverpool for Nassau, and was bound upon her legitimate voyage to that port when fallen in with, boarded and seized, in the manner aforesaid, by the said Wachusetts, in direct - contravention of the laws of nations and the rights of neutrals - :

+ contravention of the laws of nations and the rights of neutrals:

Therefore, the said appearers desire to protest, and by these presents do most solemnly protest, against the captain, officers, and crew of the United States ship-of-war Wachusetts, and against @@ -50327,7 +50508,7 @@ Consul-general, Cuba.

A true copy.

- JOHN V. CRAWFORD. + JOHN V. CRAWFORD.
I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -50433,7 +50614,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -50457,7 +50638,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -50485,7 +50666,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -50552,7 +50733,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration; sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -50605,7 +50786,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -50639,7 +50820,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -50719,10 +50900,11 @@

Should your lordship require further information with regard to the claim of Messrs. Galbraith, Redgate & Co., may we ask your lordship to give an appointment for Mr. Galbraith and ourselves to - wait upon your lordship ?

+ wait upon your lordship?

We have, &c,

- GREGORY & CHAMPION. + GREGORY & + CHAMPION.

Earl Russell, K. G., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -50784,7 +50966,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -50821,7 +51003,7 @@ injury done to my trade and the insult to my captain and crew.

I am, &c.,

- W. J. GRAZEBROOK. + W. J. GRAZEBROOK.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, K. G., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -51233,7 +51415,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -51289,7 +51471,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurances of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons &c., &c., &c.

@@ -51358,7 +51540,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -51389,7 +51571,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -51429,7 +51611,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -51462,7 +51644,7 @@ sufficiently informed I will recur to the subject.

I have the honor to be your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -51488,7 +51670,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -51527,8 +51709,8 @@

His case is under investigation.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- L. C. TURNER, Judge - Advocate. + L. C. TURNER, + Judge Advocate.

Hon. W. Hunter, Acting Secretary of State.

@@ -51573,7 +51755,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -51608,7 +51790,7 @@ obtained, I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -51665,7 +51847,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -51692,7 +51874,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -51754,7 +51936,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -51911,7 +52093,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD, + WILLIAM H. SEWARD,

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -51940,7 +52122,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons.

 @@ -51979,8 +52161,9 @@ the case submitted to the court for its decision.

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- E. DELAFIELD SMITH, U. S. District - Attorney. + E. DELAFIELD SMITH, + U. S. District + Attorney.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -52029,8 +52212,8 @@

SAMUEL R. BETTS.

A true copy.

- GEO, E. BETTS, Clerk. + GEO, E. BETTS, + Clerk. Mr. Welles to

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the - Navy. + GIDEON WELLES, + Secretary of the Navy.

E. Delafield Smith, Esq., United States Attorney, New York.

@@ -52112,8 +52295,9 @@ directed.

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- E. DELAFIELD SMITH, United States District - Attorney. + E. DELAFIELD SMITH, + United States District + Attorney.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -52153,7 +52337,7 @@

I embrace this occasion to offer to your lordship a renewed assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -52182,7 +52366,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c, &c.

@@ -52215,7 +52399,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -52263,7 +52447,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. W. H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -52288,7 +52472,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -52344,7 +52528,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons.

 @@ -52367,8 +52551,9 @@ within the boundaries of Canada.”

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- P.H. WATSON, Assistant Secretary of - War. + P.H. WATSON, + Assistant Secretary of + War.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -52395,7 +52580,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -52423,7 +52608,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -52451,7 +52636,7 @@ satisfactory to you, I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -52481,7 +52666,7 @@ stores to any of the Indians at war with the people of the United States. I am, &c,

- J. F. ELLIOT. + J. F. ELLIOT.

E. Hammond, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -52561,7 +52746,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -52593,8 +52778,8 @@ Nassau.

I have, &c.,

- C. J. BAILEY, Governor. + C. J. BAILEY, + Governor. I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -52697,7 +52882,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.,

@@ -52725,7 +52910,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons.

 @@ -52749,8 +52934,8 @@ one with Acting Rear-Admiral Bailey, if he wishes.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the - Navy. + GIDEON WELLES, + Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -52780,7 +52965,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -52811,8 +52996,8 @@ territorial waters of Great Britain.

Very respectfully, &c.,

- GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the - Navy. + GIDEON WELLES, + Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -52847,8 +53032,8 @@ testimony.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- N. COLLINS, Commander. + N. COLLINS, + Commander.

Hon. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy.

@@ -52874,13 +53059,14 @@

Subscribed and sworn before me this 29th day of November, 1862.

- GEORGE D. ALLEN, Clerk United States - District Court. + GEORGE D. ALLEN, + Clerk United States District + Court. [Untitled] -

Southern District of Florida :

+

Southern District of Florida:

Now comes John A. Johnstone, and, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is at present, and has been for the past year, an officer of the navy of the United States; that on the fifth day @@ -52906,8 +53092,9 @@ when="1862-11-29" calendar="gregorian">this 29th day of November, 1862. - GEORGE D. ALLEN, Clerk United States - District Court. + GEORGE D. ALLEN, + Clerk United States District + Court.

@@ -52931,7 +53118,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -52955,7 +53142,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -52974,7 +53161,7 @@ frustrate all attempts by the enemies of the United States to fit out privateers in the ports of Vancouver’s island.

- JAMES DOUGLASS. + JAMES DOUGLASS.
I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c.

@@ -53039,7 +53226,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD, + WILLIAM H. SEWARD,

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -53067,7 +53254,7 @@ have been made pursuant to the decree of condemnation.

I have the honor to be your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -53098,7 +53285,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -53123,7 +53310,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -53147,7 +53334,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -53180,7 +53367,7 @@ government.

I have the honor to be your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -53208,7 +53395,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -53237,7 +53424,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -53335,7 +53522,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -53360,8 +53547,8 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- F. W. SEWARD, Acting - Secretary. + F. W. SEWARD, + Acting Secretary.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -53385,8 +53572,8 @@ a copy of which is respectfully transmitted.

Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

- EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of - War. + EDWIN M. STANTON, + Secretary of War.

The Secretary of State.

 @@ -53419,11 +53606,12 @@ will be held subject to exchange.

Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

- EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of - War. + EDWIN M. STANTON, + Secretary of War. - ED. R. S. CANBY, Brig. Gen. and A. A. - G. + ED. R. S. CANBY, + Brig. Gen. and A. A. + G. Official.

War Department, I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- F. W. SEWARD, Acting - Secretary. + F. W. SEWARD, + Acting Secretary.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -53487,8 +53675,8 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- F. W. SEWARD, Acting - Secretary. + F. W. SEWARD, + Acting Secretary.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -53517,7 +53705,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -53552,7 +53740,7 @@ States as on our own side of the frontier.

Your obedient servant,

- EDWARD M. HOPKINS. + EDWARD M. HOPKINS.

The Officers in charge of Fort William, Inichipicoton, @@ -53611,7 +53799,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -53650,7 +53838,9 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LIONS: + LIONS:

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -53678,8 +53868,8 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- F.W. SEWARD, Acting - Secretary. + F.W. SEWARD, + Acting Secretary.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons.

 @@ -53707,8 +53897,8 @@

I avail myself of the opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- F. W. SEWARD, Acting - Secretary, + F. W. SEWARD, + Acting Secretary,

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -53738,8 +53928,8 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- F. W. SEWARD, Acting - Secretary. + F. W. SEWARD, + Acting Secretary.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -53765,7 +53955,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -53833,7 +54023,7 @@ to convey to Mr. Seward the substance of this despatch.

I have, &c,

- MONCK. + MONCK.

Lord Lyons.

 @@ -53867,8 +54057,9 @@ authorities, who have required information upon the subject.

I am, &c,

- F. DAVIS, Crown Attorney, County - Lambton. + F. DAVIS, + Crown Attorney, County + Lambton.

B. J. Atkinson, Esq., District Attorney, Port Huron.

@@ -53914,9 +54105,9 @@ reach.

Yours, &c,

- O’BRIEN J. ATKINSON, Prosecuting - Attorney, St. Clair County, - Michigan. + O’BRIEN J. ATKINSON, + Prosecuting Attorney, St. Clair County, + Michigan.

Mr. J. F. Davis, Crown Attorney, Lambton County, C. W.

@@ -53929,7 +54120,7 @@ wit:

Queen vs. John McElrevy and James Wilson.—Burglary.

Heard April 11, 1863.

-

James F. Baby sworn :

+

James F. Baby sworn:

On the night of the 7th instant the store of F. & W. L. Baby was broken into. A quantity of goods were taken out of it, amongst which goods there were ready-made clothing, fur caps, @@ -53943,7 +54134,7 @@

Adjourned for the prisoners to get witnesses and counsel, to April 14, 1863.

April 14, 1863.

-

James F. Baby sworn :

+

James F. Baby sworn:

The prisoners were arrested in the State of Michigan. A man named McLeod arrested them. They were brought over without any authority from the American government, so far as I know.

@@ -53969,12 +54160,12 @@ there was any ready-made clothing in it. McElrevy wore the coat produced.

JAMES CONKEY.

-

Robert Dale sworn :

+

Robert Dale sworn:

I was clerk in the store. I swear that the goods produced are part of the goods stolen from Baby’s store.

- ROBERT DALE. + ROBERT DALE.
@@ -54005,7 +54196,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. W. H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -54029,8 +54220,8 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- F. W. SEWARD, Acting - Secretary. + F. W. SEWARD, + Acting Secretary.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons.

 @@ -54055,8 +54246,8 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- F. W. SEWARD, Acting - Secretary. + F. W. SEWARD, + Acting Secretary.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c.

@@ -54084,7 +54275,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- F. W. SEWARD. + F. W. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c.

@@ -54110,7 +54301,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons.

 @@ -54156,8 +54347,9 @@ court here.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- THOS. J. BOYNTON, United States Attorney, - S. D. of Florida. + THOS. J. BOYNTON, + United States Attorney, S. D. of + Florida.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -54205,7 +54397,8 @@ leave to appeal from the decree of condemnation without filing an appeal bond.

- WM. MARVIN, Judge. + WM. MARVIN, + Judge.
I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons.

 @@ -54271,7 +54464,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -54306,7 +54499,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -54333,7 +54526,7 @@ request is cheerfully acceded to.

I have the honor to be your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -54360,7 +54553,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -54387,7 +54580,7 @@ here.

Very truly yours,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Lord Lyons.

 @@ -54417,7 +54610,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -54449,7 +54642,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c.

@@ -54495,7 +54688,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, my lord, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c.

@@ -54524,8 +54717,8 @@ him.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the - Navy. + GIDEON WELLES, + Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -54567,8 +54760,9 @@ received.

I have the honor to be, sir, very repectfully, yours,

- S. P. LEE, Acting Rear-Admiral, - Commanding N. A. B. Squadron. + S. P. LEE, + Acting Rear-Admiral, Commanding N. A. B. + Squadron.

Hon. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy.

@@ -54611,7 +54805,7 @@ themselves to you.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JOSEPH E. DeHAVEN, + JOSEPH E. DeHAVEN, Lieutenant Com’dg U. S. N. @@ -54641,8 +54835,9 @@ adjudication, it would be well to release her.

Respectfully, yours,

- S. P. LEE, A. R. Admiral, Com’dg - N. A. B. Squadron. + S. P. LEE, + A. R. Admiral, Com’dg N. A. B. + Squadron.

Lieut. Com. J. E. DeHaven, U. S. N., Com’dg U. S. S. Penobscot, off @@ -54685,7 +54880,7 @@ matter.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JOS. E. DeHAVEN, + JOS. E. DeHAVEN, Lieut. Com. U. S. N., Com’dg U. S. Steamer Penobscot. @@ -54744,7 +54939,8 @@ several in attempting to run the blockade, two of which were the Racer and British Queen.

- JOHN MACKENZIE. + JOHN + MACKENZIE. @@ -54765,7 +54961,7 @@ prize schooner Golden Eagle.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JOSEPH E. DeHAVEN, + JOSEPH E. DeHAVEN, Lieutenant Commanding. @@ -54774,8 +54970,9 @@ &c.

Respectfully forwarded.

- H. LUDLOW CASE, Captain and - Senior Officer present. + H. LUDLOW CASE, + Captain and Senior Officer + present. Forwarded in further explanation @@ -54783,8 +54980,8 @@ Secretary of State, and received by me in the department’s communication of February 10, - 1863.ACTING - REAR-ADMIRAL. + 1863.ACTING + REAR-ADMIRAL.

I am, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

- Acting Ensign SHUBAEL K. LUCE. + Acting Ensign SHUBAEL K. + LUCE.

Lieutenant Commander J. E. DeHaven, @@ -54850,8 +55048,9 @@ for the use of the prize crew.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

- SHUBAEL K. LUCE, Acting - Ensign. + SHUBAEL K. LUCE, + Acting + Ensign. @@ -54897,7 +55096,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, my lord, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c.

@@ -54945,7 +55144,7 @@

I have the honor to be with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -54981,8 +55180,9 @@

* * * * * * * *

I have the honor to remain, sir, very respectfully, yours,

- S. C. HAWLEY, United States Consul, - Nassau, N. P. + S. C. HAWLEY, + United States Consul, Nassau, N. + P.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -55015,8 +55215,8 @@ vessels-of-war from the ports of the colony.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- C. B. NESBITT, Colonial - Secretary. + C. B. NESBITT, + Colonial Secretary. [Enclosure No. 2.] @@ -55091,8 +55291,9 @@ them.

I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- S. C. HAWLEY, United States Consul, - Nassau, N. P. + S. C. HAWLEY, + United States Consul, Nassau, N. + P.

C. E. Nesbitt, Esq., Colonial Secretary, Nassau, N. P.

@@ -55139,7 +55340,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -55294,7 +55495,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -55318,7 +55519,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -55346,8 +55547,8 @@

I have directed further inquiries to be made.

I have, &c,

- C. BAYLEY, Governor. + C. BAYLEY, + Governor.

Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -55487,7 +55688,7 @@ Long cay.

I have, &c, &c,

- T. B. BURNSIDE. + T. B. BURNSIDE.

Hon. C. R. Nesbitt.

 @@ -55519,7 +55720,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -55554,7 +55755,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c.

@@ -55604,8 +55805,8 @@

The governor replied that it would be (or had become) his duty to detain him longer. The commander said, in reply, “What do I - understand your excellency to suggest ?” He then said, “I must put - an embargo on you (or on your ship) for twenty-four hours.” The + understand your excellency to suggest?” He then said, “I must put an + embargo on you (or on your ship) for twenty-four hours.” The commander said quietly, but firmly, “I touched at your port with despatches for the American consul; I asked and had your permission to anchor for a few hours; my orders require me to proceed on my @@ -55641,8 +55842,9 @@

I have the honor to remain, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- S. C. HAWLEY, United States Consul, - Nassau, N. P. + S. C. HAWLEY, + United States Consul, Nassau, N. + P.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -55680,7 +55882,7 @@ proceeding.

Believe me, dear sir, yours truly,

- C. J. BAYLEY. + C. J. BAYLEY.

S. C. Hawley, Esq., United States Consul.

@@ -55718,8 +55920,9 @@ be found when I took possession of the office.

Yours, very respectfully,

- S.C. HAWLEY, United States Consul, - Nassau, N.P. + S.C. HAWLEY, + United States Consul, Nassau, + N.P.

His Excellency C. J. Bayley, Governor of the Bahamas.

@@ -55745,8 +55948,9 @@

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- S. C. HAWLEY, United States Consul, - Nassau, N. P. + S. C. HAWLEY, + United States Consul, Nassau, N. + P.

His Excellency C. J. Bayley, Governor of the Bahamas.

@@ -55754,7 +55958,7 @@ - [Enclosure No. 4. ] + [Enclosure No. 4.] Reply to Mr Hawley. @@ -55772,15 +55976,16 @@ salutes will be exchanged.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

- A. ROGER, Lieutenant, Private - Secretary. + A. ROGER, + Lieutenant, Private + Secretary.

S. C. Hawley, Esq., U.S. Consul.

 - [Enclosure No. 5. ] + [Enclosure No. 5.] Commander Trenchard to Mr. Hawley. @@ -55819,8 +56024,9 @@ be the Sirius, of Liverpool, which has entered your port.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- STEPHEN D. TRENCHARD, Commander, U.S. - Navy. + STEPHEN D. TRENCHARD, + Commander, U.S. + Navy.

S. C. Hawley, Esq., I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.
I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -55959,7 +56165,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward.

 @@ -56034,21 +56240,22 @@ when="1862-09-05" calendar="gregorian">this 5th day of September, 1862. - AUSTIN WM. COX, Speaker. + AUSTIN WM. COX, + Speaker. Assented to in her Majesty’s name this tenth day of September, 1862. - FREDERICK SEYMOUR, Lieutenant - Governor. + FREDERICK SEYMOUR, + Lieutenant Governor. Bera copia extur. [l. s.] - S. S. PLUES, Keeper of - Records. + S. S. PLUES, + Keeper of Records. - ALEXANDER MOIR, Acting Colonial - Secretary. + ALEXANDER MOIR, + Acting Colonial + Secretary.
I have the honor to be, with, the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward. Secretary of State, &c., &c.

@@ -56110,7 +56317,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -56133,7 +56340,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, my lord, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -56160,7 +56367,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -56198,7 +56405,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, my lord, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons.

 @@ -56217,8 +56424,8 @@ death of John Hardcastle.

Your obedient servant,

- EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of - War. + EDWIN M. STANTON, + Secretary of War.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -56287,8 +56494,9 @@ impartial justice.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- J. H. MARTINDALE, Brigadier General - and Military Governor. + J. H. MARTINDALE, + Brigadier General and Military + Governor.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

@@ -56316,7 +56524,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -56360,7 +56568,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest considerations, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -56388,7 +56596,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

I have the honor to be your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -56450,7 +56658,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -56475,7 +56683,7 @@ month, addressed to this department by the Secretary of War.

I have the honor to be your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H, SEWARD. + WILLIAM H, SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -56496,8 +56704,8 @@ transmitted by you to this department.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of - War. + EDWIN M. STANTON, + Secretary of War.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -56528,8 +56736,9 @@ with the execution of the enrolment act.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JAMES B. FRY, Provost Marshal - General. + JAMES B. FRY, + Provost Marshal + General.

Hon. Edwin Stanton, Secretary of War.

@@ -56555,7 +56764,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -56597,13 +56806,13 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State,

 - [Extract ] + [Extract] Her Britannic Majesty’s consul at St. Louis to Lord Lyons. @@ -56709,7 +56918,7 @@ Secretary of the Treasury.

I have the honor to be your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons.

 @@ -56747,8 +56956,9 @@ President and Secretary of War.

With great respect,

- S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the - Treasury. + S. P. CHASE, + Secretary of the + Treasury.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -56771,8 +56981,8 @@ and elsewhere.

Yours, truly,

- EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of - War. + EDWIN M. STANTON, + Secretary of War.

Hon. S. P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury.

@@ -56800,8 +57010,8 @@

The foregoing is a true copy of an executive order this day filed by the President in the War Department.

- EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of - War. + EDWIN M. STANTON, + Secretary of War. @@ -56825,8 +57035,8 @@

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of - War. + EDWIN M. STANTON, + Secretary of War.

Hon. S. P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury.

@@ -56860,8 +57070,8 @@

Claims for property taken under this order will be presented to the quartermaster general for adjustment.

- EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of - War. + EDWIN M. STANTON, + Secretary of War.

Hon. S. P. Chase.

 @@ -56926,8 +57136,9 @@ appreciate.

With great respect,

- S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the - Treasury. + S. P. CHASE, + Secretary of the + Treasury.

Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

@@ -56957,7 +57168,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons.

 @@ -57009,7 +57220,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -57119,7 +57330,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons.

 @@ -57167,7 +57378,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -57213,7 +57424,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, sir, your most obedient, humble servant.

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -57251,7 +57462,7 @@ shall be sent without delay to Mr. Butterfield.

I have the honor, &c., &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c.

@@ -57278,7 +57489,8 @@ damages to be paid by the United States government.

We have, &c., &c.,

- SAWYER & MENENDES. + SAWYER & + MENENDES.

E. B. A. Taylor, Esq., Acting Registrar General and Treasurer, @@ -57318,7 +57530,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -57439,8 +57651,9 @@ when="1863-06-25" calendar="gregorian">this 25th day of June, 1863. - JOHN V. CRAWFORD, Acting Consul General in - Cuba. + JOHN V. CRAWFORD, + Acting Consul General in + Cuba. - JOHN V. CRAWFORD, Acting Consul General in - Cuba. + JOHN V. CRAWFORD, + Acting Consul General in + Cuba. - G. W. ARDILL. + G. W. ARDILL. Havana, @@ -57564,8 +57778,9 @@ when="1863-06-26" calendar="gregorian">this 26th day of June, 1863. - JOHN W. CRAWFORD, Acting Consul General, - in Cuba, + JOHN W. CRAWFORD, + Acting Consul General, in + Cuba. - JOHN V. CRAWFORD, Acting Consul General, - in Cuba, + JOHN V. CRAWFORD, + Acting Consul General, in + Cuba,
I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons.

 @@ -57649,7 +57865,7 @@ their recurrence,

I have the honor to be, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -57789,7 +58005,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -57814,7 +58030,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -57841,7 +58057,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons.

 @@ -57863,8 +58079,9 @@ regard as satisfactory.

With great respect,

- S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the - Treasury. + S. P. CHASE, + Secretary of the + Treasury.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -58029,8 +58246,8 @@ ultimo on this subject are herewith returned.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- HIRAM BARNEY, Collector. + HIRAM BARNEY, + Collector.

Hon. S. P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury.

@@ -58061,8 +58278,9 @@ —— day ——, 1862.[CONSULAR SEAL.]

- ——— ———, United States - Consul. + ——— ———, + United States + Consul. B. @@ -58098,8 +58316,9 @@ type="margin">[consular seal.] - ——— ———, United States - Consul. + ——— ———, + United States + Consul. @@ -58162,8 +58381,8 @@ letters, and their several enclosures, I remain, your obedient servant,

- HIRAM BARNEY, Collector + HIRAM BARNEY, + Collector

Hon. S. P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury.

@@ -58255,7 +58474,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons.

 @@ -58283,7 +58502,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -58311,7 +58530,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -58344,7 +58563,7 @@ what course proper to pursue]

An early reply solicited. I have, &c,

- GEORGE KILPATRICK. + GEORGE KILPATRICK.

Lord Lyons, G. C. B., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -58508,7 +58727,7 @@ you to accept the assurance of the high consideration with which I am, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c.

@@ -58544,7 +58763,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -58581,7 +58800,8 @@ rights are not interfered with.

We are, &c, &c,

- TOOTAL, BROADHURST & LEE. + TOOTAL, BROADHURST & + LEE.

Her Britannic Majesty’s Consul, at New York.

@@ -58610,7 +58830,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons.

 @@ -58636,7 +58856,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons.

 @@ -58681,8 +58901,8 @@ they have come to my knowledge.

Very respectfully, &c,

- GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the - Navy. + GIDEON WELLES, + Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -58752,9 +58972,9 @@

Hoping my explanation will meet with the approval of the department, I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- H. W. MULDAW, Acting Master U. S. N. - Late Prize Master, Steamer - Dolphin. + H. W. MULDAW, + Acting Master U. S. N. Late Prize Master, + Steamer Dolphin.

Hon. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, &c.

@@ -58848,7 +59068,7 @@

The undersigned avails himself of this opportunity to renew to Lord Lyons the assurance of his high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons.

 @@ -58893,7 +59113,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons.

 @@ -58942,7 +59162,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -58972,7 +59192,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -59004,7 +59224,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -59035,7 +59255,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -59061,7 +59281,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -59088,7 +59308,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -59161,7 +59381,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -59217,7 +59437,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -59243,7 +59463,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons.

Another note was addressed to Lord Lyons, of the same date and in the @@ -59269,8 +59489,8 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- F. W. SEWARD, Acting - Secretary. + F. W. SEWARD, + Acting Secretary.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons.

 @@ -59294,7 +59514,7 @@ myself of this occasion to renew to you, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

- W. STUART. + W. STUART.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -59321,7 +59541,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your obedient servant,

- F. W. SEWARD, + F. W. SEWARD,

Acting Secretary, Hon. William Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -59347,8 +59567,8 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your obedient servant,

- F. W. SEWARD, Acting Secretary of - State. + F. W. SEWARD, + Acting Secretary of State.

Hon. William Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -59372,7 +59592,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. William Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -59421,7 +59641,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you the assurance of my highest consideration.

- W. STUART. + W. STUART.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -59450,7 +59670,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM. H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM. H. SEWARD.

Hon. William Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -59476,7 +59696,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon William Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -59508,7 +59728,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. William Stuart &c., &c., &c.

@@ -59540,7 +59760,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you the assurance of my highest consideration.

- W. STUART. + W. STUART.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -59615,7 +59835,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you the assurance of my high consideration.

- W. STUART. + W. STUART.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -59648,7 +59868,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. William Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -59680,7 +59900,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you the assurances of my highest consideration.

- W. STUART. + W. STUART.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -59709,7 +59929,7 @@ regard to it is herewith transmitted.

I have the honor to be, sir, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. William Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -59737,8 +59957,9 @@ necessary for that purpose.

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- E. DELAFIELD SMITH, United States District - Attorney. + E. DELAFIELD SMITH, + United States District + Attorney.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -59769,7 +59990,7 @@ upon this department for the amount.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

E. Delafield Smith, Esq., Attorney of the United States for the Southern District of New @@ -59795,7 +60016,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. William Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -59819,8 +60040,8 @@ commanding Fort Warren, where Mr. Vernon is at present detained.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of - War. + EDWIN M. STANTON, + Secretary of War.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -59845,8 +60066,9 @@ for exercise.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- E. A. HITCHCOCK, Commissioner for - Exchange of Prisoners. + E. A. HITCHCOCK, + Commissioner for Exchange of + Prisoners.

Colonel Justin Dimmick, Commanding Fort Warren.

@@ -59889,8 +60111,9 @@ beef, instead of so much boiled.”

I am, sir, with high respect, your obedient servant,

- J. DIMMICK, Colonel United States - Army, Commanding Fort. + J. DIMMICK, + Colonel United States Army, Commanding + Fort.

Major General E. A. Hitchcock, Commissioner for Exchange of @@ -59906,9 +60129,9 @@ September 17, 1863, and am of opinion that the case of Vernon calls for no special orders at this time.

- E. A. HITCHCOCK, Major General - Volunteers, Commissioner for Exchange of - Prisoners. + E. A. HITCHCOCK, + Major General Volunteers, Commissioner for + Exchange of Prisoners.
@@ -59934,7 +60157,7 @@

I seize this occasion to offer to you, sir, a renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. William Stuart, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -59958,8 +60181,8 @@ treated the officers and crew of the Victor.

Very respectfully,

- GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the - Navy. + GIDEON WELLES, + Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -59994,8 +60217,9 @@ their treatment while at Fort Taylor I know nothing.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- J. M. B. CLITZ, Commander, United - States Navy. + J. M. B. CLITZ, + Commander, United States + Navy.

Acting Rear-Admiral J. L. Lardner, Commanding West India Squadron.

@@ -60043,8 +60267,9 @@ reception at the fort.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- J. G. MAXWELL, Lieutenant Commander U. - S. Navy. + J. G. MAXWELL, + Lieutenant Commander U. S. + Navy.

Commander J. M. B. Clitz.

 @@ -60075,8 +60300,9 @@ be courting capture.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- ALBERT KOUTZ, Lieutenant and Master U. - S. Steamer Juniata. + ALBERT KOUTZ, + Lieutenant and Master U. S. Steamer + Juniata.

Commander J. M. B. Clitz, Commanding U. S. Steamer Juniata.

@@ -60125,8 +60351,8 @@

Hoping that this statement will prove satisfactory, I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- J. H. STIMSON, Acting - Master. + J. H. STIMSON, + Acting Master.

Commander J. M. B. Clitz, Commanding U. S. Steamer Juniata.

@@ -60177,8 +60403,9 @@ consideration.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM POLLARD, Second Assistant - Engineer U. S. Navy. + WILLIAM POLLARD, + Second Assistant Engineer U. S. + Navy.

Commander John B. Clitz, Commanding U. S. Steamer Juniata.

@@ -60205,14 +60432,15 @@ are entirely false.

Respectfully, &c.,

- REUBEN RICH, Acting Master’s - Mate, - - WILLIAM MASTER, Paymaster’s - Clerk, - - THOMAS NELSON, Paymaster’s Steward, - Members of Steerage Mess. + + REUBEN RICH, + Acting Master’s Mate, + WILLIAM MASTER, + Paymaster’s Clerk, + THOMAS NELSON, + Paymaster’s Steward, Members of + Steerage Mess. +

Commander J. M. B. Clitz.

 @@ -60237,20 +60465,21 @@ contribute a single cent towards the expenses of the mess.

Respectfully, your obedient servants,

- FRANCIS CRONIN, Second Assistant - Engineer. + FRANCIS CRONIN, + Second Assistant Engineer. - WM. POLLARD, Second Assistant - Engineer. + WM. POLLARD, + Second Assistant Engineer. - PHILIP H. WHITE, Third Assistant - Engineer. + PHILIP H. WHITE, + Third Assistant Engineer. - RICHARD D. DODGE, Third Assistant - Engineer. + RICHARD D. DODGE, + Third Assistant Engineer. - ALBERT G. BONSALL, Third Assistant - Engineer. + ALBERT G. BONSALL, + Third Assistant + Engineer.

Commander J. B. M. Clitz, Commanding Juniata.

@@ -60280,8 +60509,8 @@ during his sojourn on board.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- ALBERT SCHRIVER, Surgeon. + ALBERT SCHRIVER, + Surgeon.

Commander J. M. B. Clitz, Commanding United States Steamer @@ -60341,7 +60570,7 @@ suspended.

I have the honor to be, my lord, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c.

@@ -60370,7 +60599,7 @@ foreseen by the executive department.

I have the honor to be, my lord, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c.

@@ -60401,7 +60630,7 @@ be apprised accordingly.

I have the honor to be, my lord, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -60427,7 +60656,7 @@ lordship, and to be, with high consideration, my lord, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -60449,8 +60678,9 @@ York for a report on the case, a copy of which I enclose.

With great respect,

- S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the - Treasury. + S. P. CHASE, + Secretary of the + Treasury.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -60486,8 +60716,8 @@ me by you.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- HIRAM BARNEY, Collector. + HIRAM BARNEY, + Collector.

Hon. S. P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury.

@@ -60523,7 +60753,7 @@ transmitted.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -60547,7 +60777,8 @@

I pray your lordship to accept, &c., &c., &c.,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -60573,7 +60804,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -60597,7 +60828,7 @@ with my despatch (No. 505) of the 1st instant, is now forwarded.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -60621,7 +60852,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -60646,7 +60877,7 @@ Durham, on the 2d instant.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -60670,7 +60901,7 @@ proportion to the whole population.

The receipt of this will oblige, yours, obediently,

- J. MARTIN. + J. MARTIN.

P. S.—You are at liberty to make what use you think proper of this communication.

@@ -60695,8 +60926,11 @@ Francis Adams, ambassador of the United States government to the British court.

- JOSEPH MARTIN, “Chairman.” + JOSEPH MARTIN, “Chairman.” @@ -60718,7 +60952,7 @@ of my letter to him of the 29th ultimo.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -60745,7 +60979,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -60811,7 +61045,7 @@ employ the supervision of Mr. Evarts once more.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -60843,7 +61077,8 @@ cause of discontent.

I pray your lordship to accept, &c., &c.,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -60878,7 +61113,8 @@ is not yet abandoned by the parties concerned in the enterprise.

I pray your lordship to accept, &c, &c,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c.

@@ -60902,8 +61138,9 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- J. N. MAFFITT, Commander, Confederate - States Navy. + J. N. MAFFITT, + Commander, Confederate States + Navy.

Captain J. D. Bullock, Confederate States Navy, @@ -60935,7 +61172,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c, &c., &c.

@@ -60976,7 +61213,7 @@ associates.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -61000,7 +61237,7 @@ constituents, at Richmond, in Yorkshire.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -61632,7 +61869,7 @@ a place of deposit for the purpose referred to.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c, &c.

@@ -61678,8 +61915,8 @@ to the government of the United States.

Very respectfully, &c,

- GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the - Navy. + GIDEON WELLES, + Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -61776,20 +62013,24 @@ D. 1863, at the navy department of the Confederate States of America. - GEORGE R. GHISELING. + GEORGE R. GHISELING. - J. H. MADDOX. + J. H. MADDOX. - JOHN De BREE, Paymaster, in charge. + JOHN De BREE, + Paymaster, in charge.

Signed, sealed, and delivered in presence of—

J. P. McCorkle.

Charles J. Ost.

Approved.

- S. R. MALLORY, Secretary of the - Navy. + S. R. MALLORY, + Secretary of the + Navy. @@ -61825,7 +62066,7 @@ cheerfully sustains the call.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams,.Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -61874,7 +62115,7 @@ in the question.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.,

@@ -61905,7 +62146,7 @@ complete to send.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -61963,7 +62204,7 @@ indisposition to make needless demonstrations.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -61989,7 +62230,7 @@ acknowledgment, are transmitted herewith.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -62028,7 +62269,8 @@ with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -62114,8 +62356,8 @@ party immediately implicated.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- W. L. UNDERWOOD, United States - Consul. + W. L. UNDERWOOD, + United States Consul.

Hon. Charles Francis Adams, United States Minister, London.

@@ -62141,7 +62383,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant.

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -62205,7 +62447,7 @@ nations.

I am, sir, your most obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c, &c.

@@ -62230,7 +62472,7 @@ interests in Salvador, has been received and is approved.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c, &c, &c.

@@ -62262,7 +62504,7 @@ you may write in executing this instruction.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams,. Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -62303,7 +62545,7 @@ possible.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -62489,7 +62731,7 @@ of the maker.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -62632,7 +62874,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -62697,7 +62940,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -62727,7 +62970,7 @@ practical measures.”

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H, Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -62751,8 +62994,8 @@ approved.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- F. W. SEWARD, Acting - Secretary. + F. W. SEWARD, + Acting Secretary.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c, &c., &c.

@@ -62778,7 +63021,7 @@ copy of my note is herewith transmitted.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -62818,7 +63061,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -62878,7 +63122,7 @@ conviction.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -62920,7 +63164,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -62974,7 +63219,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.,

@@ -63002,7 +63247,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -63076,8 +63322,9 @@ the government gazette of yesterday.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- WALTER GRAHAM, United States Consul for - the Cape of Good Hope. + WALTER GRAHAM, + United States Consul for the Cape of Good + Hope.

Hon. Charles F. Adams, Envoy Extraordinary, &c., &c., @@ -63103,8 +63350,8 @@ esq.

By command of his excellency the governor.

- RAWSON W. RAWSON, Colonial - Secretary. + RAWSON W. RAWSON, + Colonial Secretary. @@ -63137,7 +63384,7 @@ a reply, a copy of which I send herewith.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant.

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -63337,7 +63584,7 @@ leader on the subject, is herewith transmitted.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -64142,7 +64389,7 @@ Europe without dissatisfaction.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c, &c.

@@ -64184,7 +64431,7 @@ understood to be friendly.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -64427,7 +64674,7 @@ in their misfortunes. He had heard the bitterest remarks made against the President of the Union for endeavoring to maintain the Union, and also against the southern States for their attempting to - retain possession of their “ property.” During the first ten years + retain possession of their “property.” During the first ten years that he was in Parliament a question was being discussed which excited great interest. That question was the repeal of the Union. Those persons who advocated it stood in the same relation to this @@ -64531,7 +64778,7 @@ hear the law officers of the crown on the motion for a new trial.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -64551,7 +64798,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -64577,7 +64824,7 @@ transmitted.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -64602,7 +64849,8 @@ adoption in the interest of all the Western Powers.

I pray your lordship to accept, &c., &c.,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Honorable Earl Russell, &c., &c.

@@ -64651,7 +64899,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -64703,7 +64951,7 @@ this argument at the present time.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -64737,7 +64985,7 @@ advisable.

I am, &c., &c.,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c, &c, &c.

@@ -64810,7 +65058,7 @@ in the greatest vigor the cordial principle of non-intervention.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -64837,7 +65085,7 @@ country.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -64893,7 +65141,7 @@ are we to go through before they discover and act upon it?

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -64954,7 +65202,7 @@ transmit herewith.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -64983,7 +65231,7 @@ source of greater apprehension.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -65010,7 +65258,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -65140,8 +65389,8 @@ when="1863-11-18" calendar="gregorian">the 18th day of November, 1863. - FRED. W. TREVOR, Collector. + FRED. W. TREVOR, + Collector. @@ -65199,8 +65448,8 @@ calendar="gregorian">the 10th day of November, 1863. - FRED’K W. TREVOR, Collector. + FRED’K W. TREVOR, + Collector. Deposition of John @@ -65268,8 +65517,8 @@ calendar="gregorian">this 10th day of November, 1863. - FREDERICK W. TREVOR, Collector. + FREDERICK W. TREVOR, + Collector. Deposition of William @@ -65346,8 +65595,8 @@ calendar="gregorian">this 10th day of November, 1863. - FREDERICK W. TREVOR, Collector. + FREDERICK W. TREVOR, + Collector. Deposition of William @@ -65385,8 +65634,8 @@ calendar="gregorian">this 10th day of November, 1863. - FREDERICK W. TREVOR, Collector. + FREDERICK W. TREVOR, + Collector. Deposition of Archibald @@ -65446,8 +65695,8 @@ calendar="gregorian">this 10th day of November, 1863. - FREDERICK W. TREVOR, Collector. + FREDERICK W. TREVOR, + Collector. Earl Russell to I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -65495,7 +65744,7 @@ of the notes are herewith transmitted.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -65539,7 +65788,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Honorable Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -65560,7 +65810,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -65589,7 +65839,7 @@ suffice to give you an idea of the character of the proceedings.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -68194,7 +68444,7 @@ with Great Britain.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -68231,7 +68481,7 @@ evidences of the correctness of this course of administration.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c, &c., &c.

@@ -68254,7 +68504,7 @@ the 3d of November, a copy of which you have annexed, is approved.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -68285,7 +68535,7 @@ discussion in that conference.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -68311,7 +68561,7 @@ in order that they may be restored to the file.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -68454,7 +68704,7 @@ judge by the lights before me.

I remain, very respectfully,

- EDWIN DE LEON. + EDWIN DE LEON.

Hon. J. P. Benjamin, Secretary of State, Richmond, C. S. @@ -68572,7 +68822,10 @@

With the warmest wishes for your health and happiness, your obliged, sincere friend,

- E. De LEON. + E. De + LEON. An agreement between certain parties to run @@ -68601,10 +68854,11 @@ day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three. - WILLIAM A. ROSE, Mayor. + WILLIAM A. ROSE, + Mayor. - RICHARD HAWLEY, Deputy - Registrar. + RICHARD HAWLEY, + Deputy Registrar. this 30th day of September, 1863. - WILLIAM A. ROSE, Mayor. + WILLIAM A. ROSE, + Mayor. A.

It is agreed hereby between Colonel J. Gorgas, chief of @@ -68760,10 +69014,11 @@

We certify the above to be a true copy of the original agreement, having carefully examined the same therewith.

- J. T. SOUTTER, - - WILLIAM H. AVERELL, 3 Alderman’s - Walk, London. + + J. T. SOUTTER, + WILLIAM H. AVERELL, 3 Alderman’s Walk, London. + @@ -68817,9 +69072,9 @@ managing director, and Major Huse in behalf of the confederate government; the further details to be arranged next week.

- EDGAR P. STRINGER. + EDGAR P. STRINGER. - CALEB HUSE. + CALEB HUSE.

July 22, 1863.

Witness:

@@ -68871,7 +69126,8 @@ better.

Believe me, yours, truly,

- EDGAR P. STRINGER. + EDGAR P. + STRINGER.

Colonel Thorburn, present.

@@ -68941,8 +69197,8 @@ right.

Very truly,

- EDGAR P. STRINGER, Managing - Director. + EDGAR P. STRINGER, + Managing Director.

Hon. J. M. Mason.

 @@ -68989,7 +69245,7 @@ the government when the saltpetre is shipped.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- J. M. MASON. + J. M. MASON.

Edgar P. Stringer, Esq.

 @@ -69139,7 +69395,7 @@ counter signatures.

Your obedient servant,

- CALEB HUSE. + CALEB HUSE.

E. P. Stringer, Esq., Managing Director of the Mercantile @@ -69167,7 +69423,7 @@ to the President, and is approved.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -69200,7 +69456,7 @@ perpetuate the blessings of the Union.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c, &c.

@@ -69229,7 +69485,7 @@ continued.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -69317,7 +69573,7 @@ of the United States.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -69341,7 +69597,7 @@ highly appreciated.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c, &c, &c.

@@ -69365,7 +69621,7 @@ them.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq.,&c, &c, &c.

@@ -69388,7 +69644,7 @@ of the trial of the Alexandra, which accompanied it, and remain, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -69443,7 +69699,7 @@ nation.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c, &c., &c.

@@ -69475,8 +69731,8 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- F. W. SEWARD, Acting - Secretary. + F. W. SEWARD, + Acting Secretary.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -69507,7 +69763,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -69540,7 +69796,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your lordship the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c, &c.

@@ -69606,7 +69862,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant.

- LYONS. + LYONS.
I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient Servant

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -69662,7 +69918,7 @@ you.

I have the honor to be your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c, &c.

@@ -69690,7 +69946,7 @@ accountability.

I have the honor to be, my lord, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

To Lord Lyons.

 @@ -69725,8 +69981,8 @@ in his death.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of - War. + EDWIN M. STANTON, + Secretary of War.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -69947,8 +70203,8 @@ as having wantonly thrown his life away.

Respectfully submitted.

- J. HOLT, Judge Advocate - General. + J. HOLT, + Judge Advocate General.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

@@ -70043,8 +70299,9 @@ apparent breach of good faith.”

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- J. H. MARTINDALE, Brig. Gen. and Military - Governor. + J. H. MARTINDALE, + Brig. Gen. and Military + Governor.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

@@ -70151,8 +70408,9 @@

Trusting this statement meets your approbation, I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM P. WOOD, Superintendent of Old - Capitol Prison. + WILLIAM P. WOOD, + Superintendent of Old Capitol + Prison.

Brig. Gen. Martindale, Military Governor.

@@ -70191,7 +70449,7 @@

The governor general authorizes me to communicate it to you.

Believe me to be, my dear sir, your faithful servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward.

 @@ -70226,7 +70484,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -70281,7 +70539,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -70330,7 +70588,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your lordship’s obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Right Hon. Lord Lyons, &c., &c., &c.

diff --git a/volumes/frus1863p2.xml b/volumes/frus1863p2.xml index 89fa0dff7..7c4254a31 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1863p2.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1863p2.xml @@ -5705,7 +5705,7 @@ appreciated her interposition.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Wm. L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -5753,7 +5753,7 @@ for that purpose is impossible.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Wm. L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -5779,7 +5779,7 @@ to Mr. Drouyn de l’Huys, if requested.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -5925,7 +5925,7 @@

* * * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c.,&c., @@ -5957,7 +5957,7 @@ irritations which have prevailed there will now subside.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -5997,7 +5997,7 @@ the prosecution of the war.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -6068,7 +6068,7 @@ means of judging of it are as good or better than my own.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -6092,7 +6092,7 @@ appreciated.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -6139,7 +6139,7 @@ mails are now being closed.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -6176,7 +6176,7 @@ affected.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -6212,7 +6212,7 @@

* * * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of @@ -6257,7 +6257,7 @@ such purposes did or did not exist.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of @@ -6286,7 +6286,7 @@ brethren.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of @@ -6398,7 +6398,7 @@ which they have not anticipated.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c.

@@ -6433,7 +6433,7 @@ which has existed during the last half century.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -6458,7 +6458,7 @@ 30th last.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of @@ -6517,7 +6517,7 @@ government.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -6559,7 +6559,7 @@ authority of this government.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -6586,7 +6586,7 @@ the whole American people.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -6611,7 +6611,7 @@ inform you that it is approved.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -6658,7 +6658,7 @@

* * * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State,

I am your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -6810,7 +6810,7 @@ condition of things on this subject?

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., @@ -6863,7 +6863,7 @@ stated.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -6899,7 +6899,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., @@ -6933,7 +6933,7 @@ true one.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -6966,7 +6966,7 @@ blockades.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -7004,7 +7004,7 @@ averted.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c.,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -7179,7 +7179,7 @@ the despatch bag for that purpose.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -7209,7 +7209,7 @@ unprincipled projectors and abettors.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -7269,7 +7269,7 @@ had already received and communicated to Mr. Drouyn de l’Huys.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

April 16.

P. S.—I again saw Mr. Drouyn de l’Huys last night, and he informed me @@ -7305,7 +7305,7 @@ the proclamation of the President.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -7334,7 +7334,7 @@ condition, put to sea.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -7372,7 +7372,7 @@ shall have been able to collect upon this subject.

Accept, &c., &c.,

- CHASSELOUP LAUBAT. + CHASSELOUP LAUBAT.

P. S.—I have just this instant been notified that the ships which @@ -7504,7 +7504,7 @@ States.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -7678,7 +7678,7 @@ of rendering available to them the natural treasures of America.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -7716,7 +7716,7 @@

* * * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -7779,7 +7779,7 @@ had been left with me.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -7812,7 +7812,7 @@ common advantage of both nations.

I am sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -7959,7 +7959,7 @@ and not of design or motive injurious to France.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -8081,7 +8081,7 @@ as they think, to the interests of mankind.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -8106,7 +8106,7 @@ Japan, or Virginia, is satisfactory.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -8135,7 +8135,7 @@ require to be reported.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- W. L. DAYTON. + W. L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -8166,7 +8166,7 @@ you have suggested.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq.,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c.,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c.,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. W. H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -8320,7 +8320,7 @@ the purpose of his visit, except from the journals.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -8390,7 +8390,7 @@ application.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -8429,7 +8429,7 @@ as heretofore.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -8452,7 +8452,7 @@ relative to letters of marque, has been received, and is approved.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq.

@@ -8500,7 +8500,7 @@ with them, and its neutrality in the war which unhappily exists between that power and Mexico.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -8525,7 +8525,7 @@ the blockade service, were satisfactory.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq.

@@ -8566,7 +8566,7 @@ nations.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq.

@@ -8588,7 +8588,7 @@ upon receipt of the news of the capture of Puebla.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., @@ -8626,7 +8626,7 @@ their well-merited rewards; but at present, general, accept my warm and sincere congratulations.

- NAPOLEON. + NAPOLEON.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq.

@@ -8698,7 +8698,7 @@ l’Huys to Mr. Aspinwall, in London.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L DAYTON. + WILLIAM L DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -8746,7 +8746,7 @@

Please let me hear from you on this subject.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -8782,7 +8782,7 @@ rights of the Spanish government over the island of Cuba, and would interdict itself from all aggression against this island.

- A. RENAULD. + A. RENAULD.
@@ -8817,7 +8817,7 @@ President?

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., @@ -8906,7 +8906,7 @@ high consideration.

The minister of the Swiss Confederation,

- KERN. + KERN.

Mr. William L. Dayton, Envoy Extraordinary and @@ -8987,7 +8987,7 @@ exertions. To this he made no reply.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -9077,7 +9077,7 @@

* * * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -9129,7 +9129,7 @@ United States.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -9165,7 +9165,7 @@ the instructions upon that subject heretofore given.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq.

@@ -9189,7 +9189,7 @@ have also your No. 319 by the same mail.

Your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq.

@@ -9222,7 +9222,7 @@ action which shall not have already been inaugurated there.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq.

@@ -9270,7 +9270,7 @@ private life—it has made them more provident and wary.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of @@ -9329,7 +9329,7 @@ connected.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq.

@@ -9406,7 +9406,7 @@ cannot be disposed to stand alone in her protest against it.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq.

@@ -9445,7 +9445,7 @@ presentation and development.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq.

@@ -9472,7 +9472,7 @@ for.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq.

@@ -9560,7 +9560,7 @@ in that way quite as early as by our ordinary means of conveyance.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -9587,7 +9587,7 @@ only to say that he has promised it his prompt attention.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., @@ -9627,7 +9627,7 @@ may not fail in this emergency!

I am, sir, your obedient servant.

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., @@ -9666,7 +9666,7 @@ such acknowledgment of the south would end the war. * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -9691,8 +9691,8 @@ the matter.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- F. W. SEWARD. Acting - Secretary. + F. W. SEWARD. + Acting Secretary.

William L. Dayton, Esq.

@@ -9753,7 +9753,7 @@

* * * * * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -9816,7 +9816,7 @@ reducing it to writing in the form of a despatch.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., @@ -9878,7 +9878,7 @@ Constellation, a sailing ship, is somewhere in the Mediterranean.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., @@ -9944,7 +9944,7 @@ as can be now seen.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -9980,7 +9980,7 @@

Accept the assurances of the high consideration with which I have the honor to be, sir, your very humble and very obedient servant,

- DROUYN DE L’HUYS. + DROUYN DE L’HUYS.

Mr. Dayton, Minister of the United States, Paris.

@@ -10012,7 +10012,7 @@ have been landed.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON + WILLIAM L. DAYTON

His Excellency William H. Seward,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq.

@@ -10079,7 +10079,7 @@ been approved by the government of the United States.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -10104,7 +10104,7 @@ vice-consul to this legation.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, &c., @@ -10185,7 +10185,7 @@ certify that the foregoing copy is true and faithful.

{Seal of the consulate at Brest. }

- KENOS. + KENOS. Brest,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -10355,7 +10355,7 @@ authority in the explanations he has thus made.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq.

@@ -10379,7 +10379,7 @@ the Moniteur article, is entirely satisfactory.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq.

@@ -10403,7 +10403,7 @@ at Brest.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq.

@@ -10436,7 +10436,7 @@ representation of the case.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq.

@@ -10475,7 +10475,7 @@ repairs contemplated.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -10550,7 +10550,7 @@ action in respect to the rebel ship Florida at Brest.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -10651,7 +10651,7 @@ may leave in the course of two or three weeks.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -10679,7 +10679,7 @@ short time in port.

I am, with respect, your excellency’s very obedient servant,

- KENOS. + KENOS.

His Excellency William L.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -10779,7 +10779,7 @@ spoken of in the journals, will not, I fear, operate to detain her.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -10821,7 +10821,7 @@ Brest yesterday.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -10851,7 +10851,7 @@ have been received from him.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Wm. L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10903,7 +10903,7 @@ himself in regard to Mexico.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -10933,7 +10933,7 @@ will be, made to either of these papers.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Wm. L. Dayton, Esq.

@@ -11010,7 +11010,7 @@ excellency the Secretary of State of the United States of America the assurances of his distinguished consideration.

- J. M. ARROYO. + J. M. ARROYO.

His Excellency the Secretary of State and Foreign Affairs @@ -11070,9 +11070,9 @@

And I communicate it to you for your knowledge and consequent purposes.

- J. M. ARROYO, Under Secretary of State, - and of the Office of Foreign - Relations. + J. M. ARROYO, + Under Secretary of State, and of the Office of + Foreign Relations.

Hon. William H. Seward.

@@ -11123,8 +11123,9 @@

And I communicate it to you for your knowledge and consequent purposes.

- J. M ARROYO, Under Secretary of State, and - of the Office of Foreign Relations. + J. M ARROYO, + Under Secretary of State, and of the Office of + Foreign Relations.

Hon. William H. Seward.

@@ -11149,7 +11150,7 @@ departure of the piratical vessel, Florida.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. William L. Dayton, Esq.

@@ -11174,7 +11175,7 @@

The evidence has been heretofore sent to your department.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11300,7 +11301,7 @@

Accept, sir, the assurances of high respect with which I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

His Excellency Mr. Drouyn de l’Huys, Minister of Foreign Affairs, @@ -11330,7 +11331,7 @@ be.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., @@ -11359,7 +11360,7 @@ request, that he might have it copied, if so disposed.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., @@ -11388,7 +11389,7 @@ may warrant.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq.

@@ -11550,7 +11551,7 @@ submitting these views to the consideration of M. Drouyn de l’Huys.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c.

@@ -11588,7 +11589,7 @@ to this new and somewhat startling plot,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c.

@@ -11613,7 +11614,7 @@ hereafter be retained in port by anything essential.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, @@ -11639,7 +11640,7 @@ Winslow.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, @@ -11677,8 +11678,8 @@ of this procedure.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JNO. A. WINSLOW, Captain. + JNO. A. WINSLOW, + Captain.

Hon. William L. Dayton, &c., &c.

@@ -11761,7 +11762,7 @@ endeavoring to bring to a close?

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c.

@@ -11785,7 +11786,7 @@ England.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., @@ -11834,8 +11835,8 @@

With sentiments of very high respect, I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

- EDWARD L. KINGSBURY, United States - Consul. + EDWARD L. KINGSBURY, + United States Consul.

Hon. William L. Dayton, Envoy Extraordinary and @@ -11893,7 +11894,7 @@ consideration.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -11914,8 +11915,9 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- J. N. MAFFITT, Commander, Confederate - States Navy. + J. N. MAFFITT, + Commander, Confederate States + Navy.

Captain J. D. Bullock,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -12052,7 +12054,7 @@ declarations heretofore constantly made to us.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -12081,7 +12083,7 @@ decision as pregnant with very serious consequences.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c.,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD, + WILLIAM H. SEWARD,

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -12131,7 +12133,7 @@ sent to the Secretary of the Navy.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Wm. L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -12178,7 +12180,7 @@ marine.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -12347,7 +12349,7 @@ - ARMAN + ARMAN

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., @@ -12432,7 +12434,7 @@

Accept the assurances of the high consideration with which I have the honor to be, sir, your very humble and very obedient servant,

- DROUYN DE L’HUYS. + DROUYN DE L’HUYS.

Mr. Dayton, Minister of the United States at Paris.

@@ -12505,7 +12507,7 @@ neutrality be observed in that which concerns the war which desolates America at this moment, &c.

- CHASSELOUP LAUBAT. + CHASSELOUP LAUBAT.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L Dayton, Esq., &c., &c.

@@ -12553,7 +12555,7 @@ have been required.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -12618,7 +12620,7 @@ men.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., @@ -12654,7 +12656,7 @@ increase the number beyond that which they brought into port.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

Captain Winslow, United States Steamship Kearsarge.

@@ -12693,7 +12695,7 @@ happy if you can, without sacrifice, grant this favor.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., @@ -12780,7 +12782,7 @@

* * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., @@ -12850,7 +12852,7 @@ sovereignty and independence shall be manifested.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton. Esq., &c.,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -12910,7 +12912,7 @@

I herewith enclose a copy and translation of this communication.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -12950,7 +12952,7 @@

Accept the assurances of the high consideration with which I have the honor to be, sir, your very humble and very obedient servant,

- DROUYN DE L’HUYS. + DROUYN DE L’HUYS.

Mr. Dayton, Minister of the United States at Paris.

@@ -12977,7 +12979,7 @@ thither from a British port. Your course in the matter is approved.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c.,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c.,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -13132,7 +13134,7 @@ form.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., @@ -13165,7 +13167,7 @@ use to promote the desired solution of the matter.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM. H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM. H. SEWARD.

Wm. L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c.

@@ -13197,7 +13199,7 @@

* * * * * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -13357,7 +13359,7 @@

Accept, sir, the assurances of high consideration with which I have the honor to be your excellency’s very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

His Excellency M. Drouyn de l’Huys, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paris.

@@ -13408,7 +13410,7 @@ opposed to the duties of a strict neutrality.

The undersigned, &c.

- JOHN F. CRAMPTON. + JOHN F. CRAMPTON.

Hon. Mr. Marcy, &c., & c.

@@ -13472,7 +13474,7 @@ principles susceptible of universal application.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -13511,7 +13513,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Viscount Treilhard, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -13540,7 +13542,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Viscount Treilhard, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -13607,7 +13609,7 @@

I embrace this opportunity, sir, to renew to you the assurances of my high consideration.

- HENRI MERCIER. + HENRI MERCIER.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., @@ -13742,7 +13744,7 @@ condition of which I have spoken to you.

Accept, &c.

- ________ ________. + ________ ________.

Mr. ——— ———, Consul of France at ———.

 @@ -13809,7 +13811,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Henry Mercier, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -13869,7 +13871,7 @@

I embrace this opportunity to renew to you, sir, the assurances of my high consideration.

- HENRI MERCIER. + HENRI MERCIER.

Hon. William H. Seward. Secretary of State.

@@ -13905,7 +13907,7 @@

I embrace this opportunity to renew to you, sir, the assurances of my high consideration,

- HENRI MERCIER. + HENRI MERCIER.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., @@ -13963,8 +13965,9 @@ at New Orleans.

A true copy:

- FAUCONNET, Manager of the Consulate of - France. + FAUCONNET, + Manager of the Consulate of + France. [Translation.] Claim of Mr. Frangois Bougere, of the parish @@ -14414,8 +14417,9 @@

Eighty-eight thousand eight hundred dollars.

A true copy:

- FAUCONNET, Manager of the - Consulate. + FAUCONNET, + Manager of the + Consulate.
I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Henry Mercier, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -14610,7 +14614,7 @@ explanations will be satisfactory to your excellency, I have the honor to be, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Henry Mercier, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -14683,7 +14687,7 @@

I seize this opportunity, sir, to renew to your excellency the assurances of my high consideration.

- HENRI MERCIER. + HENRI MERCIER.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -14714,7 +14718,7 @@

Be pleased to accept, sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration.

- HENRI MERCIER. + HENRI MERCIER.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., @@ -14741,7 +14745,7 @@ and hard labor, to which they had been subjected.

Accept, sir, a renewed assurance of my very high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Henry Mergier, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -14775,7 +14779,7 @@

I embrace this occasion, sir, to renew to your excellency the assurances of my high consideration.

- HENRI MERCIER. + HENRI MERCIER. [Translation.] @@ -15001,7 +15005,7 @@ copy, we have granted the same unto him, which he has again signed after the reading thereof, on this 8th day of December, 1862.

- FRANÇOIS BOUGÉRE. + FRANÇOIS BOUGÉRE.

A true copy:

FAUCONNET, The Chancellor of the @@ -15128,7 +15132,7 @@

I embrace this occasion, sir, to renew to your excellency the assurances of my high consideration.

- HENRI MERCIER. + HENRI MERCIER.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., @@ -15246,7 +15250,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Henry Mercier, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -15290,7 +15294,7 @@ consideration.

I have the honor to be, sir, your very obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Henry Mercier, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -15322,7 +15326,7 @@ make, worthy of submission henceforth to a like test.

Accept, sir, the assurance of my very high consideration.

- HENRI MERCIER. + HENRI MERCIER.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -15380,7 +15384,7 @@ open its views to the Russian government.

Accept, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

- DROUYN DE L’HUYS. + DROUYN DE L’HUYS.

Mr. Mercier, Minister of the Emperor at Washington.

@@ -15430,7 +15434,7 @@ the Prince Gortschahoff.

Accept, &c.,

- DROUYN DE L’HUYS. + DROUYN DE L’HUYS.
@@ -15456,7 +15460,7 @@

I avail myself of the occasion, sir, to offer to you a renewed assurance of my very high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Henry Mercier, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -15493,8 +15497,9 @@ field.

With great respect, I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- G. F. SHEPLEY, Military Governor of - Louisiana. + G. F. SHEPLEY, + Military Governor of + Louisiana.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -15530,8 +15535,10 @@ and report the testimony itself, with his conclusions thereon, to this department.

- By order of Brig. Gen. G. F. SHEPLEY, Military Governor of Louisiana. + By order of Brig. Gen. G. F. + SHEPLEY, + Military Governor of + Louisiana.

James F. Miller, Assistant Adjutant @@ -15601,8 +15608,8 @@

STEPHEN THOMAS.

Subscribed and sworn to before

- BION BRADBURY, Commissioner. + BION BRADBURY, + Commissioner. Affidavit of Major Grout. @@ -15619,8 +15626,8 @@ rend="italic">th Vermont Volunteers.

Subscribed and sworn to before me.

- BION BRADBURY, Commissioner. + BION BRADBURY, + Commissioner. Affidavit of Captain Foster. @@ -15637,8 +15644,8 @@ C, 8th Vermont Volunteers.

Subscribed and sworn to before me.

- BION BRADBURY, Commissioner. + BION BRADBURY, + Commissioner. Affidavit of Napoleon Patwin. @@ -15670,8 +15677,8 @@

NAPOLEON PATWIN.

Subscribed and sworn to before me.

- BION BRADBURY, Commissioner. + BION BRADBURY, + Commissioner. Affidavit of Solon A. Perkins. @@ -15689,8 +15696,8 @@ Massachusetts Cavalry.

Subscribed and sworn to before me.

- BION BRADBURY, Commissioner. + BION BRADBURY, + Commissioner. Mr. Bradbury to

With great respect, I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- BION BRADBURY. + BION BRADBURY.

Brigadier General G. F. Shepley, Military Governor of @@ -15796,7 +15803,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Henry Mercier, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -15856,7 +15863,7 @@ at Washington as to the true character of this incident.

Accept, sir, assurances of my high consideration.

- DROUYN DE L’HUYS. + DROUYN DE L’HUYS.

Mr. Mercier, Minister of the Emperor at Washington.

@@ -15938,7 +15945,7 @@ anticipations.

Accept, sir, assurances of my high consideration.

- DROUYN DE L’HUYS. + DROUYN DE L’HUYS.

Mr. Mercier, Minister of the Emperor at Washington, D. C.

@@ -15984,7 +15991,7 @@

Please accept the renewed assurances of my high consideration.

For the minister and the first secretary of legation,

- TREILHARD. + TREILHARD.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -16011,7 +16018,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

The Viscount Treilhard, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16176,8 +16183,8 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,

- BAYARD TAYLOR, Chargé - d’Affaires. + BAYARD TAYLOR, + Chargé d’Affaires.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -16288,8 +16295,8 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,

- BAYARD TAYLOR, Chargé - d’Affaires, + BAYARD TAYLOR, + Chargé d’Affaires

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -16393,8 +16400,8 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,

- BAYARD TAYLOR, Chargé - d’Affaires. + BAYARD TAYLOR, + Chargé d’Affaires.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -16493,8 +16500,8 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,

- BAYARD TAYLOR, Chargé de - Affaires. + BAYARD TAYLOR, + Chargé de Affaires.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -16581,8 +16588,8 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,

- BAYARD TAYLOR, Chargé - d’Affaires. + BAYARD TAYLOR, + Chargé d’Affaires.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -16657,7 +16664,7 @@ stability of the Union, which I have endeavored to describe.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Bayard Taylor, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16781,8 +16788,8 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,

- BAYARD TAYLOR, Chargé - d’Affaires. + BAYARD TAYLOR, + Chargé d’Affaires.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -16843,8 +16850,8 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,

- BAYARD TAYLOR, Chargé - d’Affaires. + BAYARD TAYLOR, + Chargé d’Affaires.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -16916,7 +16923,7 @@ its sympathy was moved.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Bayard Taylor, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17084,8 +17091,8 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,

- BAYARD TAYLOR, Chargé - d’Affaires. + BAYARD TAYLOR, + Chargé d’Affaires.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17111,7 +17118,7 @@ authorized you to expect.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Bayard Taylor, Esq., &c., &c.

@@ -17148,7 +17155,7 @@ St. Petersburgh.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Bayard Taylor, Esq., &c., &c.

@@ -17296,8 +17303,8 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,

- BAYARD TAYLOR, Chargé - d’Affaires. + BAYARD TAYLOR, + Chargé d’Affaires.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., @@ -17333,7 +17340,7 @@ seas.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD + WILLIAM H. SEWARD

Bayard Taylor, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17521,8 +17528,8 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,

- BAYARD TAYLOR, Chargé - d’Affaires. + BAYARD TAYLOR, + Chargé d’Affaires.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -17570,7 +17577,7 @@ on the same subject.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Bayard Taylor, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17596,7 +17603,7 @@ shall cause it to be published here.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Bayard Taylor, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17640,8 +17647,8 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,

- BAYARD TAYLOR, Chargé - d’Affaires. + BAYARD TAYLOR, + Chargé d’Affaires.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -17793,8 +17800,8 @@ supervision of the President.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

- J. P. BENJAMIN, Secretary of - State. + J. P. BENJAMIN, + Secretary of State.

Hon. L. Q. C. Lamar, Commissioner, &c., &c., St. Petersburgh, @@ -17852,8 +17859,8 @@ one of the copies. * * * * *

I am, sir, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,

- BAYARD TAYLOR, Chargé - d’Affaires. + BAYARD TAYLOR, + Chargé d’Affaires.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -17878,7 +17885,7 @@

Please make known to him my thanks for his watchful attention.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Cassius M. Clay, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -17944,8 +17951,8 @@ three or four months. I am, sir, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,

- BAYARD TAYLOR, Chargé - d’Affaires, + BAYARD TAYLOR, + Chargé d’Affaires

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -18019,7 +18026,7 @@

* * * * * * * *

I am, very truly, your obedient servant,

- C. M. CLAY. + C. M. CLAY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, @@ -18048,7 +18055,7 @@ of the paper to Prince Gortchacow.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Cassius M. Clay, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -18082,7 +18089,7 @@

* * * * * * * *

I am, truly, your obedient servant,

- C. M. CLAY. + C. M. CLAY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -18129,7 +18136,7 @@ struck out.

I am, very, truly your obedient servant,

- C. M. CLAY. + C. M. CLAY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, @@ -18259,7 +18266,7 @@

He begs you, general, to accept the assurances of his most sincere regard.

- C. M. CLAY. + C. M. CLAY.

General Ignatieff, Aide-de-Camp General and Chief of the Asiatic Department, @@ -18329,7 +18336,7 @@

Trusting that my course will be approved by the department, I am, most truly, your obedient servant,

- C. M. CLAY. + C. M. CLAY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, @@ -18356,7 +18363,7 @@ the Emperor gave you on the occasion of your presentation.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Cassius M. Clay, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -18383,7 +18390,7 @@

* * * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Cassius M. Clay, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -18407,7 +18414,7 @@ is under consideration.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Cassius M. Clay, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -18459,7 +18466,7 @@ and to mankind,

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- C. M. CLAY. + C. M. CLAY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, @@ -18486,7 +18493,7 @@ and it is here appended, marked A.

I am, very truly, your obedient servant,

- C.M. CLAY. + C.M. CLAY.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., @@ -18539,7 +18546,7 @@ sentiments of his Imperial Majesty, and receive, at the same time, the assurance of my most distinguished consideration.

- GORTCHACOW. + GORTCHACOW.

Mr. Clay, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -18563,7 +18570,7 @@ which it contains.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Cassius M. Clay, &c., &c., &c..

@@ -18594,7 +18601,7 @@ British government.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Cassius M. Clay, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -18622,7 +18629,7 @@ powers to whom it was furnished.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Cassius M. Clay, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -18649,7 +18656,7 @@ regarded by the President with entire satisfaction.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Cassius M. Clay, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -18685,7 +18692,7 @@ United States at that place.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Cassius M. Clay, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -18751,7 +18758,7 @@ before the world. * * * * *

I am, truly, your obedient servant,

- C. M. CLAY. + C. M. CLAY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., @@ -18781,7 +18788,7 @@ has been submitted to the President.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Cassius M. Clay, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -18808,7 +18815,7 @@ subject.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Cassius M. Clay, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -18853,7 +18860,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -18883,7 +18890,7 @@ way, without foreign aid, and, I hope, without foreign intervention.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c.

@@ -18920,7 +18927,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -18952,7 +18959,7 @@ confirmed.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq.

@@ -18987,7 +18994,7 @@ and regulations in force, the fees charged, and other expenses incurred in the foreign revenue service.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.
I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -19084,7 +19091,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -19119,7 +19126,7 @@ Christian states, but of mankind.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19207,7 +19214,7 @@ type="margin">[l. s.] - ABRAHAM LINCOLN. + ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

By the President:

William H.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19262,7 +19269,7 @@ Treasury.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19312,7 +19319,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -19347,7 +19354,7 @@ surmounted.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19403,7 +19410,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -19466,7 +19473,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -19533,7 +19540,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -19604,7 +19611,7 @@ No. 87.

I have the honor to be your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -19633,7 +19640,7 @@ Constitution.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19668,7 +19675,7 @@ disappointments of the nation, and take no notice of the contraction and exhaustion of the insurgents. I am, sir, your obedient servant.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19739,7 +19746,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -19773,7 +19780,7 @@ and will continue in every emergency to be, regulated.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19901,7 +19908,7 @@ abroad.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19950,7 +19957,7 @@ whole country.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19996,7 +20003,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -20020,7 +20027,7 @@ Treasury.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -20070,7 +20077,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -20109,7 +20116,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -20162,7 +20169,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -20187,7 +20194,7 @@ movements, has been received and perused with much interest.

I am, sir, your most obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -20238,7 +20245,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -20262,7 +20269,7 @@ strategy is not yet developed.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.
I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -20338,7 +20345,7 @@ interesting information which it presents.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -20387,7 +20394,7 @@ in which it will be met, if it must come to embarrass us.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -20448,7 +20455,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -20491,7 +20498,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., @@ -20522,7 +20529,7 @@ will be sent to the Secretary of the Treasury.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -20564,7 +20571,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -20599,7 +20606,7 @@ it.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H SEWARD. + WILLIAM H SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -20628,8 +20635,8 @@ much interest.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- F. W. SEWARD, Acting - Secretary. + F. W. SEWARD, + Acting Secretary.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -20657,7 +20664,7 @@ prudence and preparation.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -20724,7 +20731,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -20768,7 +20775,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- JAMES S. PIKE. + JAMES S. PIKE.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -20855,7 +20862,7 @@ and this will be done.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq, &c., &c., @@ -20880,7 +20887,7 @@ in Europe, which it contains, are highly appreciated.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -20918,7 +20925,7 @@ representatives abroad.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James S. Pike, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -20983,7 +20990,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -21044,7 +21051,8 @@

I return this note of thanks for it, at the same time availing myself of the opportunity to wish you happiness.

- Cards of WANSIANG, TUNG, and PANKIENE. + Cards of WANSIANG, TUNG, and + PANKIENE.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, @@ -21178,7 +21186,7 @@ capacity, and extend to him all the facilities in fulfilling its duties that the treaty requires.

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

His Imperial Highness Prince Kung, Secretary-in-Chief for Foreign @@ -21270,7 +21278,7 @@ allow nothing to be done which is improper, nor permit any one to screen a person in wrong-doing for his own private ends.

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

His Imperial Highness Prince Kung, Principal Secretary of State for Foreign @@ -21464,7 +21472,7 @@

The undersigned renews to your highness assurances of his high consideration.

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

His Imperial Highness Prince Kung.

 @@ -21499,7 +21507,7 @@ soon as possible.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -21572,7 +21580,7 @@

Your proceedings at Pekin, as reported, are approved.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Anson Burlingame, Esh., &c., &c.

@@ -21624,7 +21632,7 @@ B, which was sent to George F. Seward, esq., consul at Shanghai. I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -21680,8 +21688,9 @@ supersede the provisional regulations of the fifth December, 1861.

- By order of GEORGE F. SEWARD, United - States Consul, Shanghai. + By order of GEORGE F. SEWARD, + United States Consul, + Shanghai. Revised regulations of trade on the @@ -21942,7 +21951,7 @@ China.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State,

@@ -21972,7 +21981,7 @@ date.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -22109,7 +22118,7 @@ highness, and renews the assurances of his high consideration, &c.

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Prince Kung, Chief Secretary, &c.

@@ -22137,7 +22146,7 @@ Macao. They arrived safely and promptly.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Commander D. McDougal, United States Steamer Wyoming.

@@ -22263,7 +22272,7 @@ kind as to note the time of its arrival?

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -22308,7 +22317,7 @@ established the most friendly relations with the Chinese government.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., @@ -22380,7 +22389,7 @@ would certainly not have been written thus had the writer intended to hint that the person addressed was less than his equal.

- T.W. + T.W.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Anson Burlingame, &c., &

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Anson Burlingame, Esq., &c., &c.

@@ -22489,7 +22498,7 @@ by the American people.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Anson Burlingame, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -22537,7 +22546,7 @@ is now closing.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Anson Burlingame, &c., &c.

@@ -22561,7 +22570,7 @@ at once made public.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Anson Burlingame, Esq., &c., &c.

@@ -22584,7 +22593,7 @@ proceedings in relation to bark Agnes, therein set forth.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Anson Burlingame, Esq., &c., &c.

@@ -22614,7 +22623,7 @@ session, when it will be laid before that body.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Anson Burlingame, Esq., &c., &c.

@@ -22639,7 +22648,7 @@ acknowledgments to Prince Kung for his just decision in the case.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Anson Burlingame, Esq., &c., &c.

@@ -22696,7 +22705,7 @@ strongly.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -22739,8 +22748,8 @@ some satisfactory adjustment may be determined upon. I have, &c.,

- W. P. MANGUM, United States - Consul. + W. P. MANGUM, + United States Consul.

His Excellency Anson Burlingame, United States Minister, Peking, @@ -22796,8 +22805,8 @@

With sincere wishes for your health and happiness, I have, &c.,

- W. P. MANGUM, United States - Consul. + W. P. MANGUM, + United States Consul.

Monsieur B. Edan, Consul de France, Shanghai.

@@ -22842,14 +22851,17 @@ ministers and officers of the nations to which the undersigned, respectively, pertain and belong.

- JOHN CORBETT, Captain, her Majesty’s - Scout. - - W. P. MANGUM, United States Consul, - Ningpo. - - FREDERICK HARVEY, Her Majesty’s Consul, - Ningpo. + + JOHN CORBETT, + Captain, her Majesty’s + Scout. + W. P. MANGUM, + United States Consul, + Ningpo. + FREDERICK HARVEY, + Her Majesty’s Consul, + Ningpo. + D. @@ -22895,8 +22907,8 @@ a state of uncertainty prejudicial to all interests.

I have. &c.,

- B. EDAN, The Consul of - France. + B. EDAN, + The Consul of France. @@ -22977,7 +22989,7 @@ as it is a direct appeal to your fidelity to the treaties and to the sentiments which ought to preside over our mutual relations.

- B. EDAN. + B. EDAN. F. @@ -23063,7 +23075,7 @@

I request you to reconsider the laws and regulations with reference to the principles laid down in this despatch.

- F. W. A. BRUCE. + F. W. A. BRUCE.

I am, &c.,

- F. W. A. BRUCE. + F. W. A. BRUCE.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Hon. William H. Seward.

@@ -23264,7 +23276,7 @@ qualities.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -23284,7 +23296,7 @@ but not with a view to wound your just rights by any violation of your ancient usages.

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -23354,7 +23366,7 @@ you by the next mail.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -23597,7 +23609,7 @@ and feel that a great step has been taken in the right direction in China. I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant.

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, @@ -23623,7 +23635,7 @@ government.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -23654,7 +23666,7 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, of your excelleney, the very humble and very obedient servant,

- L. D. BALLUZECK. + L. D. BALLUZECK.

Anson Burlingame, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -23698,7 +23710,7 @@ most warmly the hope you express, that our personal may not end with our official relations. I have, &c.,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

His Excellency Colonel L. de Balluzeck.

@@ -23838,7 +23850,7 @@ become the cause of dangerous complications among ourselves.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c.,

I have, &c.,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Prince Kung, Chief Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

@@ -24055,7 +24067,7 @@ safe.

I am, &c.,

- F. W. A. BRUCE. + F. W. A. BRUCE. D. @@ -24104,7 +24116,7 @@ suppressing the rebellion.

I have, &c.,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME. E. @@ -24295,7 +24307,7 @@ withdrawal.

I have, &c.,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Prince Kung, Chief Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

@@ -24391,7 +24403,7 @@ require.

I have, &c.,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Prince Kung, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24511,7 +24523,7 @@ Cunningham the letter marked A.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -24540,7 +24552,7 @@ the people of Shanghai.

I have, &c.,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Edward Cunningham, Esq.

 @@ -24568,7 +24580,7 @@ attached, marked A, B, and C.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -24605,7 +24617,7 @@ relieve commerce from the burdens put upon it by that rule.

I have, &c.,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Prince Kung, Chief Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

@@ -24673,7 +24685,7 @@ already existing between our two countries.

I have, &c.,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

His Imperial Highness Prince Kung, Chief Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

@@ -24719,7 +24731,7 @@ the question in our hands.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -24761,8 +24773,8 @@ withhold that opinion from me.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

- FREDERICK, Prince of - Wittgenstein. + FREDERICK, + Prince of Wittgenstein.

His Excellency the Hon. Anson Burlingame, Envoy Extraordinary and @@ -24813,7 +24825,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient servant,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Prince Frederick, Sayn de Wittgenstein.

@@ -24874,7 +24886,7 @@ our hands against the lawless of all nations.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- ANSON BURLINGAME. + ANSON BURLINGAME.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -24901,7 +24913,7 @@ governments.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Anson Burlingame, Esq, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24926,7 +24938,7 @@ just and equal security to all parties.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Anson Burlingame, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24951,7 +24963,7 @@ d’affaires of Denmark.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Anson Burlingame, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24977,7 +24989,7 @@ consulted on the subject at the approaching session of Congress.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Anson Burlingame, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25001,7 +25013,7 @@ for the Emperor of China.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Anson Burlingame, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25041,7 +25053,7 @@ strictly observed.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Anson Burlingame, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25064,7 +25076,7 @@ correspondence is very gratifying.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Anson Burlingame, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25089,7 +25101,7 @@ satisfaction.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Anson Burlingame, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25112,7 +25124,7 @@ conclusions therein set forth are entitled to special commendation.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Anson Burlingame, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25136,7 +25148,7 @@ will be published without loss of time.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Anson Burlingame, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25164,7 +25176,7 @@ Piper, the Danish representative here, extracts from your despatch.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Anson Burlingame, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25191,7 +25203,7 @@ with China.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Anson Burlingame, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25221,7 +25233,7 @@

I embrace, with eagerness, this occasion to offer to your excellency the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

- EDW. PIPER. + EDW. PIPER.
@@ -25319,7 +25331,7 @@

* * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, yours, very respectfully,

- G. KOERNER. + G. KOERNER.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -25420,7 +25432,7 @@ concerning African slavery.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Gustavus Koerner, Esq., &c., &c., &c., @@ -25461,7 +25473,7 @@ which is so constantly exhibited by that government at home.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Gustavus Koerner, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Madrid.

@@ -25503,7 +25515,7 @@ New Orleans.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Gustavus Koerner, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Madrid.

@@ -25663,7 +25675,7 @@ despatch.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Gustavus Koerner, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Madrid.

@@ -25719,8 +25731,8 @@

I have the honor to be, with considerations of great respect, your excellency’s obedient servant,

- R. W. SHUFELDT, Consul-General. + R. W. SHUFELDT, + Consul-General.

His Excellency the Governor, Captain-General of Cuba, &c., &c., @@ -25751,7 +25763,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Gustavus Koerner, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Madrid.

@@ -25837,7 +25849,7 @@ for the place. * * *

I have the honor to be, your most obedient servant,

- GUSTAVUS KOERNER. + GUSTAVUS KOERNER.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington @@ -25879,7 +25891,7 @@ friendship of the United States.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Gustavus Koerner, Esq., &c., &c., &c.,

I am, sir, with very great respect, your obedient servant,

- GUSTAVUS KOERNER + GUSTAVUS KOERNER

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -25989,7 +26001,7 @@

I embrace this opportunity of assuring your excellency of my most distinguished consideration.

- GUSTAVUS KOERNER. + GUSTAVUS KOERNER.

His Excellency the Marquis of Miraflores, First Secretary of State @@ -26077,7 +26089,8 @@

I improve this opportunity to renew to your excellency the assurances of my most distinguished consideration.

- EL MARQUES DE MIRAFLORES. + EL MARQUES DE + MIRAFLORES.

The Minister Plenipotentiary of the U. S.

@@ -26158,7 +26171,7 @@ in its appointments, &c., &c. * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be your most obedient servant,

- GUSTAVUS KOERNER. + GUSTAVUS KOERNER.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, @@ -26289,7 +26302,7 @@

I take this occasion to assure your excellency of my most distinguished consideration.

- GUSTAVUS KOERNER. + GUSTAVUS KOERNER.

His Excellency the Marquis of Miraflores, First Secretary of State @@ -26323,7 +26336,7 @@ coal.

Your most obedient servant,

- G. KOERNER. + G. KOERNER.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, @@ -26373,7 +26386,7 @@ liberals in the country at large.

I have the honor to be your most obedient servant,

- GUSTAVUS KOERNER. + GUSTAVUS KOERNER.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -26409,7 +26422,7 @@ the committee and of their constituents.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- GUSTAVUS KOERNER. + GUSTAVUS KOERNER.

John A. Little, Esq., United States Consul, @@ -26439,7 +26452,7 @@ developed.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Gustavus Koerner, Esq., &c., &c., Madrid.

@@ -26496,7 +26509,7 @@ the 14th of last month.

With sentiments of the highest respect, sir, your obedient servant,

- HORATIO J. PERRY. + HORATIO J. PERRY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -26548,7 +26561,7 @@ ports, or in the gulf of Mexico?

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- HORATIO J. PERRY. + HORATIO J. PERRY.

His Excellency Charles F. Adams, &c., @@ -26574,7 +26587,7 @@ communicated to the Secretary of the Navy.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

H. J. Perry, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Madrid.

@@ -26627,7 +26640,7 @@ probably be to-morrow.

With sentiments of the highest respect, sir, your obedient servant,

- HORATIO J. PERRY. + HORATIO J. PERRY.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, @@ -26682,7 +26695,7 @@ currents that this insurrection may set in motion.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Horatio J. Perry, Esq., &c., &c., Madrid.

@@ -26721,7 +26734,7 @@ acknowledged.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Horatio J. Perry, Esq., &c., &c., Madrid.

@@ -26783,7 +26796,7 @@ friendship in return.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Horatio J. Perry, Esq., &c., &c., Madrid.

@@ -26824,7 +26837,7 @@ immoderately.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Gustavus Koerner, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Madrid.

@@ -26881,7 +26894,7 @@ Marquis of Miraflores.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Horatio J. Perry, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -26912,7 +26925,7 @@ that subject with the cabinet of Madrid.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Horatio J. Perry, Esq., &c., &c., Madrid.

@@ -27029,7 +27042,7 @@

The undersigned avails himself of this occasion to renew to the honorable Secretary of State the assurance of his most high consideration.

- GABRIEL G. TASSARA. + GABRIEL G. TASSARA.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United @@ -27067,7 +27080,7 @@

The undersigned avails himself of the occasion to offer to Mr. Tassara renewed assurances of his very high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Señor Don Gabriel Garcia y Tassara, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -27098,7 +27111,7 @@

The undersigned offers to Mr. Tassara renewed assurances of his high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Señor Don Gabriel Garcia y Tassara, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -27138,7 +27151,7 @@

The undersigned avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the honorable W. H. Seward the assurances of his highest consideration.

- GABRIEL G. TASSARA. + GABRIEL G. TASSARA.

William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United @@ -27233,7 +27246,7 @@ of the occasion to reiterate to the honorable Secretary of State the assurance of his highest consideration.

- GABRIEL TASSARA. + GABRIEL TASSARA.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United @@ -27291,7 +27304,7 @@ honorable the Secretary of State the assurance of his high consideration.

- GABRIEL G. TASSARA. + GABRIEL G. TASSARA.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United @@ -27329,7 +27342,7 @@

The undersigned avails himself of this occasion to offer to Mr. Tassara a renewed assurance of his very high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Señor Don G. G. Tassara.

 @@ -27371,7 +27384,7 @@ honorable Secretary of State the assurance of his highest consideration.

- GABRIEL G. TASSARA. + GABRIEL G. TASSARA.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -27460,7 +27473,7 @@ Department, will be definitively revoked.

I remain, with the greatest consideration, truly, your servant,

- GABRIEL G. TASSARA. + GABRIEL G. TASSARA.

Hon. William H. Seward.

@@ -27593,7 +27606,7 @@ during the continuance of the present civil war.

I am, sir, with high consideration, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Señor Don Gabriel Garcia y Tassara, &c., &c., Washington.

@@ -27653,7 +27666,7 @@

I avail of this occasion to reiterate to you the assurance of my highest consideration.

- G. G. TASSARA. + G. G. TASSARA.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &I avail myself of this opportunity to offer to you renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD + WILLIAM H. SEWARD

Señor Don Gabriel Garcia y Tassara, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -27873,7 +27886,7 @@ integrity of the republic be saved.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- J. LOTHROP MOTLEY. + J. LOTHROP MOTLEY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -27906,7 +27919,7 @@ unanimously condemns.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

J. Lothrop Motley, Esq., &c., &c., Vienna.

@@ -28168,7 +28181,7 @@

Our latest dates from America are to the 20th of May. I have the honor to remain your most obedient servant,

- J. LOTHROP MOTLEY. + J. LOTHROP MOTLEY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -28207,7 +28220,7 @@ it is yet required to make.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

J. Lothrop Motley, Esq., &c., &c., &c., @@ -28256,7 +28269,7 @@ confidence.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

J. Lothrop Motley, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -28324,7 +28337,7 @@ bitter, is not exceptionably so.

I have the honor, sir, to remain your obedient servant,

- J. LOTHROP MOTLEY. + J. LOTHROP MOTLEY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -28467,7 +28480,7 @@ Austria shall arise.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

J. Lothrop Motley, Esq., &c., &c., Vienna.

@@ -28680,7 +28693,7 @@ strength and prosperity of Germany.

I have the honor to remain your obedient servant,

- J. LOTHROP MOTLEY. + J. LOTHROP MOTLEY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -28918,7 +28931,7 @@ seasonably received I will communicate it by telegraph.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

J. Lothrop Motley, &c., &c., Vienna.

@@ -28950,7 +28963,7 @@ proceeding hostile or injurious to the United States.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

J. Lothrop Motley, &c., &c., Vienna.

@@ -28980,7 +28993,7 @@ this country with profound satisfaction.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

J. Lothrop Motley, &c., &c., Vienna.

@@ -29139,7 +29152,7 @@ communicate this despatch to the imperial royal court.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

J. Lothrop Motley, Esq., &c., &c., Vienna.

@@ -29182,7 +29195,7 @@

* * * * * * * *

Your obedient servant,

- H. KREISMANN. + H. KREISMANN.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -29229,7 +29242,7 @@ manifested by the King of Prussia.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Norman B. Judd, Esq., &c., &c., Berlin.

@@ -29264,7 +29277,7 @@

* * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- N. B. JUDD. + N. B. JUDD.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -29303,7 +29316,7 @@ interesting and instructive.

Your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Norman B. Judd, Esq., &c., &c., Berlin.

@@ -29335,7 +29348,7 @@

* * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- N. B. JUDD. + N. B. JUDD.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -29366,7 +29379,7 @@ foreign countries.

Your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Norman B. Judd, Esq., &c., &c., Berlin.

@@ -29391,7 +29404,7 @@ which transcends mere curiosity.

Your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Norman B. Judd, Esq., &c., &c., Berlin.

@@ -29434,7 +29447,7 @@

* * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be your obedient servant.

- H. KREISMANN, + H. KREISMANN,

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., @@ -29462,7 +29475,7 @@

* * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- H. KREISMANN. + H. KREISMANN.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., @@ -29489,7 +29502,7 @@ will make it subserve the interests and triumph of our cause.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- H. KREISMANN. + H. KREISMANN.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., @@ -29520,7 +29533,7 @@ you, in regard to our affairs, you will please accept my thanks.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

H. Kreismann, Esq., &c., &c., Berlin.

@@ -29623,7 +29636,7 @@ war, and Russia will be left free to suppress the insurrection.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- H. KREISMANN. + H. KREISMANN.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -29686,7 +29699,7 @@ before.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- N. B. JUDD. + N. B. JUDD.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -29733,7 +29746,7 @@ are interesting and instructive.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hermann Kreismann, Esq., &c., &c., Berlin.

@@ -29765,7 +29778,7 @@ Georgia and Alabama.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Norman B. Judd, Esq., &c., &c., Berlin.

@@ -29867,8 +29880,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -29898,8 +29911,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister - Resident. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -29923,8 +29936,9 @@ honorable to the Japanese government and so conducive to peace.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the - United States in Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident of the United States in + Japan.

Lt. Col. E. St. John Neale. H. B. Majesty’s Chargé d’Affaires and Acting @@ -29978,9 +29992,9 @@ our solicitude.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- EDWARD ST. JOHN NEALE, Her Britannic - Majesty’s Chargé d’Affaires and acting Consul General in - Japan. + EDWARD ST. JOHN NEALE, + Her Britannic Majesty’s Chargé d’Affaires and + acting Consul General in Japan.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., Minister Resident of the United States, @@ -30037,8 +30051,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -30081,8 +30095,9 @@ assurances of high consideration with which I have the honor to be, your excellency’s most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the - United States in Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident of the United States in + Japan.

His Excellency Duchesne de Bellecourt, His Imperial Majesty’s Minister @@ -30117,9 +30132,9 @@ assurances. of the high consideration with which I have the honor to be your excellency’s most obedient, humble servant,

- DUCHESNE DE BELLECOURT, Minister - Plenipotentiary of his Majesty the Emperor of the French, in - Japan. + DUCHESNE DE BELLECOURT, + Minister Plenipotentiary of his Majesty the + Emperor of the French, in Japan.

His Excellency Mr. Pruyn, Minister of the United States in Japan, @@ -30156,8 +30171,9 @@

With profound respect, I remain, M. the minister, your excellency’s most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FANCON, Post-Captain, Comd’g the - ship Dordagne, of the Imperial Navy. + CHARLES FANCON, + Post-Captain, Comd’g the ship Dordagne, of the + Imperial Navy.

His Excellency Mr. the Minister of the United States @@ -30224,8 +30240,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -30248,12 +30264,11 @@ when="1862-06-15" calendar="japanese-nengō">the 18th day of the 5th month of the 2d year of Bunkin, (the 15th June, 1862.) - - KUDSE YAMATO NO KAMI. - - MIDSUNO IDSUMI NO KAMI. - - ITAKURA SUWO NO KAMI. + + KUDSE YAMATO NO KAMI. + MIDSUNO IDSUMI NO KAMI. + ITAKURA SUWO NO KAMI. + No. 2. @@ -30276,9 +30291,9 @@ purpose.

With respect and courtesy,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident for the - United States of America, &c., - &c. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident for the United States of + America, &c., &c.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -30456,8 +30471,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -30494,9 +30509,9 @@ copy of my remonstrance upon the occasion.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- E. ST. JOHN NEALE, H. B. Majesty’s Chargé - d’Affaires and Acting Consul General in - Japan. + E. ST. JOHN NEALE, + H. B. Majesty’s Chargé d’Affaires and Acting + Consul General in Japan.

Mr. Robert H. Pruyn, &c., &c., Japan.

@@ -30551,8 +30566,9 @@ will otherwise attach to the country.

With respect and courtesy,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the - United States of America in Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident of the United States of + America in Japan.

Their Excellencies Wakisaka Nakatsaka no Tayu, Midsuno Idsumi no Kami, Itakura Suwo no Kami,

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident, - &c., &c., Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident, &c., &c., + Japan.

Lieut. Col. E. St. John Neale, H. B. Majesty’s Chargé d’Affaires, &c., @@ -30624,8 +30641,9 @@ protect them.

With respect and courtesy,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister, &c., - &c., &c., Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister, &c., &c., &c., + Japan.

Their Excellencies Wakisaka Nakatsaka no Tayu, Midsuno Idsumi no Kami, Itakura Suwo no Kami, I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -30717,8 +30735,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -30759,8 +30777,9 @@ been given.

With respect and courtesy,

- ROBT. H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the - United States in Japan. + ROBT. H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident of the United States in + Japan.

Their Excellencies the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Yedo.

@@ -30796,8 +30815,9 @@ British merchants are placed.

With respect and courtesy,

- ROBT. H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the - United States in Japan. + ROBT. H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident of the United States in + Japan.

Their Excellencies the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Yedo.

@@ -30847,8 +30867,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBT. H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBT. H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -30884,12 +30904,12 @@ calendar="japanese-nengō gregorian">The 6th day of the 6th month of the 2d year of Bunion, (the 2d July, 1862.) - - WAKISAKA NAKATSAKA NO TAYU. - - MIDSUNO IDSUMI NO KAMI. - - ITAKURA SUWO NO KAMI. + + WAKISAKA NAKATSAKA NO + TAYU. + MIDSUNO IDSUMI NO KAMI. + ITAKURA SUWO NO KAMI. +

His Excellency Robert H. Pruyn, Minister Resident of the United States of @@ -30926,8 +30946,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -30959,7 +30979,7 @@ proper.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., Yedo.

@@ -31037,8 +31057,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -31066,8 +31086,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -31104,8 +31124,9 @@ with the law of the land.

With respect and esteem,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the - United States in Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident of the United States in + Japan.

Their Excellencies Wakisaka Nakatsaka no Tayu, Midsuno Idsumi no Kami, Itakura Suwo no Kami, The 7th day of the 6th month of the 2d year of Bunkin, (the 3d July, 1862.) - - WAKISAKA NAKATSAKA NO TAYU. - - MIDSUNO IDSUMI NO KAMI. - - ITAKURA SUWO NO KAMI. + + + WAKISAKA NAKATSAKA NO + TAYU. + MIDSUNO IDSUMI NO KAMI. + ITAKURA SUWO NO KAMI. +

His Excellency Robert H. Pruyn, Minister Resident of the United States of @@ -31165,8 +31187,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -31192,11 +31214,11 @@ 6th day of the 8th month of the 2d year of Bunkin, (the 29th August 1862.) - WAKISAKA NAKATSAKA NO TAYU. + WAKISAKA NAKATSAKA NO TAYU. - MIDSUNO IDSUMI NO KAMI. + MIDSUNO IDSUMI NO KAMI. - ITAKURA SUWO NO KAMI. + ITAKURA SUWO NO KAMI.

His Excellency Robert H. Pruyn, Minister Resident of the United States, @@ -31341,7 +31363,7 @@ and Paris.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., Yedo.

@@ -31557,8 +31579,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -31588,8 +31610,9 @@ United States.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the - United States of America in Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident of the United States of + America in Japan.

J. K. de Wit, Esq., His Netherland Majesty’s Consul General, &c., &c., @@ -31630,8 +31653,9 @@ distinguished consideration.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the - United States of America in Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident of the United States of + America in Japan.

His Excellency Duchesne de Bellecourt, Minister Plenipotentiary of France, @@ -31656,8 +31680,9 @@ happen by reason thereof.

With respect and esteem,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the - United States of America in Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident of the United States of + America in Japan.

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs, &c., Japan.

@@ -31686,7 +31711,7 @@ government are cordial and satisfactory.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., Yedo.

@@ -31716,7 +31741,7 @@ worthy of especial praise.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., Yedo.

@@ -31743,7 +31768,7 @@ Japanese empire.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., Yedo.

@@ -31768,7 +31793,7 @@ you so properly desire.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., Yedo.

@@ -31816,7 +31841,7 @@ usefulness in the important mission with which you are charged.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., Yedo.

@@ -31847,7 +31872,7 @@ in Japan will hereafter be inviolably protected.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., Yedo.

@@ -31872,7 +31897,7 @@ accordance with them.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., Yedo.

@@ -31907,7 +31932,7 @@ in the waters of Japan.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., Yedo.

@@ -32000,8 +32025,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -32200,8 +32225,8 @@

I am, my dear sir, most respectfully, your obedient, humble servant,

- GEORGE S. FISHER, United States - Consul. + GEORGE S. FISHER, + United States Consul.

His Excellency General Robert H. Pruyn, Minister Resident, Yedo.

@@ -32260,8 +32285,9 @@ acts.

With respect and esteem,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the - United States in Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident of the United States in + Japan.

Their Excellencies Midsuno Idsumi No Kami, Itakura Suwo No Kami, Ogalawara Dsusio No Kami, I have the honor to be, my dear colleague, your excellency’s most obedient, humble servant,

- DUCHESNE DE BELLECOURT, Minister - Plenipotentiary of France in Japan. + DUCHESNE DE BELLECOURT, + Minister Plenipotentiary of France in + Japan.

Meanwhile I avail myself, &c.,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the - United States in Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident of the United States in + Japan.

His Excellency Duchesne de Bellecourt, His Imperial Majesty’s Minister @@ -32389,8 +32417,9 @@ given to its crew and our consul,

I avail myself, &c.,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the - United States in Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident of the United States in + Japan.

His Excellency Duchesne de Bellecourt, His Imperial Majesty’s Minister @@ -32470,8 +32499,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident at - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident at Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -32554,8 +32583,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -32585,7 +32614,7 @@ spring.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., Yedo.

@@ -32616,8 +32645,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -32669,8 +32698,9 @@ all these governments will be greatly increased and be perpetual. With respect and esteem,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, &c., &c., - &c., Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + &c., &c., &c., + Japan.

Their Excellencies Midsuno Idsumi No Kami, Itakura Suwo No Kami, Ogalawara Dlusio No Kami,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., Yedo.

@@ -32735,7 +32765,7 @@ made upon the temporary residence of the British envoy.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., Yedo.

@@ -32916,8 +32946,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBT. H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBT. H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -32965,8 +32995,9 @@ as an emblem of friendship and good will.

With respect and esteem,

- ROBT. H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the - United States in Japan. + ROBT. H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident of the United States in + Japan.

Their Excellencies the Ministers for Foreign @@ -32994,12 +33025,11 @@ when="1863-02-01" calendar="gregorian japanese-nengō">the 12th day of the 12th month of the 2d year of Bunkin, (the 1st of February, 1863.) - - MIDSOENO IDSUMI NO KAMI. - - ITAKURA SUWO NO KAMI. - - OGASAWARA DSUSIO NO KAMI. + + MIDSOENO IDSUMI NO KAMI. + ITAKURA SUWO NO KAMI. + OGASAWARA DSUSIO NO KAMI. +

His Excellency Robert H. Pruyn, Minister Resident of the United States of @@ -33080,7 +33110,7 @@ assistance to the citizens of the United States.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., Yedo.

@@ -33179,8 +33209,9 @@ Nagasaki, and commercial agent at Hakodadi.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the - United States of America in Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident of the United States of America + in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -33239,9 +33270,9 @@ of our citizens.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the - United States in Japan, &c., &c., - &c. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident of the United States in + Japan, &c., &c., &c.

George S. Fisher, Esq., American Consul, Kanagawa, Japan.

@@ -33303,9 +33334,9 @@ my high regard and consideration, with which I subscribe myself your obedient, humble

- EDWARD ST. JOHN NEALE, Her Britannic - Majesty’s Chargé d’Affaires, &c., &c., &c, in - Japan. + EDWARD ST. JOHN NEALE, + Her Britannic Majesty’s Chargé d’Affaires, + &c., &c., &c, in Japan.

General R. H. Pruyn, Minister Resident of the United States in Japan, @@ -33334,7 +33365,7 @@ 24.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., Yedo.

@@ -33412,8 +33443,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -33441,8 +33472,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -33519,8 +33550,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister resident in Japan.

Hon. William. H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -33551,10 +33582,11 @@ the 3d day of the 3d month of the 3d year of Bunkin, (the 19th April, 1863.) - - MATSUDAIRA BOODZEN NO KAMI. - - INOWUYE KAWATSI NO KAMI. + + MATSUDAIRA BOODZEN NO + KAMI. + INOWUYE KAWATSI NO KAMI. +

His Excellency Robert H. Pruyn, Minister Resident of the United States of @@ -33592,9 +33624,10 @@ >the 4th day of the 3d month of the 3d year of Bunkin, (the 20th April, 1863.) - MATSUDAIRA BOODZEN NO KAMI. + MATSUDAIRA BOODZEN NO KAMI. - INOWUYE KAWATSI NO KAMI. + INOWUYE KAWATSI NO + KAMI.

His Excellency Robert H. Pruyn, Minister Resident of the United States of @@ -33633,9 +33666,10 @@ 4th day of the 3d month of the 3d year of Bunkin, (the 20th April, 1863.) - MATSUDAIRA BOODZEN NO KAMI. + MATSUDAIRA BOODZEN NO KAMI. - INOWYE KAWUATSI NO KAMI. + INOWYE KAWUATSI NO + KAMI.

His Excellency E. St. John Neale, Chargé d’Affaires and Consul-General of Great @@ -33666,9 +33700,9 @@ unsatisfied.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- EDWARD ST. JOHN NEALE, H. B. M.’s Chargé - d’Affaires, &c., &c., &c., - Japan. + EDWARD ST. JOHN NEALE, + H. B. M.’s Chargé d’Affaires, &c., + &c., &c., Japan.

General R. H. Pruyn, Minister Resident of the United States of America, @@ -33741,8 +33775,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -33763,7 +33797,8 @@ consuls of all other foreign states.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- EDWARD ST. JOHN NEALE. + EDWARD ST. JOHN + NEALE.

General Pruyn, Resident @@ -33802,13 +33837,13 @@ consul to the consuls of friendly states for the information of the subjects of their respective nations residing within this settlement.

- E. ST. JOHN NEALE. + E. ST. JOHN NEALE. Yokohama, April 16, 1863. True copy. - ABEL A. G. GOWER. + ABEL A. G. GOWER. [Enclosure No. 3.] @@ -33885,8 +33920,9 @@ concerned in the preservation of peaceful relations.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- R. H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the - United States in Japan. + R. H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident of the United States in + Japan. [Enclosure No. 4.] @@ -33992,7 +34028,8 @@ formality.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient, humble servant,

- EDWARD ST. JOHN NEALE. + EDWARD ST. JOHN + NEALE.

General R. H. Pruyn,

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- EDWARD ST. JOHN NEALE, Her Britannic - Majesty’s Chargé d’Affaires, Japan. + EDWARD ST. JOHN NEALE, + Her Britannic Majesty’s Chargé d’Affaires, + Japan.

General R. H. Pruyn,

True copy.

- ABEL A. J. GOWER. + ABEL A. J. GOWER. [Enclosure No. 7.] @@ -34116,8 +34154,9 @@ disturbances at Yokohama.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- R. H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the - United States in Japan. + R. H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident of the United States in + Japan.

Colonel E. St. John Neale, - ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the - United States in Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident of the United States in + Japan.

Colonel E. St. John Neale, I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -34458,8 +34498,9 @@ with which I have the honor to be your excellency’s most obedient, humble servant,

- DUCHESNE DE BELLECOURT, Minister - Plenipotentiary of France in Japan. + DUCHESNE DE BELLECOURT, + Minister Plenipotentiary of France in + Japan.

His Excellency General Pruyn, Minister Resident of the United @@ -34555,8 +34596,9 @@ had in view in taking this decision, will only promote peace and good relations between Japan and the western powers.

- DUCHESNE DE BELLECOURT, Minister - Plenipotentiary of France. + DUCHESNE DE BELLECOURT, + Minister Plenipotentiary of + France. - ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the - United States in Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident of the United States in + Japan.

His Excellency Duchesne de Bellecourt, Minister Plenipotentiary of France in @@ -34740,7 +34783,8 @@ duly communicated to the representatives of foreign States.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- EDWARD ST. JOHN NEALE. + EDWARD ST. JOHN + NEALE.

General R. H. Pruyn, Minister Resident of the United States in Japan.

@@ -34782,8 +34826,9 @@ of peace.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the - United States in Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident of the United States in + Japan.

Colonel E. St. John Neale, Her Britannic Majesty’s Chargé d’affaires in @@ -34830,8 +34875,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -34857,8 +34902,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -34894,8 +34939,9 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be your excellency’s most obedient, humble servant,

- DUCHESNE DE BELLECOURT, Minister - Plenipotentiary of France in Japan. + DUCHESNE DE BELLECOURT, + Minister Plenipotentiary of France in + Japan.

His Excellency Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., - ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the - United States in Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident of the United States in + Japan.

His Excellency Duchesne de Bellecourt,

I have honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident, &c., - &c. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident, &c., + &c.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -35007,8 +35055,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -35091,8 +35139,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William. H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -35136,8 +35184,8 @@

I have the honor to be. sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -35183,7 +35231,7 @@ its elucidation.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., Yedo.

@@ -35297,8 +35345,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -35359,8 +35407,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -35422,8 +35470,9 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, your excellency’s obedient, humble servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the - United States in Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident of the United States in + Japan.

His Excellency Duchesne de Belle court, - DUCHESNE DE BELLECOURT, Minister - Plenipotentiary of France in Japan. + DUCHESNE DE BELLECOURT, + Minister Plenipotentiary of France in + Japan.

His Excellency General R. H. Pruyn,

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- E. ST. JOHN NEALE, Her Britannic Majesty’s - Chargé d’Affaires, &c., &c. + E. ST. JOHN NEALE, + Her Britannic Majesty’s Chargé d’Affaires, + &c., &c.

General Robert H. Pruyn, I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -35740,8 +35791,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -35765,7 +35816,7 @@ this department advised of all your proceedings.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD + WILLIAM H. SEWARD

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., Yedo.

@@ -35873,8 +35924,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -36109,7 +36160,8 @@ affairs of state.

Respectfully received,

- Name of Tycoon. + Name of Tycoon. No. 2. @@ -36155,7 +36207,8 @@ pleasure, condescend to conquer foreigners.

This is received submissively, and with due honors,

- His own name (Mikado.) + His own name + (Mikado.)

3d Month.

 @@ -36212,8 +36265,8 @@

The foregoing is reverently received on Irminal, i. e., the August.

- Name, i. e., - TAIKUN. + Name, i.e., + TAIKUN. Proclamation to the Ono Mitske. @@ -36402,8 +36455,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -36517,8 +36570,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward. Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -36600,9 +36653,9 @@ emergency as may be practicable.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- EDW. ST. JOHN NEALE, Her Britannic - Majesty’s Chargé d’Affaires And Acting Consul General in - Japan. + EDW. ST. JOHN NEALE, + Her Britannic Majesty’s Chargé d’Affaires And + Acting Consul General in Japan.

General Robert H. Pruyn, .) - OGOSAWARA DSUSIO NO KAMI. + OGOSAWARA DSUSIO NO + KAMI.

His Excellency Robert H. Pruyn, Minister of the United States, &c., @@ -36656,8 +36710,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -36688,8 +36742,8 @@ send this despatch.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most humble servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister - Resident. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c., @@ -36739,8 +36793,9 @@ citizens of the United States may sustain by reason thereof.

With respect and esteem,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the - United States in Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident of the United States in + Japan.

His Excellency Ogasawavra Dsusio no Kami, @@ -36798,8 +36853,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -36845,8 +36900,9 @@ 1858.

With respect and esteem,

- DUCHESNE DE BELLECOURT, Minister - Plenipotentiary of France, in Japan. + DUCHESNE DE BELLECOURT, + Minister Plenipotentiary of France, in + Japan. - E. ST. JOHN NEALE, Her Britannic Majesty’s - Chargé d’Affaires in Japan. + E. ST. JOHN NEALE, + Her Britannic Majesty’s Chargé d’Affaires in + Japan.

His Excellency Ogasawara Dsusio No Kami, Member of the Gorogio, &c., @@ -36963,8 +37020,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister, &c., - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister, &c., Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -37005,8 +37062,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -37054,7 +37111,7 @@ all the western nations.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., Yedo.

@@ -37169,7 +37226,7 @@ expressed in this despatch.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., Yokohama.

@@ -37210,7 +37267,7 @@ on the occasion referred to.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., Yedo.

@@ -37276,7 +37333,7 @@ which of them must give way in any case of irreconcilable conflict.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., Yokohama.

@@ -37719,8 +37776,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -37791,8 +37848,8 @@ that the above is a true and correct copy of the original deposition.

- GEO. D. PORTER, Deputy U. S. - Consul. + GEO. D. PORTER, + Deputy U. S. Consul. Statement of loss suffered in consequence of a @@ -37825,7 +37882,7 @@ - RUSSELL & CO. + RUSSELL & CO. Shanghai, July 4, @@ -37863,8 +37920,9 @@ insulted, for such other and further measures of punishment as may be thought advisable. With respect and esteem,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the - United States of America in Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident of the United States of + America in Japan.

Their Excellencies the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Yedo.

@@ -37913,8 +37971,9 @@ both the Pembroke and the Wyoming.

With respect and esteem,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the - United States of America in Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident of the United States of + America in Japan.

Their Excellencies the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Yedo.

@@ -38024,7 +38083,8 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect and high consideration, the consul general of the Netherlands,

- D. DEGRAEFF VAN POLSBROEK. + D. DEGRAEFF VAN + POLSBROEK.

His Excellency General Pruyn, Minister Resident of the United States in @@ -38051,8 +38111,8 @@ fired into, 8th July; Dutch sloop-of-war, 11th July, at same place; 20th July, French Admiral destroyed one of those batteries.

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -38093,8 +38153,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -38208,8 +38268,8 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in - Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -38252,8 +38312,8 @@ the 6th month of the 3d year of Bunkin, (July 24, 1863.) - MATSUDAIRA BOODZEN NO KAMI, INOWUYE KAWATSI NO - KAMI. + MATSUDAIRA BOODZEN NO KAMI, INOWUYE KAWATSI NO + KAMI. [Enclosure No. @@ -38290,18 +38350,20 @@ proceed with the operations, the motives for which the undersigned have herein set forth.

- DUCHESNE DE BELLECOURT, Minister - Plenipotentiary of his Majesty the Emperor of the - French. - - ROBERT H. PEUYN, Minister Resident of the - United States. - - EDWARD ST. JOHN NEALE,, Her Britannic - Majesty’s Chargé d’Affaires. - - D. DEGRAEFF VAN POLSBROEK, Consul General - of the Netherlands in Japan. + + DUCHESNE DE BELLECOURT, + Minister Plenipotentiary of his + Majesty the Emperor of the French. + ROBERT H. PEUYN, + Minister Resident of the United + States. + EDWARD ST. JOHN NEALE,, + Her Britannic Majesty’s Chargé + d’Affaires. + D. DEGRAEFF VAN POLSBROEK, + Consul General of the Netherlands in + Japan. + Mr. Pruyn @@ -38372,8 +38434,9 @@ open the inland sea, and how and when it proposes to do so.

With respect and esteem,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the - United States in Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident of the United States in + Japan.

Their Excellencies Matsudaira Boodzen No Kami, @@ -38415,8 +38478,9 @@ government.

With respect and esteem,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the - United States in Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident of the United States in + Japan.

Their Excellencies Midsuno Idsumi No Kami, Itakura Suwo No Kami, Ministers for @@ -38478,8 +38542,9 @@ removed.

With respect and esteem,

- ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the - United States in Japan. + ROBERT H. PRUYN, + Minister Resident of the United States in + Japan.

Their Excellencies Matsudaira Boodzen No Kami, Midsuno Idsumi No Kami, Itakura Suwo No Kami, Inowuye @@ -38503,14 +38568,13 @@ when="1863-08-12" calendar="gregorian japanese-nengō">the 28th day of the 6th month of the 3d year of Bunkin, (the 12th August, 1863.) - - MATSUDAIRA BOODZEN NO KAMI. - - MIDSUNO IDSUMI NO KAMI. - - ITAKURA SUWO NO KAMI. - - INOWUYE KAWATSI NO KAMI. + + MATSUDAIRA BOODZEN NO + KAMI. + MIDSUNO IDSUMI NO KAMI. + ITAKURA SUWO NO KAMI. + INOWUYE KAWATSI NO KAMI. +

His Excellency Robert H. Pruyn, Minister Resident of the United States of @@ -38642,7 +38706,7 @@ Europe and America.

I am, &c.,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., Yokohama.

@@ -38672,7 +38736,7 @@ ratification.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD, + WILLIAM H. SEWARD,

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., Yokohama.

@@ -38699,7 +38763,7 @@ have briefly communicated.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., Yokohama.

@@ -38745,7 +38809,7 @@ have occurred since that communication was sent.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Robert H. Pruyn, Esq., &c., &c., Yokohama.

@@ -38843,7 +38907,7 @@ to the whole world.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- R. M. BLATCHFORD. + R. M. BLATCHFORD.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c.

@@ -38879,7 +38943,7 @@ business for the observance of the holidays.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

R. M. Blatchford, Esq., &c., &c., Rome.

@@ -38910,7 +38974,7 @@ insurmountable.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.
I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- R. M. BLATCHFORD. + R. M. BLATCHFORD.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -38974,7 +39038,7 @@ Union.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

George P. Marsh, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Turin.

@@ -38997,8 +39061,9 @@ by Colonel Cattabene.

By order of the Secretary of War.

- C. P. BUCKINGHAM, Brigadier General and - Assistant Adjutant General. + C. P. BUCKINGHAM, + Brigadier General and Assistant Adjutant + General.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -39028,7 +39093,7 @@ Secretary of War.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

George P. Marsh, Esq., &c., &c., &c., @@ -39075,7 +39140,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

George P. Marsh, Esq., &c., &c.,

I have the honor to be, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- GEORGE P. MARSH. + GEORGE P. MARSH.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -39165,7 +39230,7 @@ venture to communicate.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

George P. Marsh, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Turin.

@@ -39228,7 +39293,7 @@ auspicious circumstances than those which now exist.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

George P. Marsh, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Turin.

@@ -39263,7 +39328,7 @@ unfruitful of any important results.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

George P. Marsh, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Turin.

@@ -39333,7 +39398,7 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- GEORGE P. MARSH. + GEORGE P. MARSH.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -39373,7 +39438,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, yours,

- GEORGE P. MARSH. + GEORGE P. MARSH.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -39459,7 +39524,7 @@

I beg you, Mr. Minister, to accept the renewed assurance of my high consideration.

- GEORGE P. MARSH. + GEORGE P. MARSH.

His Excellency Chevalier Visconti Venosta, Minister of Foreign Affairs, @@ -39504,7 +39569,7 @@ correct European ideas in this respect.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

George P. Marsh, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Turin.

@@ -39590,7 +39655,7 @@ forbearance towards ourselves.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

George P. Marsh, Esq., &c., &c.,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

George P. Marsh, Esq, &c., &c., &c., Turin.

@@ -39651,7 +39716,7 @@ neglected.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

George P. Marsh, Esq., &c., &c., &c., I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- H. S. SANFORD. + H. S. SANFORD.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -39763,7 +39828,7 @@ the interesting information which you have given me.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

H. S. Sanford, Esq., &c., &c, &c. Brussels.

@@ -39791,7 +39856,7 @@ think important.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

H. S. Sanford, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Brussels.

@@ -39860,7 +39925,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- H. S. SANFORD. + H. S. SANFORD.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -39905,7 +39970,7 @@ demonstration against Charleston is imminent.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

H. S. Sanford, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Brussels.

@@ -39939,7 +40004,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- H. S. SANFORD. + H. S. SANFORD.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -39965,7 +40030,7 @@ capitalization of the Scheldt dues, to be held on the 1st proximo.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Henry S. Sanford, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Brussels.

@@ -40032,7 +40097,7 @@ affection.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Henry S. Sanford, Esq., &c., &c., &c.,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Henry S. Sanford, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Brussels.

@@ -40127,7 +40192,7 @@ the freedom of the Scheldt, now so happily accomplished.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- H. S. SANFORD. + H. S. SANFORD.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -40164,7 +40229,7 @@ powers without frankly making it known to the proper governments.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Henry S. Sanford, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Brussels.

@@ -40269,7 +40334,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- H. S. SANFORD. + H. S. SANFORD.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -40298,7 +40363,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

- H. S. SANFORD. + H. S. SANFORD.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -40332,7 +40397,7 @@ them.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Henry S. Sanford, &c., &c., &c., Brussels.

@@ -40432,7 +40497,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

With great respect, your obedient servant,

- E. JOY MORRIS. + E. JOY MORRIS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -40529,7 +40594,7 @@ unabated, but rather increased.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

- E. JOY MORRIS. + E. JOY MORRIS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

@@ -40562,7 +40627,7 @@

Accept, sir, I beg you also, assurances of my proper consideration.

- ALI. + ALI.

Mr. Morris, Minister Resident of the United States of America.

@@ -40601,7 +40666,7 @@ their citizens.

Accept, sir, the assurance of my perfect consideration.

- ALI. + ALI.

Mr. Morris, Minister Resident of the United States of America.

@@ -40653,7 +40718,7 @@ but not yet published.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- E. JOY MORRIS. + E. JOY MORRIS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -40709,7 +40774,7 @@ American gentlemen from the inconvenience complained of.

I have the honor, &c.,

- E. JOY MORRIS. + E. JOY MORRIS.

J Aug. Johnson, United States Consul, Beirut.

@@ -40759,7 +40824,7 @@ towards them.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- J. AUG. JOHNSON. + J. AUG. JOHNSON.

E. Joy Morris, Esq., United States Minister Resident, Constantinople.

@@ -40870,7 +40935,7 @@ avails himself of this occasion to repeat to his excellency the assurance of his high consideration.

- ALI. + ALI.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

E. Joy Morris, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Constantinople.

@@ -40953,7 +41018,7 @@ its duty in this case.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

- E. JOY MORRIS. + E. JOY MORRIS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -40990,7 +41055,7 @@ peace.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

E. Joy Morris, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Constantinople.

@@ -41022,7 +41087,7 @@ has already resulted from them.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

E. Joy Morris, Esq., &c., &c., &c., @@ -41054,7 +41119,7 @@ manifest the just reciprocation of these generous sympathies.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

E. Joy Morris, Esq., &c., &c., &c.,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM. H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM. H. SEWARD.

E. Joy Morris, Esq., &c., &c., &c.,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

E. Joy Morris, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Constantinople.

@@ -41141,7 +41206,7 @@ further from this department.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

E. Joy Morris Esq., &c., &c., &c., Constantinople.

@@ -41166,7 +41231,7 @@ to punishment the assassins of the Rev. Mr. Merriam.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

E. Joy Morris, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Constantinople.

@@ -41203,7 +41268,7 @@ it.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

E. Joy Morris, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Constantinople.

@@ -41235,7 +41300,7 @@ government, has been referred to the Secretary of the Navy.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

E. Joy Morris, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Constantinople.

@@ -41279,7 +41344,7 @@ exercises but a nominal control.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- B. JOY MORRIS. + B. JOY MORRIS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -41333,7 +41398,7 @@

Be so good, sir, as to accept the assurances of my perfect consideration.

- ALI. + ALI.

E. Joy Morris, Esq., Minister Resident of the United States of America.

@@ -41367,7 +41432,7 @@ continent for a much longer period.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

E. Joy Morris, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Constantinople.

@@ -41402,7 +41467,7 @@ remarks as you may deem most fitting to the occasion.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Bradford R. Wood, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Copenhagen.

@@ -41430,7 +41495,7 @@ pernicious designs at Copenhagen.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Bradford R. Wood, Esq., &c., &c., &c., @@ -41499,7 +41564,7 @@ destruction.

I remain, your obedient servant,

- BRADFORD R. WOOD. + BRADFORD R. WOOD.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -41531,7 +41596,7 @@ department.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Bradford R. Wood, Esq, &c., &c., &c., @@ -41563,7 +41628,7 @@

* * * * * * * *

I remain, very truly, your obedient servant,

- BRADFORD R. WOOD. + BRADFORD R. WOOD.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -41627,8 +41692,8 @@ unjust.

I remain, sir, your obedient servant,

- BRADFORD R. WOOD, Minister - Resident, + BRADFORD R. WOOD, + Minister Resident

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -41659,7 +41724,7 @@ to the subject as might be deemed expedient.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Bradford R. Wood, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Copenhagen.

@@ -41690,8 +41755,8 @@ 11th May proximo.

I remain, &c., your obedient servant,

- BRADFORD R. WOOD, Minister - Resident. + BRADFORD R. WOOD, + Minister Resident.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -41719,7 +41784,7 @@ consideration.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Bradford R. Wood, Esq., &c., &c., Copenhagen.

@@ -41751,7 +41816,7 @@ telegraph.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Bradford R. Wood, Esq., &c., &c., Copenhagen.

@@ -41777,8 +41842,8 @@ forever teach him the ninth commandment.

I remain, &c., &c., your obedient servant,

- BRADFORD R. WOOD, Minister - Resident. + BRADFORD R. WOOD, + Minister Resident.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -41942,7 +42007,7 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

- WILLIAM S. THAYER. + WILLIAM S. THAYER.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -42085,7 +42150,7 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM S. THAYER. + WILLIAM S. THAYER.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -42125,7 +42190,7 @@ can build states.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William S. Thayer, Esq, &c., &c., Alexandria.

@@ -42210,7 +42275,7 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM S. THAYER. + WILLIAM S. THAYER.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -42259,7 +42324,7 @@ of the government and people of the United States.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Wm. S. Thayer, Esq., &c., &c., Alexandria.

@@ -42294,7 +42359,7 @@ has hitherto been so eminently successful.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William S. Thayer, &c., &c., Alexandria.

@@ -42432,7 +42497,7 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM S. THAYER. + WILLIAM S. THAYER.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C

@@ -42566,7 +42631,7 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM S. THAYER. + WILLIAM S. THAYER.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -42592,7 +42657,7 @@ due consideration.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William S. Thayer, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Alexandria.

@@ -42624,7 +42689,7 @@ United States.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William S. Thayer, Esq., &c., &c., Alexandria.

@@ -42650,7 +42715,7 @@ to his Highness on some suitable occasion.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William S. Thayer, Esq., &c., &c., &c., @@ -42794,7 +42859,7 @@ the hospitals established here by European Christians.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM S. THAYER. + WILLIAM S. THAYER.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -42912,7 +42977,7 @@ in regard to canals and hydraulic engineering.

I have the honor to be, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM S. THAYER. + WILLIAM S. THAYER.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -43015,7 +43080,7 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM S. THAYER. + WILLIAM S. THAYER.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -43125,7 +43190,7 @@ mortality is less among the contingents of the isthmus than in the most salubrious villages in Egypt.

- FERD. DE LESSEPS. + FERD. DE LESSEPS. B. @@ -43258,7 +43323,7 @@ which they had sought, through their private correspondence, to turn the Viceroy from his object.

- FERD. DE LESSEPS. + FERD. DE LESSEPS. Cairo, April 14, @@ -43401,7 +43466,7 @@ affairs, and to leave him a copy.

Accept, &c., &c.,

- ALI. + ALI.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William S. Thayer, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Alexandria.

@@ -43459,7 +43524,7 @@ practicability of the proposed canal.

I am, sir, your obedient servant.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William S. Thayer, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Alexandria.

@@ -43526,7 +43591,7 @@ other kind.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM S. THAYER. + WILLIAM S. THAYER.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -43624,7 +43689,7 @@ it is involved.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM S. THAYER + WILLIAM S. THAYER

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -43649,7 +43714,7 @@ communicated to Congress early in the next session.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William S. Thayer, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Alexandria.

@@ -43744,7 +43809,7 @@ English nation is in Morocco.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- JESSE H. McMATH. + JESSE H. McMATH.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -43927,7 +43992,7 @@ department.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- JESSE H. McMATH. + JESSE H. McMATH.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -43991,7 +44056,7 @@

I avail myself of this occasion to offer to your excellency a renewed assurance of my very high consideration and regard.

- JESSE H. McMATH. + JESSE H. McMATH.

His Excellency Seid Mohamed Bargash, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

@@ -44032,7 +44097,7 @@ 17, 1863.)

The employé of the throne, elevated by God,

- MOHAMED BARGASH. + MOHAMED BARGASH.

Our dear and wise friend, Consul General for the American nation, Jesse H. McMath, Esq.

@@ -44108,7 +44173,7 @@

I avail myself of the opportunity afforded to assure your excellency of my high consideration and esteem.

- JESSE H. McMATH. + JESSE H. McMATH.

His Excellency Seid Mohamed Bargash, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -44147,7 +44212,7 @@ September 23, 1863.) The employe of the throne, elevated by God, - MOHAMED BARGASH. + MOHAMED BARGASH.

Our dear and wise friend, Consul General for the American nation, Jesse H. McMath, Esq.

@@ -44183,7 +44248,7 @@ 1863.)

The employé of the throne, elevated by God,

- MOHAMED BARGASH. + MOHAMED BARGASH.

God will save him.

 @@ -44211,7 +44276,7 @@ minister for foreign affairs.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Jesse H. McMath, Esq., &c., &c., * * * * * * * * * * * *

Your obedient servant,

- THOMAS CORWIN. + THOMAS CORWIN.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -44295,18 +44360,17 @@ minister of foreign relations the assurance of their high consideration.

- THOMAS CORWIN, E. E. & M. P. of the U. - S. A. - - E. D. WAGNER. - - FR’CO DE P. PASTOR. - - AUGUSTE V. KINT DE ROODENBECK. - - MANUEL NICHOLAS COPANCHO. - - NARCISO DE P. MARTIN. + + THOMAS CORWIN, + E. E. & M. P. of the U. S. + A. + E. D. WAGNER. + FR’CO DE P. PASTOR. + AUGUSTE V. KINT DE + ROODENBECK. + MANUEL NICHOLAS COPANCHO. + NARCISO DE P. MARTIN. +

His Excellency Mr. Juan Antonio de la Fuente, Minister of Foreign @@ -44387,7 +44451,8 @@

The undersigned takes pleasure in reiterating to their excellencies the assurances of his high consideration.

- JUAN ANTONIO DE LA FUENTE. + JUAN ANTONIO DE LA + FUENTE.

His Excellency Mr. Thomas Corwin, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister @@ -44437,7 +44502,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

Your obedient servant,

- THOS. CORWIN. + THOS. CORWIN.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c.

@@ -44464,7 +44529,7 @@ having been cancelled.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Thomas Corwin, Esq.

 @@ -44510,7 +44575,7 @@ we shall probably encounter no foreign disturbance.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Thomas Corwin, Esq.

 @@ -44569,7 +44634,7 @@

The undersigned avails himself of this occasion to renew to Mr. Romero the assurances of his most distinguished consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Señor Don Matias Romero, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -44600,7 +44665,7 @@ informed as to the defences of the place, has little, if any, doubt of success.

- THOMAS CORWIN. + THOMAS CORWIN.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -44640,7 +44705,7 @@ may give the true state of our dealings with both belligerents.

Your obedient servant,

- THOMAS CORWIN. + THOMAS CORWIN.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -44684,7 +44749,7 @@

I profit by this opportunity to renew to you, sir, the assurances of my most distinguished consideration.

- M. ROMERO. + M. ROMERO.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -44715,7 +44780,7 @@ French in the prosecution of their hostilities in Mexico.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Thomas Corwin, Esq.

 @@ -44743,7 +44808,7 @@

I avail myself of the occasion, sir, to offer you a renewed assurance of my very high consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Señor Don Matias Romero, &c., &c.

@@ -44786,7 +44851,7 @@ government, I avail of the opportunity to repeat to you, sir, the assurances of my most distinguished consideration.

- M. ROMERO. + M. ROMERO.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -44842,7 +44907,7 @@

I avail of this opportunity to repeat to you, sir, the assurances of my most distinguished consideration.

- M. ROMERO. + M. ROMERO.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -44876,7 +44941,7 @@

I avail myself of the occasion, sir, to offer to you the assurance of my distinguished consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Señor Don Matias Romero, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -44993,7 +45058,7 @@ victory should Puebla be attacked.

I am your obedient servant,

- THOMAS CORWIN. + THOMAS CORWIN.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -45068,7 +45133,7 @@

I have the honor to remain, with the highest consideration, sir, your excellency’s most obedient, humble servant,

- E. DE WAGNER. + E. DE WAGNER.

Hon. Thomas Corwin, &c., &c.

@@ -45134,7 +45199,7 @@ occasion to renew to your excellency the assurance of my esteem.

- THOMAS CORWIN. + THOMAS CORWIN.

His Excellency Baron E. D. Wagner, Minister of Prussia, Mexico.

@@ -45179,7 +45244,7 @@

Please accept, Mr. Envoy, the assurance of my high consideration,

- E. DE WAGNER. + E. DE WAGNER.

Hon. Thomas Corwin, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister @@ -45209,7 +45274,7 @@ in Mr. Wagner’s note.

I have the honor to be your friend and colleague,

- THOMAS CORWIN. + THOMAS CORWIN. A 5, No 39. @@ -45245,7 +45310,8 @@ honor to subscribe myself your very respectful, humble servant.

- MANUAL NICHOLAS CORPANCHO. + MANUAL NICHOLAS + CORPANCHO.

His Excellency the Hon. Thomas Corwin, Dean of the Diplomatic @@ -45288,7 +45354,8 @@

By this occasion I have the honor to repeat to your excellency, my colleague, that I am your obedient servant,

- FRAN’CO DE P. PASTER. + FRAN’CO DE P. + PASTER.

His Excellency Thomas Corwin, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister @@ -45322,7 +45389,8 @@

Deign to accept the assurance of my distinguished consideration,

- NARCISCO DE F. MARTIN. + NARCISCO DE F. + MARTIN.

Hon. Thomas Corwin, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -45409,7 +45477,8 @@

I avail of the occasion to renew to your excellency the assurances of my most distinguished consideration.

- J A. DE LA FUENTE. + J A. DE LA + FUENTE.

His Excellency Thomas Corwin, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister @@ -45473,7 +45542,7 @@

I take this occasion to renew to your excellency the assurance of my distinguished regard.

- THOS. CORWIN. + THOS. CORWIN.

His Excellency Señor A. de la Fuente, &c., &c., @@ -45526,7 +45595,8 @@ holds that they be respected.

The undersigned profits by this opportunity, &c.

- JUAN D. DIOS ARIAS. + JUAN D. DIOS + ARIAS.

His Excellency Baron Wagner, Minister Resident of his Majesty the King @@ -45609,7 +45679,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, sir, the assurances of my most distinguished consideration.

- M. ROMERO. + M. ROMERO.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -45646,7 +45716,7 @@

The undersigned avails himself of this occasion to offer to Mr. Romero the assurance of his distinguished consideration.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Señor Don Matias Romero.

 @@ -45722,7 +45792,7 @@ honorable William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States, the assurances of his most distinguished consideration.

- M. ROMERO. + M. ROMERO.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -45955,7 +46025,7 @@ William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States, the assurances of his most distinguished consideration.

- M. ROMERO. + M. ROMERO.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -46012,7 +46082,7 @@ unsafe.

Your obedient servant,

- THOMAS CORWIN. + THOMAS CORWIN.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State U. S. A., Washington,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Thomas Corwin, Esq.

 @@ -46107,7 +46177,7 @@ re-enforcements.

Your obedient servant,

- THOMAS CORWIN. + THOMAS CORWIN.

Hon. Willam H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -46145,7 +46215,7 @@ government.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Thomas Corwin, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Mexico.

@@ -46176,7 +46246,7 @@ having a vessel-of-war in that quarter.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Thomas Corwin, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Mexico.

@@ -46214,7 +46284,7 @@ the ultimate success of the government.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Thomas Corwin, Esq., &c., &c., Mexico.

@@ -46270,7 +46340,7 @@ absence, as shall seem expedient.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Thomas Corwin, Esq., &c., &c., Mexico.

@@ -46311,7 +46381,7 @@ the President.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James Watson Webb, Esq.

 @@ -46357,7 +46427,7 @@ prevented, because we cannot increase that despatch.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James Watson Webb, Esq.

 @@ -46394,7 +46464,7 @@ the Marquis d’Abrantes which this despatch renders necessary.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James Watson Webb, Esq.

 @@ -46428,7 +46498,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- J. WATSON WEBB. + J. WATSON WEBB.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.

@@ -46508,7 +46578,7 @@ excellency his sentiments of respect and most distinguished consideration.

- J. WATSON WEBB. + J. WATSON WEBB.

His Excellency the Marquis d’Abrantes, Councillor to his Imperial Majesty, @@ -46604,7 +46674,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- J. WATSON WEBB. + J. WATSON WEBB.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington,

I remain, with the highest regard, your obedient servant,

- THOMAS ADAMSON, Jr., Consul. + THOMAS ADAMSON, Jr., + Consul.

James Watson Webb, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -46730,7 +46803,7 @@ information; I lay before you all I have on the subject.

In haste, yours, most respectfully,

- THOMAS F. WILSON. + THOMAS F. WILSON.

J. Watson Webb, Esq.

 @@ -46823,7 +46896,7 @@ the assurance of his great personal respect and most distinguished consideration.

- J. WATSON WEBB. + J. WATSON WEBB.

His Excellency the Marquis d’Abrantes, &c., &c.

@@ -46889,7 +46962,7 @@

I reiterate to Mr. James Watson Webb the assurance of my high consideration.

- MARQUIS D’ABRANTES. + MARQUIS D’ABRANTES.

J. Watson Webb, Esq.

 @@ -47014,7 +47087,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- J. WATSON WEBB. + J. WATSON WEBB.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -47308,7 +47381,7 @@ to your excellency his cordial respect and confidence, and his most distinguished consideration.

- J. WATSON WEBB. + J. WATSON WEBB.

His Excellency the Marquis d’Abrantes, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -47350,7 +47423,7 @@

Believe me, my dear sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- J. WATSON WEBB. + J. WATSON WEBB.

————, United States Consul, ————.

 @@ -47457,7 +47530,7 @@

I am, with high esteem and consideration, your excellency’s friend,

- G. C. GREBERT. + G. C. GREBERT.

Mr. Webb, Minister, &c., Brazil.

@@ -47557,7 +47630,7 @@ profit by the occasion to renew to him the assurances of my high consideration.

- MARQUIS D’ABRANTES. + MARQUIS D’ABRANTES.

Mr. James Watson Webb, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -47588,7 +47661,7 @@

* * * * * * * *

I have the honor, &c.,

- J. WATSON WEBB. + J. WATSON WEBB.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -47665,7 +47738,7 @@ avails himself of this occasion to renew to your excellency the assurances of his most distinguished consideration.

- J. WATSON WEBB. + J. WATSON WEBB.

The Marquis d’Abrantes, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -47699,7 +47772,7 @@

I renew to James Watson Webb the expressions of my high consideration.

- MARQUIS D’ABRANTES. + MARQUIS D’ABRANTES.

General James Watson Webb, Envoy Extraordinary, &c., &c., @@ -47755,7 +47828,7 @@ facilitate in that way, or in any other, the interests of Brazil.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James Watson Webb, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -47798,7 +47871,7 @@ forbear further allusion to the subject.

* * * * * * * *

- JAMES WATSON WEBB. + JAMES WATSON WEBB.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -47856,7 +47929,7 @@ be attained.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James Watson Webb, Esq.

 @@ -47885,7 +47958,7 @@

* * * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James Watson Webb, Esq.

 @@ -47962,7 +48035,7 @@ recent trial, and they are not now far distant.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Thomas H. Nelson, Esq.

@@ -47992,7 +48065,7 @@

* * * * * * *

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- THOMAS H. NELSON. + THOMAS H. NELSON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United @@ -48126,7 +48199,7 @@ high esteem with which I have the honor to remain your excellency’s most obedient servant,

- THOMAS H. NELSON. + THOMAS H. NELSON.

His Excellency the Secretary of Foreign Relations @@ -48153,7 +48226,7 @@

* * * * * * * *

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- THOMAS H. NELSON. + THOMAS H. NELSON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United @@ -48277,7 +48350,7 @@ his high and distinguished consideration, and in subscribing himself his excellency’s attentive and obsequious servant,

- MANUEL A. TOCORNAL. + MANUEL A. TOCORNAL.

The Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United @@ -48369,7 +48442,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- THOMAS H. NELSON. + THOMAS H. NELSON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United @@ -48411,7 +48484,7 @@ myself of this occasion, I beg to renew to your excellency the assurances of my cordial esteem and distinguished consideration.

- THOMAS H. NELSON. + THOMAS H. NELSON.

His Excellency the Secretary of Foreign Relations @@ -48457,7 +48530,7 @@ will be materially impaired.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -48531,7 +48604,7 @@ the means must be adapted to the end.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -48576,7 +48649,7 @@ we should be prepared for all such contingencies.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

Commander T. Augustus Craven, United States Steamer Tuscarora, @@ -48636,8 +48709,8 @@ days.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- C. W. PICKERING, Captain. + C. W. PICKERING, + Captain.

Hon. James E. Harvey, United States Minister, @@ -48664,8 +48737,8 @@ cruisers.

I am respectfully, &c., your obedient servant,

- C. W. PICKERING, Captain. + C. W. PICKERING, + Captain.

Commander T. Augustus Craven, Commanding United States Steamship @@ -48720,7 +48793,7 @@ needed.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -48738,7 +48811,8 @@ Western islands. Turkish steamer Shasgehaad has taken despatches there for Semmes. Cruise there for some days with Kearsarge.

- MORAN, London. + MORAN, + London.

Captain Craven, United States Steamer Tuscarora.

@@ -48790,7 +48864,7 @@ under their best convictions of duty.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -48835,7 +48909,7 @@ return to these waters.

I am, respectfully,

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

Captain C. W. Pickering, United States Steamer Kearsarge, @@ -48875,7 +48949,7 @@ circumstances.

I am, respectfully,

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

Captain C. W. Pickering, United States Steamer Kearsarge, @@ -48946,7 +49020,7 @@ performed on this side of the Atlantic.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -48961,8 +49035,8 @@

“Will leave Algeciras this afternoon for Cadiz to communicate with Captain Pickering.

- “A. BRYSON, “United States Steamer - Chippewa. + “A. BRYSON, “United States Steamer Chippewa.

“Mr. Harvey, “United States Minister, Lisbon.”

@@ -48980,7 +49054,8 @@ communicate with Kearsarge as to future movements. Release remains off Algeciras.

- “SPRAGUE, Consul. + “SPRAGUE, + Consul.

“Mr. Harvey, “American Minister, Lisbon.”

@@ -49046,7 +49121,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew the assurances of my most distinguished consideration.

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

His Excellency the Duke de Soulé, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

@@ -49102,7 +49177,7 @@ reason.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -49131,7 +49206,7 @@ of the country, could reasonably be expected.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James E. Harvey, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Lisbon.

@@ -49162,7 +49237,7 @@ not seem to be the case at the present moment.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James E. Harvey, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Lisbon.

@@ -49258,7 +49333,7 @@ the efficiency of those means.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -49295,7 +49370,7 @@ commanders within my reach to this effect.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -49385,7 +49460,7 @@ the struggle. I then took leave of him.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -49419,7 +49494,7 @@ crave us to extinguish.

I am, sir, your most obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James E. Harvey, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Lisbon.

@@ -49447,7 +49522,7 @@ might be most probably expected.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

Hon. William H Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -49485,7 +49560,7 @@ accord and unity of purpose among its several departments.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -49557,7 +49632,7 @@

I avail myself of this opportunity to repeat the assurances of my highest respect and consideration.

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

His Excellency the Duke de Soulé, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

@@ -49588,7 +49663,7 @@ and by the direction which its closest alliances may take.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -49616,7 +49691,7 @@

I avail of this opportunity to renew the assurance of my most distinguished consideration.

- DUQUE DE SOULÉ. + DUQUE DE SOULÉ.

James E. Harvey, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -49650,7 +49725,7 @@ bestow the boon of freedom to his unwilling subjects in Poland.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

James E. Harvey, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Lisbon.

@@ -49705,7 +49780,7 @@ pleasure to cultivate in every proper way.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -49751,7 +49826,7 @@ while no substantial benefit is conferred.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- JAMES E. HARVEY. + JAMES E. HARVEY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington @@ -49769,8 +49844,8 @@ 150 miles from here, steering northward and eastward, in direction of British channel.

- JAMES E. HARVEY, United States - Minister, + JAMES E. HARVEY, + United States Minister

Captain Winslow, United States War Steamer Kearsarge, Brest.

@@ -49817,7 +49892,7 @@ then so soon perceive, and so universally deplore.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

George G. Fogg, Esq., &c., &c.,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

George G. Fogg, Esq., &c., &c., Berne.

@@ -49888,7 +49963,7 @@ of that kind.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

George G. Fogg, Esq., &c., &c., Berne.

@@ -49914,7 +49989,7 @@ which you reside.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

George G. Fogg, Esq., &c., &c., Berne.

@@ -49973,7 +50048,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

With sincere regard, your obedient servant,

- GEORGE G. FOGG. + GEORGE G. FOGG.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United @@ -50011,7 +50086,7 @@ grounds to apprehend any injurious designs on their part.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

George G. Fogg, Esq., &c., &c., That a similar history may be that of our own greater republic, hopes and prays your obedient servant,

- GEORGE G. FOGG. + GEORGE G. FOGG.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States of America.

@@ -50125,7 +50200,7 @@ blood and fire purer, freer, and greater than was possible without that baptism, I am your friend and obedient servant,

- GEORGE G. FOGG. + GEORGE G. FOGG.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United @@ -50159,7 +50234,7 @@ pernicious designs at Stockholm.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Jacob S. Haldeman, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -50192,7 +50267,7 @@ Copenhagen.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Jacob S. Haldeman, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -50305,7 +50380,7 @@ importance than before. Again thanking the President, and you, sir, for your kindness, I remain your obedient servant,

- J. S. HALDEMAN. + J. S. HALDEMAN.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, @@ -50336,7 +50411,7 @@ statesman of his well known clear perceptions and solid judgment.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Jacob S. Haldeman, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -50404,7 +50479,7 @@ and, as they believe, aggressive neighbors.

I remain your obedient servant,

- J. S. HALDEMAN. + J. S. HALDEMAN.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, @@ -50434,7 +50509,7 @@ conclusion of our desolating civil war. * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Jacob S. Haldeman, Esq., &c., &c., &c., @@ -50464,7 +50539,7 @@ government, to prevent the carrying into effect of any such designs.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Jacob S. Haldeman, Esq., &c., &c., &c., @@ -50516,7 +50591,7 @@

* * * * * * * *

I remain your obedient servant,

- J. S. HALDEMAN. + J. S. HALDEMAN.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., @@ -50586,7 +50661,7 @@

* * * * * * * *

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- AMOS PERRY. + AMOS PERRY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, @@ -50618,8 +50693,8 @@ accompanying the homestead bill.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- AMOS PERRY, United States - Consul. + AMOS PERRY, + United States Consul.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, @@ -50686,8 +50761,8 @@

* * * * * * * *

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- AMOS PERRY, United States - Consul. + AMOS PERRY, + United States Consul.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, @@ -50734,7 +50809,7 @@ that department.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., @@ -50768,7 +50843,7 @@

* * * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WM. L. DAYTON. + WM. L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, @@ -51011,7 +51086,7 @@ dominions, so long as France does not assail the United States.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Wm. L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -51044,7 +51119,7 @@ the decision.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -51076,7 +51151,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -51110,7 +51185,7 @@ together.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM L. DAYTON. + WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., @@ -51140,7 +51215,7 @@ most if not the whole of which is understood to be at Richmond.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -51165,7 +51240,7 @@ regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of State of the United States, and not otherwise.

- ABRAHAM LINCOLN. + ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -51217,7 +51292,7 @@ communication.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -51242,7 +51317,7 @@ Mr. Corwin.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

William L. Dayton, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -51304,7 +51379,7 @@ movements now going on in Mexico.

I am, general, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Major General N. P. Banks, Commanding the Department of the Gulf, @@ -51344,7 +51419,7 @@ Texas.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Thomas Corwin, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -51395,8 +51470,8 @@

* * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

- WILLIAM WINTHROP, United States - Consul. + WILLIAM WINTHROP, + United States Consul.

F.W. Seward, Assistant Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -51425,8 +51500,8 @@ which you will be careful hereafter to be guided.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- F. W. SEWARD, Assistant - Secretary. + F. W. SEWARD, + Assistant Secretary.

W. Winthrop, Esq., United States Consul, Malta.

@@ -51455,7 +51530,7 @@ has been ordered to cease.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

W. Winthrop, Consul of the United States, Malta.

@@ -51494,8 +51569,8 @@ true.

I have the honor to be, your most obedient servant,

- W. L. UNDERWOOD, United States - Consul. + W. L. UNDERWOOD, + United States Consul.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -51520,7 +51595,7 @@ the natural decline of credit built on so precarious a foundation.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

W. L. Underwood, Esq., United States Consul, Glasgow.

@@ -51572,7 +51647,7 @@ the south whom they profess so much to admire.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

- THOMAS H. DUDLEY. + THOMAS H. DUDLEY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -51599,7 +51674,7 @@ it, whether in money or supplies and munitions.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

T. H. Dudley, Esq., United States Consul, Liverpool.

@@ -51635,7 +51710,7 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- THOMAS H. DUDLEY. + THOMAS H. DUDLEY.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -51675,7 +51750,7 @@ fleets that are now fitting out in Europe.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

T. H. Dudley, Esq., United States Consul, Liverpool.

@@ -51704,8 +51779,8 @@ possession, I shall be glad if it may be obtained from our ministers and consuls abroad. With great respect,

- S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the - Treasury. + S. P. CHASE, + Secretary of the Treasury.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -51732,7 +51807,7 @@ desire.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. S. P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury.

@@ -51761,7 +51836,7 @@ used, the rules and regulations in force, the fees charged, and other expenses incurred in the foreign revenue service.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. S. P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury.

@@ -52038,7 +52113,7 @@ herein made, is, from the date at which the said acts respectively take effect, annulled.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD. [Circular No. 29.] @@ -52135,7 +52210,7 @@ this department if, under the laws of the countries in which they respectively reside, they are authorized to administer oaths.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.
@@ -52162,7 +52237,7 @@ information as you think proper.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. S. P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury.

@@ -52231,38 +52306,44 @@ powers, and compensation, to the end that a person of talent and character may be enabled to accept the position.

- J. D. JONES, Pres’t Atlantic Mutual Insurance - Company. - - M. H. GRINNELL, Pres’t Sun Mutual Insurance - Company. - - ALFRED OGDEN, Mount Orient Mutual Insurance - Company. - - ELWOOD WALTER, Pres’t Mercantile Mutual - Insurance Company. - - B. C. MORRIS, Pres’t Columbian Mutual - Insurance Company. - - ALFRED EDWARDS, Pres’t Pacific Mutual - Insurance Company. - - J. P. TAPPAN, Pres’t Neptune Insurance - Company. - - A. W. WHIPPLE, Pres’t Washington Mutual - Insurance Company. - - SAMUEL DRAKE SMITH, Pres’t Commercial Mutual - Insurance Company. - - JOHN H. EARLY, Pres’t New York Mutual - Insurance Company. - - F. L. LATHROP, Pres’t Union Mutual Insurance - Company. + + J. D. JONES, + Pres’t Atlantic Mutual Insurance + Company. + + M. H. GRINNELL, + Pres’t Sun Mutual Insurance + Company. + + ALFRED OGDEN, + Mount Orient Mutual Insurance + Company. + + ELWOOD WALTER, + Pres’t Mercantile Mutual Insurance + Company. + B. C. MORRIS, + Pres’t Columbian Mutual Insurance + Company. + ALFRED EDWARDS, + Pres’t Pacific Mutual Insurance + Company. + J. P. TAPPAN, + Pres’t Neptune Insurance + Company. + A. W. WHIPPLE, + Pres’t Washington Mutual Insurance + Company. + SAMUEL DRAKE SMITH, + Pres’t Commercial Mutual Insurance + Company. + JOHN H. EARLY, + Pres’t New York Mutual Insurance + Company. + F. L. LATHROP, + Pres’t Union Mutual Insurance + Company. +

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United @@ -52408,7 +52489,7 @@ next session of Congress.

I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

To Messrs. J. D. Jones, president Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company; M. H. Grinnell, president Sun Mutual Insurance Company; Alfred @@ -52489,8 +52570,8 @@ among thousands of now agonized hearts.

I have the honor, &c., &c.,

- WILLIAM B. WEST, United States - Consul. + WILLIAM B. WEST, + United States Consul.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, @@ -52522,7 +52603,7 @@ whose families still remain in Ireland.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

@@ -52544,7 +52625,7 @@ consul at Nassau, which I will thank you to return with your reply.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. S. P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury.

@@ -52579,8 +52660,8 @@ the Navy, as charged with all matters connected with the blockade.

With great respect,

- S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the - Treasury. + S. P. CHASE, + Secretary of the Treasury.

Hon. W. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -52616,8 +52697,8 @@ officer. This course has accordingly been taken.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- F. W. SEWARD, Assistant - Secretary, + F. W. SEWARD, + Assistant Secretary

S. C. Hawley, Esq., United States Consul, Nassau, now in New York.

@@ -52653,7 +52734,7 @@ is herewith enclosed.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. Edmund Bates, Attorney General.

@@ -52795,8 +52876,9 @@ left, or before she has reached the intermediate neutral port.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- TITIAN J. COFFEY, Attorney General ad - interim. + TITIAN J. COFFEY, + Attorney General ad + interim.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -52827,7 +52909,7 @@ may think proper.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy.

@@ -52856,8 +52938,8 @@ your consideration.

With great respect,

- S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the - Treasury. + S. P. CHASE, + Secretary of the Treasury.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -52926,8 +53008,8 @@ of the Acting Attorney General.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- C. P. CLINCH, Assistant - Collector. + C. P. CLINCH, + Assistant Collector.

Hon. S. P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury.

@@ -52989,7 +53071,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

Yours, very truly,

- JOHN BIGELOW. + JOHN BIGELOW.

Hon. William H. Seward.

@@ -53019,7 +53101,7 @@ against enlistments of troops for service in foreign countries.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

@@ -53054,8 +53136,8 @@ herewith transmitted.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- P. H. WATSON, Assistant Secretary of - War. + P. H. WATSON, + Assistant Secretary of War.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -53141,8 +53223,9 @@ herewith.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- CARY H. FRY, Acting Paymaster General - United States Army. + CARY H. FRY, + Acting Paymaster General United States + Army.

Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

@@ -53172,8 +53255,8 @@ transportation, which is the great obstacle.

Yours, very respectfully,

- JOHN BIGELOW, United States - Consul. + JOHN BIGELOW, + United States Consul.

Hon. William H. Seward.

@@ -53202,7 +53285,7 @@ The government has no legal authority to offer any pecuniary inducements to the advent of industrious foreigners.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

J. Bigelow, Esq., U. S. Consul, Paris.

@@ -53272,7 +53355,7 @@ forwarding them.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy.

@@ -53314,7 +53397,7 @@

Thanking you for your kind attention to the request of the department, I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. S. P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury.

@@ -53986,8 +54069,8 @@ French model.

Yours, very respectfully,

- JOHN BIGELOW, United States - Consul. + JOHN BIGELOW, + United States Consul.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -54120,7 +54203,7 @@ the department, I have the honor to be, with the highest repect, sir, your most obedient servant,

- W.H. VESEY. + W.H. VESEY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -54165,7 +54248,7 @@ responsible.

I have the honor to remain your obedient servant,

- A. W. CRAWFORD. + A. W. CRAWFORD.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -54263,8 +54346,8 @@ declaration for transit.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- A. L. WOLFF, United States - Consul. + A. L. WOLFF, + United States Consul.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

R. W. Shufeldt, Esq., United States Consul General, Havana.

@@ -54339,7 +54422,7 @@ Spanish government in the case of the Blanche.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

R. W. Shufeldt, Esq., United States Consul General, Havana.

@@ -54396,8 +54479,8 @@ use.

I am, sir, with great respect, your very obedient servant,

- FRANKLIN WEBSTER, United States - Consul. + FRANKLIN WEBSTER, + United States Consul.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of @@ -54427,8 +54510,8 @@ our minister there.

With great respect,

- S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the - Treasury. + S. P. CHASE, + Secretary of the Treasury.

Hon. W. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -54466,8 +54549,8 @@

The documents enclosed in your letter are herewith returned.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- HIRAM BARNEY, Collector. + HIRAM BARNEY, + Collector.

Hon. S. P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury.

@@ -54507,7 +54590,7 @@ courtesy, by United States consuls abroad.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. S. P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury.

@@ -54536,8 +54619,8 @@ early occasion to bring the subject to the attention of Congress.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

- S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the - Treasury. + S. P. CHASE, + Secretary of the Treasury.

Hon. W. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -54570,8 +54653,9 @@ I could have sent a few brigades to the States already. * * * * * *

I am, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES BOERNSTEIN, United States Vice-Consul, - Bremen. + CHARLES BOERNSTEIN, + United States Vice-Consul, + Bremen.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -54603,7 +54687,7 @@ ought to be, universally known.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Boernstein, Esq., United States Vice-Consul, Bremen.

@@ -54655,8 +54739,9 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your most obedient servant,

- WILLIAM W. MURPHY, United States Consul - General. + WILLIAM W. MURPHY, + United States Consul + General.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, @@ -54682,7 +54767,7 @@

I will thank you to return the despatch with your reply.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

@@ -54725,7 +54810,7 @@ Frankfort.

I am, sir, your most obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

W. W. Murphy, Esq., U. S. Consul General, Frankfort.

@@ -54767,8 +54852,8 @@ returned.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of - War. + EDWIN M. STANTON, + Secretary of War.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -54836,8 +54921,8 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM W. MURPHY, Consul - General. + WILLIAM W. MURPHY, + Consul General.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -54866,7 +54951,7 @@ administration.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

W. W. Murphy, Esq., United States Consul General, Frankfort.

@@ -54935,8 +55020,9 @@

I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your most obedient servant,

- WILLIAM W. MURPHY, United States Consul - General. + WILLIAM W. MURPHY, + United States Consul + General.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -54963,7 +55049,7 @@ orbits, though sometimes unexpectedly an eclipse obscures them.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

W. W. Murphy, Esq., United States Consul General, Frankfort.

@@ -55005,8 +55091,8 @@ desire. I would be happy, general, to receive a reply from you if possible. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, &c.,

- THEODORE CANISIUS, United States - Consul. + THEODORE CANISIUS, + United States Consul.

General Garibaldi, Spezzia, Italy.

@@ -55036,8 +55122,8 @@ and hasten to report the above to you without delay.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, &c.,

- T. CANISIUS, United States - Consul. + T. CANISIUS, + United States Consul.

Hon. W. H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -55091,7 +55177,7 @@

* * * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, &c.,

- T. CANISIUS. + T. CANISIUS.

Hon. W. H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -55147,7 +55233,7 @@ consul at Vienna is withdrawn.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

T. Canisius, Esq., United States Consul at Vienna.

@@ -55218,8 +55304,8 @@ official life with all my zeal and heart for the best of my government and country. I have the honor to be, &c.,

- F. CANISIUS, United States - Consul. + F. CANISIUS, + United States Consul.

Hon. W. H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -55247,7 +55333,7 @@ will, therefore, resume your official functions as consul at Vienna.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Theodore Canisius, Esq., United States Consul, Vienna.

@@ -55280,8 +55366,8 @@ kingdom is concerned.

* * * * * * * * *

- T. BIGELOW LAWRENCE, Consul - General. + T. BIGELOW LAWRENCE, + Consul General.

Hon. Frederick W. Seward, Assistant Secretary of State, @@ -55351,8 +55437,8 @@ interests.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient, humble servant,

- GEORGE F. SEWARD, United States - Consul. + GEORGE F. SEWARD, + United States Consul.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -55495,7 +55581,7 @@ not injurious to commerce.

I remain your obedient servant,

- COMMERCE. + COMMERCE. Shanghai,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

G. F. Seward, Esq., U. S. Consul General, Shanghai.

@@ -55758,7 +55844,7 @@ Christian states, but of mankind.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.
. - ABRAHAM LINCOLN. + ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

By the President:

William H. - WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

diff --git a/volumes/frus1864p1.xml b/volumes/frus1864p1.xml index 400db2f82..7e27d1a96 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1864p1.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1864p1.xml @@ -1776,7 +1776,7 @@ organizing something that may look like public opinion.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -1806,9 +1806,10 @@ that she is sooner or later likely to turn up as a blockade runner at Wilmington or elsewhere.

-

I have the hon or to be, sir, your obedient servant,

+

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward,

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- HORATIO J. SPRAGUE, United States - Consul. + HORATIO J. SPRAGUE, + United States Consul.

His Excellency Charles F. Adams,, United States Minister, &c., &c., @@ -1869,8 +1870,8 @@ packet does not permit me to address the Navy Department direct.

I have the honor to be, sir, in haste, your obedient servant,

- HORATIO J. SPRAGUE, United States - Consul. + HORATIO J. SPRAGUE,United States Consul.

His Excellency Charles F. Adams, United States Minister, &c., &c., @@ -1973,7 +1974,7 @@ contemplated.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &.

@@ -2081,8 +2082,9 @@ than their usual energy to remedy the evil.

Your obedient servant,

- F. H. MORSE, United States - Consul. + F. H. MORSE, + United States + Consul.

Hon. C. F. Adams, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -2120,7 +2122,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -2298,7 +2300,7 @@ enlistment of a British subject.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -2376,7 +2378,7 @@ highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -2429,7 +2431,7 @@ public interest at this time the following official documents which have come into my hands.

I am, &c.,

- JAMES SMITH. + JAMES SMITH.

Editor of the Times.

“Borough of Cork, to wit: by one of her Majesty’s justices of @@ -2483,11 +2485,11 @@ for the abolition of oaths and the substitution of declarations in lieu thereof.

- his + his - “EDWARD × LYNCH. + “EDWARD × LYNCH. - mark. + mark.

“Truly read by me to said Edward Lynch.

“THOMAS H. CROFTS.

@@ -2497,9 +2499,10 @@ when="1863-11-16" calendar="gregorian">this 16th day of November, 1863. - “ROBERT HALL, “One of her - Majesty’s Justices of the Peace for the Borough of - Cork.” + “ROBERT HALL, “One of her Majesty’s Justices of the + Peace for the Borough of + Cork.” - his + his - “PATRICK × KENNEDY. + “PATRICK × KENNEDY. - mark. + mark. “Made and subscribed before me, at and in the borough of Cork, this 18th day of November, 1863. - “FELIX MULLUN, “One of the - Justices of the Peace for the Borough of - Cork.” + “FELIX MULLUN, “One of + the Justices of the Peace for the Borough of + Cork.” @@ -2585,7 +2588,7 @@ satisfactory than throwing the burden of proof entirely on us.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward Secretary of State, &c., &c.

@@ -2634,7 +2637,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -2667,7 +2670,7 @@

* * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. Wjlliam H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -2704,7 +2707,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

The Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -2742,8 +2746,9 @@ if such had occurred to my knowledge.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedien servant,

- EDWIN G. EASTMAN, United States - Consul. + EDWIN G. EASTMAN, + United States + Consul.

His Excellency C. F. Adams, United States Minister, London.

@@ -2770,8 +2775,8 @@

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JOHN A. WINSLOW, Captain. + JOHN A. WINSLOW, Captain.

Hon. Charles Francis Adams, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister @@ -2812,8 +2817,8 @@

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JOHN A. WINSLOW, Captain. + JOHN A. WINSLOW, Captain.

Hon. W. L. Dayton, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister @@ -2847,8 +2852,8 @@ in the premises.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant.

- JOHN A. WINSLOW, Captain. + JOHN A. WINSLOW, Captain.

E. G. Eastman, Esq., United States Consul, Queenstown.

@@ -2876,8 +2881,9 @@ it was of no use.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- EDWIN G. EASTMAN, United States - Consul. + EDWIN G. EASTMAN, + United States + Consul.

His Excellency C. F. Adams, United States Minister, London.

@@ -2938,9 +2944,9 @@ otherwise utterly destitute.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JAMES S. THORNTON, Lieutenant - Commander U. S. N., and Executive - Officer. + JAMES S. THORNTON, Lieutenant Commander U. S. N., and + Executive Officer.

Captain John A. Winslow, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -2988,8 +2994,8 @@ men ashore in the pilot-boat Petrel, with a list of their names as given to the American consul.

- JOHN A. WINSLOW, Captain. + JOHN A. WINSLOW, Captain. @@ -3013,7 +3019,7 @@ deposition on the same subject, which I propose to send in at once,

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -3050,7 +3056,8 @@ that vessel.

I pray your lordship to accept, &c., &c.,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -3085,8 +3092,9 @@ the city of London, this 2d day of December, 1863, before me,

- JOHN J. ANDREW, A London Commissioner - to administer Oaths in Chancery. + JOHN J. ANDREW, + A London Commissioner to administer Oaths + in Chancery. Deposition of Joseph Murray and Thomas @@ -3134,13 +3142,13 @@ November, and at 2 a. m., the 1st of December, twenty-one of us were sent back to London.

- JOSEPH MURRAY. + JOSEPH MURRAY. - his + his - THOMAS + KELLY. + THOMAS + KELLY. - mark. + mark.

Witness to the mark of Thomas Kelly—Joshua Nunn.

@@ -3157,9 +3165,9 @@ deponent, and that he saw him make his mark thereto; before me,

- JOHN J. ANDREW, A London - Commissioner to administer Oaths in - Chancery. + JOHN J. ANDREW, + A London Commissioner to administer + Oaths in Chancery. @@ -3207,8 +3215,9 @@ the city of London, this 3d day of December, 1863, before me,

- JOHN J. ANDREW, A London Commissioner - to administer Oaths, &c. + JOHN J. ANDREW, + A London Commissioner to administer Oaths, + &c. - JOHN J. ANDREW, A London Commissioner - to administer Oaths &c. + JOHN J. ANDREW, + A London Commissioner to administer Oaths + &c. Earl Russell to I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c.,

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -3317,7 +3327,8 @@ accept the assurances of the highest consideration with which,

I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -3398,8 +3409,9 @@ affidavit corroborating the same.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- THOMAS H. DUDLEY, United States - Consul. + THOMAS H. DUDLEY, + United States + Consul.

Hon. Charles Francis Adams, United States Minister, &c., &c., @@ -3951,15 +3963,17 @@ board the steamer, when I made an excuse that I wanted to get a glass of grog with Glassbrook before I left. The clerk objected to our leaving, but he at last consented.

- BENJAMIN CONELLY. + BENJAMIN + CONELLY. Sworn at Liverpool, in the county of Lancaster, the 24th day of November, 1863, before me, - J. PEARSON, A Commissioner, - &c. + J. PEARSON, + A Commissioner, + &c. - CATHERINE STANLEY. + CATHERINE + STANLEY. Sworn at Liverpool, in the county of @@ -4013,9 +4028,9 @@ >this 26th day of November, 1863, before me, - J. PEARSON, A Commissioner to - administer Oaths in Chancery in - England. + J. PEARSON, + A Commissioner to administer Oaths in + Chancery in England. @@ -4041,8 +4056,9 @@ affidavit of Catherine Stanley.

Sworn before me this 26th November, 1863.

- J. PEAESON, Commissioner, - &c. + J. PEAESON, + Commissioner, + &c. - her + her - CECILIA + GLASSBROOK. + CECILIA + GLASSBROOK. - mark. + mark. Sworn at Liverpool, in the county of @@ -4118,9 +4134,9 @@ who appeared perfectly to understand the same, and made her mark thereto in my presence. - J. BUSHELL, A Commissioner to - administer Oaths in Chancery in - England. + J. BUSHELL, + A Commissioner to administer Oaths in + Chancery in England. A. @@ -4147,7 +4163,7 @@ of Cecilia Glassbrook.

Sworn before me this 24th day of November, 1863.

- J. BUSHELL. + J. BUSHELL. B. @@ -4167,7 +4183,7 @@ of Cecilia Glassbrook.

Sworn before me this 24th day of November, 1863,

- J. BUSHELL. + J. BUSHELL. @@ -4214,7 +4230,7 @@ of Cecilia Glassbrook, sworn before me this 24th day of November, 1863,

- JOHN BUSHELL. + JOHN BUSHELL. - DAVID CONOLLY. + DAVID CONOLLY. Sworn at Liverpool, &c., 30th November, - 1863, before me,J. - PEARSON, A Commissioner, &c, + 1863, before + me,J. + PEARSON, + A Commissioner, + &c, - ELIZA CONOLLY. + ELIZA CONOLLY.

Sworn at Liverpool, in the county of Lancaster, this 30th day of November, 1863, before me,

@@ -4308,7 +4326,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c.,

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward Secretary of State, &c., &c.

@@ -4371,7 +4389,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -4429,8 +4448,8 @@ also, very unusual. These are generally made of cast iron. All this is truth, as I shall answer to God.

- J.McGIBBON.Sworn before the collector at + J.McGIBBON.Sworn before the collector at Glasgow, December 21, 1863. @@ -4472,8 +4491,8 @@ readiness, but that now they are not so pushed for them. All which is truth, as I shall answer to God.

- JAMES ROSSSworn before the collector of customs, + JAMES ROSSSworn before the collector of customs, Glasgow, November 23, 1863. @@ -4523,7 +4542,8 @@ several times in Glasgow.

All of which is truth, as I shall answer to God.

- JOHN M. BARR.JOHN M. + BARR.Sworn before the collector of customs, Glasgow, November 23, @@ -4627,8 +4647,9 @@ fifteen years last past. I worked in Thomson’s yard three years, and am well acquainted with his hands.

- WILLIAM CARRICK.Sworn before the collector of + WILLIAM + CARRICK.Sworn before the collector of Glasgow, November 28, 1863. @@ -4653,7 +4674,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -4707,7 +4728,7 @@ government to meet the emergency.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -4745,7 +4766,7 @@ insured in London for fifteen thousand pounds.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

on. William H. Seward Secretary of State, Washington. D. C.

@@ -4843,11 +4864,11 @@ men working on board the Scylla as stokers before I joined her. They came from Woolwich. I do not know their names.

- his + his - RICHARD + SPENDIFF. + RICHARD + SPENDIFF. - mark. + mark.

Witness to the mark of Richard Spendiff: Joshua Nunn.

@@ -4860,9 +4881,9 @@ deponent, and that he saw him make his mark thereto. Before me,

- WM. MURRAY, A London Commissioner - to administer Oaths in - Chancery. + WM. MURRAY, + A London Commissioner to administer + Oaths in Chancery. @@ -4893,7 +4914,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &.

@@ -4923,8 +4945,8 @@ from this country in small numbers at a time.

I remain, sir, your obedient servant,

- F. H. MORSE, Consul. + F. H. MORSE,Consul.

Hon. Charles Francis Adams, United States Minister at London.

@@ -5075,10 +5097,10 @@

hereby certify the foregoing copy of certificate of registry to be a true copy.

- H. MAYO, Registrar - General.General Register and Record Office of - Seamen and Shipping, + H. MAYO, + Registrar General.General Register and + Record Office of Seamen and Shipping, London, December 17, 1863. @@ -5120,7 +5142,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -5153,7 +5175,7 @@ *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -5176,8 +5198,8 @@

Seconded by Mr. E. Lowden.

Adopted by the meeting, with two hands held up against it.

- RALPH WARD JACKSON, Chairman. + RALPH WARD JACKSON, Chairman.

December 1, 1863.

@@ -5224,7 +5246,7 @@ Earl Russell’s attention.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -5253,7 +5275,7 @@ class of troubles always to be seriously deprecated.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -5363,7 +5385,7 @@ the present leave the whole subject for his just consideration.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -5453,7 +5475,7 @@ in support of my despatch of yesterday, No. 789.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -5483,7 +5505,7 @@ allowances, who have been enlisted in any of the rebel vessels.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -5513,7 +5535,7 @@ necessary to state the views of the respective officers.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS

Hon. William H. Seward &c., &c., &c.

@@ -5553,7 +5575,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -5618,7 +5641,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -5641,7 +5664,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -5669,7 +5692,7 @@ Russell, with a note. Copies of these papers are subjoined.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -5716,7 +5739,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -5785,8 +5809,8 @@ of England as a rebel privateer escaped from an English port.

Very sincerely, your obedient servant,

- F. H. MORSE, Consul. + F. H. MORSE, Consul.

Hon. C. F. Adams, United States Minister, &c.

@@ -5822,19 +5846,20 @@

Sold by J. Omer, 99 Meriones, London, Navigation Office.

Endorsed at back:

- his + his - CHARLES × BULL. + CHARLES × BULL. - mark. + mark.

Witness: N. Cohen.

This is the paper writing referred to in the annexed affidavit of Enoch Cohen, sworn before me, this 11th day of December, 1863.

- JOHN CASTLE GANT, A London - Commissioner, &c. + JOHN CASTLE GANT, + A London Commissioner, + &c. @@ -5858,8 +5883,9 @@

Sworn at my office, No. 57 Nicholas lane, in the city of London, this 11th day of December, 1863, before me,

- JOHN CASTLE GANT, A London Commissioner, - &c. + JOHN CASTLE GANT, + A London Commissioner, + &c. GEORGE HILL.

Sworn 12th day of December, 1863, before me,

- JOHN CASTLE GANT, A London Commissioner, - &c. + JOHN CASTLE GANT, + A London Commissioner, + &c. JAMES NUNN.

Sworn, &c., 12th December, before me,

- JOHN CASTLE GANT, A London Commissioner, - &c. + JOHN CASTLE GANT, + A London Commissioner, + &c. @@ -5961,12 +5989,13 @@ four boats were received on board from the tug-boat. Before we left Sheerness her shell-room and magazines were up and in good condition.

- CHARLES NEWTON.CHARLES + NEWTON.Sworn, &c., 21st December, 1863, before - JOHN ANDREW, A London - Commissioner. + JOHN ANDREW, + A London Commissioner. - his + his - JAMES + MALONEY. + JAMES + MALONEY. - mark. + mark. Witness to the mark of James Maloney: - J. J. ANDREW, Commissioner, - &c. + J. J. ANDREW, + Commissioner, &c. I, William O’Kelly, of 41 Smith street, Mile End, London, do truly and solemnly swear that on the 24th November last I went to Sheerness to make inquiries about a voyage, hearing that Mr. Rumble, - inspector of machinery. afloat of her Majesty’s dockyard, Sheerness, + inspector of machinery afloat of her Majesty’s dockyard, Sheerness, was engaging a crew for a steamer called the Scylla, formerly her Majesty’s screw steamer Victor. I arrived at Sheerness at 9½ p. m. I heard the steamer was in port, but not ready for sea, and that she @@ -6112,8 +6141,9 @@

Sworn at my office at No. 5 White Hart Court, Lombard street, in the city of London, this 21st day of December, 1863, before me,

- JOHN J. ANDREW, A London Commissioner to - administer Oaths in Chancery. + JOHN J. ANDREW, + A London Commissioner to administer Oaths in + Chancery. the 22d of December, 1863, before - JOHN J. ANDREW, A Commissioner, - &c. + JOHN J. ANDREW, + A Commissioner, &c. I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obe dient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -6258,8 +6288,8 @@ without awaiting the report of your investigation of the subject.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- F. W. SEWARD, Acting - Secretary. + F. W. SEWARD, + Acting Secretary.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -6304,7 +6334,7 @@

* * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward Secretary of State.

@@ -6328,7 +6358,7 @@ country, and of his reply.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -6378,7 +6408,8 @@ consideration, with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -6403,7 +6434,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Frances Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -6428,7 +6459,7 @@ and of his lordship’s acknowledgment are herewith transmitted.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -6464,7 +6495,8 @@

I beg to renew the assurances of the highest consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Eight Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., @@ -6489,7 +6521,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -6553,7 +6585,7 @@ way to a satisfactory resolution of the national embarrassments.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -6579,7 +6611,7 @@ sentiments and cordial sympathies therein manifested.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -6611,7 +6643,7 @@ States.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -6805,8 +6837,8 @@ on duty connected with this department.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

- S. R. MALLORY, Secretary of the - Navy. + S. R. MALLORY, + Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. T. S. Bocock, Speaker of the House of Representatives, C. S. A.

@@ -6875,7 +6907,7 @@ for the laws of Great Britain, and for the laws of nations.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -6962,7 +6994,7 @@ under the protection of ever present and adequate armed force.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -6990,7 +7022,7 @@ It is to be hoped that this information is correct.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -7022,7 +7054,7 @@ was discovered.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams, Esq. &c., &c., &c.

@@ -7051,8 +7083,8 @@ requested.

Very respectfully,

- GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the - Navy. + GIDEON WELLES, + Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. William H. Seward Secretary of State.

@@ -7082,8 +7114,8 @@ that act, with the correspondence which followed.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JNO. A. WINSLOW, Captain. + JNO. A. WINSLOW, Captain.

Hon. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. @@ -7115,8 +7147,8 @@ premises.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JNO. A. WINSLOW, Captain. + JNO. A. WINSLOW, Captain.

E. G. Eastman, Esq., U. S. Consul, Queenstown.

@@ -7154,8 +7186,8 @@ ashore in the pilot-boat Petrel, with a list of their names as given to the American consul.

- JNO. A. WINSLOW, Captain. + JNO. A. WINSLOW, Captain.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JNO. A. WINSLOW, Captain. + JNO. A. WINSLOW, Captain.

Rear-Admiral Sir Lewis T. Jones, Com’dg H. M. Naval Forces, Coast of @@ -7236,8 +7268,9 @@ destitute.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- JAMES S. THORNTON, Lieutenant Commander - and Executive Officer. + JAMES S. THORNTON, + Lieutenant Commander and Executive + Officer.

Captain Jno. A. Winslow, Commanding.

@@ -7273,8 +7306,8 @@ public mind.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

- JOHN A. WINSLOW, Captain. + JOHN A. WINSLOW, Captain.

Hon. Charles Francis Adams, Env. Ext. and Min. Plen. of the U. S., London, @@ -7307,7 +7340,7 @@ adverted to.

I am sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -7368,7 +7401,7 @@ obtain by making professions of a more exalted purpose.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -7394,7 +7427,7 @@

A copy of his lordship’s note is transmitted.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -7431,7 +7464,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -7470,7 +7503,7 @@ regard to assaults of the blockade will be modified.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -7501,8 +7534,11 @@ rules applied to public vessels of belligerents.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- RICHARD H. DANA, Jr., United States Attorney. + RICHARD H. DANA, Jr., + United States Attorney.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

@@ -7536,8 +7572,11 @@

The above is a copy of a letter found on board the prize steamer R. E. Lee, of which Wilkinson was commander at the time.

- R. H. DANA, Jr., U. S. Attorney. + R. H. DANA, Jr., + U. S. Attorney. @@ -7570,8 +7609,11 @@ Commanding Cornubia.

Original found on board the prize steamer Cornubia.

- R. H. DANA, Jr., U. S. Attorney. + R. H. DANA, Jr., + U. S. Attorney. Mr. James Ash to Original found on board the prize steamer Cornubia.

 - R. H. DANA, Jr., U. S. Attorney. + R. H. DANA, Jr., + U. S. Attorney. Mr. John S. Seward to @@ -7644,8 +7689,9 @@

Original found on board the prize steamer Cornubia.

 - R. H. DANA, Jr., Attorney. + R. H. DANA, Jr., Attorney. @@ -7703,7 +7749,7 @@ necessary remedy.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -7732,7 +7778,7 @@ are approved by the President.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -7776,7 +7822,7 @@ loyally.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -7820,7 +7866,7 @@ delivered to insurgent agents there.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c.,&c., &c.

@@ -7882,7 +7928,7 @@ will be useful to you.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H SEWARD. + WILLIAM H SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -7977,7 +8023,7 @@ general policy that is radically erroneous and anomalous.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -8004,7 +8050,7 @@ whether an inquiry could not be made into the matter.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -8033,7 +8079,7 @@ similar risk in future.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- W. WINTHROP. + W. WINTHROP.

F. W. Seward, Esq., Assistant Secretary, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -8068,7 +8114,7 @@ * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -8098,7 +8144,7 @@ expressed an intention to transmit when obtained.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -8147,7 +8193,7 @@ Glasgow, is to be soon brought into court.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -8183,7 +8229,7 @@ 290, alias the Alabama.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -8207,7 +8253,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -8232,8 +8279,8 @@ aiding the rebels by arresting seamen who leave the ship.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- F. H. MORSE, Consul. + F. H. MORSE, Consul.

Hon. Charles F. Adams, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -8279,8 +8326,9 @@ the city of London, this first day of January, 1864, before me,

- JOHN T. ANDREW, A London Commissioner, - &c. + JOHN T. ANDREW, + A London Commissioner, + &c. Deposition of Andrew @@ -8319,8 +8367,9 @@ the city of London, this 1st day of January, 1864, before me,

- JOHN T. ANDREW, A London Commissioner, - &c. + JOHN T. ANDREW, + A London Commissioner, + &c. Deposition of William @@ -8364,8 +8413,9 @@ calendar="gregorian">this 1st January, 1864, before me, - JOHN T. ANDREW, A London Commissioner, - &c., &c. + JOHN T. ANDREW, + A London Commissioner, &c., + &c. Deposition of Thomas @@ -8386,11 +8436,11 @@ knew I was an Englishman, and wanted me to sign as a Dutchman, which I declined.

- his + his - THOMAS × BRYANT. + THOMAS × BRYANT. - mark. + mark.

Witness to the sign or mark of Thomas Bryant: Joshua Mann.

@@ -8402,9 +8452,9 @@ deponent, and that he saw him make his mark thereto, before me,

- JOHN T. ANDREW, A London - Commissioner to administer Oaths in - Chancery, + JOHN T. ANDREW, + A London Commissioner to administer + Oaths in Chancery, @@ -8425,7 +8475,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -8448,7 +8498,8 @@ this kingdom to carry on war against the United States.

I pray your lordship, &c., &c.

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c.

@@ -8490,7 +8541,7 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- THOMAS H. DUDLEY. + THOMAS H. DUDLEY.

Hon. Charles Francis Adams, United States Minister.

@@ -8610,8 +8661,9 @@ when="1864-01-09" calendar="gregorian">9th of January, 1864, before - JOHN BUSHELL, A Commissioner, - &c. + JOHN BUSHELL, + A Commissioner, + &c. @@ -8630,7 +8682,7 @@ department of her Majesty’s government.

I have the honor, &c., &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -8654,7 +8706,8 @@ are continued without material diminution.

I pray your lordship to accept, &c.,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -8702,7 +8755,7 @@ English piratical craft.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- THOMAS H. DUDLEY. + THOMAS H. DUDLEY.

Hon. Charles Francis Adams, United States Minister.

@@ -8874,8 +8927,9 @@ when="1864-01-08" calendar="gregorian">the 8th of January, 1864, before, - J. PEARSON, A Commissioner, - &c. + J. PEARSON, + A Commissioner, + &c. @@ -9097,9 +9151,10 @@

MARTHA LATHAM.

Sworn and subscribed to this 3d day of December, 1863.

- J. ROLLY FRIPP, A Commissioner for - taking Oaths in the Court of Queen’s Bench at - Westminister. + J. ROLLY FRIPP, + A Commissioner for taking Oaths in the + Court of Queen’s Bench at + Westminister. A. @@ -9250,9 +9305,11 @@ allotment notes must be stopped.

We are &c.

- Per M. G. KLINGENDER, + Per M. G. + KLINGENDER, - C. F. VAN MELLE. + C. F. VAN + MELLE.

Martha Latham, 19 Wellington street, Swansea, South @@ -9288,8 +9345,9 @@ when="1864-01-06" calendar="gregorian">January 6, 1864, before - J. PEARSON, A Commissioner, - &c. + J. PEARSON, + A Commissioner, + &c. @@ -9404,7 +9462,7 @@ peace is restored.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -9432,7 +9490,7 @@ me.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -9460,7 +9518,7 @@ and liberal towards himself.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -9517,7 +9575,7 @@ the outfit and manning of the vessels lying in France.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -10296,7 +10354,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10330,7 +10389,7 @@ they were wrong.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -10355,7 +10414,8 @@ the necessity of prior emigration or settlement in any vicinage.

I pray your lordship to accept the assurances, &c., &c,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10387,7 +10447,9 @@ of April, in the year of our Lord, 1863.

In testimony whereof I herewith affix my hand and seal.

- WILLIAM L. MAURY, [l. s.] + WILLIAM L. MAURY, [l. s.] + First Lieut., Com’dg Confederate States Steamer Georgia. @@ -10410,7 +10472,7 @@ of the bark Sea Bride and her cargo.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -10442,7 +10504,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10529,7 +10592,7 @@ action does not lie with him.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -10616,7 +10679,7 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10658,7 +10721,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -10690,7 +10753,7 @@ of the 20th, transmitted with my No. 581 of the 22d.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -10713,7 +10776,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10737,7 +10800,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10761,7 +10824,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -10784,7 +10847,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10867,7 +10930,7 @@ Mr. Bright, perhaps, the most formidable public man in England. I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward Secretary of State, Washington D. C.

@@ -10911,7 +10974,7 @@ even of its moral sovereignty and independence.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10936,7 +10999,7 @@ such a paper should have been promulgated.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10969,7 +11032,7 @@ the chronic evil of African slavery.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -10995,7 +11058,7 @@ engaged in the Chesapeake affair.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11038,7 +11101,7 @@ to that of the free States? * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11077,7 +11140,7 @@ this week’s steamer.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -11099,7 +11162,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11136,7 +11199,7 @@ steamer more exact information from another source.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11185,7 +11248,7 @@ inopportune moment, it is difficult to conjecture.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -11264,7 +11327,7 @@ to entertain the matter, preferring the reference now made.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11302,8 +11365,8 @@ the memorialists.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- M. M. JACKSON, United States - Consul. + M. M. JACKSON, + United States Consul.

Hon. William H. Seward Secretary of State.

@@ -11339,7 +11402,7 @@ Seward and yourself.

Yours, sincerely,

- DONALD ROSS. + DONALD ROSS.

Hon. M. M. Jackson, United States Consul.

@@ -11374,7 +11437,7 @@

And I have the honor to be, dear sir, your very obedient servant,

- DONALD ROSS. + DONALD ROSS.

Hon. Mr. Jackson, United States Consul, Halifax, N. @@ -11521,7 +11584,7 @@ vessel itself was also really owned by the same party.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11617,7 +11680,7 @@ proceeding, in order that, if deemed advisable, it may be arrested.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11643,7 +11706,7 @@ the British government.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11773,8 +11836,8 @@ instructions for the future.

I have the honor to be, sir, your very obedient servant,

- W. R. G. MELLEN, United States - Consul. + W. R. G. MELLEN, + United States Consul.

Hon. William H. Seward Secretary of State, &c. &c.

@@ -11822,7 +11885,7 @@ time and manner in which they shall be made.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., London.

@@ -11850,7 +11913,7 @@ commendation.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -11882,7 +11945,7 @@ this time.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &.

@@ -11910,7 +11973,7 @@ explanation of the proceedings against him.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c.,&c., &c.

@@ -11953,7 +12016,7 @@ the 28th ultimo.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -14213,7 +14276,7 @@ conduct towards America.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward Secretary of State.

@@ -14339,7 +14402,7 @@ more specifically from another source.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -14419,7 +14482,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq.

 @@ -14444,7 +14507,7 @@ January.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -14478,7 +14541,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -14514,7 +14577,7 @@ in their political views.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -14603,7 +14666,7 @@ devastation and misery they have produced.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -14669,7 +14732,7 @@ penalty for their perseverance.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c.

@@ -15960,7 +16023,7 @@ is lest we should ever find ourselves committed to defend that which is not justly defensible.

- HISTORICUS. + HISTORICUS.

Temple, February 16.

@@ -16044,8 +16107,9 @@ goods, said to have been part of the cargo of the Sea Bride.

“I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

- “RAWSON W. RAWSON, “Colonial - Secretary, + “RAWSON W. RAWSON, + “Colonial + Secretary,

“The U. S. Consul.”

 @@ -16074,7 +16138,7 @@ on his way to America, and will report hi ssuccess to you in person.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES ERANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES ERANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16105,7 +16169,7 @@ enterprise, who were alleged to be in Liverpool.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -16147,7 +16211,7 @@ General Meade may be superseded.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -16205,7 +16269,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16228,7 +16293,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16254,8 +16319,9 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- BENJ. MORAN, Assistant Secretary of - Legation. + BENJ. MORAN, + Assistant Secretary of + Legation.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -16362,7 +16428,7 @@ through this new political trial, as it has already surmounted so many others. I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16399,7 +16465,7 @@ court.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16676,7 +16742,7 @@ politics.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16707,7 +16773,7 @@ of a free and prosperous commerce under the treaties and laws of the United States. I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16753,7 +16819,7 @@ regard to ourselves.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq.

 @@ -16784,7 +16850,7 @@ last week. A copy is herewith transmitted, and also his reply.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -16815,7 +16881,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., @@ -16884,7 +16951,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -16920,7 +16987,7 @@ higher for a day or two, but it has since fallen back again.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., @@ -19661,7 +19728,7 @@ the department.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -19683,8 +19750,9 @@ safely packed for sea voyage.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- EDW’D HAMILTON, Rep. Agent of New South - Wales. + EDW’D HAMILTON, + Rep. Agent of New South + Wales.

Hon. C. Francis Adams, &c., &c., &c., Minister of the @@ -19710,7 +19778,8 @@ destination.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Edw’d Hamilton, Esq., Rep. Agent of New South Wales, London.

@@ -19827,7 +19896,7 @@ little response.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19864,7 +19933,7 @@ applied a remedy, and the inconvenience is expected to cease.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19890,7 +19959,7 @@ you.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19920,7 +19989,7 @@ for withholding the instruction from Congress and the public.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19962,7 +20031,7 @@ world.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -19991,7 +20060,7 @@ Commander Winslow was construed as putting an end to it.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -20537,7 +20606,7 @@ lordship’s reply are herewith transmitted.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -20574,7 +20643,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -20596,7 +20666,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -20621,7 +20691,7 @@ published by the British government for the use of Parliament.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -20946,7 +21016,7 @@ at Angra Pequena.

I am, &c.,

- W. G. ROMAINE. + W. G. ROMAINE. [Enclosure in No. 1.] @@ -21015,7 +21085,7 @@ therefore returned to this anchorage on the 15th instant.

I have, &c,

- B. W. WALKER. + B. W. WALKER.

P. S.—It is stated in the public papers that Penguin island, at Angra Pequena, near which the Saxon is said to have been @@ -21069,7 +21139,8 @@ and beg to report my arrival here this morning.

I have &c.,

- CHARLES C. FORSYTH. + CHARLES C. + FORSYTH. [Enclosure 3 in No. @@ -21105,12 +21176,13 @@ such steps as to you may be considered best.

We have &c.,

- WM. ANDERSON, SAXON & CO. + WM. ANDERSON, SAXON & + CO. - DE PASS, SPENCE & CO., Pro R. Granger & - Co. + DE PASS, SPENCE & CO., Pro R. Granger + & Co. - G.N. EBDEN. + G.N. EBDEN.

I am, &c.,

- T. FREDK. ELLIOT. + T. FREDK. ELLIOT. [Enclosure 1 in No. 2.] @@ -21179,7 +21251,7 @@ approve of the decision.

I have, &c.

- P. E. WODEHOUSE. + P. E. WODEHOUSE. [Enclosure 2 in No. @@ -21203,7 +21275,7 @@ six working days.

I have, &c.,

- CHAS. K BALDWIN. + CHAS. K BALDWIN. [Enclosure 3 in No. @@ -21262,7 +21334,7 @@ repairs.

I have, &c,

- RAWSON W. RAWSON. + RAWSON W. RAWSON. [Enclosure 4 in No. @@ -21288,7 +21360,7 @@ precise information by this mail.

I have, &c.,

- P. E. WODEHOUSE. + P. E. WODEHOUSE. [Enclosure 5 in No. @@ -21311,7 +21383,7 @@ ultimo.

I have, &c.

- B. W. WALKER. + B. W. WALKER.

For enclosure 6 in No. 2, Captain Forsyth to Rear-Admiral Sir B. @@ -21353,7 +21425,7 @@ what has reached me upon the subject.

I have, &c.

- CHARLES ELLIOT. + CHARLES ELLIOT.

We have &c.,

- SINCLAIR, HAMILTON & CO. + SINCLAIR, HAMILTON & + CO.

I am, &c.,

- E.HAMMOND. + E.HAMMOND.

I have, &c.,

- E. M. ARCHIBALD. + E. M. ARCHIBALD. [Enclosure 1 in No. 5.] @@ -21465,7 +21538,7 @@ as yet obtained in reference to this capture.

I have, &c.,

- E. M. ARCHIBALD. + E. M. ARCHIBALD.

[Enclosure 2 in No. 5.]

@@ -21512,7 +21585,7 @@ case of the Saxon, and enclosing a copy of a deposition made before me by the late second mate of that vessel. I have, &c.,

- E. M. ARCHIBALD. + E. M. ARCHIBALD. [Enclosure 1 in No. 6. ] @@ -21563,7 +21636,7 @@ witness of the shooting of the mate by the officer, Donohoe.

I have, &c.,

- E.M. ARCHIBALD. + E.M. ARCHIBALD. @@ -21688,8 +21761,9 @@

Sworn by the said David Aitchison, at the British consulate, New York, this 4th day of January, A. D. 1864, before me.

- E. M. ARCHIBALD, Her Britannic - Majesty’s Consul. + E. M. ARCHIBALD, + Her Britannic Majesty’s + Consul.

I am, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

I am, &c.,

- E. HAMMOND. + E. HAMMOND.

I am, &c.,

- C. PAGET. + C. PAGET.

I am, &c.,

- W. G. ROMAINE. + W. G. ROMAINE. [Enclosure 1 in No. 10. ] @@ -21869,7 +21943,7 @@ confirmed or noticed in any way from home.

I have, &c.,

- B. W. WALKER. + B. W. WALKER. [Enclosure 2 in No. @@ -22086,7 +22160,7 @@ least fifty miles off.

I am, &c.,

- T. FRED’K ELLIOTT. + T. FRED’K ELLIOTT. [Enclosure 1 in 11.] Sir P. Wodehouse to

I have, &c.,

- P. E. WODEHOUSE. + P. E. WODEHOUSE.

[Enclosure 2 in No. 11.]

@@ -22212,8 +22286,8 @@

Given under the public seal of the settlement of the Cape of Good Hope, this 12th day of August, 1861.

- G. GREY, Governor. + G. GREY, Governor.

By command of his excellency the governor:

RICHARD SOUTHEY, Acting @@ -22290,8 +22364,9 @@

Witness: W. H. Scott.

Before me,

- R. JOHNSON DUTTON, Acting Clerk of the - Peace. + R. JOHNSON DUTTON, + Acting Clerk of the + Peace. @@ -22354,8 +22429,9 @@

W. H. Scott.

Before me,

- R. JOHNSON DUTTON, Acting Clerk of the - Peace. + R. JOHNSON DUTTON, + Acting Clerk of the + Peace.

I have, &c.,

- W. A. SCOTT. + W. A. SCOTT. J. W. H. Russourr.

Before me,

- R. JOHNSON DUTTON, Acting Clerk of the - Peace. + R. JOHNSON DUTTON, + Acting Clerk of the + Peace. J. H. H. Russourr.

Before me,

- R. JOHNSON DUTTON, Acting Clerk of the - Peace. + R. JOHNSON DUTTON, + Acting Clerk of the + Peace. W. H. Scott.

Before me,

- R. JOHNSON DUTTON, Acting Clerk of the - Peace. + R. JOHNSON DUTTON, + Acting Clerk of the + Peace. Witness: J. A. B. Flack.

Before me,

- R. JOHNSON BUTTON, Acting Clerk of the - Peace. + R. JOHNSON BUTTON, + Acting Clerk of the + Peace.

Yours faithfully,

- THOMAS TINLEY. + THOMAS TINLEY. (Further evidence of this witness stayed by order of the attorney general.)

- R. JOHNSON DUTTON, Acting Clerk of the - Peace. + R. JOHNSON DUTTON, + Acting Clerk of the + Peace. JOSEPH WILSON.

Before me,

- E. JOHNSON DUTTON, Acting Clerk of the - Peace. + E. JOHNSON DUTTON, + Acting Clerk of the + Peace. [Enclosure 5 in No. @@ -22710,8 +22792,9 @@

THOMAS BOYCE.

Before me,

- R. JOHNSON DUTTON, Acting Clerk of the - Peace. + R. JOHNSON DUTTON, + Acting Clerk of the + Peace. [Enclosure 6 in No. @@ -22779,7 +22862,7 @@ made the land out, Table mountain bearing SE. At 11 a. m. came to an anchor in Table bay.

- THOS. BOYCE. + THOS. BOYCE. [Enclosure 7 in No. 11. @@ -22842,8 +22925,9 @@

Mark of JAMES + ADAMS.

Before me,

- R. JOHNSON DUTTON, Acting Clerk of the - Peace. + R. JOHNSON DUTTON, + Acting Clerk of the + Peace. [Enclosure 8 in No. @@ -22982,7 +23066,8 @@ getting the documents from the various offices.

We have, &c.,

- W. SAMPSON & SON. + W. SAMPSON & + SON.

[Enclosure 9 in No. 11.]

@@ -23047,7 +23132,7 @@ Town, this 26th day of November, in the year of our Lord 1863.

- MARY JANE GRAY. + MARY JANE GRAY.

As witnesses:

H. G. Glynn.

@@ -23065,8 +23150,8 @@

Given under my hand, at Cape Town, Cape of Good Hope, this 15th day of December, 1863.

- J. T. FISH, Registrar. + J. T. FISH, Registrar.

[Enclosure 11 in No. 11.]

@@ -23078,7 +23163,8 @@ south Atlantic as employment offers, for a term not exceeding six months, final port of discharge to be Table bay.

- THOMAS TINLEY, Shipping + THOMAS TINLEY, + Shipping Master.December 5, @@ -23213,7 +23299,7 @@ where we were transferred to the Lord of the Isles. I took the cargo from the beach by orders of my owners.

- STEPHEN SHEPHARD. + STEPHEN SHEPHARD.

Before me,

J. M. HILL, R. M.

@@ -23295,9 +23381,10 @@ Gray was buried, and on the following morning we were sent on shore in the Vanderbilt’s boat.

- HORACE CARREW. + HORACE CARREW. Before me, - J. M. HILL, R. M. + J. M. HILL, + R. M. Wednesday, - WILLIAM MURRAY. + WILLIAM MURRAY.

Before me,

J. M. HILL, R. M.

@@ -23428,10 +23515,12 @@

RICHARD CABLE.

Before me

- J. M. HILL, R. M. + J. M. HILL, + R. M. - R. JOHNSON DUTTON, Acting Clerk of the - Peace.R. JOHNSON DUTTON, + Acting Clerk of the + Peace.Attorney General’s Office, December 2, @@ -23487,8 +23576,8 @@

Examined with the original register, by me, and found to be correct.

- GEORGE MORGAN, Minister.GEORGE MORGAN, Minister.Cape Town,

(Quod Attestor.)

- W. E. MOORE, Notary - Public. + W. E. MOORE, + Notary Public. A. @@ -23529,8 +23618,9 @@

MARY JANE GRAY.

Before me,

- W. SAMPSON, Justice of the Peace for - Cape Town. + W. SAMPSON, + Justice of the Peace for Cape + Town.

(Quod Attestor.)

- W. E. MOORE, Notary - Public. + W. E. MOORE, + Notary Public.

Witnesses: A. T. Bridge, Clerk.

@@ -23605,8 +23695,9 @@

Issued at the port of Aberdeen on the 25th day of February, 1853.

- GEORGE BROCK, Shipping - Master. + GEORGE BROCK, + Shipping + Master. No. 2. @@ -23615,7 +23706,8 @@ himself to be a fit and proper person to take charge of a vessel.

- JAMES MURISON.JAMES + MURISON.Cape Town,

We have, &c.,

- SINCLAIR, HAMILTON & CO. + SINCLAIR, HAMILTON & + CO. [Untitled] @@ -23754,7 +23847,7 @@ United States steamer Vanderbilt in regard to that vessel.

I am, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

We have, &c.,

- SINCLAIR, HAMILTON & CO. + SINCLAIR, HAMILTON & + CO.

I have, &c.,

- E. HAMMOND. + E. HAMMOND.

I have, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS. [Enclosure in No. 16.] @@ -23866,7 +23960,7 @@ the deposition back to me,

I have, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS.
@@ -23912,7 +24006,7 @@ records of the admiralty.

I am, &c.,

- T. FRED’K ELLIOT. + T. FRED’K ELLIOT.

We have &c.,

- SINCLAIR, HAMILTON & CO. + SINCLAIR, HAMILTON & + CO.

I am, &c.

- RUSSELL, + RUSSELL,

I have, &c.,

- T. FRED’K ELLIOTT. + T. FRED’K ELLIOTT.

I am, &c.,

- RUSSELL, + RUSSELL,

I have, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

[Enclosure 1 in No. 22, Mr. Seward to Lord Lyons, printed elsewhere in this volume.]

@@ -24113,7 +24208,7 @@ Saxon.

I have, &c.,

- E. M. ARCHIBALD. + E. M. ARCHIBALD. [Enclosure 3 in No. @@ -24151,7 +24246,7 @@ officer, it really cannot be used as evidence.

I have, &c.,

- CHARLES EDWARDS. + CHARLES EDWARDS.

I have, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

[Enclosure 1 in No. 23, Mr. Seward to Lord Lyons, dated February 3, 1864, published elsewhere in this volume.]

@@ -24209,7 +24304,7 @@ attend?”

I am, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS. [Enclosure 4 in No. 23. @@ -24250,7 +24345,7 @@

He can be heard of at her Majesty’s consulate, at New York. I have, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

We have, &c.,

- SINCLAIR, HAMILTON & CO. + SINCLAIR, HAMILTON & + CO.

[Enclosure in No. 24.]

Extract from the Cape of Good @@ -24340,8 +24436,9 @@

G. GREY, Governor.

By command of his excellency the governor:

- RICHARD SOUTHEY, Acting Colonial - Secretary + RICHARD SOUTHEY, + Acting Colonial + Secretary

I am, &c.,

- E. HAMMOND. + E. HAMMOND.

I am, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

I am, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

I am, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

[Enclosure in No. 28.]

@@ -24594,98 +24691,98 @@ of the deck. Donaghan was standing on the poop, just above the three steps, on the port side, where Mr. Gray was coming up. When he had got up these two steps, Donaghan called out, “Go - down !” When Gray heard this, he turned his head and looked up - at Donaghan, and Donaghan repeated the words, “Go down!” “Go - down, or I’ll shoot you!” He didn’t give the mate time to go - down or do anything; he spoke so quick, it was all done in a - moment; there was no attempt to resist, or go on; there wasn’t - time. When he spoke the third time, “Go down,” he put his left - hand on Gray and pushed him. Mr. Gray fell back, wheeling round - to save himself as he fell, and turning his face towards - Donaghan, when Donaghan lifted his revolver and shot him, and - the poor man fell back dead, and never moved an eye. The bullet - had entered above and a little behind the left ear, and went - downward. He lay right on his back. I was seven or eight yards - from him. I stepped for’ard with two of our men to pick him up, - and the senior officer, who stood on the top of the cabin, sung - out “Draw swords.” His men drew their swords. They were all - gathered about aft—a good lot of men. I am not quite sure - whether another boat’s crew had come by this time from the - Vanderbilt. When the men had drawn their cutlasses they - surrounded us, and presented their pistols at our breasts. They - blackguarded us awfully, and asked one of the men whether we - wanted to take the ship back. They drove us for’ard when they - found that we didn’t make any resistance. About five minutes - afterwards I went aft with another man (W. Murray) to pick Mr. - Gray up, who was still lying where he fell, with his head - supported by our captainand our second mate. The captain (who I - heard afterwards had rushed by the man at his cabin, when he - heard the shot fire) held the mate’s head in his lap, and looked - up and said, “What did - you shoot my mate for?” Donaghan said, “I’m sorry for the man, - but he should obey orders.” Donaghan continued, “There’s some - damned humbug about that boat—five men came off, and there’s - seven going ashore,” (pointing with his revolver towards the - boat of the men who had come for the meat and were returning.) - “We ought to go ashore and do for the bloody lot of ’em; they - are all Alabama men; that’s one of the Alabama’s men, too, - (pointing to the body of Mr. Gray.) He was very much excited at - the time; he had his revolver cocked, flourishing it about every - way. Mr. Gray’s body was put down the after-hatch. The crew were - told not to come aft, unless we spoke to one of the sentries, - whom they placed all over the ship. It was nearly 2 p. m., - perhaps, when Mr. Gray was shot. At 8 o’clock we were all sent - below, and told not to come on deck, if we didn,t want to be - shot, without hailing the sentry first. They kept us below all - night. In the forenoon next day our captain sent forward a slip - of paper asking me (in pencil) to take account of everything - that went on, as he was not allowed to write, and was closely - watched. I made memorandums on papers (in pencil.) I don’t know - what became of the papers—left on board the ship, I suppose, but - I think I must have destroyed them,—no, I must have taken them - away with me, for in the vessel in which I went up to the Cape I - copied the statements down from these papers. The copy that I - made was given to one of the reporters of the paper when he came - on board at Cape Town. I never saw it afterwards. I also signed, - on board the Lord of the Isles, a combined statement which I - drew up, and which was signed by myself, and Murray, and Cable. - It was given up, I believe, to the governor or other authority - at the Cape. The captain had it from us, and delivered it with - his own to the port boat at the Cape. They kept us on board all - that day, (the day after the murder.) In the afternoon, about - dusk, they buried Mr. Gray. They brought a coffin from the - Vanderbilt, put it into a boat, and took the captain, but none - of us, and went ashore and buried the mate. We remained on board - that night too. Next day we landed on the main land, all but the - second mate (David Atcheson, of Dundee) and the cook; they were - to go to New York. They landed us with fourteen or fifteen - pounds of small biscuit and about five gallons of water. That - day the Saxon went to sea. The Vanderbilt had weighed anchor, - and had gone out in chase of a vessel, but she returned and went - inside Penguin island and took the coals. The captain knew that - there was a guano island about ten miles off. We walked across - and waved to the people there, and they sent a boat and took us - off. The island is close to the shore. The men that had come for - the meat had gone there. We stayed on the island about two days, - when the Isabel (an English schooner) came in and took us down - to Ichaboe, another guano island. We partly loaded a brig there - called the Lord of the Isles, and went further down in the - schooner, with the brig, to Hottentots’ bay, to fill up the - brig, and then went in the brig to Cape Town. There was an - investigation at the magistrates’ court. I gave evidence, and - the captain and the two men who were close to Mr. Gray when he - was shot, William Murray and Richard Cable. We were sixteen days - in Cape Town. Murray and Cable came home with me in the Cambal, - but I don’t know where they are—shipped in another vessel, I - suppose; but I don’t know. We came to London on the 6th - February. I have been living since at my mother’s, 3 New - Terrace, Turner street, Stepney. I am looking for a vessel every - day. I have told my story as a yarn. One day I was telling the - story to a friend. A gentleman was present. He was a perfect - stranger to me. I said that I was thinking of giving my - evidence, as I heard that there was to be an investigation. He - said, “You had better go to the secretary of the treasury.” So I - came here yesterday morning, and left my address.

+ down!” When Gray heard this, he turned his head and looked up at + Donaghan, and Donaghan repeated the words, “Go down!” “Go down, + or I’ll shoot you!” He didn’t give the mate time to go down or + do anything; he spoke so quick, it was all done in a moment; + there was no attempt to resist, or go on; there wasn’t time. + When he spoke the third time, “Go down,” he put his left hand on + Gray and pushed him. Mr. Gray fell back, wheeling round to save + himself as he fell, and turning his face towards Donaghan, when + Donaghan lifted his revolver and shot him, and the poor man fell + back dead, and never moved an eye. The bullet had entered above + and a little behind the left ear, and went downward. He lay + right on his back. I was seven or eight yards from him. I + stepped for’ard with two of our men to pick him up, and the + senior officer, who stood on the top of the cabin, sung out + “Draw swords.” His men drew their swords. They were all gathered + about aft—a good lot of men. I am not quite sure whether another + boat’s crew had come by this time from the Vanderbilt. When the + men had drawn their cutlasses they surrounded us, and presented + their pistols at our breasts. They blackguarded us awfully, and + asked one of the men whether we wanted to take the ship back. + They drove us for’ard when they found that we didn’t make any + resistance. About five minutes afterwards I went aft with + another man (W. Murray) to pick Mr. Gray up, who was still lying + where he fell, with his head supported by our captainand our + second mate. The captain (who I heard afterwards had rushed by + the man at his cabin, when he heard the shot fire) held the + mate’s head in his lap, and looked up and said, “What did you shoot my mate + for?” Donaghan said, “I’m sorry for the man, but he should obey + orders.” Donaghan continued, “There’s some damned humbug about + that boat—five men came off, and there’s seven going ashore,” + (pointing with his revolver towards the boat of the men who had + come for the meat and were returning.) “We ought to go ashore + and do for the bloody lot of ’em; they are all Alabama men; + that’s one of the Alabama’s men, too, (pointing to the body of + Mr. Gray.) He was very much excited at the time; he had his + revolver cocked, flourishing it about every way. Mr. Gray’s body + was put down the after-hatch. The crew were told not to come + aft, unless we spoke to one of the sentries, whom they placed + all over the ship. It was nearly 2 p. m., perhaps, when Mr. Gray + was shot. At 8 o’clock we were all sent below, and told not to + come on deck, if we didn,t want to be shot, without hailing the + sentry first. They kept us below all night. In the forenoon next + day our captain sent forward a slip of paper asking me (in + pencil) to take account of everything that went on, as he was + not allowed to write, and was closely watched. I made + memorandums on papers (in pencil.) I don’t know what became of + the papers—left on board the ship, I suppose, but I think I must + have destroyed them,—no, I must have taken them away with me, + for in the vessel in which I went up to the Cape I copied the + statements down from these papers. The copy that I made was + given to one of the reporters of the paper when he came on board + at Cape Town. I never saw it afterwards. I also signed, on board + the Lord of the Isles, a combined statement which I drew up, and + which was signed by myself, and Murray, and Cable. It was given + up, I believe, to the governor or other authority at the Cape. + The captain had it from us, and delivered it with his own to the + port boat at the Cape. They kept us on board all that day, (the + day after the murder.) In the afternoon, about dusk, they buried + Mr. Gray. They brought a coffin from the Vanderbilt, put it into + a boat, and took the captain, but none of us, and went ashore + and buried the mate. We remained on board that night too. Next + day we landed on the main land, all but the second mate (David + Atcheson, of Dundee) and the cook; they were to go to New York. + They landed us with fourteen or fifteen pounds of small biscuit + and about five gallons of water. That day the Saxon went to sea. + The Vanderbilt had weighed anchor, and had gone out in chase of + a vessel, but she returned and went inside Penguin island and + took the coals. The captain knew that there was a guano island + about ten miles off. We walked across and waved to the people + there, and they sent a boat and took us off. The island is close + to the shore. The men that had come for the meat had gone there. + We stayed on the island about two days, when the Isabel (an + English schooner) came in and took us down to Ichaboe, another + guano island. We partly loaded a brig there called the Lord of + the Isles, and went further down in the schooner, with the brig, + to Hottentots’ bay, to fill up the brig, and then went in the + brig to Cape Town. There was an investigation at the + magistrates’ court. I gave evidence, and the captain and the two + men who were close to Mr. Gray when he was shot, William Murray + and Richard Cable. We were sixteen days in Cape Town. Murray and + Cable came home with me in the Cambal, but I don’t know where + they are—shipped in another vessel, I suppose; but I don’t know. + We came to London on the 6th February. I have been living since + at my mother’s, 3 New Terrace, Turner street, Stepney. I am + looking for a vessel every day. I have told my story as a yarn. + One day I was telling the story to a friend. A gentleman was + present. He was a perfect stranger to me. I said that I was + thinking of giving my evidence, as I heard that there was to be + an investigation. He said, “You had better go to the secretary + of the treasury.” So I came here yesterday morning, and left my + address.

Treasury,

I am, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL. [Enclosure in No. 29.] @@ -24794,7 +24891,7 @@ followed by a compromise with the French.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Chas. E. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24821,7 +24918,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHAELES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHAELES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -24857,7 +24954,8 @@ Majesty’s government.

I pray your lordship to accept, &c., &c.,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24888,7 +24986,8 @@ department at Washington.

I pray your lordship to accept the assurances, &c., &c.,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -24913,7 +25012,7 @@ certain topics connected with rebel operations on the ocean. * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -24994,7 +25093,7 @@ acknowledgment.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon, William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -25017,8 +25116,8 @@ excellency the American minister.

“Signed in behalf of the meeting,

- “JOHN EMERSON, Chairman.” + “JOHN EMERSON, Chairman.” [From the @@ -25163,7 +25262,7 @@ built by the Messrs. Laird at Birkenhead.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -25209,7 +25308,7 @@ Klingender & Co.; and if not, what he really did say.

I am, &c.,

- E. HAMMOND. + E. HAMMOND.

I am, &c.,

- GEO. A. HAMILTON. + GEO. A. HAMILTON. [Enclosure 1 in No. 2] @@ -25278,7 +25377,7 @@ the Parliamentary Return, date 20th July, 1863, No. 461.

I am, &c.,

- F. G. GARDNER. + F. G. GARDNER. [Enclosure 2 in No. @@ -25332,7 +25431,7 @@ conclusions. I herewith return the copy of the letter from the Foreign Office.

- S. PRICE EDWARDS. + S. PRICE EDWARDS. [Enclosure 3 in No. @@ -25358,8 +25457,8 @@

I beg to add that arms and other munitions of war are still being shipped to the United States.

- H. GOOLD, Assistant - Surveyor. + H. GOOLD, + Assistant Surveyor.

[The other enclosures, with Mr. Adams’s No. 616, being correspondence respecting the Alabama and the iron-clad @@ -25403,7 +25502,7 @@ that unprincipled and calamitous attempt at revolution.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25532,7 +25631,7 @@ exists.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25563,7 +25662,7 @@ stands immeasurably better than it has done at any former period.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25587,7 +25686,7 @@ events.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25613,7 +25712,7 @@ possessions in northwestern America.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, &c., &c., &c,

@@ -25639,7 +25738,7 @@

Your proceedings in this matter are approved.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -25668,7 +25767,7 @@ those sent in my No. 619.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -25692,7 +25791,7 @@ The decision will be given on an early day after the Easter recess.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -26183,7 +26282,7 @@ case.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -26208,7 +26307,7 @@ and of my reply on the 15th.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -26332,7 +26431,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -26476,7 +26575,8 @@ with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your lordship’s most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c.,&c., &c.

@@ -26502,7 +26602,7 @@ have been adopted unanimously.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -27481,7 +27581,7 @@ this remark as his answer.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -27508,7 +27608,7 @@ * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -27530,7 +27630,7 @@ “Correspondence respecting the Tuscaloosa.”

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -27590,7 +27690,7 @@ America at the Cape of Good Hope.

I am, &c.,

- W. G ROMAINE + W. G ROMAINE [Enclosure 1 in No. 1] @@ -27708,7 +27808,7 @@ bark of 500 tons, having 2 small guns and 10 men.

I have, &c.,

- B. W. WALKER. + B. W. WALKER. @@ -27737,7 +27837,7 @@ government.

I have, &c.,

- R. SEMMES. + R. SEMMES. [Enclosure 3 in No. @@ -27769,7 +27869,8 @@ Florida, which is expected.

I have &c.,

- CHARLES C. FORSYTH. + CHARLES C. + FORSYTH. [Enclosure 4 in No. @@ -27798,7 +27899,7 @@ our ports.

I have, &c.,

- B. W. WALKER. + B. W. WALKER. @@ -27849,7 +27950,8 @@ States.

I have, &c.,

- P. E. WODEHOUSE. + P. E. + WODEHOUSE.

[Enclosure 7 in No. 1.]

@@ -27945,7 +28047,7 @@ case is to avoid any breach of strict neutrality.

I have, &c.,

- B. W. WALKER. + B. W. WALKER. [Enclosure 9 in No. @@ -27979,7 +28081,8 @@ forthwith.

I have, &c,

- P. E. WODEHOUSE, + P. E. + WODEHOUSE, [Enclosure 10 in No. @@ -28004,7 +28107,7 @@ communication.

I have, &c.,

- B. W. WALKER. + B. W. WALKER. [Enclosure 11 in No. @@ -28041,7 +28144,8 @@ captured by the Alabama.

I have, &c.,

- CHARLES C. FORSYTH. + CHARLES C. + FORSYTH. @@ -28064,7 +28168,7 @@ on the presence of this vessel in the colony.

I am, &c.,

- F. ROGERS. + F. ROGERS. [Enclosure 1 in No. @@ -28282,7 +28386,7 @@ distressed countrymen, as is required of him by law.

I have, &c.,

- SEMMES. + SEMMES. [Enclosure 4 in No. @@ -28310,7 +28414,8 @@ this port.

I have, &c.,

- P. E. WODEHOUSE. + P. E. + WODEHOUSE. [Enclosure 5 in No. @@ -28337,7 +28442,7 @@ of making these repairs.

I have, &c.,

- R. SEMMES. + R. SEMMES. [Enclosure 6 in No. @@ -28363,8 +28468,9 @@ in which the capture was effected.

I have, &c.,

- L. ADAMSON, For Colonial - Secretary. + L. ADAMSON, + For Colonial + Secretary. [Enclosure 7 in No. @@ -28398,7 +28504,7 @@ two to three miles outside of the marine league.

I have, &c.,

- R. SEMMES. + R. SEMMES. [Enclosure 8 in No. @@ -28444,8 +28550,9 @@ purpose of that document.

Yours, &c.,

- WALTER GRAHAM, United States - Consul. + WALTER GRAHAM, + United States + Consul. [Enclosure 9 in No. @@ -28485,8 +28592,9 @@ her Majesty’s government.

I have, &c.,

- L. ADAMSON, For the Colonial - Secretary. + L. ADAMSON, + For the Colonial + Secretary. [Enclosure 10 in No. @@ -28519,8 +28627,9 @@ the outrage as the exigency requires,

I am, &c.,

- WALTER GRAHAM, United States - Consul. + WALTER GRAHAM, + United States + Consul. [Enclosure 11 in No. @@ -28542,8 +28651,9 @@ capture.

I have &c.,

- RAWSON W. RAWSON, Colonial - Secretary. + RAWSON W. RAWSON, Colonial + Secretary. [Enclosure 12 in No. @@ -28590,8 +28700,9 @@ which Captain Semmes himself declined to take.

I have, &c.,

- WALTER GRAHAM, United States - Consul. + WALTER GRAHAM, + United States + Consul. [Enclosure 13 in No. @@ -28635,8 +28746,9 @@

Thus done and protested before me, the said consul, the day, month, and year above written.

- WALTER GRAHAM, United States - Consul. + WALTER GRAHAM, + United States + Consul.

Charles F. White, Master of Sea Bride.

@@ -28662,8 +28774,9 @@ in progress.

I have, &c.,

- RAWSON W. RAWSON, Colonial - Secretary. + RAWSON W. RAWSON, Colonial + Secretary. [Enclosure 15 in No. @@ -28694,8 +28807,9 @@ her Majesty’s ship Valorous.

I have, &c.,

- WALTER GRAHAM, United States - Consul. + WALTER GRAHAM, + United States + Consul. [Enclosure 16 in No. @@ -28732,8 +28846,9 @@ to stand off and on the land until daylight, which orders were obeyed.

- JAMES ROBERTSON, Steward, Bark Sea - Bride. + JAMES ROBERTSON, Steward, Bark Sea + Bride.

Witness my hand and official seal this 7th day of August, 1863.

@@ -28770,9 +28885,9 @@ chagrined to find her so near the land, ordered her further off, which was done immediately.

- JOHN SCHOFIELD, Late 1st officer of Bark Sea - Bride. + JOHN SCHOFIELD, Late 1st + officer of Bark Sea Bride.

Witness my hand and official seal this 7th day of August, 1863.

@@ -28806,8 +28921,9 @@ removal of the prize crew from the Sea Bride.

I have, &c.,

- L. ADAMSON, For the Colonial - Secretary. + L. ADAMSON, + For the Colonial + Secretary. @@ -28835,8 +28951,9 @@ case to her Majesty’s government.

I have, &c,

- RAWSON W. RAWSON, Colonial - Secretary. + RAWSON W. RAWSON, Colonial + Secretary. [Enclosure 20 in No. @@ -28899,8 +29016,9 @@ neutrality that has yet been given.

I have, &c.,

- WALTER GRAHAM, United States - Consul. + WALTER GRAHAM, + United States + Consul. [Enclosure 21 in No. @@ -28923,8 +29041,9 @@ entitled.

I have, &c.,

- RAWSON W. RAWSON, Colonial - Secretary. + RAWSON W. RAWSON, Colonial + Secretary. [Enclosure 22 in No. @@ -28972,8 +29091,9 @@ rights as importunate, or my remarks as inopportune,

I have, &c.,

- WALTER GRAHAM, United States - Consul. + WALTER GRAHAM, + United States + Consul. @@ -29010,8 +29130,9 @@ strict sense of duty to your country.

I have, &c.,

- RAWSON W. RAWSON, Colonial - Secretary. + RAWSON W. RAWSON, Colonial + Secretary. [Enclosure 24 in No. @@ -29083,8 +29204,9 @@ diplomatic functions.

I have, &c.,

- WALTER GRAHAM, United States - Consul. + WALTER GRAHAM, + United States + Consul. [Enclosure 25 in No. @@ -29113,8 +29235,9 @@ indispensable.

I have, &c.,

- RAWSON W. RAWSON, Colonial - Secretary. + RAWSON W. RAWSON, Colonial + Secretary. [Enclosure 26 in No. @@ -29139,7 +29262,7 @@ land, and quite five if not six from the northwest point of Robben island.

- J. HOPSON. + J. HOPSON.

Taken before me at Green Point, this 7th day of August, 1863.

@@ -29170,10 +29293,11 @@ we should be called upon to give our evidence respecting the affair, and we took a note of the time it occurred.

- W. S. FIELD, Collector of - Customs.Cape - Town, + W. S. FIELD, + Collector of + Customs.Cape + Town, August 8, 1863. @@ -29200,10 +29324,11 @@

JOHN ROE.

This statement made before me,

- R. JOHNSON DUTTON, Acting Clerk of - the Peace.Cape - Town, + R. JOHNSON DUTTON, Acting Clerk of the + Peace.Cape + Town, August 6, 1863. @@ -29252,8 +29377,9 @@

Taken before me, at Cape Town, this 7th day of August, 1863.

- R. JOHNSON DUTTON, Acting Clerk of - the Peace. + R. JOHNSON DUTTON, Acting Clerk of the + Peace.

Witnesses:

J. W. A. Russond.

@@ -29295,7 +29421,8 @@ captured by the Alabama

I have, &c.,

- CHARLES C. FORSYTH. + CHARLES C. + FORSYTH. For enclosure 31 in No. 2, Rear-Admiral Sir @@ -29328,7 +29455,8 @@ Majesty’s colonies or possessions abroad.

I am, &c.,

- W. G. ROMAINE. + W. G. + ROMAINE. [Enclosure 33 in No. @@ -29362,7 +29490,7 @@ circumstances.

I have, &c.,

- J. RUSSELL. + J. RUSSELL.

For enclosure 34 in No. 2, Sir P. Wodehouse to Rear-Admiral @@ -29404,8 +29532,9 @@ British government for the said bark and underwriters.

I have, &c.,

- G. S. HOLMES, Agent for said - Underwriters. + G. S. HOLMES, + Agent for said + Underwriters. [Enclosure 40 in No. @@ -29426,8 +29555,9 @@ circumstances under which it took place.

I have, &c.,

- RAWSON W. RAWSON, Colonial - Secretary. + RAWSON W. RAWSON, Colonial + Secretary. @@ -29452,7 +29582,7 @@ vessels.

I am, &c.,

- C. PAGET. + C. PAGET. [Enclosure 1 in No. @@ -29490,7 +29620,7 @@ proclamation.

I have, &c.,

- B. W. WALKER. + B. W. WALKER. [Enclosure 2 in No. @@ -29535,7 +29665,8 @@ at 5.30 p. m. this day.

I have, &c.,

- C. C. FORSYTH. + C. C. + FORSYTH. @@ -29557,7 +29688,7 @@ Confederate States ship Alabama and her prizes.

I am, &c.,

- C. PAGET. + C. PAGET. [Enclosure 1 in No. 4.] @@ -29606,7 +29737,7 @@ surprising they did not see each other.

I have, &c.,

- B. W. WALKER. + B. W. WALKER.

[Enclosure 2 in No. 4.]

@@ -29661,7 +29792,7 @@ week.

I am, &c.,

- C. PAGET. + C. PAGET. No. 6. @@ -29681,7 +29812,7 @@ The Vanderbilt was reported as having reached the Mauritius.

I am, &c.,

- W. G. ROMAINE. + W. G. ROMAINE. No. 7. @@ -29816,7 +29947,7 @@ owners.

I have, &c.,

- NEWCASTLE. + NEWCASTLE. @@ -29954,7 +30085,8 @@ this despatch at your earliest convenience.

I have, &c.,

- P. E. WODEHOUSE. + P. E. + WODEHOUSE.

[For enclosure 2 in No. 8, the Duke of Newcastle to Sir P. @@ -30037,7 +30169,7 @@ requested by the governor.

I have, &c.,

- B. W. WALKER. + B. W. WALKER.

[Enclosure 2 in No. 9.]

@@ -30080,9 +30212,9 @@

Is there any cargo on board, and what does it consist of?—No cargo; only stores for ballast.

- JOHN LOW, Lieutenant Commander, - Confederate States baric - Tuscaloosa. + JOHN LOW, + Lieutenant Commander, Confederate + States baric Tuscaloosa.

Francis L. Wood, @@ -30121,7 +30253,7 @@ you.

I have, &c.,

- B. W. WALKER. + B. W. WALKER. [Enclosure 4 in No. @@ -30147,7 +30279,8 @@ properly reclaimed by her original owners.

I have, &c.,

- P. E. WODEHOUSE. + P. E. + WODEHOUSE. [Enclosure 5 in No. @@ -30177,7 +30310,7 @@ vessel to the officer bearing this letter to you.

I am, &c.,

- B. W. WALKER. + B. W. WALKER. [Enclosure 6 in No. @@ -30211,7 +30344,7 @@ excellency as soon as received.

I have, &c.,

- B. W. WALKER. + B. W. WALKER. [Enclosure 7 in No. @@ -30235,7 +30368,7 @@ Tuscaloosa.

I am, &c.,

- JOHN LOW. + JOHN LOW. [Enclosure 8 in No. @@ -30307,7 +30440,7 @@ circumstances of the case.

I have, &c.,

- JOHN LOW. + JOHN LOW. [Enclosure 9 in No. @@ -30329,7 +30462,8 @@ the Tuscaloosa.

I have, &c.,

- P. E. WODEHOUSE. + P. E. + WODEHOUSE. [Enclosure 10 in No. @@ -30357,7 +30491,8 @@ consideration.

I have, &c.,

- RAWSON W. RAWSON. + RAWSON W. + RAWSON. [Enclosure 11 in No. @@ -30384,7 +30519,7 @@ Tuscaloosa is detained.

I have, &c.,

- B. W. WALKER. + B. W. WALKER.

N. B.—I beg to enclose a list of the officers and men on @@ -30554,11 +30689,13 @@ charts; standing and running rigging complete, but in very bad condition. No spare stores of any description on board.

- JOHN LOW, Lieut., Com’dg Confederate - States bark Tuscaloosa. + JOHN LOW, + Lieut., Com’dg Confederate States bark + Tuscaloosa. - W. R. KENNEDY, Lieut., her Majesty’s - ship Narcissus. + W. R. KENNEDY, + Lieut., her Majesty’s ship + Narcissus. @@ -30573,11 +30710,13 @@ revolver pistols; 300 ball cartridges for ditto; 500 percussion caps for ditto; 5 cutlasses; 8 water-casks; 3 charts.

- JOHN LOW, Lieut., Com’dg Confederate - States bark Tuscaloosa. + JOHN LOW, + Lieut., Com’dg Confederate States bark + Tuscaloosa. - W. R. KENNEDY, Lieut., her Majesty’s - skip Narcissus. + W. R. KENNEDY, + Lieut., her Majesty’s skip + Narcissus. [Enclosure 13 in No. 9.] @@ -30605,7 +30744,8 @@ owners.

I have, &c.,

- P. E. WODEHOUSE. + P. E. + WODEHOUSE. @@ -30628,7 +30768,7 @@ the colonial government.

I am, &c.,

- FREDERICK ROGERS. + FREDERICK ROGERS. [Enclosure 1 in No. 10.] @@ -30699,7 +30839,8 @@ the correspondence are enclosed.

I have, &c.,

- P. E. WODEHOUSE. + P. E. + WODEHOUSE. [Enclosure 2 in No. @@ -30721,8 +30862,9 @@ original holders.

I have, &c.,

- RAWSON W. RAWSON, Colonial - Secretary. + RAWSON W. RAWSON, Colonial + Secretary. @@ -30772,8 +30914,9 @@ received with great satisfaction by me.

I have, &c.,

- WALTER GRAHAM, United States - Consul. + WALTER GRAHAM, + United States + Consul. [Enclosure 4 in No. @@ -30796,7 +30939,8 @@ Tuscaloosa.

I have, &c.,

- P. E. WODEHOUSE. + P. E. + WODEHOUSE. [Enclosure 5 in No. @@ -30824,10 +30968,11 @@ transaction.

We have &c.,

- W. R. KENNEDY, Lieutenant. + W. R. KENNEDY, Lieutenant. - THOMAS POUNDS. + THOMAS + POUNDS. [Enclosure 6 in No. @@ -30852,7 +30997,8 @@ proposed.

I have, &c.

- P. E. WODEHOUSE. + P. E. + WODEHOUSE. [Enclosure 7 in No. @@ -30887,7 +31033,7 @@ their arrangements.

I have, &c.,

- JOHN LOW. + JOHN LOW. [Enclosure 8 in No. @@ -30916,7 +31062,8 @@ excellency’s directions.

I have, &c.,

- RAWSON W. RAWSON. + RAWSON W. + RAWSON. [Enclosure 9 in No. @@ -30947,8 +31094,9 @@ them.

I have, &c.,

- WALTER GRAHAM, United States - Consul. + WALTER GRAHAM, + United States + Consul. [Enclosure 10 in No. @@ -30969,8 +31117,9 @@ government may think fit to issue respecting them.

I have, &c.,

- RAWSON W. RAWSON, Colonial - Secretary. + RAWSON W. RAWSON, Colonial + Secretary. @@ -31023,8 +31172,8 @@ disposed of as the government may direct.

I have, &c.,

- B. W. WALKER, Rear-Admiral. + B. W. WALKER, Rear-Admiral. [Enclosure 2 in No. @@ -31061,7 +31210,7 @@ hereafter.

I have, &c.,

- B. W. WALKER. + B. W. WALKER. @@ -31083,7 +31232,8 @@ States relative to an inspection of the Tuscaloosa.

I have, &c.,

- P. E. WODEHOUSE. + P. E. + WODEHOUSE. [Enclosure 4 in No. @@ -31109,8 +31259,9 @@ you a copy.

I have, &c.,

- WALTER GRAHAM, United States - Consul. + WALTER GRAHAM, + United States + Consul. [Enclosure 5 in No. @@ -31145,8 +31296,9 @@ 2d of January last, of which the attached are copies.

I have, &c.,

- J. M. HOETS, United States - Consular Agent. + J. M. HOETS, + United States Consular + Agent.

We concur in the above.

W. R. KENNEDY, Lieutenant, @@ -31179,7 +31331,7 @@ ship Narcissus.

I have, &c.,

- B. W. WALKER. + B. W. WALKER. [Enclosure 7 in No. 11.] @@ -31364,10 +31516,10 @@

N. B.—The whole of this rigging is condemnable.

- W. R. KENNEDY, Lieutenant.Simon’s - Bay, + W. R. KENNEDY, Lieutenant.Simon’s + Bay, January 2, 1864. @@ -31423,13 +31575,16 @@

Standing and running rigging complete, but in very bad condition.

No spare stores of any description on board.

- - J. LOW, Lieutenant, Com’dg - Confederate States baric - Tuscaloosa. - - W. R. KENNEDY, Lieutenant, H. M. - S, Narcissus. + + + J. LOW, + Lieutenant, Com’dg Confederate + States baric Tuscaloosa. + + W. R. KENNEDY, Lieutenant, H. M. S, + Narcissus. + @@ -31504,11 +31659,13 @@ - J. LOW, Lieutenant, Comm’dg - Confederate States bark Tuscaloosa. + J. LOW, + Lieutenant, Comm’dg Confederate States + bark Tuscaloosa. - W. R. KENNEDY, Lieutenant, H. M. S. - Narcissus. + W. R. KENNEDY, + Lieutenant, H. M. S. + Narcissus. No. 12. @@ -31529,7 +31686,8 @@ the governor of that colony on the subject.

I am, &c.,

- T. FREDERICK ELLIOT. + T. FREDERICK + ELLIOT. [Enclosure in No. @@ -31558,7 +31716,7 @@ subject by the next mail.

I have, &c.,

- NEWCASTLE. + NEWCASTLE. @@ -31580,7 +31738,7 @@ Tuscaloosa.

I am, &c.,

- FREDERICK ROGERS. + FREDERICK ROGERS. [Enclosure in No. 13.] @@ -31636,7 +31794,7 @@ fuller consideration, by her Majesty’s government.

I am, &c.,

- NEWCASTLE. + NEWCASTLE. @@ -31660,7 +31818,7 @@ offenders.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -31691,7 +31849,7 @@ disconnected with their policy towards the United States.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -31723,7 +31881,7 @@ know not how this will affect the decision.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -31755,7 +31913,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -31799,8 +31958,8 @@ intention of those controlling her.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

- F. H. MORSE, Consul. + F. H. MORSE, Consul.

Hon. C. F. Adams, United States Minister.

@@ -31835,7 +31994,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c.,&c.

@@ -32023,8 +32182,9 @@

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

- BENJAMIN MORAN, Assistant Secretary of - Legation, + BENJAMIN MORAN, + Assistant Secretary of + Legation,

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -32066,7 +32226,7 @@ whether it would be advisable to suggest a cruise at once of some of our vessels that may be in reach.

- JESSE H. McMATH. + JESSE H. McMATH.

Horatio J. Sprague, United States Consul, Gibraltar,

@@ -32116,7 +32276,7 @@ Russell’s note of the 19th instant in reply.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -32146,7 +32306,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -32181,7 +32341,7 @@ has been made for them.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -32208,7 +32368,7 @@ Laird.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -32229,8 +32389,8 @@

They are now published with the permission of Messrs. Laird Brothers.

- VACHER & SONS, Publishers. + VACHER & SONS, Publishers. 29, Parliament Street,

We are, sir, your obedient servants,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

Price Edwards, Esq.

 @@ -32295,7 +32455,7 @@ customs.

I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

- S. PRICE EDWARDS. + S. PRICE EDWARDS.

Messrs. Laird Brothers.

 @@ -32322,7 +32482,7 @@ built.

I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

- A. H. LAYARD. + A. H. LAYARD.

Messrs. Laird & Co., Birkenhead.

@@ -32363,7 +32523,7 @@ six or seven weeks from this date.

We are, sir, your obedient servants,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

A. H. Layard, Esq., M. P.

@@ -32396,7 +32556,7 @@ vessel.

We are, sir, your obedient servants,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

S. Price Edwards, Esq.

 @@ -32424,7 +32584,7 @@ have been brought to a conclusion. I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

- GEO. A. HAMILTON. + GEO. A. HAMILTON.

Messrs. Laird & Co., Birkenhead.

@@ -32447,7 +32607,7 @@ be had. That reply may yet come in time to meet your wishes.

I am, dear sirs, yours, very truly,

- S. P. EDWARDS. + S. P. EDWARDS.

Messrs. Laird Brothers.

 @@ -32482,7 +32642,7 @@ vessel not less than six or seven weeks from this date.

We are, sir, your obedient servants,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

George A. Hamilton, Esq.

 @@ -32503,7 +32663,7 @@ her.

I have only this moment received the telegram. Yours truly,

- S. PRICE EDWARDS. + S. PRICE EDWARDS.

Messrs. Laird Brothers.

 @@ -32532,8 +32692,8 @@ to send her away.

I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

- SAMUEL PRICE EDWARDS, Collector. + SAMUEL PRICE EDWARDS, Collector.

Messrs. Laird Brothers, Birkenhead.

@@ -32564,7 +32724,7 @@ previous correspondence, and we now beg to confirm the same; and are, sir, your obedient servants,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

Samuel Price Edwards, Esq., Collector of her Majesty’s Customs, @@ -32621,7 +32781,7 @@ of customs will be instructed to detain the vessel.

I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

- H. BRAND. + H. BRAND.

Messrs. Laird, Birkenhead.

@@ -32646,7 +32806,7 @@

The trial of the iron-clad screw steam vessel is deferred.

We are, sir, your obedient servants,

- LAIRD BROTHERS, + LAIRD BROTHERS,

H. Brand, Esq.

 @@ -32684,7 +32844,7 @@ Bravay & Co., of Paris.

We are, &c.,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

Hon. H. Brand.

 @@ -32729,7 +32889,7 @@ that these precautions will meet with your concurrence.

I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

- GEO. A. HAMILTON, + GEO. A. HAMILTON,

Messrs. Laird & Co., Birkenhead.

@@ -32758,7 +32918,7 @@ by us the El Tousson) to Mr. Morgan, the surveyor of customs. We are, respectfully, your mest obedient servants,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

G. A. Hamilton, Esq.

 @@ -32811,7 +32971,7 @@ some weeks before she is finally completed.

We are, respectfully, your obedient servants,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

Geo. A. Hamilton, Esq.

 @@ -32838,7 +32998,7 @@ directions to the commissioners of customs accordingly.

I have the honor to be, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

- GEO. A. HAMILTON. + GEO. A. HAMILTON.

Messrs. Laird, Birkenhead.

@@ -32891,7 +33051,7 @@ amount of loss and annoyance not easily estimated.

We remain, sir, your obedient servants,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

George A. Hamilton, Esq.

 @@ -32943,7 +33103,7 @@ of their design impossible.

Waiting your reply, we remain, sir, your obedient servants,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

George A. Hamilton, Esq.

 @@ -32987,7 +33147,7 @@ of their design impossible.

We remain, sir, your most obedient servant,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

S. Price Edwards, Esq.

 @@ -33016,7 +33176,7 @@ custom-house officers in possession of the vessel.

I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

- GEO. A. HAMILTON. + GEO. A. HAMILTON.

Messrs. Laird, Birkenhead Iron Works, Birkenhead.

@@ -33053,7 +33213,7 @@ time.

We are, sir, your obedient servants,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

George A. Hamilton, Esq.

 @@ -33079,7 +33239,7 @@ week, or within any other suitable time.

I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

- GEO. A. HAMILTON. + GEO. A. HAMILTON.

Messrs. Laird Brothers, Birkenhead Iron Works, Birkenhead.

@@ -33105,8 +33265,8 @@ remove your workman at once from on board the ships.

I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

- S. PRICE EDWARDS, Collector. + S. PRICE EDWARDS, Collector.

Messrs. Laird Brothers, Birkenhead.

@@ -33175,7 +33335,7 @@ reconsidered,” which we now beg to confirm.

We are, my lord, your most obedient servants,

- LAIRD BROS. + LAIRD BROS.

The Right Hon. Earl Russell.

Same sent to G. A. Hamilton, Esq., @@ -33266,7 +33426,7 @@ proceedings.

We are, my lords, your lordships’ most obedient servants,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

The Lords Commissioners of H. M. Treasury.

@@ -33300,7 +33460,7 @@ safety in this inclement season of the year.

We are, sir, your obedient servants,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

The Secretary to the Treasury.

 @@ -33324,7 +33484,7 @@ commissioners of her Majesty’s treasury.

I am, gentlemen, your most obedient servant,

- E. HAMMOND. + E. HAMMOND.

Messrs. Laird, Birkenhead.

@@ -33353,7 +33513,7 @@ telegram to the secretary of state for foreign affairs.

I am, gentlemen, your most obedient servant,

- W. G. ROMAINE. + W. G. ROMAINE.

Messrs. Laird Brothers, Birkenhead.

@@ -33399,7 +33559,7 @@ commissioners of her Majesty’s treasury.

I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

- E. HAMMOND. + E. HAMMOND.

Messrs. Laird, Birkenhead.

@@ -33428,7 +33588,7 @@ telegram on the 29th ultimo.

I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

- GEO. A. HAMILTON. + GEO. A. HAMILTON.

Messrs. Laird, Birkenhead.

@@ -33474,7 +33634,7 @@ the case will necessarily receive in a court of law.

I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

- GEO A. HAMILTON. + GEO A. HAMILTON.

Messrs. Laird Brothers, Birkenhead.

@@ -33521,7 +33681,7 @@ exposure to the damp and wet at this inclement season.

We are, my lord, your obedient servants,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

Copy of above to—

Secretary to Treasury, same date;

@@ -33554,7 +33714,7 @@ communication will be addressed to you thereon.

I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

- GEO. A. HAMILTON. + GEO. A. HAMILTON.

Messrs. Laird Brothers, Birkenhead.

@@ -33578,7 +33738,7 @@ directions as that department may think proper to give.

I am, gentlemen, your most obedient servant,

- E. HAMMOND. + E. HAMMOND.

Messrs. Laird Brothers, Iron Works, Birkenhead.

@@ -33603,7 +33763,7 @@ the property on board from injury, &c.

I am, gentlemen, your most obedient servant,

- C. PAGET. + C. PAGET.

Messrs. Laird & Co., Birkenhead.

@@ -33653,7 +33813,7 @@ of any kind need be anticipated.

I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

- GEO. A. HAMILTON. + GEO. A. HAMILTON.

Messrs. Laird Brothers, Birkenhead.

@@ -33676,7 +33836,7 @@ to-morrow.

We are, sir, your obedient servants,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

G. A. Hamilton, Esq.

 @@ -33717,7 +33877,7 @@ rend="italic">£20,500 expires on the 24th instant.

We are, sir, your obedient servants,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

The Secretary to the Treasury.

 @@ -33746,7 +33906,7 @@ reply.

We are, sir, your obedient servants,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

The Secretary to the Treasury.

 @@ -33771,7 +33931,7 @@ would again respectfully ask an early reply.

We are, sir, your obedient servants,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

The Secretary to the Treasury.

 @@ -33821,7 +33981,7 @@ purpose to have them placed.

We are, sir, your most obedient servants,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

The Secretary to the Treasury.

The plan enclosed indicates the various positions of the vessels @@ -33858,7 +34018,7 @@ comply with your request.

I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

- GEO. A. HAMILTON. + GEO. A. HAMILTON.

Messrs. Laird & Co., Birkenhead.

@@ -33895,7 +34055,7 @@ of her Majesty’s government.

I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

- GEO. A. HAMILTON. + GEO. A. HAMILTON.

Messrs. Laird, Birkenhead Iron Works, Birkenhead,

@@ -33940,7 +34100,7 @@ repeatedly pressed this course on the law advisers of the crown.

We are, sir, your obedient servants,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

The Secretary to the Treasury.

 @@ -33963,7 +34123,7 @@ under seizure, to be completed.

I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

- GEO. A. HAMILTON. + GEO. A. HAMILTON.

Messrs. Laird Brothers, Birkenhead Iron Works, Birkenhead.

@@ -34000,7 +34160,7 @@ owners of the ships.

We are, sir, your obedient servants,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

The Secretary to the Treasury.

 @@ -34028,7 +34188,7 @@ collecting evidence.

I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

- G. A. HAMILTON. + G. A. HAMILTON.

Messrs. Laird Brothers, Birkenhead Iron Works, Birkenhead.

@@ -34059,8 +34219,8 @@ attempt be made to remove her from where she is at present.

I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

- W. G. STEWART, Assistant - Collector. + W. G. STEWART, + Assistant Collector.

Messrs. Laird & Co., Birkenhead.

@@ -34090,7 +34250,7 @@ ship-keeper when going on board.

We are, respectfully, your obedient servants,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

W. G. Stewart, Esq., Assistant Collector of her Majesty’s Customs, @@ -34136,7 +34296,7 @@ letter from the treasury.

We are, sir, your obedient servants,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

W. G. Stewart, Esq.

 @@ -34160,8 +34320,8 @@ officers of customs at all times.

I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

- W. G. STEWART, Assistant - Collector. + W. G. STEWART, + Assistant Collector.

Messrs. Laird Brothers.

 @@ -34187,8 +34347,8 @@ which I used as synonymous with these terms.

I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

- W. G. STEWART, Assistant - Collector. + W. G. STEWART, + Assistant Collector.

Messrs. Laird Brothers.

 @@ -34212,8 +34372,8 @@ of customs.

Respectfully,

- E. MORGAN, Surveyor. + E. MORGAN, Surveyor.

Messrs. Laird.

 @@ -34236,8 +34396,8 @@ float, Birkenhead.

Respectfully,

- EDWARD MORGAN, Surveyor. + EDWARD MORGAN, Surveyor.

Messrs. Laird.

 @@ -34269,7 +34429,7 @@ which her Majesty’s government apprehend.

We are, respectfully, sir, your obedient servants,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

Capt. Inglefield, R. N.

 @@ -34321,8 +34481,8 @@ placing a party of men as a guard upon your premises.

I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

- E. A. INGLEFIELD, Captain. + E. A. INGLEFIELD, Captain.

We are, sir, your obedient servant,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

Captain Inglefield, R. N., H. M. S. Majestic.

@@ -34408,7 +34568,7 @@ place.

We are, sir, your obedient servant,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

Captain Inglefield, R. N., H. M. S. Majestic.

@@ -34437,8 +34597,8 @@ o’clock.

I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

- E. A. INGLEFIELD, Captain. + E. A. INGLEFIELD, Captain.

Messrs. Laird, Birkenhead.

@@ -34464,7 +34624,7 @@ opening this dock again to-morrow morning. We are, sir, your obedient servants,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

Captain Inglefield, H. M. S. Majestic.

@@ -34492,7 +34652,7 @@

Be so good as to acknowledge receipt of this intimation.

We are, sir, your obedient servants,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

Captain Inglefield, R. N., H. M. S. Majestic.

@@ -34516,8 +34676,8 @@ your graving dock to-morrow morning.

I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

- E. A. INGLEFIELD, Captain. + E. A. INGLEFIELD, Captain.

Your obedient servant,

- E. MORGAN, Surveyor. + E. MORGAN, Surveyor.

Messrs. Laird Brothers.

 @@ -34558,7 +34718,7 @@ Bravay & Co., 6 Rue de Londres, Paris.

Your obedient servant,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

Mr. Morgan.

 @@ -34590,8 +34750,8 @@ question to my custody upon my sending an officer and party to take charge of them. I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

- E. A. INGLEFIELD, Captain. + E. A. INGLEFIELD, Captain.

Messrs. Laird, Birkenhead.

@@ -34617,7 +34777,7 @@ consideration.

We are, sir, your obedient servants,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

Captain Inglefield, R. N., H. M. S. Majestic.

@@ -34649,8 +34809,8 @@ Monnassir.

I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

- E. A. INGLEFIELD, Captain. + E. A. INGLEFIELD, Captain.

Messrs. Laird, Birkenhead.

@@ -34693,7 +34853,7 @@ they have given you on this point.

We are, sir, your obedient servants,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

Captain Inglefield, R. N., H. M. S. Majestic.

@@ -34735,7 +34895,7 @@ of the government in this matter.

We are, sir, your obedient servants,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

Captain Inglefield, R. N., H. M. S. Majestic.

@@ -34761,8 +34921,8 @@ convenience.

I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

- E. A. INGLEFIELD, Captain. + E. A. INGLEFIELD, Captain.

Messrs. Laird, Birkenhead.

@@ -34793,8 +34953,8 @@ really much concerned.

And always yours, respectfully,

- E. A. INGLEFIELD, Captain. + E. A. INGLEFIELD, Captain.

Messrs. Laird, Birkenhead.

@@ -34828,7 +34988,7 @@ so.

We are, sir, your obedient servants,

- LAIRD BROTHERS. + LAIRD BROTHERS.

Captain Inglefield, R. N., H. M. S. Majestic.

@@ -34859,8 +35019,8 @@ that I may be refunded the amount deposited.

I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

- E. A. INGLEFIELD, Captain. + E. A. INGLEFIELD, Captain.

Messrs. Laird, Birkenhead.

@@ -34894,7 +35054,7 @@ from the present House of Commons.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington. D. C.

@@ -34925,7 +35085,7 @@ with this government.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -34950,7 +35110,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -34976,7 +35136,7 @@ army, and the case of piracy on board the steamer Chesapeake.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -35011,7 +35171,7 @@ matter.

I have, &c.,

- G. ARBUTHNOT. + G. ARBUTHNOT. [Enclosure 1 in No. 1.] @@ -35069,7 +35229,7 @@ instructions he put the men on board.

I am, &c.,

- F. G. GARDNER. + F. G. GARDNER. [Enclosure 2 in No. @@ -35092,20 +35252,21 @@ they being too poor to pay, and I am not aware of any payment made to them on board.

- his + his - JOHN + DUNN. + JOHN + DUNN. - mark. + mark.

Read over to the party in our presence, who witness his mark hereto ths 12th of November, 1863, at Queenstown.

- J. MOORE, Surveyor, - - N. SEYMOUR. - - P. DUNN. + + J. MOORE, Surveyor, + N. SEYMOUR. + P. DUNN. +
@@ -35126,7 +35287,7 @@ the Hon. J. M. Mason, together with copies of the declarations to which it refers. Believe, &c.,

- DONOUGHMORE. + DONOUGHMORE. [Enclosure 1 in No. 2.] @@ -35156,7 +35317,7 @@ Robert Dowling, esq., at Cork or Queenstown.

I have, &c.,

- J. M. MASON. + J. M. MASON. @@ -35205,19 +35366,19 @@

Made and subscribed before me, at and in the borough of Cork, this 18th day of November, 1863.

- his + his - PATRICK × KENNEDY. + PATRICK × KENNEDY. - mark. + mark.

Truly read by me,

THOMAS H. CROFTS.

 - FELICE MULLUN, One of the Justices of - the Peace for the borough of - Cork. + FELICE MULLUN, + One of the Justices of the Peace for the + borough of Cork. [Enclosure 3 in No. @@ -35275,18 +35436,19 @@

Made and subscribed before me, in the borough of Cork, this 16th day of November, 1863.

- his + his - EDWARD × LYNCH. + EDWARD × LYNCH. - mark. + mark.

Truly read by me to the said Edward Lynch,

THOMAS W. CROFTS.

 - ROBERT HALL, Justice of the Peace, - Borough of Cork. + ROBERT HALL, + Justice of the Peace, Borough of + Cork.

I am, &c.,

- W. G. ROMAINE. + W. G. ROMAINE. [Enclosure in No. @@ -35352,7 +35514,7 @@ them on shore at Queenstown.

I have, &c.,

- LEWIS JONES. + LEWIS JONES.

I am, &c.,

- W. G. ROMAINE. + W. G. ROMAINE. [Enclosure 1 in No. 7.] @@ -35410,7 +35572,7 @@ irregular.

I am, &c.,

- LEWIS T. JONES. + LEWIS T. JONES. [Enclosure 5 in No. @@ -35468,7 +35630,7 @@ otherwise utterly destitute.

Very respectfully, &c.,

- JAS. S. THORNTON. + JAS. S. THORNTON.
@@ -35496,7 +35658,7 @@ collected to sustain it.

I am, &c.,

- E. HAMMOND. + E. HAMMOND.

I am, &c.

- H. A. BRUCE. + H. A. BRUCE.

I am, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

I am, &c.,

- E. HAMMOND. + E. HAMMOND.

I am, &c.,

- E. HAMMOND. + E. HAMMOND.

I have, &c.,

- JEREMIAH PERRY. + JEREMIAH PERRY. [Enclosure 2 in No. @@ -35728,7 +35890,8 @@ about issuing tickets as you may see fit.

Yours, &c.,

- PAGE, RICHARDSON & CO. + PAGE, RICHARDSON & + CO.

[Enclosure 3 in No. 3.]

@@ -35814,7 +35977,7 @@ the matter requires your presence.

I am, &c.,

- P. H. FINNEY. + P. H. FINNEY. [Enclosure 5 in No. @@ -35867,7 +36030,8 @@ authorities should assist him by every means in their power.

Yours, &c.,

- SABLE & SEARLE. + SABLE & + SEARLE. [Enclosure 6 in No. @@ -35896,8 +36060,9 @@

Steps have been taken to watch the man’s movements, which shall be reported in due course.

- ——————, Sub Inspector - Constabulary. + ——————, + Sub Inspector + Constabulary. [Enclosure 7 in No. @@ -35932,8 +36097,9 @@ repay their employers £1, which is to be advanced together with their passage fare.

- ————————, Sub-Inspector, - Constabulary. + ————————, + Sub-Inspector, + Constabulary.
@@ -35956,7 +36122,7 @@ been made to his lordship on the subject by Mr. Adams.

I am, &c.,

- E. HAMMOND. + E. HAMMOND.

I am, &c.,

- FREDERIC ROGERS. + FREDERIC ROGERS. [Enclosure 1 in No. 6.] @@ -36169,7 +36335,7 @@ country as compared with other countries.

I have, &c.,

- T. W. C. MURDOCH. + T. W. C. MURDOCH.

[Enclosure 2 in No. 6.]

@@ -38399,7 +38565,7 @@ annexed.

I am, &c.,

- H. WADDINGTON. + H. WADDINGTON. [Enclosure 1 in No. @@ -38437,7 +38603,7 @@ to about that extent.

I am, &c.,

- FREDERIC ROGERS. + FREDERIC ROGERS.

[For enclosure 2 in No. 7, Mr. Murdoch to Sir F. Rogers, January @@ -38472,7 +38638,7 @@ officers, who are of opinion that the evidence would not be sufficient to sustain a prosecution. I am, &c.,

- H. WADDINGTON. + H. WADDINGTON.

I am, &c.,

- H. WADDINGTON. + H. WADDINGTON. [Enclosure in No. 9.] @@ -38523,8 +38689,8 @@ railways, &c., and all are of the laboring class, and strong athletic young men.

- DANIEL RYAN, Superintendent. + DANIEL RYAN, Superintendent.

Submitted. J. L. O. Ferrall.

@@ -38550,7 +38716,7 @@ young men by the agency of P. J. Finney.

I am, &c.,

- H. WADDINGTON. + H. WADDINGTON. [Enclosure in No. @@ -38570,8 +38736,8 @@ Liverpool. It is said that the vessel which shall convey them to Boston shall sail from Liverpool on to-morrow.

- DANIEL RYAN, Superintendent. + DANIEL RYAN, Superintendent.

The Commissioners of Police, Submitted. @@ -38610,7 +38776,7 @@ it except that contained in newspapers

I have, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS. [Enclosure in No. 1.] @@ -38923,7 +39089,7 @@ on the subject.

I have, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

[Enclosure 1 in No. 2, Lord Lyons to Mr. Seward, published elsewhere.]

@@ -39150,7 +39316,7 @@ to-day.

I have, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS. [Enclosure 3 in No. @@ -39184,7 +39350,7 @@

Please detach and forward as before. Telegraph when return answer is received. Very important.

- J. H. C., per T. + J. H. C., per T.

A. Keith, @@ -39482,7 +39648,7 @@ escape.

I have, &c.,

- HASTINGS DOYLE. + HASTINGS DOYLE. [Enclosure 1 in No. 5.] @@ -39506,8 +39672,8 @@ against them.

I have, &c.,

- N. GUNNISON, Vice-Consul. + N. GUNNISON, Vice-Consul. [Enclosure 2 in No. @@ -39525,7 +39691,8 @@ information you may have immediately to collectors of Portland, Boston, and Eastport.

- I. WASHBURN, Jr., + I. WASHBURN, + Jr., Collector of Portland. @@ -39544,7 +39711,7 @@

Is the steamer Chesapeake, or has she been, in your port? Please answer.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.
- J. Q. HOWARD, United States - Consul. + J. Q. HOWARD, + United States Consul.
- C. O. LEACH, United States - Consul. + C. O. LEACH, + United States Consul.
A steamer said to be of similar appearance to Chesapeake passed this harbor about noon yesterday, steering down the bay.

- A. L. + A. L.
- ISRAEL WASHBURN, Jr., - Collector. + ISRAEL WASHBURN, Jr., Collector.
- I. WASHBURN, Jr., - Collector. + I. WASHBURN, Jr., Collector.
- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.
- JOSEPH D. DAVIS. + JOSEPH D. DAVIS.
- J. M. MERRILL, United States Consular - Agent. + J. M. MERRILL, + United States Consular + Agent.
She lies behind Blue island, near Jordan, out of sight, discharging cargo into lighters, and waiting for coals.

- A. F. FARRAR. + A. F. FARRAR. [Enclosure 3 in No. 5.] @@ -39758,8 +39928,8 @@ of Halifax, and I verily believe such information to be true.

- NATHANIEL GUNNISON, Vice-Consul. + NATHANIEL GUNNISON, Vice-Consul.

Sworn at Halifax, this 14th day of December, A. D. 1863, before me.

@@ -39786,8 +39956,9 @@ present informed, they can legally interfere.

I have, &c.,

- C. TUPPER, Provincial - Secretary. + C. TUPPER, + Provincial + Secretary. [Enclosure 5 in No. @@ -39824,8 +39995,8 @@ may arise.

The vessel will sail to-morrow.

- JOHN HARLEY, Collector. + JOHN HARLEY, Collector. [Enclosure 6 in No. @@ -39866,8 +40037,8 @@ regulations of the port.

I am, &c.,

- JOHN HARLEY, Collector. + JOHN HARLEY, Collector.

[Enclosure 7 in No. 5.]

@@ -39932,8 +40103,9 @@

Given under my hand and seal at Halifax, in the said province, this 17th day of December, A. D. 1863.

- HASTINGS DOYLE, Administrator of the - Government. + HASTINGS DOYLE, + Administrator of the + Government. [Enclosure 8 in No. @@ -39962,8 +40134,9 @@ the navy of the United States.

I have, &c.,

- C. TUPPER, Provincial - Secretary. + C. TUPPER, + Provincial + Secretary. [Enclosure 9 in No. @@ -40012,7 +40185,7 @@ Ella and Annie.

I have, &c.,

- A. G. CLAREY. + A. G. CLAREY. [Enclosure 10 in No. @@ -40041,8 +40214,9 @@ properly constituted authorities.

I have, &c.,

- CHARLES TUPPER, Provincial - Secretary. + CHARLES TUPPER, + Provincial + Secretary. [Enclosure 11 in No. @@ -40071,7 +40245,7 @@ procure the immediate release of the said William and Alexander Henry.

- SUSAN HENRY. + SUSAN HENRY.

His Excellency Major General Hastings @@ -40103,7 +40277,7 @@ him will meet with redress at the hands of your excellency.

And your memorialist, as in duty bound, will ever pray.

- JOHN E. HOLT. + JOHN E. HOLT.

Halifax, @@ -40136,7 +40310,7 @@ the shore without my knowing of it, and seeing the persons in it.

- JOHN E. HOLT. + JOHN E. HOLT.

Sworn to before me, at Halifax, this 18th day of December, 1863.

@@ -40201,7 +40375,7 @@ subject, born in Nova Scotia, and have never taken the oath of allegiance to any foreign state.

- JOHN E. HOLT. + JOHN E. HOLT.

Sworn to before me at Halifax, this 18th day of December, A. D. 1863,

@@ -40225,17 +40399,18 @@ read over to me, and I say that the statements made therein are true in every particular.

- his + his - DANIEL + MURPHY. + DANIEL + MURPHY. - mark + mark

Sworn to before me at Halifax, this 18th day of December, 1863, having been first read over and explained,

- P. C. HILL, Mayor, and Justice of - the Peace. + P. C. HILL, + Mayor, and Justice of the + Peace. @@ -40261,8 +40436,9 @@ allegations of the violation of international law.

I have, &c.,

- CHARLES TUPPER, Provincial - Secretary. + CHARLES TUPPER, + Provincial + Secretary. [Enclosure 17 in No. @@ -40296,7 +40472,7 @@ of the pirates.

I have, &c.,

- A. G. CLAREY. + A. G. CLAREY. [Enclosure 18 in No. @@ -40338,7 +40514,7 @@ wish to depart to report themselves to their own government

I have, &c.,

- A. G. CLAREY. + A. G. CLAREY. [Enclosure 19 in No. @@ -40393,8 +40569,9 @@ had in your custody or intended to surrender any prisoners.

I have, &c.,

- CHARLES TUPPER, Provincial - Secretary. + CHARLES TUPPER, + Provincial + Secretary. [Enclosure 20 in No. @@ -40426,7 +40603,7 @@ administrator of the government respecting the steamer Chesapeake. I have, &c.,

- A. G. CLAREY. + A. G. CLAREY.

[For enclosure 21 in No. 5, Mr. Seward to Lord Lyons, December @@ -40462,8 +40639,9 @@ Chesapeake, and the prisoners now in your keeping.

I have, &c.,

- CHARLES TUPPER, Provincial - Secretary. + CHARLES TUPPER, + Provincial + Secretary. @@ -40511,8 +40689,8 @@ Ireland and the United States.

I have, &c.,

- NATHANIEL GUNNISON, Vice- - Consul. + NATHANIEL GUNNISON, + Vice- Consul.

[Enclosure 25 in No. 5.]

@@ -40549,8 +40727,8 @@

Given under my hand and seal, at Halifax, in the said province, the 19th day of December, A. D. 1863.

- HASTINGS DOYLE, Administrator of the - Government. + HASTINGS DOYLE, Administrator of the Government. [Enclosure 26 in No. @@ -40589,8 +40767,8 @@ will take steps for his apprehension, as he is now being rowed down the harbor in a boat by two fishermen.

- NATHANIEL GUNNISON, Vice-Consul. + NATHANIEL GUNNISON, Vice-Consul. [Enclosure 27 in No. @@ -40620,8 +40798,9 @@ apprehension of George Wade is herewith enclosed. I have, &c.,

- C. TUPPER, Provincial - Secretary. + C. TUPPER, + Provincial + Secretary. [Enclosure 28 in No. @@ -40649,7 +40828,7 @@ wish the services of the police in the matter any further.

I have, &c.,

- P. CARTERET HILL. + P. CARTERET HILL. [Enclosure 29 in No. @@ -40670,8 +40849,8 @@ of this city.

I have, &c.,

- NATHANIEL GUNNISON, Vice-Consul. + NATHANIEL GUNNISON, Vice-Consul. [Enclosure 30 in No. @@ -40692,7 +40871,7 @@ government.

I have, &c.,

- P. CARTERET HILL. + P. CARTERET HILL. [Enclosure 31 in No. @@ -40746,7 +40925,7 @@ Almon.

I am, &c.,

- LEWIS HUTT. + LEWIS HUTT. [Enclosure 32 in No. @@ -40813,7 +40992,7 @@ submit herewith.

I have, &c.,

- GARRET COTTER. + GARRET COTTER.

I have, &c.,

- HASTINGS DOYLE. + HASTINGS DOYLE. [Enclosure 1 in No. 6.] @@ -40902,7 +41081,7 @@ government of the United States, but of course no more.

I have, &c.,

- HASTINGS DOYLE. + HASTINGS DOYLE. [Enclosure 2 in No. @@ -40930,8 +41109,8 @@ province.

I have, &c.,

- N. GUNNISON, Vice-Consul. + N. GUNNISON, Vice-Consul. @@ -40953,8 +41132,9 @@ been taken to insure the safety of the Chesapeake.

I have, &c.,

- CHARLES TUPPER, Provincial - Secretary. + CHARLES TUPPER, + Provincial + Secretary.

I have, &c.,

- ARTHUR GORDON. + ARTHUR GORDON.

[Enclosure 1 in No. 7.]

Extract from the St. John, New Brunswick, Morning @@ -41310,7 +41490,7 @@ President’s order, given in his note, would be acted up to.

I have, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

I have, &c.,

- ARTHUR H. GORDON. + ARTHUR H. GORDON.

[Enclosure 2 in No. 10, Lord Lyons to Mr. Seward, January 4, @@ -41421,7 +41601,7 @@ government.

I have, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS. [Enclosure 4 in No. @@ -41447,7 +41627,7 @@ ultimo shall be acted up to.

I have, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS. [Enclosure 5 in No. @@ -41471,7 +41651,7 @@ excellency on the 21st ultimo.

I have, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

I am, &c.

- J. Q. HOWARD, United States - Consul. + J. Q. HOWARD, + United States + Consul. [Enclosure 2 in No. @@ -41769,11 +41950,11 @@ perfectly to understand the same.

ISAAC WILLETS.

- his + his - DANIEL + HENDERSON, + DANIEL + HENDERSON, - mark. + mark.

H. J. Gilbert @@ -41867,7 +42048,7 @@ twenty-seventh year of her Majesty’s reign, A. D. 1863.

By his excellency’s command.

- J. L. TILLEY. + J. L. TILLEY. [Enclosure 4 in No. @@ -41902,7 +42083,7 @@ excellency.

I have, &c.,

- J. HAMILTON GRAY. + J. HAMILTON GRAY. [Enclosure 5 in No. @@ -41932,7 +42113,7 @@ you with the least possible delay.

I have, &c.,

- HARRY MOODY. + HARRY MOODY.

I have, &c.,

- HASTINGS DOYLE. + HASTINGS DOYLE. [For enclosure 1 in No. 12, Lord Lyons to Major General Doyle, December 21, 1863, see enclosure 8 in No. @@ -42032,7 +42213,7 @@ and me in carrying out the law.

I have, &c.,

- P. CARTERET HILL. + P. CARTERET HILL. [Enclosure 3 in No. @@ -42075,7 +42256,7 @@ prudent to await the arrival of the latter, but with equally unsuccessful results. I have, &c.,

- P. CARTERET HILL. + P. CARTERET HILL.

I have, &c.,

- HASTINGS DOYLE. + HASTINGS DOYLE. [Enclosure in No. @@ -42186,7 +42367,7 @@ with this matter.

I have, &c.,

- HASTINGS DOYLE. + HASTINGS DOYLE.

I have, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

[Enclosure 1 in No. 15, Mr. Seward to Lord Lyons, dated January 5, 1864, published elsewhere in this series.]

@@ -42272,7 +42453,7 @@ had been demanded by the government of the United States

I have, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS. [Enclosure 3 in No. @@ -42401,7 +42582,7 @@ the endeavors made to arrest Braine.

I have, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS. [Enclosure 5 in No. @@ -42424,7 +42605,7 @@ Scotian waters.

I have, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS. [Enclosure 6 in No. @@ -42457,7 +42638,7 @@ extradition, under the treaty, of certain persons therein named. I have, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

I have, &c.,

- S. L. TILLEY. + S. L. TILLEY.
@@ -43720,7 +43901,7 @@ refer.

I have, &c.,

- NEWCASTLE. + NEWCASTLE.

I have, &c.,

- HASTINGS DOYLE. + HASTINGS DOYLE. [Enclosure 1 in No. 20.] @@ -43929,7 +44110,7 @@ evidence.

I am, &c.,

- J. W. JOHNSON. + J. W. JOHNSON. [Enclosure 2 in No @@ -43991,7 +44172,7 @@ alleged offenders of it.

I have, &c.,

- HASTINGS DOYLE. + HASTINGS DOYLE.

[Enclosure 3 in No. 20, supplement to Halifax Reporter of January @@ -44211,7 +44392,7 @@ United States, nor have I spoken to him about it.

I am, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

I have, &c.,

- HASTINGS DOYLE. + HASTINGS DOYLE. [Enclosure in No. 22.] Mr. Johnson to

I have, &c.,

- W. J. JOHNSTON. + W. J. JOHNSTON.

I have, &c.,

- NEWCASTLE. + NEWCASTLE.

I have, &c.,

- ARTHUR H. GORDON. + ARTHUR H. GORDON.

[Enclosure 1 in No. 24.]

Newspaper Extracts.

@@ -44586,7 +44767,7 @@ excellency’s decision.

I have, &c.,

- S. L. TILLEY. + S. L. TILLEY.

I have, &c.,

- HASTINGS DOYLE. + HASTINGS DOYLE. [Enclosure in No. 26.] @@ -45456,8 +45637,9 @@

J. W. JOHNSTON.

Sworn before me this sixth day of January, A. D. 1864,

- JAMES R. SMITH, Registrar of the - Vice-Admiralty Court at Halifax. + JAMES R. SMITH, + Registrar of the Vice-Admiralty Court at + Halifax. A.

Halifax.

@@ -45493,8 +45675,9 @@

Sworn to, at Halifax, this 18th day of December, A. D., 1863, before me,

- P. C. HILL, Mayor and Justice of - the Peace. + P. C. HILL, + Mayor and Justice of the + Peace. B. @@ -45529,8 +45712,9 @@

Sworn to, at Halifax, this 18th day of December, A. D. 1863, before me,

- P. C. HILL, Mayor and Justice of - the Peace. + P. C. HILL, + Mayor and Justice of the + Peace. C. @@ -45575,8 +45759,9 @@

Sworn to, at Halifax, this 18th day of December, A. D. 1863, before me,

- P. C. HILL, Mayor and Justice of - the Peace. + P. C. HILL, + Mayor and Justice of the + Peace. @@ -45726,8 +45911,9 @@

Sworn before me (the same having been read over to the deponent) this fourth day of January, A. D. 1864,

- JAMES R. SMITH, Registrar, - Vice-Admiralty Court at Halifax. + JAMES R. SMITH, + Registrar, Vice-Admiralty Court at + Halifax. Province of Nova Scotia, @@ -45801,8 +45987,9 @@

JOHN E. HOLT.

Sworn before me, this fourth day of January, A. D. 1864,

- JAMES R. SMITH, Registrar, - Vice-Admiralty Court at Halifax. + JAMES R. SMITH, + Registrar, Vice-Admiralty Court at + Halifax. Province of Nova Scotia, PATRICK CONNERS.

Sworn before me, this 6th day of January, A. D. 1864,

- JAMES R. SMITH, Registrar, - Vice-Admiralty Court of Halifax. + JAMES R. SMITH, + Registrar, Vice-Admiralty Court of + Halifax.

I have, &c.,

- NEWCASTLE. + NEWCASTLE.

I am, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

I have, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

I have, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS. [Enclosure in No. 31.] Mr. Seward to

I have, &c.,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. + SEWARD.
@@ -46165,7 +46354,7 @@ obtain.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD + WILLIAM H. SEWARD

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -46204,7 +46393,7 @@ intends to fit out some vessel here in England as a privateer.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- THOMAS H. DUDLEY. + THOMAS H. DUDLEY.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -46252,7 +46441,7 @@ meeting of the citizens of Rochdale. They were received by him with feelings of grateful satisfaction. I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -46285,7 +46474,7 @@ of the province of New Brunswick.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -46312,7 +46501,7 @@ and ask to have them so far corrected as may be just and necessary.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -46365,8 +46554,8 @@ soon appear in the Indian ocean.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

- W. R. G. MELLEN, United States - Consul. + W. R. G. MELLEN, + United States Consul.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -46459,8 +46648,9 @@ ownership is determined.

I have the honor to be, sir, your very obedient servant,

- W. R. G. MELLEN, United States - Consul. + W. R. G. MELLEN, + United States + Consul.

The Hon. the Acting Colonial Secretary, &c., &c., @@ -46501,8 +46691,9 @@ captors.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

- EDWARD RUSHWORTH, Acting Colonial - Secretary. + EDWARD RUSHWORTH, + Acting Colonial + Secretary.

The Consul for the United States of America, &c., &c., @@ -46619,8 +46810,9 @@ absurd.

I have the honor to be, sir, your very obedient servant,

- W. R. G. MELLEN, United States - Consul. + W. R. G. MELLEN, + United States + Consul.

The Hon. the Acting Colonial Secretary, &c., &c., @@ -46651,7 +46843,7 @@ steamer.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -46683,7 +46875,7 @@ shall approve.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -46709,7 +46901,7 @@ are appreciated by this government. I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -46736,7 +46928,7 @@ of the courts of London in the case of the Alexandra. I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -46781,7 +46973,7 @@ whole proceeding may be readily foreseen.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. Willtam H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.,

@@ -46821,7 +47013,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

The Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -46898,7 +47091,7 @@ effecting a permanent disruption of the United States.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -46945,7 +47138,7 @@ been received from elsewhere.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C,

@@ -46985,7 +47178,8 @@ consideration, with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS,

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -47040,7 +47234,8 @@ Squarey to retain counsel in the case. I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- THOMAS H. DUDLEY. + THOMAS H. + DUDLEY.

Hon. Charles Francis Adams, United States Minister, &c., @@ -47169,7 +47364,8 @@

With high respect, I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- THOMAS H. DUDLEY. + THOMAS H. + DUDLEY.

His Excellency Charles Francis Adams.

@@ -47200,7 +47396,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -47254,7 +47450,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -47360,7 +47556,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -47535,7 +47731,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -47565,7 +47762,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, &c., &c.,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS: + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS:

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -47604,7 +47802,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -47657,7 +47855,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant.

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -47694,7 +47893,8 @@ not.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Captain John A. Winslow, U. S. N., U. S. S. Kearsarge, London.

@@ -47727,7 +47927,7 @@ are annexed.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -47751,7 +47951,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -47775,7 +47975,8 @@ insurgents in the United States.

I pray your lordship to accept the assurances, &c., &c.,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -47803,7 +48004,7 @@ Mr. Morse took their statements; hence I have not.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- THOMAS H. DUDLEY. + THOMAS H. DUDLEY.

Hon. Charles Francis Adams, Minister of the United States.

@@ -47847,9 +48048,9 @@ to understand the same, and made her mark thereto in my presence. Before me,

- HENRY C. DUNCAN, A Commissioner to - Administer Oaths in the - County. + HENRY C. DUNCAN, + A Commissioner to Administer Oaths in + the County. Deposition of Catharine Dow. @@ -47887,8 +48088,9 @@

Sworn at Liverpool aforesaid this 2d day of April, 1864, before me,

- HENRY C. DUNCAN, A Commissioner, - &c., &c + HENRY C. DUNCAN, + A Commissioner, &c., + &c @@ -47909,7 +48111,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -47943,7 +48145,7 @@ heretofore well known as rebel agents or sympathizers.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -48104,7 +48306,7 @@ correspondence.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -48126,7 +48328,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -48153,7 +48355,7 @@ last.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS,

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -48185,7 +48387,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -48217,7 +48419,7 @@ arrived in England.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -48253,7 +48455,7 @@

* * * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -49792,7 +49994,7 @@ receive information and instructions from you.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -49816,7 +50018,7 @@ established by an act of the rebel congress.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -49962,7 +50164,7 @@ Approved March 5, 1864. - JEFFERSON DAVIS. + JEFFERSON DAVIS.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD + WILLIAM H. SEWARD

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -50052,7 +50254,7 @@

* * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -50081,7 +50283,7 @@ made and forwarded in season to effect their release.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -50123,7 +50325,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -50158,7 +50360,7 @@ investigation necessary.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -50184,7 +50386,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -50209,7 +50411,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., @@ -50353,7 +50555,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -50375,7 +50578,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -50426,7 +50629,7 @@ to this demonstration is becoming unequivocal enough.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. @@ -51608,7 +51811,7 @@ present circumstances, to be admissible.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -51650,7 +51853,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -51728,7 +51931,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -51771,7 +51975,7 @@ glad to have some line of instructions to know how far to go.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c.,&c.

@@ -51800,7 +52004,7 @@ announced.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -51832,7 +52036,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -51857,7 +52062,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -51883,7 +52088,7 @@ present one.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -51910,7 +52115,7 @@ in company with my note.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -51937,7 +52142,7 @@ supplies.”

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -52027,7 +52232,7 @@ pass safely through the trials which are before us.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -52056,7 +52261,7 @@ unsatisfactory.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -52103,7 +52308,7 @@ government upon the subject.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -52140,7 +52345,7 @@ considerable strategic importance.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -52200,7 +52405,7 @@ triumph of their enemies.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES F. ADAMS. + CHARLES F. ADAMS.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -52276,7 +52481,7 @@ subject. Hence I shall not enlarge upon it.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -52339,7 +52544,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -52461,8 +52667,8 @@

* * * * * * * * *

Your obedient servant,

- F. H. MORSE, Consul. + F. H. MORSE, Consul.

Hon. Charles Francis Adams, United States Minister, &c., &c., @@ -52507,8 +52713,9 @@

Sworn by the deponent, at my office, No. 37 Nicholas lane, in the city of London, this the 9th day of April, 1864, before me,

- JOHN CASTLE GRANT, A London - Commissioner, &c. + JOHN CASTLE GRANT, + A London Commissioner, + &c. Sworn by the deponent at my office, No. 37 Nicholas lane, in the city of London, this 9th day of April, 1864, before me,

- JOHN CASTLE GRANT, A Commissioner to - administer Oaths in Chancery. + JOHN CASTLE GRANT, + A Commissioner to administer Oaths in + Chancery. - JOHN CASTLE GRANT, A London - Commissioner to administer Oaths in - Chancery. + JOHN CASTLE GRANT, + A London Commissioner to administer Oaths + in Chancery. - JOHN J. ANDREW, A London Commissioner - to administer Oaths in Chancery. + JOHN J. ANDREW, + A London Commissioner to administer Oaths + in Chancery. - JOHN T. ANDREW, A London Commissioner - to administer Oaths in Chancery. + JOHN T. ANDREW, + A London Commissioner to administer Oaths + in Chancery.

Respectfully,

- WILLIAM V. A. CAMPBELL, Lieutenant - Commanding, Confederate States - Navy. + WILLIAM V. A. CAMPBELL, + Lieutenant Commanding, Confederate States + Navy.

William Alexander Bradshaw.

 @@ -52879,9 +53089,9 @@ day of February, 1864.

Respectfully,

- WILLIAM V. A. CAMPBELL, Lieutenant - Commanding, Confederate States - Navy. + WILLIAM V. A. CAMPBELL, + Lieutenant Commanding, Confederate States + Navy.

Mr. Joseph Buchanan.

 @@ -52908,8 +53118,9 @@ Commanding, Confederate States Navy.

Registered by

- DOUGLASS F. FOREST, Assistant - Paymaster C. S. Navy. + DOUGLASS F. FOREST,Assistant Paymaster C. S. + Navy. Sworn by the deponent, Charles Bennett, at my office, No. 37 Nicholas lane. &c., &c., &c.

- JOHN CASTLE GRANT, A London - Commissioner, &c., &c. + JOHN CASTLE GRANT, + A London Commissioner, &c., + &c. Sworn at my office, No. 5 White Hart court, Lombard street, in the city of London, this 29th day of February, 1864.

- JOHN J. ANDREW, A London Commissioner, - &c., &c., &c. + JOHN J. ANDREW, + A London Commissioner, &c., &c., + &c. - JOHN J. ANDREW, A London Commissioner, - &c., &c., &c. + JOHN J. ANDREW, + A London Commissioner, &c., &c., + &c. Deposition of Thomas @@ -53180,8 +53394,9 @@ above affidavit to the said deponent, and that he saw him make his mark thereto. Before me,

- J. WILKINSON, A London Commissioner, - &c., &c. + J. WILKINSON, + A London Commissioner, &c., + &c. Deposition of James @@ -53259,8 +53474,9 @@ the contents of the above affidavit of the said deponent, and that he saw him make his mark thereto. Before me,

- JOHN T. ANDREW, A London Commissioner, - &c., &c. + JOHN T. ANDREW, + A London Commissioner, &c., + &c. Deposition of John @@ -53303,8 +53519,9 @@

Sworn at my office, No. 5 White Hart court, Lombard street, in the city of London, this 21st day of March, 1864.

- JOHN J. ANDREW, A London Commissioner, - &c., &c. + JOHN J. ANDREW, + A London Commissioner, &c., + &c. Deposition of Thomas @@ -53375,8 +53592,9 @@

Sworn at my office, No. 5 White Hart court, Lombard street, in the city of London, this the 28th day of March, 1864.

- JOHN J. ANDREW, A London Commissioner, - &c., &c. + JOHN J. ANDREW, + A London Commissioner, &c., + &c. - JOHN I. ANDREW, A London Commissioner, - &c., &c. + JOHN I. ANDREW, + A London Commissioner, &c., + &c. Depositions. @@ -53442,8 +53661,9 @@ calendar="gregorian">this 31st of March, 1864, before me, - JOHN I. ANDREW, A London Commissioner - to Administer Oaths in Chancery. + JOHN I. ANDREW, + A London Commissioner to Administer Oaths + in Chancery. Earl Russell to I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -53970,7 +54190,7 @@ the majority is not over-large.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -57730,7 +57950,7 @@ embarrassments.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -57783,7 +58003,7 @@ cannot fail to be earnestly condemned and execrated.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -57815,7 +58035,7 @@ submitted without considerable delay.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -57840,7 +58060,7 @@

* * * * * * * *

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Adams, &c., &c., &c., London.

@@ -57893,7 +58113,7 @@ contest.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &. &c.

@@ -57926,7 +58146,7 @@ dissolution.

I am,sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c.,&c.

@@ -57961,7 +58181,7 @@ object. Possibly the Alexandra may take her place.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -57986,7 +58206,7 @@ is forwarded herewith.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -58020,7 +58240,8 @@

Renewing the assurances of my highest consideration, I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

The Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -58075,8 +58296,9 @@ Lombard street, in the city of London, this 26th day of April, 1864, before me,

- JOHN J. ANDREWS, A London Commissioner - to Administer Oaths in Chancery. + JOHN J. ANDREWS, + A London Commissioner to Administer Oaths + in Chancery. Deposition of George @@ -58168,8 +58390,9 @@ Lombard street, in the city of London, this 19th day of April, 1864, before me,

- JOHN J. ANDREWS, A London Commissioner - to Administer Oaths in Chancery. + JOHN J. ANDREWS, + A London Commissioner to Administer Oaths + in Chancery. Deposition of Edward Shaw and William @@ -58299,8 +58522,9 @@ in the city of London, this the 22d day of April, 1864, before me,

- JOHN CANTE GANT, A London Commissioner - to Administer Oaths in Chancery, + JOHN CANTE GANT, + A London Commissioner to Administer Oaths + in Chancery,
@@ -58328,7 +58552,7 @@ government.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -58409,7 +58633,7 @@ persevere in the campaign as at first designed.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -58433,7 +58657,7 @@ approved.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -58480,7 +58704,7 @@ venture to add this one to the others.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -58509,7 +58733,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -58565,7 +58789,7 @@ tendency to serve on board of dubious rebel ships.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -58597,7 +58821,7 @@ hereafter.

I have the honor to be, sir, your, obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -58621,7 +58845,7 @@ in the subject. Copies of these three papers are now transmitted.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -58645,7 +58869,8 @@ consideration, with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

The right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -58670,7 +58895,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -58700,7 +58925,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -58739,7 +58964,7 @@ the steamer via Queenstown, in the usual course of the mail.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obdient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -58790,7 +59015,8 @@ consideration with which I have the honor to be, my lord, your most obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS + ADAMS.

The Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -58812,7 +59038,7 @@

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -58836,7 +59062,7 @@ the affairs of the United States, (Nos. 11, 12, 13, and 14.)

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCES ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCES ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

@@ -60473,7 +60699,7 @@ 208. Not reported - Consul Archibald . + Consul Archibald. Nov. 4 3 Capture of the Robert Bruce @@ -64599,7 +64825,7 @@ inform me whether you have any explanations to offer on the subject.

I am, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL. Extract from the Dublin Evening Mail of March 16, 1864. @@ -64916,7 +65142,7 @@ respect for the laws of Great Britain and for the law of nations.

I pray, &c.,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

I am, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

I am, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL. [Enclosure in No. 4.] Extract from deposition of Daniel @@ -65092,7 +65318,7 @@ proof of any offence.

I pray, &c.,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

I am, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

I have, &c.,

- J. M. MASON. + J. M. MASON. [Enclosure in No. 1.] Mr. Benjamin to

I have, &c.,

- J. P. BENJAMIN. + J. P. BENJAMIN.

I am, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

I have, &c.,

- J. M. MASON. + J. M. MASON.

[For enclosure 1 in No. 3, newspaper extract, see “North America, No 13, (1864,)” p. 6–8.]

@@ -65591,7 +65817,7 @@ have sustained injury by this outrage.

I have, &c.,

- J. M. MASON. + J. M. MASON. [Enclosure in No. 4.] @@ -65832,8 +66058,8 @@ reign.

By his excellency’s command,

- C. R. NESBITT, Colonial - Secretary. + C. R. NESBITT, + Colonial Secretary.
@@ -65853,7 +66079,7 @@ of Mr. G. Moore, her Majesty’s consul at Richmond.

I am, &c.

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.
Her Majesty’s government will therefore await the result of that inquiry.

I am, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

I have, &c.,

- J. M. MASON. + J. M. MASON. [Enclosure in No. 7.] @@ -66684,7 +66910,7 @@ authorities at Nassau.

I have, &c.,

- J. M. MASON. + J. M. MASON. [Enclosure 1 in No. 8.] Declaration of Theodore Cavillier. @@ -66733,13 +66959,14 @@ soon returned home. One steamer that was lying-to had an American flag flying. I do not know when she left.

- THEODORE CAVILLIER, his + mark. + THEODORE CAVILLIER, his + + mark.

Declared to before me, this 4th day of June, A. D. 1863.

 - ORMOND D. MALCOLM, Notary - Public. + ORMOND D. MALCOLM, + Notary Public.
the 6th day of June, in the year of our Lord 1863. - ORMOND D. MALCOLM, Notary - Public. + ORMOND D. MALCOLM, + Notary Public. [Enclosure 2 in No. 8.] Declaration of Robert C. Fonte and Ivey @@ -66849,8 +67076,8 @@

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my seal of office, at Nassau, this 9th day of June, A. D. 1863.

- B. L. BURNSIDE, Notary - Public. + B. L. BURNSIDE, + Notary Public. @@ -66943,8 +67170,8 @@

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my seal of office, at Nassau, this 9th day of June, A. D. 1863.

- B. L. BURNSIDE, Notary - Public. + B. L. BURNSIDE, + Notary Public. [Enclosure 4 in No. 8.] @@ -66995,8 +67222,8 @@

In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal notarial the 6th day of June, in the year of our Lord 1863.

- ORMOND D. MALCOLM, Notary - Public. + ORMOND D. MALCOLM, + Notary Public. [Enclosure 5 in No. 8.] @@ -67052,8 +67279,8 @@ office at Nassau, in the island of New Providence, this 9th day of June, A. D. 1863.

- B. L. BURNSIDE, Notary - Public. + B. L. BURNSIDE, + Notary Public. [Enclosure 6 in No. 8.] @@ -67108,8 +67335,8 @@

In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal notarial, the 6th day of June, in the year of our Lord 1863.

- ORMOND D. MALCOLM, Notary - Public. + ORMOND D. MALCOLM, + Notary Public. [Enclosure 7 in No. 8.] @@ -67169,17 +67396,17 @@ shore. She remained in the position and place that I have described until dark. I did not notice when she left.

- his + his - WILLIAM + HANNA. + WILLIAM + HANNA. - mark. + mark.

Declared to before me this 4th day of June, A. D. 1863.

 - ORMOND D. MALCOLM, Notary - Public + ORMOND D. MALCOLM, + Notary Public Bahama Islands, New Providence. @@ -67197,8 +67424,8 @@ calendar="gregorian">the 6th day of June, in the year of our Lord 1863. - ORMOND D. MALCOLM, Notary - Public. + ORMOND D. MALCOLM, + Notary Public. @@ -67248,8 +67475,8 @@

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal notarial the 10th day of June, in the year of our Lord 1863.

- ORMOND D. MALCOLM, Notary - Public. + ORMOND D. MALCOLM, + Notary Public. [Enclosure 9 in No. 8.] @@ -67293,8 +67520,8 @@

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal notarial the 6th day of June, in the year of our Lord 1863.

- ORMOND D. MALCOLM, Notary - Public. + ORMOND D. MALCOLM, + Notary Public. [Enclosure 10 in No. 8.] @@ -67385,8 +67612,8 @@

In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my seal of office at Nassau, this 11th day of June, A. D. 1863.

- B. L. BURNSIDE, Notary - Public. + B. L. BURNSIDE, + Notary Public. [Enclosure 11 in No. 8.] @@ -67463,8 +67690,8 @@ office at Nassau, in the island of New Providence, this 9th day of June, A. D. 1863.

- B. L. BURNSIDE, Notary - Public, + B. L. BURNSIDE, + Notary Public, [Enclosure 12 in No. 8.] @@ -67507,8 +67734,8 @@ office, at Nassau, in the island of New Providence, this 10th day of June, A. D. 1863.

- B. L. BURNSIDE, Notary - Public. + B. L. BURNSIDE, + Notary Public.

I am, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

I am, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

I have, &c.,

- J. M. MASON. + J. M. MASON.

I have, &c.,

- J. M. MASON. + J. M. MASON.

[For enclosure in No. 12, Mr. Benjamin to Mr. Mason, June 11, 1863, see @@ -67749,7 +67976,7 @@ reply to this communication as your convenience will permit.

I am, &c.,

- CHARLES WALSH. + CHARLES WALSH. (E.)—Mr. Magee to If I fail here, I will invoke the aid of Lord Lyons at Washington.

I am, &c.,

- JAMES MAGEE. + JAMES MAGEE. (F.)—Mr. Walsh to

Very respectfully, &c.,

- CHARLES WALSH. + CHARLES WALSH. (G.)—Mr. Walsh to

I remain, &c.,

- CHARLES WALSH. + CHARLES WALSH.

B. M., thirty-one kegs specie, 5,000 dollars each, together 155,000 dollars.

@@ -67933,7 +68160,7 @@ go.” Further than this I have no knowledge.

Very respectfully,

- N. B. HITCHCOCK. + N. B. HITCHCOCK. [(I.)—Circular to consuls and consular @@ -67954,7 +68181,7 @@ directly, or through neutral countries.

With great respect, &c.,

- J. P. BENJAMIN. + J. P. BENJAMIN.

I am, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

I have, &c.,

- J. M. MASON. + J. M. MASON. [For enclosure 1 in No. 14, Mr. Benjamin to Mr. Mason, June 6, 1863, see “North America, No. 13, (1864,)” p. 6–8.] @@ -68073,7 +68300,7 @@ Queen’s proclamation of neutrality, from enrolment in that State.

I have, &c.,

- GEO. MOORE. + GEO. MOORE.

P. S.—Since writing the above, I have received a letter from a Mr. Thomas @@ -68121,7 +68348,7 @@ of Richmond.

I am, &c.,

- J. P. BENJAMIN. + J. P. BENJAMIN. @@ -68167,7 +68394,7 @@ his land.

Very respectfully, &c.,

- GEO. M. EDGAR. + GEO. M. EDGAR. [Enclosure 7 in No. 14.] @@ -68199,7 +68426,7 @@

I will say no more, for it grieves me to write this.

Believe me, &c.,

- GEOEGE MOORE. + GEOEGE MOORE.

I have, &c.,

- J. M. MASON + J. M. MASON

I am, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

I am, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

I have, &c.,

- J. M. MASON. + J. M. MASON.

I have, &c.,

- J. M. MASON. + J. M. MASON.

I am, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.
- GEORGE A. TRENHOLM, By his agent, JNO. B. - LAFITTE. + GEORGE A. TRENHOLM, By his agent, JNO. B. + LAFITTE.
@@ -68888,8 +69115,8 @@ granted to you, and to make public these letters patent.

I have, &c.,

- J. P. BENJAMIN, Secretary of - State. + J. P. BENJAMIN, + Secretary of State.

[Enclosure 3 in No. 1.]

@@ -68931,7 +69158,7 @@ in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three. - JEFFERSON DAVIS. + JEFFERSON DAVIS.

By the President:

J. P. Benjamin, @@ -68955,7 +69182,7 @@ which I will communicate to my government by the first opportunity.

I have, &c.,

- GEO. MOORE. + GEO. MOORE.

I have, &c.,

- GEO. MOORE. + GEO. MOORE. [Enclosure 2 in No. 2.] @@ -69117,7 +69344,7 @@ conscription.

I have, &c.,

- GEO. MOORE. + GEO. MOORE. @@ -69184,7 +69411,7 @@ guidance.

Very respectfully, &c.,

- G. W. LAY. + G. W. LAY. @@ -69208,7 +69435,7 @@ directly or through neutral countries.

I am, &c.,

- J. P. BENJAMIN. + J. P. BENJAMIN. [Enclosure 5 in No. 2.] @@ -69384,8 +69611,8 @@ for foreign affairs.

I am, &c.,

- J. P. BENJAMIN, Secretary of - State. + J. P. BENJAMIN, + Secretary of State.

Hon. James M. Mason, Commissioner, &c., &c., London.

@@ -69451,7 +69678,7 @@

Requesting instructions from your lordship.

I have, &c.,

- FRED. J. CRIDLAND. + FRED. J. CRIDLAND. [Enclosure 1 in No. 3] Colonel Garner to

Very respectfully, &c.,

- GEO. G. GARNER, Chief of - Staff. + GEO. G. GARNER, + Chief of Staff. [Enclosure 2 in No. 3.] @@ -69494,7 +69721,7 @@

Due notice is taken of the major general’s instructions and request.

I am, &c.,

- FRED. J. CRIDLAND. + FRED. J. CRIDLAND. [Enclosure 3 in No. 3.] @@ -69520,7 +69747,7 @@ Alabama.

I am, &c.,

- J. P. BENJAMIN. + J. P. BENJAMIN. [Enclosure 4 in No. 3.] @@ -69567,7 +69794,7 @@ than the State of Alabama will of course be duly attended to.

I am, &c.,

- FRED. J. CRIDLAND. + FRED. J. CRIDLAND.

I am, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL.

I have, &c.,

- F. J. CRIDLAND. + F. J. CRIDLAND. [Enclosure 2 in No. 5.] @@ -69674,7 +69901,7 @@

Awaiting instructions from your lordship for my future guidance, I have, &c.

- F. J. CRIDLAND. + F. J. CRIDLAND.

[For enclosure 3 in No. 5, Colonel Garner to Acting Consul Cridland, June @@ -69718,7 +69945,7 @@ which I will also place before your lordship.

I have, &c.,

- FRED. J. CRIDLAND. + FRED. J. CRIDLAND.

[For enclosure 6 in No. 5, Mr. Benjamin to Acting Consul Cridland, June @@ -69753,7 +69980,7 @@ there.”

I have, &c.,

- FRED. J. CRIDLAND. + FRED. J. CRIDLAND. @@ -69777,7 +70004,7 @@ forwarded to Earl Russell, and now submit the same to your lordship.

I have, &c.,

- FRED J. CRIDLAND. + FRED J. CRIDLAND. [Enclosure 10 in No. 5.] @@ -69796,7 +70023,7 @@

I doubt not that instructions will arrive in a month or two.

Yours, &c.,

- J. P. BENJAMIN. + J. P. BENJAMIN.
I have no other information respecting this correspondence.

I have, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS. [Enclosure in No. 6.] [Extract from the @@ -70125,7 +70352,7 @@

I have no other information on the subject.

I have, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS. [Enclosure in No. 7.] Extract from the National @@ -70288,7 +70515,7 @@

I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of that reply.

I have, &c.,

- H. PINCKNEY WALKER. + H. PINCKNEY WALKER. [Enclosure 1 in No. 8.] Mr. Benjamin to

I am, &c.,

- J. P. BENJAMIN, Secretary of - State. + J. P. BENJAMIN, + Secretary of State. [Enclosure 2 in No. 8.] @@ -70369,8 +70596,8 @@ limits.

I am, &c.,

- J. P. BENJAMIN, Secretary of - State. + J. P. BENJAMIN, + Secretary of State. [Enclosure 3 in No. 8.] @@ -70438,7 +70665,7 @@ the coast of this consular district.

I have, &c.,

- H. PINCKNEY WALKER. + H. PINCKNEY WALKER.

I have, &c.,

- H. PINCKNEY WALKER. + H. PINCKNEY WALKER. [Enclosure 1 in No. 9.] @@ -70783,7 +71010,7 @@ l’Huys as will obviate all risk of misapprehension.

I am, &c.,

- J. P. BENJAMIN. + J. P. BENJAMIN.

[For Mr. Benjamin’s letter to Mr. Fullarton, of October 8, 1863, see enclosure 2 in No. 8.]

@@ -71065,7 +71292,7 @@ hands of Earl Russell.

I am, &c.,

- J. P. BENJAMIN. + J. P. BENJAMIN.

[For letter of Earl Russell to Mr. Mason, dated August 19, 1864, see @@ -71435,8 +71662,9 @@ certificate of such exemption.

By command of the secretary of war:

- S. COOPER, Adjutant and Inspector - General. + S. COOPER, + Adjutant and Inspector + General.
@@ -71533,7 +71761,7 @@ practice, especially in South Carolina, any legal decision of a competent court favorable to the exemption as a matter of right.

I am, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS. Lord Lyons to Consul Molyneux. @@ -71569,7 +71797,7 @@

I forwarded to Earl Russell a copy of your despatch of the 27th ultimo, and I shall also send his lordship a copy of this answer to it.

I am, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS. Circular addressed to her, Majesty’s consuls in the @@ -71615,7 +71843,7 @@ Majesty’s government confidently hope and expect that no further occasion for remonstrance will arise on this point.

I am, &c.,

- RUSSELL. + RUSSELL. @@ -71625,7 +71853,7 @@ they were led to expect.

I have, &c.,

- A. FULLARTON. + A. FULLARTON. [Enclosure 1 in No. 10.] @@ -71700,7 +71928,7 @@ Captain Brooks.

I am, &c.,

- A. FULLARTON. + A. FULLARTON. [Enclosure 2 in No. 10.] @@ -71719,7 +71947,7 @@ Stephenson, of Columbus, and William Gray, of La Grange, Georgia.

Yours, &c.,

- A. FULLARTON. + A. FULLARTON.

[For enclosure 3 in No. 10, Mr. Benjamin to Acting Consul Fullarton, @@ -71769,8 +71997,9 @@ officers in service are not subject to conscription.

By command of Major General Howell Cobb:

- R. J. HALLETT, Acting Assistant Adjutant - General. + R. J. HALLETT, + Acting Assistant Adjutant + General.

I have, &c.,

- LYONS. + LYONS.

I have, &c.,

- A. FULLARTON. + A. FULLARTON. [Enclosure in No. 12.] Acting Consul Fullarton to

I am, &c.,

- A. FULLARTON. + A. FULLARTON.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -72084,7 +72313,7 @@ present opportunity.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

- CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. + CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

@@ -74000,7 +74229,7 @@ 30,000 men.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -74047,7 +74276,7 @@ be meted to the guilty parties.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

@@ -74068,8 +74297,8 @@

Orders have been given for the arrest and punishment of the fabricators and publishers of the spurious proclamation.

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of - State. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD, + Secretary of State.

Charles Francis Adams, Esq., U. S. Minister Plenipotentiary, London, England.

@@ -74106,7 +74335,7 @@ to Mr. Koerner, our representative at Madrid.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

- WILLIAM H. SEWARD. + WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Charles F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

diff --git a/volumes/frus1951-54Iran.xml b/volumes/frus1951-54Iran.xml index f83c17d3a..f6ff28009 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1951-54Iran.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1951-54Iran.xml @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ - - + @@ -18,8 +16,7 @@ Washington 2017 frus1951-54Iran - 1951 to 1954 + 1951 to 1954

Released in 2017 as printed book.

@@ -54,17 +51,12 @@ United States Government Publishing Office Washington 2017 - DEPARTMENT OF STATE Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, + DEPARTMENT OF STATE Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 -
+
Press Release

Office of the HistorianBureau of Public @@ -139,12 +131,9 @@ University graciously provided high quality scanned images of each printed book, which the Office further digitized to create a full text searchable edition. These volumes are available online and as free ebooks at the Office of the - Historian’s website (https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments).

-

This quarterly release also includes the new publication Foreign Relations of the United - States, Iran, 1951–1954. This volume complements Foreign Relations of the United + Historian’s website (https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments).

+

This quarterly release also includes the new publication Foreign Relations of the United + States, Iran, 1951–1954. This volume complements Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Volume X, Iran, 1951–1954, published in 1989, by providing documentation on the use of covert operations by the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.

@@ -155,9 +144,7 @@
-
+
Preface

The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and @@ -189,24 +176,19 @@ should be omitted for the purpose of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the Foreign Relations series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded.

-

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954

+

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954

This volume is part of a sub-series that documents the foreign policies of the - Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower administrations. However, - this volume is a retrospective volume that is meant to supplement Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, + Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower administrations. However, + this volume is a retrospective volume that is meant to supplement Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, Volume X, Iran, 1951–1954, published in 1989. The 1989 volume provided significant documentation on the oil dispute between the United Kingdom and Iran following the latter’s decision to - nationalize the assets of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in March 1951. It represents a thorough, + nationalize the assets of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in March 1951. It represents a thorough, accurate, and reliable account of the role the United States played in mediating the dispute. However, it did not provide any documentation on the role of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the formulation of U.S. policy toward Iran or documentation on the covert action - that led to the overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq on August 19, 1953. The lack + that led to the overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq on August 19, 1953. The lack of such documentation prompted a sharply critical reaction from concerned academics, the media, and other interested members of the public. In 1991, this reaction prompted the introduction and passage of congressional legislation, @@ -311,8 +293,7 @@

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation, annotation, and editorial notes - presented here, and read together with Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, volume X, Iran, + presented here, and read together with Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, volume X, Iran, 1951–1954, provide a broadly accurate account of the main lines of U.S. policy toward Iran from 1951 to 1954.

Acknowledgments

@@ -321,10 +302,8 @@ his work on the Foreign Relations series. This volume is dedicated to his memory.

The editor wishes to acknowledge the valuable assistance of the Historical Staff - of the Center for the Study of Intelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency. The editor extends - sincere appreciation to staff at the Truman and Eisenhower + of the Center for the Study of Intelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency. The editor extends + sincere appreciation to staff at the Truman and Eisenhower Presidential Libraries. The editor would also like to thank the staff at the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II), College Park.

James Van Hook selected and annotated the documentation, under the supervision of @@ -334,7 +313,7 @@ Ashley, successive Chiefs of the Declassification and Publishing Division. Do Mi Stauber prepared the index.

- Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D. + Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D. The Historian @@ -343,9 +322,7 @@
-
+
Contents @@ -388,14 +365,11 @@
-
+
Sources

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

-

The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations series include all records needed to +

The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in @@ -421,23 +395,20 @@ access to the papers of Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower, as well as other White House foreign policy records. - Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library in Independence, Missouri, + Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library in Independence, Missouri, and the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas, include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies, including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Department of State historians also have full access to records of the Department - of Defense, particularly the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of Defense and their major + of Defense, particularly the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of Defense and their major assistants. The Central Intelligence Agency provided full access to its files.

Sources for Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954

This volume includes National Security Council and Presidential materials that - document the U.S. decision to proceed with the operation against Mosadeq, and the operational files within the + document the U.S. decision to proceed with the operation against Mosadeq, and the operational files within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that document the implementation of the operation, codenamed TPAJAX. Moreover, this volume includes documents that illustrate the U.S. Government’s collective attempt to @@ -448,8 +419,7 @@ documentary collections throughout the U.S. Government, including the Department of State, the National Security Council, the Presidential libraries, the Department of Defense, foreign aid agencies, and the many collections of the - Central Intelligence Agency. For the most part, the CIA files were still classified. Other collections were either + Central Intelligence Agency. For the most part, the CIA files were still classified. Other collections were either still classified, still classified in part (i.e. redacted), or had been released to the public recently.

The focus of Foreign @@ -457,8 +427,7 @@ 1989, was on the oil negotiations resulting from Iran’s nationalization of the British controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951. This retrospective volume focuses on the evolution of U.S. thinking on Iran as well as the U.S. Government - covert operation that resulted in Mosadeq’s overthrow on August 19, 1953. Both volumes should + covert operation that resulted in Mosadeq’s overthrow on August 19, 1953. Both volumes should therefore be read together for complete documentation on U.S. policy toward Iran from 1951 to 1954.

This volume has drawn heavily on the central decimal files of the Department of @@ -477,35 +446,25 @@

The general National Security Council (NSC) records in Record Group 273 have been used to establish the evolution of policy from 1951 to 1954. Drawn from both - the relevant Truman and Eisenhower administration collections, these + the relevant Truman and Eisenhower administration collections, these documents include the official minutes, which are quite short and consist - largely of records of action, and files on the major NSC policy papers relevant to U.S. policy toward Iran (NSC 107 and NSC + largely of records of action, and files on the major NSC policy papers relevant to U.S. policy toward Iran (NSC 107 and NSC 136). These NSC files allow the researcher not only to follow policy, but also to locate those analytical pieces that played direct roles in the formulation of policy. As the official minutes in Record Group 273 consist only of records of action, this volume has made use of the more extensive NSC meeting minutes found in the - Truman and Eisenhower Presidential libraries. Many of + Truman and Eisenhower Presidential libraries. Many of these documents appeared in the 1989 Foreign Relations volume on Iran, albeit with critical redactions which have been restored here. - Special attention has also been given to the CIA files devoted to the NSC + Special attention has also been given to the CIA files devoted to the NSC policymaking process. The relevant files here are housed in the Office of the - Deputy Director for Intelligence, who maintained the NSC files for the Director of Central Intelligence. These files, - found in Job 33R00601A and Job 80R01443R, contain CIA contributions to the policy debates surrounding NSC papers 107 and 136.

+ Deputy Director for Intelligence, who maintained the NSC files for the Director of Central Intelligence. These files, + found in Job 33R00601A and Job 80R01443R, contain CIA contributions to the policy debates surrounding NSC papers 107 and 136.

Great use has also been made of the many collections containing analytical - documentation devoted to the evolving U.S. Government understanding of Mosadeq and Iran. Along with analytical pieces + documentation devoted to the evolving U.S. Government understanding of Mosadeq and Iran. Along with analytical pieces from the Department of State collections discussed above, this volume draws - heavily on documents produced by the analytical arm of the CIA, particularly the relevant National + heavily on documents produced by the analytical arm of the CIA, particularly the relevant National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs), housed in the files of the present-day National Intelligence Council. Special @@ -513,8 +472,7 @@ document the debates and/or evolution of consensus opinion, material for which is also contained in the NIE files. The most important such collection is in Job 79R01012A. The Deputy Director for Intelligence files also have material that - effectively demonstrates the debates over how to understand Mosadeq within the context of Iranian history, + effectively demonstrates the debates over how to understand Mosadeq within the context of Iranian history, the expected future trajectory of the country, and U.S. Government strategic priorities. These are found in the “staff memoranda” files (Job 79T00937A). Unfortunately, these memoranda, of which there are many hundreds per year, are @@ -532,8 +490,7 @@ accurately reflect what is housed in DO files. Nevertheless, these files tend to have been created and organized with the intent to facilitate policy decisions and implementation. Also of great importance are the relevant files maintained - by the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). These actually are not considered operational files, but, for + by the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). These actually are not considered operational files, but, for the purposes of this volume, have been utilized to document the Director’s role in the covert policy toward Iran. These files are often very useful, but are not of uniform quality, nor do they give the consistent impression of completeness. @@ -560,25 +517,19 @@ maintain collections that illustrated policy contexts within which specific operational needs were to be met. This practice was significant to this volume in two ways. First, there is an overall tendency for certain project files for - countries regarded as more important to contain documentation of internal DO discussions that led to the approval of proposed + countries regarded as more important to contain documentation of internal DO discussions that led to the approval of proposed covert operations as well as the execution of those operations. These files, a - kind of central file by default, contain relevant telegraphic traffic, DO analytical pieces, operational proposals, and - reports about the implementation of covert operations. Second, the DO also maintained more general files for - top-level officials within the Directorate. The files maintained for Frank Wisner, the head of the Office of Policy + kind of central file by default, contain relevant telegraphic traffic, DO analytical pieces, operational proposals, and + reports about the implementation of covert operations. Second, the DO also maintained more general files for + top-level officials within the Directorate. The files maintained for Frank Wisner, the head of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) and later the Directorate for Plans (DP) were particularly relevant for this volume. Wisner’s “secret” files, in Job 79–01228A, organized by subject, are variously rich and - sparse in documentation, but generally episodic in character. Wisner’s “top + sparse in documentation, but generally episodic in character. Wisner’s “top secret” files, in Job 80–01795R, are organized chronologically up to 1954 and appear more complete. They do not contain materials on the evolution of covert policies to the extent that the core project files do, but they do contain - complete collections of reports submitted to Wisner by the Area Divisions as well as a complete record of + complete collections of reports submitted to Wisner by the Area Divisions as well as a complete record of Wisner’s interaction with the “Senior Consultants,” the interdepartmental body that officially discussed and approved covert actions with Wisner and other high officials of the Directorate of Plans @@ -587,8 +538,7 @@

The original CIA cables relating to the implementation of the covert action TPAJAX no longer exist. The original TPAJAX operational cables appear to have been destroyed as part of an office purge - undertaken in 1961 or 1962, in anticipation of Near East (NE) Division’s move to the Central Intelligence + undertaken in 1961 or 1962, in anticipation of Near East (NE) Division’s move to the Central Intelligence Agency’s new headquarters. However, during the preparation of the previous volume on this topic, Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, volume X, Iran, 1951–1954, in the late @@ -603,8 +553,7 @@ as well as more recent searches undertaken by HO with the cooperation of the CIA.

When interviewed in the mid-1990s, NE staff - members who were present during the office move to the new CIA headquarters building in the 1960’s stated + members who were present during the office move to the new CIA headquarters building in the 1960’s stated that the Division’s "chrono” files and cables were destroyed at that time. Chrono files, typically held for only one year, were intended as duplicate reference sets of documents held in other files. The staff also noted that the @@ -620,13 +569,11 @@ mid-1990s turned up no 1950s microfilmed cables, nor any record of their destruction.

HO began research on the previous 1951–1954 Iran volume in the late 1970s, at a - time when the microfilm cables in the Cable Secretariat had been scheduled for destruction but not yet destroyed. + time when the microfilm cables in the Cable Secretariat had been scheduled for destruction but not yet destroyed. At that time, a CIA historian assisting with the volume searched and located relevant cables relating to TPAJAX in the Cable Secretariat’s microfilm set. Due to the poor quality of this microfilm (and - possibly the lack of printing capability) the CIA historian transcribed these cables on a typewriter. It appears + possibly the lack of printing capability) the CIA historian transcribed these cables on a typewriter. It appears that the transcriptionist attempted to capture everything on the original cables, and to reproduce all of the text and numbers on the same part of the page where they appeared on the original. Given the way in which the cables were @@ -642,23 +589,17 @@ account describes half an inch of transcripts; more recent accounts list 68 cables, including the ones printed in this volume. Currently, 68 cable transcripts have been located at the CIA. It - appears that they are all copies HO brought to the CIA in 1994, when HO began contemplating the current retrospective + appears that they are all copies HO brought to the CIA in 1994, when HO began contemplating the current retrospective volume and inquired about the origins of the transcripts. More recently, HO has searched its own files, active and retired, and has been unable to find the - transcribed cables originally provided to HO by the CIA historian in the late 1970s. However, the compiler of this + transcribed cables originally provided to HO by the CIA historian in the late 1970s. However, the compiler of this volume had access to all of the transcribed cables at the time the volume was compiled approximately 10 years ago. In a few instances, cable transcripts printed or footnoted in this volume could not be located in the extant set of 68 - cables at CIA, specifically: Document 276; the cable referenced in footnote 2, Document 273; and the cable referenced + cables at CIA, specifically: Document 276; the cable referenced in footnote 2, Document 273; and the cable referenced in footnote 3, Document 290. It should be noted that a few other CIA cables from before and - after the time of the TPAJAX operation itself have survived in the CIA and Truman Library collections listed below. Some of these surviving + after the time of the TPAJAX operation itself have survived in the CIA and Truman Library collections listed below. Some of these surviving original cables appear in this volume, in addition to the transcribed cables.

@@ -721,10 +662,8 @@ Security Council Policy Papers - Box 194 (Pertaining to the NSC 107 Series) - Box 210 (Pertaining to the NSC 136 Series) + Box 194 (Pertaining to the NSC 107 Series) + Box 210 (Pertaining to the NSC 136 Series) Official Minutes, 1947–1961 Boxes 12, 14, 16, 22–24, 26–27, 29, 35, 38 @@ -788,8 +727,7 @@ Job 80R01731R (DCI’s Interagency Correspondence) Job 80–01065A (Records of the Psychological Strategy - Board, as maintained by the DCI) + Board, as maintained by the DCI) National Intelligence Council Files @@ -797,21 +735,16 @@ Estimates) Job 79S01011A (Registry of Special National Intelligence Estimates) - Job 79R00904A (Memoranda for the DCI) + Job 79R00904A (Memoranda for the DCI) Job 98–00979R (National Intelligence Estimates) Files of the Deputy Director for Intelligence Job 01–00707R - Job 33R00601A (Files on NSC Papers, as maintained by the DDI) + Job 33R00601A (Files on NSC Papers, as maintained by the DDI) Job 79T00937A (Staff memoranda) - Job 80R01443R (Briefing for DCI intended for meetings of the NSC) + Job 80R01443R (Briefing for DCI intended for meetings of the NSC) Job 80–00810A (Disseminated Telegrams) Files of the Directorate of Intelligence, Office @@ -852,20 +785,15 @@ United States. Department of State. American Foreign Policy, 1950–55: Basic Documents, Vol. II. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957. - United States. Department of State. Department of State Bulletin. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, + United States. Department of State. Department of State Bulletin. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953. - Warner, Michael (ed.). CIA Cold War Records: The CIA Under Harry Truman. Washington: Central + Warner, Michael (ed.). CIA Cold War Records: The CIA Under Harry Truman. Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, 1994.
-
+
Abbreviations and Terms AA, @@ -1226,9 +1154,7 @@
-
+
Persons Acheson, Dean @@ -1437,8 +1363,7 @@ August 1951; Director of Central Intelligence after January 1953 Dulles, John Foster, Consultant to Secretary of State Dean - Acheson and Personal Representative of President Truman for the Japanese Peace Treaty; + Acheson and Personal Representative of President Truman for the Japanese Peace Treaty; Secretary of State after January 21, 1953 Dunn, James C., Ambassador to France, March 13, 1952–March 2, @@ -1748,8 +1673,7 @@ Nematollah, Commander of the Iranian Imperial Guard after 1954; responsible for delivering the Shah's order of dismissal to Prime Minister Mosadeq on August 16, - 1953, and subsequently for arresting Prime Minister Mosadeq + 1953, and subsequently for arresting Prime Minister Mosadeq Nasser, Ali Asqar, Acting Governor of the Bank Melli Iran, 1951–1952; Governor after 1952 @@ -1816,8 +1740,7 @@ Qashqai (Ghashghai, Ghashghaie), Mohamed Nasr (Nasser) Khan, Chieftain of Qashqai tribe - Qavam Es Sultaneh, + Qavam Es Sultaneh, Ahmed, Iranian Prime Minister, 1921, 1922–1923, 1942–1943, 1946–1947, and July 16–July 22, 1952 Radford, Admiral Arthur @@ -1997,29 +1920,19 @@ -
+
Iran, 1951–1954 -
- United States Efforts To Understand Mosadeq, February 1951–February 1952 -
- 1. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1950–1952, - classified general records, Box 27. Secret. Prepared by Joseph J. Wagner, Second Secretary +
+ United States Efforts To Understand Mosadeq, February 1951–February 1952 +
+ 1. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1950–1952, + classified general records, Box 27. Secret. Prepared by Joseph J. Wagner, Second Secretary of the Embassy. Sent by air pouch to the Department. No. 679 - Tehran, February 23, 1951. + Tehran, February 23, 1951.

THE POSITION OF THE SOVIETS IN IRAN

[Omitted here is a table of contents.]

@@ -2041,8 +1954,7 @@ future may bring.

Historical Background:

The past is supposed to be the prologue to the future. If history shows - anything it is the continuing pressure of the Russians upon the Persians for more than two hundred + anything it is the continuing pressure of the Russians upon the Persians for more than two hundred years. The Russian drive for expansion was first felt under Peter the Great who, in a war with the Persians in 1722, took practically all of the western and southern shores of the Caspian. In 1800 Russia annexed @@ -2129,8 +2041,7 @@

The Iranians and Communism:

The number of real Communists in Iran is comparatively very small. A good estimate probably would be one person per thousand. The member of - Iranians who out of desperation induced by the unsatisfactory state of affairs look to or + Iranians who out of desperation induced by the unsatisfactory state of affairs look to or sympathize with the Tudeh Party is, on the other hand, very considerable.

It is difficult for any one familiar with the ruggedly selfish and @@ -2174,8 +2085,7 @@ to despise and which he is certain will do nothing for him. And, the persistent belief that the Moslem religion will serve as a bulwark against the spread of Communism mostly represents wishful thinking, for - the Moslem Church in Iran seems to be about as corrupt as the Government and to be equally ignorant + the Moslem Church in Iran seems to be about as corrupt as the Government and to be equally ignorant of the problems of the age. The Iranian does not really look to the West because he has now generally adopted the belief that the West is trying to use him for its own ends. And, subconsciously, much of the hatred @@ -2354,8 +2264,7 @@

The latest Soviet move was made but several months ago. They then apparently became worried by the implication inherent in our plans to assist the country economically and seem to have decided to meet that - challenge through a reversion to peaceful techniques, anticipating our move by entering the field of + challenge through a reversion to peaceful techniques, anticipating our move by entering the field of economics themselves. Also, their timing was very good, for they took advantage of the fear psychology generated in Teheran by the Korean episode, than in its early stages. They offered the Iranians the hope @@ -2371,14 +2280,11 @@ a “soft” policy toward the Soviet Union on the part of the Iranians. That new policy seems to have resulted from several things: (a) the Iranian desire to demonstrate friendship, while keeping their fingers - crossed at the same time, (b) the decision of the Razmara Government to restore a + crossed at the same time, (b) the decision of the Razmara Government to restore a “balance” between the great powers interested in Iran (which carried - with it the apparent desire of Razmara to be the first Premier within recent years able + with it the apparent desire of Razmara to be the first Premier within recent years able to deal with the Soviets), (c) possibly, according to political rumors, - the existence of a secret understanding between Razmara and the Soviet Ambassador + the existence of a secret understanding between Razmara and the Soviet Ambassador providing for greater freedom to Soviet “democratic” propaganda, the suppression of anti-Soviet propaganda and the release of some of the Tudeh leaders.

@@ -2495,8 +2401,7 @@

Our Consulate in Tabriz has reported the presence in Azerbaijan of a number of officials of the former “Democratic” regime. Also, several newspapermen who recently toured through the area have reported that - they found the population in general to be dissatisfied, to feel neglected by the Central + they found the population in general to be dissatisfied, to feel neglected by the Central Government, and to be lacking in any real anti-Communist feelings. The Soviets undoubtedly could, if they wished, send into the area the Barzanis (greatly @@ -2526,8 +2431,7 @@ for the Dismissal of the Two American Military Missions—

The presence of the American Military Missions with the Iranian Army and Iranian Gendarmérie serves, from our point of view, much more of a - political than military purpose. Their presence also is none [more?] proof, to the Iranians who see them every + political than military purpose. Their presence also is none [more?] proof, to the Iranians who see them every day, of American interest in the maintenance of the integrity of Iran.

It is possible that the Soviets might again be led to demand their @@ -2563,8 +2467,7 @@ evident reasons, most difficult to anticipate.

In this connection, some thought might be given to the relations between Prime Minister Razmara and the - Soviets. While no evidence has yet been produced that Razmara is really pro-Soviet, yet the + Soviets. While no evidence has yet been produced that Razmara is really pro-Soviet, yet the fact remains that he is the first Premier within recent years to lead the Iranians down the path of closer and consequently more dangerous relations with the Soviets. Also, CAS Teheran received a report on a @@ -2572,12 +2475,10 @@ Razmara is actually working in the interests of the Soviets. While that report is difficult to evaluate, yet it also seems noteworthy that the Soviets have been very - sparing in their criticism of Razmara. Even in the case of the recent Iranian action + sparing in their criticism of Razmara. Even in the case of the recent Iranian action in voting to name the Chinese Communists as aggressors in Korea, the inspired leftist press in Teheran has placed the blame therefor mainly - upon Entezum and not upon Razmara.

+ upon Entezum and not upon Razmara.

The Possible Shape of Things to Come:

If one assumes that the Soviets are ready for a world war, then there is little sense in trying to estimate on the basis of past developments @@ -2587,8 +2488,7 @@

Our thinking must therefor be based upon the supposition that the present ideological struggle (probably with armed conflicts arising from time to time on the borders dividing the Soviet and Free blocs) will continue - for some period to come. Accepting that hypothesis, the study of the pattern of Soviet activity + for some period to come. Accepting that hypothesis, the study of the pattern of Soviet activity in Iran during recent years indicates that that activity has been primarily directed to the acquisition of the northern, particularly northwestern, areas of the country. It would seem logical to conclude @@ -2632,42 +2532,34 @@ for us to decide the role which we would assume should such a state of affairs eventuate.

- Joseph J. - Wagner + Joseph J. + Wagner Second Secretary of Embassy
-
+
2. Editorial Note -

In telegram 2001 from Tehran, March 7, 1951, Ambassador Grady reported on the “confused” +

In telegram 2001 from Tehran, March 7, 1951, Ambassador Grady reported on the “confused” situation in Tehran following the assassination that day of Prime Minister Razmara. Discounting the possibility that the Soviets had been involved in the assassination, Grady wrote that many others - may have had an interest in Razmara’s death, including the Shah, who feared + may have had an interest in Razmara’s death, including the Shah, who feared Razmara’s power; the British, who felt Razmara had not done enough to settle the oil dispute; and the National Front. He added that the Shah had suggested the imposition of martial law to the - Majlis, but was dissuaded from doing so. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, + Majlis, but was dissuaded from doing so. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/3–751)

-

In telegram 2008 from Tehran, March 8, Ambassador Grady predicted that, in the wake of +

In telegram 2008 from Tehran, March 8, Ambassador Grady predicted that, in the wake of Razmara’s assassination, the likelihood of the Majlis demanding nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian - Oil Company (AIOC) was high. Grady therefore suggested that + Oil Company (AIOC) was high. Grady therefore suggested that “considering US may lose through any open intervention, that we stand to lose less by insistence that - Britains now make every possible effort reach agreement along Aramco lines while we limit our action + Britains now make every possible effort reach agreement along Aramco lines while we limit our action to public and private statements that we believe such an agreement would completely safeguard Iran interests and should be accepted by them.” He added that “this approach could be discussed at Washington–London level @@ -2687,22 +2579,17 @@ conditions.” (Ibid., 788.00/3–951) For a related report on the situation in Iran from Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Burton - Berry, to Secretary Acheson, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, volume X, Iran, + Berry, to Secretary Acheson, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, volume X, Iran, 1951–1954, pages 9–11 (Document 5).

-
+
3. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 79T00937A, Box 1, Folder 1, Staff Memoranda—1951. Secret. There is no drafting information on the memorandum. - Washington, March 9, 1951. + Washington, March 9, 1951.

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION NO. 32

FOR @@ -2713,23 +2600,16 @@ The Situation in Iran

1. Information is still incomplete regarding the influences at work - behind the assassination of Premier Razmara of Iran. It appears, however, that the murder + behind the assassination of Premier Razmara of Iran. It appears, however, that the murder was an outgrowth of Iran’s internal stress and strains and that Soviet influences were not directly involved. Little is known about - Fedi-i-a-Islam, the organization which planned to [the] murder, but it is probably a band of religious fanatics + Fedi-i-a-Islam, the organization which planned to [the] murder, but it is probably a band of religious fanatics similar to the so-called Committee of Twelve responsible for the murder of Minister of Court Ilajir in November 1949. Like the Committee of Twelve, Fedi-i-a-Islam appears to be an extremist off-shoot of the small but vociferous troup of religious reactionaries and xenophobes in the - Majlis. This group has opposed Razmara especially for his “sellout” to the UK on the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) concession issues. Members of - group, however, have also accused Razmara of appeasing the USSR and of coddling the pro-Communist element in Iran; + Majlis. This group has opposed Razmara especially for his “sellout” to the UK on the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) concession issues. Members of + group, however, have also accused Razmara of appeasing the USSR and of coddling the pro-Communist element in Iran; although there have been various unproved assertions that Mulla Kashani, the leader of the ultra-reactionary clerical element, has covert ties with the USSR, it is unlikely that the @@ -2744,22 +2624,17 @@ general sense of aimlessness, insecurity, and frustration and by highlighting Iran’s lack of capable leadership. The Shah may well respond temporarily to the challenge by attempting personally to provide - the vigorous leadership that Iran needs, but it is doubtful that he has the tenacity of purpose to - persist in such a policy. As for the premiership, General Razmara was elevated from Chief of + the vigorous leadership that Iran needs, but it is doubtful that he has the tenacity of purpose to + persist in such a policy. As for the premiership, General Razmara was elevated from Chief of Staff to Premier last year because he appeared to be the only man who had the prestige and vigor needed to stir the Iranian Government out of its accustomed lethargy. The Shah is reportedly considering naming Minister of Court Ala, the competent and strongly pro-US former - Iranian Ambassador in Washington, to the premiership. Although Ala might get more whole-hearted + Iranian Ambassador in Washington, to the premiership. Although Ala might get more whole-hearted support than did Razmara from - the Shah, (who was unable to control his fears that Razmara might attempt to seize power - as the Shah’s own father had done), Ala lacks strong supporters in Parliament. Whether or + the Shah, (who was unable to control his fears that Razmara might attempt to seize power + as the Shah’s own father had done), Ala lacks strong supporters in Parliament. Whether or not Ala is given the premiership, Razmara’s office will probably revert in the end to the old-time politicians who have borne @@ -2773,40 +2648,30 @@ declaration but that no practical steps to expropriate the company would ensure. Razmara himself, apparently felt that some sop to the advocates of nationalization was - needed. In presenting to the Oil Commission, as his own, an AIOC proposal for a more generous + needed. In presenting to the Oil Commission, as his own, an AIOC proposal for a more generous concession agreement, Razmara inserted a declaration that nationalization was the ultimate objective of the government.

-
+
4. Memorandum From the Plans Branch, Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence - (Jackson)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, + (Jackson)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box - 11, Folder 14. Iran 1951–1953. Secret. Drafted by [name not declassified]. - Washington, March 12, 1951. + 11, Folder 14. Iran 1951–1953. Secret. Drafted by [name not declassified]. + Washington, March 12, 1951.

U.S.-Iranian relations have been deteriorating for some time with the result that there has been a closer orientation of Iran with the Soviet [Union], and a number of reports bear witness to this fact. Ambassador Grady in January was sufficiently exercised to propose a quiet decrease in number of U.S. - women and children in Tehran and to state that the situation was sufficiently serious to + women and children in Tehran and to state that the situation was sufficiently serious to be brought to the attention of the President before it was too late. - With the assassination of Razmara, deterioration of the situation receives new + With the assassination of Razmara, deterioration of the situation receives new impetus.

As you know, ONE is presently working on - N.I.E. 6, “Iran’s Position in the East-West Conflict.”Document 13. However, - due to new conditions arising from the death of Razmara and the general sensitivity of + N.I.E. 6, “Iran’s Position in the East-West Conflict.”Document 13. However, + due to new conditions arising from the death of Razmara and the general sensitivity of Iran, a Special Estimate or Intelligence Memorandum might be warranted in order to cover CIA until the final production of N.I.E. 6. Reasons for such an estimate might include:

@@ -2821,41 +2686,33 @@ Communist Tudeh Party (presently outlawed) may have a new resurgence especially in the south where there have been numerous economic difficulties.

-

(4) Again, with the death of Razmara, the National Front and other parties probably +

(4) Again, with the death of Razmara, the National Front and other parties probably will promote nationalization of oil with greater determination. If oil is nationalized, there is a presumption that the Iranians will turn to - the Soviet [Union] instead of UK–US for technical advice. This would give + the Soviet [Union] instead of UK–US for technical advice. This would give the Russians a great opportunity to obtain a modicum of control in relation to Iranian oil and a further chance of obtaining northern oil concessions.

(5) There is also the ever-present Kurdish problem. The Kurdish group in the Caucasus under Mullah Mustafa - Barzani are pro-Communist, and Barzani has already asked permission to + Barzani are pro-Communist, and Barzani has already asked permission to pass (with a number of his followers) through Iran to Iraq. This permission, to date, has been denied as long as these Kurdish elements - wish to carry arms. If, however, Barzani, and his followers are allowed to pass through + wish to carry arms. If, however, Barzani, and his followers are allowed to pass through Iran they would then be able to get in touch with Kurdish elements in Syria, Iraq, and Turkey. Many of these Kurds are long-standing dissidents, and trouble might ensue.

(6) The inherent weakness of the Iranian government has probably been - increased by the death of Razmara. Increased infiltration of Russian agents, + increased by the death of Razmara. Increased infiltration of Russian agents, heated debate over such things as nationalization of oil and growing activity of dissident elements including the Tudeh Party, could lead to severe internal disorders and even possibly to the overthrow of the Iranian government. In such a case Russia might seize the opportunity to - intervene overtly under the guise of maintaining peace in Iran specifically and the Near East + intervene overtly under the guise of maintaining peace in Iran specifically and the Near East in general. The chance of such an overt invasion of Iran would not appear probable but can not be completely overlooked.

-
+
5. Paper Prepared in the Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job @@ -2863,14 +2720,9 @@ is undated but is attached to a working draft dated March 13. This is apparently the paper presented to Department of State officials on March 14. See Document 8. - Washington, undated. + Washington, undated.

SUMMARY APPRAISAL OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAN

-

The assassination of Prime Minister Razmara seriously worsens an already grave situation in +

The assassination of Prime Minister Razmara seriously worsens an already grave situation in Iran. Political and economic insecurity combine with chauvinist and fanatical religious emotions to produce an atmosphere extremely favorable to Soviet subversion. Nationalization of the oil industry @@ -2886,8 +2738,7 @@ anti-US elements gaining control of the government.

2. A serious worsening of the internal situation and further - assassinations, including that of the Shah and Prime Minister Ala. Such developments could well + assassinations, including that of the Shah and Prime Minister Ala. Such developments could well result in a complete breakdown of the central government and general disintegration.

3. The actual assumption of control over the central government by @@ -2912,17 +2763,14 @@ assistance in the form of money, personnel and technical aid to the police and security forces in Iran. It should be pointed out that this whole program would have a vastly better chance of success if it could - be done in support of a vigorous overt US program to strengthen Iran, including loans, increased + be done in support of a vigorous overt US program to strengthen Iran, including loans, increased military aid, medical and public health programs, and Point Four assistance generally.

The chief danger to the continuity of any pro-Western government—aside from the consequences of failure to make progress with critical financial and economic problems and the disruptive influence of the USSR—lies in the unholy alliance - of the MossadeqIn the margin after “Mossadeq” is handwritten “National Front.” + of the MossadeqIn the margin after “Mossadeq” is handwritten “National Front.” group with Ayatollah Kashani.After the name “Kashani,” a @@ -2942,30 +2790,24 @@ appeals of the Kashani group as being contrary to the principles of Islam. It is probable that leading clerics do believe this and, in addition, they are likely to be - jealous of the popularity and conspicuousness of Kashani.

+ jealous of the popularity and conspicuousness of Kashani.

The individuals to be approached include the following:

a. [5 lines not declassified]

b. [1½ lines not declassified]

c. [1½ lines not declassified]

d. [2 lines not declassified]

-

Efforts should also be made to buy off Kashani. It would appear that at heart Kashani is primarily interested in +

Efforts should also be made to buy off Kashani. It would appear that at heart Kashani is primarily interested in himself rather than being inspired by a crusading zeal, and there have - been indications that his attitude toward the US can be influenced by money.

+ been indications that his attitude toward the US can be influenced by money.

Approach to Kashani should be made through either:

a. [1 line not declassified]

b. [1½ lines not declassified]

-

An alternative course would be to discredit Kashani by means of printed +

An alternative course would be to discredit Kashani by means of printed material. Pamphlets could be clandestinely printed and distributed vehemently attacking Kashani. - Two approaches, at least, are possible. One is to praise Kashani in such a way as fully to + Two approaches, at least, are possible. One is to praise Kashani in such a way as fully to expose the dangers of his methods. Another is to trade his career, emphasizing the unsavory character of a good deal of it, and then tie him in with the Soviet efforts to undermine the Iranian Government.

@@ -2979,8 +2821,7 @@ misleading the grand old patriot. Two methods appear possible:

a. Use of clandestine publications to expose the Soviet ties of Hosein Makki, Sayyid Sbol Hazan - Haerizadeh, and possibly Ibol Qader Azad.

+ Haerizadeh, and possibly Ibol Qader Azad.

b. Attempt to split off such of his more stable and reasonable followers as Dr. Mozafar Boghai and Illahyer Saleh by demonstrating the general disorder and anarchy which this group is fostering.

@@ -3010,14 +2851,12 @@

a. Political Factions.

There are many political groups, few of which can be called parties. All of these should be worked on in an effort to establish a practical - coalition. They include, among others, the Majlis factions called Iran and Javan, which + coalition. They include, among others, the Majlis factions called Iran and Javan, which appear to be moderately progressive in character. There are also many prominent, intelligent, and influential younger government officials now affiliated with the Iran group. They have the ability to work together and are less inclined to the excessive - nationalism of these leaders who tend to go along with the Mossadeq group. A new progressive + nationalism of these leaders who tend to go along with the Mossadeq group. A new progressive party, under the leadership of Movvagar, was established about 1 March and appears desirous of US aid.

b. Ranking Army Leaders.

@@ -3042,8 +2881,7 @@ results be obtained from the encouragement of clandestine political opposition.

The most effective tactic might be to encourage collaboration between - Iranian Army divisional commanders and local tribal leaders in setting up military areas of + Iranian Army divisional commanders and local tribal leaders in setting up military areas of resistance to the authority of the government. Approach would be made to the divisional commanders and to the same tribal leaders already mentioned. In addition, approaches would be made to leaders of the Boer @@ -3052,34 +2890,25 @@

Such of these groups as proved amenable could be covertly supplied with money, arms, matériel, food, and possibly personnel.

-
+
6. Draft Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security CouncilSource: National Archives, RG 273, Records of the - National Security Council, Policy Papers, Box 194, NSC–107 (Section 2). Top Secret. + National Security Council, Policy Papers, Box 194, NSC–107 (Section 2). Top Secret. NSC 107 was circulated to the members of the NSC on March 14 under cover of a letter from James S. - Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of the NSC. In his cover letter, Lay indicated that the enclosed + Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of the NSC. In his cover letter, Lay indicated that the enclosed draft statement of policy, based on an initial draft by the Department of State, was to be discussed by the National Security - Council at its meeting on March 21. NSC 107 and its attached Staff Study are printed with + Council at its meeting on March 21. NSC 107 and its attached Staff Study are printed with redactions in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, - vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 11–23 (Documents 6 and 7). + vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 11–23 (Documents 6 and 7). NSC 107 - Washington, March 14, 1951. + Washington, March 14, 1951.

IRAN

1. It continues to be in the security interest of the United States that @@ -3146,20 +2975,15 @@

d. As desirable, consultation with selected countries to attain support for the United States position.

-

e. Exposure of USSR responsibility and consideration of reference of the +

e. Exposure of USSR responsibility and consideration of reference of the situation to the United Nations.

-

6. In the event of overt attack by organized USSR military forces against Iran, the United States in +

6. In the event of overt attack by organized USSR military forces against Iran, the United States in common prudence would have to proceed on the assumption that global war is probably imminent. Accordingly, the United States should then immediately:At the March 21 meeting, the - NSC adopted NSC 107, although it noted the - “following views of the Joint Secretaries regarding NSC 107, as read by the Secretary of - Defense: ‘The Joint Secretaries recommend that NSC 107 be rejected in its entirety. + NSC adopted NSC 107, although it noted the + “following views of the Joint Secretaries regarding NSC 107, as read by the Secretary of + Defense: ‘The Joint Secretaries recommend that NSC 107 be rejected in its entirety. The heart of NSC 107 is paragraphs 5 and 6; what to do in case of internal subversion in Iran and what to do in case of a Soviet attack, respectively. Neither paragraph @@ -3206,13 +3030,10 @@ JCS, “from the military point of view, perceive no objection to the use of the statement of policy on Iran in NSC 107 as an interim - working guide.” (Ibid., Policy Papers, Box 194, NSC–107 (Section 2)) President - Truman approved NSC 107 on March 24 and directed the + working guide.” (Ibid., Policy Papers, Box 194, NSC–107 (Section 2)) President + Truman approved NSC 107 on March 24 and directed the Department of State to submit monthly progress reports. (Memorandum - from Lay to the NSC, March 26; ibid., Official Minutes + from Lay to the NSC, March 26; ibid., Official Minutes 1947–1961, Box 12, 87th Meeting)

Attachment

@@ -3229,15 +3050,13 @@ attack and exposure to political subversion, Iran must be regarded as a continuing objective in the Soviet program of expansion. If Iran should come under Soviet domination, the independence of all other countries of - the Middle East would be threatened. Specifically the USSR could (1) control or limit the + the Middle East would be threatened. Specifically the USSR could (1) control or limit the availability of a Middle Eastern oil reservoir upon which the economy of Western Europe depends; (2) acquire advance bases for subversive activities or actual attack against a vast contiguous area including Turkey, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula (hence the Suez Canal), Afghanistan, and Pakistan; (3) obtain a base hundreds of miles nearer to potential - US–UK lines of defense in the Middle East than any held at + US–UK lines of defense in the Middle East than any held at present; (4) control continental air routes crossing Iran, threaten those traversing adjacent areas, and menace shipping in the Persian Gulf; and (5) undermine the will of most Middle Eastern countries to @@ -3271,8 +3090,7 @@ social reform and an expanding economy with the purpose of alleviating discontent and strengthening allegiance to the central government.

Evaluation of Current Policy

-

5. Our objective of preventing domination of Iran by the USSR has so far been achieved by means of +

5. Our objective of preventing domination of Iran by the USSR has so far been achieved by means of political action. Iran, after first following a policy of procrastination, evasion and compromise when confronted by an aggressive Soviet attitude, has for the past three years, with strong United States @@ -3302,8 +3120,7 @@ designed to strengthen popular loyalty to the central government, and the provision of surplus light military equipment on credit for internal security and legitimate defense purposes. Iran has also been included in - the Mutual Defense Assistance Program and is now receiving military aid on a grant basis. The + the Mutual Defense Assistance Program and is now receiving military aid on a grant basis. The purpose of this aid is to assist in the maintenance of internal security, to increase the confidence of the Iranian Government and people in their ability to defend themselves, to give concrete evidence @@ -3319,8 +3136,7 @@ following elements:

a. An Export-Import Bank loan of $25,000,000 for road building and agricultural improvement. Failure of Iran to accept - this credit would increase our reliance on IBRD credits and United States Government grants as levers + this credit would increase our reliance on IBRD credits and United States Government grants as levers to induce the Iranian Government to put its economic house in order.

b. The strengthening of the staffs of the existing American diplomatic and consular posts in Iran and the opening of a new @@ -3345,8 +3161,7 @@ its entire operation is resented as a closed corporation exploiting Iranian wealth but beyond the reach of Iranian custom or law.

9. This has resulted in strong antagonism against the British and, among - the less educated, against all foreigners, and has led many Iranians to believe that the Western + the less educated, against all foreigners, and has led many Iranians to believe that the Western powers are not seriously interested in the welfare and independence of the country but are concerned only with exploiting its primary resources for their own purposes. The present Iranian leaders do not associate the @@ -3354,8 +3169,7 @@ however, want the United States to side with them in the dispute and force the Company to meet their terms. Nationalization, which is currently under discussion in the Iranian Parliament, is not impossible - and if it did occur would subsequently make it easier for the USSR to influence the distribution of the + and if it did occur would subsequently make it easier for the USSR to influence the distribution of the oil. The United States should use its utmost influence to persuade the British to offer, and the Iranian Government to accept, an equitable concession agreement. Failure to reach such agreement carries with it @@ -3380,8 +3194,7 @@ orientation policy has gone too far and has placed Iran in an extremely vulnerable position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union without obtaining anything in return to help Iran protect itself. This attitude combined - with recent ostensibly friendly gestures by the USSR have started a trend towards Iran’s + with recent ostensibly friendly gestures by the USSR have started a trend towards Iran’s reversion to its historical policy of playing one power off against the other and maintaining a precarious neutrality. The new program of American assistance and guidance outlined above is designed to @@ -3399,8 +3212,7 @@ apply strong political and psychological pressures against Iran in an effort to force the government of that country into submission, it is considered unlikely that the Soviet Union would be willing to resort to - direct armed intervention by organized USSR military forces at this time. Nevertheless the + direct armed intervention by organized USSR military forces at this time. Nevertheless the possibility of such armed intervention cannot be entirely ruled out. In the absence of such armed intervention Iran is probably capable of maintaining successful resistance to Soviet pressure and could be @@ -3421,8 +3233,7 @@ feeling of hopelessness and a public psychology inherently dangerous from the point of view of Iran’s determination to resist Soviet pressures. Present Soviet tactics in Iran are designed to convince the - Iranians that they have nothing to fear from the USSR and it seems certain that in their + Iranians that they have nothing to fear from the USSR and it seems certain that in their search for security many Iranians are impressed by the present “friendly” policy of the Soviets. Unless the United States can convince them of the real issue at stake, they will insist on a government in @@ -3439,8 +3250,7 @@ States could, in conjunction with the United Kingdom and with little risk in proportion to the possible gain, take positive steps, including covert measures, to support pro-Western elements and effect Iran’s - alignment with the free world. The alternative course of action, that of accepting without + alignment with the free world. The alternative course of action, that of accepting without counter-action Iran’s reversion to an attitude of neutrality, would probably result in eventual loss of Iran with the consequences noted in paragraph 2 above.

@@ -3455,13 +3265,11 @@ communist overthrow of the government is not only possible but even probable unless steps are taken to improve the economic and social condition of the people and increase the efficiency of the government. - The appointment of General Razmara, formerly Chief of Staff of the Iranian Army, as + The appointment of General Razmara, formerly Chief of Staff of the Iranian Army, as Prime Minister gave promise of improved leadership and direction; but up to the time of his assassination on March 7, 1951, his accomplishments had been singularly few.

-

15. The assassination of Prime Minister Razmara underlines the basic political instability of +

15. The assassination of Prime Minister Razmara underlines the basic political instability of Iran and emphasizes once again the need for strong and vigorous leadership. It had been hoped at the time of his appointment in June 1950 that Razmara possessed the @@ -3496,8 +3304,7 @@ emergency and this might be sufficient to accomplish our purposes without the use of United States forces. Use of United Kingdom forces probably would not have the same degree of provocation as the use of - United States forces; but would give the USSR a pretext to invoke the 1921 Irano-Soviet Treaty of + United States forces; but would give the USSR a pretext to invoke the 1921 Irano-Soviet Treaty of Friendship. On the other hand, should this course prove ineffective in restoring the legitimate government, the United States would have to accept loss of all or part of Iran or pass to the course of action noted @@ -3515,8 +3322,7 @@ not be available in the foreseeable future. Commitment of United States forces even in a show of force might provoke military action by the USSR which could well lead to - hostilities between the United States and the USSR.

+ hostilities between the United States and the USSR.

Third Contingency: The establishment of pro-Soviet provincial governments in Iran by subversive or other means not involving the use of Soviet military force.

@@ -3533,8 +3339,7 @@ maladministration in the Iranian Government continue for an indefinite period and if political leadership is not greatly improved.

19. If this contingency did occur we would be faced with intensified - Soviet subversive activities in the remaining free areas of Iran and in Near Eastern areas contiguous + Soviet subversive activities in the remaining free areas of Iran and in Near Eastern areas contiguous thereto and with an increased tendency on the part of Near Eastern countries to seek strengthened security arrangements with the Western powers. Should security arrangements considered satisfactory by them not @@ -3556,18 +3361,15 @@

21. Information presently available does not indicate that overt Soviet attack with organized USSR military forces against Iran is probable at this time, especially since - opportunities still remain for the USSR to gain its objectives in Iran short of overt attack. + opportunities still remain for the USSR to gain its objectives in Iran short of overt attack. However, the possibility of such attack cannot be excluded, since the USSR has the military capability of launching an attack without warning and quickly overrunning Iran. While such an attack would in fact give rise to the risk of global war, - it is possible, even though not probable, that the USSR, miscalculating the degree of risk + it is possible, even though not probable, that the USSR, miscalculating the degree of risk involved, would launch an attack against Iran designed to attain Soviet objectives in that area without bringing on global war. It is also - possible, but improbable, that the USSR would deliberately assume a risk of global war by + possible, but improbable, that the USSR would deliberately assume a risk of global war by attacking Iran.

22. It seems likely, in view of the repeated references to the 1921 Irano-Soviet Treaty of Friendship in the Soviet protests to Iran in 1948 @@ -3598,8 +3400,7 @@ a base of operations for any attacks—made either directly or through the counter-revolutionary forces—which they might contemplate against Russia or the Soviet Republics allied to her.”

-

It is also the view of the Department’s legal advisers that if the USSR made out a case for co-existence of +

It is also the view of the Department’s legal advisers that if the USSR made out a case for co-existence of the above four conditions, and at the same time the Government of Iran denied their co-existence and/or resisted the introduction of Soviet troops into Iran, the USSR would not @@ -3627,8 +3428,7 @@

b. Opposing the aggression by all means short of global war, including deployment of United States and United Kingdom forces for localized opposition to the Soviet attack. This course - would lead to hostilities between United States and USSR forces involving the risk of global + would lead to hostilities between United States and USSR forces involving the risk of global war, while the commitment of United States forces in Iran would reduce United States capabilities for global war if it developed. However, this course, in so far as it prevented complete Soviet occupation of Iran, @@ -3664,28 +3464,20 @@ was probably imminent.

-
+
7. Memorandum From the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans (Roosevelt) - to the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Dulles)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, + to the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Dulles)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, Iran 1951–1953. Secret. - Washington, March 15, 1951. + Washington, March 15, 1951. SUBJECT Comments on NIE Paper (The - Current Crisis in Iran) dated 15 March 1951Reference is to SE–3, Document + Current Crisis in Iran) dated 15 March 1951Reference is to SE–3, Document 9, distributed on March 16.

1. In accordance with the request you made to me this afternoon over the - phone I am submitting to you our comments on the present NIE paper on the current crisis in Iran + phone I am submitting to you our comments on the present NIE paper on the current crisis in Iran (15 March 1951). There is no need for me to point out that we are not in the estimating business and can comment only in the light of our operating experiences and requirements. As an operator I am bound to @@ -3707,10 +3499,7 @@ than the kind of vigorous action which we feel is required.

4. On paragraph 2 (a): Admittedly there have been no cables received to indicate that the armed forces are not able to maintain order but this, - in our opinion, is a negative argument. Razmara, in our opinion, was the one manA handwritten note, apparently by Roosevelt, is inserted at this + in our opinion, is a negative argument. Razmara, in our opinion, was the one manA handwritten note, apparently by Roosevelt, is inserted at this point and reads: “with the exception of the Shah, who potentially could do so but cannot apply himself to the job.” capable of controlling these forces and now that he is dead it is highly likely on @@ -3741,8 +3530,7 @@ question.

7. On paragraph 2 (d): In our opinion the statement that “responsible government officials . . . are aware of the difficulties involved in - nationalism” is misleading. That some such as the Shah and Ala are against this drastic action is + nationalism” is misleading. That some such as the Shah and Ala are against this drastic action is undoubtedly true. That some government officials are “aware” of the difficulties is also true but it does not necessarily follow that they will take any action. With the overwhelming vote in the Majlis there is @@ -3764,72 +3552,54 @@ intervention when the situation is playing so directly into their hands.

- Kermit - RooseveltPrinted from a - copy that bears Roosevelt’s typed signature. + Kermit + RooseveltPrinted from a + copy that bears Roosevelt’s typed signature.
-
+
8. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near - Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/3–1551. Top + Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/3–1551. Top Secret. Drafted by Rountree. - Attached is a handwritten note apparently written by Berry. In this note Berry poses a number of questions, + Attached is a handwritten note apparently written by Berry. In this note Berry poses a number of questions, such as, “Is there the material from which to build ‘a strong - coalition government in Iran?’ (as suggested by CIA)”; “Is this the moment to bring + coalition government in Iran?’ (as suggested by CIA)”; “Is this the moment to bring out ‘a rigorous overt U.S. program to strengthen Iran’ or is it the moment to let the dust settle while we act correctly?”; and “It is generally assumed that Ala and his government are a temporary expedient. If so what do we expect to follow, what groups and what leaders? Are we now working, educationally and otherwise, on such?” - Washington, March 15, 1951. + Washington, March 15, 1951. SUBJECT CIA Proposals for the Iranian Crisis

Problem

-

To consider possible courses of covert action by CIA representatives in relation to the Iranian crisis.

+

To consider possible courses of covert action by CIA representatives in relation to the Iranian crisis.

Discussion

At the request of CIA, and accompanied by other representatives of NEA, I visited Messrs. Allen Dulles, - Frank Wisner and Kermit Roosevelt on March 14 to discuss + Frank Wisner and Kermit Roosevelt on March 14 to discuss the current Iranian crisis. CIA, concerned over the turn of events in that country, had prepared the attached paper on the situation, setting forth possible courses of - action which might be carried out covertly.Document 5. It was emphasized + action which might be carried out covertly.Document 5. It was emphasized that the paper is no more than a draft hurriedly prepared and that the program would be refined on the basis of subsequent discussions with the Department.

-

I undertook to discuss in general terms the CIA proposals with the appropriate Departmental officers - before pursuing the matter further with CIA. The real importance of the paper is, I think, that +

I undertook to discuss in general terms the CIA proposals with the appropriate Departmental officers + before pursuing the matter further with CIA. The real importance of the paper is, I think, that CIA is prepared to move ahead rapidly with an action program requiring supplies, money, and personnel if, in the opinion of the Department, it will be useful in the attainment of our objectives in Iran.

I feel that we certainly must not under-estimate the dangers involved in - the Iranian situation, although Razmara’s assassination appears in fact to have been + the Iranian situation, although Razmara’s assassination appears in fact to have been accomplished by a representative of a small fanatical nationalist sect. - The lack of drastic subsequent developments lends credence to the assumption that the + The lack of drastic subsequent developments lends credence to the assumption that the assassination was not brought about by Communist elements, although Communism in Iran clearly has benefited greatly by the confusion and turmoil which has been created. At the moment there is reason to hope @@ -3862,8 +3632,7 @@ propaganda supporting the Shah and the Prime Minister at the present moment would unquestionably embarrass them and leave them open to criticism from the nationalist factions as American creatures. The - various propaganda points suggested by CIA are good.

+ various propaganda points suggested by CIA are good.

(2) While a “strong coalition movement” along the proper lines would be desirable, it is difficult to see how such a development could be brought about by United States agencies at this time.

@@ -3876,8 +3645,7 @@ the United States of Iranian security officials.

(4) I concur in the comment that this whole program would have a better chance of success if it could be carried out in support of a vigorous - overt United States program to strengthen Iran, including loans, increased military aid, medical + overt United States program to strengthen Iran, including loans, increased military aid, medical and public health programs and Point IV assistance. Every effort is being made to increase as appropriate and expedite our Iranian aid programs.

@@ -3892,13 +3660,10 @@ approach as evidence of the intrigues of foreign powers against the sovereignty of Iran; in this he could win more adherents and further inflame those whom he already has. The alternate course proposed by - CIA, to discredit Kashani by means of printed + CIA, to discredit Kashani by means of printed material, etc., has, I believe, merit but this program would have to be carried out with the greatest caution.

-

(6) I concur with the opinion expressed by CIA that any approach to Dr. Mohamad Mossadeq, the leader of the National Front +

(6) I concur with the opinion expressed by CIA that any approach to Dr. Mohamad Mossadeq, the leader of the National Front group, would be difficult, and believe it would be fruitless. The suggested use of clandestine publications to expose the Soviet ties of some of his followers appears a distinct possibility, but the possible @@ -3924,30 +3689,21 @@ contingencies it is recognized that our action must be far more drastic than under present circumstances, and the suggestions set forth by CIA should be given careful - consideration. In this connection, the present NSC paper on Iran, which was approved by the Senior Staff - on March 13 and is going to the Council for approval on March 21, provides broad latitude for + consideration. In this connection, the present NSC paper on Iran, which was approved by the Senior Staff + on March 13 and is going to the Council for approval on March 21, provides broad latitude for United States measures along these lines.An - apparent reference to NSC 107, Document 6.

+ apparent reference to NSC 107, Document 6.

Recommendations

(1) That NEA pursue discussions with CIA along the foregoing lines and urge that agency to proceed with appropriate aspects of its action program, pointing out that the success of the program depends in very - large measure upon the caliber of the CIA personnel assigned to the task.

-

(2) That instructions agreed to by the Department and CIA be communicated to Tehran, authorizing + large measure upon the caliber of the CIA personnel assigned to the task.

+

(2) That instructions agreed to by the Department and CIA be communicated to Tehran, authorizing the implementation of such elements of the program as are fully approved by the Ambassador.In the left margin next to - these two recommendations, Matthews wrote: “I agree.” In Kermit Roosevelt’s account of the - same meeting, dated March 17, he wrote that “Mr. Berry informed CNE that Deputy Under-Secretary + these two recommendations, Matthews wrote: “I agree.” In Kermit Roosevelt’s account of the + same meeting, dated March 17, he wrote that “Mr. Berry informed CNE that Deputy Under-Secretary Matthews had read and approved in substance the reference memorandum. He said that this approval was qualified in terms that had been understood fully by @@ -3957,15 +3713,11 @@ accelerated OPC program, that the specific illustrations included in the paper would require careful evaluation in the field, and that the whole program would be subject - to coordination with and approval of the ambassador.” Roosevelt also discussed with + to coordination with and approval of the ambassador.” Roosevelt also discussed with Berry the need to place - additional personnel and funding at the disposal of the OPC in Tehran to “assist the - Ambassador for the purposes of this program.” Roosevelt concluded by noting that - “It was agreed that a further meeting of State and CIA representatives on this program + additional personnel and funding at the disposal of the OPC in Tehran to “assist the + Ambassador for the purposes of this program.” Roosevelt concluded by noting that + “It was agreed that a further meeting of State and CIA representatives on this program should be held as soon as possible, preferably on 19 March . . . CNE strongly recommends that ADPC and, if possible, DD/P @@ -3977,9 +3729,7 @@ Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, Iran 1951–1953)

-
+
9. Special EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79S01011A, Box 3, Folder 3, SE–3, The Current Crisis in @@ -3993,14 +3743,12 @@ SE–3 - Washington, March 16, 1951. + Washington, March 16, 1951.

THE CURRENT CRISIS IN IRAN

Conclusions

1. The political situation in Iran has long been unstable. This - instability has been increased by the assassination of Razmara, which has led to a new + instability has been increased by the assassination of Razmara, which has led to a new outburst of extreme nationalism, expressed in a vigorous demand for nationalization of oil resources of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

2. We do not believe, however, that the situation is such that there is @@ -4025,45 +3773,37 @@ to find a face-saving settlement with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

3. Nevertheless, the possibility cannot be excluded that the situation may be aggravated and the crisis prolonged by an unyielding attitude on - the part of the British, or by some unpredictable development such as assassination of the Shah. In + the part of the British, or by some unpredictable development such as assassination of the Shah. In such circumstances the opportunity might be created for an attempt by the Tudeh Party to seize power, or even for armed intervention by the USSR.

Discussion

The Background of the Crisis

-

4. The assassination of Premier Razmara by a religious fanatic on 7 March and the +

4. The assassination of Premier Razmara by a religious fanatic on 7 March and the ensuing period of uncertainty are direct results of the agitation for nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which has been building up ever since the rejection by the Majlis in December 1950 of a revised concession agreement offered by the company. This agitation has been led by a very small group of ultra-nationalists in the Majlis known as the National Front. One of its leaders, the violently anti-British - religious figure, Mulla Kashani, was reportedly implicated in the assassination, + religious figure, Mulla Kashani, was reportedly implicated in the assassination, also by religious fanatics, of another high official in 1949.

5. Tension over the oil issue increased sharply in the period just preceding the assassination. The National Front stepped up its demands - for nationalization, using that issue as a club to attack Razmara, whose attempts to provide + for nationalization, using that issue as a club to attack Razmara, whose attempts to provide strong government had run counter to its own attempts to gain a controlling influence. The National Front reportedly approached the British with an offer to drop the nationalization issue entirely if the - British would help get rid of Razmara in favor of a more acceptable Premier. The - British, irritated with Razmara’s failure to line up support for their position, + British would help get rid of Razmara in favor of a more acceptable Premier. The + British, irritated with Razmara’s failure to line up support for their position, delivered strong official warnings against any attempts at - nationalization, meanwhile, however, indicating to Razmara that they were willing to + nationalization, meanwhile, however, indicating to Razmara that they were willing to grant a more generous concession agreement along the lines of that recently concluded by Saudi Arabia and the Arabian-American Oil Company. Razmara was persuaded to go before the Majlis Oil Commission with a statement prepared for him by the British emphasizing the practical difficulties of nationalization. - In his presentation on 3 March, Razmara (to the irritation of the British) was careful + In his presentation on 3 March, Razmara (to the irritation of the British) was careful to label the statement as one prepared by technical experts rather than his own. The statement, however, still brought down the wrath of the ultra-nationalists upon him and may well have furnished the immediate @@ -4086,8 +3826,7 @@ US Embassy, while in the afternoon Mulla Kashani held a mass meeting which, though orderly, was marked by inflammatory speeches - denouncing the British and Razmara. The organization responsible for the murder, + denouncing the British and Razmara. The organization responsible for the murder, the Friends of Islam, threatened violence against other opponents of nationalization and indicated that reprisals would be forthcoming if the assassin were not released. Although the provinces apparently continued @@ -4111,8 +3850,7 @@ Ala, who has been approved by both the Senate and the Majlis, is described as apparently “cheerful and optimistic” about what he regards as the task of effecting a - reconciliation among the various factions, including Kashani’s. Meanwhile, the impending + reconciliation among the various factions, including Kashani’s. Meanwhile, the impending adjournment of Parliament for the Noruz holidays offers a breathing spell, and it has been reported that the police have been quietly rounding up members of the reportedly small Friends of Islam group and @@ -4124,42 +3862,28 @@ note on nationalization which the UK has sent Iran may actually provoke rather than discourage further ultra-nationalist outbursts.

-

9. A major indication of the trend will be provided by Ala’s presentation of his proposed +

9. A major indication of the trend will be provided by Ala’s presentation of his proposed Cabinet to the Majlis on 18 March.

-
+
10. Memorandum From the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans (Roosevelt) - to the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Dulles)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, + to the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Dulles)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, Iran 1951–1953. Top Secret. - Washington, March 26, 1951. + Washington, March 26, 1951. SUBJECT NIE–6—Iran’s Position in the - East-West ConflictRoosevelt was presumably - commenting on the March 21 draft of NIE–6. (Ibid.) For the text of NIE–6 as distributed, see Document 13. + East-West ConflictRoosevelt was presumably + commenting on the March 21 draft of NIE–6. (Ibid.) For the text of NIE–6 as distributed, see Document 13. -

1. In accordance with your telephone request to Mr. Wisner, I am submitting the following +

1. In accordance with your telephone request to Mr. Wisner, I am submitting the following comments on NIE–6 prepared by ourselves in collaboration with OSO.

2. We feel that the basic fault of this paper is that it is not addressed - to the present situation in Iran. (Historically, NIE–6 was designed as a supporting paper - for NSC 107.Document 6.) In our opinion it + to the present situation in Iran. (Historically, NIE–6 was designed as a supporting paper + for NSC 107.Document 6.) In our opinion it fails to come to grips with the essential question, which is whether the loss of Iran to USSR domination in the “cold war” would vitally affect the security of @@ -4169,8 +3893,7 @@ strong possibility.

3. It is difficult to quarrel with individual sentences or statements in NIE–6. However, we feel that there - are many sins of omission rather than commission and that the tone gives the impression that the situation is + are many sins of omission rather than commission and that the tone gives the impression that the situation is neither critical or remediable. We do not feel that conclusions 1 b and 1 c and 2 b and 2 c can be separated so distinctly but that the situation described in (b) of both paragraphs greatly increases the @@ -4179,18 +3902,15 @@ correct it implies that US interests would best be served by not aiding Iran. Admittedly no firm alignment of Iran with the United States can be assured by any program, but if the - loss of Iran is “vital to the security interests of the US in the cold war” every effort should be + loss of Iran is “vital to the security interests of the US in the cold war” every effort should be made to obtain the best alignment possible.

5. The statements in paragraph 8 relating to the strength of subversive elements in Iran, and the ability of the Iranian security forces to control those elements, seem over optimistic. Admittedly there is no - clear evidence that the government does not have control of the army and the gendarmérie. Also, there + clear evidence that the government does not have control of the army and the gendarmérie. Also, there is no conclusive evidence that the Tudeh Party has been able to penetrate the army and the security organizations to any considerable - degree. However, the death of Razmara has eliminated the one man who did have + degree. However, the death of Razmara has eliminated the one man who did have effective control of the security forces. The Tudeh Party remains the one secure organization in Iran, and we are without reliable estimates as to its strength and capability. OSO, @@ -4203,23 +3923,19 @@ effective interrogation as well as the manner of their escape would indicate possible Tudeh or Soviet penetration at high levels.

- Kermit - Roosevelt + Kermit + Roosevelt
-
+
11. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Dulles) to - Director of Central Intelligence SmithSource: + Director of Central Intelligence SmithSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, Iran 1951–1953. Top Secret. The undated attachment was apparently drafted in the Directorate of Plans. - Washington, March 28, 1951. + Washington, March 28, 1951. SUBJECT CIA’s Role in Iran @@ -4227,10 +3943,8 @@

1. I have reviewed the attached memorandumA list at the end of Dulles’ cover memorandum refers to two enclosures, TS 55559, attached and - printed, and TS 55558, which was not found. respecting CIA’s role in Iran and pass it on with - concurrence. I wish to stress, however, that the steps which CIA alone can take in this situation will + printed, and TS 55558, which was not found. respecting CIA’s role in Iran and pass it on with + concurrence. I wish to stress, however, that the steps which CIA alone can take in this situation will probably not substantially change the present downward trend and to be really effective should be combined with an over-all program in the economic, financial, and military fields. This would imply coordinated @@ -4249,8 +3963,7 @@ restricted in Iran owing primarily to the hampering effect of increased distrust of the West, including the US. The Iranians, alleging that US aid has - been wholly inadequate, remain unconvinced of the genuineness of US interest in Iran.

+ been wholly inadequate, remain unconvinced of the genuineness of US interest in Iran.

2. Under existing circumstances, and in the absence of a series of major overt US efforts in the political, economic, and military fields, CIA can @@ -4291,22 +4004,16 @@ would not be possible of accomplishment covertly without the pretext and cover which only a greatly increased overt program would provide.

CIA’S ROLE IN IRAN

-

1. In view of the seriousness of the Iranian situation, CIA is striving to do what it can to help +

1. In view of the seriousness of the Iranian situation, CIA is striving to do what it can to help reduce the possibility of the country’s falling into Soviet hands and to foster the establishment of an enduring pro-Western alignment. Existing - conditions are such, however, as to make all CIA operations exceptionally difficult and uncertain of + conditions are such, however, as to make all CIA operations exceptionally difficult and uncertain of outcome. Of the various circumscribing factors, the most serious is a - mounting distrust of the West, including the US, which makes it almost impossible to send additional + mounting distrust of the West, including the US, which makes it almost impossible to send additional covert agents into the country, restricts the movements and effectiveness of those already there, severely limits the number of - Iranians willing to cooperate with the US in clandestine operations, and makes the people in - general unreceptive, if not downright hostile, to US overtures. US policy has not succeeded in demonstrating to the + Iranians willing to cooperate with the US in clandestine operations, and makes the people in + general unreceptive, if not downright hostile, to US overtures. US policy has not succeeded in demonstrating to the Iranians that the US is genuinely interested in their country or in convincing them that their salvation lies in firm alignment with the West, and not in rapprochement with the @@ -4316,8 +4023,7 @@ US assistance to Iran is maintained at the present rate or at a rate which is not substantially more vigorous than at present. It is questionable whether the program - provided for in NSC 107Document 6. even if + provided for in NSC 107Document 6. even if fully and speedily executed would suffice to reverse the unfavorable trend. Under these circumstances, CIA can do little more than intensify its psychological-political warfare @@ -4350,8 +4056,7 @@ which is hardly possible under present conditions.

f. Gearing its collection machinery to provide increased intelligence needed in connection with these various activities. “Soft” targets - relatively easy to penetrate for information purposes include [1½ lines not declassified] (especially the + relatively easy to penetrate for information purposes include [1½ lines not declassified] (especially the following of Mulla Kashani), [1½ lines not declassified]. “Hard” targets requiring long-range operations to penetrate include the Tudeh Party, @@ -4370,13 +4075,11 @@ policy of all-out aid to Iran, both overt and covert, the prospect of preserving Iran during the cold war period could be immeasurably improved. Greater cover would be available, and the atmosphere might be - cleared for augmenting and expanding CIA operations, which could be more effective in support of + cleared for augmenting and expanding CIA operations, which could be more effective in support of a program directed positively toward promoting stability and active cooperation with the West instead of toward the negative objective of trying to prevent a bad situation from growing worse. Emphasis would be - placed on rehabilitating Iran and building up immunity to Soviet and Soviet-inspired subversion, + placed on rehabilitating Iran and building up immunity to Soviet and Soviet-inspired subversion, and plans could be more effectively laid for operations to be carried out if Soviet troops should invade and occupy Iran.

5. Under a US program of all-out aid, @@ -4390,15 +4093,13 @@ with which CIA could work and which would be extremely useful in helping to prevent hostile penetration of key government offices and in running operations against the Tudeh - Party, Soviet installations, and the USSR itself.

+ Party, Soviet installations, and the USSR itself.

b. Greater influence upon the Iranian press. Subsidization would be increased as needed; hostile publications could be forced out of business; and the direction of certain influential papers would, in effect, be completely taken over.

c. If possible, the establishment of a clandestine broadcasting station - in Iran. The station, purporting to be inside the USSR, would transmit black propaganda + in Iran. The station, purporting to be inside the USSR, would transmit black propaganda designed to discredit the USSR and Soviet Communism and aimed particularly at the Azerbaijani and other waverers. This station could be a powerful instrument in strengthening @@ -4421,45 +4122,33 @@

f. [1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]

-
+
12. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near - Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to Secretary of State AchesonSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/4–351. Top + Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to Secretary of State AchesonSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/4–351. Top Secret. Drafted by Gray and Rountree. - Washington, April 3, 1951. + Washington, April 3, 1951. SUBJECT The Iranian Situation -

With reference to my memorandum of March 14For the text of this memorandum, explaining the implications of +

With reference to my memorandum of March 14For the text of this memorandum, explaining the implications of Razmara’s assassination - for the escalating Anglo-Iranian oil dispute, see Foreign + for the escalating Anglo-Iranian oil dispute, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 9–11 (Document 5). outlining the Iranian situation, there follows a summary of more recent developments:

-

The high state of tension that developed as a result of Razmara’s assassination has continued. +

The high state of tension that developed as a result of Razmara’s assassination has continued. A few days after this murder, the former Minister of Education in Razmara’s Government was shot and later died, and rumors spread regarding further assassinations. Martial law in Tehran was declared by the Shah on March 20 for a period of two months and Parliament adjourned for the Iranian New Year holidays. More recently, plots were reportedly uncovered involving - planned attempts on the lives of the Shah, Prime Minister Ala and other offi-cials who were + planned attempts on the lives of the Shah, Prime Minister Ala and other offi-cials who were suspected of having moderate views regarding nationalization.

A succession of strikes broke out last week in Abadan and nearby - oilfields, the original cause being a reduction by AIOC of living allowances for its + oilfields, the original cause being a reduction by AIOC of living allowances for its workers. These strikes, which initially involved only a few employees, quickly expanded as a result of agitation by members of the illegal Communist Tudeh Party, posing as members of the National Front group @@ -4475,8 +4164,7 @@

Prime Minister Ala, in view of the seriousness of the situation, convened an emergency session of Parliament on April 2 but, in the absence of a quorum, the Parliament - was compelled to adjourn. Meanwhile, Ala’s position is + was compelled to adjourn. Meanwhile, Ala’s position is somewhat tenuous, as he has not yet received the customary vote of confidence and there is some question as to the legality of the declaration of martial law in the absence of a properly installed @@ -4496,8 +4184,7 @@ nationalization, it is felt that any precipitous action on the part of the British would bring about a very dangerous situation. We therefore requested the British to take no important steps without consulting us, - and the Foreign Office agreed. In light, however, of the AIOC decision to reduce allowances at + and the Foreign Office agreed. In light, however, of the AIOC decision to reduce allowances at this critical juncture and the subsequent report that elements of the British fleet had been sent to Abadan, the matter was again pursued with the Foreign Office in London. We were told that the Foreign Office did @@ -4515,14 +4202,9 @@ March 20, reported that the Foreign Office assured Ambassador Gifford of its willingness to consult with the U.S. “prior substantive action.” In - telegram 5142 from Tehran, March 30, however, Gifford reported that “ultimate + telegram 5142 from Tehran, March 30, however, Gifford reported that “ultimate action, if Brit lives endangered - by threatened seizure oil properties wld probably be to move Brit troops to Basra and take other mil precautions. FonOff recognizes risk in any + by threatened seizure oil properties wld probably be to move Brit troops to Basra and take other mil precautions. FonOff recognizes risk in any display of force and wld probably sanction it only as last resort. It is significant however that FonOff does not discount @@ -4531,9 +4213,7 @@ 1950–1954, 888.2553/3–2051.

Of great concern to us is the position of the British Government. There have been indications that it is considering a “strong” course in Iran - which, in our view, would be extremely dangerous. Mr. McGhee is now consulting with British officials in London, + which, in our view, would be extremely dangerous. Mr. McGhee is now consulting with British officials in London, and it is hoped that they will divulge their plan to him. Also, it is expected that conversations with a British delegation headed by Ambassador Franks will begin in @@ -4544,19 +4224,15 @@ basis which would take into account the Iranian demand for nationalization and would protect the legitimate interests of both parties.For documentation on discussions - with British Ambassador Franks on the issue of Iran, which took place on + with British Ambassador Franks on the issue of Iran, which took place on April 17 and 18, see Foreign Relations, - 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 30–42 (Documents 12 and 13).

+ 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 30–42 (Documents 12 and 13).

Regarding special United States measures in the present crisis, we are endeavoring to implement as rapidly as possible the various segments of existing aid programs, although it is generally felt that these cannot to a great extent be successful in quickly providing a significant impact upon Iranian public opinion. We are, therefore, considering - extraordinary measures and have also asked for Ambassador Grady’s urgent views concerning the + extraordinary measures and have also asked for Ambassador Grady’s urgent views concerning the most effective utilization of special funds which might be obtained for this purpose.Telegram 1698 to Tehran, March 28; ibid., pp. 28–30 (Document @@ -4569,12 +4245,8 @@ departing for Tehran to help carry out this phase.

-
- 13. National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79R01012A, Box 2, +
+ 13. National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79R01012A, Box 2, Folder 5, NIE–6: Iran. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the @@ -4586,29 +4258,23 @@ NIE–6 - Washington, April 5, 1951. + Washington, April 5, 1951.

IRAN’S POSITION IN THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT

The Problem

To estimate the position of Iran in the East-West conflict.The importance of Iranian oil - to Western Europe, and by implication to the US, has been assessed in NIE–14, The Importance of Iranian and + to Western Europe, and by implication to the US, has been assessed in NIE–14, The Importance of Iranian and Middle East Oil to Western Europe Under Peacetime Conditions. The military effect of the loss of Iran on the defensibility of the rest of the Middle East and its psychological - effect on countries of the Near East will be discussed in NIE–26, Key Problems - in the Near and Middle East Affecting US Security Interests. [Footnote is in the + effect on countries of the Near East will be discussed in NIE–26, Key Problems + in the Near and Middle East Affecting US Security Interests. [Footnote is in the original.]

Conclusions

1. US security interests in Iran have during the past six months been progressively undermined by political and economic developments that have: (a) weakened the present regime; - (b) induced the government to adopt policies favorable to the USSR (and hence unfavorable to the West); + (b) induced the government to adopt policies favorable to the USSR (and hence unfavorable to the West); and (c) increased the influence of ultranationalist elements, which have already compelled the government to adopt policies unfavorable to the West and may force the adoption of additional measures against Western @@ -4635,8 +4301,7 @@ imminent, the USSR is unlikely under present conditions to take the risk of international complications involved in overt military action in Iran. The Kremlin must estimate - that there would be at least an even chance that the US would oppose any overt military action + that there would be at least an even chance that the US would oppose any overt military action by the USSR in Iran.

b. The Iranian Government probably will impose further restrictions on Western interests, but is unlikely to eliminate @@ -4664,8 +4329,7 @@ economic stability. Such assistance would have to be regarded as a long range, continuing investment. It could not be expected to result in a firm or permanent alignment of Iran with the West, or increase - significantly Iran’s small defensive capability against the USSR.

+ significantly Iran’s small defensive capability against the USSR.

Discussion

Iran’s Present Position

1. Iran’s strongest existing connections are with the West. Iran is @@ -4675,14 +4339,11 @@ Company alone accounts for an estimated 6 to 8 percent of Iran’s national income, provides approximately a quarter of the Iranian Treasury’s total receipts, and contributes materially to Iran’s foreign - exchange through purchase of rials for local use. Most Iranians are better disposed toward the West + exchange through purchase of rials for local use. Most Iranians are better disposed toward the West than toward the USSR. The Iranian Government is a recipient of US military assistance and has US military advisers - for its army and gendarmérie. It has consistently supported the US in the UN.

+ for its army and gendarmérie. It has consistently supported the US in the UN.

2. This relationship with the West, however, is seriously threatened. Iran is extremely vulnerable to Soviet attack. In addition, the country’s political, economic, and social instability exposes it to @@ -4718,8 +4379,7 @@ Iran’s ability to resist subversion will decline, and that consequently the advantages of an early attack on Iran would be incommensurate with the risk of international complications involved. The Kremlin must - estimate that there would be at least an even chance that the US would oppose any overt military action + estimate that there would be at least an even chance that the US would oppose any overt military action by the USSR in Iran. If, however, the British were to send their armed forces into Iran to protect their nationals in the oil well area, the Soviets might take action based on @@ -4772,8 +4432,7 @@ despite its grumbling, remains politically apathetic. Nevertheless, there is a growing feeling of insecurity and dissatisfaction, notably among students, white collar workers, and industrial laborers. This - feeling can find expression only through extremist movements. The USSR has worked assiduously to exploit + feeling can find expression only through extremist movements. The USSR has worked assiduously to exploit popular insecurity and dissatisfaction in Iran, not only through its support of the subversive Tudeh Party but also through special efforts to revive the separatist @@ -4786,11 +4445,9 @@ large organized group; there are only a handful of National Front deputies in Parliament. Nevertheless, the popular appeal of their nationalist agitation and the violence of their terrorist fringe has - enabled them to exercise, both before and after Premier Razmara’s assassination, an influence + enabled them to exercise, both before and after Premier Razmara’s assassination, an influence out of all proportion to their numerical strength.

-

7. The assassination of Premier Razmara by a religious fanatic on 7 March and the +

7. The assassination of Premier Razmara by a religious fanatic on 7 March and the subsequent threat of terrorism have increased Iran’s internal tensions and provided new opportunities for factional conflict and subversion. Although Razmara failed to gain @@ -4812,8 +4469,7 @@ relief from hardship is not provided. At present, however, the government retains control over the army and gendarmérie, and so long as it continues to do so the pro-Soviet forces will probably not be able to - gain power without actual armed intervention by the USSR. Martial law is now in effect in + gain power without actual armed intervention by the USSR. Martial law is now in effect in Terhan and the oil area.

a. The Communist-dominated Tudeh Party, though it has apparently succeeded in building up a unified underground @@ -4837,8 +4493,7 @@ their landlords, the people of these provinces would generally oppose the return of the Russians or their Iranian disciples.

c. Although there have been periodic reports of an - imminent Kurdish revolt, there is no firm evidence that the USSR has succeeded in transforming + imminent Kurdish revolt, there is no firm evidence that the USSR has succeeded in transforming traditional Kurdish hatred of the authorities into an active revolutionary spirit and in securing the cooperation of the Kurdish tribes. Even if the Kurds did revolt, they would probably be ineffective @@ -4870,8 +4525,7 @@ Progress would undoubtedly continue to be hampered by Iranian lack of skill, by graft and political maneuvering, by resistance to change by both the vested interests and the population at large, and by lack of - perseverance. There is a real danger that Western advisers, as in the past, will either become + perseverance. There is a real danger that Western advisers, as in the past, will either become overwhelmed by the complexities of the situation or, by their zealousness, incur the opposition of the Iranians. Nevertheless, Western aid and guidance, if accepted by the Iranians, would contribute to the @@ -4880,16 +4534,14 @@

11. Iran’s foreign policy is currently unsettled. Between the end of World War II and mid-1950 the Iranian Government moved closer to the West, in part because of its desire for economic assistance, but mainly - because of the menacing attitude of the USSR. The USSR attempted + because of the menacing attitude of the USSR. The USSR attempted unsuccessfully to discourage Iranian association with the West by frontier incidents, threatening notes, and propaganda utterances accusing Iran of allowing the US to organize bases for aggression on its soil and reminding the Iranians of the USSR’s “right” to move in against such bases under the 1921 Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Friendship. The - Iranian Government made repeated pleas for US economic and military support, and the Shah and the late + Iranian Government made repeated pleas for US economic and military support, and the Shah and the late Premier Razmara (then Chief of Staff) asserted that Iran was committed to the West. Nevertheless, Iran has retained a basic preference for isolation and neutrality and a @@ -4899,8 +4551,7 @@ to prevent any one power from gaining a dominant influence. These sentiments have been reinforced by resentment of past Anglo-Russian interference in Iranian affairs. The Russian Communists are generally - hated and feared like their Czarist predecessors. The UK, though no longer generally feared, has + hated and feared like their Czarist predecessors. The UK, though no longer generally feared, has remained an object of widespread mistrust and—through its interest in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the once Iranian-controlled island of Bahrein—a favorite target of Iranian xenophobia. Within recent months @@ -4918,16 +4569,14 @@ increased its dealings with the USSR, notably through conclusion of a trade agreement. The trend toward nationalism and neutrality, earlier manifested in the cancellation of - VOA and BBC rebroadcast facilities, restriction of travel by + VOA and BBC rebroadcast facilities, restriction of travel by foreign nationals in Iran, and obstinate bargaining over the terms of the pending $25 million Export-Import Bank loan, has now culminated in overwhelming approval by both houses of Parliament of a resolution for nationalization of the oil industry.

12. It is unlikely that the present movement away from the West would - lead Iran to align itself with the USSR. The vehemence of current feeling against the British + lead Iran to align itself with the USSR. The vehemence of current feeling against the British is a manifestation of Iran’s basic resentment of foreign influence rather than an expression of pro-Soviet sentiment; the number of Iranians who actively support the USSR @@ -4939,12 +4588,10 @@ alignment of Iran with the USSR. The great majority of Iranians, and particularly the present regime, are unlikely to be won over by a friendly Soviet policy even if such a - policy were long continued. The favorable impression which the USSR created by its recent actions has + policy were long continued. The favorable impression which the USSR created by its recent actions has already begun to wear off, in view of the limited usefulness of the trade pact, the failure of the Soviet-Iranian border commission to - produce concrete results, and the USSR’s continuing role as a hard bargainer on such matters as + produce concrete results, and the USSR’s continuing role as a hard bargainer on such matters as Iran’s gold claims.

13. It is also unlikely that Iran will completely eliminate Western interests. Although the small group of ultra-nationalist deputies in @@ -4961,24 +4608,19 @@ opposition of many members of the ruling class.

14. There is little doubt, however, that Iran has embarked on a course involving a loosening of its connections with the West and a guarded - extension of its dealings with the USSR. Although the British may be able to patch up their + extension of its dealings with the USSR. Although the British may be able to patch up their relations with Iran on the oil question, ultimate expropriation of the oil company has at least been brought closer, and the curtailment of the - few other commercial advantages which the UK still enjoys in Iran will undoubtedly continue. The Shah + few other commercial advantages which the UK still enjoys in Iran will undoubtedly continue. The Shah and some other leaders will probably continue to try to obtain Western economic and military aid, but Parliament’s willingness to accept such aid is far from certain. In any event, the Iranian Government can be expected to insist that US help be provided on Iranian terms, to refuse any overt commitment to the West, - and perhaps to waver in its support of the US in the UN. Although the - Iranian Government will probably not cancel the US + and perhaps to waver in its support of the US in the UN. Although the + Iranian Government will probably not cancel the US military missions, it may well further curtail the freedom of action of - mission officers and other US and UK officials. Meanwhile, Iran will probably + mission officers and other US and UK officials. Meanwhile, Iran will probably be willing to develop additional commercial and cultural ties with the USSR, though it will attempt to control the extension of Soviet influence. Iran would probably not go so @@ -4987,8 +4629,7 @@ company.

15. In the event of war, Iran’s policy would probably be as follows:

a. If Iran were attacked, the Iranians would offer - some resistance, meanwhile calling for US and UN aid.

+ some resistance, meanwhile calling for US and UN aid.

b. If an isolated Soviet or Satellite attack took place against some other country, Iran would remain neutral or, at most, support the UN without contributing @@ -5006,8 +4647,7 @@ on the oil issue is a prerequisite to improvement of Iran’s relations with the West. An expanded US economic assistance program would tend to strengthen the position of those who - have looked to the West for help. A more explicit US pledge of military support, either + have looked to the West for help. A more explicit US pledge of military support, either unilaterally or through a US-backed regional security organization, might quiet the present fears of the Shah concerning the remoteness of Western support. The assassination of @@ -5018,8 +4658,7 @@ rendered questionable by Iran’s underlying dislike and fear of foreign influence and by its awareness of its extreme vulnerability to Soviet attack. Most Iranian opinion would probably remain skeptical about the - degree, permanency, and unselfishness of US interest in strengthening the country. Even given a more + degree, permanency, and unselfishness of US interest in strengthening the country. Even given a more favorable attitude toward the US, most influential Iranians would probably oppose any attempt to align Iran firmly with the West on the ground that such an arrangement would be @@ -5028,26 +4667,18 @@ respect to the great powers.

-
+
14. Memorandum From the Chief of the Political Operations Staff, Near East and Africa Division ([name not declassified]) to the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, - Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 80–01795R, Box 4, - Folder 8, Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) History 1Apr1951–15Apr1951. Top + Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 80–01795R, Box 4, + Folder 8, Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) History 1Apr1951–15Apr1951. Top Secret. - Washington, April 11, 1951. + Washington, April 11, 1951. SUBJECT NSC 107, The - Position of the United States with Respect to IranDocument + Position of the United States with Respect to IranDocument 6.

1. On 24 March the President approved and directed the implementation of @@ -5062,35 +4693,29 @@ event the Iranian Government should take steps leading toward communist control in Iran, the United States should be prepared to undertake “special political operations” to reverse the trend and effect Iranian - alignment with the free world. The quoted term is used in NSC documents to indicate OPC-type operations.

+ alignment with the free world. The quoted term is used in NSC documents to indicate OPC-type operations.

3. Other sections of NSC 107 call for measures to be taken by the United States which may well be supported by OPC-type activities.

4. NSC 107 should be taken into account in the current preparation of your strategic plan for Iran.

- [name not declassified] + [name not declassified]
-
+
15. Memorandum From the Chief of the Plans Staff, Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans ([name not declassified]) to the Acting Chief of the Policy, Plans and Review Section, Office of Policy Coordination, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency ([name not declassified])Source: - Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 80–01795R, Box 4, Folder 8, Office of + Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 80–01795R, Box 4, Folder 8, Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) History 1Apr1951–15Apr1951. Top Secret. Drafted and signed by the Chief of the Plans Staff. - Washington, April 12, 1951. + Washington, April 12, 1951. SUBJECT Comments on your memorandum, “The Limitations of Diplomacy,” dated @@ -5124,13 +4749,10 @@ painted by Soviet propaganda. Our purpose is not to threaten the present regime (it is in our interest to preserve that) but to encourage it, by introducing progressive elements into the government, to enact reforms - and withstand Soviet pressures. These measures cannot prevent the USSR from forcibly taking over Iran at - will, but they can, if accompanied by a strong overt US policy, help shore up Iran against + and withstand Soviet pressures. These measures cannot prevent the USSR from forcibly taking over Iran at + will, but they can, if accompanied by a strong overt US policy, help shore up Iran against subversion, disaffection, defection, and revolution—developments which - might in turn lead to rapprochement with or surrender to the USSR.

+ might in turn lead to rapprochement with or surrender to the USSR.

3. We are even investigating the feasibility of establishing a local or “Titoist” Communist Party as a possible means of splitting and therefore weakening the Soviet Communist movement in Iran. This is obviously a @@ -5142,22 +4764,17 @@ excellent memorandum. I should be happy to discuss this with you further.

- [name not declassified] + [name not declassified]
-
+
16. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of the Office of National Estimates (Langer) to Director - of Central Intelligence SmithSource: + of Central Intelligence SmithSource: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC - Files, Job 79R00904A, Box 1, Folder 2, Memos for DCI (1951) (Substantive). Secret. + Files, Job 79R00904A, Box 1, Folder 2, Memos for DCI (1951) (Substantive). Secret. There is no drafting information on the memorandum. - Washington, April 20, 1951. + Washington, April 20, 1951. SUBJECT Situation in Iran @@ -5166,8 +4783,7 @@ strikes and violence, the Abadan refinery has been closed down, and production and shipping operations have been restricted. Crude oil exports have been reduced by 20 percent, and the export of refined - products will cease within a few days. Petroleum experts are at variance on the time that must elapse + products will cease within a few days. Petroleum experts are at variance on the time that must elapse between the settlement of the strike and the resumption of full production of refined products.Ambassador Grady has reported that @@ -5184,16 +4800,13 @@ At least 20,000 workers are now idle, and anti-British feeling is running high. Tudeh and National Front agents are active in the area and can be expected to continue to foment demonstrations and violence.

-

If further trouble occurs, there is a possibility that the UK might send troops to southern Iran. - UK Foreign Minister Morrison has stated that he would not +

If further trouble occurs, there is a possibility that the UK might send troops to southern Iran. + UK Foreign Minister Morrison has stated that he would not hesitate “to take appropriate action” to safeguard British lives and property. Two British frigates are standing by at Kuwait, another is at Bahrein, and a cruiser is on its way to the Persian Gulf from Aden. Should any British forces be landed in southern Iran, not only would - Anglo-Iranian relations be further embittered but the USSR would be given a pretext under the + Anglo-Iranian relations be further embittered but the USSR would be given a pretext under the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921 to occupy parts of northern Iran.

A further serious danger is that the combination of Tudeh leadership and deep-seated unrest which has produced the crisis in southern Iran might @@ -5219,28 +4832,21 @@ (d) suppression of free speech and assembly.

There are several indications that the Shah is seriously considering the - adoption of such a drastic course of action, in which event Ala would probably be replaced by + adoption of such a drastic course of action, in which event Ala would probably be replaced by Qavam or Seyyid Zia, the only leaders believed capable of carrying out a “strong” program. Seyyid Zia, in spite of his pro-British reputation, is generally estimated to be the most likely candidate for such a role at the present time.

- William L. - Langer + William L. + Langer
-
+
17. Memorandum by the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, - Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, + Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, Iran 1951–1953. Secret. - Washington, April 23, 1951. + Washington, April 23, 1951.

The Tehran station submits the following estimate of the situation in Iran as of 18 April 1951 for the purpose of operational planning.

The position of the Ala Cabinet is @@ -5254,28 +4860,21 @@ appointed Minister of Interior, have been included in the Cabinet. Ala, however, is receiving only limited active support from the Shah and others and is facing - opposition from Seyyid Zia and his British supporters and from Qavam. Nevertheless Ala may be able to retain the + opposition from Seyyid Zia and his British supporters and from Qavam. Nevertheless Ala may be able to retain the premiership and, if so, he plans to take stronger measures against the - extremists. Most observers, however, believe Ala will be replaced by Seyyid Zia, a move which the - station feels would probably occur only with Ala’s full approval as being in the best interests of + extremists. Most observers, however, believe Ala will be replaced by Seyyid Zia, a move which the + station feels would probably occur only with Ala’s full approval as being in the best interests of Iran.In the margin next to this sentence - is a handwritten note, apparently written by Wisner, that reads: “‘Most + is a handwritten note, apparently written by Wisner, that reads: “‘Most observers have been influenced by British propaganda, I think!” If Seyyid Zia becomes Prime Minister, he would apparently inaugurate a strong man type of government. It is believed that the Shah would order dissolution of the Majlis after Seyyid Zia obtained a vote of confidence, call for new elections and support Seyyid - Zia in governing by decree and forcefully suppressing opposition. Although Seyyid Zia claims + Zia in governing by decree and forcefully suppressing opposition. Although Seyyid Zia claims privately that he will demonstrate by his actions that he is no longer under British control, the station comments that unless he can convince - Iranians he does not support British policy, the US would come in for sharp Iranian resentment if it + Iranians he does not support British policy, the US would come in for sharp Iranian resentment if it supported him. Iranian antagonism toward the British is deep-seated and widespread and, according to the station, all its information indicates that nationalization of oil is inevitable. Furthermore, since Seyyid @@ -5288,34 +4887,22 @@ been no disturbances since 15 April, the strike is no nearer settlement. Abadan security forces are not attempting to prevent picketing or arrest agitators but they are prepared, presumably, to halt any sizeable riots. - The workers have been publicly urged by Kashani to refrain from strikes and disturbances. The + The workers have been publicly urged by Kashani to refrain from strikes and disturbances. The refinery is reportedly working 25% of normal.

-

In Isfahan order has reportedly been restored by [but] the government has yet to settle the problems of the +

In Isfahan order has reportedly been restored by [but] the government has yet to settle the problems of the textile industry.

- KRPrinted from a copy that bears Roosevelt’s typed initials. + KRPrinted from a copy that bears Roosevelt’s typed initials.
-
+
18. Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, Directorate of Plans (Wisner) to - the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Dulles)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 80–01795R, Box 4, - Folder 9, Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) History, 16Apr1951–30Apr1951. Top Secret; - Sensitive. Drafted by Roosevelt. - Washington, April 23, 1951. + the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Dulles)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 80–01795R, Box 4, + Folder 9, Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) History, 16Apr1951–30Apr1951. Top Secret; + Sensitive. Drafted by Roosevelt. + Washington, April 23, 1951. SUBJECT Special Iranian Program @@ -5328,31 +4915,24 @@ our Ambassador.

2. The OPC “task force” now in Tehran has cabled stating that the Ambassador agrees that the time is now ripe - for action and has authorized an independent OPC approach to Ala + for action and has authorized an independent OPC approach to Ala with an offer of [dollar amount not declassified] to be used entirely at his discretion. Speedy action is urged in view of the severe test which the Prime Minister will face this week when he presents his Finance Bill.

3. Steps are being taken to obtain final policy approval from Deputy Under Secretary Matthews and to - consider the desirability of coordinating our approach to Ala with that which Ambassador + consider the desirability of coordinating our approach to Ala with that which Ambassador Grady should shortly be - authorized to take presenting an official US aid program.

-

4. We propose that the initial payment should be [dollar amount not declassified]. Before approaching Ala + authorized to take presenting an official US aid program.

+

4. We propose that the initial payment should be [dollar amount not declassified]. Before approaching Ala OPC Tehran would like assurance that the full sum will be authorized and that the first installment will reach them as soon as possible.

5. It is therefore requested that you authorize the immediate disbursement of [dollar amount not declassified] - and the additional expenditure, if results warrant, of [dollar amount not declassified] during the fiscal - year 1952.No response from Dulles was found.

+ and the additional expenditure, if results warrant, of [dollar amount not declassified] during the fiscal + year 1952.No response from Dulles was found.

6. This operation obviously requires special security measures, and will be handled on “Eyes Only” basis among those who need to know of it. In view of Ala’s elevated position @@ -5360,33 +4940,27 @@ propose to request no receipt from him, nor any detailed accounting for the expenditure of the funds.

- Frank G. - WisnerPrinted from a copy + Frank G. + WisnerPrinted from a copy with this typed signature.
-
+
19. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, OCI Files, Job 91T01172R, Box 3, Folder 29. Top Secret; ACORN. - Washington, April 30, 1951. + Washington, April 30, 1951. SUBJECT The Soviet Attitude toward the Situation in Iran since the - Assassination of Razmara + Assassination of Razmara -

1. The situation in Iran since the assassination of Premier Razmara on 7 March has presented the +

1. The situation in Iran since the assassination of Premier Razmara on 7 March has presented the Soviet Union with favorable opportunities to increase its influence and gain ultimate control over the country. The ostensible show of - non-intervention in the situation on the part of the USSR calls for a comprehensive review of + non-intervention in the situation on the part of the USSR calls for a comprehensive review of recent Soviet diplomatic moves, current propaganda, activity along the Soviet-Iranian border, and the tactics of the outlawed pro-Soviet Tudeh Party. The possibility of future Soviet intervention under the terms of @@ -5397,8 +4971,7 @@ the government’s problems connected with oil nationalization, internal unrest, and relations with the British. There is no evidence that the Soviet Ambassador in Iran has put any pressure on the Iranian - Government. In corroboration of this, Premier Ala told the French Ambassador in late + Government. In corroboration of this, Premier Ala told the French Ambassador in late March that there had been no Soviet pressure on him. The Soviet Union seems aware that for the time being any ill-timed Soviet diplomatic pressure or demands for oil rights might cause these advantages to be @@ -5412,16 +4985,12 @@ has refrained from commenting editorially on actions taken by the Iranian Government or speculating on future developments. Soviet press and propaganda have avoided any hint of unfriendliness towards the - government or comment on its instability. Since Razmara’s assassination this - propaganda has concentrated on US–UK rivalry for Iranian oil and US–UK + government or comment on its instability. Since Razmara’s assassination this + propaganda has concentrated on US–UK rivalry for Iranian oil and US–UK exploitation of Iran. The Communists’ “clandestine” “Free Azerbaijan” radio in Baku, on the other hand, has adhered to its previous policy of attacking the Shah, Premier Ala, - and the Majlis as pawns of US–UK imperialism and betrayers of the Iranian + and the Majlis as pawns of US–UK imperialism and betrayers of the Iranian people.

4. While the Soviet Union is believed capable of invading Iran successfully without prior warning, there has been no indication that @@ -5432,22 +5001,19 @@ and some additional military activities since late February. These are probably connected with the annual Soviet maneuvers in this area, which began earlier than usual this year. Reports that dissident elements - (exiled Azerbaijani Democrats and Barzani Kurds) are on the frontier ready to invade Iran + (exiled Azerbaijani Democrats and Barzani Kurds) are on the frontier ready to invade Iran have appeared, as is common during periods of tribal migrations and regular maneuvers. No reports of any Soviet activity on the Khorassan sector of the border east of the Caspian Sea have been received. Soviet military maneuvers on this section of the frontier generally begin later than those on the Azerbaijan border.

-

5. Communist policy in Iran since Razmara’s assassination has been aimed at inciting +

5. Communist policy in Iran since Razmara’s assassination has been aimed at inciting further agitation on the oil issue while keeping Communist connections with the disturbances on a covert level. Although there is no firm evidence of pro-Soviet Tudeh Party involvement in the current disturbances, press reports and Iranian officials commonly blame the Tudeh Party. The Tudeh is said to be behind the “Organization for the - Expropriation of the Anglo Iranian Oil Company” (AIOC), which, with the National Front + Expropriation of the Anglo Iranian Oil Company” (AIOC), which, with the National Front (the ultra-nationalist faction in Parliament), has spearheaded the movement to nationalize Iran’s oil. The Tudeh, according to Iranian intelligence reports, is also behind the organization of the @@ -5466,38 +5032,31 @@ conferring with Satellite officials in Tehran on 16 April, reportedly stated that it was hardly likely that the Soviets would intervene in Iran if British troops landed to maintain law and order in the south. He - added that any Soviet action would depend on the duration of the UK action and that furthermore the treaty’s - terms would require an appeal to the USSR from the Tehran government. His delineation of Soviet + added that any Soviet action would depend on the duration of the UK action and that furthermore the treaty’s + terms would require an appeal to the USSR from the Tehran government. His delineation of Soviet intentions may have been an effort to encourage a more forceful British policy towards Iran. While the USSR undoubtedly realizes that British military forces are unlikely to occupy the oil area, any Communist-inspired agitation in the oil fields during - the strike was presumably aimed at provoking the UK. Should Communist-Nationalist agitation tactics bring on + the strike was presumably aimed at provoking the UK. Should Communist-Nationalist agitation tactics bring on new disturbances in the oil area, British intervention would intensify unrest and hatred of the UK to the USSR’s advantage. On 26 April, a Moscow commentary alleged British concentration of armed forces in the vicinity of southern Iran and for the first time charged the British with the intention of “interfering actively in internal affairs should - occasion arise.” Repeated emphasis on the possibility of UK intervention could be viewed as an + occasion arise.” Repeated emphasis on the possibility of UK intervention could be viewed as an unspoken threat of Soviet intervention under the terms of the 1921 treaty.

-
+
20. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 79T00937A, Box 1, Folder 1, Staff Memoranda—1951. Secret. There is no drafting information on the memorandum. - Washington, May 1, 1951. + Washington, May 1, 1951.

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION NO. 67

FOR @@ -5507,8 +5066,7 @@ SUBJECT Iranian Developments -

1. The elevation of Mohammad Mossadeq, the leader of the ultra-nationalist National +

1. The elevation of Mohammad Mossadeq, the leader of the ultra-nationalist National Front Party, to the premiership constitutes a radical departure in Iran’s political development. Political activity in Iran has generally consisted in the struggle for power among a small group of men of the @@ -5524,50 +5082,36 @@ of the general appeal of his constant demand that all foreign influence be eliminated from Iran. He has the support not only of his National Front Party but also of the Fadayan Islam, a small terrorist group of - religious fanatics, the Tudeh Party (as long as Mossadeq’s chauvinism is directed + religious fanatics, the Tudeh Party (as long as Mossadeq’s chauvinism is directed against the Western Powers), and probably the great majority of Iran’s peasants, laborers, and tradesmen, who, though politically inert, can significantly affect political developments in Tehran through strikes, demonstrations, and violence.

3. Because of the intensity of Iranian chauvinism, few Iranian leaders dare to oppose Mossadeq publicly. - It is for this reason that Mossadeq has exerted such a decisive influence over + It is for this reason that Mossadeq has exerted such a decisive influence over Iranian developments during the past year. He has blocked the negotiation of US loan and the conclusion of a revised AIOC - agreement. He condoned the assassination of Razmara on the grounds that the latter was being too + agreement. He condoned the assassination of Razmara on the grounds that the latter was being too lenient with the British. Finally he pushed the oil nationalization oil bill through the Majlis, probably against the better judgment of most of the deputies, who, however, succumbed to patriotic fervor or feared the consequences (including assassination) of opposing the measure.

4. During the six weeks when Hussein - Ala was Prime Minister, Mossadeq was chairman of the Majlis Oil Commission - appointed to draw up recommendations for taking over the AIOC installations. The Shah, Ala, and moderate members of the Majlis - probably hoped that some agreement could be patched up with the AIOC before Mossadeq could complete his work. Mossadeq, however, reported to Majlis + Ala was Prime Minister, Mossadeq was chairman of the Majlis Oil Commission + appointed to draw up recommendations for taking over the AIOC installations. The Shah, Ala, and moderate members of the Majlis + probably hoped that some agreement could be patched up with the AIOC before Mossadeq could complete his work. Mossadeq, however, reported to Majlis more than a month ahead of schedule. Increased bitterness toward the UK resulting from the intervening strikes and violence in the oil field area kept emotions high throughout - the country and simplified Mossadeq’s job in obtaining prompt Majlis approval for + the country and simplified Mossadeq’s job in obtaining prompt Majlis approval for his recommendations. The new law sets up a government committee of twelve to take over oil installations and provides for setting aside 25 percent of oil revenues to meet future claims of the “former company.” - The Majlis action resulted in the immediate resignation of Ala, and, on the recommendation of both - the Majlis and the Senate, the Shah asked Mossadeq to form a new government.Prime Minister Ala resigned on April 27. Two days later, the Shah + The Majlis action resulted in the immediate resignation of Ala, and, on the recommendation of both + the Majlis and the Senate, the Shah asked Mossadeq to form a new government.Prime Minister Ala resigned on April 27. Two days later, the Shah asked Mosadeq to form a new government.

5. Although the responsibilities of office may to some extent act as a @@ -5576,8 +5120,7 @@

a. Full implementation of the nationalization law and effective Iranian Government control of the oil installations in southern Iran. It is possible that, if the UK accepted - nationalization in principle, Mossadeq might be willing to conclude a management + nationalization in principle, Mossadeq might be willing to conclude a management contract with AIOC, under which the latter would operate the oil installations under the direction of an Iranian Government agency. If the UK and @@ -5588,17 +5131,14 @@ to obtain foreign technicians through individual contracts to restart production.

b. The elimination of other manifestations of foreign influence in Iran. - It is extremely unlikely that Mossadeq would accept international loans from the + It is extremely unlikely that Mossadeq would accept international loans from the Export-Import Bank or IBRD. He might even refuse to accept further US military aid and request the US Military Missions to leave the country.

-

6. In pursuit of these objectives, Mossadeq will probably adopt a lenient attitude toward +

6. In pursuit of these objectives, Mossadeq will probably adopt a lenient attitude toward manifestations of nationalist fervor, even if indulged in by members of - the Tudeh Party. He has consistently opposed martial law and restrictions on speech, assembly, + the Tudeh Party. He has consistently opposed martial law and restrictions on speech, assembly, and the press. There is a danger that the Tudeh Party may attempt to take advantage of Mossadeq’s leniency in this respect to foment violence and disturbances throughout @@ -5607,11 +5147,9 @@ legalizing their status. In the long run, however, the National Front and Tudeh will almost certainly clash, for their fundamental aims are diametrically opposed.

-

7. The most significant aspect of Mossadeq’s advent to power is that the more moderate +

7. The most significant aspect of Mossadeq’s advent to power is that the more moderate elements in Iran’s governing class appear to have lost control of the - situation. Many deputies in the Majlis supported Mossadeq for Prime Minister in the hope + situation. Many deputies in the Majlis supported Mossadeq for Prime Minister in the hope that the oil crisis, for which he is largely responsible, would result in his own downfall. In view of his strong popular backing, however, he will not be easily displaced. If he obtains increased revenues from @@ -5624,43 +5162,29 @@

a. UK occupation of the oil installations; and

b. the establishment under the aegis of the Shah of a semi-dictatorial - regime willing to negotiate a new agreement with AIOC on the latter’s terms. The first - alternative would probably result from the refusal of the AIOC, presumably backed by the UK Government, to negotiate on Mossadeq’s terms. The second + regime willing to negotiate a new agreement with AIOC on the latter’s terms. The first + alternative would probably result from the refusal of the AIOC, presumably backed by the UK Government, to negotiate on Mossadeq’s terms. The second alternative would result from the opposition of Iran’s vested interests, - including the Shah, to the growing power of Mossadeq. The likelihood of either alternative occurring + including the Shah, to the growing power of Mossadeq. The likelihood of either alternative occurring would be increased very greatly by widespread violence and - demonstrations. The stability of Mossadeq’s regime will, therefore, depend to a large + demonstrations. The stability of Mossadeq’s regime will, therefore, depend to a large extent on his relations with the Tudeh Party.

-
- 21. Progress Report Prepared for the National Security CouncilSource: National Archives, +
+ 21. Progress Report Prepared for the National Security CouncilSource: National Archives, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Minutes 1947–1961, Box 13, 91st Meeting. - Top Secret. The report was sent by memorandum from Webb to Lay. - Washington, May 2, 1951. + Top Secret. The report was sent by memorandum from Webb to Lay. + Washington, May 2, 1951. SUBJECT First Progress Report on NSC 107, - “The Position of the United States with Respect to Iran”Pursuant to NSC + “The Position of the United States with Respect to Iran”Pursuant to NSC Action No. 454e. [Footnote is in the original.] -

NSC 107Document 6. was approved as +

NSC 107Document 6. was approved as Governmental policy on March 14. It is requested that this Progress Report, as of April 24 be circulated to the members of the Council for their information.

@@ -5671,16 +5195,13 @@ Prime Minister Razmara by a religious fanatic was followed immediately by the vote of the Parliament in favor of nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the - assassination of one of Razmara’s cabinet ministers, widespread demonstrations and + assassination of one of Razmara’s cabinet ministers, widespread demonstrations and disorders, and by a serious and crippling strike in the southern oil fields and the Abadan refinery. The Communist (Tudeh) Party is exploiting the situation, particularly the oil strikes, to the utmost. While much of what has appeared in the American press has been exaggerated, the situation in Iran is very serious.

-

The Iranian Government, headed by Prime Minister Hossein Ala, appointed to succeed Razmara, has acted throughout the +

The Iranian Government, headed by Prime Minister Hossein Ala, appointed to succeed Razmara, has acted throughout the crisis with commendable firmness. At the time of his appointment, Prime Minister Ala was looked upon both in Iran and abroad as an honest and patriotic man but weak. In the six @@ -5695,14 +5216,11 @@ operation for this and possibly other ailments.

Action Taken

-

In line with the policy statement contained in NSC 107, the United States has:

-

1. Informed the Shah and Prime Minister Ala that they have the full support of the United States +

In line with the policy statement contained in NSC 107, the United States has:

+

1. Informed the Shah and Prime Minister Ala that they have the full support of the United States Government.

2. Urged the British Government to take similar action.

-

3. Inaugurated special political measures as provided for in NSC 107.

+

3. Inaugurated special political measures as provided for in NSC 107.

4. Cautioned the British Government against taking any “strong” measures such as manipulation into office of a dictatorial Prime Minister who would attempt to nullify the popular nationalization resolution, or the @@ -5735,8 +5253,7 @@ making the Iranians an offer of an equal share of the Company’s profits and immediate steps to include Iranians in the direction of the Company. The Company would, under this proposal, become progressively “Iranized” - until, upon the end of the concession in 1993, it would be totally Iranian. The United States + until, upon the end of the concession in 1993, it would be totally Iranian. The United States representatives took the position that this offer would be totally unacceptable to the Iranians and that the United States could not therefore support it.

@@ -5774,45 +5291,37 @@

The period under review saw Iran in ferment and a most delicate situation was created. The situation however, as of the date of this report, was not as serious as most press reports had pictured and prompt and - vigorous implementation of the policies set forth in NSC 107 offer the United States the best + vigorous implementation of the policies set forth in NSC 107 offer the United States the best hope of stabilizing the situation and strengthening Iran’s alignment with the free world.

- James E. - WebbPrinted from a copy + James E. + WebbPrinted from a copy that bears Webb’s typed signature with an indication he signed the original.
-
+
22. Telegram From the Station in Iran to the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, Iran 1951–1953. Top Secret. - Tehran, May 3, 1951. -

TEHE 121. Re: TEHE 079 (IN 36119). Part One.

+ Tehran, May 3, 1951. +

TEHE 121. Re: TEHE 079 (IN 36119). Part One.

1. For our post operational planning estimate of situation 1 May 1951 follows.

2. Majlis selection Mosadeq to succeed Ala on 26 April 1951 came as great surprise even to Seyyid Zia who apparently expected be chosen but believes Mosadeq has - committed political suicide and is not displeased. Ala resigned because of conviction + committed political suicide and is not displeased. Ala resigned because of conviction Majlis and Senate would pass oil bill in spite of his private opposition and recognition inability to execute. UK protest probably spurred Ala’s - action and Majlis determination pass oil bill. Mosadeq has replaced Ala’s policy employ limited force + action and Majlis determination pass oil bill. Mosadeq has replaced Ala’s policy employ limited force maintain order by policy appeal patriotism Iran. Public to refrain action and avoid disorder. Lack of incident 1 May 1951 first test validity this approach. Mosadeq @@ -5829,18 +5338,14 @@ extent diverted by the National Front and could be even further diverted by Mosadeq’s continued success. Such diversion will be opposed by Tudeh sympathizers who may be expected - to exert every effort gain control Mosadeq Government. This will split the National Front - and present a serious danger. If Mosadeq can pass liberal legislation on the political + to exert every effort gain control Mosadeq Government. This will split the National Front + and present a serious danger. If Mosadeq can pass liberal legislation on the political front and provide enough money on the economic front to improve living condition of his followers his prospects of defeating Tudeh are good. If - he can control it the potential force at Mosadeq’s disposal is probably sufficient to overcome + he can control it the potential force at Mosadeq’s disposal is probably sufficient to overcome much of the opposition of the vested interests. It is also unlikely if Mosadeq succeeds that Shah - will or can oppose him in his program or reform. Mosadeq’s age and ill health provide + will or can oppose him in his program or reform. Mosadeq’s age and ill health provide further uncertainty in any forecast.

Part Two.

@@ -5853,8 +5358,7 @@ opposition and discrediting or subverting individuals or groups within National Front. Latter’s present mood makes impossible influence now. Position Kashani and Fedayan - not yet certain but currently seem anti-Tudeh and supporters Mosadeq. Whittling down Tudeh + not yet certain but currently seem anti-Tudeh and supporters Mosadeq. Whittling down Tudeh long-range job as is exploitation of existing groups and formulation of new ones.

2. Current operations and developments follow:

@@ -5870,35 +5374,26 @@

Part Three.

[1 paragraph (5½ lines) not declassified]

-
- 23. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 23. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, - 788.00/5–451. Secret. Drafted by Richards. Attachment drafted by Stutesman and Cuomo. Sent by pouch. + 788.00/5–451. Secret. Drafted by Richards. Attachment drafted by Stutesman and Cuomo. Sent by pouch. No. 899 - Tehran, May 4, 1951. + Tehran, May 4, 1951.

Transmitting a Memorandum Entitled “Estimate of the Political Strength of the Mossadeq Government”.

There is transmitted herewith for the consideration of the Department a - memorandum entitled “Estimate of the Political Strength of the Mossadeq Government” which has been + memorandum entitled “Estimate of the Political Strength of the Mossadeq Government” which has been prepared by Mr. Stutesman and Mr. Cuomo of the Embassy staff.

I am confident that the Department will find the enclosed memorandum of - considerable interest. The enigmatic Dr. Mosadeq is to exert considerable influence in Iran in + considerable interest. The enigmatic Dr. Mosadeq is to exert considerable influence in Iran in the immediate future. The skill with which he conducts the affairs of the government, and the political course which he follows will probably determine the future not only of the vitally important oil resources of @@ -5909,12 +5404,10 @@ government especially important. He has qualities which, while not commending him to the world, may establish his place firmly in the minds of the people as a popular leader.

-

I am inclined to doubt the statement in the memorandum that Mosadeq “has the confidence of the +

I am inclined to doubt the statement in the memorandum that Mosadeq “has the confidence of the majority of Iranians”. The majority of the Iranians are illiterate and uninformed and are concerned only with their daily living. Inside the - principal towns the name of Mosadeq is probably little better known than was that of + principal towns the name of Mosadeq is probably little better known than was that of Razmara, Mansour, or Saleh. It is nevertheless true that Dr. Mosadeq does @@ -5930,30 +5423,22 @@ Richards

Counselor of Embassy

Attachment

-

ESTIMATE OF THE POLITICAL STRENGTH OF THEMOSADEQ GOVERNMENT

+

ESTIMATE OF THE POLITICAL STRENGTH OF THEMOSADEQ GOVERNMENT

It seems appropriate at this time to make an estimate of the situation in - Iran and of the political strength of the Mosadeq Government. From this estimate it may be + Iran and of the political strength of the Mosadeq Government. From this estimate it may be possible also to perceive some indications of further developments, although this paper will not go into that aspect of the future.

-

The resignation of Prime Minister Hosein Ala and the advent of Mohammed Mosadeq to power have been adequately described - elsewhere. At the present Dr. Mosadeq and his cabinet are only establishing themselves +

The resignation of Prime Minister Hosein Ala and the advent of Mohammed Mosadeq to power have been adequately described + elsewhere. At the present Dr. Mosadeq and his cabinet are only establishing themselves and, also for the present, the choice of the Prime Minister and his - cabinet appears to please many sections of the Iranian public although for different reasons, + cabinet appears to please many sections of the Iranian public although for different reasons, some of which are described below.

-

Any estimate of the political strength of the Mosadeq Government must take cognizance of the wide +

Any estimate of the political strength of the Mosadeq Government must take cognizance of the wide speculation current in Tehran regarding the length of time which the Prime Minister will be able to retain power. Speculation ranges from a week to many months tenure of office. But all such conjecture must balance the forces at play about the new Government.

-

The sources of strength which are available to Prime Minister Mosadeq of course depend on his +

The sources of strength which are available to Prime Minister Mosadeq of course depend on his physical ability to survive the arduous task of leading an Iranian Government. Dr. Mosadeq is in his seventies and also was ill last winter to an extent that he could not @@ -5978,17 +5463,14 @@ conceivably extend to any political issue today his claim that an attack on Mosadeq is an attack on the best interests of the people. Concurrently he can accuse his critics of - being pro-British by being anti-Mosadeq. Also in this connection Dr. Mosadeq may well be the only politician + being pro-British by being anti-Mosadeq. Also in this connection Dr. Mosadeq may well be the only politician in Iran today who might make a deal with the British to settle the oil question on a practical basis which it increasingly appears must include British personnel continuing to man the oil fields and refinery. Only Dr. Mosadeq might be able to accomplish this without bringing a general accusation of treason on his head. His stand against foreign influence in Iran and particularly his - well known leadership in the struggle to nationalize the AIOC has given him a good vantage point + well known leadership in the struggle to nationalize the AIOC has given him a good vantage point from which to work in settling this outstanding and delicate matter. Already there are straws in the wind showing the Prime Minister’s interest in bringing the matter to some conclusion, for on May 3rd he @@ -6008,26 +5490,22 @@ called already by one newspaper a “national union cabinet” was apparently built to prevent controversy with the Majlis. It is deliberately not a National Front cabinet. Another move in this cautious - line of avoiding open dissatisfaction in the Majlis was Dr. Mosadeq’s first step to implement his + line of avoiding open dissatisfaction in the Majlis was Dr. Mosadeq’s first step to implement his long sought program of seeking electoral reform by calling for representatives of the Fractions of the Majlis to meet with the cabinet ministers concerned, in working out an acceptable electoral reform. He has avoided the open fighting on the Majlis floor which holds such dangers for any Government.

-

Finally, there is presently real support for Prime Minister Mosadeq in the ranks of the National +

Finally, there is presently real support for Prime Minister Mosadeq in the ranks of the National Front coalition which, if it holds together in this support, can materially assist him in the Majlis and before the people. Although National Front Deputies are not entering the cabinet they have demonstrated their support for their erstwhile Majlis leader. Even leftist Deputies Azad and Haerizadeh on May Day urged - the workers to heed and support the Mosadeq Government.

+ the workers to heed and support the Mosadeq Government.

However, there are many factors present in the situation today which may - work to bring about the downfall of the Mosadeq Government.

+ work to bring about the downfall of the Mosadeq Government.

First of all is the character of the man himself. His emotions under stress have been demonstrated. He is more used to opposing than governing, and although he has held some administrative posts in the @@ -6041,37 +5519,31 @@ political shrewdness but it might be disastrous if he continues such a vague approach to future problems.

-

Internal political forces which may defeat the Mosadeq program certainly include the +

Internal political forces which may defeat the Mosadeq program certainly include the reactionaries who can be expected to oppose vigorously any social or economic reform program. The Court and the Parliament represent landed and wealthy interests who will resist any attacks on their prerogatives or profits. Already several representatives of the Court and old line - political circles have indicated delight that Mosadeq is Prime Minister because he + political circles have indicated delight that Mosadeq is Prime Minister because he must now wrestle with the problems which he previously forced on the Government. Close candidate for Premiership, Seyid Zia, on the day that Mosadeq’s appointment was announced, gleefully told an Embassy officer that he was very pleased at - this development which would remove Mosadeq from the Majlis and surely cause him to fall on + this development which would remove Mosadeq from the Majlis and surely cause him to fall on his face while Prime Minister. The Shah reportedly indicated to a - British Embassy source on May 3rd that Dr. Mosadeq’s stay in power was not expected to continue for + British Embassy source on May 3rd that Dr. Mosadeq’s stay in power was not expected to continue for a long time.

If Dr. Mosadeq fails to correct the ancient evils of oppressive Government and economic woes he will lose much popular support and increase popular disappointment and cynicism. Distrust and dislike of Government is deep-rooted in Iran and - even a popular hero like Dr. Mosadeq will have difficulty in overcoming this, even + even a popular hero like Dr. Mosadeq will have difficulty in overcoming this, even without the added problems of possible loss of oil revenues and lack of U.S. economic aid. He has emphasized his concern in this regard and his strong desire to have an economic program for the alleviation of popular discontent.

The leftist part in the picture is not yet clear. Several National Front - Deputies who were close to Mosadeq represent a radical leftist approach to + Deputies who were close to Mosadeq represent a radical leftist approach to politics. Their brand of political action will probably be pressed on Mosadeq who may be forced to take such action which will split his National Front supporters, @@ -6114,60 +5586,45 @@ policy of waiting for him to demonstrate alone whether he can remain in power.

-
+
24. Telegram From the Station in Iran to the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, Iran 1951–1953. Secret. No telegram number appears on the source text. - Tehran, May 6, 1951. + Tehran, May 6, 1951.

IN 39208. Re: WASH 40240 (OUT 99765).Not found.

-

1. Following is joint OSO–OPC interim reply ref tel submitted +

1. Following is joint OSO–OPC interim reply ref tel submitted without ref Grady or consultation with [less than 1 line not declassified] who presently absent Tehran.

-

2. TEHE 121Document 22. Part 1 (IN 38800) +

2. TEHE 121Document 22. Part 1 (IN 38800) gave general estimate situation 1 May 51. Reassessment situation in light events past five days indicate somewhat more clearly following points:

a. Mosadeq personally receiving more popular support both from within and outside National Front than - has been accorded other recent govts.

+ has been accorded other recent govts.

b. His choice of cabinet while somewhat disappointing has not yet evoked much opposition.

-

c. As popular nationalist leader Mosadeq’s strength derives from spirit of nationalism +

c. As popular nationalist leader Mosadeq’s strength derives from spirit of nationalism which presently is dominant political force Iran.

-

d. In this position he appears to be opposing both UK and USSR influence Iran, but seems relatively well disposed to +

d. In this position he appears to be opposing both UK and USSR influence Iran, but seems relatively well disposed to US Government which represents third - force with no vested interest. (We are informed by [name not declassified] and Grady that Mosadeq believes US + force with no vested interest. (We are informed by [name not declassified] and Grady that Mosadeq believes US Government “benevolent neutrality” re oil negotiation was great aid to National Front.

-

e. Although other opposition forces can be expected to develop (TEHE 121, part 1, para 2), only organized +

e. Although other opposition forces can be expected to develop (TEHE 121, part 1, para 2), only organized and vocal opposition that appears to be emerging at this time is Communist (Tudeh).

f. US Government policy objective Iran probably can best be implemented by encouraging legitimate indigenous liberal progressive movements which detract from or supplant Tudeh.

-

g. Oil nationalization and 9 point Mosadeq proposalThe “9-Point +

g. Oil nationalization and 9 point Mosadeq proposalThe “9-Point Law,” promulgated by the Shah on May 1, implemented the oil - nationalization bill. See Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, + nationalization bill. See Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, p. 44 (Document 15). is a fact which cannot be reversed without major upheaval or long festering wounds, reasonable moderation of implementation probably is best that @@ -6189,14 +5646,12 @@ smoothly to effect change. Secondly, of the opposition leaders presently in sight (Seyyid Zia, Qavam, Zahedi), each have disadvantage outweighing their advantages, and we - doubt if any are capable of mustering Mosadeq’s strength or receive the broad popular support + doubt if any are capable of mustering Mosadeq’s strength or receive the broad popular support which is being accorded him. Moreover, it now appears doubtful whether any rightist opposition can be expected to weaken Tudeh to extent Mosadeq and National Front possibly can do. Tentatively, therefore, we are inclined to view that - wisest course may be to support Mosadeq, however, risks of this course, including effects possible + wisest course may be to support Mosadeq, however, risks of this course, including effects possible UK and other reaction, must yet be fully weighed.

5. Although we are not yet in position estimate this aspect situation @@ -6204,16 +5659,11 @@ probably would be receptive to direct approach.

6. [1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]

-
- 25. Minutes of Director of Central Intelligence Smith’s MeetingSource: Central Intelligence Agency, +
+ 25. Minutes of Director of Central Intelligence Smith’s MeetingSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Intelligence, Job 80B01676R, Box 23, Folder 5, Director’s Staff Meetings. Top Secret. - Washington, May 9, 1951. + Washington, May 9, 1951.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Iran.]

Mr. Dulles stated that in his opinion only one thing could save the situation in Iran, namely to have @@ -6221,30 +5671,19 @@ close the Majlis and temporarily rule by decree. At a later date a new premier could be installed with our help. The Director asked Mr. Dulles to get in touch with - Mr. Matthews and Mr. McGhee at State Department and discuss + Mr. Matthews and Mr. McGhee at State Department and discuss this matter. If we are to act along these lines, it may be necessary to have an NSC directive.

-
- 26. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, Iran. Top +
+ 26. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, Iran. Top Secret. - Washington, May 10, 1951. + Washington, May 10, 1951. SUBJECT - Conversation between Messrs. George McGhee, Burton - Berry, and William Rountree of the State Department, and Allen Dulles and Kermit Roosevelt of CIA, Thursday, 10 May 1951 + Conversation between Messrs. George McGhee, Burton + Berry, and William Rountree of the State Department, and Allen Dulles and Kermit Roosevelt of CIA, Thursday, 10 May 1951

1. Mr. Dulles emphasized to Mr. McGhee the urgent importance @@ -6252,8 +5691,7 @@ situation. He stated that he felt the time might come very shortly when the Shah would have to choose between making a fight for his kingdom and going into exile. If he chooses to fight, his course of action would - probably have to be that of dissolving the Majlis, replacing Mossadeq as Prime Minister with a man + probably have to be that of dissolving the Majlis, replacing Mossadeq as Prime Minister with a man upon whom he could rely, and governing the country as his father did, by decree. Mr. Dulles suggested that the Shah might require considerable moral and practical support @@ -6265,12 +5703,9 @@ whatever would be helpful in this regard. Consideration might be given to sending an individual in whom the Shah had great personal confidence to Tehran to stiffen the Shah’s will to resist and to assure him of - American support. In response to Mr. McGhee’s question, Mr. Dulles indicated that there seemed to be general + American support. In response to Mr. McGhee’s question, Mr. Dulles indicated that there seemed to be general agreement that Ambassador George - AllenGeorge Allen served as U.S. + AllenGeorge Allen served as U.S. Ambassador to Iran during the Iran crisis of 1946. would be the best possible person for the job, but that it was recognized that there were very grave practical difficulties in the way of his use.

@@ -6290,22 +5725,18 @@

3. It was agreed that Mr. Dulles, in the course of his forthcoming trip to New York, would get in touch - with Mr. Suydam to discover from him what individuals in the US had made the most impression upon the - Shah during his visit to this country. He would also see Dr. Forkner with a view to evaluating his + with Mr. Suydam to discover from him what individuals in the US had made the most impression upon the + Shah during his visit to this country. He would also see Dr. Forkner with a view to evaluating his possible usefulness and, in case he seemed to be the right man for the job, to find out whether he would be willing to go to Iran.

4. Mr. Rountree said that he would consult with Mr. Ray Muir to obtain from him suggestions on - individuals who seem to know the Shah particularly well. Mr. Berry stated that he would keep in + individuals who seem to know the Shah particularly well. Mr. Berry stated that he would keep in close touch with Mr. Roosevelt and that they would explore carefully the suggestions which Mr. Dulles had made together with such other approaches as might occur.At - the Director’s meeting held on May 24, Dulles reported that “he had been conducting + the Director’s meeting held on May 24, Dulles reported that “he had been conducting discussions with State on Iran including the possibility of the Shah taking a strong stand. There was discussion of the probable necessity of getting money to Iran so that it would be available for @@ -6313,37 +5744,27 @@ of Intelligence, Job 80B01676R, Box 23, Folder 5, Director’s Staff Meetings)

-
- 27. Memorandum for the RecordSource: National Archives, RG 273, +
+ 27. Memorandum for the RecordSource: National Archives, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Policy Papers, Box 194, NSC–107 (Section 2). Top Secret. There is no drafting information on the summary, which is an - enclosure to a memorandum from Executive Secretary Lay to Secretary Acheson, dated May 17, indicating + enclosure to a memorandum from Executive Secretary Lay to Secretary Acheson, dated May 17, indicating that “the President authorized you to proceed, in connection with the oil nationalization issue in Iran, along the lines proposed by - you and discussed by the Council at the meeting (NSC Action No. 473–b).” At this meeting of the National Security Council, the + you and discussed by the Council at the meeting (NSC Action No. 473–b).” At this meeting of the National Security Council, the NSC also noted the progress report, dated May 2 (Document 21) submitted - by the Under Secretary of State. (National Archives, RG 273, Records of the National + by the Under Secretary of State. (National Archives, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Minutes 1947–1961, Box 13, 91st Meeting) - Washington, May 16, 1951. + Washington, May 16, 1951.

Brief Informal Summary of the Points Raised in the Discussion at the 91st Meeting of the National Security Council of the Position of the United States With Respect to Iran

The Secretary of State opened the discussion by informing the Council of the most recent British proposal requesting United States support if the - British felt compelled to send military forces into Iran to prevent forcible seizure of the + British felt compelled to send military forces into Iran to prevent forcible seizure of the A.I.O.C. by the Iranian Government. The Secretary of State requested the guidance of the President and Council in deciding what course should be followed.

@@ -6395,9 +5816,7 @@ actual distribution of the oil to the consumers in the Western world and prevent the Soviets from securing it.

-
+
28. Special EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79S01011A, Box 3, Folder 6, SE–6 Current Developments in @@ -6408,21 +5827,17 @@ Air Force, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate, except as noted by - the Director of Intelligence, USAF, with regard to paragraph 4. + the Director of Intelligence, USAF, with regard to paragraph 4. SE–6 - Washington, May 22, 1951. + Washington, May 22, 1951.

CURRENT DEVELOPMENT IN IRAN

Conclusions

-

1. The clash of interests between Iran and the UK over Iran’s oil resources has reached a critical stage - with the elevation of Mohammad Mossadeq, the leader of the ultra-nationalist National +

1. The clash of interests between Iran and the UK over Iran’s oil resources has reached a critical stage + with the elevation of Mohammad Mossadeq, the leader of the ultra-nationalist National Front group, to the premiership. Although a real effort will undoubtedly be made to reach a compromise settlement, a solution will be achieved only with great difficulty. In any event, there is little indication @@ -6430,8 +5845,7 @@ Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) will modify their respective stands in sufficient time to permit an early settlement of the issue.

-

2. Although there are important elements opposed to Mossadeq, it is unlikely that he can be +

2. Although there are important elements opposed to Mossadeq, it is unlikely that he can be removed from power so long as the oil question remains a burning issue, except by violence or by the establishment of a semi-dictatorial regime under the aegis of the Shah. In the present highly inflammatory state of @@ -6442,21 +5856,17 @@ developments may occur before a settlement is reached:

a. Mossadeq might take physical - possession of the oil installations now operated by the AIOC. He may also require the British + possession of the oil installations now operated by the AIOC. He may also require the British employees of AIOC to leave the country.

b. The UK has indicated that it will not - employ force in Iran without prior consultation with the US. It is unlikely that the UK would attempt by force to forestall or + employ force in Iran without prior consultation with the US. It is unlikely that the UK would attempt by force to forestall or counter physical occupation of the oil installations by the Iranian Government, but the UK could and might land troops in Iran for the actual or alleged purpose of safeguarding British lives in the event of further violence or sabotage.

c. There is a serious possibility that the landing of British troops in - southern Iran, for whatever reason, would be taken by the USSR as a pretext for sending its troops + southern Iran, for whatever reason, would be taken by the USSR as a pretext for sending its troops into northern Iran.

d. In the event of further demonstrations and violence, which may well occur at any time, the Tudeh Party might be able to seriously undermine @@ -6468,13 +5878,9 @@ curtailed for about two weeks, might be again interrupted by a recurrence of strikes in the oil field area or by a, b, c, or d above.

-

4. Any intensification of the current crisis would give the USSR added opportunities for exploiting - the local unrest and might eventually enable the USSR to deny a large part or the whole of - the Iranian oil supply to the Western Powers.It is the view of the Director of Intelligence, USAF, that this paragraph should read +

4. Any intensification of the current crisis would give the USSR added opportunities for exploiting + the local unrest and might eventually enable the USSR to deny a large part or the whole of + the Iranian oil supply to the Western Powers.It is the view of the Director of Intelligence, USAF, that this paragraph should read as follows: “4. A continuation of the current crisis would greatly enhance the capability of the Soviet Union to deny more and possibly all the Iranian oil to the West through exploitation of the @@ -6492,12 +5898,10 @@ solve the country’s critical economic and social problems. Nevertheless, because he is an astute politician and has strong popular support on the oil issue at least, he will probably not be easily displaced while that - issue is still unsettled. In internal affairs Mossadeq has criticized former Iranian + issue is still unsettled. In internal affairs Mossadeq has criticized former Iranian governments for their failure to achieve social benefits for the people and has opposed measures designed to restrict freedom of speech, - assembly, and the press. Politically, he has urged that the Shah be stripped of power and that the + assembly, and the press. Politically, he has urged that the Shah be stripped of power and that the Majlis become the dominant factor in the government. However, he does not believe that the present members of the Majlis truly represent the interests of the Iranian people and advocates electoral reform.

@@ -6513,40 +5917,31 @@ is in direct proportion to, the intensity of feeling against the British over the oil issue. Although other critical problems will plague his administration, they are not likely to cause his downfall so long as the - oil crisis remains a burning issue. Mossadeq’s campaign against the AIOC has had the support not only of his + oil crisis remains a burning issue. Mossadeq’s campaign against the AIOC has had the support not only of his National Front group but also of the Fedayan Islam (the small terrorist - group of religious fanatics who were responsible for Razmara’s assassination), the illegal + group of religious fanatics who were responsible for Razmara’s assassination), the illegal Tudeh (Communist) Party, and probably the great majority of Iran’s laborers, trades-men, and students, who can significantly affect political developments in Iran through strikes, demonstrations, and violence. Both the Fedayan Islam and the Tudeh Party, however, are - constantly attempting to coerce Mossadeq into adopting more extreme measures against + constantly attempting to coerce Mossadeq into adopting more extreme measures against Western interests. Fedayan Islam has apparently unseated its more - moderate leader and has threatened Mossadeq’s life. Meanwhile, the Tudeh Party has gone + moderate leader and has threatened Mossadeq’s life. Meanwhile, the Tudeh Party has gone beyond nationalization of the oil industry to demand ousting of the US military mission, refusal of US arms assistance, and closer relations with the USSR.

-

3. Because of the wide support for Mossadeq’s chauvinistic crusade, few Iranian leaders +

3. Because of the wide support for Mossadeq’s chauvinistic crusade, few Iranian leaders dared oppose him publicly. His influence in the Majlis was largely responsible for Razmara’s failure to obtain a revised AIOC - agreement and loans from the Export-Import Bank and the IBRD. He condoned the assassination of + agreement and loans from the Export-Import Bank and the IBRD. He condoned the assassination of Razmara on the grounds that - the latter was traitorously lenient in his negotiations with the AIOC. Finally, he pushed the oil + the latter was traitorously lenient in his negotiations with the AIOC. Finally, he pushed the oil nationalization bills through the Majlis against the wishes of the Shah and Prime Minister Ala. Many of the Majlis deputies probably voted for the measures against their better - judgment, succumbing to the emotionalism of Mossadeq’s appeal or fearing the consequences (possibly + judgment, succumbing to the emotionalism of Mossadeq’s appeal or fearing the consequences (possibly including assassination) of opposing the measure.

4. When Hussein Ala was Prime Minister, Mossadeq was chairman @@ -6555,27 +5950,22 @@ The Shah, Prime Minister Ala, and moderate members of the Majlis probably hoped that some agreement could be patched up with - the AIOC before Mossadeq could complete his work. + the AIOC before Mossadeq could complete his work. Mossadeq, however, reported to the Majlis more than a month ahead of schedule. Increased bitterness toward the UK, reinforced by the intervening strikes and violence in the oil field area, kept emotions - high throughout the country and simplified Mossadeq’s job in obtaining prompt Majlis approval for + high throughout the country and simplified Mossadeq’s job in obtaining prompt Majlis approval for his recommendations. The new law sets up a government committee to act as trustee for the oil properties until an Iranian Company can be established and provides for setting aside 25 percent of oil revenues to - meet future claims of the “former company.” Mossadeq’s precipitate move to force action on the oil - issue resulted in the immediate resignation of Ala.

+ meet future claims of the “former company.” Mossadeq’s precipitate move to force action on the oil + issue resulted in the immediate resignation of Ala.

5. Although the responsibilities of office may to some extent act as a sobering influence on Mossadeq, he will almost certainly attempt to implement the nationalization law and gain effective control of the oil installations in southern Iran. He - might be willing to conclude a management contract with AIOC, under which the latter would + might be willing to conclude a management contract with AIOC, under which the latter would operate the oil installations under the direction of an Iranian company. However, he would probably prefer to obtain the technical assistance Iran needs by means of separate contracts with individual specialists. @@ -6587,30 +5977,25 @@ rapidly weakened by any considerable decline of anti-British feeling or by his inability to cope with Iran’s fundamental economic and social problems. There is some danger that he might attempt to maintain himself - in power by turning his chauvinistic crusade against the US. He might even refuse to accept further + in power by turning his chauvinistic crusade against the US. He might even refuse to accept further US military aid and request the US military missions to leave the country.

-

6. In view of the fact that both Iran and the UK have a very great interest in the uninterrupted +

6. In view of the fact that both Iran and the UK have a very great interest in the uninterrupted production of Iranian oil, a real effort will undoubtedly be made to reach a compromise settlement. However, in view of the attitude of both governments, a settlement can probably be reached only with great difficulty. The 11-man Oil Committee has already threatened to revoke the residence permits of AIOC’s foreign staff unless the AIOC turns - over its oil installations to the Iranian Government. The UK has taken the position that Iran has no - right unilaterally to abrogate its contract with AIOC and, therefore, no right to + over its oil installations to the Iranian Government. The UK has taken the position that Iran has no + right unilaterally to abrogate its contract with AIOC and, therefore, no right to expropriate the oil installations under the guise of nationalization. The UK has proposed the establishment of a new British company to run operations in Iran, which would include Iranians on the board of directors; equal sharing of profits; and a progressive increase in the number of Iranians employed by the company. - Mossadeq will undoubtedly turn down this offer, for it + Mossadeq will undoubtedly turn down this offer, for it manifestly fails to meet the requirements of the oil nationalization law. The proposal certainly does not represent the final British position. However, a serious danger exists that critical developments @@ -6627,9 +6012,7 @@ physical possession of the oil installations even at the risk of closing down the whole industry.

b. The UK has indicated that it will not - employ force in Iran without prior consultation with the US. It is unlikely that the UK would send its troops into the oil field + employ force in Iran without prior consultation with the US. It is unlikely that the UK would send its troops into the oil field area to forestall or counter occupation of the oil installations by the Iranian Government, but the UK could and might land troops in Iran for the actual or alleged purpose of @@ -6646,13 +6029,11 @@ by the USSR as a pretext for sending troops into northern Iran.

c. Anti-British feeling will remain strong, and the danger of - demonstrations and violence will continue. Mossadeq has consistently opposed martial law and + demonstrations and violence will continue. Mossadeq has consistently opposed martial law and restrictions on the freedom of speech, assembly, and the press. One of his first acts in office was to remove a ban on May Day demonstrations in Tehran, and martial law may soon be lifted in the Abadan area. - Furthermore, although the Tudeh Party has begun to attack Mossadeq, he may yield to its demand + Furthermore, although the Tudeh Party has begun to attack Mossadeq, he may yield to its demand for legal status. There is a danger that the Tudeh Party may attempt to take advantage of Mossadeq’s leniency to foment disturbances throughout the country and that @@ -6662,8 +6043,7 @@ internal security.

d. If Mossadeq takes physical possession of the oil installations, he will undoubtedly seek foreign - assistance in operating the oil industry. A number of US oil + assistance in operating the oil industry. A number of US oil companies have already shown some interest in the situation, and Mossadeq might well be able to persuade some company to operate in Iran on his terms. Such a @@ -6672,31 +6052,24 @@ Mossadeq might attempt to obtain Soviet specialists to run the oil installations.

8. There is little doubt that sooner or later efforts will be made by the - British, the Shah, and deputies in the Majlis to undermine Mossadeq’s position. However, in view + British, the Shah, and deputies in the Majlis to undermine Mossadeq’s position. However, in view of Mossadeq’s popular backing, it is unlikely that the Shah and the Majlis would dare oppose him while - tension over the oil issue remains high. Mossadeq is more likely to force the oil issue by + tension over the oil issue remains high. Mossadeq is more likely to force the oil issue by extreme action than permit himself to be undermined by the Shah and the - Majlis on other internal issues. It is therefore unlikely that Mossadeq can be overthrown during this + Majlis on other internal issues. It is therefore unlikely that Mossadeq can be overthrown during this critical period except by violence or by the establishment of a semi-dictatorial regime under the aegis of the Shah. Such a course of action would involve risks which the Shah has thus far shown no willingness to take.

-
+
29. Memorandum From Henry Villard of the Policy Planning Staff to the Chairman of - the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)Source: + the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 888.2553/5–245. Top Secret. - Washington, May 24, 1951. + Washington, May 24, 1951.

IRANIAN SITUATION

On the basis of a talk with Allen Dulles last night, and with one of his operatives just @@ -6710,8 +6083,7 @@ accompli as far as nationalization is concerned but should not allow the principle of compensation to go by default.

2. The Iranians have not yet faced up to the problem of production, - operation and marketing of the oil supplies. The main objective has been to nail down the + operation and marketing of the oil supplies. The main objective has been to nail down the nationalization of the company and they are only now beginning to grapple with the details. In doing so, however, they are not likely to grant the British any rights tending to preserve a semblance of British @@ -6720,25 +6092,20 @@ in regard to the latter point, they prefer to do it that way.

3. CIA stands ready to proceed at any - time with the plan it had in mind when Ala was Prime Minister, provided a useful purpose can be + time with the plan it had in mind when Ala was Prime Minister, provided a useful purpose can be perceived. At present, however, the feeling is that such an effort would be wasted. Ala himself is no longer in a position to utilize the scheme effectively, and there is no - one else who can be trusted. I concur in this view.Reference is presumably to the program first + one else who can be trusted. I concur in this view.Reference is presumably to the program first outlined in Document 5.

-

4. An American physician, Dr. Forkner of New York, is scheduled to leave next week to +

4. An American physician, Dr. Forkner of New York, is scheduled to leave next week to examine the Shah and diagnose his trouble. No question of an operation by this American is involved, so I suppose there can be no objection to the move.

-

The Iranian Government today delivered a virtual ultimatum to the AIOC to nominate a representative within +

The Iranian Government today delivered a virtual ultimatum to the AIOC to nominate a representative within one week for the purpose of discussing nationalization of the oil company. Although the British are reluctant to accept this invitation to - “participate in the ceremony of digging their own grave”, as Grady puts it, we are urging them to + “participate in the ceremony of digging their own grave”, as Grady puts it, we are urging them to go ahead. I feel that this represents the last chance the British may have to pull something out of the fire, by bringing up for discussion the realistic problems of production and marketing.

@@ -6757,33 +6124,24 @@ to the Soviet Union of this “imperialistic action” would be enormous. We should therefore be on our guard against any attitude of the British which would incite the Iranians to take over the oil fields by force, - leading to the employment of U.K. troops to “protect British lives” or property and with the Soviets + leading to the employment of U.K. troops to “protect British lives” or property and with the Soviets piously sitting on the sidelines while their stooges take over in Teheran.

- Henry S. - VillardVillard initialed above his + Henry S. + VillardVillard initialed above his typed signature.
-
- 30. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in IranSource: National Archives, +
+ 30. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in IranSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 888.2553/4–1751. Secret. Drafted on May 26 by P.J. Halle and C.V. Ferguson, cleared by - Freeman, and approved by Rountree. - Washington, May 29, 1951, + Freeman, and approved by Rountree. + Washington, May 29, 1951, 6 p.m. -

2228. Subsequent to receipt useful info contained urtel 2449 Apr 17,In telegram 2449 from Tehran, April 17, Ambassador +

2228. Subsequent to receipt useful info contained urtel 2449 Apr 17,In telegram 2449 from Tehran, April 17, Ambassador Grady discussed the significance of alleged British contacts with tribes in southern Iran reported in CIA PD 888, April @@ -6791,13 +6149,10 @@ British had traditionally maintained contact with southern Iranian tribes both to protect their oilfields and to provide contingency options in the event of a breakdown in central government authority - or a Soviet invasion of Iran. (Both telegram 2449 and CIA PD 888 are appended to an April 24 - memorandum from Assistant Secretary McGhee to H. Freeman + or a Soviet invasion of Iran. (Both telegram 2449 and CIA PD 888 are appended to an April 24 + memorandum from Assistant Secretary McGhee to H. Freeman Matthews, “Tribal Situation in Iran”; ibid., - 888.2553/4–2451) Based on the above information, President Truman “thought that there was + 888.2553/4–2451) Based on the above information, President Truman “thought that there was nothing further to be done about the matter.” (Memorandum of conversation between Acheson and Truman, May 7; @@ -6807,36 +6162,27 @@ possibly designed to promote separatist tendencies among groups in southern Iran.

In view importance this subj Emb is - requested, using own, CAS and Amconsul Isfahan sources, submit tele report on recent and + requested, using own, CAS and Amconsul Isfahan sources, submit tele report on recent and current Brit activities in southern Iran. Report shld not be confined purely tribal matters but include Brit - activities among traditionally pro-Brit leaders of settled population.

+ activities among traditionally pro-Brit leaders of settled population.

Request ur views whether there is any possibility in event IranGov attempts seize AIOC properties by force that there wld be resistance and/or uprising of any sort on part native Iran elements.

- Acheson + Acheson
-
- 31. Progress Report Prepared for the National Security CouncilSource: National Archives, +
+ 31. Progress Report Prepared for the National Security CouncilSource: National Archives, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Minutes 1947–1961, Box 13, 93rd Meeting. - Top Secret. The report was sent by memorandum from Webb to Lay. - Washington, May 31, 1951. + Top Secret. The report was sent by memorandum from Webb to Lay. + Washington, May 31, 1951. SUBJECT Second Progress Report on NSC @@ -6848,12 +6194,9 @@ information.

A—The General Situation

The situation in Iran has deteriorated further since the submission of - the First Progress Report on April 24.Document 21.

-

On April 28 the Government of the moderate Prime Minister, Hosein Ala, was replaced by one headed - by the extreme nationalist leader, Dr. Mohamad Mosadeq. Immediately upon his appointment, the + the First Progress Report on April 24.Document 21.

+

On April 28 the Government of the moderate Prime Minister, Hosein Ala, was replaced by one headed + by the extreme nationalist leader, Dr. Mohamad Mosadeq. Immediately upon his appointment, the Iranian Parliament unanimously voted for the immediate implementation of nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and the Iranian Government has so far categorically rejected all attempts by the British @@ -6917,8 +6260,7 @@ knowledge and capital but transport and marketing facilities such as those provided by the company.” For the complete text of this statement, see Department of State Bulletin, - May 28, 1951, p. 851. See also Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, + May 28, 1951, p. 851. See also Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 56–57 (Document 23).

c. Stressed to the British Government the need for proceeding with caution and moderation.

@@ -6939,8 +6281,7 @@ control program and the arrangement for the early dispatch to Iran of teams of rural improvement experts.

c. Maintained a neutral position towards the - present government of Prime Minister Mosadeq. It is believed advisable, in view of the + present government of Prime Minister Mosadeq. It is believed advisable, in view of the present highly emotional state of the Iranian people, for the United States not to oppose him publicly and at the same time take no action which could be construed as support for him, his Government, or his @@ -6949,39 +6290,28 @@ independence and territorial integrity of Iran are of deep concern to the United States.

- James E. - WebbPrinted from a copy + James E. + WebbPrinted from a copy that bears Webb’s typed signature with an indication that he signed the original.
-
- 32. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 32. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 888.2553/6–351. Secret. Received June 4 at 11:09 a.m. - Tehran, June 3, 1951, + Tehran, June 3, 1951, 10 p.m.

3095. We can add little to Embtel - 2449, April 17See footnote 2, Document 30. re Brit activities among tribes southern - Iran (Deptel 2228, May 29).Document + 2449, April 17See footnote 2, Document 30. re Brit activities among tribes southern + Iran (Deptel 2228, May 29).Document 30.

In conversation with Qashqai - Khans, we have been told that Brit have had some recent contact with at least one of + Khans, we have been told that Brit have had some recent contact with at least one of their sub-tribes, namely the Qashquli. The Qashqais claim that they - wld cooperate with Brit only in event of Sov invasion of Iran or establishment of - Sov satellite govt in Tehran. Qashqais also informed us + wld cooperate with Brit only in event of Sov invasion of Iran or establishment of + Sov satellite govt in Tehran. Qashqais also informed us that it is possible that Brit may have some understanding with certain other FARS tribes, including the Mamassani, the Arabs, and @@ -6996,21 +6326,16 @@

Altho we have been unable to obtain specific info, possibility that Brit may be negotiating with southern tribes should not (rpt not) be - dismissed. It seems only logical that Brit + dismissed. It seems only logical that Brit shld take such action in effort to maintain order in south if (A) for one reason or another auth of Central - Govt breaks down or (B) if Brit lives in oil area are threatened by - mob action and violence and Mosadeq + Govt breaks down or (B) if Brit lives in oil area are threatened by + mob action and violence and Mosadeq Govt appears unable control situation. - Also there is always possibility that Brit may attempt to use southern tribal uprisings as + Also there is always possibility that Brit may attempt to use southern tribal uprisings as counter pressure on govt (as in 1946), shld - Sov attempt seize control Tehran Govt by infiltration or actual + Sov attempt seize control Tehran Govt by infiltration or actual invasion.

Notwithstanding fact certain tribal grps in south may be to degree controlled by Brit, it is doubtful @@ -7018,47 +6343,34 @@ cld muster sufficient tribal strength without introducing Brit troops to oppose forceful action by Iran Govt. - This assumes, of course, Iranian troops in south wld remain loyal to Central Govt. As was reported in Embtel 2847, May 18, PriMin + This assumes, of course, Iranian troops in south wld remain loyal to Central Govt. As was reported in Embtel 2847, May 18, PriMin Mosadeq has already changed a number of officials, including military commanders, on grounds that - those transferred were too much under Brit influence.In telegram 2847 + those transferred were too much under Brit influence.In telegram 2847 from Tehran, May 18, Grady also reported that these “substantial changes personnel holding govt posts” were “particularly - in south Iran.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, + in south Iran.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/5–1851)

Matter will be followed closely and views of Isfahan will be requested by mail, there being no code facilities between Tehran and Isfahan. CAS concurs.

- Grady + Grady
-
+
33. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of the Office of National Estimates (Langer) to Director - of Central Intelligence SmithSource: + of Central Intelligence SmithSource: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC - Files, Job 79R00904A, Box 1, Folder 2, Memos for DCI (1951) (Substantive). Top + Files, Job 79R00904A, Box 1, Folder 2, Memos for DCI (1951) (Substantive). Top Secret. - Washington, June 20, 1951. + Washington, June 20, 1951. SUBJECT - Comments on British Draft Document, JIC (51) 44, “Military Implications of the Entry of + Comments on British Draft Document, JIC (51) 44, “Military Implications of the Entry of British Forces into Persian Territory”

1. The following are comments of the National Estimates Board on the @@ -7066,12 +6378,10 @@ “Military Implications of the Entry of British Forces into Persian Territory.”Not found.

2. The British JIC estimates that armed - intervention by British military forces would enable the UK to retain effective control of the oil + intervention by British military forces would enable the UK to retain effective control of the oil fields in southern Iran and bring about the replacement of the present Iranian Government by a more moderate one that would be “prepared to - negotiate” on the oil issue. We believe that the British JIC (a) is too optimistic concerning the + negotiate” on the oil issue. We believe that the British JIC (a) is too optimistic concerning the Iranian political reaction to armed intervention in Iran, and (b) underestimates the adverse reaction of the United Nations in general and the Near and Middle Eastern countries in particular.

@@ -7089,14 +6399,10 @@ of the central government as to the formation of a more moderate one. In such a situation the Tudeh Party might be able to seize control of the central government. If the USSR should - in the meantime have occupied northern Iran, as the British JIC believes it likely, the Tudeh Party + in the meantime have occupied northern Iran, as the British JIC believes it likely, the Tudeh Party probably could count on enough Soviet assistance not only to maintain political control in Iran but also to make British operation of the oil - fields increasingly difficult. While we agree with the British JIC that the USSR probably would not initiate a general war over Iran, we believe that one of the + fields increasingly difficult. While we agree with the British JIC that the USSR probably would not initiate a general war over Iran, we believe that one of the main reasons for this Soviet attitude would be Soviet expectation that British armed intervention in Iran would be likely to result in effective Soviet control of Iran without general war.

@@ -7113,21 +6419,16 @@ bases the UK intervention would have to be launched.

- William L. - Langer + William L. + Langer
-
- 34. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/6–2551. Top +
+ 34. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/6–2551. Top Secret. Drafted by C. Vaughan Ferguson, Jr., of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs. - Washington, June 25, + Washington, June 25, 1951. SUBJECT @@ -7167,86 +6468,57 @@ which could not be stated over the telephone the recent telegram from Tehran reporting an approach by the Qashqais to the British Embassy should be discounted.The reference is to - telegram 3351 from Tehran, June 20. (Ibid. 888.2553–AIOC/6–2051)

+ telegram 3351 from Tehran, June 20. (Ibid. 888.2553–AIOC/6–2051)

The brothers will proceed to Washington shortly and desire to meet with Ambassador Wiley, Justice - Douglas, Mr. Allen Dulles as well as Mr. McGhee and other appropriate officers - in NEA. Mr. Dooher stated that the Qashqai tribe + Douglas, Mr. Allen Dulles as well as Mr. McGhee and other appropriate officers + in NEA. Mr. Dooher stated that the Qashqai tribe plans to leave one of the four ruling brothers in the United States.

-
+
35. Note by the Acting Executive Secretary of the National Security - Council (Gleason)Source: National Archives, RG 273, Records of the National - Security Council, Policy Papers, Box 194, NSC–107 (Section 3). Top Secret. The enclosed statement - is printed in redacted form in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, + Council (Gleason)Source: National Archives, RG 273, Records of the National + Security Council, Policy Papers, Box 194, NSC–107 (Section 3). Top Secret. The enclosed statement + is printed in redacted form in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, pp. 71–76 (Document 32). NSC 107/2 - Washington, June 27, 1951. + Washington, June 27, 1951.

THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATESWITH RESPECT TO IRAN

REFERENCES - A. NSC 107; NSC 107/1 and Annex to NSC 107/1NSC 107 is Document 6. NSC 107/1, dated June 6, and the annex to NSC 107/1, dated June 20, are not + A. NSC 107; NSC 107/1 and Annex to NSC 107/1NSC 107 is Document 6. NSC 107/1, dated June 6, and the annex to NSC 107/1, dated June 20, are not printed. (National Archives, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Policy Papers, Box 194, NSC–107 (Section 3)) B. NSC Actions Nos. 500, 473 and - 454NSC Action Nos. 500, 473, and 454 are ibid., NSC Records of Action, Box 95, + 454NSC Action Nos. 500, 473, and 454 are ibid., NSC Records of Action, Box 95, NSC Actions 407–598. - C. Progress Reports by the Under Secretary of State on NSC 107, dated May 2 and May 31, + C. Progress Reports by the Under Secretary of State on NSC 107, dated May 2 and May 31, 1951Documents 21 and 31. D. Two memos for NSC from - Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 21, 1951Reference is to two memoranda to the National - Security Council from Lay, dated June 21, that forwarded the + Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 21, 1951Reference is to two memoranda to the National + Security Council from Lay, dated June 21, that forwarded the recommendations of the JCS for revision of NSC 107/1 and then - reported on the recommendation of the Senior NSC Staff that the suggested - revisions of the JCS for NSC 107/1 be adopted by the NSC. (National Archives, RG 273, Records of the National + reported on the recommendation of the Senior NSC Staff that the suggested + revisions of the JCS for NSC 107/1 be adopted by the NSC. (National Archives, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Minutes 1947–1961, Box 14, 95th Meeting) - E. NIE–6; SE–6Documents 13 and 28. + E. NIE–6; SE–6Documents 13 and 28.

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of Defense Mobilization, at the 95th Council meeting with the President presiding (NSC Action No. - 500),NSC Action No. 500, taken as a result of the 95th + 500),NSC Action No. 500, taken as a result of the 95th meeting of the NSC, is summarized here. considered the draft statement of policy on Iran contained in NSC 107/1 together with @@ -7276,8 +6548,7 @@

1. It is of critical importance to the United States that Iran remain an independent and sovereign nation firmly aligned with the free world. Because of its key strategic position, its petroleum resources, its - vulnerability to intervention or armed attack by the USSR, and its vulnerability to political + vulnerability to intervention or armed attack by the USSR, and its vulnerability to political subversion, Iran must be regarded as a continuing objective of Soviet expansion. The loss of Iran by default or by Soviet intervention would:

@@ -7347,15 +6618,13 @@ world, would produce a chaotic situation in Iran, and might cause the Iranian Government to turn to the Soviet Union for help. However, should the lives of British subjects in Iran be placed in immediate jeopardy by - mob violence, the United States would not oppose the entry of British forces into the danger + mob violence, the United States would not oppose the entry of British forces into the danger area for the sole purpose of evacuating British nationals on the clear understanding that this would be undertaken only as a last resort and that the British forces so introduced would be withdrawn immediately after the evacuation was completed. In the event of a British decision to use force against the advice of the United States, the situation - would be so critical that the position of the United States would have to be determined in + would be so critical that the position of the United States would have to be determined in the light of the world situation at the time.

4. Because of United States commitments in other areas, the current understanding with the United Kingdom that it is responsible for the @@ -7394,8 +6663,7 @@ States and jointly with the United Kingdom, the position of the United States would have to be determined in the light of the situation at the time.

-

7. In the event of a Soviet attack by organized USSR military forces against Iran, the United States in +

7. In the event of a Soviet attack by organized USSR military forces against Iran, the United States in common prudence would have to proceed on the assumption that global war is probably imminent. Accordingly, the United States should then immediately:

@@ -7428,16 +6696,11 @@ secure or deny Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrein.

-
- 36. Memorandum for the RecordSource: National Archives, RG 59, +
+ 36. Memorandum for the RecordSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/6–7951. Top Secret. Drafted by - Gerald F.P. Dooher. - New York, June 29, 1951. + Gerald F.P. Dooher. + New York, June 29, 1951.

The following points were made by the Qashqai brothers at a luncheon party June 27 and a dinner party June 28. I have added my personal comments:

@@ -7453,8 +6716,7 @@

2. It appears that one of the four Khans (on a rotating system) will be in the United States at all times. This, in my belief, looks like the beginning of a liaison arrangement.

-

3. Khosrow Khan is here as an emissary of Prime Minister Mossadeq. One of his missions is to +

3. Khosrow Khan is here as an emissary of Prime Minister Mossadeq. One of his missions is to influence American public opinion in favor of Iran. I have seen the letter from Mossadeq to Khosrow Khan instructing him to carry out this mission.

@@ -7464,8 +6726,7 @@ opinion the Western world would do well to cultivate the only one of these two forces available to them, namely, the Qashqais.

5. Khosrow Khan states that the Iranian Army’s effectiveness was - shattered by the bullet that killed Razmara.

+ shattered by the bullet that killed Razmara.

6. They believe that for $3,000,000 the four most important army garrisons in Iran could be purchased by any bidder. And for $10,000,000 the entire army could be bought. I detected in these statements the @@ -7480,43 +6741,35 @@ their control over the tribe. They talk of 200,000 effective fighting men among the Qashqais and other Southern tribes, but also mention the figure of 75,000 “picked men”.

-

9. The Qashqais express great love and admiration for Dr. Mossadeq. On occasion they wink when +

9. The Qashqais express great love and admiration for Dr. Mossadeq. On occasion they wink when they say this. They have no use for the other National Fronters.

10. As successor to Mossadeq they - talk of either Sardar Fakher Hekmat or Dr. Baghai. I believe their candidate is + talk of either Sardar Fakher Hekmat or Dr. Baghai. I believe their candidate is Hekmat.

11. The Qashqais never liked the Shah. Four years ago they feared him. Last year they despised him. This year they find him ridiculous.

12. Their expenditures in New York make it apparent that this was a good year for the Qashqais.

- Gerald F. P. - DooherPrinted from a copy + Gerald F. P. + DooherPrinted from a copy that bears Dooher’s typed signature.
-
+
37. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of the Office of National Estimates (Langer) to Director - of Central Intelligence SmithSource: + of Central Intelligence SmithSource: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC - Files, Job 79R00904A, Box 1, Folder 2, Memos for DCI (1951) (Substantive). Secret. + Files, Job 79R00904A, Box 1, Folder 2, Memos for DCI (1951) (Substantive). Secret. There is no drafting information on the memorandum. - Washington, July 6, 1951. + Washington, July 6, 1951. SUBJECT Iranian Developments -

1. There is a serious danger that, unless the UK or the US adopt policies +

1. There is a serious danger that, unless the UK or the US adopt policies which will maintain the flow of Iranian oil to the West, Iran will be forced to turn to the USSR for assistance or will suffer an economic collapse. In either case, Iran @@ -7524,15 +6777,12 @@

2. At the present time the UK appears to be prepared to close down the AIOC installations in Iran, withdraw all British personnel from Iran, and - boycott Iranian oil rather than submit to Iran’s terms. It is unlikely that these tactics will + boycott Iranian oil rather than submit to Iran’s terms. It is unlikely that these tactics will induce Iran to accept a compromise settlement.

3. US oil companies apparently are not - planning to come to Iran’s assistance but, like the UK oil companies, are planning + planning to come to Iran’s assistance but, like the UK oil companies, are planning readjustments to provide alternate sources of supply for markets - previously satisfied by Iranian oil. The US has set up a Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee, + previously satisfied by Iranian oil. The US has set up a Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee, representing 19 major US companies operating abroad, for this purpose. The activities of this and similar bodies in the UK and Western Europe @@ -7540,8 +6790,7 @@ customers to buy, its oil even if it obtained individual technicians from various countries to maintain production. The flow of oil from Iran might be maintained to some extent, but it would probably be a small - proportion of the flow maintained by AIOC and would probably provide Iran with less of an income + proportion of the flow maintained by AIOC and would probably provide Iran with less of an income than it received from AIOC. If the Iranian oil industry were shut down completely for any length of time, Iran would find it almost impossible to recapture its former markets. @@ -7556,13 +6805,11 @@ southern oilfields, Iran would be lost to the West; and the consolidation of Iran as a Soviet Satellite would be only a matter of time.

-

5. The current US policyNSC 107/2. +

5. The current US policyNSC 107/2. [Footnote is in the original. NSC 107/2 is Document 35.] of supporting the Shah, extending military, economic, and technical assistance, and - bringing our influence to bear on Iran and the UK in the oil controversy appears hardly adequate to the + bringing our influence to bear on Iran and the UK in the oil controversy appears hardly adequate to the situation. If Iran’s stability (and therefore its vulnerability to Communist pressure) depends on the continued flow of its oil to the West, US policy-makers are confronted @@ -7577,40 +6824,32 @@ own juice” before coming to his assistance?

(c) Is it in our interest to assist Iran to maintain its oil industry, - even if such assistance has to be extended on Mossadeq’s present terms?

+ even if such assistance has to be extended on Mossadeq’s present terms?

(d) Are Mossadeq’s present terms in fact completely unreasonable and uneconomic from the point of view of a foreign concessionaire?

-

(e) If they are, is it in the interest of the US to subsidize a US oil +

(e) If they are, is it in the interest of the US to subsidize a US oil company to operate Iran’s oil industry?

(f) Would it be better to adopt such a course of action than to be compelled at a subsequent date to use force in Iran to put down a Communist uprising?

-

6. All these questions raise serious problems in connection with US–UK +

6. All these questions raise serious problems in connection with US–UK relations. The time appears to be rapidly approaching, however, when they will have to be answered unless the West is prepared to: (1) fight to retain in Iran what it appears unable to retain by negotiation; or (2) abandon Iran to Communism.

- William L. - LangerPrinted from a copy + William L. + LangerPrinted from a copy that bears Langer’s typed signature.
-
- 38. Memorandum for the RecordSource: National Archives, RG 59, - Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/7–651. Secret. Drafted by John Wiley of the Bureau of +
+ 38. Memorandum for the RecordSource: National Archives, RG 59, + Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/7–651. Secret. Drafted by John Wiley of the Bureau of European Affairs, former Ambassador to Iran. The memorandum is - attached to a July 6 memorandum from Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary + attached to a July 6 memorandum from Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, to the Executive Secretariat, which reads: “Ambassador John Wiley left the attached memorandum with the Secretary today. He said that he had @@ -7620,22 +6859,18 @@ situation we could even have the roots of a world war. Could this be passed on to Mr. McGhee for his information?” - Washington, undated. + Washington, undated.

IRAN

A tribal revolt in the South led by the Qashqais would suggest British collusion, even though the Qashqais are violently anti-British. The U.S.S.R. might plausibly invoke the treaty of 1921 in the event of such an uprising. Very confidentially, the Qashqais state categorically that they will not recognize any government in Iran formed with Tudeh - (Communist) participation, and will formally notify the “powers” in this sense. This implies that + (Communist) participation, and will formally notify the “powers” in this sense. This implies that an uprising might have a separatist character and not be merely another internal rebellion.

Alone, they claim, they can defeat the Iranian army even if it is - supported by the Azerbaijani and the Barzani. If the Soviet Union intervenes, their situation + supported by the Azerbaijani and the Barzani. If the Soviet Union intervenes, their situation will be hopeless but they will fight to the end.

It may be recalled that in 1946 the Qashqais defeated and disarmed an Iranian regiment and surrounded Shiraz. Peace was made by @@ -7646,9 +6881,7 @@

The consequences of such an uprising could be inflammatory. The Qashqais are not bluffing, and they are determined and resolute.

-
+
39. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central @@ -7660,8 +6893,7 @@ SIC No. 9750 - Washington, July 11, 1951. + Washington, July 11, 1951.

EFFECTS OF CLOSING DOWN THE IRANIAN OIL INDUSTRY

Four aspects of the Iranian oil crisis merit appraisal as the closedown of production approaches:

@@ -7677,16 +6909,14 @@

(4) In the event that Soviet Russia, either through pressure tactics or because Iran turned to it in desperation, should gain control of the oil industry, it could - transport part of the Iranian production to the USSR and Communist China, but would + transport part of the Iranian production to the USSR and Communist China, but would require years to exploit it fully.

Effect on World Oil Supply

The withdrawal of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company would almost completely close down the Iranian oil industry, which currently accounts for approximately 7% of the free world’s supply of crude oil and 5.3% of its refined products. Continental Western Europe secures 31% of its refined - products and 16% of its crude oil from Iran. About 25% of the UK’s domestic needs are supplied by the + products and 16% of its crude oil from Iran. About 25% of the UK’s domestic needs are supplied by the AIOC. South Asia gets close to 70% of its oil and oil products from Iran.

Within a year, expanded production in Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia @@ -7721,23 +6951,20 @@ to close down completely in the near future because of a lack of storage facilities. Crude oil production will also then cease. About 80,000 Iranians will be unemployed and the government will have lost the - approximately 40% of its revenue formerly provided by oil royalties. The resulting squeeze + approximately 40% of its revenue formerly provided by oil royalties. The resulting squeeze may be temporarily alleviated by a sale of government bonds or an increase in the note issue, but it is difficult to see how the army or the civil service can be kept functioning for long without pay.

Failure of the present government to keep the oil industry operating would so reduce popular confidence that the government probably would - not be able to remain in office. Should Prime Minister Mossadeq decide at the last moment that + not be able to remain in office. Should Prime Minister Mossadeq decide at the last moment that the AIOC is needed to keep oil revenues from drying up, and attempt to compromise, he might well be assassinated or removed. A more conservative prime minister, if installed, would arouse so much antagonism that he could not retain control. Under such circumstances it is probable that the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party would maneuver into power a Communist-dominated government. - In the demoralized situation envisioned, no overt USSR support would be needed to turn Iran + In the demoralized situation envisioned, no overt USSR support would be needed to turn Iran from the West and place it among the Satellites.

Should the Tudeh Party gain control of the government, the tribes of south and west Iran—the oil producing area—might denounce the Tehran @@ -7765,22 +6992,17 @@ a restriction which has limited the operations of the Haifa refinery to one-quarter of its capacity. Complaints of the Western powers and Israel will continue unheeded, however, as long as the shortage of refined - products does not affect Egypt directly. Inspired by Iranian nationalism, Egypt can also be + products does not affect Egypt directly. Inspired by Iranian nationalism, Egypt can also be expected to step up its present efforts to dislodge British troops from the Suez Canal Zone and to end the British administration in the Sudan.

-

Capabilities of the USSR To Utilize Iranian Oil

-

With the termination of the control of Iran’s oil resources by the AIOC, the Soviet Union could capitalize +

Capabilities of the USSR To Utilize Iranian Oil

+

With the termination of the control of Iran’s oil resources by the AIOC, the Soviet Union could capitalize on this opportunity to deny Iranian oil to the West as well as to augment its own supplies of crude oil and refined products. In spite of the difficult task of taking over such a complicated installation as the - Abadan refinery, it is believed that the USSR could provide enough qualified technicians to keep it - operating at a level sufficient to supply the USSR with all the products it is at present able to + Abadan refinery, it is believed that the USSR could provide enough qualified technicians to keep it + operating at a level sufficient to supply the USSR with all the products it is at present able to transport.

Transporting the oil from Iran would present formidable problems to the Soviet Union because the Soviet bloc owns only about 1% of the world’s @@ -7800,12 +7022,10 @@ annual production of this commodity, which is vital to the conduct of a long-range strategic air offensive. Overland transport could in time be increased with new tank cars and possibly with air transport.

-

The Iranian terrain would make construction of a pipeline to the USSR a most difficult and expensive +

The Iranian terrain would make construction of a pipeline to the USSR a most difficult and expensive proposition, though it is not an impossible engineering feat. Such a pipeline could conceivably be constructed in two to three years and - would presumably be used for refined products. While the USSR might be unwilling to lay so costly + would presumably be used for refined products. While the USSR might be unwilling to lay so costly a pipeline in view of Iran’s vulnerability to Western interdiction efforts in the event of war, there is a strong possibility that such a pipeline would be built if the Soviet Union were to commence integrating @@ -7814,50 +7034,38 @@ oil resources, Iran would be exploited in the familiar pattern.

-
- 40. Project Outline Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence +
+ 40. Project Outline Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 58–00070R, Box 12, Folder 496, OPC Operational Project Outline, Reel 96. Top Secret. According to an attached clearance sheet, the plan was developed by [name - not declassified] and approved by Acting ADPC [name not - declassified], August 2. Wisner added his approval on August 6 with the + not declassified] and approved by Acting ADPC [name not + declassified], August 2. Wisner added his approval on August 6 with the following condition: “Approved—Subject to clear understanding that this does not now involve a commitment of the amount in excess of [dollar amount not declassified]—and may not do so until approved by PRC of the survey to be made.” - Washington, July 26, 1951. + Washington, July 26, 1951.

Project [less than 1 line not declassified]

1. References

-

a. NSC 10/2.National Security Council Directive 10/2, dated June 18, 1948, +

a. NSC 10/2.National Security Council Directive 10/2, dated June 18, 1948, charged the CIA with developing a covert action capability. NSC 10/2 - is printed in Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the + is printed in Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, pp. 713–715 (Document 293).

b. CIA Report No. CSO–B–19395, dated 10 August 1950 attached.

-

c. Memorandum from Chief, Contract Division, 0/0 for AD/OPC attached, dated 20 March 1951.

-

d. Memorandum from Chief, Contract Division, 0/0 for AD/OPC, attached, dated 11 May 1951.None of the documents listed as attached was +

c. Memorandum from Chief, Contract Division, 0/0 for AD/OPC attached, dated 20 March 1951.

+

d. Memorandum from Chief, Contract Division, 0/0 for AD/OPC, attached, dated 11 May 1951.None of the documents listed as attached was found attached.

2. Problem and Objective

Penetration of tribal areas in general, and Southwestern Iran in - particular, has long been a problem for OPC. The Qashqai tribe, reputed to be the strongest tribe + particular, has long been a problem for OPC. The Qashqai tribe, reputed to be the strongest tribe in Iran, inhibits a large area in Southwest Iran that is of particular importance in the development of an escape and evasion network and as a base for guerrilla warfare activities. Due to the extreme sensitivity of @@ -7875,14 +7083,12 @@ area will be analyzed and exploited.

3. Proposal

-

Several factors have now been combined which give OPC an opportunity to penetrate the area +

Several factors have now been combined which give OPC an opportunity to penetrate the area under discussion. They are: [7½ lines not declassified].

[2 paragraphs (22 lines) not declassified]

Benefits accruing to OPC from - implementation of this project are: Placement of OPC agents in a hitherto inaccessible + implementation of this project are: Placement of OPC agents in a hitherto inaccessible area; opportunity to observe and evaluate the potential value of the tribesman to OPC in resistance and guerrilla warfare activities; opportunities to establish escape and @@ -7894,8 +7100,7 @@

4. Risks

[1½ lines not declassified] it is not believed that a great deal of risk is involved in this project. The advantages - listed above seem to outweigh any risk by OPC and the financial arrangements appear to be secure. + listed above seem to outweigh any risk by OPC and the financial arrangements appear to be secure. Since the Qashqai are direct benefactors of this project, the possibility of their revealing the source of funds is extremely remote.

@@ -7906,11 +7111,8 @@

[Omitted here is additional budgetary detail related to the project.]

-
- 41. Project Outline Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence +
+ 41. Project Outline Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 78–01521R, Box 5, Folder 25, [text not declassified]. Top Secret. According to an attached clearance sheet, the plan was @@ -7918,20 +7120,13 @@ on July 24, and approved [less than 1 line not declassified] on August 10. According to another copy of the outline, this project was approved by the Project Review - Committee on September 6, although with its funding reduced to [dollar amount not declassified]. (Ibid., Job + Committee on September 6, although with its funding reduced to [dollar amount not declassified]. (Ibid., Job 58–00070R, Box 12, Folder 494, OPC Operational Project Outline, Reel 96) - Washington, undated. + Washington, undated.

1. References

-

a. NSC 10/2See footnote 2, Document 40.

-

b. NSC 107Document 6.

+

a. NSC 10/2See footnote 2, Document 40.

+

b. NSC 107Document 6.

c. The Crisis in Iran dated 13 March 1951, TS ControlSee footnote 1, Document 5.

@@ -7944,8 +7139,7 @@ developing into a democratic state in the Western sense, shows little possibility of becoming master of her fate and architect of her future. The steady deterioration of the Iranian oil situation has been of great - value to the Soviet Union, and the USSR is prepared, through the medium of the Tudeh Party of + value to the Soviet Union, and the USSR is prepared, through the medium of the Tudeh Party of Iran, to capitalize on the chaotic situation toward which Iran is now heading. On the other hand, the United States has no Iranian party or group with which to combat the Tudeh/Communist menace in Iran and the @@ -7957,8 +7151,7 @@ from being subverted or overthrown by the Communists in Iran.

a. Objective

The objective of this project is to establish an effective force in - Iranian politics with which to oppose the Tudeh/Communists. OPC will back individuals and groups in an + Iranian politics with which to oppose the Tudeh/Communists. OPC will back individuals and groups in an endeavor to produce an organized and directed attack upon the Communists in Iran. It will attempt to contact, through the indigenous elements it backs, various religious @@ -7971,8 +7164,7 @@ Communism; and capitalizing on personal enmity and competition among enemy leadership.

3. Proposal

-

In pursuit of the objectives above, it is proposed that OPC subsidize the existing political +

In pursuit of the objectives above, it is proposed that OPC subsidize the existing political warfare activities of [3 lines not declassified] and it is believed that this organization represents a force of great potential in Iranian politics. [4 lines not @@ -8001,17 +7193,11 @@

[6 paragraphs (18 lines) not declassified]

-
- 42. Memorandum From the Counselor of Embassy (Richards) to the Ambassador to Iran - (Henderson)Source: National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1950–1952, +
+ 42. Memorandum From the Counselor of Embassy (Richards) to the Ambassador to Iran + (Henderson)Source: National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1950–1952, classified general records,Box 29. Confidential. - Tehran, August 15, 1951. + Tehran, August 15, 1951. SUBJECT British Views on Future of the Government @@ -8024,23 +7210,18 @@ the negotiations. He then indicated that the British are giving serious consideration to the situation which may develop in case oil negotiations break down within the next few days.

-

Regardless of the success or failure of the Stokes Mission he feels (and I am confident that he - reflects the official British Embassy opinion) that Mosadeq cannot be expected to continue +

Regardless of the success or failure of the Stokes Mission he feels (and I am confident that he + reflects the official British Embassy opinion) that Mosadeq cannot be expected to continue in power for long. Mosadeq himself has indicated that he would resign upon the completion of successful negotiations with the British. There is evidence that increasing opposition may force him out unless the negotiations are successful.

The problem of a successor therefore arises. A list of likely candidates - for Prime Minister was reviewed by Mr. Middleton who stated that he had information to the + for Prime Minister was reviewed by Mr. Middleton who stated that he had information to the effect that the Shah was toying with the idea of the appointment of either Minister of Court Ala or - Ibrahim Hakimi. Mr. Middleton characterized Mr. Ala as a man of good-will but lacking + Ibrahim Hakimi. Mr. Middleton characterized Mr. Ala as a man of good-will but lacking in the force and decisiveness necessary at this critical juncture. Hakimi he dismissed as impossible because of his advanced age (he admits to 80 years) and his @@ -8054,19 +7235,15 @@ service; and others such as Soheli, the Ambassador at London, Ebtehaj, the Ambassador at Paris, and Ali Mansour, the Ambassador at Rome, he dismissed as out of the running.

-

This review leaves, according to Mr. Middleton, only two likely successors, Qavam and Seyid Zia.

+

This review leaves, according to Mr. Middleton, only two likely successors, Qavam and Seyid Zia.

Qavam, he stated, would probably be the most effective “strong man” for a short term, and judging from his activities since his return from Europe, he still has considerable political following; further he believed that the Shah, who has seen Qavam several times - recently, would not look upon Qavam with disfavor, in spite of their break last year. - However, while mentally alert, Qavam is in ill-health and probably incapable of + recently, would not look upon Qavam with disfavor, in spite of their break last year. + However, while mentally alert, Qavam is in ill-health and probably incapable of carrying the burden of a high government office. Furthermore, he characterized Qavam as a member of the corrupt old-guard who could not be expected to carry out economic @@ -8093,8 +7270,7 @@ and U.K. must impress upon the Shah the necessity for acceptance of the strongest possible Prime Minister and that the Shah must be assured of at least moral support by both governments to the extent that he would - feel confident in such a choice. Otherwise Mr. Middleton foresees the possible + feel confident in such a choice. Otherwise Mr. Middleton foresees the possible appointment of another weak Prime Minister and the consequent continuation of confused drifting.

The following are my comments on the foregoing:

@@ -8119,18 +7295,15 @@ power before that date is in a position to appoint officials to run the elections, to determine places of voting, and otherwise to make arrangements regarding elections. This in the past has always meant that - it is in a position to “rig” the elections. Mosadeq and his followers will be unlikely to give up + it is in a position to “rig” the elections. Mosadeq and his followers will be unlikely to give up such an opportunity unless they are forced to do so.

-

Another factor which must be considered if Mosadeq goes out is that he would then be a public hero +

Another factor which must be considered if Mosadeq goes out is that he would then be a public hero and would undoubtedly be a leader of a strong and embarrassing opposition in the Majlis. Any Prime Minister who might succeed him would find it extremely difficult to put through any legislation against the opposition of Mosadeq.

I am of the opinion that we should go very slow in making any comments - regarding the length of time Mosadeq may be in office or who should succeed him. We + regarding the length of time Mosadeq may be in office or who should succeed him. We must avoid close identification with any politician, at least for the present. To do otherwise would leave us open to accusation of close and sinister collaboration with the British and would give support to the @@ -8141,15 +7314,12 @@ serious attention. But we must exercise great caution in the manner by which we attempt to assist in this regard.

- ALR + ALR
-
- 43. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 43. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1950–1952, classified general records, Box 24. Secret. Drafted by Cuomo. The despatch was @@ -8160,8 +7330,7 @@ No. 224 - Tehran, August 20, 1951. + Tehran, August 20, 1951.

RECENT INCREASE IN POLITICAL PRESTIGE OFAYATOLLAH KASHANI

Summary:

@@ -8175,9 +7344,7 @@ such a man. He has more recently been assisted in elevating himself to a position of prominence by publicity accorded him in the foreign press and by the prestige given him through the fact that he alone among - religious leaders received calls from Mr. W. Averell Harriman and Mr. Richard Stokes.

+ religious leaders received calls from Mr. W. Averell Harriman and Mr. Richard Stokes.

His delusions of grandeur have been accentuated by events which have put him in the limelight of a local political affair having international implications. Although under present tense conditions, he has attained a @@ -8189,8 +7356,7 @@

Introduction:

Recently, Ayatollah Seyid Abol Qasem Kashani has become increasingly prominent in Iranian - public affairs. Ambitious, opportunistic, fanatical, Kashani’s influence depends + public affairs. Ambitious, opportunistic, fanatical, Kashani’s influence depends primarily on the support of the poorer and more ignorant classes of the Iranian people, and the more fanatical elements of the bazaar. From among this following Kashani @@ -8199,8 +7365,7 @@ assassinations and murders.

His power springs from these elements and he is careful to maintain his - influence over them. With such support, Kashani has been able to frighten into cautious silence + influence over them. With such support, Kashani has been able to frighten into cautious silence many who would otherwise oppose those causes which for whatever reason he has chosen to espouse. At the moment, the popular issue—which he helped make popular and which he is now exploiting to his advantage—is @@ -8217,22 +7382,18 @@ youth and even today, revolved around the Shiah pilgrims who came to pay homage at the tomb of Imam Ali, son-in-law of the Prophet. Educated by mullahs, he became one himself at an early age. His father opposed the - British in Iraq during World War I and the still-young Kashani found himself in a Holy War + British in Iraq during World War I and the still-young Kashani found himself in a Holy War declared by his father and other religious leaders against all Christians. His father was killed in a battle following the British landings on the Persian Gulf. Since then he freely threatens “Holy War” at the least provocation and his hatred of the British, accentuated by later events, verges on the psychopathic.

He continued to oppose British interference in Iranian affairs for some - years after World War I, but he must have appraised Reza Shah as one stronger than himself + years after World War I, but he must have appraised Reza Shah as one stronger than himself for he cautiously kept out of that monarch’s way in spite of the anti-clerical policies which were carried out during his reign and the continuation of Iranian oil exploitation by the British.

-

Following the advent of World War II and the abdication of Reza Shah, Kashani again took up the task of +

Following the advent of World War II and the abdication of Reza Shah, Kashani again took up the task of opposing British activities. When the Allies occupied Iran, the British promptly imprisoned him in spite of objections raised by the then U.S. Minister, Dreyfus. His relative @@ -8243,17 +7404,13 @@ Minister Qavam, who exiled him to the provinces. In early 1949, after the attempted assassination of the Shah, as a precautionary measure Prime Minister Mohammed Sa’ed, - aided and advised by Army Chief of Staff Ali Razmara, sent Kashani out of the country again.

+ aided and advised by Army Chief of Staff Ali Razmara, sent Kashani out of the country again.

The influence he wields was demonstrated when he was elected to the Majlis while still in exile. He was elected as a National Front deputy in 1950 along with his friend. Dr. Mosadeq. Both attribute all of Iran’s shortcomings and misfortunes to British - interference in Iran. When Razmara became Prime Minister, Kashani did not find it difficult to + interference in Iran. When Razmara became Prime Minister, Kashani did not find it difficult to support National Front policies, particularly in attacking the man whom both he and Mosadeq believed to be subservient to British influence and who had been instrumental in @@ -8269,21 +7426,16 @@ for political intrigue. He has tried to take full advantage of it. It should be pointed out, however, that contrary to anything he may say at the present time, at least until June of last year he had not opposed - the supplementary oil agreement offered by the AIOC and under discussion at that time.Embassy Despatch No. 382 of June 22, 1950. [Footnote - is in the original. Despatch 382 from Tehran is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, + the supplementary oil agreement offered by the AIOC and under discussion at that time.Embassy Despatch No. 382 of June 22, 1950. [Footnote + is in the original. Despatch 382 from Tehran is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/6–2250.]

Nevertheless, events moved on and he moved with them. With the unwitting aid of the foreign press in combination with the aroused and unrequited - passions of the Iranian people, Kashani was elevated, and cleverly helped elevate + passions of the Iranian people, Kashani was elevated, and cleverly helped elevate himself, to an influential position in Iranian political affairs. Dr. Mosadeq was careful to call on him as soon as he became Prime Minister, and has kept in regular - contact with him ever since. Kashani in turn has supported the Prime Minister. He has + contact with him ever since. Kashani in turn has supported the Prime Minister. He has at all critical moments issued messages to the people affirming the necessity of Dr. Mosadeq’s leadership in the vital oil nationalization issue.

@@ -8296,42 +7448,33 @@ seat, Kashani said that he would go to the Majlis only in case of an emergency. Perhaps he is waiting for a propitious occasion. In the prevailing tense atmosphere, - and over the oil nationalization issue, should Kashani decide to make a public + and over the oil nationalization issue, should Kashani decide to make a public appearance he would undoubtedly draw together an impressive mass of people.

At the suggestion of Dr. Mosadeq two weeks ago, W. Averell - Harriman called on Kashani.The Harriman Mission, composed of + Harriman called on Kashani.The Harriman Mission, composed of W. Averell Harriman, William M. Rountree, Walter Levy, and General Landry, traveled to Iran on July 13 in order to encourage a solution - to the oil dispute between Iran and the United Kingdom. Harriman left Tehran on August 25. + to the oil dispute between Iran and the United Kingdom. Harriman left Tehran on August 25. Richard Stokes, Lord Privy Seal, led the British delegation to Iran that remained in Tehran from August 4 to August 23 at which time talks between the British and the Iranians were suspended. For extensive documentation on the Harriman Mission, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, - Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 88–173 (Documents 39–91). As released to the press by Kashani, the interview was + Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 88–173 (Documents 39–91). As released to the press by Kashani, the interview was practically a Kashani monologue. A few pertinent remarks from the published version of the interview follows:

-

“I must tell you plainly, Mr. Harriman, that we have been oppressed and robbed by the +

“I must tell you plainly, Mr. Harriman, that we have been oppressed and robbed by the former oil company for fifty years” . . . . “Now four hundred Moslems have pinned their hopes on our country. All the Moslem countries expect us to break the chain put on our feet by British imperialist - exploitation . . .” “Should Dr. Mosadeq compromise, he will lose the sincere support he + exploitation . . .” “Should Dr. Mosadeq compromise, he will lose the sincere support he is now receiving from the people” . . . . “I am now working for the union of the Moslem nations, and also for the union of the peoples of the East. As I told you, I am trying my best to unite my four hundred @@ -8343,8 +7486,7 @@ addressed a message to the people of Khazistan expressing his appreciation of their patriotism and assistance:

“I expect every effort will be exerted to maintain order . . . . and to - support the government of His Excellency Dr. Mosadeq, and the appropriation committee which is + support the government of His Excellency Dr. Mosadeq, and the appropriation committee which is working for the benefit of the workers of Khazistan. I pray that God Almighty will bestow health, happiness and tranquility upon my dear brethren and that the hands of the merciless foreigners will be severed. @@ -8356,42 +7498,33 @@ and Liaqat Ali Khan of Pakistan calling upon them amicable to settle the Kashmir dispute. He received a reply from both Prime Ministers.

-

To digress for a moment at this point, when Reza Shah decided to break the power of the clergy in +

To digress for a moment at this point, when Reza Shah decided to break the power of the clergy in Iran one of his first acts was to strike at its finances. He confiscated the ecclesiastical properties and the managers of the properties were made civil functionaries of the Ministry of Education. In recent years, despite the growing influence of the clergy no attempt has as yet been - put forth by that clergy to revise the fundamental laws made by Reza Shah which stripped it of its power. It is to the - Minister of Education that Kashani now addressed himself. In a letter to him + put forth by that clergy to revise the fundamental laws made by Reza Shah which stripped it of its power. It is to the + Minister of Education that Kashani now addressed himself. In a letter to him Kashani urged the Minister to make certain changes in order to conform to the regulations of Islam. The letter closes:

“I seriously request your Excellency to issue prompt instructions regarding the foregoing points and expect that you will advise us of any decision you make to this effect.”

-

The next move was for The Right Honorable Richard Stokes to pay him a visit. He, like Mr. +

The next move was for The Right Honorable Richard Stokes to pay him a visit. He, like Mr. Harriman, was subjected to a long harangue. His repeated requests for permission to leave were ignored while Kashani talked - on. It was during this interview that Kashani made the following remark:

+ on. It was during this interview that Kashani made the following remark:

“Even Dr. Mosadeq, who enjoys the unanimous support of the people, if he deviated from the nine article law, risks losing not only his prestige but also risks suffering the same fate as Razmara”.

To Kashani this means anyone - deviating from the path of nationalization as now laid down by Kashani “risks suffering the same + deviating from the path of nationalization as now laid down by Kashani “risks suffering the same fate as Razmara”.

-

After the satisfaction of his interview with Mr. Stokes another flow of “messages” may - be expected. The first has already appeared. It is Kashani’s message to Pakistan on the +

After the satisfaction of his interview with Mr. Stokes another flow of “messages” may + be expected. The first has already appeared. It is Kashani’s message to Pakistan on the occasion of its fourth anniversary of independence. The message ends:

“In conclusion I avail myself of the opportunity to strongly recommend to @@ -8399,8 +7532,7 @@ previous policy of friendship with its Indian neighbor and not to take any steps that would undermine the satisfactory solution of existing differences.”

-

As evidence of his expanding activities the Tehran newspaper Keyhan, of August 16 reports the following:

+

As evidence of his expanding activities the Tehran newspaper Keyhan, of August 16 reports the following:

“The correspondent of the newspaper Al Masri has reported that Haji Amin-ol-Hoseini, the Grand Mufti of Palestine, is a staunch supporter of Ayatollah @@ -8420,13 +7552,9 @@

He has fantastic delusions of grandeur which until recently had little basis in fact. Events, however, have moved in his favor. His political stature has been inflated by the publicity accorded him in the foreign - press and the prestige given him by the fact that Mr. Harriman and Mr. Stokes called on him. Their interviews - have been exploited to the maximum by Kashani.

-

Although his stature has grown over the last few months, Kashani has not attained the + press and the prestige given him by the fact that Mr. Harriman and Mr. Stokes called on him. Their interviews + have been exploited to the maximum by Kashani.

+

Although his stature has grown over the last few months, Kashani has not attained the overwhelming influence which he believes he has and which he would have others believe he has. Despite his present prominence in Iranian political affairs, there is no doubt that his pretensions vastly exceed @@ -8436,8 +7564,7 @@ little basis for it. He would fall from his relatively influential position as soon as its thin props were removed.

His reputation as a religious leader is not supported by his colleagues - whose influence in educated circles far exceed that of Kashani. While his bombast and + whose influence in educated circles far exceed that of Kashani. While his bombast and threats are effective in the current tense atmosphere, he probably would fail to withstand a determined attack against him by any government with the support of reputable religious leaders who would expose the @@ -8445,22 +7572,19 @@ pretensions.

For the Ambassador:

- Arthur L. - Richards + Arthur L. + Richards Counselor of Embassy
-
+
44. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Intelligence and ResearchSource: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79R01012A, Box 14, Folder 1, NIE–46 Iran. Secret. - Washington, September 13, 1951. + Washington, September 13, 1951.

CURRENT STRENGTH OF THE TUDEH PARTY IN IRAN

Problem

Estimate of the current capability of the Tudeh Party to seize control in @@ -8470,8 +7594,7 @@

Since the suppression of the Tudeh following the attempted assassination of the Shah in February 1949, the party has operated openly through the Peace Partisans and the Society Organized to Fight Imperialist Oil - Companies. Up to April 29, 1951, when Mosadeq became Prime Minister, the usual official method + Companies. Up to April 29, 1951, when Mosadeq became Prime Minister, the usual official method of controlling Tudeh was by invoking martial law, making arrests, and suppressing newspapers. Mosadeq, however, lifted martial law, released certain Tudeh leaders from prison, @@ -8480,8 +7603,7 @@ participants, with the exception of the demonstration in Tehran on July 15, 1951.

Since a major objective of Soviet policy in Iran is to end western - influence there, the Tudeh actively supported Mosadeq in his nationalization policy, + influence there, the Tudeh actively supported Mosadeq in his nationalization policy, except when it appeared likely that he might arrive at an agreement which would retain significant British control in Iran. Although Mosadeq has welcomed all @@ -8494,8 +7616,7 @@ of Ramazan, and a severe setback on July 15 when they engaged in open fighting with the police and military in front of the Majlis. This street fight lost them the respect of many Iranians due to Iranian - repugnance for public rudeness to a national guest (Harriman), and significantly chilled + repugnance for public rudeness to a national guest (Harriman), and significantly chilled the ardor of hangers-on and co-demonstrators.

In addition to the setback in Tehran, the strength of Tudeh in Isfahan was recently broken when the chief of police arrested all the @@ -8510,10 +7631,8 @@ unavailable, but a reasonably dependable source estimates the current active membership at 4000.

Tudeh leaders have undoubtedly been instructed by Soviet agents to - agitate for the expulsion of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) and to emphasize alleged British - imperialism in Iran. Since support for Mosadeq is almost universal and anti-British sentiment + agitate for the expulsion of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) and to emphasize alleged British + imperialism in Iran. Since support for Mosadeq is almost universal and anti-British sentiment is intense, it is very difficult to estimate public support for Tudeh. It is probable that Mosadeq himself could get Majlis @@ -8528,8 +7647,7 @@ join the anti-AIOC organization and ultimately the Tudeh ranks. Since any successor government would probably have to maintain order by force if it accepts any agreement - which will, in effect, restore the AIOC to its former position in Iran, Tudeh may be expected + which will, in effect, restore the AIOC to its former position in Iran, Tudeh may be expected to exploit the anticipated popular indignation to the fullest extent. The allegiance of the security forces, if ordered to support an unpopular settlement, is doubtful.

@@ -8560,50 +7678,36 @@ part of 1952.

-
+
45. Study Prepared in the Office of Research and Reports, Directorate - of Intelligence, Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, ORR Files, Job 79S01097A, Box 1, + of Intelligence, Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, ORR Files, Job 79S01097A, Box 1, Folder 14, SIC/Z–14L(1)/51, The Importance and Availability of Iranian Oil to the USSR under Peacetime Conditions. Top Secret; SUEDE; Dissemination to U.S. Personnel Cleared for Special Intelligence Information. Sent to - DCI, G–2, ONI, AIR, State, - AFSA, NSC, JCS, and OCI. - Washington, September 22, 1951. + DCI, G–2, ONI, AIR, State, + AFSA, NSC, JCS, and OCI. + Washington, September 22, 1951.

THE IMPORTANCE AND AVAILABILITY OF IRANIAN OIL TOTHE USSR UNDER PEACETIME CONDITIONS

[Omitted here is a Foreword.]

Summary

-

For the purposes of this paper it is assumed that: (1) the USSR will be willing to invest the - necessary effort to exploit Iranian oil; (2) the USSR will gain unlimited access to - Iranian oil production under circumstances short of global war;The bulk of Iranian petroleum products must be +

For the purposes of this paper it is assumed that: (1) the USSR will be willing to invest the + necessary effort to exploit Iranian oil; (2) the USSR will gain unlimited access to + Iranian oil production under circumstances short of global war;The bulk of Iranian petroleum products must be moved to the USSR by sea through waters dominated by Western powers. [Footnote is in the original.] and (3) the USSR - and Iran will not have access to US–UK controlled tankers or + and Iran will not have access to US–UK controlled tankers or technicians.

This paper is limited to a discussion of the developments during the first year of substantial oil shipments from Iran to the Soviet Orbit. - It does not consider the transition periodThis paper makes no attempt to estimate either the time required to + It does not consider the transition periodThis paper makes no attempt to estimate either the time required to place the Abadan facilities in production again or the length of time necessary to put into operation the rail and sea transportation facilities for carrying Abadan production. The refinery has been - shut down since 1 August 1951. AIOC officials estimate it would take their own + shut down since 1 August 1951. AIOC officials estimate it would take their own technicians two to three months to restore full operation of the refinery. Technicians not experienced with the plant might require up to nine months to restore full production. [Footnote is in the @@ -8613,16 +7717,13 @@

The potential importance of Iranian oil to the Soviet Orbit is indicated by the estimate that during the first year following the transition period the Soviet Orbit could import and utilize approximately 2,900,000 - metric tons of petroleum products. The USSR, if necessary, could supply the technicians and + metric tons of petroleum products. The USSR, if necessary, could supply the technicians and materials required to operate the refinery at this level. The volume of imports could be increased in subsequent years as more and more transportation facilities become available and the level of production rises.

Of the 2.9 million tons of petroleum products which the Soviet Orbit - could import during the first year, the USSR could provide tankers for the movement of approximately 1.6 million tons to the + could import during the first year, the USSR could provide tankers for the movement of approximately 1.6 million tons to the Soviet Far East and Communist China. In this way, the Soviet Union could take care of the minimum petroleum needs of the Communist Far East which cannot be met by local production. The use of the sea route would also @@ -8647,33 +7748,22 @@

[Omitted here is the 13-page body of the study with an attached appendix, two tables, and a map.]

-
- 46. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 46. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1950–1952, classified general records, Box 39. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Henderson. Repeated to London. The telegram is the Embassy’s copy as approved and has no time of transmission. - Tehran, September 25, 1951. + Tehran, September 25, 1951.

1157. 1. Shepherd, British - Ambassador, asked Ambassador Henderson have informal tea with him yesterday - afternoon. View circumstances Henderson accepted although credentials not presented. - Conversation informal and friendly. Shepherd presented his views considerable detail, - indicating certain differences in interpretation and approach between U.S. and U.K. - Embassies. Various points made by Shepherd or impressions obtained by Henderson from Shepherd’s comments set forth briefly + Ambassador, asked Ambassador Henderson have informal tea with him yesterday + afternoon. View circumstances Henderson accepted although credentials not presented. + Conversation informal and friendly. Shepherd presented his views considerable detail, + indicating certain differences in interpretation and approach between U.S. and U.K. + Embassies. Various points made by Shepherd or impressions obtained by Henderson from Shepherd’s comments set forth briefly below:

2. Shepherd insisted Iranian opposition to British retention control Iranian oil superficial; did not @@ -8687,8 +7777,7 @@ Dept in getting together and working out common program. He suggested it would be useful if two Embassies could thresh out matter here so they could present parallel - views and recommendations to respective govts.

+ views and recommendations to respective govts.

4. Shepherd said British had been severely criticized for interference in Iranian internal affairs, but many Iranians while criticizing were simultaneously insisting British @@ -8697,11 +7786,9 @@ their neighbors. He thought time had come when there should be change in government; nothing constructive could be accomplished so long as Mosadeq remained in power; - therefore efforts should be concentrated on getting Mosadeq out at earliest possible + therefore efforts should be concentrated on getting Mosadeq out at earliest possible moment. One question was whether it would be better have him succeeded - by some “strong” politician like Qavam or Seyid Zia, or have him replaced by a more + by some “strong” politician like Qavam or Seyid Zia, or have him replaced by a more colorless PriMin who, after short interval, would give way to “strong” man. He inclined defend Seyid Zia expressing opinion latter’s reputation as “British stooge” no great @@ -8717,13 +7804,10 @@

5. Shepherd thought little would come out of suggestion that Iranian Mission might visit London. He did, however, consider it important that Shah had apparently come to opinion - that it would be in interest of Iran for Mosadeq to retire. In response to questions, he stated + that it would be in interest of Iran for Mosadeq to retire. In response to questions, he stated he had no evidence that Shah was as yet prepared to take any concrete - action to expedite retirement Mosadeq.

-

6. Henderson told Shepherd he still in process + action to expedite retirement Mosadeq.

+

6. Henderson told Shepherd he still in process orientation and was endeavoring obtain views and background. He was not therefore prepared just yet offer suggestions.

@@ -8732,31 +7816,21 @@ passed on to any foreign Govt officials including British.

- Richards + Richards
-
+
47. Memorandum From Henry Villard of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of - State, to the Chairman of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 888.2553/9–2651. + State, to the Chairman of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 888.2553/9–2651. Secret. - Washington, September 26, 1951. + Washington, September 26, 1951.

IRANIAN SITUATION

As I see it the Iranian situation now boils down to the following facts and conclusions:

1. The British have rejected our suggestions in regard to Mossadegh and - discussion of the latest Iranian proposals.See Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, - Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 162–169 (Documents 86–89). They persist in working for Mossadegh’s downfall + discussion of the latest Iranian proposals.See Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, + Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 162–169 (Documents 86–89). They persist in working for Mossadegh’s downfall and profess to have the Shah’s support of this aim. In this they are employing tactics they have always employed in Iran and which were a principal cause for the drastic nationalization laws. British intrigue @@ -8774,8 +7848,7 @@ could not last long. The Shah cannot be expected to move against Mossadegh. In the first place he lacks guts to do so. In the second place he is aware of the extreme unpopularity of such action. The - removal of Mossadegh by the Shah could only result in an attempt to govern the country by armed + removal of Mossadegh by the Shah could only result in an attempt to govern the country by armed force. Even this would probably be impossible in view of the unreliability of the Iranian armed forces in the face of angry public opinion. The British pretend to believe that public opinion is not a @@ -8793,16 +7866,13 @@ Iranians as distinct from economic considerations. That objective is not to reach a negotiated settlement on the question of profits or management, but to drive out British influence in accordance with a - literal interpretation of the Iranians’ communication to the ICJ: “in order to free themselves from the + literal interpretation of the Iranians’ communication to the ICJ: “in order to free themselves from the claws of a usurping company which for long years has served as a disturbing influence in economic, social and political fields in Iran.”For statements made before the International Court of Justice in regard to the Anglo-Iranian oil - dispute, see International Court of Justice, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom vs. Iran) Pleadings, - Oral Arguments, Documents, Leyden. See also Document 76. Emotion—not logic—is the + dispute, see International Court of Justice, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom vs. Iran) Pleadings, + Oral Arguments, Documents, Leyden. See also Document 76. Emotion—not logic—is the controlling factor, and the sooner the British realize they are not wanted in Iran, the sooner can we approach a possible solution.

4. It seems to me that the time has arrived for a show-down with the U.K. @@ -8822,32 +7892,19 @@ to swallow it, but the stakes are so high that unless we try something of this sort a whole chapter of dangers will presently open up.

- Henry S. - VillardVillard initialed above his + Henry S. + VillardVillard initialed above his typed signature.
-
- 48. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 33R00601A, Box 17, Folder 4, National - Security Council 107 Series. Top Secret. Drafted by Roosevelt and concurred in by [name not declassified] on behalf of Wisner. The memorandum is attached - to a memorandum from Roosevelt to Wisner, October 9, that reads: “There is attached - herewith for the Director’s use in connection with the NSC meeting tomorrow on Iran a - memorandum setting forth the recent developments in OPC operations in Iran.” - Washington, October 9, 1951. +
+ 48. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 33R00601A, Box 17, Folder 4, National + Security Council 107 Series. Top Secret. Drafted by Roosevelt and concurred in by [name not declassified] on behalf of Wisner. The memorandum is attached + to a memorandum from Roosevelt to Wisner, October 9, that reads: “There is attached + herewith for the Director’s use in connection with the NSC meeting tomorrow on Iran a + memorandum setting forth the recent developments in OPC operations in Iran.” + Washington, October 9, 1951.

OPERATIONS IN IRAN

1. CIA is unable to affect the immediate political crisis in Iran, which can only be resolved by diplomatic @@ -8874,8 +7931,7 @@ expected Tudeh demonstrations in October by counter-demonstrations.

b. Our expanded psychological warfare program calls for expenditure of [less than 1 line not declassified] to - purchase printing presses and set up a printing establishment [3 lines not declassified].

+ purchase printing presses and set up a printing establishment [3 lines not declassified].

c. Progress was made in organizing stay-behind activities. Preliminary discussions took place with the British in the field in Escape and Evasion planning, demolition, and general stay-behind activities. Field @@ -8883,69 +7939,49 @@ been undertaken. We have been in contact with leaders of the influential Qashqai tribe of southwestern Iran, who gave us formal assurances that in the event of war they would - cooperate in collecting and transmitting intelligence, in E&E operations, sabotage, and the - formation of resistance groups. We are now attempting to install US personnel in this tribal area.

+ cooperate in collecting and transmitting intelligence, in E&E operations, sabotage, and the + formation of resistance groups. We are now attempting to install US personnel in this tribal area.

d. [1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

-
+
49. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and - African Affairs, Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 888.2553/10–1051. Top + African Affairs, Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 888.2553/10–1051. Top Secret. Drafted by Kitchen and Rountree. The paper is - attached to a memorandum from McGhee to Acheson for use as a background summary for the + attached to a memorandum from McGhee to Acheson for use as a background summary for the 104th meeting of the NSC on the same day. See Document 50. - Washington, October 10, 1951. + Washington, October 10, 1951.

THE CURRENT IRANIAN SITUATION

The last briefing of the Security Council on Iran dealt with the - situation as of August 22, while Mr. Harriman was in Tehran.The + situation as of August 22, while Mr. Harriman was in Tehran.The official minutes of the NSC meeting of August 22 record that the National Security Council discussed NSC 107/2 and a briefing given by DCI - Smith. (Ibid., RG 273, Records of the National + Smith. (Ibid., RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Minutes 1947–1961, Box 16, 100th Meeting) The British-Iranian negotiations which had been - brought about through Mr. Harriman’s efforts were thereafter suspended. Later, + brought about through Mr. Harriman’s efforts were thereafter suspended. Later, they were broken off altogether by the British Government as a result of - strong public statements made by Dr. Mosadeq. The following is a brief account of + strong public statements made by Dr. Mosadeq. The following is a brief account of developments since that time.

-

On September 12, Prime Minister Mosadeq addressed a letter to Mr. Harriman setting forth certain +

On September 12, Prime Minister Mosadeq addressed a letter to Mr. Harriman setting forth certain proposals for a possible settlement and stating that failure by the British within 15 days to agree to resumption of negotiations would compel the Iranian Government to expel British technicians remaining in the south.For a discussion of Prime Minister Mosadeq’s letter to Harriman and its - aftermath, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, - pp. 162–163 (Document 86). Regarding the Harriman Mission, see footnote 3, Document 43. Mr. + aftermath, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, + pp. 162–163 (Document 86). Regarding the Harriman Mission, see footnote 3, Document 43. Mr. Harriman declined to pass - this communication on to the British as requested by Dr. Mosadeq, pointing out in friendly terms + this communication on to the British as requested by Dr. Mosadeq, pointing out in friendly terms that the proposals would not in his judgment provide a basis for new discussions.

Several days later Dr. Mosadeq, through Minister of Court Ala, - informally submitted modified proposals to the British Ambassador which, while still far from + informally submitted modified proposals to the British Ambassador which, while still far from satisfactory, the Department felt provided hope that a basis could be found to renew the talks. The Shah himself believed it highly desirable that the British not reject this overture. Indications were given that @@ -8962,25 +7998,21 @@ representations, word was received from the British Ambassador in Tehran to the effect that the Shah was convinced of the need for getting rid of Dr. Mosadeq and was only - concerned as to how this could best be done.Document 46. On this basis the + concerned as to how this could best be done.Document 46. On this basis the decision was taken to reject flatly the proposal and to offer Dr. Mosadeq no encouragement that the British were prepared to resume negotiations. It was felt by the - British that these tactics would weaken Dr. Mosadeq and strengthen his opposition in the Majlis. The + British that these tactics would weaken Dr. Mosadeq and strengthen his opposition in the Majlis. The British Ambassador was instructed to encourage the Shah in every way to replace Dr. Mosadeq with a government amenable to a reasonable settlement.

The Department’s disappointment at this action was shared by the Shah and Minister of Court Ala. The Court has made it clear that it would be a mistake for either the Shah or any - foreign power to try to effect Dr. Mosadeq’s removal at this time, and our analysis of the + foreign power to try to effect Dr. Mosadeq’s removal at this time, and our analysis of the situation confirms that the Shah’s own position would be seriously endangered if he should endeavor to bring this about until the - widespread support in Iran for Dr. Mosadeq has considerably diminished. The Shah has, + widespread support in Iran for Dr. Mosadeq has considerably diminished. The Shah has, however, been made aware of the fact that we would encourage him to move if he should feel his position sufficiently strong to do so.

Dr. Mosadeq reacted sharply to the @@ -8990,16 +8022,11 @@ instructed immediately to see the Prime Minister and the Shah and to express our grave concern over the expulsion order, urging that it be not implemented. He undertook in every appropriate way to have the order - canceled and to persuade Prime Minister Mosadeq to show some reason in this critical situation, - but his advice was not heeded. The Prime Minister categorically refused to withhold - the order and denounced the British in the strongest terms.See Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, + canceled and to persuade Prime Minister Mosadeq to show some reason in this critical situation, + but his advice was not heeded. The Prime Minister categorically refused to withhold + the order and denounced the British in the strongest terms.See Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 164–167 (Document 88). A memorandum - of conversation, dated September 28, is in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, + of conversation, dated September 28, is in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 888.2553/9–2851.

The cancellation order brought forth from the British new and strong approaches to the Shah urging him to take immediate action, but the @@ -9008,8 +8035,7 @@ force in such circumstances, the British Cabinet, then confronted with the necessity for an immediate decision, decided to take the matter to the Security Council. The British Government informed the Department on - September 28 of this plan.See Foreign + September 28 of this plan.See Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 183–185 (Document 97). Before our reaction had been obtained, a public announcement was made by the British and a draft @@ -9025,18 +8051,14 @@ use of force, and that they would require a strong resolution to be introduced even if it could not receive the required number of votes or was vetoed by the Soviet Union. They agreed, however, to undertake to - draft a resolution which could receive our diplomatic support.In telegram 1581 from London, October 1, + draft a resolution which could receive our diplomatic support.In telegram 1581 from London, October 1, Gifford voiced his concern at U.S.–U.K. divergency over the nature of a potential U.N. - Security Council resolution on Iran. Gifford argued, “we have now reached point where it + Security Council resolution on Iran. Gifford argued, “we have now reached point where it seems to me there is clear-cut issue before us: do we condemn or at - least imply condemnation of Mossadeq for his continued irresponsibility or do we + least imply condemnation of Mossadeq for his continued irresponsibility or do we in effect condone it by associating ourselves with a res which - attaches no blame and treats both parties equally?” Gifford concluded: “I hope most + attaches no blame and treats both parties equally?” Gifford concluded: “I hope most earnestly that Dept may be able to give urgent consideration to these points with a view toward evolving new res which avoids what I consider needlessly provocative @@ -9049,8 +8071,7 @@ complaint, and by a vote of 9 to 2 agreed that the item should be put on the agenda. The question of competence was not then decided, and several delegations reserved their position in this respect. Subsequently, the - British and American delegations endeavored to work out a mutually acceptable draft + British and American delegations endeavored to work out a mutually acceptable draft resolution. Our efforts to persuade the British to assume a more conciliatory attitude in the draft resulted in a sharp reaction in London, and the British Government through various channels in London, @@ -9069,21 +8090,17 @@ (b) call for a resumption of negotiations on the basis of the principles of the Court’s decision, unless some other mutually acceptable basis can be found; and (c) call upon all countries to take no action which would - prejudice the rights, claims or positions of the parties.In October, the United States worked with the + prejudice the rights, claims or positions of the parties.In October, the United States worked with the British on the United Nations Security Council resolution, which called for a resumption of oil negotiations on the basis of the opinion of the International Court of Justice issued on July 5. In its negotiations with the British on the proposed Security Council resolution, the U.S. attempted to dissuade them from including a demand for the return of all British technicians expelled from Iran - as a result of Prime Minister Mosadeq’s order of September 24. For extensive - documentation on this Security Council resolution, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, + as a result of Prime Minister Mosadeq’s order of September 24. For extensive + documentation on this Security Council resolution, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 196–220 (Documents - 102–110).

+ 102–110).

Dr. Mosadeq, heading a large Iranian delegation, arrived in New York on October 8 to represent Iran before the Security Council. It is understood that his efforts will be @@ -9092,8 +8109,7 @@ the AIOC in particular and the British in general. It is feared that airing the matter before the Security Council will very seriously prejudice the possibility of successful - negotiations. It would be well if Dr. Mosadeq’s presence in the United States could be used as + negotiations. It would be well if Dr. Mosadeq’s presence in the United States could be used as an opportunity to bring about a resumption of negotiations before the Security Council action, although the present British political situation is such as to make it unlikely that they will or can agree to @@ -9104,12 +8120,8 @@

Assistant Secretary of State George C. McGhee has had conversations in New York with Dr. - Mosadeq.See ibid., pp. 211–218 (Documents 108 and 109). While these - talks have been largely of a preliminary nature, Dr. Mosadeq has given the impression that + Mosadeq.See ibid., pp. 211–218 (Documents 108 and 109). While these + talks have been largely of a preliminary nature, Dr. Mosadeq has given the impression that he would like if possible to avoid Security Council action, especially since he believes that what he must say before the Council would make it extremely difficult for the British to negotiate with his Government; @@ -9131,23 +8143,18 @@ Mosadeq, in line with the usual courtesies extended to visiting Prime Ministers, to come to Washington during his stay in the United States. This will provide an - opportunity for constructive talks with Dr. Mosadeq at the highest level. A time for the visit has + opportunity for constructive talks with Dr. Mosadeq at the highest level. A time for the visit has not, however, been established as yet.

-
+
50. Editorial Note

According to the official minutes of the National Security Council meeting held on October 10, 1951, with regard to Iran, the Council “discussed the current situation in Iran in the light of an oral report - by the Secretary of State.” (National Archives, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official + by the Secretary of State.” (National Archives, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Minutes 1947–1961, Box 16, 104th Meeting) In the meeting, the National Security Council also considered an October 10 memorandum from the Joint - Chiefs of Staff signed by Air Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt Vandenberg to Secretary of + Chiefs of Staff signed by Air Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt Vandenberg to Secretary of Defense Lovett. In the memorandum, Vandenberg pointed to the serious consequences that would obtain should the Soviet Union @@ -9162,8 +8169,7 @@ Iran in coordination with the other areas of the Middle East; and

“c. Assure the continued supply of Iranian oil to the Western World, at least during peace.”

-

At the end of the memorandum, Vandenberg added that “from the United States military +

At the end of the memorandum, Vandenberg added that “from the United States military point of view, Iran’s orientation towards the United States in peacetime and maintenance of the British position in the Middle East now transcend in importance the desirability of supporting British oil interests in @@ -9173,17 +8179,13 @@ Relations, 1952–1954, volume X, Iran, 1951–1954, pages 220–222 (Document 111).

-
+
51. Telegram From the Station in Iran to the Central Intelligence - AgencySource: Truman Library, Papers of + AgencySource: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files, Box 180. Secret. No telegram number appears on the source text. - Tehran, October 12, 1951. + Tehran, October 12, 1951. SUBJECT Analysis of Iranian Political Situation @@ -9201,20 +8203,17 @@ anti-court movement (Razmara and the Shah described as servants of the British). If the United States should continue to side - spectacularly with the British (for example, Harriman’s refusal to pass to the + spectacularly with the British (for example, Harriman’s refusal to pass to the British Mossadeq’s “ultimatum,” and the postponement of the $25,000,000 Export-Import Bank loan), the brunt of anti-Western feeling could easily cover the United States as well as Great Britain.

-

B. Dictatorship of the streets. The Mossadeq government is the prisoner of the “streets.” +

B. Dictatorship of the streets. The Mossadeq government is the prisoner of the “streets.” The “streets” are composed of two main groups: the followers of Mullah Kashani and the Tudeh Party (with satellite fronts), both of which are exploiting to the fullest a wave of genuine nationalistic feelings of a broad section of - the upper middle class. Although Kashani’s following is possibly more numerous than that + the upper middle class. Although Kashani’s following is possibly more numerous than that of the Tudeh, the former has neither the organization, discipline, nor revolutionary and conspiratorial training and experience of the latter. Accordingly, of the two the more powerful is undoubtedly the Tudeh @@ -9242,27 +8241,19 @@ pro-Mossadeq stand, have now rallied to the national front banner. In a letter dated September 1951 Navab Safavi, leader of the - Fedayan-I-Islam, made peace with Kashani; a letter from Burujurdi of Qum (the outstanding - spiritual leader of Iran) to the Shah urged him to support Mossadeq.

+ Fedayan-I-Islam, made peace with Kashani; a letter from Burujurdi of Qum (the outstanding + spiritual leader of Iran) to the Shah urged him to support Mossadeq.

C. Kashani’s enormous influence in support of the government was demonstrated on 3 September 1951 by the general closing of the bazaars throughout the nation at his request and by the orderliness of the parades he sponsored in favor of the government on the same day.

-

D. The Shah has taken a stand in favor of Mossadeq and at least since 17 September has refused to - listen to British entreaties to rally opposition in favor of Seyyed Zia Tabatabai. At Mossadeq’s request the Shah has ordered the Princess Ashraf out of the country +

D. The Shah has taken a stand in favor of Mossadeq and at least since 17 September has refused to + listen to British entreaties to rally opposition in favor of Seyyed Zia Tabatabai. At Mossadeq’s request the Shah has ordered the Princess Ashraf out of the country (she left in late September 1951), thereby showing that he would no longer (that is, for the time being) condone court intrigues in political matters.

-

E. The Tudeh Party and peace front organizations are backing Mossadeq, albeit only on specific +

E. The Tudeh Party and peace front organizations are backing Mossadeq, albeit only on specific issues. As long as Mossadeq’s policy remains intransigent against the British, the Tudeh is behind Mossadeq. The Tudeh does not @@ -9278,13 +8269,11 @@ present more than he fears the British. No other Prime Minister prior to Mossadeq could claim such sponsorship. The Shah dares not talk back or step out of line. He is - fully aware now that the political wave which brought Mossadeq into power was in great part + fully aware now that the political wave which brought Mossadeq into power was in great part an anti-court wave.

C. The campaign of intimidation supported by certain elements of the National Front and condoned by Mullah - Kashani (but not condoned by Mossadeq) has contributed toward current elimination of + Kashani (but not condoned by Mossadeq) has contributed toward current elimination of British-sponsored opposition. (See also paragraph 2 a above.)

4. The Soviet Union is in a relatively strong position to reap advantages.

@@ -9320,8 +8309,7 @@ East.

(4) It lays the groundwork for a common front of nationalists in the Near East against Anglo-Saxon “imperialists.” (This policy, favorable to the - Soviet Union, can be carried out much more smoothly by the Mossadeq government, a bourgeois + Soviet Union, can be carried out much more smoothly by the Mossadeq government, a bourgeois government, than by a Tudeh government.)

(5) The Soviet “siding” with Iran at the Security Council in early October 1951 has increased sympathy for the Soviets even in the ranks of @@ -9335,38 +8323,29 @@ and a revival of nationalism.

-
- 52. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 52. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1950–1952, classified general records, Box 32. Secret. Drafted by Richards. The telegram is the Embassy copy as approved and has no time of transmission. - Tehran, October 30, 1951. -

1590. 1. Abol Qasem Panahi called on Richards yesterday stating that he was emissary of + Tehran, October 30, 1951. +

1590. 1. Abol Qasem Panahi called on Richards yesterday stating that he was emissary of Qavam. After reviewing what he described as “rapidly deteriorating situation” Iran, Panahi stated - that many people now felt that Mosadeq could not retain position as Primin for long + that many people now felt that Mosadeq could not retain position as Primin for long after his return from US. If he failed return with agreement permitting early resumption oil production his political opponents would brand his mission a failure. On other hand any likely agreement would involve arrangements with British and this would leave Mosadeq open to charges having sold out to British.

-

2. Panahi then stated Shah had been seeing Qavam and, while Qavam’s shortcomings well recognized, Shah now prepared +

2. Panahi then stated Shah had been seeing Qavam and, while Qavam’s shortcomings well recognized, Shah now prepared accept him as next Primin in absence any more promising candidate.

3. Qavam had indicated to Panahi that he would have no dealings with Russians; and that he would have - minimum dealings with Brits. However before taking next steps Qavam wanted to be assured he would + minimum dealings with Brits. However before taking next steps Qavam wanted to be assured he would be acceptable to US were he to be called to power.

4. Panahi was told Emb could not @@ -9381,30 +8360,21 @@

5. Point also made to Panahi that Emb would hope any new Govt would enlist support young, respectable and forward-looking leaders for positions of - responsibility. Panahi stated Qavam already lining up likely candidates for number key + responsibility. Panahi stated Qavam already lining up likely candidates for number key posts and he thought they would meet specifications we had in mind although there was “poverty of leaders” in Iran.

-

6. Foregoing is of considerable interest as coming from Qavam and as indication thinking of - considerable number Iranians. Richards’ handling of matter has my approval.

+

6. Foregoing is of considerable interest as coming from Qavam and as indication thinking of + considerable number Iranians. Richards’ handling of matter has my approval.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
- 53. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 80–01795R, Box 7, Folder 2, Office +
+ 53. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 80–01795R, Box 7, Folder 2, Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) History 03Nov51–13Nov51. Top Secret. - Washington, November 9, 1951. + Washington, November 9, 1951. SUBJECT DADPC–CNEA Weekly Meeting, 7 @@ -9416,29 +8386,17 @@ [name not declassified] [name not declassified] -

1. [name not declassified] asked [name not declassified] if he had seen the policy - paper on Iran that had been returned for reworking.Not found. At a meeting with the Deputy Assistant - Director of Policy Coordination held on November 21, [name not declassified] “noted that an awkward - situation had developed out of the new NSC policy paper on Iran. When the original paper was - sent back for reworking Mr. Dulles suggested that the [less - than 1 line not declassified] Roosevelt and [name not - declassified] collaborate on the job. [name not declassified] however, has gone ahead and written - the paper without consulting with Mr. Roosevelt. It is an extremely poor paper. [name not declassified] simultaneously +

1. [name not declassified] asked [name not declassified] if he had seen the policy + paper on Iran that had been returned for reworking.Not found. At a meeting with the Deputy Assistant + Director of Policy Coordination held on November 21, [name not declassified] “noted that an awkward + situation had developed out of the new NSC policy paper on Iran. When the original paper was + sent back for reworking Mr. Dulles suggested that the [less + than 1 line not declassified] Roosevelt and [name not + declassified] collaborate on the job. [name not declassified] however, has gone ahead and written + the paper without consulting with Mr. Roosevelt. It is an extremely poor paper. [name not declassified] simultaneously submitted it to Mr. Roosevelt - and the Board. For all intents and purposes Mr. Roosevelt is committed to it - although he had nothing to do with its drafting. [name not declassified] noted that NEA is saying nothing. There is a strong possibility + and the Board. For all intents and purposes Mr. Roosevelt is committed to it + although he had nothing to do with its drafting. [name not declassified] noted that NEA is saying nothing. There is a strong possibility that the Policy Planning Staff will kill it before it gets to the Senior Staff.” (Memorandum for Record, November 29; ibid.) [name not declassified] answered that he had @@ -9446,17 +8404,13 @@ NSC wanted it redone and that Mr. Dulles, who is a member of that staff, had suggested that the [less than 1 line - not declassified] and Roosevelt be given the job. The two main faults with the + not declassified] and Roosevelt be given the job. The two main faults with the paper are that it does not really come to grip with the problems in Iran and it fails to consider our relationships with the British.

[name not declassified] went on to say that the - over-all Iranian situation is getting worse. Mossadeq is still here and talking about negotiating but - at the moment no actual negotiations are taking place. [name not declassified] asked if the change in - British government would have any effect on negotiations and [name not declassified] said he doubted it + over-all Iranian situation is getting worse. Mossadeq is still here and talking about negotiating but + at the moment no actual negotiations are taking place. [name not declassified] asked if the change in + British government would have any effect on negotiations and [name not declassified] said he doubted it strongly. [name not declassified] said that they were going to have another conference this afternoon (7 Nov. 1951) to look at OPC strategy in the @@ -9466,11 +8420,9 @@ any contact with British SIS on any of these problems. [name not declassified] said that SIS had been contacted only on - stay-behind activities in the Near East. [name not declassified] + stay-behind activities in the Near East. [name not declassified] asked what would happen should the situation further deteriorate, - perhaps a coup that would put the Tudeh party in the government. [name not declassified] said that for all intents + perhaps a coup that would put the Tudeh party in the government. [name not declassified] said that for all intents and purposes that would become a stay-behind situation and there would be British-U.S. co-operation. We would probably support a rump government of the Shah. U.S. is fairly well committed to give military @@ -9481,36 +8433,25 @@ lose Iran, it is very likely that one by one the other Near East countries would collapse in turn.

- [name not declassified] + [name not declassified]
-
- 54. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 54. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1950–1952, classified general records, Box 32. Secret; Priority. - Drafted and initialed by Henderson. Repeated to London and Paris. The + Drafted and initialed by Henderson. Repeated to London and Paris. The telegram is the Embassy copy as approved and there is no time of transmission. - Tehran, November 16, 1951. -

1829. This shld not be shown Brit altho parts re Iranian pol situation can be used as basis for + Tehran, November 16, 1951. +

1829. This shld not be shown Brit altho parts re Iranian pol situation can be used as basis for discussion.

1. Campaign to replace Mosadeq by - Qavam has recd setback during last two days. + Qavam has recd setback during last two days. Yesterday afternoon Middleton, Brit Chargé d’ Affaires, told me he had learned thru quite good channels that Shah has again changed his - mind and desires no one except Ala, MinCourt, as next Primin. He asked where our Emb stood re Mosadeq, Qavam + mind and desires no one except Ala, MinCourt, as next Primin. He asked where our Emb stood re Mosadeq, Qavam and Ala.

2. I said we had no instructions and expected none on this subject. Our present position was that Emb @@ -9522,8 +8463,7 @@ Of course if any PM shld be clearly leading country down path towards Communism we wld not - hesitate as exception to take moves to try to save Iran even tho they might be + hesitate as exception to take moves to try to save Iran even tho they might be considered as interference. Such situation did not appear exist at present.

3. Middleton said Shah had @@ -9534,120 +8474,75 @@ Ambassador now expected here within ten days. He might not be able however longer to evade interview. He was afraid Shah might ask what Brit - wld think of Ala as new Primin. What kind of reply + wld think of Ala as new Primin. What kind of reply wld I make to question this kind as - to US position. I said I wld probably reply US had no intention supporting any candidate; nevertheless + to US position. I said I wld probably reply US had no intention supporting any candidate; nevertheless I sure I was voicing views my Govt in saying I considered Ala as man of - highest ideals and principles, loyal and honest, a statesman who wld be a credit to any country. I thot - [thought] however Ala was so kindhearted and so lacking in guile and + highest ideals and principles, loyal and honest, a statesman who wld be a credit to any country. I thot + [thought] however Ala was so kindhearted and so lacking in guile and pol skill that he might have great - difficulty in coping with situation unless he shld have Cabinet composed in part of most patriotic + difficulty in coping with situation unless he shld have Cabinet composed in part of most patriotic statesmen of country skilled in politics and not afraid adopt strong measures and in part of young energetic men with progressive ideas - willing and able institute necessary reforms. Middleton seemed agree with me. He - also agreed with my expressed belief Ala had no desire be Primin at this time.

+ willing and able institute necessary reforms. Middleton seemed agree with me. He + also agreed with my expressed belief Ala had no desire be Primin at this time.

4. Middleton asked me state frankly what I thot of Qavam. I said I knew latter only by reputation which in some respects not high. I thot it wld be unfortunate if public - shld get idea US supporting him. I believed it wld also be against our common interests + shld get idea US supporting him. I believed it wld also be against our common interests if Iranians shld come to belief he was - Brit candidate. Middleton said he doing best to - dissipate impression which seemed to be rather widespread Brit supporting Qavam. Qavam complicated character. He had recently sent + Brit candidate. Middleton said he doing best to + dissipate impression which seemed to be rather widespread Brit supporting Qavam. Qavam complicated character. He had recently sent emissaries who represented his platform in rosy light. For instance, - liberal attitude towards settlement oil dispute (altho not return Brit oil companies to Iran); agricultural - and financial reforms; entry Iran into ME defense pact; suppression of Commies, etc. Of course + liberal attitude towards settlement oil dispute (altho not return Brit oil companies to Iran); agricultural + and financial reforms; entry Iran into ME defense pact; suppression of Commies, etc. Of course these mere promises. Qavam so tricky no one knew exactly what he wld - do if once in power. Nevertheless Mosadeq with his anti-Brit bias; plus his apparent determination to keep Iran + do if once in power. Nevertheless Mosadeq with his anti-Brit bias; plus his apparent determination to keep Iran “neutral” might well lead Iran into clutches of Russia. I said I - appreciated this danger and agreed developments shld be closely watched. I did not say - Qavam had sent US message he desired keep aloof from both + appreciated this danger and agreed developments shld be closely watched. I did not say + Qavam had sent US message he desired keep aloof from both Russians and Brit and cooperate with US.

-

5. Later in evening I had long talk with Ala. He said Shah anxious know latest US attitude towards Mosadeq and our views re Iranian pol scene. Was it to be inferred from - “special treatment” shown to Mosadeq in WashingtonMosadeq visited the +

5. Later in evening I had long talk with Ala. He said Shah anxious know latest US attitude towards Mosadeq and our views re Iranian pol scene. Was it to be inferred from + “special treatment” shown to Mosadeq in WashingtonMosadeq visited the United States in October. See Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 241–255 - (Documents 117–119). that US wanted him to remain in power? Were press reports to effect that + (Documents 117–119). that US wanted him to remain in power? Were press reports to effect that US thot Communism only alternative to Mosadeq accurate? I replied - Mosadeq went to US as Primin of Iran with full backing of + Mosadeq went to US as Primin of Iran with full backing of Majlis. US Govt therefore had treated him with all respect due to full-fledged rep of Iran. Courtesies and - consideration not shown to Mosadeq as an individual but to head of Iranian Govt. US + consideration not shown to Mosadeq as an individual but to head of Iranian Govt. US prepared cooperate with Mosadeq - or any other duly installed Primin prepared to work with it. Ala said he understood Mosadeq returning to Iran determined - neither to change his policies re oil or to resign. Was US prepared to give Iran financial + or any other duly installed Primin prepared to work with it. Ala said he understood Mosadeq returning to Iran determined + neither to change his policies re oil or to resign. Was US prepared to give Iran financial assistance so it cld carry on without oil revenues? I said I not in position answer such question just now. I thot however it might not be easy for US Govt to give or lend Iran funds for an indefinite period to compensate it for its loss of oil revenues.

-

6. Ala asked re attitude US towards Qavam. I again replied US not supporting or opposing him. It was trying not +

6. Ala asked re attitude US towards Qavam. I again replied US not supporting or opposing him. It was trying not interfere in internal affairs of country. I asked if it true Shah was not favorable to Qavam’s candidacy. Ala said “no”, but Shah not yet decided give Qavam full support. Qavam was - outstanding candidate succeed Mosadeq; nevertheless, Shah continued hesitate throw his + outstanding candidate succeed Mosadeq; nevertheless, Shah continued hesitate throw his weight behind him. Unfortunately on November 14 vicious attack had been made on Qavam’s integrity by Senator Farrokh on floor Senate. Shah deeply regretted this attack and sent message to Qavam that - effect. Since Senator was friend Shah Qavam was deeply suspicious that Court was in some way - involved in this attack. In his chagrin Qavam had applied for passport to leave country. Shah - was still trying dispel this suspicion and persuade Qavam remain on. I remarked another - person was being mentioned for Primin. Ala replied that other person wld in no circumstances accept post. He had held it for + effect. Since Senator was friend Shah Qavam was deeply suspicious that Court was in some way + involved in this attack. In his chagrin Qavam had applied for passport to leave country. Shah + was still trying dispel this suspicion and persuade Qavam remain on. I remarked another + person was being mentioned for Primin. Ala replied that other person wld in no circumstances accept post. He had held it for month prior to Mosadeq and his - experience had convinced him he not cut out for pol life that kind. I said that with strong experienced and + experience had convinced him he not cut out for pol life that kind. I said that with strong experienced and forward looking Cabinet perhaps he might be able rally country around him. Ala said he thought he cld be more useful in his present @@ -9655,31 +8550,24 @@ remarked Shah wld probably like to see me in near future.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
- 55. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 55. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, - 788.00/11–2351. Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Melbourne. Received December + 788.00/11–2351. Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Melbourne. Received December 12. No. 636 - Tehran, November 23, 1951. + Tehran, November 23, 1951. REF - Embassy’s secret telegram No. 1869, November 19, 1951Not found. + Embassy’s secret telegram No. 1869, November 19, 1951Not found. SUBJECT @@ -9713,8 +8601,7 @@

A. Corrupt and inefficient system of government.

B. Strong popular current of anti-foreign nationalism, personified and - led by Prime Minister Musaddiq, Kashani and National Front supporters.

+ led by Prime Minister Musaddiq, Kashani and National Front supporters.

C. Constitutional monarchy, headed by indecisive and weak though well-intentioned Shah.

D. Small oligarchy of landowners and merchants, motivated primarily by @@ -9783,8 +8670,7 @@

He has thus far been unable to use nationalist elements to strengthen the Crown or to effect much needed reforms in the face of the landowning-merchant oligarchy.

-

The Shah realizes that Musaddiq and Kashani, with their followers, are anxious to limit his +

The Shah realizes that Musaddiq and Kashani, with their followers, are anxious to limit his powers and he is also aware that National Front hostility towards the Army arises from the fear that he might use it against them. However, he currently feels if he should actively try to remove Musaddiq there could @@ -9798,8 +8684,7 @@ religious leaders, has been one of the main obstacles to progress of the Iranian people and to the development of the country’s resources. It has tenaciously fought for maintenance of the status quo. While supporting - the Shah as a stabilizing factor in the country, it has obstructed his inclinations towards + the Shah as a stabilizing factor in the country, it has obstructed his inclinations towards reforms. This feudal group is anxious to perpetuate itself and is governed by short-sighted self-interest.

E. The oil dispute with the British, with attendant dislocation of Iran’s @@ -9852,8 +8737,7 @@ an indigenous political movement advocating reforms close to the heart of the populace. In fact, many Iranians have not forgotten certain reforms sponsored by the Party during the time of its ascendancy.

-

The average Iranian has an historic suspicion of the USSR, but at the same time he has an +

The average Iranian has an historic suspicion of the USSR, but at the same time he has an ostrich-like attitude in viewing current Soviet intentions. He is being diverted by the current oil dispute and communist efforts to interpret it as Anglo-American imperialism. His imagination in this regard is @@ -9873,8 +8757,7 @@ the United States favored the Iranian case, and may be expected to increase Tudeh potential directly and indirectly through the resultant tendency of the National Front and its popular supporters to turn toward - the USSR.See footnote 4, Document 49. In + the USSR.See footnote 4, Document 49. In time this may create an environment favorable to the Tudeh ambition to seize power.

There is little indication of an immediate intention to seize power by @@ -9930,16 +8813,12 @@ comeback.

-
- 56. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 56. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/11–2851. Top Secret; Security Information; Priority. Repeated to London. Received at 3:02 p.m. - Tehran, November 28, + Tehran, November 28, 1951, 7 p.m.

1984. Please do not (rpt not) disclose to British.

@@ -9953,9 +8832,7 @@ agencies and military institutions. British concerned unless these activities are checked, there can develop real danger Communist coup.

-

2. Turning to political situation Middleton said British Embassy feared if Mosadeq carried out plans for “free +

2. Turning to political situation Middleton said British Embassy feared if Mosadeq carried out plans for “free elections” result would be elimination from Majlis of moderate elements and packing of Majlis with emotional, ignorant national extremists and groups willing to look to Russia for leadership. Elections would @@ -9967,31 +8844,21 @@ should take advantage his coming conversation with Shah in order point out gravity situation and suggest time had come for Shah take action to have Mosadeq replaced. He - intended to send at once telegram to Eden requesting authority to take such step but before + intended to send at once telegram to Eden requesting authority to take such step but before doing so would like to ascertain what US attitude wld be. He thought Shah might - hesitate to take necessary action unless convinced that both UK and US + hesitate to take necessary action unless convinced that both UK and US believed it should be done. Would I be willing support suggestions made by him to Shah for effecting change in government?

-

3. In response my inquiries Middleton said although British not (rpt not) enthusiastic about Qavam, they still thought latter with +

3. In response my inquiries Middleton said although British not (rpt not) enthusiastic about Qavam, they still thought latter with his political experience and well-organized following would have better chance of replacing Mosadeq than - any other political leader. He did not (rpt not) believe Qavam serious in demanding his passport to leave + any other political leader. He did not (rpt not) believe Qavam serious in demanding his passport to leave country. In his opinion Qavam - was merely trying to force Shah to make decision whether or not (rpt not) to give him support.

-

4. I told Middleton by no (rpt no) means sure it would be in our + was merely trying to force Shah to make decision whether or not (rpt not) to give him support.

+

4. I told Middleton by no (rpt no) means sure it would be in our joint interest for US at this juncture - join UK in pressing Shah to take steps to effect change of + join UK in pressing Shah to take steps to effect change of govt. If we both brought pressure on Shah and change was successfully effected, National Front opposition to new government would probably be both anti-American and anti-British. @@ -10003,123 +8870,77 @@ attempt and should fail, Crown as stabilizing element might be eliminated from Iran public life and National Front government would be just as bitter against Americans as British and any moderating influence - we might have now would be destroyed. I also was not (rpt not) happy at idea of throwing support + we might have now would be destroyed. I also was not (rpt not) happy at idea of throwing support to Qavam, whose past record created certain doubts as to what he might do when once in power.

5. Middleton said idea was not (rpt not) to suggest to Shah that he exceed his constitutional powers. It was rather suggest to him that he inform Hekmat, Pres of Majlis - privately that he thought time had come for Mosadeq to go and that if Hekmat + privately that he thought time had come for Mosadeq to go and that if Hekmat cld obtain petition addressed to him - signed by majority members Majlis asking that Mosadeq be replaced he wld take appropriate steps immed. Middleton said he thought there was good chance that + signed by majority members Majlis asking that Mosadeq be replaced he wld take appropriate steps immed. Middleton said he thought there was good chance that Hekmat cld obtain requisite number of signatures if he cld tell members Majlis whom he approached Shah wld be willing to act. Middleton said perhaps it wld be possible persuade - Hekmat rather than Qavam to try organize govt. I said I certainly thought that + Hekmat rather than Qavam to try organize govt. I said I certainly thought that Hekmat from point of view world opinion wld be better replacement - for Mosadeq than Qavam. I did not (rpt not) know, however, whether Hekmat + for Mosadeq than Qavam. I did not (rpt not) know, however, whether Hekmat wld be willing to undertake such difficult task or whether he cld, on such short notice, set up kind of organization necessary effectively to - govern country in face of opposition which he wld be sure to encounter. Middleton said he also did not (rpt not) know whether Hekmat + govern country in face of opposition which he wld be sure to encounter. Middleton said he also did not (rpt not) know whether Hekmat wld be willing and ready to undertake to head govt, that was matter which cld be settled between Shah and - Hekmat. What Middleton + Hekmat. What Middleton wld like to know, however, was whether if Brit wld undertake to persuade Shah to - effect change of govt Americans wld go along or at least not (rpt not) oppose.

-

6. I said my tentative position was somewhat as fols: “If Brit + effect change of govt Americans wld go along or at least not (rpt not) oppose.

+

6. I said my tentative position was somewhat as fols: “If Brit shld make suggestion to Shah along lines suggested and Shah or Ala - wld ask my opinion in matter I wld not (rpt not) wet-blanket idea, neither wld I urge Shah to take such action. In talking over matter + wld ask my opinion in matter I wld not (rpt not) wet-blanket idea, neither wld I urge Shah to take such action. In talking over matter with Ala I might remind him of our conversation of some weeks ago during which he told me the Shah had decided that if Mosadeq after returning Iran shld refuse to change his advisers and policies and shld - insist on new elections under his auspices, Shah wld feel that no (rpt no) matter what consequences might be he must take + insist on new elections under his auspices, Shah wld feel that no (rpt no) matter what consequences might be he must take steps to remove Mosadeq - before latter cld lead country to ruin. I might after + before latter cld lead country to ruin. I might after reminding Ala this conversation ask him whether in his opinion time had come for him to make decision of - this character”. I told Middleton that, of course, my tentative position might - be altered by instructions which I might receive from my govt or in light subsequent events. I - cld not (rpt not) bind myself.

-

7. I wld be grateful if Dept + this character”. I told Middleton that, of course, my tentative position might + be altered by instructions which I might receive from my govt or in light subsequent events. I + cld not (rpt not) bind myself.

+

7. I wld be grateful if Dept wld inform me whether it approves my reply to Middleton. Present position here extremely critical. On one hand there is undoubtedly great - danger that “free elections” under Mosadeq might result in Majlis dominated by - irresponsible elements. On other hand for US, while maintaining outwardly friendly relations with + danger that “free elections” under Mosadeq might result in Majlis dominated by + irresponsible elements. On other hand for US, while maintaining outwardly friendly relations with Mosadeq, covertly to bring pressure for his overthrow, wld place - it in invidious position regardless whether or not (rpt not) Mosadeq’s overthrow was effected. It wld not (rpt not) add to US + it in invidious position regardless whether or not (rpt not) Mosadeq’s overthrow was effected. It wld not (rpt not) add to US reputation for us to play double-faced role in Iran. If we think that Mosadeq’s policies are so - dangerous that we must work against him we shld let him know what we think before taking action. It + dangerous that we must work against him we shld let him know what we think before taking action. It seems to me, particularly in view statements made to me yesterday by - Ala (Embtel 1983, Nov 28),In telegram 1983 from Tehran, November 28, Henderson reported Ala’s appraisal that Mosadeq was now displaying + Ala (Embtel 1983, Nov 28),In telegram 1983 from Tehran, November 28, Henderson reported Ala’s appraisal that Mosadeq was now displaying considerable political skills. The efforts of the Queen Mother to intrigue with Ahmad Qavam, in Ala’s estimation, were - likely to backfire. The Shah had directed Ala to speak to Mosadeq, “who repeated anti-Brit line as entire justification his + likely to backfire. The Shah had directed Ala to speak to Mosadeq, “who repeated anti-Brit line as entire justification his policies of intransigence re oil solution . . . Further, Primin expressed opinion US would give budgetary aid rather than see Iran go communist, since if economic - chaos came to Iran there would be no chance for pro-Brit + chaos came to Iran there would be no chance for pro-Brit govt and communism would result.” (Ibid., RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1950–1952, classified general records, Box 29) Shah not @@ -10129,74 +8950,46 @@ hero and while latter is probably more popular with masses than any polit figure in many years.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
+
57. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United KingdomSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/11–2851. Top Secret; Security Information; - Priority. Drafted by Ferguson, cleared in EUR, and approved by McGhee. Repeated Priority to Rome + Priority. Drafted by Ferguson, cleared in EUR, and approved by McGhee. Repeated Priority to Rome for Secretary Acheson and to Tehran. - Washington, November 29, + Washington, November 29, 1951, 8:28 p.m.

2732. Dept disturbed at action suggested by Brit - Emb Tehran (Tehran’s 1984 Nov 28 rpt London 414)Document 56. and approves reply - given by Henderson to Middleton. It seems to us requesting - Shah at this particular moment to dismiss Mosadeq is doomed to failure; Mosadeq now at peak popularity and + Emb Tehran (Tehran’s 1984 Nov 28 rpt London 414)Document 56. and approves reply + given by Henderson to Middleton. It seems to us requesting + Shah at this particular moment to dismiss Mosadeq is doomed to failure; Mosadeq now at peak popularity and cld in test of strength probably overthrow Shah rather than vice-versa. Such an approach therefore, by virtue of position in which it wld - place Shah, might turn him against Brit.

-

In view of joint appraisal recently recd from US and UK Embs Tehran,See Document 55. - Dept surprised Brit still believe solution of their - problem in Iran is simply to get rid of Mosadeq (urtel 2537 + place Shah, might turn him against Brit.

+

In view of joint appraisal recently recd from US and UK Embs Tehran,See Document 55. + Dept surprised Brit still believe solution of their + problem in Iran is simply to get rid of Mosadeq (urtel 2537 Nov 28).Not found. Even in unlikely - event this shld succeed, Dept cannot rpt not see how any successor Govt cld adopt more moderate policy for some time to come. To - stay in power or even to stay alive, new PriMin in our opinion cld + event this shld succeed, Dept cannot rpt not see how any successor Govt cld adopt more moderate policy for some time to come. To + stay in power or even to stay alive, new PriMin in our opinion cld not rpt not retreat substantially from Mosadeq’s nationalization policies.

Brit - Emb approached Dept Nov 28 on instrs from FonOff and expressed great interest in - IBRD proposals (Deptel 2713 Nov 28)Telegram 2713 to London, November 28, was also sent - as telegram 1102 to Tehran, printed in Foreign + Emb approached Dept Nov 28 on instrs from FonOff and expressed great interest in + IBRD proposals (Deptel 2713 Nov 28)Telegram 2713 to London, November 28, was also sent + as telegram 1102 to Tehran, printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 287–288 (Document 134). The telegram describes the proposal of the IBRD for - participation in a solution to the oil dispute. IBRD Vice President Robert L. Garner told Department + participation in a solution to the oil dispute. IBRD Vice President Robert L. Garner told Department officials that the proposal contained three basic points: (1) The Bank would arrange for an American or Dutch group to operate the oil fields and refineries. (2) The petroleum would be sold “free on @@ -10209,39 +9002,27 @@ Department reacted to the proposal with skepticism because it was felt Mosadeq would not wish to accept any British participation in the plan, a 33.5% discount - would still make Iranian oil too expensive, and Mosadeq would not likely accept a + would still make Iranian oil too expensive, and Mosadeq would not likely accept a 50–50 revenue sharing plan. although proposal as put to Brit apparently contains substantive variations from that conveyed to us, particularly as regards participation Brit in Iran oil - industry. Brit asking US take no action with respect to US aid programs in Iran which might harden + industry. Brit asking US take no action with respect to US aid programs in Iran which might harden IranGov towards proposals now - being refined by Bank. Tehran’s 1985 Nov 28 reports Mosadeq also very interested in IBRD proposal.See ibid., pp. + being refined by Bank. Tehran’s 1985 Nov 28 reports Mosadeq also very interested in IBRD proposal.See ibid., pp. 288–291 (Document - 135). While obstacles pointed out in Deptel 2713 still appear great to us, - we are encouraged by attitude shown by both parties. Shld Mosadeq learn as is inevitable of any + 135). While obstacles pointed out in Deptel 2713 still appear great to us, + we are encouraged by attitude shown by both parties. Shld Mosadeq learn as is inevitable of any Brit attempt to have Shah dismiss him, he certainly will not rpt not be amenable to any suggestions for solution put forward by Bank or anyone - else, and will see to it that any successor govt - cld not rpt not accept any overtures of this nature.

+ else, and will see to it that any successor govt + cld not rpt not accept any overtures of this nature.

Accordingly we believe you shld discuss matter frankly with FonOff pointing out while we sympathize with Brit - position, our analysis is that contemplated Brit course of action not only unlikely to produce any - basic improvement in US–UK position in Iran but in present + position, our analysis is that contemplated Brit course of action not only unlikely to produce any + basic improvement in US–UK position in Iran but in present atmosphere prevailing there, it contains serious dangers. We firmly believe Mosadeq’s fall and replacement by suitable alternative must come about primarily as result @@ -10257,49 +9038,34 @@ dismissed wld in all probability result in further removal Brit from Iran picture. It might also precipitate situation in Iran leading to - assumption of power by Commies or by extremists of Maki–Kashani type who will not hesitate make deal with + assumption of power by Commies or by extremists of Maki–Kashani type who will not hesitate make deal with Communists.

If, despite above, Brit feel they must - proceed with this course of action, we will of course not rpt [not] stand in their way. If asked by + proceed with this course of action, we will of course not rpt [not] stand in their way. If asked by Shah for statement US position following - Brit representations, we wld take line suggested by Henderson and tell Shah while we felt + Brit representations, we wld take line suggested by Henderson and tell Shah while we felt Mosadeq leading his country to disaster and change seems necessary, it is decision he himself must make and US - wld not feel we cld press him one way or the other. You - shld urge Brit not to press Shah take any action + wld not feel we cld press him one way or the other. You + shld urge Brit not to press Shah take any action which he in his own judgment thinks inadvisable.

-

In view Tehran injunction not discuss with Brit Tehran’s 1984, wld +

In view Tehran injunction not discuss with Brit Tehran’s 1984, wld apprec Henderson indicating to London Dept and Rome his views re - Gifford informing FonOff source our info. If London - Emb representations wld involve serious breach confidence, + Gifford informing FonOff source our info. If London + Emb representations wld involve serious breach confidence, Henderson - shld take above line with Middleton and request him convey our + shld take above line with Middleton and request him convey our views London FonOff.

- WebbDeputy Under + WebbDeputy Under Secretary Matthews - initialed for Under Secretary Webb, who was Acting Secretary. + initialed for Under Secretary Webb, who was Acting Secretary.
-
+
58. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI @@ -10311,20 +9077,13 @@ Staff Memorandum No. 171 - Washington, undated. + Washington, undated. SUBJECT The Tudeh Problem in US Intelligence -

1. The questions posed in NIE–46An apparent reference to NIE–46 in draft form. NIE–46 was distributed in final form +

1. The questions posed in NIE–46An apparent reference to NIE–46 in draft form. NIE–46 was distributed in final form on February 4, 1952, and is printed as Document 63. have once again emphasized our lack of definite knowledge about the Tudeh Party. We know that the party exists as a @@ -10344,8 +9103,7 @@ the Iranian police, the Iranian Army, [less than 1 line not declassified].

2. This is a highly unsatisfactory situation and one which would appear - to warrant our putting strong pressure on SO, G–2 (whose + to warrant our putting strong pressure on SO, G–2 (whose representatives are primarily concerned with army loyalty) and other agencies to try to do something about it. In exerting such pressure, however, I think it is incumbent on us to do two things. The first is to @@ -10355,19 +9113,16 @@ to afford plenty of opportunities for penetration. It is a relatively small conspiratorial party, by its own testimony highly concerned about security, which has applied the cell organization strictly to prevent - individual members from knowing too much. If SO manages to place an agent at the center of one of the + individual members from knowing too much. If SO manages to place an agent at the center of one of the three of four important provincial headquarters of Tudeh or in the - national Politbureau—and SO certainly should be trying—we + national Politbureau—and SO certainly should be trying—we should be able to get precise answers to our questions. Until that happy day, we shall have to rely, as we do in the case of the Soviet Politbureau, on imprecise secondary information.

3. The second task incumbent upon us is to take a closer look at the estimative value of the information about Tudeh that is available. We have a fairly complete picture of Tudeh’s early history as Iran’s first - real political party, from the emergence of its leaders from Reza Shah’s prisons during the war up + real political party, from the emergence of its leaders from Reza Shah’s prisons during the war up through 1946, when a Tudeh offshoot ruled in Azerbaijan, Tudeh leaders held the mayoralty of Tehran and seats in the cabinet, and Tudeh dominated the labor movement. We have documentary evidence as to the @@ -10397,8 +9152,7 @@

5. The impression that Tudeh is currently concentrating on building up popular confidence and support rather than on preparing for an imminent resort to force is borne out by recent reports. One possible signpost is - provided by a Cominform Journal article of late August which + provided by a Cominform Journal article of late August which describes Tudeh progress in glowing terms but points out that the movement still has a long way to go and indicates that establishment of a popular front government is the next step. There have been two or @@ -10406,9 +9160,7 @@ supporters to the new Majlis. Reports of cell meetings indicate preoccupation with such matters as collection of dues, education, sale of party publications, and tighter security in view of the recent police - seizure of membership lists and other documents. The SO representative’s preliminary analysis of the documents + seizure of membership lists and other documents. The SO representative’s preliminary analysis of the documents seized in the 27 October police raid on Tudeh’s Tehran provincial headquarters indicated that no Tudeh plans “of any significance” had been found. I have seen only one report of Tudeh military preparations, @@ -10417,8 +9169,7 @@ southern Iran. There have been two or three recent reports that Tudeh recognized that an opportunity to take power might come relatively soon but that it was still unprepared and did not desire a direct clash at - this time with the relatively favorable Mossadeq government.

+ this time with the relatively favorable Mossadeq government.

6. This picture of the development of the Tudeh Party is admittedly based on incomplete information, and our information regarding specific Tudeh capabilities is even less precise. Even there, I think we have enough @@ -10430,8 +9181,7 @@ bribe, or trick other politicians into giving it assistance. These factors are analyzed below.

a. Popular support. Actual strength of the party - and its supporters is unknown, and existing estimates by US, British and Iranian officials in Iran + and its supporters is unknown, and existing estimates by US, British and Iranian officials in Iran range all the way from 4,000 (active membership) to 20–40,000 (possibly including sympathizers). A rough index is provided, however, by the size of Tudeh demonstrations, which have specifically been described in some @@ -10455,8 +9205,7 @@ indications would show up in reports now being received. By way of comparison, there have been numerous reports over the last few years of Soviet agent activities and imminent revolts among the Kurds. None of - these revolts has materialized. There have been various unsubstantiated reports of Tudeh + these revolts has materialized. There have been various unsubstantiated reports of Tudeh penetration of the armed forces and equally categorical denials from strongly anti-Tudeh informants who also should be in a position to know. The question of armed forces loyalty has been under almost constant @@ -10472,30 +9221,20 @@ the amount of popular support and ability to use violence that it possesses.

7. It is suggested that the intelligence problem raised in this - memorandum be discussed with representatives of SO, OPC, G–2, and OIR at an early date.

+ memorandum be discussed with representatives of SO, OPC, G–2, and OIR at an early date.

- R.L. - Hewitt + R.L. + Hewitt
-
+
59. Memorandum From the Chief of the Iran Branch, Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans ([name not declassified]) to the Chief of the Operations Division, - Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Helms)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 80–01795R, Box 8, - Folder 2, Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) History, 21Dec51–29Dec51. Top Secret; Security + Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Helms)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 80–01795R, Box 8, + Folder 2, Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) History, 21Dec51–29Dec51. Top Secret; Security Information. - Washington, December 29, 1951. + Washington, December 29, 1951. SUBJECT Summary of Project Activities during December 1951 @@ -10504,15 +9243,13 @@ Psychological Warfare.

[Omitted here is one paragraph of operational data.]

2. Attempts to expose and oppose the Tudeh Party in the National - elections of Iran continue to be the main activity under project [6 lines not declassified].

+ elections of Iran continue to be the main activity under project [6 lines not declassified].

3. [1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

4. [1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

5. Headquarters finally rejected two possibilities of fighting the Tudeh Party in the National elections because of the questionable worth of the - operations. The possibility of utilizing and supporting Ayatollah Kashani, the influential + operations. The possibility of utilizing and supporting Ayatollah Kashani, the influential and fanatic Moslem cleric, was discarded because of the difficulty in controlling him and limiting our support to an anti-Tudeh campaign. It was felt that Kashani would @@ -10522,12 +9259,10 @@ approval of the court.

[Omitted here are three paragraphs of operational detail.]

- [name not declassified] + [name not declassified]
-
+
60. Editorial Note

Prime Minister Mosadeq’s reluctance to accede to the conditions for a continuation of military @@ -10539,11 +9274,8 @@ determined that such assistance would strengthen U.S. security and unless the recipient country agreed to certain obligations. (P.L. 82–165; 65 Stat. 381) A memorandum from Acting Assistant Secretary of - State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs Berry to Secretary Acheson, dated January 8, 1952, - explained that “Prime Minister Mosadeq thus far has categorically refused to give the + State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs Berry to Secretary Acheson, dated January 8, 1952, + explained that “Prime Minister Mosadeq thus far has categorically refused to give the assurances required under Section 511(a) of the Mutual Security Act in order to permit continuation after January 8 of military aid and economic and technical assistance in support of the military effort. Dr. @@ -10553,37 +9285,27 @@ Iran irrevocably with the United States in opposition to the Soviet Union, thus militating against Iran’s current efforts to maintain a neutral position in the East-West struggle.” As the Department was - flexible in devising a formula whereby Mosadeq could legitimately fulfill the conditions set + flexible in devising a formula whereby Mosadeq could legitimately fulfill the conditions set forth in the Mutual Security Act, “we proceeded with a plan to obtain from Dr. Mosadeq in suitable form assurances under Section 511(b) of the legislation which would permit continuation of ‘simple’ economic aid. After difficult negotiations even - on this point, Ambassador Henderson was successful in obtaining from Dr. Mosadeq a letter which, although not + on this point, Ambassador Henderson was successful in obtaining from Dr. Mosadeq a letter which, although not wholly satisfactory, at least contained assurances that Iran adhere to the principles of the United Nations, those principles including the principles set forth in Section 511(b). An exchange of notes on this - basis was accomplished on January 5.” For the text, see Foreign + basis was accomplished on January 5.” For the text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, volume X, Iran, 1951–1954, pages 305–311 (Document 141).

-

In telegram 2771 to Tehran, April 1, Acheson directed Henderson to “tell Shah you have reported his views to +

In telegram 2771 to Tehran, April 1, Acheson directed Henderson to “tell Shah you have reported his views to Washington and have been advised there is still no way military aid can be extended to Iran in absence assurances required by law. At your - discretion you may also wish to tell him that US will be forced in near future to divert elsewhere funds + discretion you may also wish to tell him that US will be forced in near future to divert elsewhere funds appropriated for Iran unless there is reasonable assurance Iran will - become eligible for resumption military aid.” (National Archives, RG 84, London Embassy Files, Lot 59 F 59, + become eligible for resumption military aid.” (National Archives, RG 84, London Embassy Files, Lot 59 F 59, classified general records, Box 28)

-
+
61. Despatch From the Station in Iran to the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job @@ -10591,8 +9313,7 @@ Sent by air pouch. Approved by the Chief of Station and sent from the Deputy Chief of Station to the Chief of Foreign Division R. - Tehran, January 10, 1952. + Tehran, January 10, 1952.

[Despatch number not declassified]

SUBJECT @@ -10602,52 +9323,38 @@ January

Following transmitted for the record only as it may contribute to further - operations involving the penetration of Kashani’s group.

+ operations involving the penetration of Kashani’s group.

1. Attached hereto (Attachment 1) is a summary of remarks and opinions expressed by Mulla Ayatolla Kashani during a conversation [less than 1 line not declassified] on 5 January 1952.

2. The conversation [less than 1 line not - declassified] and took place in a house chosen by Kashani in the Shimran suburb of + declassified] and took place in a house chosen by Kashani in the Shimran suburb of Tehran on 5 January. [1½ lines not declassified] It was explained [less than 1 line not - declassified] to Kashani that we had nothing to ask of Kashani, nor anything specific to discuss with him; but that + declassified] to Kashani that we had nothing to ask of Kashani, nor anything specific to discuss with him; but that the reason for the meeting was to afford an opportunity for a frank, informal, friendly exchange of views.

3. Kashani immediately began attacking American policy of “siding with the British” in Iran, being most outspoken in his views. His criticism against the United States - appeared to begin with “America’s imposition of Razmara on the Iranian people.” He + appeared to begin with “America’s imposition of Razmara on the Iranian people.” He singled out U.S. Attaché Gerald - Dooher for special condemnation, and recalled Dooher’s interview with him during - which the former tried to get him to support Razmara’s candidacy for premiership. + Dooher for special condemnation, and recalled Dooher’s interview with him during + which the former tried to get him to support Razmara’s candidacy for premiership. Kashani stated that pious American claims to not interfere in internal Iranian affairs were belied - by Wiley’s and Dooher’s support of Razmara. He also attacked the United + by Wiley’s and Dooher’s support of Razmara. He also attacked the United States for its support of the British position in Egypt.

4. [1½ lines not declassified] it is felt that a - personal relationship with Kashani over a period of time may serve to give this + personal relationship with Kashani over a period of time may serve to give this Station a better insight into the character and significance of this most important Iranian and Middle Eastern political figure.

-

5. In Attachment 2 is a brief analysis of Kashani as a person as could be gathered in one two-hour +

5. In Attachment 2 is a brief analysis of Kashani as a person as could be gathered in one two-hour conversation.

name not declassified

Attachment 1

-

Summary of remarks made by Mulla Ayatolla Kashani during conversation [less than 1 line not declassified] on 5 January +

Summary of remarks made by Mulla Ayatolla Kashani during conversation [less than 1 line not declassified] on 5 January 1952

1. Iran wants nothing from the United States save to be left alone and to have American influence used to prevent other powers—particularly Great @@ -10686,18 +9393,15 @@

6. Similarly I do not believe that Iran should continue to accept military aid so long as it binds Iran to any commitments inconsistent with Iran’s Sovereignty.

-

(Station Note: Although wording cannot be recalled, Kashani gave the impression that he +

(Station Note: Although wording cannot be recalled, Kashani gave the impression that he was not in favor of military aid anyway.)

7. Solution of the Oil Problem

The World Bank, like other international organizations is primarily motivated by its interest in preserving the privileges of the large powers and is not truly dedicated to helping the smaller nations. (Station Note: The United Nations support of Iran during the Azerbaijan - Democratic separatist movement in 1946 was pointed out to Kashani as an example of United - Nations support of weak nations. Kashani said that basically the larger Western nations + Democratic separatist movement in 1946 was pointed out to Kashani as an example of United + Nations support of weak nations. Kashani said that basically the larger Western nations who control the United Nations were motivated by wholly selfish interests in their 1946 protection of Iran. The United Nations has not acted similarly in the defense of Iran against British pressure.)

@@ -10754,12 +9458,10 @@ words of others etc. He is a most difficult individual to talk with.

Kashani is not a logical or judicious thinker. He gives the appearance of being greatly motivated by - emotion but above all by personal ambition. Kashani thinks in grandiose terms of + emotion but above all by personal ambition. Kashani thinks in grandiose terms of Middle East crusades against Western Imperialism. While most Persian politicians are solely concerned - with their role and position within Iran, it is obvious that Kashani’s aspirations are greater. + with their role and position within Iran, it is obvious that Kashani’s aspirations are greater. He appears to be personally concerned with what occurs in Morocco, Israel, Syria, Pakistan and India and claims to be well informed as to events throughout the Middle East.

@@ -10767,38 +9469,29 @@ conspiratorial air, the air of a man who thoroughly enjoys intrigue. He lowers his voice to whisper when particularly important points are made. He showed genuine concern when other callers were announced during the - conversation. His son, rather than a servant, served tea. [1½ lines not declassified]

+ conversation. His son, rather than a servant, served tea. [1½ lines not declassified]

-
+
62. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of the Office of National Estimates (Kent) to Director of - Central Intelligence SmithSource: Central Intelligence + Central Intelligence SmithSource: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79R01012A, Box 14, Folder 1, NIE–46 Iran. Secret; Security Information. - Washington, January 30, 1952. + Washington, January 30, 1952. SUBJECT NIE–46: Probable Developments in - Iran in 1952 in the Absence of an Oil SettlementDocument + Iran in 1952 in the Absence of an Oil SettlementDocument 63. -

1. The major conclusion reached in NIE–46 (Paragraph 9) was: “Barring the establishment of +

1. The major conclusion reached in NIE–46 (Paragraph 9) was: “Barring the establishment of authoritarian rule, either by the National Front or by the conservatives, the Tudeh potential for gaining control over the country will substantially increase.”

-

2. The major estimative omission in NIE–46 is the failure to estimate the likelihood of +

2. The major estimative omission in NIE–46 is the failure to estimate the likelihood of authoritarian rule actually being established. Many hours of discussion - failed to produce unanimity among the IAC agencies on the divergent views originally proposed by + failed to produce unanimity among the IAC agencies on the divergent views originally proposed by State and the Board of National Estimates.

3. The Board’s position was that economic and political disintegration under Mossadeq would occur quite @@ -10820,22 +9513,17 @@ equally likely possibilities—authoritarian rule by the National Front or by the conservatives.

6. The Army has advised that it wished to raise several more points - regarding the present draft. The Board did not call another IAC representatives meeting on the grounds + regarding the present draft. The Board did not call another IAC representatives meeting on the grounds that State and Navy were completely satisfied with the present draft. They agreed with the Board that little more could be accomplished at the working level.

- Sherman - Kent + Sherman + Kent
-
- 63. National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79R01012A, Box 14, +
+ 63. National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79R01012A, Box 14, Folder 1, NIE–46 Iran. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, this estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the @@ -10848,8 +9536,7 @@ NIE–46 - Washington, February 4, 1952. + Washington, February 4, 1952.

PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN IN 1952 IN THEABSENCE OF AN OIL SETTLEMENT

Conclusions

@@ -10866,8 +9553,7 @@ in satisfying the basic economic and social demands which have been intensified by the nationalization issue.

3. It is unlikely that Iran can sell financially significant amounts of - oil to non-Soviet orbit countries without the acquiescence of AIOC, or will obtain significant oil + oil to non-Soviet orbit countries without the acquiescence of AIOC, or will obtain significant oil revenues from sales to the Soviet orbit countries.

4. However, the Mossadeq government can meet its essential obligations for two or three months by @@ -10901,13 +9587,11 @@ the National Front movement continue to dominate the political scene in Iran. They have retained the enthusiastic support, particularly in Tehran, of the urban workers, shopkeepers, teachers, students, - government employees and religious zealots who, under Mossadeq’s leadership, have seized the + government employees and religious zealots who, under Mossadeq’s leadership, have seized the political initiative from the traditional ruling groups of wealthy merchants and landlords. Although his followers in the National Front do not form a firmly-knit party, - and some are ambitious, self-seeking politicians like Mullah Kashani and Hosein Makki, + and some are ambitious, self-seeking politicians like Mullah Kashani and Hosein Makki, Mossadeq will most likely be able to prevent a split in the National Front in the near future.

11. The oil crisis has not had any noticeable effect on the national @@ -10929,37 +9613,28 @@ of local crop failure, this year’s food crop has been approximately normal, prices have remained stable, and there have been no shortages of sugar and tea, the only imported staples in Iran’s diet.

-

12. Conservative opposition to Mossadeq is at present disorganized, hesitant, and +

12. Conservative opposition to Mossadeq is at present disorganized, hesitant, and fearful. This opposition is drawn mainly from the traditional ruling group, many members of which fear they will lose their parliamentary - seats in elections conducted by the Mossadeq government. Although a substantial majority in - the Majlis is basically opposed to Mossadeq, most of the deputies have supported him on the - oil issue and acquiesced in Mossadeq’s decision to hold elections while his + seats in elections conducted by the Mossadeq government. Although a substantial majority in + the Majlis is basically opposed to Mossadeq, most of the deputies have supported him on the + oil issue and acquiesced in Mossadeq’s decision to hold elections while his popularity was high. Mossadeq’s critics are reluctant to expose themselves to the mob hysteria and - possible violence which they fear Mossadeq’s group or the Tudeh Party might bring to bear + possible violence which they fear Mossadeq’s group or the Tudeh Party might bring to bear against them. More important, they have been restrained by the Shah’s - failure to commit himself to support the removal of Mossadeq. Although the Shah asserts + failure to commit himself to support the removal of Mossadeq. Although the Shah asserts that Mossadeq’s oil policy will prove disastrous for Iran, he has been unable to agree with the - opposition on a suitable successor to Mossadeq and apparently fears that an attempt to remove + opposition on a suitable successor to Mossadeq and apparently fears that an attempt to remove Mossadeq at this time would lead to his own assassination or to a revolution against his throne.

13. The Communist-dominated Tudeh Party has bettered its position considerably during Mossadeq’s - tenure of office. Although Mossadeq is basically hostile to Soviet imperialism, his + tenure of office. Although Mossadeq is basically hostile to Soviet imperialism, his government has failed to take a clear-cut stand against the Tudeh Party, primarily because Mossadeq is - unwilling to take drastic action against an organization which he believes can be kept + unwilling to take drastic action against an organization which he believes can be kept under control and which supports the government on the nationalization issue. In addition, some National Front leaders and government officials appear to be Tudeh sympathizers. As a result, Tudeh has been able to @@ -10982,27 +9657,20 @@ eradicate all foreign interference in Iran and Iran’s need for foreign assistance. Mossadeq and most of his followers are as much opposed to Soviet as to British interference - in Iran, and also are suspicious of closer ties with the US. They fear that such ties would lead to + in Iran, and also are suspicious of closer ties with the US. They fear that such ties would lead to direct political or economic penetration which would oblige Iran to - commit itself to the West or antagonize the USSR. Nevertheless, Mossadeq has recognized, as most Iranian leaders have in + commit itself to the West or antagonize the USSR. Nevertheless, Mossadeq has recognized, as most Iranian leaders have in the past, that Iran cannot maintain a completely isolationist position, and is following out the traditional policy of balancing off the great powers against each other. Although his followers have not hesitated to - attack the US as well as the UK, Mossadeq has asked that the US provide emergency financial assistance to Iran until + attack the US as well as the UK, Mossadeq has asked that the US provide emergency financial assistance to Iran until such time as the oil industry is restored to production. He has simultaneously entered into negotiations for a new trade agreement with the USSR and has reportedly sought oil technicians from the Soviet bloc as well as from various Western countries. He has also reportedly entered negotiations with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary for the sale of Iranian oil.

-

Probable Economic Developments Under Mossadeq

+

Probable Economic Developments Under Mossadeq

15. In the absence of an oil settlement, Iran will continue its efforts to sell to any customer. It is unlikely, however, that Iran could sell financially significant amounts of oil to non-Soviet orbit countries @@ -11047,12 +9715,10 @@ provide Mossadeq with a lasting solution of his financial problems.

18. The USSR might attempt to gain - political advantages in Iran by providing Mossadeq with limited advances against future oil + political advantages in Iran by providing Mossadeq with limited advances against future oil deliveries or by satisfying Iran’s dollar and gold claims against the USSR. Such measures would have - only a temporary effect on the financial position of the Mossadeq government. We do not believe + only a temporary effect on the financial position of the Mossadeq government. We do not believe that the USSR would be willing to give Mossadeq sufficient assistance to solve Iran’s financial problems except on terms which he @@ -11064,8 +9730,7 @@ oil industry will force the Iranian Government in the coming months to reduce imports largely to the level which can be financed from the proceeds of non-oil exports. Because of the high level of exports which - has characterized Iranian foreign trade in the Korean war period and which is expected to + has characterized Iranian foreign trade in the Korean war period and which is expected to continue at a substantially similar level for at least over the next six months, and because of the still uncommitted Central Bank holdings of foreign exchange of approximately 30 million dollars, it is improbable @@ -11102,32 +9767,26 @@ Majlis and therefore Mossadeq will probably not seek this authorization until after the convening of the new Majlis (now scheduled for late February) in which National Front - strength will probably be sufficient to give the Mossadeq government legislative + strength will probably be sufficient to give the Mossadeq government legislative authority to meet its obligations through the summer of 1952. The ability of the government to continue to meet its financial obligations in the absence of adequate oil revenues thus depends upon its will and determination to resort to the expedients available to it, and upon its success in persuading the Majlis to follow its lead.

-

Prospects For The Survival Of The Mossadeq Regime

+

Prospects For The Survival Of The Mossadeq Regime

22. The survival of the Mossadeq government, however, will not depend solely upon its ability to avert a - financial breakdown. The popularity of the Mossadeq + financial breakdown. The popularity of the Mossadeq government derives largely from its success in “liberating” Iran from British interference. However, the unrest which has found expression through, and has been intensified by, the oil nationalization issue is - not likely to subside now that the AIOC has been ejected. Although Mossadeq will continue to benefit from popular + not likely to subside now that the AIOC has been ejected. Although Mossadeq will continue to benefit from popular opposition to the British, he will have increasing difficulty drawing public attention away from his failure both to fulfill promises of economic improvement and to derive significant benefits from Iran’s oil resources. He is thus likely to be faced with the possibility of losing popular support.

-

23. Although the new Majlis will probably continue to support Mossadeq on the issue of British +

23. Although the new Majlis will probably continue to support Mossadeq on the issue of British interference, the National Front majority is itself likely to split on other issues. The government will almost certainly have difficulty in agreeing on and in obtaining Majlis support for measures which would @@ -11146,25 +9805,21 @@ little support. This may eventually have a serious effect on their morale and consequently on their will and ability to maintain the government’s authority over such potentially separatist elements as the - Azerbaijanis, the Kurds, the Bakhtiaris, and the Qashqais, as well as in Tehran. The + Azerbaijanis, the Kurds, the Bakhtiaris, and the Qashqais, as well as in Tehran. The ability of the government to maintain frontier security and collect taxes would decline. A weakening of the government’s central authority would greatly enhance the danger of a substantial increase in Tudeh influence, not only in Tehran but particularly among the oil workers in the South and the population of Iran’s northern provinces. There would also be greater opportunities for Soviet exploitation.

-

25. It is probable that either Mossadeq or another National Front leader will continue +

25. It is probable that either Mossadeq or another National Front leader will continue as Prime Minister, at least for the present. The Shah has the constitutional power to dissolve the Majlis and can usually remove a Prime Minister from office. He also is Commander in Chief of the Army and has the support of the Army. It is extremely unlikely that he would use his power to remove Mossadeq as long as the latter has the support of the Majlis, since such a move - might lead to serious civil disturbances. If Mossadeq’s popular support weakens, the chances of his removal by normal + might lead to serious civil disturbances. If Mossadeq’s popular support weakens, the chances of his removal by normal political means will increase. In this event, the land-owning group will probably try to reassert its control over the central government and may be successful if a suitable leader can be found.

@@ -11177,8 +9832,7 @@ make concessions to nationalist sentiment and to rule by authoritarian methods.

27. We thus believe that during 1952 there will be increasing demands for - social and economic benefits which Mossadeq and the National Front will find it hard to + social and economic benefits which Mossadeq and the National Front will find it hard to satisfy without adopting authoritarian methods, partly because of the lack of unity in the National Front and partly because of difficulties in meeting financial requirements. Barring establishment of @@ -11198,25 +9852,16 @@ will continue for the period of this estimate.

-
- 64. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 64. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1950–1952, classified general records, Box 31. Secret; Security - Information; Priority. Drafted by Cuomo and Melbourne on February 15 and cleared by Richards. The telegram is the + Information; Priority. Drafted by Cuomo and Melbourne on February 15 and cleared by Richards. The telegram is the Embassy copy as approved and has no time of transmission. - Tehran, February 16, 1952. -

3118. This estimate Tudeh potential prepared by Emb and concurred in by CAS and Service Attachés - supplements Embtel 2943 Feb 4 [5].In telegram 2943 + Tehran, February 16, 1952. +

3118. This estimate Tudeh potential prepared by Emb and concurred in by CAS and Service Attachés + supplements Embtel 2943 Feb 4 [5].In telegram 2943 from Tehran, February 5, the Embassy reported that the National Front had largely succeeded in limiting Tudeh gains in the recent Majlis elections. Nevertheless, the Embassy stressed that “in @@ -11229,30 +9874,24 @@ as from possibility that gov may become impotent result of its own bankruptcy.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/2–552)

-

We believe Tudeh potential inextricably bound with fate Natl Front Govt and internal stability. Hence, +

We believe Tudeh potential inextricably bound with fate Natl Front Govt and internal stability. Hence, estimate duration Mosadeq regime without financial resources is basic to calculation of rapidity with which presently well-organized Tudeh may infiltrate all organs of power - and may successfully challenge Natl Front. Mosadeq + and may successfully challenge Natl Front. Mosadeq Govt may continue for unspecified period because of popular support and hesitant Shah, with Army, might be reluctant attempt replace him. Therein appears to lie danger since Mosadeq Govt might hang on and neutralize - other anti-communist opposition forces until pro-Tudeh Govt + other anti-communist opposition forces until pro-Tudeh Govt wld be able assume power.

-

Oil is only publicized program of Mosadeq +

Oil is only publicized program of Mosadeq Govt, and because of coalition character Natl Front contains seeds of disunity on domestic issues. Mosadeq thus far has kept - party unity thru need for mutual support in elections and natl unity, despite deteriorating - domestic conditions, by concentrating on anti-Brit issue. He is believed unwilling to take any stringent + party unity thru need for mutual support in elections and natl unity, despite deteriorating + domestic conditions, by concentrating on anti-Brit issue. He is believed unwilling to take any stringent actions against Tudeh for fear creating untimely internal troubles. Govt thus might remain in power while political, economic and mil @@ -11262,8 +9901,7 @@ Tudeh vote Tehran amounts approx 30 thousand. By descending order Maki is first on list with approx 112 thousand while Tudeh candidate Qasemi is 14th with approx 29 - thousand votes. Despite some rigging ballot by Govt, Tudeh vote count believed essentially accurate. There + thousand votes. Despite some rigging ballot by Govt, Tudeh vote count believed essentially accurate. There was energetic buying voting cards by Tudeh party from apathetic non-party voters before and during balloting. (To offset this in use of ballot count as calculation @@ -11276,22 +9914,16 @@ downward. Returns clearly showed Tudeh is strongest organized opposition force to Govt since no non-communist opposition candidate received vote equal to that of Tudeh candidate - lowest on list. This tends substantiate Mosadeq statement to Amb (Embtel 3031 Para 5 + lowest on list. This tends substantiate Mosadeq statement to Amb (Embtel 3031 Para 5 Feb 11) that Tudeh remains only organized political faction in - opposition.Foreign + opposition.Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 349–352 (Document 157).

Disturbing also is info Natl Front is attempting covertly divert loyalty of security forces from Shah to Govt. Mosadeq becoming ever more suspicious of Shah and may make overt move to undermine his authority - (Embtel 3067 Feb 13).In telegram 3067 from Tehran, February 13, Henderson reported that Mosadeq had told him of his + (Embtel 3067 Feb 13).In telegram 3067 from Tehran, February 13, Henderson reported that Mosadeq had told him of his suspicions that the Iranian army was unfriendly to the National Front and “interfering in elections” against National Front candidates. When Henderson @@ -11299,30 +9931,22 @@ impression that the army had refrained from interfering in politics, Mosadeq replied that “they were rather careful in concealing their activities,” and that - such activities must cease. Henderson closed this telegram with the comment that + such activities must cease. Henderson closed this telegram with the comment that he was “somewhat apprehensive from statements made to me during - course this conversation with Mosadeq that gulf between him and Shah is widening + course this conversation with Mosadeq that gulf between him and Shah is widening and that he may take some step in not distant future which will - result in open breach between them.” (National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1950–1952, + result in open breach between them.” (National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1950–1952, classified general records, Box 29) Any open struggle between them will give good fishing to Tudeh.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
- 65. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 65. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, - 788.00/2–1652. Secret. Received March 11. Drafted by Melbourne. The study was drafted + 788.00/2–1652. Secret. Received March 11. Drafted by Melbourne. The study was drafted by Stutesman. Written on the despatch is the following comment: “Excellent despatch.” Except as noted in the footnotes below, the telegrams and despatches cited @@ -11332,18 +9956,15 @@ No. 878 - Tehran, February 16, 1952. + Tehran, February 16, 1952. SUBJECT Transmitting a study entitled “The Rise of an Iranian Nationalist” -

There is transmitted a report prepared by Mr. John H. Stutesman, Jr., Second +

There is transmitted a report prepared by Mr. John H. Stutesman, Jr., Second Secretary of Embassy, entitled, “The Rise of an Iranian Nationalist”. - This report is a study of the political techniques of Mohammad Mosadeq and as such, is the + This report is a study of the political techniques of Mohammad Mosadeq and as such, is the third in a series of basic reports which the Political Section of the Embassy is preparing.See the following Secret Embassy Despatches: (1) #736 December 20, 1951, entitled @@ -11381,8 +10002,7 @@ his own ambitions with national aspirations. By winning popular support for his emotion-charged policies “in the nation’s interest” he has succeeded in winning political power.

-

The nature and profundity of the national emotions to which Mosadeq appeals are then considered. +

The nature and profundity of the national emotions to which Mosadeq appeals are then considered. Nationalism, social discontent and political irresponsibility are basic elements in Iranian politics today. Iranian nationalism is not unlike other fervent, though usually ill-defined, nationalist sentiments in @@ -11391,12 +10011,10 @@ and political irresponsibility lead Iranians to support a Premier who insists that the rest of the world must accept his uncompromising point of view.

-

The final chapter of this paper describes Mosadeq’s realism in directing the National Front’s rise +

The final chapter of this paper describes Mosadeq’s realism in directing the National Front’s rise to power. His understanding of the vulnerabilities of his opponents allowed him, by simple opposition, to cripple previous Governments, to - turn a disorganized and selfish Majlis into an emotional pro-Mosadeq, pro-nationalization group, to + turn a disorganized and selfish Majlis into an emotional pro-Mosadeq, pro-nationalization group, to terrify the Shah and, so far successfully, to deal with the entrenched interests in Iran, the communists and other foreign influence.

Mosadeq’s new design for politics @@ -11421,11 +10039,9 @@ the ignorant and irresponsible masses. Study of the techniques which he used and the emotions he appealed to is necessary for observers of Iran’s future.

-

II. Political Characteristics of Mohammad Mosadeq

+

II. Political Characteristics of Mohammad Mosadeq

Iran is not easily comprehensible to westerners. Iranians have many - different values, respond to different appeals, have customs and characteristics quite peculiar + different values, respond to different appeals, have customs and characteristics quite peculiar to themselves. Mohammad Mosadeq is an aristocratic Moslem Persian, born to wealth, bound by tradition, steeped in classic Persian culture. He is proud to be a Persian and he @@ -11439,8 +10055,7 @@ perverse way, this attitude reflects the deep pride in country which all Iranians have. Mosadeq shares this patriotism. Examples of a willingness to join in patriotic - movements are numerous in Mosadeq’s career, most prominent among them being his + movements are numerous in Mosadeq’s career, most prominent among them being his participation in the constitutional reform of 1906 and his determination, while in the Majlis, to prevent the Russians from controlling northern Persia.

@@ -11451,39 +10066,31 @@ now holds a place in many Persian hearts solely because he demonstrated battling patriotism in his supervision of expropriation of the British oil industry in Khuzistan.It may be - appropriate here to note Dr. Johnson’s definition of patriotism: “The last refuge + appropriate here to note Dr. Johnson’s definition of patriotism: “The last refuge of a scoundrel.” [Footnote is in the original. At the end of the footnote, there is a handwritten comment that reads: “Who is the - scoundrel, AIOC or Mosadeq?”]

+ scoundrel, AIOC or Mosadeq?”]

Incorruptibility Another characteristic which has won for Mosadeq a good public reputation is his disregard for the material benefits which usually accrue to Persian government officials. Many Persians consider that corruption is the natural state of the human race and refuse to believe - that the tremendously wealthy oil company could not buy Mosadeq to its point of view or at + that the tremendously wealthy oil company could not buy Mosadeq to its point of view or at least persuade him to pervert the nationalization law to some long-term, devious British advantage.

-

By his refusal to be bought, Dr. Mosadeq broke the ancient pattern of bribery which had +

By his refusal to be bought, Dr. Mosadeq broke the ancient pattern of bribery which had been used to move most previous politics in Iran. The old gang of intriguing greedy politicians could not overthrow with their traditional - tactics a Premier who was not interested in cash profits. Mosadeq’s colleagues, however, do not + tactics a Premier who was not interested in cash profits. Mosadeq’s colleagues, however, do not fail to profit from their positions under the cloak of the Prime Minister’s peculiar probity.

-

Infirmities As an aged man, Mohammad Mosadeq naturally finds the +

Infirmities As an aged man, Mohammad Mosadeq naturally finds the burdens of the premiership extremely wearing. There is no faking in his - need to rest as much as possible. However, as the following storyRelated by a reliable source who was present + need to rest as much as possible. However, as the following storyRelated by a reliable source who was present during the incident. [Footnote is in the original.] shows, he sometimes used his weariness to serve political purposes.

-

Once, in the early days of his premiership, when Dr. Mosadeq worked in his official office, +

Once, in the early days of his premiership, when Dr. Mosadeq worked in his official office, an important visitor asked to see him with some request. The Prime Minister, who up to that point had been energetically handling correspondence at his desk, said he would receive the man in a minute. @@ -11497,11 +10104,9 @@ Mosadeq is carrying on his duties despite great personal pain. This act encourages, and to some extent symbolizes to Iranian minds, national resistance to the British. - On April 30, 1951, in his first speech as Prime Minister, Dr. Mosadeq declared, “I never thought that + On April 30, 1951, in his first speech as Prime Minister, Dr. Mosadeq declared, “I never thought that my health would ever permit me to accept so important a position, but - the oil question obligates me to take up this heavy burden”.Radio address to the nation, April 30 (Embassy + the oil question obligates me to take up this heavy burden”.Radio address to the nation, April 30 (Embassy despatch 881, May 1, 1951). [Footnote is in the original. Despatch 881 is in the National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1950–1952, classified general records, Box @@ -11515,8 +10120,7 @@ upon this diagnosis; but there is little doubt that Iran’s Prime Minister is a sick man and his frequent petty passions reflect to great extent his physical infirmities.

-

Dramatic Personality To his career, Mohammad Mosadeq brings the most +

Dramatic Personality To his career, Mohammad Mosadeq brings the most necessary attribute of a demagogue—a dramatic personality. The fainting and the tears which seem so funny to Americans deeply move his Persian listeners. He has a superb sense of timing and of symbolism.

@@ -11553,18 +10157,15 @@ the need to fight for independence in an evil world. Gradually, he brought the color of anti-British feelings into the design, moving from reason to emotion almost imperceptibly so that his listeners felt at the - end that he had won a victory over national enemies.Embassy telegrams 2159, 2162, December 12, 1951. + end that he had won a victory over national enemies.Embassy telegrams 2159, 2162, December 12, 1951. [Footnote is in the original.]

Calm study of his speech shows that he did not answer any of the trenchant criticisms and certainly gave no reason to believe that he - would leave the road down which he leads his country. But even Hosein Ala, Minister of Court, the + would leave the road down which he leads his country. But even Hosein Ala, Minister of Court, the evening that he heard this speech on Radio Tehran, eagerly told Ambassador Henderson that Iran was fortunate to have Dr. Mosadeq - to champion its interests against “its AIOC incubus”.Embassy telegram + to champion its interests against “its AIOC incubus”.Embassy telegram 2158, December 12, 1951. [Footnote is in the original.]

Ambitions Mosadeq has shown constant @@ -11572,8 +10173,7 @@ obtain applause. He has shown willingness, any time his political position is threatened, to resort to the cheapest kind of political trickery to discredit his opponents.

-

The futile hopes of his opponents that Mosadeq would resign after driving out the British oil +

The futile hopes of his opponents that Mosadeq would resign after driving out the British oil technicians, leaving to his successor the heavy burden of recovering the nation’s financial and political stability, failed to take account of Mosadeq’s desire to hold @@ -11581,57 +10181,41 @@ nationalization of the oil industry was completed. As this program neared its end, he declared “reluctantly” that he would stay in power while elections to the 17th Majlis were held. It can be assumed that - when these elections near completion Mosadeq will find another reason to remain the man in + when these elections near completion Mosadeq will find another reason to remain the man in charge.

Mosadeq has shown little shame, conscience, or dignity when question of his political advantage is - raised. An example of this was given when Mosadeq, in order to avoid weakening his internal + raised. An example of this was given when Mosadeq, in order to avoid weakening his internal political position, refused to give clear assurance that U.S. aid would be used to strengthen Iran’s military and economic ability to maintain - its independence. It was not Mosadeq’s refusal which was so shocking as his casual + its independence. It was not Mosadeq’s refusal which was so shocking as his casual remark that for the U.S. offer of 23 million dollars aid, given freely by Americans to help his weak and threatened country, he would offer in - return “assurances” worth only and exactly that sum.Embassy telegram 2199, December 14, 1951. [Footnote - in the original. Telegram 2199 from Tehran is printed in Foreign + return “assurances” worth only and exactly that sum.Embassy telegram 2199, December 14, 1951. [Footnote + in the original. Telegram 2199 from Tehran is printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 291–295 (Document 136).]

-

When it has served his political advantage, Mosadeq has broken confidence. Prime Minister Hosein Ala, an honest devoted servant - of his country, was led to believe in early 1951 that Mosadeq wanted to develop legislation - to nationalize the oil industry with the concurrence of the Ala Government. When it appeared, with +

When it has served his political advantage, Mosadeq has broken confidence. Prime Minister Hosein Ala, an honest devoted servant + of his country, was led to believe in early 1951 that Mosadeq wanted to develop legislation + to nationalize the oil industry with the concurrence of the Ala Government. When it appeared, with the sudden passage of the nine-point Nationalization Law, that the National Front had used Ala’s - confidence only to increase the Government’s embarrassment, Hosein Ala had no alternative but to - resign, thus opening the way for Mosadeq to assume power.

-

To gain a temporary advantage before Parliament, Mosadeq has used slander. On September + confidence only to increase the Government’s embarrassment, Hosein Ala had no alternative but to + resign, thus opening the way for Mosadeq to assume power.

+

To gain a temporary advantage before Parliament, Mosadeq has used slander. On September 5, before the Senate, and on September 9, before the Majlis, he implied - that British policy and money dominated court officials.Ala’s + that British policy and money dominated court officials.Ala’s “explanations” (Embassy despatch 341, September 11, 1951) failed to erase the slander. [Footnote is in the original. Despatch 341 from - Tehran is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, + Tehran is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 888.2553/9–1151.] He continually has slandered the motives and reputations of his opposition in the Majlis. Any criticism of his - Government has been labeled by Mosadeq as “pro-British” action.

+ Government has been labeled by Mosadeq as “pro-British” action.

Determination Unusual among Iranian politicians, Mohammad Mosadeq has shown an uncompromising determination to obtain what he desires. This - characteristic, worthy in just causes, often becomes for Mosadeq a form of political fixation. + characteristic, worthy in just causes, often becomes for Mosadeq a form of political fixation. Mesmerized by his own ambitions, he discards advice and reason while steering towards his fixed objective. If it is demonstrated that this course will lead to chaos, he still shows an inability, or @@ -11644,8 +10228,7 @@ Persian graft of swollen payrolls. He, of course, had to resign and the status quo returned.

-

In 1921, in three fantastic months as Minister of Finance, Mohammad Mosadeq cut all salaries in +

In 1921, in three fantastic months as Minister of Finance, Mohammad Mosadeq cut all salaries in his Ministry and fired the numerous incompetents. Again, the consequences of this drastic action, which in itself could have but small effect upon the general inefficiency and incompetence in @@ -11678,8 +10261,7 @@ psychological rather than the economic issues in the oil dispute led, more than any other failure of the West, to the present impasse in Iran. Sir William Frazer’s classic statement of his Company’s position in - early 1951, “There will be no further concessions”Embassy telegram 1454, January 3, 1951. [Footnote + early 1951, “There will be no further concessions”Embassy telegram 1454, January 3, 1951. [Footnote is in the original.] could only anger, frustrate and unite the Persians. The wave of feeling which engulfed the British in Iran may have started as a demand for a better bargain; but, encouraged by its @@ -11693,18 +10275,15 @@ which sets them apart from others. Time, in its story of Prime Minister Mosadeq as “man of 1951”, gave an impression that he ranked with great - philosophical nationalists like Nehru. In fact, he is much more an opportunist who + philosophical nationalists like Nehru. In fact, he is much more an opportunist who perceived the potential force in indigenous nationalism and had the ability to direct it to his support.

-

Towards the end of 1949, nine politiciansDeputies Abol Qadar Azad, +

Towards the end of 1949, nine politiciansDeputies Abol Qadar Azad, Dr. Mosafar Baghai, Seyid Abol Hasan Haerizadeh, Ayatollah Kashani, Seyid Hosein Maki, Dr. Mohammad - Mosadeq, Seyid Mahud Nariman, Alayar Saleh, Seyid Ali Shayegan. + Mosadeq, Seyid Mahud Nariman, Alayar Saleh, Seyid Ali Shayegan. Only Azad subsequently left the coaliton. [Footnote is in the original.] formed a coalition whose name, the National Front, showed its determination to @@ -11731,8 +10310,7 @@ simply want freedom from this influence.

When Mosadeq leaned forward in his bed to tell Ambassador Grady - sharply, “We value independence more than economics”,Memorandum of Conversation, June 28 (Embassy + sharply, “We value independence more than economics”,Memorandum of Conversation, June 28 (Embassy despatch 1159, June 29, 1951). [Footnote is in the original.] he was not only arguing against American advice that Iran should make a settlement with the British in order to preserve oil revenues. He was @@ -11740,13 +10318,11 @@ he would end what he believed to be Iran’s semi-colonial status. This sentiment was shared by Persians of all classes. Even the present opposition to Mosadeq’s - Government does not declare that British influence should return. Removal of the British + Government does not declare that British influence should return. Removal of the British from Iran was a necessary part, in Persian eyes, of winning Iran’s “independence”.

When badly handled, badly publicized oil negotiations in 1950 focused - popular attention on that issue, Mosadeq sensed, like a weathervane, the direction in + popular attention on that issue, Mosadeq sensed, like a weathervane, the direction in which winds of national sentiment were blowing. He and his colleagues expanded and exploited the emotions on this issue; and, calling expropriation “nationalization”, he assumed charge of a “crusade” to @@ -11764,25 +10340,19 @@

Antagonism to the British has served many purposes for the National Front. Mosadeq’s critics on any issue are portrayed to the public as British agents. Covering all - sources of possible opposition, Mosadeq once said, “British agents are in the Majlis; + sources of possible opposition, Mosadeq once said, “British agents are in the Majlis; British agents are in the Government; British agents are in the national - societies; and British agents are in the Court”.Address to the Majlis Sept. 9 (Embassy despatch + societies; and British agents are in the Court”.Address to the Majlis Sept. 9 (Embassy despatch 335, Sept. 11, 1951). [Footnote is in the original. Despatch 335 from Tehran is ibid., RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1950–1952, classified general records, Box 29.]

-

Whenever parliamentary votes of confidence are called for, Mosadeq has forced the vote to take a +

Whenever parliamentary votes of confidence are called for, Mosadeq has forced the vote to take a pro- or anti-British character. The first votes were kept on the issue of the oil nationalization law. “Those who oppose the Government also - oppose the nationalization of the oil industry”.Address to the Senate, Sept. 5, 1951. [Footnote is - in the original.] When criticisms rose that Mosadeq had missed a good chance to - settle the oil dispute to Iranian advantage when the Stokes Mission was in Tehran, the + oppose the nationalization of the oil industry”.Address to the Senate, Sept. 5, 1951. [Footnote is + in the original.] When criticisms rose that Mosadeq had missed a good chance to + settle the oil dispute to Iranian advantage when the Stokes Mission was in Tehran, the Prime Minister forced a parliamentary vote on the Government’s decision to drive out the British oil technicians from Abadan. Anyone who voted against him would have been classified as favoring retention of British @@ -11794,8 +10364,7 @@ Council”.Farewell speech to the nation, Oct. 6 (Embassy despatch 466, Oct. 9, 1951). [Footnote is in the original.] The question whether his defense was sound or - necessary obviously could not be raised when the nation’s defense against the British “tyranny” was + necessary obviously could not be raised when the nation’s defense against the British “tyranny” was at stake. The recent action of the Government to close all British consulates again drew the sting from the opposition’s searching criticism of Mosadeq’s disastrous @@ -11817,14 +10386,12 @@ phenonomen in the world. Iran has stripped off the capitulations which gave foreigners special legal privileges and has blocked or “nationalized” all concessions except the Caspian fisheries concession - to the Soviets. The boasts of Mosadeq and Maki, + to the Soviets. The boasts of Mosadeq and Maki, his lieutenant in expropriation of the Abadan refinery, that it would be preferable to leave the oil below ground rather than allow foreign profiteering are rooted in national resentment against foreign concessionaires.

-

In his first speech as Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosadeq declared, “Thanks to God and to the +

In his first speech as Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosadeq declared, “Thanks to God and to the efforts of both Houses of Parliament, the greatest source of national wealth has returned to us”.Radio address to the nation, April 30, 1951. [Footnote is in the original.] @@ -11842,8 +10409,7 @@ to help Iran withstand the pressures of Soviet-directed communism.

When Razmara, in 1950, first gave indications that he thought Iran’s best hope for survival lay not in - close alliance with the West but in a policy of “neutralism”, he obviously hoped that Iran, like + close alliance with the West but in a policy of “neutralism”, he obviously hoped that Iran, like Switzerland, could remain outside all major international conflicts. He, and most Iranians, drew from the battle in Korea a conclusion that Iran, so far from UN bases, so vulnerable to @@ -11857,24 +10423,19 @@ of bad policy in angering both previous rivals simultaneously.

Mosadeq recognizes the necessity to rely on foreign power to protect him from Soviet or British - aggression. In a conversation with Ambassador Grady, he said that he appreciated the + aggression. In a conversation with Ambassador Grady, he said that he appreciated the American attitude in the oil dispute since he considered it “protection for Iran”.Memorandum of Conversation May 2 (Embassy despatch 889, May 4, 1951). [Footnote is in the original.] But he sponsors and expresses a policy of neutralism. Hosein Ala once - refused the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs for Mosadeq because Ala would not cut Iran’s ties to the + refused the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs for Mosadeq because Ala would not cut Iran’s ties to the West.

On May 3, 1951, Mosadeq said “our foreign policy shall be based on support of the United Nations Charter, - friendship with all states and mutual respect for all nations.”Statement before the Majlis, May 3 (Embassy + friendship with all states and mutual respect for all nations.”Statement before the Majlis, May 3 (Embassy telegram 2661, May 3, 1951). [Footnote is in the original. Telegram - 2661 from Tehran is in National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1950–1952, classified + 2661 from Tehran is in National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1950–1952, classified general records, Box 29.] Throughout the year which followed, he held to this pronouncement but refused to make or even seem to make new commitments or new alliances. His trip to Egypt in late 1951 and his @@ -11897,21 +10458,17 @@ Ambassador Henderson (Embassy telegram 2011, Dec. 1, 1951). [Footnote is in the original.] Whether this view was either wise or well-founded - is not pertinent here. The fact is that + is not pertinent here. The fact is that Mosadeq’s foreign policy has been set and he can be expected to follow it unswervingly.

-

Since the purpose of this study of Mosadeq’s techniques is to find a pattern which new +

Since the purpose of this study of Mosadeq’s techniques is to find a pattern which new nationalist leaders must follow or at least understand, it is important here to state, that, in the writer’s opinion, the national aspirations described above will be factors in any political movement in the near - future in Iran. The words and actions which Mosadeq has used to cater to and excite these emotions + future in Iran. The words and actions which Mosadeq has used to cater to and excite these emotions are not the only techniques possible. However, they have proved successful and he will likely hold to them. Another man could probably - score equally well, if he follows Mosadeq’s example.

+ score equally well, if he follows Mosadeq’s example.

Social Discontent

The Gap Between the People and Their Rulers The causes and the character of social discontent throughout Asia have been @@ -11923,10 +10480,8 @@

Mosadeq described this situation to Ambassador Grady in their first conversation.Memorandum of - Conversation, May 2, 1951. [Footnote is in the original. Grady reported on the conversation - in telegram 2650 from Tehran, May 2, printed in Foreign + Conversation, May 2, 1951. [Footnote is in the original. Grady reported on the conversation + in telegram 2650 from Tehran, May 2, printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 45–46 (Document 17).] “There has been in Iran a gap between the government and the people . . . This gap, combined with @@ -11934,11 +10489,9 @@ greatest force in this country is public opinion and no government can stand which does not close the gap between itself and popular opinion.”

-

In his first speech as Prime Minister, Mosadeq assured his people that he understood and would +

In his first speech as Prime Minister, Mosadeq assured his people that he understood and would take care of their discontent. “The shadows which were covering our - unhappy country will soon give way to the sun of happiness.”Address to the nation, April 30, 1951. [Footnote is + unhappy country will soon give way to the sun of happiness.”Address to the nation, April 30, 1951. [Footnote is in the original.]

The organized tours of Tehran slums which officials and newspaper correspondents had to take in the summer of 1951 emphasized this aspect @@ -11949,17 +10502,13 @@ which might tear the present social fabric of Iran. He has no program for reform; he claims no panacea for progress beyond nationalization of the oil industry.

-

Through hope of social change, Mosadeq has gained a following of liberal Iranians who - see its necessity and who support the National Front in preference to communism. His emotional - appeals and his promises of future prosperity have won to Mosadeq great masses of discontented +

Through hope of social change, Mosadeq has gained a following of liberal Iranians who + see its necessity and who support the National Front in preference to communism. His emotional + appeals and his promises of future prosperity have won to Mosadeq great masses of discontented city workers. The peasant masses have been hard to ex-cite since any government, even Mosadeq’s is represented to them by the same oppressive tax-collector or landowner; - but vague country-wide emotions are stirred by Mosadeq’s oratory, to hope for social + but vague country-wide emotions are stirred by Mosadeq’s oratory, to hope for social betterment.

In another way, Mosadeq has turned social discontent to his advantage by focusing national irritations and @@ -11967,8 +10516,7 @@ and bankruptcy from public indignation.

Suspicion of Government Government in Persia is rightly considered oppressive. The people are suspicious of the - traditional selfishness of authority in Asia.The old American proverb, “Build a better mousetrap + traditional selfishness of authority in Asia.The old American proverb, “Build a better mousetrap and the world will beat a path to your door” becomes, in Asia, an injunction to get control of the government’s mousetrap monopoly. [Footnote is in the original.] @@ -11981,8 +10529,7 @@ bits. They denounced the Saed Government for not decentralizing power. They attacked the Razmara Government when it attempted to decentralize authority.

-

By recognizing the popularity of plain opposition, Mosadeq won a reputation while +

By recognizing the popularity of plain opposition, Mosadeq won a reputation while crippling any progress of the government in power. When he became Prime Minister, he said that previous governments had failed to close the “gap” between the rulers and the people, while he, basing his strength @@ -11990,8 +10537,7 @@ always seeks to identify the public interest with his policies and actions. Even so, he recognizes the profundity and permanence of popular suspicion of any Government and he allowed only one of the National - Front deputies to enter government service.Nariman was made Minister of Finance, but he soon resigned to run + Front deputies to enter government service.Nariman was made Minister of Finance, but he soon resigned to run for election to the 17th Majlis. [Footnote is in the original.]

Penetration of New Ideas After centuries of @@ -12030,8 +10576,7 @@ social discontent is the desire of a confused people for a leader. Persia’s greatest periods of prosperity and power have been under despotic rule. There is no tradition in Iran of democracy or of - progressive action by an electorate. Although they hated Reza Shah’s oppression, most Persians + progressive action by an electorate. Although they hated Reza Shah’s oppression, most Persians now refer to those days longingly and say that Persia needs again a “strong man”.

Mosadeq has taken advantage of the @@ -12089,36 +10634,30 @@ appear in his name and in his references to God in almost every speech. The political advantage he finds in Islam clearly shows in his close alliance with Mullah Kashani - who now holds extensive influence in the Government.A study of Mullah + who now holds extensive influence in the Government.A study of Mullah Kashani’s techniques and organization is being prepared by the Embassy. [Footnote is in the original.]

There is one other great effect which Islam has had upon the mind and character of Mosadeq. The - fatalism of Islam plays an important part in Mosadeq’s attitudes. Like the Moslem chauffeur who + fatalism of Islam plays an important part in Mosadeq’s attitudes. Like the Moslem chauffeur who believes that no matter how recklessly he drives, if Allah wills it, he will not crash, Mosadeq allows himself the freedom of acting recklessly, certain that great forces, including God and Fate, will save him or destroy him as they will, no matter what he does.

Both by personal conviction, by his understanding of Iranian emotions and - by the political advantage he will gain, it is expected that Mosadeq will continue to placate + by the political advantage he will gain, it is expected that Mosadeq will continue to placate extreme and retrogressive religious fanaticism. Permission for bigger, bloodier Moharram flagellant processions, continued pressure to cut off foreign cultural and educational influence, will probably result. The - nationalist leader who follows Mosadeq will find easily aroused emotions and fanatic + nationalist leader who follows Mosadeq will find easily aroused emotions and fanatic following in cooperation with Iran’s mullahs.

Pride in Past History It is impossible for a Persian to forget that, in the past three thousand years of history, his country has often been superior politically and culturally to the rest of the world. He turns, in modern times, for comfort to past martial and intellectual glories. The neo-Achaemenian architecture of public - buildings in Tehran, the choice of first names from the Book of Kings, which celebrates legendary Persian + buildings in Tehran, the choice of first names from the Book of Kings, which celebrates legendary Persian glory, are two of numerous examples of Iranian concentration on the past.

This introversion leads inevitably to resistance or indifference to @@ -12129,8 +10668,7 @@ Persians think their ancient ideas and traditions are the best. Scholarly attempts to strip Arab words from the Persian language may be an intellectual affectation, but they rise from a sense of Persian - superiority over all things foreign. Mosadeq shares and takes advantage of this national + superiority over all things foreign. Mosadeq shares and takes advantage of this national pride. On September 1, in an address to the nation, he said, “We must bring to the attention of the whole world the fact that the Iranian nation, conscious of its glorious past history, cannot tolerate any @@ -12141,8 +10679,7 @@ 1950–1954, 788.00/9–451.]

An excellent example of the way he appeals to patriotic pride in order to avoid parliamentary criticism and to focus hatred on the British - occurred when he addressed the Majlis on September 9. The Stokes Mission had returned to + occurred when he addressed the Majlis on September 9. The Stokes Mission had returned to England, and Iranians were anxious that they might have failed to make best use of the opportunity to come to an agreement with the British. Mosadeq declared, and cheers @@ -12184,8 +10721,7 @@ newspapers openly threatened that American military advisers would not have their contracts renewed unless American military aid is given. (Embassy telegram 2693 January 18, 1952). Use of the Point IV - program to win a sort of pro-Mosadeq American lobby is apparently one of + program to win a sort of pro-Mosadeq American lobby is apparently one of Mosadeq’s objectives. [Footnote is in the original.]

Iranian Vanity and Irresponsibility

@@ -12195,28 +10731,21 @@ preserving his country, will save him from destruction. “If (Iran’s) oil industry collapses and no money comes and disorder and communism follow, it will be your fault entirely”.Memorandum - of conversation, May 29 between Mosadeq, British Ambassador Sir Francis Shepherd and American + of conversation, May 29 between Mosadeq, British Ambassador Sir Francis Shepherd and American Ambassador Grady (Embassy despatch 1022, May 31, 1951). [Footnote is in the original. The - memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign + memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 57–59 (Document 24).]

Mosadeq is gambling that Iran’s strategic and political importance will force America to give him money to meet his budgetary deficit and will lead to pressure on the British - to lift their blockade of Iran’s oil sales.It is pertinent to point out here that Mosadeq has good reasons for taking the calculated + to lift their blockade of Iran’s oil sales.It is pertinent to point out here that Mosadeq has good reasons for taking the calculated risk of threatened suicide. If Iran falls into communist hands, a - great rent will be torn in our “containment” ring around the USSR. Strategically, loss of Iran + great rent will be torn in our “containment” ring around the USSR. Strategically, loss of Iran will be calamitous for the free world. In 1918 the Bolshevik writer - K. Troyanovski assigned an important role to Iran in his “The East and the Revolution”. “The Persian + K. Troyanovski assigned an important role to Iran in his “The East and the Revolution”. “The Persian revolution is the key to the revolution of all of the Orient, just as Egypt and the Suez Canal are the key to the British domination of the Orient. Persia is the Suez Canal of the revolution. If we shift @@ -12295,35 +10824,29 @@ distrust among all Persians.“I and my tribe against the nation; I and my clan against the tribe; I and my brothers against the clan; and I against my brothers”—Old Persian - Proverb. [Footnote is in the original.] One of Mosadeq’s most extraordinary feats has + Proverb. [Footnote is in the original.] One of Mosadeq’s most extraordinary feats has been his welding of nine selfish, power-seeking politicians into a National Front which acted in cooperation and submerged individual interest into common purpose. Organization and refusal to disintegrate is probably the greatest factor in the National Front’s political success.

Propaganda Advertising men agree that a sales - campaign must have a simple, heavily-repeated slogan. When Mosadeq first came to power he said he + campaign must have a simple, heavily-repeated slogan. When Mosadeq first came to power he said he had two programs: implementation of the oil nationalization law and electoral reform.Address to the Majlis May 3 (Embassy telegram 2661, May 3, 1951). [Footnote is in the - original.] Even this platform was soon reduced to one plank—oil.“My program concerns the oil and my work is to + original.] Even this platform was soon reduced to one plank—oil.“My program concerns the oil and my work is to carry out the nationalization law”. Address to the Senate September 5, 1951. [Footnote is in the original.] The propaganda of the National Front, both as a Parliamentary minority and as a Government, has depended on this theme and, without a similarly simple, emotion-charged appeal, no opposition has been able to succeed.

Control The familiar military trappings of a - police state are lacking in Iran today, but Mosadeq, when crossed, acts as tyrannically as any + police state are lacking in Iran today, but Mosadeq, when crossed, acts as tyrannically as any dictator, using popular excitement and gangs of thugs to enforce his will. He told the Majlis opposition bluntly and quite truthfully, “You dare not step outside the Majlis and criticize the National Front. You - would be torn to pieces by the crowds.”Statement in the Majlis, December 11, 1951. [Footnote is in the + would be torn to pieces by the crowds.”Statement in the Majlis, December 11, 1951. [Footnote is in the original.]

Professional Oppositionist

Saed Government The Government, the Court and Army @@ -12354,23 +10877,18 @@ Again the National Front’s popularity grew as the prestige and authority of the Government waned.

Razmara - Government The full history of the rise and fall of Razmara could probably not be written. + Government The full history of the rise and fall of Razmara could probably not be written. The intrigues of this Premier became so intricate within a few months of his rise to power that it would be impossible to follow the many secret - channels he maintained to British and to Soviet sources of promises and pressure, to + channels he maintained to British and to Soviet sources of promises and pressure, to learn what liaison he had to various Court and Parliamentary cliques, or to know the extent of his grandiose ambitions.

It is a paradox that Mosadeq most strenuously opposed the man who first broke Iran’s close identification with the West and who focused national attention on an oil dispute with - the British. It was the fight against Razmara that brought the National Front most prominently - before the public eye. Again Mosadeq turned to his advantage what seemed to be the - greatest threat against him. Razmara’s reputation of being a strong-handed military + the British. It was the fight against Razmara that brought the National Front most prominently + before the public eye. Again Mosadeq turned to his advantage what seemed to be the + greatest threat against him. Razmara’s reputation of being a strong-handed military man allowed Mosadeq to champion parliamentary and press freedom against a tyranny which in fact did not exist. Mosadeq tilted with a @@ -12378,24 +10896,19 @@ “giant” fell, the credit redounded to the National Front.

Ala Government When Hosein - Ala became Prime Minister, Mosadeq saw that it could only be an interim appointment + Ala became Prime Minister, Mosadeq saw that it could only be an interim appointment while major forces in Iran worked to establish the next Government. - Mosadeq gained Ala’s confidence and used him to avert - much British pressure on the Shah and Parliament. He used the Ala Government almost like a + Mosadeq gained Ala’s confidence and used him to avert + much British pressure on the Shah and Parliament. He used the Ala Government almost like a stalking-horse as he prepared to ram oil nationalization through an emotionally aroused Majlis. Ala, - who had confidently thought that Mosadeq had been working to prepare constructive + who had confidently thought that Mosadeq had been working to prepare constructive legislation, suddenly was faced with a proposed law which he felt could only bring destruction of Iran’s economy. When he resigned, he was as much a victim of Mosadeq’s political realism as Saed, Mansur and Razmara.

-

Attitudes Towards the ShahEmbassy despatch 736, December 20, 1951, A Study +

Attitudes Towards the ShahEmbassy despatch 736, December 20, 1951, A Study of the Shah. [Footnote is in the original.]

National Front Antagonism to the Monarchy The antagonism of National Front leaders to the monarchy antedate the @@ -12417,32 +10930,25 @@ Frontists have responded to communist propaganda which obviously holds no place for the Shah in Iran’s future.All National Front leaders signed, in 1950, the communist-sponsored - “Peace Petition” and all pronounced themselves opposed to UN intervention in Korea. [Footnote is + “Peace Petition” and all pronounced themselves opposed to UN intervention in Korea. [Footnote is in the original.]

When the National Front became a minority in the Majlis, one of its most repeated themes was criticism of Court corruption and intrigues. Princess Ashraf was a favorite target; and, although the Shah, by his position, was free from direct attack, the National Front did not fail to blame him indirectly - for his Court’s iniquities. Kashani never opens his numerous “proclamations” with + for his Court’s iniquities. Kashani never opens his numerous “proclamations” with the customary courtesy—“under the auspices of his Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah”. Hosein Maki, a historian of some repute in Persia, has written biting criticism of the Pahlevis. Haerizadeh always called the first Pahlevi, “Reza Khan,” in his speeches in the 16th - Majlis, and he led National Front attacks on Princess Ashraf’s reputation. Nariman - publicly criticized the Shah in 1950 when Razmara was appointed to the premiership without a + Majlis, and he led National Front attacks on Princess Ashraf’s reputation. Nariman + publicly criticized the Shah in 1950 when Razmara was appointed to the premiership without a Majlis vote of inclination.

-

Prime Minister Mosadeq’s Control of the Shah When Mosadeq became Prime Minister, he was +

Prime Minister Mosadeq’s Control of the Shah When Mosadeq became Prime Minister, he was aware that his popularity and a strong Majlis vote of inclination had - forced the Shah to appoint him. He later reported to the SenateAddress to the Senate, September 5, 1951. + forced the Shah to appoint him. He later reported to the SenateAddress to the Senate, September 5, 1951. [Footnote is in the original.] that his pro-British rival, Seyid Zia, had been waiting with the Shah when the news arrived that Mosadeq had been acclaimed by @@ -12455,8 +10961,7 @@

Again, Mosadeq used to his advantage what seemed to be a threatening force. The very reason why the Shah had undermined previous Prime Ministers was his fear of being - overthrown by a successful “strong man”. Mosadeq took the problem by its horns and underlined the + overthrown by a successful “strong man”. Mosadeq took the problem by its horns and underlined the Shah’s own fears, pointing out that, if the Shah removed him, the forces of nationalism which he represented would in turn throw out the Shah.

@@ -12472,8 +10977,7 @@ strengthen that opinion and its resultant fear and procrastination.

Thus Mosadeq has avoided the pitfall which the Shah dug for other premiers. By relying on national - forces beyond reach of Court plots, Mosadeq is protected from the Shah’s most dangerous + forces beyond reach of Court plots, Mosadeq is protected from the Shah’s most dangerous weapon and has caught the Shah in his fears of deposition. The control which Mosadeq now holds upon the Shah can best be illustrated by the following examples.

@@ -12483,11 +10987,8 @@ rage at the demand, but both Princess Ashraf and the Queen Mother had to leave Tehran.

In late December, 1951, the Queen Mother, who had returned from - semi-exile in Hamadan, expressed her open support of Qavam to replace Mosadeq and sent flowers and candy, - with her card, to opposition deputies in asylum in the Majlis. Mosadeq’s protest took the form of a + semi-exile in Hamadan, expressed her open support of Qavam to replace Mosadeq and sent flowers and candy, + with her card, to opposition deputies in asylum in the Majlis. Mosadeq’s protest took the form of a threat of resignation from the premiership which the Shah and Minister of Court Ala begged him to withdraw. He “reconsidered” his offer to resign, but, in the meantime, @@ -12496,21 +10997,17 @@ convinced that the Shah would never act to put him in the place of Mosadeq.

Recently, Mosadeq has shown his - low regard for the Shah more clearly than before, telling Hosein Ala on January 12 that he would + low regard for the Shah more clearly than before, telling Hosein Ala on January 12 that he would not consult the Shah before making important decisions on internal or external affairs.Embassy telegram 2607, January 13, 1952. [Footnote is in the original. Telegram 2607 from - Tehran is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, + Tehran is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 888.2553/1–1352.] Also, he has exerted efforts both internally and by refusing U.S. military aid to weaken the Iranian Army upon which the Shah relies for support.

-

It has been interesting to speculate about the reasons for Mosadeq’s evident antagonism to the +

It has been interesting to speculate about the reasons for Mosadeq’s evident antagonism to the Army. He has always been opposed to military control of Iran’s affairs. - During his political career, Mosadeq has found the Army usually oppressive. At + During his political career, Mosadeq has found the Army usually oppressive. At present, the Army is the main source of power for the Shah. If he should win control of the Army, Mosadeq might not be so firm in his opposition but probably he will always fear @@ -12533,14 +11030,9 @@ Party strategy was planned to gain maximum advantage from the source of each man’s powers. Kashani, who never took his Majlis seat, was consulted on how to stir his bazaar - following in support of National Front policies. Saleh, Nariman, Shayegan and Haerizadeh had close touch with - Iranian intellectuals and leftist liberals. Mosadeq was a great orator and a national hero. - Maki, Baghai, Azad each appealed in different ways + following in support of National Front policies. Saleh, Nariman, Shayegan and Haerizadeh had close touch with + Iranian intellectuals and leftist liberals. Mosadeq was a great orator and a national hero. + Maki, Baghai, Azad each appealed in different ways to numbers of admirers. All these men worked to focus the attention they commanded towards the National Front rather than upon themselves alone.

@@ -12569,12 +11061,10 @@ Opposition When Mosadeq became Prime Minister, he had the unanimous support of Parliament. The motives for this unanimity were various, ranging from National Front - extreme views to hopes of Seyid Zia’s partisans that + extreme views to hopes of Seyid Zia’s partisans that Mosadeq would hang himself in his responsibilities. It was not for several months that questions of a - serious nature were raised on the Majlis floor against Mosadeq’s direction of the nation. The + serious nature were raised on the Majlis floor against Mosadeq’s direction of the nation. The Prime Minister has avoided all these questions and controlled his Majlis opposition by three primary methods—parliamentary maneuvers, anti-British moves and propaganda and terror in Tehran streets.

@@ -12586,8 +11076,7 @@ cause the Majlis to dissolve itself, thus preventing an embarrassing session. Pro-Government deputies were told to leave town in such numbers, ostensibly to attend provincial elections, that by January 22 - there was no Majlis quorum in Tehran. Simultaneously, Mosadeq ordered British Consulates to + there was no Majlis quorum in Tehran. Simultaneously, Mosadeq ordered British Consulates to be closed and it is clear that he intended, if his strategy of preventing Majlis sessions failed, to force a vote of confidence upon his anti-British actions rather than upon the opposition’s @@ -12606,10 +11095,8 @@ thugs who looted anti-Government newspapers, beat up opposition deputies on occasion, and threatened or attacked the families of the men in asylum, were acting under orders of National Front leaders. The crowds - gathered to demonstrate for Mosadeq on numerous occasions were obviously controlled - by terroristic organizations such as Kashani’s Warriors of Islam and Baghai’s so-called Iran + gathered to demonstrate for Mosadeq on numerous occasions were obviously controlled + by terroristic organizations such as Kashani’s Warriors of Islam and Baghai’s so-called Iran Workers Party.

In a more gentle way, Mosadeq has terrorized the entire Majlis by turning to the “people” when he was not @@ -12622,8 +11109,7 @@

Struggle with the Entrenched Interests

Any political leader in Iran has to face the power and inertia of Iran’s entrenched, reactionary interests. Mohammad - Mosadeq with realism and great shrewdness has played his politics to break up this + Mosadeq with realism and great shrewdness has played his politics to break up this monolithic force, first cloaking with nationalist emotions his real ambitions to break the power of old-line politicians in Government, then defeating conservative elements in the Court and Majlis, and then @@ -12632,43 +11118,35 @@ prepared to leave Iran to live abroad show their fears of National Front antagonism or of the chaos and the communism which many think inevitable.

-

Truce Dr. Mosadeq is a wealthy landowner and an aristocrat. His +

Truce Dr. Mosadeq is a wealthy landowner and an aristocrat. His son’s luxurious house in town is placed on a crossroad with three royal palaces. Despite his oratory about social reform, most Persians consider Mosadeq a member of the wealthy ruling class.

When emotions were aroused about the oil dispute, Persians of all classes - were swept with nationalistic fervor. The angriest pro-Mosadeq speeches heard by westerners at + were swept with nationalistic fervor. The angriest pro-Mosadeq speeches heard by westerners at private parties came from the scions of important Persian families. The antagonism which would have been expected from the entrenched interests to any politician calling for substantial change in the existing system was not forthcoming because the entrenched interests were dominated, in - early 1951, by the emotions of Mosadeq’s oil nationalization program.

+ early 1951, by the emotions of Mosadeq’s oil nationalization program.

It is also true, unfortunately, that the class which in England produces dedicated and courageous leaders seems generally to produce in Persia a selfish and weak-willed group of men. When this class can crush reform - without fear of much opposition, it is a potent force. When Mosadeq appeared on the political scene + without fear of much opposition, it is a potent force. When Mosadeq appeared on the political scene he was too dangerous a quantity for either the Shah or entrenched interests to oppose. These “leaders” mostly spent their efforts to - persuade someone else to remove Mosadeq.

+ persuade someone else to remove Mosadeq.

Piecemeal Defeats Mosadeq’s treatment of the Shah and Court and his capture and suppression of the Majlis has been - described. In these victories Mosadeq defeated representatives of Iran’s entrenched + described. In these victories Mosadeq defeated representatives of Iran’s entrenched interests. It is quite possible that a coordinated opposition from the Court and Majlis, based on contributions and other influence from the - landowners and great merchants, could have defeated Mosadeq. By persuading the Shah against + landowners and great merchants, could have defeated Mosadeq. By persuading the Shah against cooperation with the Majlis opposition deputies, by labeling as British agents any courtiers or deputies who were courageous or aware enough to - speak against the National Front, Mosadeq prevented much concerted opposition from the + speak against the National Front, Mosadeq prevented much concerted opposition from the entrenched interests.

Direct Attack Mosadeq’s timing has been @@ -12686,12 +11164,9 @@ and they will be faced with a substantial number of deputies who owe allegiance to the National Front or whose natural inclinations are toward National Front policies. It is quite true that the morass of - Persian politics will not be drained overnight and Mosadeq may bog down in corruption and - inertia. Also, it is possible that Mosadeq will join with the full force of the entrenched - interests to fight against a threatening communism. So far, Mosadeq has dealt successfully with the + Persian politics will not be drained overnight and Mosadeq may bog down in corruption and + inertia. Also, it is possible that Mosadeq will join with the full force of the entrenched + interests to fight against a threatening communism. So far, Mosadeq has dealt successfully with the entrenched interests, and he maintains the initiative in the struggle with them.

Dealing with Foreign Influences

@@ -12701,8 +11176,7 @@ play these rivals off against each other and some third force, first French, then German and now American, has developed a traditionally devious foreign policy. The history of recent foreign influence in - Iran’s affairs has been well described in Lenczowski’s book Russia and the West in Iran 1918–1948. + Iran’s affairs has been well described in Lenczowski’s book Russia and the West in Iran 1918–1948. Mosadeq’s decision to drive out the British required him to establish a new balance in Iran between Russia and America. So far, he has done this with consummate skill, and @@ -12725,8 +11199,7 @@ as the Partisans of Peace. There is little doubt that this type of opposition is fruitless since communist strength grows as Iran’s economic and political chaos deepens. The National Front has not yet - used the weapon of police suppression of the communists although the law prohibiting the Tudeh + used the weapon of police suppression of the communists although the law prohibiting the Tudeh Party is still in force. Mosadeq is playing a difficult game of encouraging Russia officially while attempting, by street riots, to prevent communist action.

@@ -12735,12 +11208,8 @@ too realistic where Iran’s relations with the United States are concerned. He has used and abused American good will, encouraging the United States to play the “honest broker” in the oil dispute in order to - lay upon the shoulders of Ambassador Grady, then Mr. Harriman, then Assistant Secretary McGhee, the blame for failure to - “persuade” the British to Mosadeq’s point of view. He gambles on Iran’s strategic and + lay upon the shoulders of Ambassador Grady, then Mr. Harriman, then Assistant Secretary McGhee, the blame for failure to + “persuade” the British to Mosadeq’s point of view. He gambles on Iran’s strategic and political importance in America’s “containment” policy to force American budgetary aid. He views American efforts to give him aid as evidence of some international desperation to prop him up. He realizes that American @@ -12753,10 +11222,8 @@ You Americans must save Iran anyhow”.

Asiatic “Neutrals” The neutralism of India and the theory of a “neutral” bloc of Moslem states meets the approval of the - National Front and many Persians. Kashani often speaks of an international Moslem union, - presumably under his command. Mosadeq, in Egypt, called for mutual, though essentially + National Front and many Persians. Kashani often speaks of an international Moslem union, + presumably under his command. Mosadeq, in Egypt, called for mutual, though essentially moral, support between Middle Eastern nations. It is doubtful if these vague thoughts will soon become particularly concrete. Certainly, at this moment, the influence of neighboring Moslem countries is negligible @@ -12779,8 +11246,7 @@ Mosadeq’s example will be followed in the future.

-

The national emotions upon which Mosadeq has played are permanent and profound in Iran. +

The national emotions upon which Mosadeq has played are permanent and profound in Iran. Hopes that Iran’s aroused nationalism can be or will be disregarded are unfounded. Nationalist emotions could possibly be rechanneled or transformed in some way, but they will not easily be erased. As @@ -12801,12 +11267,10 @@ Selfishness and disorganization characterize Persian politics, and Mosadeq has made the most of those conditions. Whoever tries to stand against him or to follow him - must have equal realism. Again, in military terms, Mosadeq’s political ability has been + must have equal realism. Again, in military terms, Mosadeq’s political ability has been shown in his consolidation of a position when it was won and his ability to prevent or overcome counter-attacks.

-

The great tragedy for Iran is that Mosadeq, who has recognized and led nationalist +

The great tragedy for Iran is that Mosadeq, who has recognized and led nationalist emotions, does not now seem to know where he is going. The methods which Mosadeq used to come to power are fine for “assault” and capture of power, but, by their own @@ -12858,19 +11322,15 @@

-
+
66. Memorandum From the Acting Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans ([name not declassified]) to the Deputy Director for Plans, Central - Intelligence Agency (Dulles)Source: + Intelligence Agency (Dulles)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, Iran. Secret; Security Information. - Washington, February 20, 1952. + Washington, February 20, 1952. SUBJECT Appraisal of Activities [less than 1 line not @@ -12881,8 +11341,7 @@

[name not declassified] concludes that the current election trend, on the basis of results tabulated thus far, indicates that our primary objective of denying to the Tudeh Communist Party - representation in the new parliament has met with success, [2 lines not declassified].

+ representation in the new parliament has met with success, [2 lines not declassified].

Voting began in Iran on 23 December, 1951, and is scheduled to end on 1 March, 1952. As of 14 February, 25 deputies out of a total complement of 136 have been elected. Further reports on the progress of the elections @@ -12896,8 +11355,7 @@ declassified] with respect to the Iranian Parliamentary Elections -

In a preliminary appraisal of the influence and activities of [less than 1 line not declassified] with respect +

In a preliminary appraisal of the influence and activities of [less than 1 line not declassified] with respect to the parliamentary elections now in process, [less than 1 line not declassified] their fundamental objectives with regard to the Iranian elections were (1) to stimulate in the Iranian @@ -12924,8 +11382,7 @@ become confident of success throughout the provinces. In the preliminary Tehran results, based on 100,000 votes out of a total of 140,000, all Tudeh candidates were badly defeated. In every Iranian constituency thus - far reported, Prime Minister Mosadeq’s National Front party has been victorious, and + far reported, Prime Minister Mosadeq’s National Front party has been victorious, and the Tudeh party has yet to win a single seat.

[1½ lines not declassified] success in these anti-Tudeh election efforts depended in large measure on preparatory @@ -12940,8 +11397,7 @@

[5 lines not declassified] Successful efforts were made simultaneously to effect a united front on the part of non-Tudeh - candidates, whose political differences were reconciled [1½ lines not declassified]. Following creation of + candidates, whose political differences were reconciled [1½ lines not declassified]. Following creation of this united anti-Tudeh front, its representatives toured the area seeking popular support for the front and openly denouncing Tudeh aspirants. [8 lines not declassified] The @@ -12951,14 +11407,10 @@

-
+
The July 1952 Iranian Political Crisis and Its Aftermath, March 1952–February 1953 -
+
67. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI @@ -12969,28 +11421,20 @@ Staff Memorandum No. 211 - Washington, March 28, 1952. + Washington, March 28, 1952. SUBJECT - Effect of Recent Developments in Iran on Mossadeq’s Regime + Effect of Recent Developments in Iran on Mossadeq’s Regime -

1. The oil negotiations between the Iranian Government and the IBRD, which began on 14 February, were - suspended on 16 March because of disagreement on four issues:For documentation on the oil negotiations between - the Iranian Government and the IBRD, see Foreign Relations, - 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 354–370 (Documents 159–169).

+

1. The oil negotiations between the Iranian Government and the IBRD, which began on 14 February, were + suspended on 16 March because of disagreement on four issues:For documentation on the oil negotiations between + the Iranian Government and the IBRD, see Foreign Relations, + 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 354–370 (Documents 159–169).

a. Iran refused to permit British oil technicians to return to Iran. The Bank refused to discriminate against the British in this way, not only on general principles, but also on the grounds that there were not sufficient oil technicians of other countries available to operate the - Abadan refinery efficiently. Moreover, the Bank assumed that the UK would not have accepted a settlement + Abadan refinery efficiently. Moreover, the Bank assumed that the UK would not have accepted a settlement which barred the return of British technicians to Iran.

b. Iran demanded that the Bank concede that it would be managing the oil industry “on behalf of” Iran. The Bank adopted the position that it @@ -13005,15 +11449,13 @@ price formula and suggested various formulas approximating the 50–50 profit-sharing standard in effect in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq.

d. Iran demanded the right to sell 30 percent of its production directly - to independent buyers. The Bank supported the British position that in any settlement the + to independent buyers. The Bank supported the British position that in any settlement the marketing agent (i.e., AIOC) must have the right to buy practically all Iranian production.

2. While Mossadeq might have been willing to compromise on the other issues, he made it very clear that he could not permit British technicians to return to Iran under any - circumstances. There is little likelihood that Mossadeq or any other National Front + circumstances. There is little likelihood that Mossadeq or any other National Front leader will retreat from this position or that the British would accept a settlement that barred the return of British technicians to Iran. Thus, although the talks have not been formally broken off, there is @@ -13021,9 +11463,7 @@ regime remains in power in Iran.

3. While public opinion in Iran, even among politically conscious groups, is difficult to assess, there appears to have been considerable - disillusionment at the breakdown of the negotiations with IBRD. Opposition to Mossadeq in a significant proportion of + disillusionment at the breakdown of the negotiations with IBRD. Opposition to Mossadeq in a significant proportion of the press is more intense than ever before, and there has been a notable absence of pro-Mossadeq demonstrations. Civil servants, members of the armed forces, and the @@ -13039,8 +11479,7 @@ few payments to them in recent months.

4. The increasing concern of more conservative elements with the trend of events has been reflected in the Senate, which before it adjourned on 19 - March seriously considered calling for Mossadeq’s resignation. Its failure to act can be + March seriously considered calling for Mossadeq’s resignation. Its failure to act can be attributed largely to the Shah’s refusal to support such a movement at this time. The Shah actually advised against it because he continues to believe that Mossadeq must be @@ -13056,12 +11495,9 @@

5. Much of the Shah’s self-confidence probably results from the fact that the armed forces have recently displayed increasing antagonism towards the National Front and demonstrated their loyalty to him. Army leaders - have been antagonized by Mossadeq’s attitude blocking US arms assistance and his + have been antagonized by Mossadeq’s attitude blocking US arms assistance and his refusal to renew the contracts of the US - military mission.See Document 60. Their opposition to the National + military mission.See Document 60. Their opposition to the National Front has been clearly demonstrated during the current elections. While the army exerted its influence discreetly and concentrated its efforts in provincial areas, it was instrumental in defeating a number of @@ -13079,8 +11515,7 @@ from effectively maintaining internal order. If, for instance, the government attempted to cut the army budget significantly or failed to meet army salary payments over a protracted period, the Shah and the - army leaders would probably act decisively to remove Mossadeq from power.

+ army leaders would probably act decisively to remove Mossadeq from power.

6. The new Majlis, at least initially, will be heavily weighted in favor of the government. Approximately 60 deputies, out of a total of 136, have already been elected. Of these, probably about 25 are active @@ -13094,21 +11529,17 @@ constituted the chief opposition and would undoubtedly have elected several deputies if the elections had been conducted honestly. The 8 hard-core National Front deputies from Tabriz are personal followers of - the religious reactionary Kashani, and 3 of them have had connections with Tudeh - in the past. Three or four personal followers of Kashani were also elected in other + the religious reactionary Kashani, and 3 of them have had connections with Tudeh + in the past. Three or four personal followers of Kashani were also elected in other parts of the country. The chief opposition in the Tabriz area came from the wealthy landowners and tribal elements, who were astonished at their defeat by, in some cases, impoverished and unknown mullahs. The elections, which started in December, have progressed slowly, primarily because of attempts by the government to block the election of opposition candidates. There appears also to have been some rivalry - between different factions within the National Front, particularly between candidates + between different factions within the National Front, particularly between candidates supported by Kashani and - candidates claiming the support of Mossadeq. In many districts the counting of ballots has + candidates claiming the support of Mossadeq. In many districts the counting of ballots has been stopped and new elections called. Violence has been unusually widespread even for an election period, and at least 35 deaths have resulted. Because of the government’s fear of Tudeh strength in Abadan @@ -13142,8 +11573,7 @@ a number of the conclusions in NIE–46, “Probable Developments in Iran in 1952 in the Absence of an Oil Settlement.”Document - 63. The major conclusions of NIE–46, and the way in which they are + 63. The major conclusions of NIE–46, and the way in which they are affected by recent developments in Iran, may be briefly summarized as follows:

a. Mossadeq or @@ -13172,8 +11602,7 @@ be valid.

g. It can probably obtain Majlis support for emergency fiscal measures which would avert a fiscal breakdown at least - through the summer of 1952. The decline in Mossadeq’s popularity suggests that, + through the summer of 1952. The decline in Mossadeq’s popularity suggests that, even with stronger National Front representation in the Majlis, he may not be able to obtain Majlis approval for emergency fiscal legislation “which would avert a fiscal breakdown at least through the summer of @@ -13183,8 +11612,7 @@ Government will be under increasing pressure to satisfy hopes for social and economic benefits; failure to provide these benefits would be likely to lead many National Front supporters to turn to - the Tudeh Party. There is as yet no evidence that Mossadeq has made any attempt to + the Tudeh Party. There is as yet no evidence that Mossadeq has made any attempt to improve social and economic conditions or that disillusion and opposition growing out of his failure to do so has led to any increase in Tudeh strength. This is not to say that Tudeh influence may not @@ -13194,18 +11622,14 @@ agreeing on reform measures and in obtaining Majlis support for them. Consequently, the National Front would probably be forced to adopt authoritarian methods. While there is some evidence of - cleavages in the National Front, particularly between the Kashani and Mossadeq factions, they have certainly + cleavages in the National Front, particularly between the Kashani and Mossadeq factions, they have certainly not resulted from differences over possible “reform measures.” Nor is there any indication that the National Front regime is considering the - adoption of authoritarian methods. Mossadeq has relied heavily on Majlis support. It is + adoption of authoritarian methods. Mossadeq has relied heavily on Majlis support. It is difficult to envisage how the National Front could resort to authoritarian rule without first obtaining control of the army, the leaders of which have once again shown, in the elections, that they are - almost exclusively anti-Mossadeq.

+ almost exclusively anti-Mossadeq.

j. A conservative government would also be forced to rule by authoritarian means and to make concessions to nationalist @@ -13220,17 +11644,13 @@ would obviously be restricted under authoritarian rule, it does not automatically follow that the Tudeh potential will increase in the absence of authoritarian rule. (See h. above.)

-

8. In summary, recent developments suggest that Mossadeq’s chances of remaining in - power are not as good as was indicated in NIE–46, although it is extremely difficult to estimate who +

8. In summary, recent developments suggest that Mossadeq’s chances of remaining in + power are not as good as was indicated in NIE–46, although it is extremely difficult to estimate who might succeed him. If Mossadeq were to resign voluntarily while the National Front still controlled the Majlis, it is possible that an even more extreme and uncompromising - National Front leader, such as Kashani or Makki, might come to power. However, it now - appears more likely that Majlis opposition to Mossadeq’s fiscal program would be the + National Front leader, such as Kashani or Makki, might come to power. However, it now + appears more likely that Majlis opposition to Mossadeq’s fiscal program would be the immediate cause of his fall from power, in which event a more moderate National Front leader or even a conservative might come to power. While such a successor government might not act with sufficient energy and @@ -13241,8 +11661,7 @@ possibility that Mossadeq or the Shah will be assassinated. The terroristic Fedayan Islam organization has been more active during the past month and was responsible for the - recent near-fatal attack on a former deputy prime minister to Mossadeq. In the current tense + recent near-fatal attack on a former deputy prime minister to Mossadeq. In the current tense atmosphere other groups or individuals may adopt the same tactics. The assassination of Mossadeq would probably be successfully exploited by the National Front extremists to @@ -13257,15 +11676,12 @@ occurring would probably have an important influence on the actions and attitudes of the leading figures on the Iranian political scene.In - Staff Memorandum No. 214 (Revised), April 14, Leavitt suggested that Iran + Staff Memorandum No. 214 (Revised), April 14, Leavitt suggested that Iran intelligence specialists agreed that developments did not warrant - revision of this estimate. While they conceded Mosadeq’s popularity had declined + revision of this estimate. While they conceded Mosadeq’s popularity had declined during the past 2 months and that there was a revival of anti-Mosadeq agitation by - more conservative elements, they “continue to believe that Mossadeq will once again be able to + more conservative elements, they “continue to believe that Mossadeq will once again be able to rally sufficient support to remain in power. In particular, they still believe that Mossadeq will probably succeed in assembling a Majlis quorum and in obtaining @@ -13275,37 +11691,29 @@ overthrowing Mossadeq, even though they agree that during the past two months he has seemed more self-confident and has indicated a determination to retain control - of the armed forces.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 79T00937A, Box 1, + of the armed forces.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 79T00937A, Box 1, Folder 3, Staff Memoranda—1952 (Substantive))

- John H. - Leavitt + John H. + Leavitt
-
+
68. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1950–1952, classified general records, Box 25. Secret; Security Information. Repeated to Tehran for the Ambassador only. Received March 29 at 3 p.m. - Paris, March 28, + Paris, March 28, 1952, 8 p.m. -

5970. At request of former Prime Minister Qavam of Iran, Embassy Officer called at his hotel. +

5970. At request of former Prime Minister Qavam of Iran, Embassy Officer called at his hotel. Invitation was extended by Parvis Khan Khalili, Afghan subject of - Georgian origin, and Khazrai, both in Qavam’s entourage.

-

Extremely oriental manner of Qavam made it difficult to fathom real purpose of + Georgian origin, and Khazrai, both in Qavam’s entourage.

+

Extremely oriental manner of Qavam made it difficult to fathom real purpose of conversation. Some light was thrown by Khazrai who subsequently endeavored to interpret obtuse and vague words of ex-Prime Minister - Qavam. Qavam expressed his admiration, + Qavam. Qavam expressed his admiration, sympathy and confidence in US and referred to abortive attempt to get in contact with President in 49 to warn him of dangerous course which Iran was following. He stressed his @@ -13323,24 +11731,19 @@ friendly terms but described as young, weak and easily influenced by his Court Advisers. Qavam stated that he would be ready to initiate economic and social reforms, with or - without aid from abroad, settle the oil problem with UK and undertake strong measures against + without aid from abroad, settle the oil problem with UK and undertake strong measures against Tudeh and Commie agitation. This he could not do, however, unless he was assured of complete confidence of Shah and Parliament.

-

We were asked to transmit to Department Qavam’s desire to work for salvation his country in +

We were asked to transmit to Department Qavam’s desire to work for salvation his country in close collaboration with US and were requested to obtain response fm Dept before Qavam returns to Tehran. When we expressed mystification as to what response to what question was - expected, Khazrai, after conferring with Qavam in Persian, intimated that in event latter were to - come to power, he would like assurance from US that it would lend good offices with Shah in obtaining + expected, Khazrai, after conferring with Qavam in Persian, intimated that in event latter were to + come to power, he would like assurance from US that it would lend good offices with Shah in obtaining unflinching Royal support. We answered that it would be impossible for US Government to pronounce on - anything so hypothetical, and added that US Government, of course, was gravely concerned over + anything so hypothetical, and added that US Government, of course, was gravely concerned over deteriorating situation in Iran and had already shown its concern in trying in every way possible to assist Iran and strengthen it so it could maintain itself as independent member of free nations.

@@ -13348,212 +11751,137 @@ attempting to ascertain whether he would have backing of Washington in case he was called upon to form government. We would appreciate receiving any remarks which Washington, after consulting Ambassador - Tehran, might wish us to convey to Qavam.

+ Tehran, might wish us to convey to Qavam.

Qavam has been in Europe last 3 months and just recently undergone operation in Switzerland for nervous - facial tic. He appeared old but far from extinct. Qavam told us that he had left Iran + facial tic. He appeared old but far from extinct. Qavam told us that he had left Iran at time of arrival new Ambassador and, therefore, had not seen him but hoped to meet him on return to Tehran.

- Dunn + Dunn
-
- 69. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 69. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 888.00/3–3152. Secret; Security Information; Priority. Repeated to Paris. Received at 12:55 p.m. - Tehran, March 31, + Tehran, March 31, 1952, 4 p.m.

3715. 1. During last 6 months Emb has - been approached on numerous occasions by friends Qavam (Paris tel to Dept 5970, March 28)Document 68. with + been approached on numerous occasions by friends Qavam (Paris tel to Dept 5970, March 28)Document 68. with purpose endeavoring extract from Emb assurances that US Govt wld take various steps effect - establishment gov headed by Qavam or at least wld + establishment gov headed by Qavam or at least wld look with favor upon such govt if set up. Some these emissaries have urged I press Shah interevene with Majlis - or Senate in order bring about replacement Mosadeq by Qavam. Others have merely asked that we give assurances + or Senate in order bring about replacement Mosadeq by Qavam. Others have merely asked that we give assurances that if Qavam - shld become PriMin his govt + shld become PriMin his govt wld be viewed with friendly eyes by - US and US + US and US wld be prepared render substantial - financial or econ assistance to his govt. Practically all these friends of Qavam have assured Emb that Qavam + financial or econ assistance to his govt. Practically all these friends of Qavam have assured Emb that Qavam wld be friendly to West, particularly to US. Within recent weeks some of them - have gone so far as say that if he shld come to power he wld + have gone so far as say that if he shld come to power he wld take steps place Iran openly on side West and bring Iran into Mid-East - command. Some of them have also informed Emb that his health is greatly improved and that he is + command. Some of them have also informed Emb that his health is greatly improved and that he is planning return almost immediately Iran.

-

2. Shah continues be antipathetic to Qavam in spite claims Qavam’s friends that his attitude re Qavam has altered during recent +

2. Shah continues be antipathetic to Qavam in spite claims Qavam’s friends that his attitude re Qavam has altered during recent months. During my talk with Shah on Mar 20 he told me again he did not - (rpt not) trust Qavam and dismissed possibility + (rpt not) trust Qavam and dismissed possibility latter’s return to power. Ala - also told me several days ago he distressed at stories that Princess Ashraf was mtg Qavam and was conspiring to make him + also told me several days ago he distressed at stories that Princess Ashraf was mtg Qavam and was conspiring to make him PriMin. We understand most of - royal family, particularly Queen Mother, Princess Ashraf and Prince Abdor Reza favor Qavam and are critical of Shah’s - attitude. We believe most Iran politicians at present do not (rpt not) consider Qavam as likely candidate for PriMin in view Shah’s opposition.

+ royal family, particularly Queen Mother, Princess Ashraf and Prince Abdor Reza favor Qavam and are critical of Shah’s + attitude. We believe most Iran politicians at present do not (rpt not) consider Qavam as likely candidate for PriMin in view Shah’s opposition.

3. Altho Qavam is old and perhaps to extent decrepit; altho some his closest advisers have bad reputations re personal honesty and polit integrity; and altho he is by no (rpt no) means inspiring leader; nevertheless, we inclined believe that of all candidates who thus far - have been mentioned as possible successors to Mosadeq, he wld probably be most effective PriMin from point view of restoring stability in country - and of working out arrangements which, if Brit + have been mentioned as possible successors to Mosadeq, he wld probably be most effective PriMin from point view of restoring stability in country + and of working out arrangements which, if Brit wld show more reasonable attitude, wld result in revival oil industry and improvement Iran’s financial position. He might even venture launch some much needed econ reforms which his followers say he has in mind.

4. Emb has been uniformly replying to - approaches made to it by friends Qavam to effect US + approaches made to it by friends Qavam to effect US Govt pursues policy of - non-interference in Iran internal affairs. US - Govt therefore cannot (rpt cannot) support one candidate for + non-interference in Iran internal affairs. US + Govt therefore cannot (rpt cannot) support one candidate for PriMin against another. If however Qavam - shld come to power, US + shld come to power, US Govt wld hope to have friendly relations - with his govt and with him. US + with his govt and with him. US Govt recalls the pleasant relations - which it had enjoyed with Iran during period Qavam was PriMin and wld hope that + which it had enjoyed with Iran during period Qavam was PriMin and wld hope that similar relations wld exist if he shld again come to power.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
+
70. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in FranceSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/4–152. Top Secret; Security Information; Priority. Drafted by Ferguson, cleared - in WE and BNA, and approved by Berry. Repeated to Tehran and London. - Washington, April 1, 1952. -

5824. Wld appreciate Emb using greatest circumspection (urtel 5970 Mar 28)Document 68. in - dealing with Qavam. Dept concerned not only at possible + in WE and BNA, and approved by Berry. Repeated to Tehran and London. + Washington, April 1, 1952. +

5824. Wld appreciate Emb using greatest circumspection (urtel 5970 Mar 28)Document 68. in + dealing with Qavam. Dept concerned not only at possible repercussions within Iran shld it - become known there has been direct contact between Qavam and US officials but we are disturbed at presence Khalili and - Khazrai during ur mtg. According Dept’s records both are notorious - internatl adventurers and both, particularly Khaz-rai, may be Sov agents.

-

Believe best line to take in reply Qavam’s query is that, as he is well aware from his - experience as PriMin, US does not rpt not interfere in Iran internal affairs and under no - rpt no circumstances cld indicate its preference for any - particular candidate for Premiership. This pol + become known there has been direct contact between Qavam and US officials but we are disturbed at presence Khalili and + Khazrai during ur mtg. According Dept’s records both are notorious + internatl adventurers and both, particularly Khaz-rai, may be Sov agents.

+

Believe best line to take in reply Qavam’s query is that, as he is well aware from his + experience as PriMin, US does not rpt not interfere in Iran internal affairs and under no + rpt no circumstances cld indicate its preference for any + particular candidate for Premiership. This pol wld of course apply in case of conflict - between Shah and any particular PriMin.

+ between Shah and any particular PriMin.

We fear last sentence Tehran’s 3715 rpt Paris 85 Mar 31Document - 69. undesirable in present instance since it cld be interpreted by Qavam and his present associates in - Paris as indirect indication of support. We have no rpt no objection Tehran’s continuing this + 69. undesirable in present instance since it cld be interpreted by Qavam and his present associates in + Paris as indirect indication of support. We have no rpt no objection Tehran’s continuing this statement to emissaries in Iran whose reputations are better than those Khalili and Khazrai. Any - further info present activities these two persons wld be welcome. Wld appreciate ur repeating + further info present activities these two persons wld be welcome. Wld appreciate ur repeating all tels this subj to London.

- Acheson + Acheson
-
+
71. Memorandum From the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans (Roosevelt) to the Chief of the Operations Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency ([name not declassified])Source: - Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 80–01795R, Box 10, Folder 3, Office of + Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 80–01795R, Box 10, Folder 3, Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) History 01Apr52–15Apr52. Top Secret; Security Information. - Washington, April 5, 1952. + Washington, April 5, 1952. SUBJECT - Monthly Division Operations Report of NEA Activity for March 1952 + Monthly Division Operations Report of NEA Activity for March 1952

[Omitted here are portions of the report unrelated to Iran.]

3. Reports from Iran during March stressed the progressive deterioration of the economic and political situation in view of Prime Minister Mossadeq’s prolonged failure to reach some settlement of the oil controversy. Four political trends - have become apparent: a) Prime Minister Mossadeq, in spite of maneuvers within his National + have become apparent: a) Prime Minister Mossadeq, in spite of maneuvers within his National Front and evidence of waning popularity, is considered capable of remaining in power and control at least during the early session of the new parliament. b) The prestige of the Shah is weakening because of his @@ -13567,12 +11895,9 @@ and the Government, preoccupied with economic and political problems, takes no positive action against the Tudeh. d) Xenophobia in Iran is now being directed against the US since - Washington’s statement that no significant US economic aid would be granted Iran prior to an oil - settlement.An apparent reference to the statement contained in - telegram 1648 to Tehran, February 9, printed in Foreign + Washington’s statement that no significant US economic aid would be granted Iran prior to an oil + settlement.An apparent reference to the statement contained in + telegram 1648 to Tehran, February 9, printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 348–349 (Document 156). This anti-American feeling has recently been exploited by the Tudeh.

@@ -13585,8 +11910,7 @@ with Department of State representatives on this subject in March 1952 has been found. In his monthly report prepared for Chief of Operations Helms for December - 1951, dated January 7, 1952, Roosevelt reported that “with the continued + 1951, dated January 7, 1952, Roosevelt reported that “with the continued deterioration of the situation in Iran, conversations have been held with the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State and the Acting Assistant Secretary. The likelihood of the fragmentation of @@ -13596,9 +11920,7 @@ to the Shah, and concerning stockpiling, timing, and collaboration with the British, were all regarded by the Department officials as pertinent and important. Although no conclusions were reached - regarding these specific matters, Mr. Berry pointed out that NSC 107/2, defining the position of the United States + regarding these specific matters, Mr. Berry pointed out that NSC 107/2, defining the position of the United States with respect to Iran, would be restudied and redrafted, since its basic premises have proved faulty; a new and clearer policy is expected to be formulated. Such a revision should pro-vide clearer @@ -13620,32 +11942,24 @@ of uncontested Tudeh “rule of the streets”.

[Omitted here are portions of the report unrelated to Iran.]

- Kermit - RooseveltPrinted from a + Kermit + RooseveltPrinted from a copy with Roosevelt’s typed signature.
-
- 72. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 72. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1950–1952, classified general records, Box 29. Secret; Security - Information. Drafted by Melbourne and Henderson. Repeated to London. The telegram is the + Information. Drafted by Melbourne and Henderson. Repeated to London. The telegram is the Embassy copy as approved and has no time of transmission. - Tehran, May 9, 1952. -

4349. As result instructions rec’d by Brit + Tehran, May 9, 1952. +

4349. As result instructions rec’d by Brit Emb which lists questions in different - order from Deptel 2441 May 2,In telegram 2441 to Tehran, May 2, the + order from Deptel 2441 May 2,In telegram 2441 to Tehran, May 2, the Department requested that the Embassy conduct a joint analysis with the British Embassy of the situation in Iran. Specifically, the Department, as well as the Foreign Office, requested the Embassies’ @@ -13664,9 +11978,7 @@ situation remains highly uncertain and that it impossible to assess its course beyond most immediate future. In considering interplay of internal Iranian forces and their possible shift with events and time, - we believe that policies of US, UK and USSR toward Iran are at least as important as internal + we believe that policies of US, UK and USSR toward Iran are at least as important as internal forces, which in turn react to these foreign influences. With these observations in mind, there follows estimate of Iranian situation by two Embassies:

@@ -13696,8 +12008,7 @@

(c) Is financial and economic collapse inevitable and if so is it matter of weeks or longer period?

(a) This has already been dealt with in latest reports prepared by - Economic/Commercial Counselor in consultation with US/Brit + Economic/Commercial Counselor in consultation with US/Brit Emb.An apparent reference to two surveys of Iran’s economic and financial condition at the close of the Iranian year 1330, prepared @@ -13720,72 +12031,51 @@ unlikely Govt cld obtain Majlis [text missing] on for limited use of remaining gold reserve behind currency and for expansion - of currency required for financing Govt deficit. Thus, while in our opinion Govt cld not make full use of all country’s + of currency required for financing Govt deficit. Thus, while in our opinion Govt cld not make full use of all country’s resources, it cld obtain sufficient funds to meet its needs for considerable time.

(c) Ultimate financial and economic collapse is believed to be inevitable in absence restoration oil income. Such collapse might be matter of months unless Majlis authorization obtained for use currency gold - reserve and/or currency expansion to support Bank Melli loan to Govt. With such authorization Govt might carry on thru Iranian year + reserve and/or currency expansion to support Bank Melli loan to Govt. With such authorization Govt might carry on thru Iranian year 1331 (until Mar 1953).

-

3) In event of collapse of central Govt, what is most likely political development?

+

3) In event of collapse of central Govt, what is most likely political development?

We do not believe that collapse of central Govt imminent despite slow drift toward anarchy. Nevertheless, unity of Natl Front under strain and it showing certain indecision. Iran’s problems in varied fields becoming so serious that Mosadeq Govt or its possible successors - probably will be obliged to think in terms of authoritarian govt. This govt may be a) present Govt or revised Natl Front regime, + probably will be obliged to think in terms of authoritarian govt. This govt may be a) present Govt or revised Natl Front regime, b) one derived from non-communist opposition groups, c) one frankly controlled by communists or military junta.

-

(a) We do not believe that oil problem can be solved so long as Mosadeq remains Primin. In absence - solution and Western financial aid he may at some point make overtures to USSR. He may try include Tudehists in his +

(a) We do not believe that oil problem can be solved so long as Mosadeq remains Primin. In absence + solution and Western financial aid he may at some point make overtures to USSR. He may try include Tudehists in his cabinet in hope obtaining Soviet economic aid and convincing West that his threats to “turn toward Russia” have reality. If Natl Front, with or without Mosadeq’s ostensible leadership, shld degenerate in this - fashion, way might be prepared for govt controlled by communists and installation of regime + fashion, way might be prepared for govt controlled by communists and installation of regime which wld disregard or overthrow Shah. - On other hand, revised Natl Front Govt conceivable without Mosadeq which wld remain loyal to Shah and which wld try strike balance between Free World and Soviet Union. + On other hand, revised Natl Front Govt conceivable without Mosadeq which wld remain loyal to Shah and which wld try strike balance between Free World and Soviet Union. Such regime might be willing seek solution oil problem and if it succeeds, can survive.

-

(b) Opposition combination replacing Mosadeq +

(b) Opposition combination replacing Mosadeq cld assume office thru exercise by Shah - of his constitutional powers in some form. This regime wld require full support of Shah and army + of his constitutional powers in some form. This regime wld require full support of Shah and army to exercise authoritarian methods in running country and in proceeding against its opponents. Such regime, which might be strong civilian coalition or military junta, cld try strike balance between Russia and West or turn openly to West for support, while seeking in either case solve oil problem.

(c) Dissatisfaction among tribal elements resulting in large-scale - outbreaks difficult for armed forces to control cld be signal for communist effort to seize control of - Tehran and of north with covert Soviet support. Resultant regime cld be outright communist dictatorship or + outbreaks difficult for armed forces to control cld be signal for communist effort to seize control of + Tehran and of north with covert Soviet support. Resultant regime cld be outright communist dictatorship or military non-communist junta cld be set up to meet threat.

We think that order of likelihood of above occurring is (a), (b) and (c). - We consider most probable development to be that Mosadeq will remain in power until + We consider most probable development to be that Mosadeq will remain in power until after World Court decision in June. Thereafter probability increases of - his being replaced by revised Natl Front Govt. However, if Mosadeq takes active steps to approach the Russians, + his being replaced by revised Natl Front Govt. However, if Mosadeq takes active steps to approach the Russians, such as actually going to Moscow or appointing Tudeh ministers, or if Shah becomes convinced that Natl Front has weakened to such extent that he can take action at only slight risk to himself, possibility of (b) @@ -13799,17 +12089,12 @@ as yet indicated his preferences in this respect. Opponents of Natl Front claim that if there were joint Anglo-American approach to Shah for removal of Mosadeq and - installation of alternative regime, this wld oblige Shah to act. We doubt whether such step wld be effective unless considerable + installation of alternative regime, this wld oblige Shah to act. We doubt whether such step wld be effective unless considerable pressure were exerted to convince Shah of great dangers of inaction and concrete advantages to Iran and to himself to be derived from his intervention. We believe that Shah might be willing use Armed Forces to - support weak Primin who wld not be likely become rival. However, - under conditions developing in Iran, we believe weak Govt, despite military support, wld be short lived. Shah is notoriously + support weak Primin who wld not be likely become rival. However, + under conditions developing in Iran, we believe weak Govt, despite military support, wld be short lived. Shah is notoriously reluctant accord full support to strong Primin, but he might reluctantly agree to do so if convinced this necessary to prevent collapse of Iran or complete discrediting monarchy.

@@ -13820,8 +12105,7 @@ Soviet Union, this not inconsistent with traditional Iranian policy of playing one great power off against another and belief that by such means country can continue maintain precarious independence. We both - believe it quite probable that Mosadeq, if driven into corner, will turn to Moscow more + believe it quite probable that Mosadeq, if driven into corner, will turn to Moscow more as gesture of defiance than in any hope of getting real assistance. We do not think volatile elements of population and of Natl Front willing to realize, as do thoughtful Iranians, that country can obtain little @@ -13830,20 +12114,13 @@ irretrievable steps may have been taken which might place Iran virtually in hands USSR.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
- 73. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/5–1652. Secret; - Security Information. Drafted by Rountree. - Washington, May 16, +
+ 73. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/5–1652. Secret; + Security Information. Drafted by Rountree. + Washington, May 16, 1952. SUBJECT @@ -13860,19 +12137,15 @@

Mr. Pyman has served as British Oriental Counselor in Tehran and has handled Iranian problems in London - for eleven years, with the exception of one year in St. Louis, Missouri. He recently returned to + for eleven years, with the exception of one year in St. Louis, Missouri. He recently returned to London for leave and reassignment to Rio. He was sent by the Foreign Office to Washington to consult with the British Embassy upon Iranian matters and to participate in the conversations between the Embassy and - Departmental representatives. In this final meeting with Mr. Pyman before his return to London, we + Departmental representatives. In this final meeting with Mr. Pyman before his return to London, we sought to obtain his views upon several matters, particularly upon - possible candidates as Prime Minister in the event Dr. Mosadeq should resign or fall. Rather + possible candidates as Prime Minister in the event Dr. Mosadeq should resign or fall. Rather than the usual running account of the conversation, the following - reflects the summary of what Pyman had to say.

+ reflects the summary of what Pyman had to say.

It was recognized by both sides that the type of Prime Minister who would be chosen to succeed Dr. Mosadeq would depend in large measure upon the circumstances surrounding the @@ -13888,9 +12161,7 @@ National Front, a Prime Minister in the third category, “National Front Candidates” might be chosen.

Normal-Type Candidates

-

1) Qavam—The Shah does not like Qavam and fears that he would +

1) Qavam—The Shah does not like Qavam and fears that he would constitute a threat to the Shah’s position. The principal disadvantage of Qavam as a Prime Minister would be that nepotism and corruption would flourish, and his political @@ -13904,12 +12175,10 @@

2) Mansur—Mansur is a routine, traditional Iranian politician, and an opportunist who would make a serious attempt to settle the oil dispute, not so much on the basis of principle as upon - the basis of expediency. While the Shah’s opinion of Mansur is not known, it is believed + the basis of expediency. While the Shah’s opinion of Mansur is not known, it is believed that he would find some reassurance in recalling that he successfully fired Mansur upon “15 minutes - notice” in order to make way for the appointment of General Razmara. The Shah would, therefore, + notice” in order to make way for the appointment of General Razmara. The Shah would, therefore, find in Mansur no threat to his own position.

3) Seyid Zia—The possibilities of Seyid Zia’s @@ -13923,18 +12192,13 @@ British ejection of his father. With a strongly pro-British Prime Minister in office, his logic is that there is no guarantee this would not happen to him. The Shah would also be reluctant to appoint Seyid Zia - for the same reasons which make Qavam unacceptable to him.

-

4) Hakimi—Hakimi, about 90, is the champion of the “Iranian Youth + for the same reasons which make Qavam unacceptable to him.

+

4) Hakimi—Hakimi, about 90, is the champion of the “Iranian Youth Movement”. He probably will not again be considered seriously as a - candidate. The Shah remarked recently when Hakimi’s name was mentioned as a possible Prime + candidate. The Shah remarked recently when Hakimi’s name was mentioned as a possible Prime Minister, “He didn’t do a damn thing before and wouldn’t now. Why should he be Prime Minister?”

-

5) Entezam—There is some evidence that the Shah has been +

5) Entezam—There is some evidence that the Shah has been thinking about Entezam as Prime Minister. He is highly regarded by the British in terms of ability and integrity. His past record in the Cabinet was very good. His obvious @@ -13942,13 +12206,11 @@ years and has no political following. On the other hand this might be said to be an advantage since he is untainted. While he is not in the National Front or associated with that party, there has been some talk - of his replacing Kazemi as Foreign Minister in the Mosadeq government upon his return to + of his replacing Kazemi as Foreign Minister in the Mosadeq government upon his return to Iran from Washington.

6) Ebtehaj—An energetic, patriotic man who is liked by the Shah. There has been some indication that the Shah has been - considering Ebtehaj as a possible replacement for Mosadeq. His difficulty is that he + considering Ebtehaj as a possible replacement for Mosadeq. His difficulty is that he cannot get along with his countrymen and engages in running battles with key political leaders. He would be “good at anything” but Prime Minister, except under dictatorship of the Shah. He has no Majlis @@ -13962,8 +12224,7 @@

Military Figures

1) Ahmadi—Ahmadi is a dead political force who is busy collecting rent for the 500 pieces of property which he owns in - Tehran. His level of intelligence was not eulogized by Pyman.

+ Tehran. His level of intelligence was not eulogized by Pyman.

2) Zahedi—Zahedi, unscrupulous, energetic and ambitious, has a rare quality of interest in practical problems and how to deal with them. He is an opportunist and as such would seek a @@ -13989,48 +12250,38 @@ regarded as a leading contender for the job of Prime Minister, either as a compromise candidate vis-à-vis the Shah and the National Front, or as a “dictator” under the Shah.

-

3) Arfa—Arfa +

3) Arfa—Arfa is not a serious contender, although his name has cropped up from time - to time. He is anti-communist and in fact was jailed by Qavam as being too anti-communist + to time. He is anti-communist and in fact was jailed by Qavam as being too anti-communist during the latter’s regime. He is unstable and was described as a “wild man”. He has friends in and near the National Front, although this - friendship may derive from his insuperable hatred of Razmara and his collaboration with the + friendship may derive from his insuperable hatred of Razmara and his collaboration with the National Front to oust him. He lives on a farm and is not active politically now. The Shah’s attitude is not known, although the General and his wife were formerly among the Palace set.

-

4) Garzan—Garzan, Chief of the General Staff, is not a likely +

4) Garzan—Garzan, Chief of the General Staff, is not a likely candidate, although his name has been mentioned from time to time. He does not have a forceful personality although in general he is regarded as a good military man. He has never played an active role in politics.

National Front Candidates

-

1) Maki—Although Maki is sometimes regarded as a moderate, it is believed +

1) Maki—Although Maki is sometimes regarded as a moderate, it is believed that he is more an opportunist. As such he would probably endeavor to settle the oil controversy if he could get away with it. His firebrand statements in Abadan should not be taken too seriously. His position on the oil matter is not on the basis of principle but on the basis of what - is to his advantage. Contrary to Mosadeq’s record, that of Maki is not in opposition to the Shah or the Shah’s + is to his advantage. Contrary to Mosadeq’s record, that of Maki is not in opposition to the Shah or the Shah’s prerogatives. A former Qavam man, Maki has important connections with the Qavam party and could get the support of a certain number of non-National - Front politicians. His relations with Kashani are probably not good, an important factor being + Front politicians. His relations with Kashani are probably not good, an important factor being that in the recent elections he received more votes as Deputy from Tehran than did Kashani. Although he would be contending with Baghai as Mosadeq’s replacement in the National Front, he would probably have a majority of - the National Front members behind him. Maki has no financial means, having had a meteoric rise + the National Front members behind him. Maki has no financial means, having had a meteoric rise since about 12 years ago when he was an Air Force sergeant. After that he was a “hack journalist” and a minor government employee. He is probably anti-communist at the moment for reasons of self-interest @@ -14038,12 +12289,8 @@ as Mosadeq’s replacement.

2) Baghai—Baghai’s influence is limited to his own small segment of the National Front, and is therefore not regarded as a - likely candidate. His relations with Kashani are not as good as Maki’s.

-

3) Kashani—Kashani sees his role as that of influencing + likely candidate. His relations with Kashani are not as good as Maki’s.

+

3) Kashani—Kashani sees his role as that of influencing developments from behind the scene. It is unlikely that the role of Prime Minister is one in which he sees himself, and thus he would not seek appointment, although such a possibility should not be @@ -14057,9 +12304,7 @@ much better than those of any other National Front man, and the Shah would have little fear that Busheri would endeavor to usurp his prerogatives.

-

5) Martin [Matin]-Daftari—“Neutralist Joe” is for a sterilized Iran. His +

5) Martin [Matin]-Daftari—“Neutralist Joe” is for a sterilized Iran. His idea is that if there are no Western interests in Iran, Iran would not be the object of USSR hostility; if there are no Russian interests in Iran, the West would not be mad @@ -14068,21 +12313,18 @@ fold of the National Front, is moderate, although ineffective. Some members of the National Front dislike him and consider him a British spy. As Prime Minister, his political philosophy would lead him to - insist on a form of oil settlement so that he could say to the USSR that the British or Americans have + insist on a form of oil settlement so that he could say to the USSR that the British or Americans have no control of the operation in south Iran. He would endeavor to obtain face-saving devices, but might render it possible to come to some agreement. He is regarded as a possible candidate, although the considerations which might lead to his appointment would far more likely - lead to the appointment of Busheri who would have all of Matin-Daftari’s advantages and few of + lead to the appointment of Busheri who would have all of Matin-Daftari’s advantages and few of his disadvantages.

6) Shayegan—He is regarded as a narrow and bigoted man. He shares Mosadeq’s views on restricted royal prerogatives, and does not have good relations with the Palace. He is in very bad health and may not want the job of Prime - Minister even if he could get it. He has indicated a strong desire to be President of the Majlis + Minister even if he could get it. He has indicated a strong desire to be President of the Majlis and is actively seeking that office.

7) Saleh—Saleh is in the “dog house” but perhaps this is to his credit. As Minister of the Interior he refused the @@ -14096,18 +12338,13 @@ extremely unlikely.

In summary, it would appear that if the Shah has a free choice and if constitutional methods are to prevail the most likely candidates would - be Qavam, Mansur, Soheily and Entezam, possibly in that order. If a - strong dictator-type Prime Minister is sought, Zahedi would be the leading contender. - As a purely National Front candidate Maki would be the most likely, while Busheri’s chances + be Qavam, Mansur, Soheily and Entezam, possibly in that order. If a + strong dictator-type Prime Minister is sought, Zahedi would be the leading contender. + As a purely National Front candidate Maki would be the most likely, while Busheri’s chances would be good as an all-around compromise. If such a compromise is sought, however, Zahedi would also qualify in this category.

-

Turning to other subjects, we discussed with Pyman the appointment of a British Ambassador to Iran. +

Turning to other subjects, we discussed with Pyman the appointment of a British Ambassador to Iran. Pyman said that he and Chargé d’Affaires Middleton had recommended against the appointment of any ambassador under present @@ -14122,29 +12359,22 @@

Regarding the British case before the International Court of Justice, Pyman felt that the chances of a favorable decision were about 50–50. In discussing the consequences - of the ICJ action, Pyman said that the British position + of the ICJ action, Pyman said that the British position would probably be much more difficult if the decision should be unfavorable. On the other hand, it is hard to see how a favorable decision would have any great influence upon the situation.

-
- 74. Memorandum for the RecordSource: National Archives, RG 330, +
+ 74. Memorandum for the RecordSource: National Archives, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files, Office of - Military Assistance, Project Decimal File, Box 63, 091.3 MDAP Iran. Confidential; Security + Military Assistance, Project Decimal File, Box 63, 091.3 MDAP Iran. Confidential; Security Information. Prepared by William C. Foster, former Administrator of the Economic - Cooperation Administration. Major General George Olmsted, Director, Office + Cooperation Administration. Major General George Olmsted, Director, Office of Military Assistance, enclosed this memorandum with a June 9 letter. - Washington, May 21, 1952. + Washington, May 21, 1952. SUBJECT Interview with the Ghashghais—May 20, 1952 @@ -14153,8 +12383,7 @@ with Messrs. Nasser Ghashghai and Abdullah Ghashghai. It was understood that we were not to discuss the oil situation but the - interview was for the purpose of advising me of what the Ghashghais considered to be dangerous + interview was for the purpose of advising me of what the Ghashghais considered to be dangerous trends in the army in Iran.

The interview was devoted to that activity with the fear expressed by Nasser @@ -14165,8 +12394,7 @@ are inclined to the Communists, will not fight to defend their country, and that these young officers are subverting many of the troops who are therefore not worthy of having American arms given to them. They spoke - glowingly of course of the fighting spirit of the Ghashghai tribe and of the fact that the + glowingly of course of the fighting spirit of the Ghashghai tribe and of the fact that the Ghashghai tribe was attracting to it the support of other tribes, all of whom would fight firstly to defend their country against any invader. Their particular warning was @@ -14184,45 +12412,35 @@ government in authority but that I appreciated their interest in coming and that our meeting would be informal and off-the-record. No reference was made to the oil situation other than that the people of Iran were - losing their income due to the current situation which they hoped would soon end and Nasser stated that in his opinion it + losing their income due to the current situation which they hoped would soon end and Nasser stated that in his opinion it would be a wise thing if America could make a loan to his country.

- William C. - FosterPrinted from a copy + William C. + FosterPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
-
- 75. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 75. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.11/5–2452. Secret; Security Information; Priority. Repeated to London. Received at 8:38 a.m. - Tehran, May 24, 1952, + Tehran, May 24, 1952, noon.

4540. 1. Ala Min Court asked to see me yesterday afternoon. He told me he wanted talk in utmost confidence re problem - facing Shah. Until several weeks ago Shah’s policy of not (rpt not) intervening in political + facing Shah. Until several weeks ago Shah’s policy of not (rpt not) intervening in political situation seemed to have widespread support although certain opposition circles were inclined be critical at his passivity. As situation has continued decline increasing number Iranian polit leaders have been insisting that Shah take some action to prevent complete ruin of country. He was afraid that Shah’s policy of non-intervention was now commencing seriously to affect his prestige. Country was looking to Shah - to take some kind of action. Question was what kind of action shld he take and at what point.

-

Shld Shah take steps to effect removal Mosadeq before May 27 tentative date departure for + to take some kind of action. Question was what kind of action shld he take and at what point.

+

Shld Shah take steps to effect removal Mosadeq before May 27 tentative date departure for Hague?See Document - 76. If he did and Internatl Court shld decide against Iran Shah and new + 76. If he did and Internatl Court shld decide against Iran Shah and new govt wld certainly be blamed. Shld Shah try bring about fall of Mosadeq after @@ -14235,197 +12453,132 @@ effecting his removal. Mosadeq might dawdle on his way back. He might stop over in Switzerland or elsewhere in meantime financial situation of country might have resulted - in internal disorders. Furthermore if Shah shld bring about removal Mosadeq now, in Hague, or after his return what cld his successor do to relieve financial + in internal disorders. Furthermore if Shah shld bring about removal Mosadeq now, in Hague, or after his return what cld his successor do to relieve financial situation? If Bank Melli shld be unable furnish more money new govt - wld probably not (rpt not) be able pay govt salaries and other current + wld probably not (rpt not) be able pay govt salaries and other current expenses.

It seemed now quite clear US - cld not (rpt not) help Iran overcome its financial difficulties + cld not (rpt not) help Iran overcome its financial difficulties except with advance approval of Brit - Govt. That approval not (rpt not) likely be given until Iran had + Govt. That approval not (rpt not) likely be given until Iran had met such condition as UK may prescribe for oil settlement. It wld take considerable amount of time for agreement to be concluded even if both govts take conciliatory attitude. But Iran had no (rpt no) knowledge - which wld cause it to believe Brit + which wld cause it to believe Brit wld take conciliatory attitude. It not - (rpt not) impossible UK seeing that Iran’s situation was - desperate might stiffen its demands to such extent that new govt finding itself unable meet them - wld collapse. Even if US + (rpt not) impossible UK seeing that Iran’s situation was + desperate might stiffen its demands to such extent that new govt finding itself unable meet them + wld collapse. Even if US Govt wld be willing come to rescue new Iranian Govt financially without - awaiting settlement oil question there no (rpt no) reason believe it had funds readily available for - such purpose. Perhaps Congressional action wld be required. Ala + awaiting settlement oil question there no (rpt no) reason believe it had funds readily available for + such purpose. Perhaps Congressional action wld be required. Ala said he wld be grateful for such advice and suggestions as I might be able give him on confidential personal basis.

-

2. We are convinced in view unyielding attitude assumed by Mosadeq and by Brit - Govt no (rpt no) settlement oil problem possible so long as - Mosadeq remains as PriMin. Mosadeq’s retirement therefore seems condition precedent +

2. We are convinced in view unyielding attitude assumed by Mosadeq and by Brit + Govt no (rpt no) settlement oil problem possible so long as + Mosadeq remains as PriMin. Mosadeq’s retirement therefore seems condition precedent to reaching oil settlement. Nevertheless hesitate in view lack of knowledge of Brit intentions give - Ala advice. I assume Brit prefer that we do not (rpt not) know their intentions and that we + Ala advice. I assume Brit prefer that we do not (rpt not) know their intentions and that we give no (rpt no) advice. It seems to me that some of Ala’s worries are - justified. I cld not (rpt not) therefore brush them lightly + justified. I cld not (rpt not) therefore brush them lightly aside and suggest he tell Shah he shld get rid of Mosadeq now. I therefore told Ala I could - appreciate his perplexities and was sorry I had no (rpt no) ready answer for all of them. + appreciate his perplexities and was sorry I had no (rpt no) ready answer for all of them. Before venturing offer any advice I wld - like give whole matter careful thought. Ala said he wld talk to + like give whole matter careful thought. Ala said he wld talk to me again in day or two. He afraid however it already too late for Shah - take any decisive action before date set for Mosadeq’s departure.

+ take any decisive action before date set for Mosadeq’s departure.

3. I asked Ala who in his opinion - seemed likely at this juncture to succeed Mosadeq. He said number of candidates. Among old line + seemed likely at this juncture to succeed Mosadeq. He said number of candidates. Among old line politicians there were Qavam, Mansour and Hakimi. He did not (rpt not) seem enthusiastic about these three. He said Entezam’s - name was also cropping up again. He spoke of Entezam in somewhat warmer tones. Busheri was anxious + name was also cropping up again. He spoke of Entezam in somewhat warmer tones. Busheri was anxious for job. Maki also had been - talking like a candidate to Shah. Ala seemed doubtful that either of these men had + talking like a candidate to Shah. Ala seemed doubtful that either of these men had necessary prestige. He said among Natl Front group Shah was particularly impressed with Saleh. Shah liked Saleh’s courage and - determination in dealing with Kashani. Saleh + determination in dealing with Kashani. Saleh seemed to have integrity as well as strength. I expressed doubt re Saleh. I said I understood he - was even more stubborn than Mosadeq in matter oil dispute. It my understanding in - past had displayed appeasement tendencies in dealing with Russia and international + was even more stubborn than Mosadeq in matter oil dispute. It my understanding in + past had displayed appeasement tendencies in dealing with Russia and international Communism. On several recent occasions he had indicated his opposition to presence US advisers in Iran. I did not (rpt not) judge qualifications of - Iranian politicians entirely by their attitude re US advisers but that attitude might be + Iranian politicians entirely by their attitude re US advisers but that attitude might be symptomatic of their approach toward problems basically affecting future of Iran. Ala said perhaps Saleh cld be persuaded take more friendly - attitude toward West. I pointed out Saleh reputed to be even more stubborn than Mosadeq. I was not (rpt not) however well acquainted with - Saleh and did not (rpt not) wish do him possible injustice by + attitude toward West. I pointed out Saleh reputed to be even more stubborn than Mosadeq. I was not (rpt not) however well acquainted with + Saleh and did not (rpt not) wish do him possible injustice by expressing opinions of him based on hearsay.

4. Ala asked me if I had any idea - as to kind of agreement re oil which wld be acceptable to Brit. I replied in negative, pointing out I was, however, aware - of several kinds which wld not (rpt not) be acceptable. I added I thought + as to kind of agreement re oil which wld be acceptable to Brit. I replied in negative, pointing out I was, however, aware + of several kinds which wld not (rpt not) be acceptable. I added I thought Brit might still be willing accept - proposals similar to those made by Internatl Bank. I was not (rpt not) in position, however, speak for - Brit. I asked Ala why he did not (rpt not) discuss problem direct with - Brit. He said he did not (rpt not) like to do this without knowledge - Mosadeq and Mosadeq + proposals similar to those made by Internatl Bank. I was not (rpt not) in position, however, speak for + Brit. I asked Ala why he did not (rpt not) discuss problem direct with + Brit. He said he did not (rpt not) like to do this without knowledge + Mosadeq and Mosadeq wld, of course, object to informal conversations. Ala expressed concern re matter Brit oil technicians. He afraid Brit had in mind entry several hundred. He thought perhaps country might be able tolerate arrangements under which say 20 percent of foreign technicians - wld be Brit. He not (rpt not) + wld be Brit. He not (rpt not) sure. Situation in south explosive and appearance in oil areas of even relatively small number Brit technicians might result in violence and sabotage on wide scale. Eventually number Brit technicians - might be increased but at beginning number shld be extremely limited. I said one aspect of problem - seemed be that fairly large number Brit technicians needed to reopen refinery. Ala said many Iranians still cld not (rpt not) understand why technicians other than Brit - cld not (rpt not) be found for most of jobs in which foreign experts + might be increased but at beginning number shld be extremely limited. I said one aspect of problem + seemed be that fairly large number Brit technicians needed to reopen refinery. Ala said many Iranians still cld not (rpt not) understand why technicians other than Brit + cld not (rpt not) be found for most of jobs in which foreign experts needed. There was tendency among Iranians believe polit rather than - technical reasons responsible for insistence that Brit experts necessary for operation + technical reasons responsible for insistence that Brit experts necessary for operation Iranian oil industry.

-

5. Dept might care reread Embtel 3999, Apr 18Not found. in connection with above.

+

5. Dept might care reread Embtel 3999, Apr 18Not found. in connection with above.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
+
76. Editorial Note

Prime Minister Mosadeq departed for The Hague in May 1952 to await the judgment of the International Court of Justice with regard to its jurisdiction over the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute. The British had filed a complaint against the Iranian Government with the ICJ on May 26, - 1951. In its judgment of July 22, 1952, the ICJ found it did not have jurisdiction in the Anglo-Iranian + 1951. In its judgment of July 22, 1952, the ICJ found it did not have jurisdiction in the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute for two reasons. First, ICJ jurisdiction depended upon the terms under which any country acceded to the International Court of Justice. In its declaration of October 1930, - the Government of Iran, in the view of the ICJ, had made clear that the jurisdiction of the ICJ could relate only to disputes between + the Government of Iran, in the view of the ICJ, had made clear that the jurisdiction of the ICJ could relate only to disputes between Iran and other countries over the terms of treaties signed after the - date of the declaration. The British had argued that the ICJ’s jurisdiction extended to the + date of the declaration. The British had argued that the ICJ’s jurisdiction extended to the adjudication of disputes arising from all treaties signed by the - Government of Iran at any time. As the ICJ rejected that argument, the U.K. Government could not + Government of Iran at any time. As the ICJ rejected that argument, the U.K. Government could not invoke the most-favored-nation status accorded British nationals in Iran in the Treaty of 1857 to establish standing under the jurisdiction of - the ICJ. Secondly, the ICJ rejected the British argument that the - agreement reached between the Government of Iran and the AIOC of April 29, 1933, constituted a + the ICJ. Secondly, the ICJ rejected the British argument that the + agreement reached between the Government of Iran and the AIOC of April 29, 1933, constituted a treaty between the United Kingdom and the Government of Iran. Despite - the fact that the U.K. took the dispute between the AIOC and the Government of Iran to the + the fact that the U.K. took the dispute between the AIOC and the Government of Iran to the League of Nations and thus facilitated the agreement of April 29, 1933, that agreement, according to the ICJ, still constituted a simple concessionary agreement between Iran and a @@ -14435,46 +12588,34 @@ v. Iran) Preliminary Objection, Judgment of July 22nd, 1952”, International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders, Leyden, 1952, pages - 93–115. Coinciding nearly to the day of Qavam’s resignation and Mosadeq’s reinstatement as Prime Minister on July 21, + 93–115. Coinciding nearly to the day of Qavam’s resignation and Mosadeq’s reinstatement as Prime Minister on July 21, 1952, the Department of State commented in telegram 585 to London, July - 26, that “The Hague Court decision coinciding with Mosadeq’s return to power will further + 26, that “The Hague Court decision coinciding with Mosadeq’s return to power will further strengthen his public position.” See Document 99.

-
- 77. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 77. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 788.13/6–652. Top Secret; Security Information; Priority. Repeated - to London. Received at 2:21 p.m. Printed with redactions in Foreign + to London. Received at 2:21 p.m. Printed with redactions in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 389–392 (Document 178). - Tehran, June 6, 1952, + Tehran, June 6, 1952, 6 p.m. -

4736. 1. During casual conversation which I had with Ala on June 4 he told me that Shah had +

4736. 1. During casual conversation which I had with Ala on June 4 he told me that Shah had already requested Mosadeq in view of delicate situation of country to return to Tehran immediately after latter had completed presentation of Iran’s case at Hague (see paragraph - 6 Embtel 4609 of May 28)Telegram 4609 from Tehran, May 28, is printed ibid., + 6 Embtel 4609 of May 28)Telegram 4609 from Tehran, May 28, is printed ibid., pp. 384–386 (Document - 176). and that Mosadeq was expected arrive in Tehran about June 13. + 176). and that Mosadeq was expected arrive in Tehran about June 13. Ala said shortly after Prime Minister’s arrival Majlis and Senate would probably be called upon to give government vote of confidence and Shah was seriously considering advisability of exerting his influence as discreetly as possible to - bring about vote lack confidence. Ala therefore would like see me in nearest possible + bring about vote lack confidence. Ala therefore would like see me in nearest possible fu-ture to discuss further various points reached in our conversation of May 27.See ibid.

2. I met Ala June 5 his office. @@ -14491,36 +12632,22 @@ not) be conciliatory and efforts new government to find reasonable and fair solution oil problem should fail what would happen to new government and Iran in view present financial situation? Shah was - hesitating in view his lack knowledge as to what Brit or US might do to make move which might result in Mosadeq’s involuntary resignation + hesitating in view his lack knowledge as to what Brit or US might do to make move which might result in Mosadeq’s involuntary resignation because he and new govt might find - themselves in impossible financial situation with govt bankrupt and no (rpt no) financial relief in sight. + themselves in impossible financial situation with govt bankrupt and no (rpt no) financial relief in sight. Mosadeq and his supporters cld then claim that they had worked out plans for saving country from financial ruin which they had been unable put into effect because with backing of Shah they had been ousted - by govt which had no (rpt no) solution to offer. Ala asked if there was any hope - whatsoever that US - wld be willing assist new Iran Govt financially in case that govt - shld take what US + by govt which had no (rpt no) solution to offer. Ala asked if there was any hope + whatsoever that US + wld be willing assist new Iran Govt financially in case that govt + shld take what US wld consider as reasonable attitude re oil problem and shld make honest effort bring about quick solution that problem.

3. I told Ala so many factors - involved in hypothetical situation presented by him I cld not (rpt not) give categorical answer. Said I had reason believe however that + involved in hypothetical situation presented by him I cld not (rpt not) give categorical answer. Said I had reason believe however that if present or future govt shld adopt course of action which wld make it clear that Iran itself @@ -14528,13 +12655,10 @@ expected to do in order to finance itself from its own resources, including oil, US Govt - wld do what it cld in circumstances save Iran from collapse. I then + wld do what it cld in circumstances save Iran from collapse. I then outlined to Ala points A, B and C - of Deptel 2742 of May 30.In telegram 2742 to Tehran, May 30, the Department - discussed what the U.S. should do in the event Mosadeq was removed from office. + of Deptel 2742 of May 30.In telegram 2742 to Tehran, May 30, the Department + discussed what the U.S. should do in the event Mosadeq was removed from office. Acheson authorized Henderson to discuss with Ala, at the Ambassador’s @@ -14554,134 +12678,85 @@ understood to be way in which US Govt was thinking at present time. US - Govt was of course not (rpt not) in position to make any + Govt was of course not (rpt not) in position to make any commitments re what it might do in situation which might involve unanticipated factors. Ala - expressed appreciation and asked if I wld object if he wld pass + expressed appreciation and asked if I wld object if he wld pass on to Shah who is at present on Caspian Sea for weeks “rest” what I had told him. I replied in negative and said I would be glad to discuss - matter myself with Shah on his return in case latter shld desire me to do so.

-

4. Reverting to problem of who successor of Mosadeq might be, Ala referred particularly to Hakimi, Qavam + matter myself with Shah on his return in case latter shld desire me to do so.

+

4. Reverting to problem of who successor of Mosadeq might be, Ala referred particularly to Hakimi, Qavam and Mansour. He said that there was strong feeling in Senate that situation of country made it necessary for some widely respected - personality of broad experience to take over as PriMin and to bring into his cabinet + personality of broad experience to take over as PriMin and to bring into his cabinet other political leaders also of imposing stature. If, for instance, Hakimi shld come into power he might bring - into his cabinet people like Mansour, Rais (former MinFonAff in Razmara cabinet), Djam, etc. I said + into his cabinet people like Mansour, Rais (former MinFonAff in Razmara cabinet), Djam, etc. I said that I had heard that Qavam was reputed to dislike having imposing figures about him, he was to want - only “yes-men” in his cabinet. Ala said he thought I had been correctly informed. If + only “yes-men” in his cabinet. Ala said he thought I had been correctly informed. If Qavam - shld become PriMin cab might be made up of + shld become PriMin cab might be made up of comparatively young so-called “technicians” rather than elderly statesmen. Ala said he had noticed me talking with Hakimi on - preceding evening and he wondered what kind of impression Hakimi + preceding evening and he wondered what kind of impression Hakimi had made. I said that it had - been difficult for me to believe that Hakimi was really 82 years old. He seemed to me to have - energy and alertness of well-preserved man of 65. Ala said Hakimi was continual surprise to his friends because of + been difficult for me to believe that Hakimi was really 82 years old. He seemed to me to have + energy and alertness of well-preserved man of 65. Ala said Hakimi was continual surprise to his friends because of his excellent physical condition and mental alertness.

During recent trip of Shah to Shiraz Hakimi had shown more stamina than - most younger men in Shah’s party. For first time Ala spoke in rather favorable way of + most younger men in Shah’s party. For first time Ala spoke in rather favorable way of Qavam. He also said Shah had been impressed by Mansour during his recent convs with latter. Altho Mansour had been charged with public dishonesty in his past career these - charges had never been proved. Ala asked what my impression had been of Mansour during - my various convs with him. I said that I not (rpt not) in position to adequately judge but if Mansour had - ability to put into practice what he preached he shld make excellent PriMin. I cld not (rpt not) but - wonder however why in his last term as PriMin he had not (rpt - not) accomplished what he now said shld be done. I asked Ala if Shah was still considering Saleh as possible successor to - Mosadeq. He said Saleh had made excellent impression on + charges had never been proved. Ala asked what my impression had been of Mansour during + my various convs with him. I said that I not (rpt not) in position to adequately judge but if Mansour had + ability to put into practice what he preached he shld make excellent PriMin. I cld not (rpt not) but + wonder however why in his last term as PriMin he had not (rpt + not) accomplished what he now said shld be done. I asked Ala if Shah was still considering Saleh as possible successor to + Mosadeq. He said Saleh had made excellent impression on Shah and Shah had not (rpt not) as yet dismissed him as possibility. I remarked if Shah and his advisers wanted - new PriMin to be of natl stature I had some doubt that + new PriMin to be of natl stature I had some doubt that Saleh had requisite standing in the country. Ala agreed but - said in view Shah’s liking for him Saleh - cld not (rpt not) as yet be dropped from running. I asked Ala if he might not (rpt not) be willing reconsider his own + said in view Shah’s liking for him Saleh + cld not (rpt not) as yet be dropped from running. I asked Ala if he might not (rpt not) be willing reconsider his own decision not to accept PriMin job. - Ala said no (rpt no). He said he did not (rpt not) believe he had qualifications for - shouldering difficult and delicate responsibilities which new PriMin must face.

-

4 [sic]. I asked Ala whether Shah had yet tentatively worked out manner + Ala said no (rpt no). He said he did not (rpt not) believe he had qualifications for + shouldering difficult and delicate responsibilities which new PriMin must face.

+

4 [sic]. I asked Ala whether Shah had yet tentatively worked out manner in which change of govt might be - effected. Ala said no (rpt no). Great pressure was being brought - to bear on Shah however to decide at once who new PriMin was to be and to permit several + effected. Ala said no (rpt no). Great pressure was being brought + to bear on Shah however to decide at once who new PriMin was to be and to permit several of his most trusted advisers know what his decision was so that plans cld be made in advance for - selection of new cabinet and so that feelers cld be sent out re solution of oil dispute. Ala said he wld talk to me again within next few days in case any kind + selection of new cabinet and so that feelers cld be sent out re solution of oil dispute. Ala said he wld talk to me again within next few days in case any kind of definite decision was made. Altho Shah is apparently seriously toying - with idea of making move to get rid of Mosadeq and altho he is beginning to realize that his + with idea of making move to get rid of Mosadeq and altho he is beginning to realize that his prestige is suffering because he has permitted sit of country to deteriorate over such long period without intervention, nevertheless he has in past shown himself to be so indecisive and cavillating that we cannot (rpt not) assume in advance that he will not (rpt not) find some excuse for failing to take action.

-

5. For last two months supporters Qavam have been trying make arrangements for us to meet. - They have made numerous suggestions that I see him at house of some mutual friend. I +

5. For last two months supporters Qavam have been trying make arrangements for us to meet. + They have made numerous suggestions that I see him at house of some mutual friend. I have refused however to call on him or to meet him in some ostentatious - way because it was clear that if I shld do so impression wld + way because it was clear that if I shld do so impression wld be created I was supporting his candidacy. Furthermore, I have turned down categorically suggestions that I meet him surreptitiously. - Arrangements have finally been made through Turk Amb for Qavam and myself to meet at a dinner arranged at Turk + Arrangements have finally been made through Turk Amb for Qavam and myself to meet at a dinner arranged at Turk Emb this evening. Other important Iran polit leaders including Ala, Hakimi, Mansour and Rais will also be present. Furthermore Dutch and Belgian Mins have been invited. - This is first time in several yrs Qavam has appeared anywhere socially and his supporters + This is first time in several yrs Qavam has appeared anywhere socially and his supporters are extremely anxious that he will impress his fellow guests with sound-ness of his mental and physical condition. I doubt that any polit - convs can take place at dinner this kind but shall report to Dept re my impressions.In telegram 2810 to Tehran, June 9, the Department + convs can take place at dinner this kind but shall report to Dept re my impressions.In telegram 2810 to Tehran, June 9, the Department commented on Henderson’s conversation with Ala as follows: “Dept most appreciative @@ -14689,48 +12764,35 @@ and way you have handled this extraordinarily delicate matter. While we wld not wish to suggest names possible PriMins to Shah and believe you are in best position - comment upon those suggested by Shah and Ala, FYI on basis + comment upon those suggested by Shah and Ala, FYI on basis info available here we not enthusiastic re candidates mentioned. We realize, however, that choice must be made by Shah on basis complex - factors. Assume Shah clearly understands our position re Saleh whom we consider so unstable + factors. Assume Shah clearly understands our position re Saleh whom we consider so unstable that his appt might constitute a serious danger to Iran.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.13/6–652)

- Henderson + Henderson
-
- 78. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 78. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.13/6–1252. Top Secret; Security Information; Priority. Repeated to London. Received at 11:38 a.m. - Tehran, June 12, 1952, + Tehran, June 12, 1952, 1 p.m. -

4812. 1. Nothing sufficient interest warrant tel occurred Turk Emb dinner June 6 (Emtel 4736 June +

4812. 1. Nothing sufficient interest warrant tel occurred Turk Emb dinner June 6 (Emtel 4736 June 6).Document 77. Dinner furnished opportunity, however, for me meet Qavam and observe his - apparent relations with other prominent Irans such as Ala, Hakimi, Rais, etc. He seemed to be in surprisingly good + apparent relations with other prominent Irans such as Ala, Hakimi, Rais, etc. He seemed to be in surprisingly good mental and fair physical condition. He was poised, affable, showed - lively sense of humor. His personality dominated grp, all + lively sense of humor. His personality dominated grp, all mbrs who showed him marked respect. Relations between him and Hakimi, which at one time were strained seemed cordial as were those with - Ala. I avoided pol convs during even but agreed have + Ala. I avoided pol convs during even but agreed have dinner quietly with Qavam on June 10, at home mutual friend.

2. I learned on June 10 that Shah, who had been planning stay in Caspian @@ -14739,54 +12801,30 @@ return. It was alleged for instance that conspiracy had been discovered among high army officers to effect coup d’état in coop with Tudeh. It was also said that disagreements had developed between Shah and - Ala over who shld be new pres of Majlis. Another story - was Shah had returned in order make nec preparations for new PriMin to replace Mosadeq. In order obtain Ala’s analysis current pol situation, I made appointment see him + Ala over who shld be new pres of Majlis. Another story + was Shah had returned in order make nec preparations for new PriMin to replace Mosadeq. In order obtain Ala’s analysis current pol situation, I made appointment see him noon June 11 and also asked him arrange mtg for me with Shah.

-

3. During private dinner with Qavam at house our mutual friend I again found Qavam alert and energetic. He was by +

3. During private dinner with Qavam at house our mutual friend I again found Qavam alert and energetic. He was by no (rpt no) means somnolent, senile character described by certain columnists. He stated at outset his - willingness assume responsibilities PriMin in case Shah shld - desire him do so, but insisted he not (rpt not) seeking job. He did not (rpt not) ask me to give him support. Qavam told me he had always advocated + willingness assume responsibilities PriMin in case Shah shld + desire him do so, but insisted he not (rpt not) seeking job. He did not (rpt not) ask me to give him support. Qavam told me he had always advocated friendly relations with US; had made enemies in certain grps in past by showing preference for Amers when fon advisers seemed necessary. He defended his appointment Tudeh mbrs in one his previous cabs on ground that he believed their actions in office wld disillusion many progressive - Irans who at that time thought it possible coop with Commies.Reference is to Qavam’s inclusion of three members of the Tudeh + Irans who at that time thought it possible coop with Commies.Reference is to Qavam’s inclusion of three members of the Tudeh Party in his Cabinet during his Premiership in 1946. He - considered experiment successful since there was no (rpt no) longer appreciable demand on part - any Irans except those willing see Iran fall under Sov control for coop with Tudeh elements. + considered experiment successful since there was no (rpt no) longer appreciable demand on part + any Irans except those willing see Iran fall under Sov control for coop with Tudeh elements. He intimated that if Shah wld ask him - become PriMin he wld include in cab such figures as Fhakimi - [Hakimi] as MinInt; Soheili and Mansour, one of whom as MinForAffs. He + become PriMin he wld include in cab such figures as Fhakimi + [Hakimi] as MinInt; Soheili and Mansour, one of whom as MinForAffs. He said he might recommend Entezam - as Min Court and Ala as Amb - US. He wld fill other cab positions with mbrs various previous cabs, possibly including mbrs of Razmara cab who wld no + as Min Court and Ala as Amb + US. He wld fill other cab positions with mbrs various previous cabs, possibly including mbrs of Razmara cab who wld no (rpt no) longer be boycotted. He said he might appt mbrs various leaders NF to positions resp if they @@ -14799,158 +12837,103 @@ wld have in preventing complete bankruptcy govt. His understanding was govt - wld encounter real finan crisis latter part June. He - thought probably quickest way obtain funds was sale oil stored Abadan. Did I think US market perhaps some US Cos wld + wld encounter real finan crisis latter part June. He + thought probably quickest way obtain funds was sale oil stored Abadan. Did I think US market perhaps some US Cos wld be willing under certain conditions purchase this oil. I replied in my opinion Iran wld be making mistake try - sell this oil to any customer other than AIOC. I did not (rpt not) + sell this oil to any customer other than AIOC. I did not (rpt not) believe US Govt wld purchase oil in present circumstances or that any resp US firm - wld care start feud with AIOC by buying it. Qavam asked if there was possibility + wld care start feud with AIOC by buying it. Qavam asked if there was possibility that US in order help Iran meet crisis wld give it temporary budgetary - assist. I said I cld not (rpt not) say precisely what US + assist. I said I cld not (rpt not) say precisely what US Govt - wld do but I did not (rpt not) think it wld be able give finan - aid unless Amer public cld be convinced that Iran was doing - everything possible help itself. At present US public thought that Iran was not (rpt not) doing all possible help itself. + wld do but I did not (rpt not) think it wld be able give finan + aid unless Amer public cld be convinced that Iran was doing + everything possible help itself. At present US public thought that Iran was not (rpt not) doing all possible help itself. It considered Iran by assuming unreasonable attitude re oil dispute, was - at least partly resp for its present fin difficulties. Unless Amer public opinion shld believe that Iran was energetically + at least partly resp for its present fin difficulties. Unless Amer public opinion shld believe that Iran was energetically and sincerely trying settle oil dispute on reasonable and fair basis it wld be certain to object to extension US finan aid to Iran.

-

5. Qavam said if he PriMin he wld do everything within reason come understanding with - Brit. But how about Brit? Did I have any reason believe - Brit on their part wld meet friendly Iran approach half-way? +

5. Qavam said if he PriMin he wld do everything within reason come understanding with + Brit. But how about Brit? Did I have any reason believe + Brit on their part wld meet friendly Iran approach half-way? Neither he nor (rpt nor) any other PriMin cld afford capitulate entirely. Public - sentiment Iran cld not (rpt not) be entirely ignored even by - strong central govt. He wld like to come to equitable agrmt with - Brit not (rpt not) only because he wanted friendly relations with + sentiment Iran cld not (rpt not) be entirely ignored even by + strong central govt. He wld like to come to equitable agrmt with + Brit not (rpt not) only because he wanted friendly relations with Brit and because Iran needed fon financial assist but because he anxious restore Iran’s good name in - business world so that fon investors wld not (rpt not) be + business world so that fon investors wld not (rpt not) be afraid to take risks in country. In view its geographical and intl position econ develop of Iran shld be speeded up. Fon investments shld therefore be encouraged.

6. I asked Qavam if he had any - idea as to kind of solution oil prob which might be agreeable to Brit, wld restore confidence business world in country and wld at same time be acceptable to Iran + idea as to kind of solution oil prob which might be agreeable to Brit, wld restore confidence business world in country and wld at same time be acceptable to Iran public. He countered by saying he had intended to ask me precisely same question. I told him I not (rpt not) sufficiently acquainted with sentiments Iran public or with current Brit attitude to venture answer. I said however that for purpose discussion I might ask him what his views wld be with re to some kind - arrangement under which an intl private company wld undertake operation oil industry Iran on behalf Iran - Govt and oil produced wld be sold to AIOC at prices to be agreed upon. These prices wld be so set as to permit sale Iran oil + arrangement under which an intl private company wld undertake operation oil industry Iran on behalf Iran + Govt and oil produced wld be sold to AIOC at prices to be agreed upon. These prices wld be so set as to permit sale Iran oil on competitive basis in world markets and at same time to provide for - payment compensation installments. Qavam said he had been thinking of some kind of + payment compensation installments. Qavam said he had been thinking of some kind of arrangements along these lines. Possibility it might be acceptable to Iran people if intl company wld be of really international character and wld include Iranians on same basis as natls of other countries. I said I did - not (rpt not) know what attitude UK + not (rpt not) know what attitude UK wld be to such arrangement but I was - sure it wld not (rpt not) give any consideration to it + sure it wld not (rpt not) give any consideration to it unless Brit cld play role in intl company at least - as great as that of natls of other countries and unless there wld be absolutely no (rpt no) discrimination in employment - Brit techs. Qavam said it seemed to him only fair + as great as that of natls of other countries and unless there wld be absolutely no (rpt no) discrimination in employment + Brit techs. Qavam said it seemed to him only fair that Brit shld have participation to same extent as natls other countries and that Brit techs shld be employed. He thot it - important however that such company shld be of bona fide intl character and that Brit technicians shld not (rpt not) dominate operation industry. He added it extremely + important however that such company shld be of bona fide intl character and that Brit technicians shld not (rpt not) dominate operation industry. He added it extremely important for him to know immed Brit current attitude re oil problems. - I help him in this respect. I said I cld not (rpt not) tell him + I help him in this respect. I said I cld not (rpt not) tell him what present Brit attitude was. I had - impression Brit did not (rpt not) desire discuss this matter with + impression Brit did not (rpt not) desire discuss this matter with Iranians thru third parties. My suggestion was that best way to ascertain Brit attitude was to go direct to Brit. He turned to our host - and asked that efforts be made for him to see Middleton, Brit Chargé d’Affaires, as soon as possible.

+ and asked that efforts be made for him to see Middleton, Brit Chargé d’Affaires, as soon as possible.

7. Qavam said that if he or any other PriMin shld be successful in obtaining settlement oil problem he hoped US wld increase its efforts to help in - speeding up econ develop Iran. All Iranians grateful for US Pt IV assist but something should be + speeding up econ develop Iran. All Iranians grateful for US Pt IV assist but something should be done on more massive scale in order stimulate production of country and restore confidence public in Iran econ.

8. I outlined to Middleton - morn June 11 my conv with Qavam and told him that probably Qavam + morn June 11 my conv with Qavam and told him that probably Qavam wld try to get in touch with him. I also talked with Middleton along lines suggested in Deptel 2810, June - 9 which arrived few moments before my apptmt with him.In telegram 2810 to Tehran, June 9, the Department + 9 which arrived few moments before my apptmt with him.In telegram 2810 to Tehran, June 9, the Department suggested that the British be asked to send a message indirectly to the Shah in order to “greatly reassure him upon an aspect which must - be of major concern in relation appt PM to succeed Mosadeq. Brit - might by suitable means indicate that shld a new govt come + be of major concern in relation appt PM to succeed Mosadeq. Brit + might by suitable means indicate that shld a new govt come to power giving tangible evidence of sincere desire to reach equitable oil agreement, they wld - meet such Govt half way and wld make every effort consistent + meet such Govt half way and wld make every effort consistent Brit natl interest and commercial realities arrive promptly at mutually satisfactory settlement.” @@ -14959,35 +12942,24 @@ Middleton said that he was prepared see Qavam if latter shld desire talk to him. He added - that several days ago he had asked his govt for instrs as to what he shld say in case he shld - be queried by Shah or other Iran leader as to whether Brit + that several days ago he had asked his govt for instrs as to what he shld say in case he shld + be queried by Shah or other Iran leader as to whether Brit wld be willing to meet half way - friendly approaches of some new Iran govt. He had not (rpt not) + friendly approaches of some new Iran govt. He had not (rpt not) as yet recd reply but he proposed if - queried either by Shah (who had indicated that he wld like see him privately) or by + queried either by Shah (who had indicated that he wld like see him privately) or by Qavam that altho he had no (rpt no) instrs on subj he personally was convinced that genuinely friendly approach on behalf Iran Govt - wld find Brit + wld find Brit Govt conciliatory and reasonable. - During my various talks with Middleton I have considered it unwise tell him in so many words that Shah - had endeavored thru me to find out what Brit attitude might be if approached by new friendly Iran + During my various talks with Middleton I have considered it unwise tell him in so many words that Shah + had endeavored thru me to find out what Brit attitude might be if approached by new friendly Iran Govt. I have however made it clear - to him that Shah seemed to be genuinely worried as to whether new govt + to him that Shah seemed to be genuinely worried as to whether new govt cld expect friendly and reasonable - treatment from Brit. Middleton indicated to me that he + treatment from Brit. Middleton indicated to me that he inclined believe his govt had not (rpt not) made up its own mind as yet what its final position re Iran oil dispute should be. He said he @@ -14996,45 +12968,33 @@

9. Ala told me during my talk with him noon June 11 that Shah had returned Tehran earlier than planned at earnest request Ala who had urged - him for sake his own prestige to return at once. Ala said rumors re army plots for Tudeh + him for sake his own prestige to return at once. Ala said rumors re army plots for Tudeh coup totally unfounded. He added he had several very frank talks with Shah since latter’s return. He had urged Shah to decide at once who successor to Mosadeq shld be to inform that successor and - to suggest to that successor that he prepare immed for Shah’s exam tentative list members new Cabinet. + to suggest to that successor that he prepare immed for Shah’s exam tentative list members new Cabinet. He had told Shah that unless Shah moved with speed and determination - respect for him among leaders of country wld decline to such extent that throne might be endangered. + respect for him among leaders of country wld decline to such extent that throne might be endangered. Financial situation had become so acute that at Cabinet meeting on June 10 Finance Minister had warned other ministers that country was now “in - state of danger” and that he did not (rpt not) want to be held responsible for what might happen. + state of danger” and that he did not (rpt not) want to be held responsible for what might happen. Ala said list possible PriMins now (rpt now) apparently reduced to three, Qavam, Hakimi and Mansour, in that order. I told Ala of my - conversation preceding even with Qavam pointing out that Qavam had not (rpt not) - asked me intervene on his behalf and that I had no (rpt no) intention doing so. Ala seemed to be somewhat more in favor + conversation preceding even with Qavam pointing out that Qavam had not (rpt not) + asked me intervene on his behalf and that I had no (rpt no) intention doing so. Ala seemed to be somewhat more in favor of Qavam than he had been in - our previous conversations. Altho he was not (rpt not) enthusiastic about any of candidates he mentioned - fact that Shah also seemed to be more friendly towards Qavam than previously. He said one + our previous conversations. Altho he was not (rpt not) enthusiastic about any of candidates he mentioned + fact that Shah also seemed to be more friendly towards Qavam than previously. He said one advantage of Qavam was that latter’s stature in Iran so great that foremost leaders of country - wld not (rpt not) feel it below their dignity to serve under him. He + wld not (rpt not) feel it below their dignity to serve under him. He told me I was to see Shah on 11 o’clock morning June 12. He was sure Shah wld ask my advice and he hoped I - wld not (rpt not) hesitate to let Shah know that time had come for + wld not (rpt not) hesitate to let Shah know that time had come for positive action. I told Ala I had been reliably informed that Shah was still intimating in confidence that US @@ -15052,14 +13012,12 @@ support.

10. I asked Ala if Shah had worked - out plan for bringing about change govt. Ala said + out plan for bringing about change govt. Ala said tentative plan was (a) selection by Shah of successor; (b) approval by Shah of Cabinet list prepared by person selected; (c) obtaining consent most members on list to accept Cabinet post; (d) discreet organization of trusted members of Senate and Majlis into groups prepared act - quickly; (e) upon presentation by Mosadeq of his resignation in accordance with custom fol + quickly; (e) upon presentation by Mosadeq of his resignation in accordance with custom fol opening of new Majlis Shah wld accept resignation PriMin; (f) respective groups in Senate and Majlis wld then @@ -15067,87 +13025,56 @@ I asked Ala if he thought all this cld be done secretly. Were not (rpt not) leaks likely occur? - Wld not (rpt not) Mosadeq + Wld not (rpt not) Mosadeq find out what was going on before submitting resignation? Might he not (rpt not) launch violent attack - upon Shah and members Royal Family? Was it not (rpt not) likely also that Mosadeq might find excuse delay submitting resignation + upon Shah and members Royal Family? Was it not (rpt not) likely also that Mosadeq might find excuse delay submitting resignation to Majlis? Ala admitted these - possibilities but said only other alternative wld be for Shah to take steps personally to remove + possibilities but said only other alternative wld be for Shah to take steps personally to remove Mosadeq without waiting for vote lack confidence. Shah doubted, however, constitutionality move this kind. Ala said that since Shah - wanted to act in constitutional manner he wld have to incur risk of being attacked by Mosadeq. Both Shah and Ala knew that Mosadeq for some time had been + wanted to act in constitutional manner he wld have to incur risk of being attacked by Mosadeq. Both Shah and Ala knew that Mosadeq for some time had been collecting evidence of activities on part Shah and Royal Family which if - made public might be damaging. It was possible Mosadeq + made public might be damaging. It was possible Mosadeq wld endeavor make this evidence public - once he became convinced that Shah had decided he shld be replaced. Ala added that if Mosadeq + once he became convinced that Shah had decided he shld be replaced. Ala added that if Mosadeq shld fail to submit his resignation to Majlis he might be asked by Senate or Majlis to explain what he intended - to do re Iran’s financial situation and if his remarks shld be unsatisfactory, as they probably - wld be, there cld be vote indicating lack confidence in + to do re Iran’s financial situation and if his remarks shld be unsatisfactory, as they probably + wld be, there cld be vote indicating lack confidence in govt.

11. I asked Ala about struggle for Pres of Majlis. Ala said Shah determined to have Emami (Imam Jumeh). Altho considerable opposition not - (rpt not) only from NF but also from many in opposition who - thought it mistake to have cleric preside over Parliament. Maki had informed Ala on evening June 9 that if Shah’s - interference on behalf of Emami successful National Front members wld leave Majlis and no (rpt not) quorum cld be obtained. I obtained impression there was strong + (rpt not) only from NF but also from many in opposition who + thought it mistake to have cleric preside over Parliament. Maki had informed Ala on evening June 9 that if Shah’s + interference on behalf of Emami successful National Front members wld leave Majlis and no (rpt not) quorum cld be obtained. I obtained impression there was strong divergence between Shah and Ala over this point and that Ala inclined towards Moazami as compromise choice. Ala admitted, however, that Moazami, altho not - (rpt not) member NF, was close friend Mosadeq and if elected President might - use this position frustrate effort to have Mosadeq replaced.

+ (rpt not) member NF, was close friend Mosadeq and if elected President might + use this position frustrate effort to have Mosadeq replaced.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
- 79. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 79. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.13/6–1352. Top Secret; Security Information; Priority. Repeated to London. Received June 14 at 6:25 a.m. Printed with redactions in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 396–400 (Document 181). - Tehran, June 13, 1952, + Tehran, June 13, 1952, 3 p.m.

4837. 1. When I arrived palace morning June 12 to call on Shah I found - Ala awaiting me (Embtel 4812 of June 12).Document 78. He said - he hoped I wld not (rpt not) hesitate impress on Shah + Ala awaiting me (Embtel 4812 of June 12).Document 78. He said + he hoped I wld not (rpt not) hesitate impress on Shah necessity for urgent action. He feared that Shah who had seemed quite resolute two days ago was again weakening and becoming indecisive. He knew that I had been consistently refraining from doing anything which @@ -15160,43 +13087,31 @@ sent to me through Ala and said I failed understand how Shah cld have obtained impression that US - Govt or I was supporting Mosadeq. Mosadeq had been named by Shah as Prime Minister and his + Govt or I was supporting Mosadeq. Mosadeq had been named by Shah as Prime Minister and his nomination had been approved by Majlis. I had considered it my duty to - endeavor to maintain as friendly working relations as conditions wld permit with Prime Minister of Iran. + endeavor to maintain as friendly working relations as conditions wld permit with Prime Minister of Iran. During my numerous conversations with Shah I thought that I had made it clear to him that in opinion US - Govt and of myself Mosadeq’s policies were pushing Iran - toward ruin. Furthermore, I had also not (rpt not) hesitated in my various talks with Mosadeq to let him also know that in + Govt and of myself Mosadeq’s policies were pushing Iran + toward ruin. Furthermore, I had also not (rpt not) hesitated in my various talks with Mosadeq to let him also know that in opinion US Govt and myself he was fol policies which were not (rpt not) beneficial to Iran.

Shah said he had thoroughly understood my attitude and had never had any - doubt that I was voicing views of State Dept. Nevertheless, numerous stories had come to him to + doubt that I was voicing views of State Dept. Nevertheless, numerous stories had come to him to effect that US press and many Americans including some US oil companies were supporting Mosadeq. He had also heard that various American nationals in private conversations had been - saying that choice was between Mosadeq and communism. He therefore had asked Ala to obtain definite statement re our + saying that choice was between Mosadeq and communism. He therefore had asked Ala to obtain definite statement re our attitude towards Mosadeq.

3. I then referred to remarks made by him during previous conversations - indicating disappointment at amount and type of military aid which US seemed to be prepared to extend to Iran. Endeavored to + indicating disappointment at amount and type of military aid which US seemed to be prepared to extend to Iran. Endeavored to assure him US deeply interested in future Iran and anxious to strengthen Iran’s defensive capacity. During this portion our conversation I followed line contained in para 4a–b of - Deptel 2742 of May 30.Telegram 2742 to Tehran, May 30, is printed in + Deptel 2742 of May 30.Telegram 2742 to Tehran, May 30, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 386–389 (Document 177). For a summary of paragraphs 4a and @@ -15208,54 +13123,35 @@ situation. Apparently funds not (rpt not) available to pay portion of govt salaries due May 20 unless steps wld be - taken which might undermine public confidence in Bank Melli. What wld happen on June 20, next pay day, no + taken which might undermine public confidence in Bank Melli. What wld happen on June 20, next pay day, no one knew. Although Mosadeq had been requested return immediately after presentation Iranian case at Hague Prime Minister seemed determined stay on for time in Europe. He might not (rpt not) get back until after June 20. Meantime, increasing pressure being brought on Shah to replace Mosadeq at once or - encourage Senate and Majlis vote no (rpt no) confidence in govt. Shah did not (rpt + encourage Senate and Majlis vote no (rpt no) confidence in govt. Shah did not (rpt not) see how he cld do anything while - decision of Court still pending. If Court shld find itself competent, failure Mosadeq policy wld be clear. Mosadeq might resign or steps cld be taken get rid of him. If Court shld decide itself incompetent Mosadeq might again be hero. He likely - to announce that he had won Iran’s freedom, that Iran cld now sell its oil, and that in short + decision of Court still pending. If Court shld find itself competent, failure Mosadeq policy wld be clear. Mosadeq might resign or steps cld be taken get rid of him. If Court shld decide itself incompetent Mosadeq might again be hero. He likely + to announce that he had won Iran’s freedom, that Iran cld now sell its oil, and that in short time financial difficulties wld be - eliminated. This wld not (rpt not) be true; Iran wld still have difficulties in selling oil - to buyers who had means to transport it. Nevertheless, Mosadeq + eliminated. This wld not (rpt not) be true; Iran wld still have difficulties in selling oil + to buyers who had means to transport it. Nevertheless, Mosadeq wld probably be able with his false - promises deceive public for some time and until his deceit shld become known it wld be dangerous remove him. Therefore, + promises deceive public for some time and until his deceit shld become known it wld be dangerous remove him. Therefore, nothing cld be done until Court had made its decision and if decision favorable to Iran it might be impossible do anything for considerable time.

5. I stressed to Shah desperateness of present financial situation of country. I said responsible Iranian statesmen seemed now to be fully conscious of seriousness of crisis which Iran was facing. It seemed to - me they were hesitating from acting because they did not (rpt not) know what Shah wanted them to do. + me they were hesitating from acting because they did not (rpt not) know what Shah wanted them to do. I doubted that thinking Iranian leaders would believe that a favorable decision of Court would be of material assistance in helping Iranian - financial difficulties. They would be quite aware that if Mosadeq stayed on and Iran should make + financial difficulties. They would be quite aware that if Mosadeq stayed on and Iran should make no (rpt no) constructive move in direction oil settlement Iran would continue drift towards ruin. These - people were looking towards Shah to show same decisiveness in this situation as he had + people were looking towards Shah to show same decisiveness in this situation as he had shown in 1946 when he had ordered armed forces to clear usurpers out of Azerbaijan. Prestige of Throne was high this moment. If, however, Shah allowed Iran to continue drift towards ruin without taking some action @@ -15269,21 +13165,16 @@ should therefore understand in giving voice to some of my thoughts I was not (rpt not) venturing to press advice on him.

-

6. Shah seemed troubled. He said it would not (rpt not) be fair for Iranian statesmen to blame him if he +

6. Shah seemed troubled. He said it would not (rpt not) be fair for Iranian statesmen to blame him if he did not (rpt not) come out for removal - Mosadeq at time Mosadeq might again be national hero. + Mosadeq at time Mosadeq might again be national hero. If he should do so Mosadeq could become formidable antagonist not (rpt not) only to government but to Throne. In any event Shah would be taking - great risk to support replacement of Mosadeq unless he was in possession assurances that new - government would receive almost immediate financial aid from UK or US. + great risk to support replacement of Mosadeq unless he was in possession assurances that new + government would receive almost immediate financial aid from UK or US. With best will in world it would take considerable time for new - government negotiate and sign oil agreement with Brit. Oil problem complicated. It could + government negotiate and sign oil agreement with Brit. Oil problem complicated. It could not (rpt not) be solved over night.

Furthermore no (rpt no) new government could exist if it should capitulate entirely. He was convinced, for @@ -15298,8 +13189,7 @@ assistance, not (rpt not) only would that government fall, but Throne would be in jeopardy and influence those elements in Iran friendly to West would sharply diminish.

-

Could he also obtain assurance that British would not (rpt not) try drive impossible bargain with +

Could he also obtain assurance that British would not (rpt not) try drive impossible bargain with new government? What had taken place during recent months in Egypt not (rpt not) encouraging. Egypt in better financial position, however, than Iran; it could afford to wait. @@ -15307,79 +13197,58 @@ acceptable to Iranian people would be fatal.

7. I told Shah he should not (rpt not) expect US Government to give him any - fast assurances in advance of financial assistance. Attitude US people and members of Congress as events + fast assurances in advance of financial assistance. Attitude US people and members of Congress as events unfolded would contribute to making of US decision this respect. In my opinion this attitude would be determined by manner in which Iranian - Government approached oil problem. I was convinced that if US public and Congress should obtain + Government approached oil problem. I was convinced that if US public and Congress should obtain impression Government Iran trying energetically and sincerely find fair - solution on oil dispute they would not (rpt not) like to see that government fall merely because it + solution on oil dispute they would not (rpt not) like to see that government fall merely because it could not (rpt not) obtain temporary - financial aid. Another factor which would influence US decision of financial aid would be + financial aid. Another factor which would influence US decision of financial aid would be attitude UK Government and public. - US would not (rpt not) of course like to take action + US would not (rpt not) of course like to take action which would further inflame UK opinion - against Iran and at same time injure US–UK relations. Government + against Iran and at same time injure US–UK relations. Government of Iran by approaching UK Govt in genuinely conciliatory spirit and with obvious desire find fair solution could greatly improve atmosphere British-Iranian relations and prepare way for necessary financial aid as well as solution oil problem.

-

It might be helpful if Shah could get in touch at once with Middleton and talk to him with same - frankness as to me. Shah said he would see Middleton before latter departed for UK next week for conference in London but - he hesitated talk to him so openly, not (rpt not) because he did not (rpt not) trust Middleton but because he afraid of gossip in London with +

It might be helpful if Shah could get in touch at once with Middleton and talk to him with same + frankness as to me. Shah said he would see Middleton before latter departed for UK next week for conference in London but + he hesitated talk to him so openly, not (rpt not) because he did not (rpt not) trust Middleton but because he afraid of gossip in London with subsequent fatal leak to press. He had had unfortunate experience in - this regard last autumn. He could have no (rpt no) objection, however, if I should outline to + this regard last autumn. He could have no (rpt no) objection, however, if I should outline to Middleton what he had told me about oil problem and financial aid.

8. I said British had made it clear they preferred settle oil problem by direct negotiations and did not (rpt not) relish dealing through third party. Although I would inform Middleton of some of Shah’s - worries as expressed by him to me, I hoped he wld also talk with him frankly.

+ worries as expressed by him to me, I hoped he wld also talk with him frankly.

9. Shah said he had been giving considerable thought to problem of successor to Mosadeq. Seemed to be three approaches this problem:

(A) New Prime Minister to be either member National Front or someone closely associated with it. Saleh - outstanding candidate this category. Saleh seemed to have progressive ideas, integrity and + outstanding candidate this category. Saleh seemed to have progressive ideas, integrity and common sense. Saleh had made mistakes in past including experiment of collaboration with Tudeh. He thought Saleh had become wiser. Saleh might be able mold - national movement, strength of which could not (rpt not) be ignored, into constructive force. If Saleh should go off wrong direction it + national movement, strength of which could not (rpt not) be ignored, into constructive force. If Saleh should go off wrong direction it would not (rpt not) be difficult remove him. Busheri also possibility. Busheri, however, sometimes showed - opportunistic characteristics and too much under influence Kashani.

+ opportunistic characteristics and too much under influence Kashani.

(B) New Prime Minister to be someone who could possibly work with National Front and at same time would have respect of country’s leading statesmen. He thought Mansour could play this role. Mansour experienced, resourceful, persuasive and progressive. He stood half-way between nationalists and so-called elder statesmen.

-

(C) Cabinet headed by and composed of elder statesmen. Qavam, of course, ranked as most - prominent of elder statesmen but Hakimi had almost as great prestige and had perhaps - better reputation. Elder statesman like Qavam or Hakimi +

(C) Cabinet headed by and composed of elder statesmen. Qavam, of course, ranked as most + prominent of elder statesmen but Hakimi had almost as great prestige and had perhaps + better reputation. Elder statesman like Qavam or Hakimi could form Cabinet outstanding men of country who might help tide country over present crisis. He was worried, however, lest such government might be entirely devoid progressive ideas. It might be @@ -15398,8 +13267,7 @@ flames hatred and promote prejudice. They had resorted to demagoguery and cheap tricks. I wondered if so-called National Front has the leadership or vision to forge new nationalist progressive Iran. In - National Front we remember intelligent, progressive men who not (rpt not) pleased with direction present + National Front we remember intelligent, progressive men who not (rpt not) pleased with direction present government was taking country. I doubted any these men had experience and prestige to lead Iran out of its present difficulties. I had studied Saleh’s record carefully and @@ -15407,19 +13275,14 @@ so stubborn that if he once in power he might refuse take advice of Shah or anyone else.

It might be impossible remove him until he had already led country to - ruin. So far as oil dispute was concerned Saleh had on number occasions indicated himself to be - even more irreconcilable than Mosadeq. He had only lately spoken against presence + ruin. So far as oil dispute was concerned Saleh had on number occasions indicated himself to be + even more irreconcilable than Mosadeq. He had only lately spoken against presence foreign advisers in Iran. He was potentially dangerous demagogue in my - opinion. Shah said during his talks with Saleh latter had shown moderation and common sense. + opinion. Shah said during his talks with Saleh latter had shown moderation and common sense. Saleh had, for instance, seemed to be willing to be conciliatory regarding oil problem. I - remarked it might be mistake to judge Saleh on what he might have said for purpose pleasing - Shah. Shah agreed and said certainly he would not (rpt not) be appointed before very careful + remarked it might be mistake to judge Saleh on what he might have said for purpose pleasing + Shah. Shah agreed and said certainly he would not (rpt not) be appointed before very careful examination had been made of his past record and present tendencies.

11. Continuing my comments I told Shah that members of present National Front did not (rpt not) necessarily @@ -15430,52 +13293,41 @@ nationalism, they could divert national movement along constructive progressive lines. It was not (rpt not) necessary that national movement should encourage hatred for foreigners - and elimination of progressive West ideas. I said I did not (rpt not) know Mansour very well. During my + and elimination of progressive West ideas. I said I did not (rpt not) know Mansour very well. During my two conversations with him I had been impressed by his analyses of - situation here and by remedies which he had proposed. I did not (rpt not) know whether he had strength of + situation here and by remedies which he had proposed. I did not (rpt not) know whether he had strength of character or experience to put those remedies into effect if he should become Prime Minister. Shah knew Mansour much better than I.

-

12. I told Shah my personal knowledge of Qavam was also limited. Ever since my arrival in Tehran +

12. I told Shah my personal knowledge of Qavam was also limited. Ever since my arrival in Tehran partisans of Qavam had been asking US to support his candidacy for Prime Minister. In particular they had been trying prevail on me to endeavor influence Shah in his favor. I, of course, had consistently - refused become involved in intrigue this character. Some of Qavam’s friends had for some time + refused become involved in intrigue this character. Some of Qavam’s friends had for some time tried to arrange for us to meet. I had refused to meet him surreptitiously or in circumstances which might justify belief we were conniving against present government. Last week, however, I had met him at dinner given by Turkish Ambassador. Since he was one Iran’s outstanding statesmen and since at that dinner he had expressed his desire talk further with me, I had offered call on him.

-

One of his adherents, however, informed me later that Qavam would prefer we have dinner +

One of his adherents, however, informed me later that Qavam would prefer we have dinner together. Accordingly, I had dined with him on June 10 at house mutual friend. Shah said Ala had told him of my dinner with Qavam. - What kind of impression had Qavam made? Could I tell him about our conversation? I - summarized conversation with Qavam along lines contained Embtel 4812 of June 12. Shah was particularly interested in + What kind of impression had Qavam made? Could I tell him about our conversation? I + summarized conversation with Qavam along lines contained Embtel 4812 of June 12. Shah was particularly interested in Qavam’s apparent attitude - regarding oil problem. I said Qavam had not (rpt not) + regarding oil problem. I said Qavam had not (rpt not) even intimated I try to influence Shah on his behalf. He had, however, told me he was too old have any personal ambitions and he would accept Prime Ministership only if he convinced Shah really wanted him head new - government. He had also told me that he would not (rpt not) remain in government for single + government. He had also told me that he would not (rpt not) remain in government for single minute if at any time he should believe he had lost confidence of Shah. I said I of course not (rpt not) able judge sincerity of Qavam in making these remarks. They had had, however, every ring of sincerity.

-

13. Shah asked what I thought of Hakimi. I said I had had even less contact with him than +

13. Shah asked what I thought of Hakimi. I said I had had even less contact with him than with Qavam. I had met him casually several times and had appointment with him at his house later in day. During my brief encounters with him I had been impressed by his @@ -15495,26 +13347,18 @@ despite his age and certain unpleasant passages in his record might be best choice to steer government through difficult days ahead.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
- 80. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 80. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1950–1952, classified general records, Box 32. Secret; Security - Information. Drafted by Melbourne and approved by Henderson in draft. The telegram + Information. Drafted by Melbourne and approved by Henderson in draft. The telegram is the Embassy copy as approved and does not have a time of transmission. - Tehran, June 20, 1952. -

4925. Candidates for successor to Mosadeq must adjust to one political fact of present + Tehran, June 20, 1952. +

4925. Candidates for successor to Mosadeq must adjust to one political fact of present Iranian situation: namely, ingrained reluctance of Shah to appoint “strong” Primin (Deptel 2879 June 16).In telegram 2879 to Tehran, June 16, @@ -15531,55 +13375,36 @@ regime which will be required. Decision must be his since Majlis and Senate apparently will await his initiative indefinitely.

Emb views re categories of candidates - differ in some points from those expressed by Pyman in May 16 conversation:See ibid. 1) Older states-men Qavam and Hakimi (both of whom in early eighties) from recent + differ in some points from those expressed by Pyman in May 16 conversation:See ibid. 1) Older states-men Qavam and Hakimi (both of whom in early eighties) from recent interviews with Amb, appear surprisingly alert, clear thinking, and cognizant of essential problems - now facing Iran. Shah apparently becoming more friendly toward Qavam but pressure from Senate behalf + now facing Iran. Shah apparently becoming more friendly toward Qavam but pressure from Senate behalf Hakimi may render it easier for - him name latter, whom Shah personally wld prefer to Qavam.

-

2) “Neutral” candidates, such as Entezam, Soheily and Mansur: Entezam + him name latter, whom Shah personally wld prefer to Qavam.

+

2) “Neutral” candidates, such as Entezam, Soheily and Mansur: Entezam having been away from Iran for lengthy time not cognizant of all political forces at work in country and reportedly not particularly decisive personality. These wld be heavy disadvantages in attempting to cope with situation. Soheily, while presumably having confidence of Queen Mother, who currently on very bad terms with her son, Shah, wld suffer - heavily by virtue of previous post as Amb to UK. Soheily’s - reputation for honesty also not entirely clean. Mansur has successfully placed himself + heavily by virtue of previous post as Amb to UK. Soheily’s + reputation for honesty also not entirely clean. Mansur has successfully placed himself in middle between “neutrals” and Natl Front. He has reputation as grafter and lacks necessary decisiveness. His weakness of character may, however, make him more acceptable to Shah and he may be possible compromise choice.

3) Shah has toyed with possibility Natl Front candidate in order avoid - arousing too great antagonism on part Mosadeq and make transition less abrupt from present - regime. Typically mentioned are Busheri, Maki and Saleh. + arousing too great antagonism on part Mosadeq and make transition less abrupt from present + regime. Typically mentioned are Busheri, Maki and Saleh. Busheri attempts be all things to all men, but now on cool terms with - Mosadeq, and Emb believes lacking in judgment and - convictions. He not now being seriously considered. Maki + Mosadeq, and Emb believes lacking in judgment and + convictions. He not now being seriously considered. Maki wld be highly undesirable Primin in view lack background, extreme ambition, and lack of restraint. He still - one of Natl Front leadership triumvirate with Mosadeq and Kashani. Saleh - Emb considers unfriendly US and West and unstable personality.

+ one of Natl Front leadership triumvirate with Mosadeq and Kashani. Saleh + Emb considers unfriendly US and West and unstable personality.

4) Of mil men suggested for Primin, Zahedi has been most prominently mentioned. At present Shah does not appear likely to @@ -15589,87 +13414,67 @@ be chosen if emergency shld develop.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
+
81. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of the Office of National Estimates (Kent) to Director of - Central Intelligence SmithSource: Central Intelligence + Central Intelligence SmithSource: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79R00904A, Box 1, Folder 3, Memos for DCI (1952) (Substantive). Secret. There is no drafting information on the memorandum. - Washington, June 24, 1952. + Washington, June 24, 1952. SUBJECT Approaching Crisis in Iranian Situation

1. Recent developments in Iran suggest that a financial crisis is - imminent and may lead to the fall of Mossadeq. The Mossadeq government has exhausted readily available + imminent and may lead to the fall of Mossadeq. The Mossadeq government has exhausted readily available expedients to meet its financial obligations. The Central Bank claims that its reserves are critically low and has refused to extend further loans to the government. Opposition elements in the new Majlis blocked government efforts to dominate that body and are in a position to prevent the passage of emergency fiscal legislation that would enable the government to meet its obligation for a few more months. The press - reflects a significant diminution of Mossadeq’s prestige, and the leadership of the National + reflects a significant diminution of Mossadeq’s prestige, and the leadership of the National Front appears to be losing its cohesion.

2. However, Mossadeq has frequently in the past demonstrated his ability to re-establish his position and may therefore succeed in weathering this crisis. The outcome of the impending crisis will depend on several factors which are - at present obscure: (a) the unpredictable conduct of Mossadeq; (b) the actions of the + at present obscure: (a) the unpredictable conduct of Mossadeq; (b) the actions of the wavering Shah; (c) the proceedings in the International Court of Justice; (d) the precise position the UK might take regarding an oil settlement; and (e) the policy and actions of the US.

-

3. Iranian specialists in OIR, G–2, and O/CI concur in the view of O/NE +

3. Iranian specialists in OIR, G–2, and O/CI concur in the view of O/NE that under these circumstances a National Intelligence Estimate on Iran - cannot profitably be initiated at this time. OIR is preparing studies on such key factors in Iran as the + cannot profitably be initiated at this time. OIR is preparing studies on such key factors in Iran as the Tudeh Party and the economic situation. In the event that a sudden - change in the Iranian situation requires the initiation of a new NIE, much of the basic research for such + change in the Iranian situation requires the initiation of a new NIE, much of the basic research for such an NIE will, therefore, already have - been completed. O/NE is keeping in close touch with OIR on these matters.

+ been completed. O/NE is keeping in close touch with OIR on these matters.

- Sherman - KentPrinted from a copy + Sherman + KentPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
-
+
82. Editorial Note

Elections to the 17th Majlis took place throughout the spring and into the summer of 1952, and the new Majlis convened formally on April 27, - 1952. On July 14, Prime Minister Mosadeq submitted a new Cabinet to the Shah based on the - elected membership of the 17th Majlis up to that point. Mosadeq included in this submission a + 1952. On July 14, Prime Minister Mosadeq submitted a new Cabinet to the Shah based on the + elected membership of the 17th Majlis up to that point. Mosadeq included in this submission a claim for control over the War Ministry, which the Shah refused. As a result, Mosadeq resigned his post - as Prime Minister and, on July 17, was replaced by Qavam.

+ as Prime Minister and, on July 17, was replaced by Qavam.

-
+
83. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI @@ -15680,8 +13485,7 @@ Staff Memorandum No. 247 - Washington, July 1, 1952. + Washington, July 1, 1952. SUBJECT An Evaluation of the Significance of the National Front Movement @@ -15771,8 +13575,7 @@ of the urban middle class necessarily indicate that the days of the “old guard” are numbered and that a “middle class” leader will now dominate the scene. Developments in the Arab states over the past twenty years - have demonstrated that the pashas—men like Nahas in Egypt, Nuri Said in Iraq, and President Khuri + have demonstrated that the pashas—men like Nahas in Egypt, Nuri Said in Iraq, and President Khuri in Lebanon—are just as capable of manipulating public opinion and using it to enhance their own political power and maintaining their prerogatives as leaders who have sprung from the people. While, @@ -15796,13 +13599,11 @@ at the urban middle class as well as at the wealthy merchants and landlords.

7. The obvious explanation for this absence of class bias in the National - Front movement is that class consciousness is not yet a political factor in Iran. While the + Front movement is that class consciousness is not yet a political factor in Iran. While the urban middle class is becoming increasingly articulate, it is not homogeneous, its intellectual outlook is confused, and its aims as a social group are so inchoate as to be practically non-existent. Its - political energies are devoted exclusively to the national aim of eliminating British influence. Beyond that, + political energies are devoted exclusively to the national aim of eliminating British influence. Beyond that, all that the members of this group appear to want at present is the opportunity to plan a more active role in political affairs. In a political sense, therefore, the needs of these people have been filled, @@ -15822,8 +13623,7 @@ over-step the bounds of a constitutional monarch, and most important of all his conviction that his own, as well as his country’s, best interests are served by keeping in step with public opinion. - Consequently, his decision not to act against Mossadeq until the latter’s position + Consequently, his decision not to act against Mossadeq until the latter’s position has been undermined by the course of events does not in itself indicate that his position is weak. The vital elements of his position—his prestige in the country, his command of the armed forces and the loyalty @@ -15845,11 +13645,9 @@ as strongly as the National Front has itself. However, they have, particularly since last fall, placed progressively more emphasis on Mossadeq’s failure to solve - the critical financial and economic problems resulting from the oil issue. In view of the + the critical financial and economic problems resulting from the oil issue. In view of the interdependence of the oil problem and the financial situation their - attitude is no more consistent than Mossadeq’s. It is, nevertheless, good politics and an + attitude is no more consistent than Mossadeq’s. It is, nevertheless, good politics and an indication that the political developments of the past year have not been lost on them. Their attitude toward the oil controversy is, however, more realistic and prospects for an oil solution would improve @@ -15891,22 +13689,17 @@ sophistication of the urban middle class, which will probably not occur for many years.

- John H. - Leavitt + John H. + Leavitt
-
- 84. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 84. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, - 788.13/7–1852. Secret; Security Information; NIACT. Repeated to London. Received + 788.13/7–1852. Secret; Security Information; NIACT. Repeated to London. Received at 9:24 a.m. - Tehran, July 18, 1952, + Tehran, July 18, 1952, 1 p.m.

239. 1. Emissary Qavam, in whom I have confidence, came to see me this morning to ask if I could visit @@ -15917,58 +13710,45 @@ caution in order not (rpt not) to outrage sensibilities of country. In meantime there are heavy back payments due in governmental salaries and new pay day falls on July 20. - Qavam hopes that US will find some way to help tide + Qavam hopes that US will find some way to help tide government over financially until he has had opportunity settle oil problem and otherwise get Iran’s house in financial order.

2. I asked emissary if Qavam thought of possibility obtaining temporary loan from Bank Melli through issuance of limited amount of notes against currency coverage. Emissary said matter was being given consideration but consent of Majlis must - first be obtained and it would be impolitic for Qavam’s first approach to Majlis to + first be obtained and it would be impolitic for Qavam’s first approach to Majlis to be request for lowering of currency coverage. In any event at least month would elapse before necessary legislation could be passed and notes made available to government.

-

3. I told emissary I would be glad discuss matter with Qavam in our talk tomorrow but +

3. I told emissary I would be glad discuss matter with Qavam in our talk tomorrow but Qavam should know in advance that I in no (rpt no) position to make commitments about financial aid. This aid involved number - factors, some rather complicated. I asked if Qavam was making similar approach to + factors, some rather complicated. I asked if Qavam was making similar approach to Brit. Emissary replied he thought probably Qavam would send - message some kind to Brit. Emb today but it would not (rpt not) be possible to begin serious + message some kind to Brit. Emb today but it would not (rpt not) be possible to begin serious discussion re oil with Brit. until machinery had been set up and certain amount time consuming preparations made.

-

4. My informant told me that he was with Qavam last night at time news received that Majlis had +

4. My informant told me that he was with Qavam last night at time news received that Majlis had taken vote in his favor. He said within ten minutes after results of Majlis vote had been received, Gen. - Kupal, Chief Police, called on Qavam and expressed his joy that Majlis had decided in + Kupal, Chief Police, called on Qavam and expressed his joy that Majlis had decided in his favor and stated his desire to do everything possible to insure that - change in government would lead to no (rpt no) disorders. Few minutes later Mil Governor of Tehran + change in government would lead to no (rpt no) disorders. Few minutes later Mil Governor of Tehran appeared on similar mission. While these two officers were still with - Qavam, Ala + Qavam, Ala Min. Court telephoned on behalf of Shah, informing Qavam that decree naming him Prime - Minister would be issued and that in meantime Qavam should at once assume - responsibilities of Prime Minister. Qavam turned from telephone to officers and told them + Minister would be issued and that in meantime Qavam should at once assume + responsibilities of Prime Minister. Qavam turned from telephone to officers and told them that he expected them to maintain complete law and order in Tehran. They were to act with restraint. Nevertheless, they should make it clear that no (rpt no) disturbances of any kind - would be tolerated. Simultaneously, Qavam gave orders that radio should inform public of his + would be tolerated. Simultaneously, Qavam gave orders that radio should inform public of his nomination as Prime Minister and of his determination that law and order should be maintained in Tehran and throughout country. According to my informant, certain manifestations which were being planned by various @@ -15977,8 +13757,7 @@ assured Qavam that they were confident that with his backing they could maintain order in Tehran with no (rpt no) difficulty.

-

5. According to my informant, he had long private talk with Qavam early this morning during which +

5. According to my informant, he had long private talk with Qavam early this morning during which Qavam discussed foreign policies and indicated, as he had on previous occasions, that Iran’s destiny lay with Western world and that it was his intention cooperate @@ -15994,197 +13773,121 @@ conversation with latter. Upon his return he told informant that he thought Shah really had begun to trust him and intended work with him loyally.

-

8. My informant stated that Cabinet probably not (rpt not) be selected until July 19 or 20. +

8. My informant stated that Cabinet probably not (rpt not) be selected until July 19 or 20. Qavam has decided to retain Portfolio FA temporarily for self. It also likely, according to informant, that Ala will go as - Amb Wash and Sen-Ti will be Min. Court. These matters, of course, must + Amb Wash and Sen-Ti will be Min. Court. These matters, of course, must be coordinated with Shah.

9. After leaving Embassy, informant repeated our conversation to Qavam who sent him back to me with message to effect that receipt financial aid was of utmost - urgency; that he really should have it today (rpt today) or tomorrow. It would be misinterpreted if he + urgency; that he really should have it today (rpt today) or tomorrow. It would be misinterpreted if he would ask Brit. for such aid before - opening oil negotiations and therefore US was only hope. He asked if US really interested in saving Iran it move with + opening oil negotiations and therefore US was only hope. He asked if US really interested in saving Iran it move with unprecedented speed.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
- 85. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 85. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, - 888.10/7–1852. Secret; Security Information; NIACT. Repeated to London. Received + 888.10/7–1852. Secret; Security Information; NIACT. Repeated to London. Received at 10:34 a.m. - Tehran, July 18, 1952, + Tehran, July 18, 1952, 2 p.m.

242. 1. I sincerely hope that Dept can - move in matter of financial aid as Qavam suggested “with unprecedented speed” (Embtel 239, July 18).Document 84.

-

2. I had tentative chat with Middleton + move in matter of financial aid as Qavam suggested “with unprecedented speed” (Embtel 239, July 18).Document 84.

+

2. I had tentative chat with Middleton immed fol first visit of emissary from Qavam referred to in - reftel and told Middleton of Qavam’s expressed hope that US + reftel and told Middleton of Qavam’s expressed hope that US wld be able at once to advance - sufficient financial aid enable his govt meet payrolls and other urgent financial needs. We + sufficient financial aid enable his govt meet payrolls and other urgent financial needs. We arranged for meeting this afternoon of reps two Embs to work out joint - recommendations to Wash and London. Middleton said that it was his personal tentative - opinion that in view peculiarities of situation it wld be helpful if US + recommendations to Wash and London. Middleton said that it was his personal tentative + opinion that in view peculiarities of situation it wld be helpful if US cld immed extend aid sufficient to tide Iran over financial crisis of ensuing weeks. In so stating he not (rpt not) undertaking speak for - Emb or for his govt. Middleton referred to conversations in London in which - he had expressed some doubt re advisability US Govt extending financial assistance immed to govt replacing that of Mosadeq. He said that at that time he had had in mind - some weak govt—not (rpt not) strong govt of kind which Qavam was forming. Qavam’s govt + Emb or for his govt. Middleton referred to conversations in London in which + he had expressed some doubt re advisability US Govt extending financial assistance immed to govt replacing that of Mosadeq. He said that at that time he had had in mind + some weak govt—not (rpt not) strong govt of kind which Qavam was forming. Qavam’s govt cld afford take positive stand and need not (rpt not) worry about endeavors on part various groups to misinterpret American financial assistance. Middleton and I both were of opinion that it wld be advantageous to West if US - cld make Qavam feel at outset that West was friendly. We also + cld make Qavam feel at outset that West was friendly. We also agreed that if US financial assistance was extended it shld be made clear to Iran and to rest of world that Brit - fully approved such extension. Care shld be taken that impression not (rpt not) be created that difference of opinion re financial - assistance existed between UK and US and assistance shld be accorded in such way as to build up good will for - UK as well as for US.

+ fully approved such extension. Care shld be taken that impression not (rpt not) be created that difference of opinion re financial + assistance existed between UK and US and assistance shld be accorded in such way as to build up good will for + UK as well as for US.

3. More mature views of two Embs will, I hope, go forward to London and Wash this evening after conference this afternoon. In meantime I hope Dept can already be laying basis for quick action. Our joint tel this evening will probably contain estimate of amount which shld be given at this time.

-

4. One question which will be raised is whether financial aid shld be grant or loan and we hope Dept can be giving this question thot. - This Emb inclined to favor grant at this - juncture and feel confident Qavam - wld not (rpt not) hesitate ask for grant if he shld believe any possibility grant wld be accorded.

+

4. One question which will be raised is whether financial aid shld be grant or loan and we hope Dept can be giving this question thot. + This Emb inclined to favor grant at this + juncture and feel confident Qavam + wld not (rpt not) hesitate ask for grant if he shld believe any possibility grant wld be accorded.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
+
86. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United KingdomSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files - 1950–1954, 888. 10/7–1852. Top Secret; Priority; NIACT. Repeated Priority and NIACT to Tehran. Drafted by + 1950–1954, 888. 10/7–1852. Top Secret; Priority; NIACT. Repeated Priority and NIACT to Tehran. Drafted by Ferguson and approved by Byroade. - Washington, July 18, 1952, 11:40 p.m. -

431. Emb requested raise immed with Brit at highest feasible level question raised Tehran’s + Washington, July 18, 1952, 11:40 p.m. +

431. Emb requested raise immed with Brit at highest feasible level question raised Tehran’s 239,Document - 84. 242,Document 85. and 248 July 18In telegram 248 from Tehran, Henderson asked that the United + 84. 242,Document 85. and 248 July 18In telegram 248 from Tehran, Henderson asked that the United States extend aid that would enable the new Iranian Government to deal with its financial crisis until around September 20. To that end, Henderson suggested allocating to the Iranian Government a lump sum, based on the current deficit, the exchange rate, and Iran’s ability to absorb aid, with the understanding that “possible further aid dependent on - progress toward oil settlement.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, - 888.10/7–1852) and solicit urgent Brit concurrence in recommendations both Middleton and Henderson that US extend immed - finan assistance to Qavam gov.

+ progress toward oil settlement.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, + 888.10/7–1852) and solicit urgent Brit concurrence in recommendations both Middleton and Henderson that US extend immed + finan assistance to Qavam gov.

Suggest if Brit show reluctance you pt [point] out this question has been raised with them on several occasions at high level and that US convinced failure to act immed may cause us to lose best chance yet for settlement oil controversy and reversal deterioration situation in Iran. While we naturally wish to be guided in - our action by Brit views, Dept believes we shld lose no time in extending support + our action by Brit views, Dept believes we shld lose no time in extending support which Qavam clearly needs if he - is to remain in power and work out agreement with Brit. (FYI final action on our part may require clearance and + is to remain in power and work out agreement with Brit. (FYI final action on our part may require clearance and action here at highest level.)

Brit may be informed our tentative - thinking is to give or lend Qavam at once small amt along lines suggested Tehran’s - 248 as interim stopgap measure without rpt without promise any more will be forthcoming. Aid + thinking is to give or lend Qavam at once small amt along lines suggested Tehran’s + 248 as interim stopgap measure without rpt without promise any more will be forthcoming. Aid wld clearly be tied to oil controversy and he wld be told it being - extended to help him in interim period required for him to arrange negots for settlement with UK in accordance his announced intention.

-

In view urgency situation, we believe Qavam must have this aid not rpt not later than early next week and therefore earnestly + extended to help him in interim period required for him to arrange negots for settlement with UK in accordance his announced intention.

+

In view urgency situation, we believe Qavam must have this aid not rpt not later than early next week and therefore earnestly solicit earliest Brit concurrence. (Brit Emb informed.)

- Acheson + Acheson
-
+
87. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI @@ -16195,8 +13898,7 @@ Staff Memorandum No. 256 - Washington, July 18, 1952. + Washington, July 18, 1952. SUBJECT OIR Comments on Staff Memorandum @@ -16205,41 +13907,30 @@

1. The memorandum below is by [name not declassified] of OIR and deals with John Leavitt’s Staff Memo - No. 247 dated 1 July on the National Front Movement in Iran.Document 83.

-

2. [name not declassified] and Leavitt have since discussed the + No. 247 dated 1 July on the National Front Movement in Iran.Document 83.

+

2. [name not declassified] and Leavitt have since discussed the matter at some length. Leavitt believes that if [name not declassified] had written the memo after the discussion, the rebuttal might not have been - cast in such extreme terms. John is prepared to rebut [name not declassified] memo at any time. I concur with John, + cast in such extreme terms. John is prepared to rebut [name not declassified] memo at any time. I concur with John, however, that this argument could go on forever and that it might as well be suspended until it can be focused on a concrete problem such as - revision of NIE–46.Document 63. I also + revision of NIE–46.Document 63. I also concur in John’s view that both he and [name not declassified] are stating their points of view in rather exaggerated terms and that the truth probably lies in some as yet undefined middle ground.

3. The memo below is therefore being circulated for your information with - the recommendation that the matter be allowed to lie fallow until NIE–46 is revised or NIE–73 reaches the drafting stage.NIE–73, + the recommendation that the matter be allowed to lie fallow until NIE–46 is revised or NIE–73 reaches the drafting stage.NIE–73, “Conditions Affecting U.S. Security,” is in the Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79R01012A, - Box 25, Folder 1. Further news on Mossadeq’s resignation may make a revision of NIE–46 a more immediate problem than a vacation-minded + Box 25, Folder 1. Further news on Mossadeq’s resignation may make a revision of NIE–46 a more immediate problem than a vacation-minded Board and Staff would prefer.

[name not declassified]

Attachment

Washington, undated.

OIR MEMO

-

The oversimplification and condensation of OIR’s observations on the significance of the National +

The oversimplification and condensation of OIR’s observations on the significance of the National Front movement in Section 2 is hardly a fair presentation in that it is so worded as to present an extreme position, ending with the statement that we “have assumed that a political and social revolution has in fact @@ -16251,20 +13942,17 @@

One of the major weaknesses of the CIA analysis is the assumption that the National Front group and the “old guard” (traditional ruling aristocracy) are separate and distinct. The - statement is made in Section 4 that “with the exception of Mosadeq himself, none of the leaders of + statement is made in Section 4 that “with the exception of Mosadeq himself, none of the leaders of the National Front has been a member of the traditionally ruling aristocracy and few of them had previously held important government posts.” To mention only a few of the representatives of the traditional governing group who have collaborated closely with the National Front, - one might pick Saleh, Amini, Haerizadesh, Busheri, Ram, + one might pick Saleh, Amini, Haerizadesh, Busheri, Ram, Malek Madani, Bayat, or Khosro Qashqai. It is true, as pointed out in Section 5, that the leadership need not necessarily come from the “middle class,” but the revolutionary effects can arise just as well from a liberal aristocrat. It does not seem to be entirely irrelevant to - refer in this connection to Roosevelt and the New Deal. The traditional governing + refer in this connection to Roosevelt and the New Deal. The traditional governing groups have been split up by the National Front, not only over the question of the exclusion of the British, but over internal problems such as electoral reform, more effective taxation, and social justice. @@ -16278,8 +13966,7 @@ name just a few, have preached the need for social and economic reforms to equalize the tax burden and raise the general standard of living. Furthermore, the - socialistic Iran Party, of which Saleh is the head and whose membership includes many + socialistic Iran Party, of which Saleh is the head and whose membership includes many foreign-educated, middle-aged Iranians, has clearly defined social, political, and economic aims. Nor is it accurate to say, as in Section 7, that “the National Front’s ideas concerning basic reforms and @@ -16290,15 +13977,13 @@ OCI, whereas National Front officials have apparently been cooperating effectively with Point IV officials. Qavam was, if - anything, more tenacious than Mosadeq in seeking “political power as an end in + anything, more tenacious than Mosadeq in seeking “political power as an end in itself.”

Contrary to the conclusion in Section 8, the prestige of the Shah in the eyes of the Court and the more conservative of the “old guard” has been weakened during the 14 months of National Front domination. Whatever influence he has, has certainly not been used either to strengthen the - Throne through autocratic action, as his mother and Princess Ashraf would like, or to + Throne through autocratic action, as his mother and Princess Ashraf would like, or to restore the “old guard” to power, as the more conservative of the vested interests would like.

As pointed out in Section 9, the vested interests continue to hold a @@ -16356,28 +14041,20 @@ class will probably not increase greatly for many years. Any policy based upon that assumption would, in our opinion, be very hazardous.

-
- 88. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 88. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, - 888.10/7–1952. Secret; Security Information; NIACT. Repeated to London. Received + 888.10/7–1952. Secret; Security Information; NIACT. Repeated to London. Received at 8:45 a.m. - Tehran, July 19, 1952, + Tehran, July 19, 1952, 2 p.m. -

263. 1. During my talks this morning with Qavam our conversation limited for most part to urgent +

263. 1. During my talks this morning with Qavam our conversation limited for most part to urgent need of Iran for financial aid. Nevertheless other matters were touched upon which might be of interest.

2. Qavam remarked that during - last two years, as result of policies of preceding govt, number of persons had been able to - become members of Majlis who had no (rpt no) qualifications for parliamentary work and who + last two years, as result of policies of preceding govt, number of persons had been able to + become members of Majlis who had no (rpt no) qualifications for parliamentary work and who depended upon methods other than those of parliamentary character in endeavoring to obtain their pol objectives. Some of the deps hiding behind their parliamentary @@ -16388,13 +14065,10 @@ part?

3. I said that if because of unparliamentary tactics on part certain members it shld become impossible for - Majlis to continue to function it seemed to me that govt + Majlis to continue to function it seemed to me that govt wld be justified in dissolving Majlis - through constitutional means. I did not (rpt not) believe that in trying situation which Iran was - facing, world cld expect govt of Iran to tolerate situation in + through constitutional means. I did not (rpt not) believe that in trying situation which Iran was + facing, world cld expect govt of Iran to tolerate situation in which it was paralyzed. I was not (rpt not) sufficiently well acquainted with background and customs give advice but thought Qavam @@ -16402,28 +14076,22 @@ constitutional channels.

4. Qavam said that he hoped that people in US - wld not (rpt not) be shocked if he wld be compelled temporarily to resort to certain strong + wld not (rpt not) be shocked if he wld be compelled temporarily to resort to certain strong measures. There wld be charges probably that he was acting in an undemocratic manner. Nevertheless there were times when in order to save democracy govts might find themselves compelled to take strong actions against violators of peace who while ostensibly struggling for “democracy” were in fact trying to destroy - democratic institutions. I replied that I was sure Qavam + democratic institutions. I replied that I was sure Qavam wld maintain his reputation, combining his firmness with restraint.

-

5. I asked Qavam if govt was encountering any difficulties in +

5. I asked Qavam if govt was encountering any difficulties in various parts of country to maintain law and order. I referred particularly to Abadan where there were large groups of organized workmen who might be mobilized for purpose of creating disorder. He maintained that generally throughout country peaceful conditions prevailed altho here and there, there had been demonstrations which had - been suppressed. Realizing dangers existing in Abadan, govt upon assuming power had immed taken steps which he thought + been suppressed. Realizing dangers existing in Abadan, govt upon assuming power had immed taken steps which he thought wld be successful in preventing serious disturbances.After sending this telegram, Henderson @@ -16433,37 +14101,27 @@ afternoon and request power dissolve Parliament. He believes it necessary have authority do so because of activities certain deputies, who, under shield of parliamentary immunity, had incited - today’s disturbances. If deputies continue such activities Qavam proposes dissolve + today’s disturbances. If deputies continue such activities Qavam proposes dissolve Parliament and arrest offending deputies simultaneously.” (Ibid.)

- Henderson + Henderson
-
- 89. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 89. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.13/7–1952. Secret; Security Information. Repeated to London. Received at 11:53 a.m. Telegram 265 was transmitted subsequent to - telegrams 263 and 264, but is a fuller report on Henderson’s initial meeting with - Prime Minister Qavam. - Tehran, July 19, 1952, + telegrams 263 and 264, but is a fuller report on Henderson’s initial meeting with + Prime Minister Qavam. + Tehran, July 19, 1952, 3 p.m. -

265. 1. I opened conv with Qavam this morning by congratulating +

265. 1. I opened conv with Qavam this morning by congratulating him on his appt, stating that I was sure that he was accepting it for patriotic reasons since he must be aware heavy responsibilities which he - was incurring. His name was familiar to American Govt and American people as Iran + was incurring. His name was familiar to American Govt and American people as Iran statesman who had always supported coop between our respective countries and I sure I speaking for them when I wished him success in accomplishment difficult tasks awaiting him. He replied he had accepted @@ -16472,36 +14130,21 @@ accepted in hope he might be able render some services to Iran even in old age. He had always considered US as disinterested friend of Iran. In his younger days under Qajar dynasty - when Iran was in difficult position, he had appealed to US for aid and US had saved country by arranging for loan of $2 million. + when Iran was in difficult position, he had appealed to US for aid and US had saved country by arranging for loan of $2 million. On occasions too numerous to list US had proved to be true friend to Iran. He therefore was encouraged again to - ask for US aid. He need not (rpt not) describe finan situation of country. No (rpt no) public funds available. Past due + ask for US aid. He need not (rpt not) describe finan situation of country. No (rpt no) public funds available. Past due and current govt wages and salaries as - well as other urgent bills against govt must be paid at once. He hoped within few months - restore Iran’s credit and solvency but country must have immed foreign finan assistance if it was not (rpt not) to move into chaos. US was only country to which he cld turn. He had sent msg to me yesterday re Iran’s urgent - needs and he understood that I had already telegraphed Wash. He hoped that his request for help + well as other urgent bills against govt must be paid at once. He hoped within few months + restore Iran’s credit and solvency but country must have immed foreign finan assistance if it was not (rpt not) to move into chaos. US was only country to which he cld turn. He had sent msg to me yesterday re Iran’s urgent + needs and he understood that I had already telegraphed Wash. He hoped that his request for help was being recd with sympathy and that - he wld have favorable answer in immed future.

+ he wld have favorable answer in immed future.

2. I told Qavam I quite sure US Govt fairly well informed Iran’s finan situation and that his - request for help wld be recd by US + request for help wld be recd by US Govt with understanding and sympathy. I had no (rpt no) idea, however, whether US @@ -16511,36 +14154,21 @@ question to which US Govt must find answer was whether it had funds available without Congressional legis to use for aid this - kind. Second question was whether it wld be possible in case such funds were available to extend + kind. Second question was whether it wld be possible in case such funds were available to extend finan aid to Iran in circumstances which wld be acceptable to public opinion of three countries: US, Iran and UK.

-

3. I said US not (rpt not) accustomed to extending finan or budgetary aid except in - emergencies. On several occasions Mosadeq had asked for Amer - finan aid and it had not (rpt not) been given him. Amer +

3. I said US not (rpt not) accustomed to extending finan or budgetary aid except in + emergencies. On several occasions Mosadeq had asked for Amer + finan aid and it had not (rpt not) been given him. Amer Govt and public had been of opinion that kind of emergency which wld - justify budgetary aid did not exist when request from Mosadeq was recd. There was widespread belief in US that if Mosadeq had taken what US + justify budgetary aid did not exist when request from Mosadeq was recd. There was widespread belief in US that if Mosadeq had taken what US Govt and public considered to be - reasonable attitude resolution oil problem Iran wld have been able overcome its budgetary difficulties - without finan help from US. It was clear that Amer public opinion was against giving + reasonable attitude resolution oil problem Iran wld have been able overcome its budgetary difficulties + without finan help from US. It was clear that Amer public opinion was against giving finan aid to Iran in circumstances which wld make it appear that such aid was in fact subsidizing what it considered to be @@ -16548,145 +14176,95 @@ situation at present was somewhat different. It was my understanding that present govt was anxious solve oil prob on basis which wld be fair and - reasonable to all concerned and which at same time wld safeguard Iran’s rights and promote + reasonable to all concerned and which at same time wld safeguard Iran’s rights and promote welfare Iran people. Present Iran Govt moreover was in urgent need finan - help during period which must elapse before oil problem cld be solved and Iran’s oil resources + help during period which must elapse before oil problem cld be solved and Iran’s oil resources cld begin again produce badly - needed revenues. Yesterday, therefore, I had recommended to US + needed revenues. Yesterday, therefore, I had recommended to US Govt it consider request from Qavam in somewhat different - light from requests heretofore recd.See Document 86, footnote 4. I told Qavam that such recommendations as I + light from requests heretofore recd.See Document 86, footnote 4. I told Qavam that such recommendations as I had made had been for aid of limited character. I had recommended limited aid because I did not (rpt not) - believe that Amer or Brit public opinion wld look with favor upon extension at this + believe that Amer or Brit public opinion wld look with favor upon extension at this moment of financial aid to Iran in amts greater than might be needed to tide country over period longer than perhaps two months. I had, therefore, urged that US Govt give - favorable consideration to extending finan aid to Iran sufficient to enable govt to function until, say, Sept 20, by + favorable consideration to extending finan aid to Iran sufficient to enable govt to function until, say, Sept 20, by which time it wld be possible reasses situation in light achievements govt and progress made in solution oil prob. It had seemed to me that by Sept - 20 if Iran Govt pursued energetic measures its finan house might be in sufficiently + 20 if Iran Govt pursued energetic measures its finan house might be in sufficiently good order, and its progress resolution oil prob might be sufficiently satisfactory to effect restoration Iran’s solvency to such extent it wld be able satisfy its future finan needs thru existing internal and domestic channels.

-

4. I particularly stressed that if finan credit was to be extended attn must be particularly - paid to Amer public opinion. US - Govt had no (rpt no) desire interfere in selection members Cabinet. +

4. I particularly stressed that if finan credit was to be extended attn must be particularly + paid to Amer public opinion. US + Govt had no (rpt no) desire interfere in selection members Cabinet. Primin must realize however that US public opinion wld be more favorable if Cabinet members wld so far as possible be men whose integrity and ability wld be unquestioned. Furthermore, domestic program of govt - wld also influence US opinion. It wld be helpful, for instance, if US public opinion be convinced that Iran Govt was really serious in its intention + wld also influence US opinion. It wld be helpful, for instance, if US public opinion be convinced that Iran Govt was really serious in its intention to effect certain finan and econ reform which every intelligent Iran knew was badly needed. Furthermore, it important that US public really believe that Iran Govt was sincere in its desire to settle oil prob on reasonable and fair basis. I was quite aware that govt - cld not (rpt not) prove sincerity its intentions prior to US decision re granting finan aid to Iran. Nevertheless, what + cld not (rpt not) prove sincerity its intentions prior to US decision re granting finan aid to Iran. Nevertheless, what might happen in next few days was important and even after aid was - extended it was still more important that Iran Govt follow policies which wld not (rpt not) + extended it was still more important that Iran Govt follow policies which wld not (rpt not) embarrass US - Govt in face US public opinion. Similar sensibilities UK - Govt and UK public opinion must not (rpt not) be overlooked. It wld be harmful to US, to + Govt in face US public opinion. Similar sensibilities UK + Govt and UK public opinion must not (rpt not) be overlooked. It wld be harmful to US, to Iran and to free world in gen if US and UK shld have serious divergencies re - Iran. It was in interest all three countries that there shld be cooperation among them on basis + Iran. It was in interest all three countries that there shld be cooperation among them on basis mutual confidence. I hoped new govt - wld find it possible to convince Brit - Govt and public opinion that it really desired - Brit friendship. Neither shld Iran public opinion be overlooked. - Any finan aid which US might be able extend to Iran must be + wld find it possible to convince Brit + Govt and public opinion that it really desired + Brit friendship. Neither shld Iran public opinion be overlooked. + Any finan aid which US might be able extend to Iran must be given in such circumstances as not (rpt - not) to arouse suspicions among Iran people that Iran Govt was in any way sacrificing their - interest in order obtain needed funds. Also, every effort shld be made not (rpt not) to give color to charges certain + not) to arouse suspicions among Iran people that Iran Govt was in any way sacrificing their + interest in order obtain needed funds. Also, every effort shld be made not (rpt not) to give color to charges certain to be made that US was aiding or subsidizing some particular Iran Govt - rather than country of Iran. I was sure Qavam himself understood that any finan aid which US might give to Iran at this time was not (rpt not) being given to help him - personally or to aid his particular govt. It was being extended for purpose of enabling Iran + rather than country of Iran. I was sure Qavam himself understood that any finan aid which US might give to Iran at this time was not (rpt not) being given to help him + personally or to aid his particular govt. It was being extended for purpose of enabling Iran Governmental apparatus to carry on and for Iran to continue to exist as independent state.

5. I told Primin I hoped he was not (rpt not) disappointed at limitations which I had placed on my recommendations. Also, I wanted again to make it clear that I had no - (rpt no) idea whether my govt + (rpt no) idea whether my govt wld find itself in position to act favorably on my recommendations. I was talking with him with extreme - frankness because I believed our relations in future wld be more satisfactory if we were frank + frankness because I believed our relations in future wld be more satisfactory if we were frank and specific and did not (rpt not) waste time in mere generalities.

6. Primin said he was appreciative my frankness, he fully agreed in that it was important that any aid which US might be able extend Iran shld be - arranged in such way as to be acceptable to public opinion of US, UK and + arranged in such way as to be acceptable to public opinion of US, UK and Iran, and he was anxious to cooperate. He was confident that if we cld give enough aid to permit - govt function over period next two months, accomplishments his govt during that period wld more than satisfy American public - opinion that its money had been well invested. He did not (rpt not) ask whether by end Sept his + govt function over period next two months, accomplishments his govt during that period wld more than satisfy American public + opinion that its money had been well invested. He did not (rpt not) ask whether by end Sept his govt - wld be fully solvent; nevertheless, he believed that by + wld be fully solvent; nevertheless, he believed that by that time both people of Iran and peoples of other friendly countries wld have more reason to trust in future Iran than they have at present. He intended to move just as fast as conditions wld permit in solving oil - problems on reasonable fair basis. Qavam added that situation was extremely urgent and he + problems on reasonable fair basis. Qavam added that situation was extremely urgent and he hoped have some kind indication US Govt attitude within next two or three days.

@@ -16695,107 +14273,73 @@ complete secrecy. He said, however, that he expected inform Shah of details our conversation.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
+
90. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files - 1950–1954, 888.10/7–1952. Top Secret; Security Information; NIACT. Repeated to Tehran. Received + 1950–1954, 888.10/7–1952. Top Secret; Security Information; NIACT. Repeated to Tehran. Received at 1:45 p.m. - London, July 19, 1952, + London, July 19, 1952, 4 p.m.

358. In continued absence Eden and - Strang, I saw Makins and Bowker this morning and made points - contained Deptel 431, July 18.The reference to telegram 431 is in error. The + Strang, I saw Makins and Bowker this morning and made points + contained Deptel 431, July 18.The reference to telegram 431 is in error. The correct reference should be to telegram 421, July 18, in which Acheson suggested to the Embassy in London that “you also emphasize to Fonoff we consider it essential Brit - Govt be prepared reopen negots early date and have ready + Govt be prepared reopen negots early date and have ready proposals likely be acceptable to new Iran Cabinet.” (Ibid.)

-

Their tentative reactions, which are being sent to Eden in country and to which they hope - have his reaction later today, are as fols: FonOff agrees in principle it wld be desirable extend finan assistance Qavam and that US +

Their tentative reactions, which are being sent to Eden in country and to which they hope + have his reaction later today, are as fols: FonOff agrees in principle it wld be desirable extend finan assistance Qavam and that US shld furnish it. They feel strongly, however, that amt of aid shld be - minimum necessary to enable Qavam meet his immed + minimum necessary to enable Qavam meet his immed finan difficulties. They feel it is - desirable that aid be tied to oil settlement, but stress that it shld be connected only in genl way and + desirable that aid be tied to oil settlement, but stress that it shld be connected only in genl way and not (rpt not) with Iran acceptance any specific proposals.

I said I did not (rpt not) think there - was any difference between us on either of foregoing points. Dept had stressed in its instrs to me + was any difference between us on either of foregoing points. Dept had stressed in its instrs to me that only question at issue is extending small amt of aid as interim stop-gap measure without promise any more will be forthcoming. Re tying aid to oil settlement, I said this wld - be done only in genl way by making it clear to Qavam that help was only for interim period necess for + be done only in genl way by making it clear to Qavam that help was only for interim period necess for him to arrange negots.

Makins went on to say there are two points of tactics which require careful consideration. Firstly, - FonOff feels there shld be public Iranian request before we - announce any such aid. In this same connection, it wld probably be best from Qavam’s point of view if publicity + FonOff feels there shld be public Iranian request before we + announce any such aid. In this same connection, it wld probably be best from Qavam’s point of view if publicity minimized. Secondly, there is question of timing of any announcement. FonOff feels these questions shld be fully discussed with Qavam in advance any announcement in order assure tactics are worked out in manner which will be most calculated help him and minimize opposition attempts exploit - sitn by representing aid as indication US and UK brought him to + sitn by representing aid as indication US and UK brought him to power. FonOff will let us know later today of Eden’s reactions and we - shall then inform Dept. FonOff will also be notifying Brit + shall then inform Dept. FonOff will also be notifying Brit Emb Wash.

- Gifford + Gifford
-
- 91. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 91. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, - 788.21/7–2052. Secret; Security Information; NIACT. Repeated to London. Received + 788.21/7–2052. Secret; Security Information; NIACT. Repeated to London. Received at 10:50 a.m. - Tehran, July 20, 1952, + Tehran, July 20, 1952, 3 p.m.

276. 1. Natl Front Deputies have been pursuing unparliamentary tactics in - order prevent functioning of Majlis. Some of them including Kashani who has made appeal to Armed - Forces not (rpt not) obey Qavam’s orders and Ghanatabodi who has publicly threatened + order prevent functioning of Majlis. Some of them including Kashani who has made appeal to Armed + Forces not (rpt not) obey Qavam’s orders and Ghanatabodi who has publicly threatened personally to kill Qavam if given opportunity, are also endeavoring promote disorder and even full-scale revolution. In Tehran members of Iran Party, one of most @@ -16803,93 +14347,59 @@ coalition is extremely active, particularly among youth. They are denouncing not only Qavam but Shah himself.

-

2. In view these rapid developments, Qavam insists he must have free hand to act quickly and +

2. In view these rapid developments, Qavam insists he must have free hand to act quickly and decisively. He sent msg to me this morning that yesterday afternoon during audience with Shah, he had asked latter for authority in his - discretion to dismiss Majlis at moment’s notice in case it shld become clear that Majlis unable + discretion to dismiss Majlis at moment’s notice in case it shld become clear that Majlis unable function because of obstructive tactics of opposition Deputies some whom were hiding behind parliamentary immunities while endeavoring disrupt public order. He told - Shah that in any event he might find it necessary arrest Kashani in view latter’s open + Shah that in any event he might find it necessary arrest Kashani in view latter’s open incitement to rebellion. Shah had hesitated and had said he must examine - constitutional aspects problem. Qavam had thereupon informed Shah that unless he cld be given free hand in this emergency + constitutional aspects problem. Qavam had thereupon informed Shah that unless he cld be given free hand in this emergency by Shah, he wld be compelled to submit his resignation. He asked Shah to think matter over and give him - decision earliest possible moment. Late yesterday evening Qavam was informed by some of his + decision earliest possible moment. Late yesterday evening Qavam was informed by some of his advisers that Shah was still hesitating and that during course day, - Ala, Min Court, had had three hour conversation with Kashani. Qavam infuriated at news that Court - was carrying on conversation with Kashani after latter had engaged in treasonable acts, + Ala, Min Court, had had three hour conversation with Kashani. Qavam infuriated at news that Court + was carrying on conversation with Kashani after latter had engaged in treasonable acts, immed sent his resignation to Shah orally through Ala, Court - official who happened to be visiting Qavam at time.

-

3. According to emissary who brought me above info, Qavam had recd no (rpt not) reaction + official who happened to be visiting Qavam at time.

+

3. According to emissary who brought me above info, Qavam had recd no (rpt not) reaction from Shah re his resignation and was sitting idly at his residence maintaining he no (rpt no) longer PriMin.

-

4. Upon receipt this info, I called immed on Ala to +

4. Upon receipt this info, I called immed on Ala to obtain his version. Ala astonished at news that Qavam had resigned and maintained there must be some misunderstanding. He had just talked over telephone with Shah who told him that yesterday afternoon Qavam had asked Shah - for authority to arrest Kashani and that he (Shah) was hesitating whether or not + for authority to arrest Kashani and that he (Shah) was hesitating whether or not (rpt not) to give authority for act - which might be unconstitutional. Ala told me he had informed Shah that subversive - movements were being encouraged by failure of govt to act decisively and that Shah shld not (rpt not) allow quibbles re constitution prevent Qavam from taking steps necessary to - forestall general conflagration. In my presence Ala called in his Deputy Human to inquire whether latter had + which might be unconstitutional. Ala told me he had informed Shah that subversive + movements were being encouraged by failure of govt to act decisively and that Shah shld not (rpt not) allow quibbles re constitution prevent Qavam from taking steps necessary to + forestall general conflagration. In my presence Ala called in his Deputy Human to inquire whether latter had heard that Qavam had submitted resignation. Human also expressed astonishment at news which I had brought and said there must be some misunderstanding. Unsuccessful steps were made get in touch with - Ala. Ala went at once to discuss matter with + Ala. Ala went at once to discuss matter with Shah and to endeavor persuade latter to agree to dissolution of - Parliament or to some other measure which might give Qavam adequate powers to preserve law + Parliament or to some other measure which might give Qavam adequate powers to preserve law and order.

5. Ala also told me that he had - not (rpt not) seen Kashani since early morning July 18. + not (rpt not) seen Kashani since early morning July 18. Ala seemed to believe that some intriguers had been trying to cause difficulties between Shah and - Qavam. Ala said that he wld like to call on Qavam and come to understanding with + Qavam. Ala said that he wld like to call on Qavam and come to understanding with him if he cld do so without being compelled to pass through rows of “courtiers” usually to be found in Qavam’s residence. He - wld appreciate it if I wld send message to Qavam and let Qavam know what he had told me. I - sent this message immediately on return to Emb and understand - mtg is being arranged this afternoon between Qavam and Ala.

+ wld appreciate it if I wld send message to Qavam and let Qavam know what he had told me. I + sent this message immediately on return to Emb and understand + mtg is being arranged this afternoon between Qavam and Ala.

6. We are somewhat disturbed at situation which is developing as result of inability of Qavam and Shah to cooperate fully at this critical moment. While Tudeh is strengthening @@ -16899,84 +14409,53 @@

7. I hope later this evening to be able to discuss new developments with Middleton who is out of town today.

-

8. We are hopeful that with aid Ala, Shah and Qavam will come to effective working agreement. In - meantime shld not (rpt not) slacken our efforts to perfect +

8. We are hopeful that with aid Ala, Shah and Qavam will come to effective working agreement. In + meantime shld not (rpt not) slacken our efforts to perfect arrangements for extending financial aid to Iran on urgent basis.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
- 92. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 92. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, - 788.13/7–2152. Secret; Security Information; NIACT. Repeated to London. Received + 788.13/7–2152. Secret; Security Information; NIACT. Repeated to London. Received at 12:04 p.m. - Tehran, July 21, 1952, + Tehran, July 21, 1952, 5 p.m.

308. 1. Nine o’clock this morn emissary from Qavam called to inform me he had good news. Qavam had recd msg last night that Shah - wld like see him early this morn and Qavam had understood from msg that Shah finally prepared - give him necessary powers. Emissary said he understood Qavam already on way Palace. At 11 + wld like see him early this morn and Qavam had understood from msg that Shah finally prepared + give him necessary powers. Emissary said he understood Qavam already on way Palace. At 11 o’clock this emissary telephoned that apparently there had been some mistake. After waiting several hours for expected call from Palace Qavam had become discouraged and had again relapsed into state of complete passivity. Since center Tehran was at time engaged in what amounted to civil war, - it seemed to me fantastic that PriMin + it seemed to me fantastic that PriMin shld be sitting passively at his home as result some kind misunderstanding with court. I therefore told Ala by telephone what I had heard. Ala said Shah had decided - not (rpt not) to talk to Qavam this morn but to one of Qavam’s lieutenants; that Shah had told this lieutenant - that he cld not (rpt not) just now (rpt now) grant powers Qavam desired; that Shah’s attitude + not (rpt not) to talk to Qavam this morn but to one of Qavam’s lieutenants; that Shah had told this lieutenant + that he cld not (rpt not) just now (rpt now) grant powers Qavam desired; that Shah’s attitude was being explained to Qavam - and it was his understanding that Qavam - wld accept Shah’s decision on temporary basis. I told + and it was his understanding that Qavam + wld accept Shah’s decision on temporary basis. I told Ala that sit Tehran was very - bad and asked what Shah intended do. Ala replied Shah hesitated take steps which might lead + bad and asked what Shah intended do. Ala replied Shah hesitated take steps which might lead to shedding more blood and Shah was trying at moment decide what best do in circumstances.

2. At 12:30 Middleton called. He had just had long talk with Ala. Ala had told him that perhaps - “all of us” had underestimated strength Mosadeq, that Mosadeq seemed have following tremendous popular appeal - and that public sentiment was clearly opposed to Qavam. Shah therefore was being + “all of us” had underestimated strength Mosadeq, that Mosadeq seemed have following tremendous popular appeal + and that public sentiment was clearly opposed to Qavam. Shah therefore was being forced to consider whether or not (rpt - not) he shld not (rpt not) request Qavam’s resignation and appoint - successor; he might perhaps even turn again to Mosadeq. Middleton expressed opinion to Ala that return of Mosadeq + not) he shld not (rpt not) request Qavam’s resignation and appoint + successor; he might perhaps even turn again to Mosadeq. Middleton expressed opinion to Ala that return of Mosadeq wld almost certainly mean elimination of Shah in not (rpt not) distant future. Ala agreed to existence @@ -16984,45 +14463,30 @@ not (rpt not) easy decide on who successor to Qavam be. Mansur was one possibility. - Middleton told Ala that no (rpt no) PriMin - cld succeed unless Shah wld give him in this difficult sit powers - necessary preserve law and order. Ala asked Middleton whether in case govt + Middleton told Ala that no (rpt no) PriMin + cld succeed unless Shah wld give him in this difficult sit powers + necessary preserve law and order. Ala asked Middleton whether in case govt shld come into power which desired - settle oil problem on reasonable basis UK + settle oil problem on reasonable basis UK wld be willing cooperate in matter of - finan aid. Middleton said that was question which + finan aid. Middleton said that was question which might well be discussed with both Brits and Amers. He thought it might be good idea for Shah to see Amer Amb and himself jointly in order - discuss this important matter. Ala said he was afraid that joint visit of Middleton and myself on Shah might be - misconstrued at this juncture. Middleton renewed request which had been pending for + discuss this important matter. Ala said he was afraid that joint visit of Middleton and myself on Shah might be + misconstrued at this juncture. Middleton renewed request which had been pending for some time that he be recd by Shah.

3. While Middleton was still in - my office I succeeded in getting Ala again on telephone. I told him that according my + my office I succeeded in getting Ala again on telephone. I told him that according my info thousands rioters were milling thru the city streets, shouting - “death to Brit and Amer imperialists, down with Shah”. I did - not (rpt not) believe that I, as Amer + “death to Brit and Amer imperialists, down with Shah”. I did + not (rpt not) believe that I, as Amer Amb, must point out that if these crowds were permitted to continue carry on demonstrations this kind passions wld be aroused which might result in death or injury to Amer citizens. I had been considering possibilities asking for taking - decisive action before situation entirely out control. I was not (rpt not) making formal request see Shah at + decisive action before situation entirely out control. I was not (rpt not) making formal request see Shah at this moment since if I called on him just now my visit might be misinterpreted. Nevertheless, I might consider it necessary see him later in day unless situation wld @@ -17033,125 +14497,80 @@ were stirring up passions and violence were being permitted continue their incitation. Ala said he regretted truth of what I said. He had discussed matter with me on - preceding evening and I knew how he felt. I said that I was not (rpt not) endeavoring criticize Ala or anyone else, I was merely pointing out that + preceding evening and I knew how he felt. I said that I was not (rpt not) endeavoring criticize Ala or anyone else, I was merely pointing out that unless really firm measures were taken to bring halt rabble-rousing, - harm cld come to one or more Amer citizens for whose safety I had + harm cld come to one or more Amer citizens for whose safety I had responsibility. Ala said that he understood my position and wld at once tell HIM what I had said.

-

4. Ala added HIM was considering advisability of +

4. Ala added HIM was considering advisability of replacing Qavam whose unpopularity was now (rpt now) quite evident. I replied that I was not (rpt - not) asking that any particular PriMin be given power to maintain order. It was my opinion - however that order wld not (rpt not) be restored in country until Shah + not) asking that any particular PriMin be given power to maintain order. It was my opinion + however that order wld not (rpt not) be restored in country until Shah wld permit those responsible for - its maintenance to make and carry out necessary decisions. Ala said that Shah wld receive Qavam soon in audience and that he, Ala, wld try pass along to Shah what I had said before audience + its maintenance to make and carry out necessary decisions. Ala said that Shah wld receive Qavam soon in audience and that he, Ala, wld try pass along to Shah what I had said before audience began.

5. Ala also referred to suggestion made by Middleton that latter - and I might make joint call on Shah. Ala had some doubt re wisdom joint audience this time. - Enemies Shah and of Western world might convince public that US and UK + and I might make joint call on Shah. Ala had some doubt re wisdom joint audience this time. + Enemies Shah and of Western world might convince public that US and UK were bringing pressure on Shah. I said there some problems affecting - Iran, US and UK, solution to which might be advanced by joint + Iran, US and UK, solution to which might be advanced by joint discussions. Nevertheless, I realized there might be misinterpretation joint approach just now.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
- 93. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 93. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.13/7–2152. Secret; NIACT. Repeated to London. Received at 12:47 p.m. - Tehran, July 21, 1952, + Tehran, July 21, 1952, 6 p.m.

309. 1. Emissary Qavam called on - me at 3 o’clock this afternoon (Embtel 308, rptd London + me at 3 o’clock this afternoon (Embtel 308, rptd London 99).Document - 92. He said that Shah had sent msg to Qavam thru one of Qavam’s lieutenants shortly before + 92. He said that Shah had sent msg to Qavam thru one of Qavam’s lieutenants shortly before noon suggesting that Qavam - pursue following course; (a) set up cabinet at once; (b) obtain finan aid from US; and (c) endeavor to administer country with firmness on - constitutional basis. Shah promised that if it shld become clear that new Cabinet cld not (rpt not) function - in present situation and if members new Cabinet wld join in recommending that Majlis be dissolved he wld give such recommendation sympathetic consideration.

-

2. According to my informant Qavam was disturbed at this msg. He told his advisers he - cld not (rpt not) believe that Shah was serious. Shah must know that + pursue following course; (a) set up cabinet at once; (b) obtain finan aid from US; and (c) endeavor to administer country with firmness on + constitutional basis. Shah promised that if it shld become clear that new Cabinet cld not (rpt not) function + in present situation and if members new Cabinet wld join in recommending that Majlis be dissolved he wld give such recommendation sympathetic consideration.

+

2. According to my informant Qavam was disturbed at this msg. He told his advisers he + cld not (rpt not) believe that Shah was serious. Shah must know that unless he cld give convincing evidence that he had power and ability maintain order and to govern country he - cld obtain no (rpt no) finan assistance from US or + cld obtain no (rpt no) finan assistance from US or elsewhere. Furthermore it was mockery to talk about any Cabinet - attempting to function in present conditions. Qavam, therefore insisted that he + attempting to function in present conditions. Qavam, therefore insisted that he immediately submit his formal resignation. His advisers, however, begged him for good of Iran not (rpt not) be precipitous. They suggested that he ask for immediate audience with Shah - in order explain situation. Qavam finally yielded and asked for audience. It was not + in order explain situation. Qavam finally yielded and asked for audience. It was not (rpt not) until 2 o’clock that - reply was received from Shah that he wld receive Qavam + reply was received from Shah that he wld receive Qavam at 5. In meantime Qavam had learned that Shah was having protracted conferences with reps of - opposition. When it became clear to Qavam that his visit to Shah was being postponed while + opposition. When it became clear to Qavam that his visit to Shah was being postponed while HIM was having discussions with - those who shared responsibility for stirring up revolt against govt he again insisted on submitting - resignation. His advisers however, begged him to wait until they cld make appeal to me.

+ those who shared responsibility for stirring up revolt against govt he again insisted on submitting + resignation. His advisers however, begged him to wait until they cld make appeal to me.

2. Emissary of Qavam asked me if - I wld not (rpt not) be willing to try to see Shah before Shah received + I wld not (rpt not) be willing to try to see Shah before Shah received Qavam in order to impress on Shah seriousness of situation and to persuade him before too late to give Qavam necessary powers. I - replied that I had gone just as far as I properly cld to impress upon Shah seriousness of + replied that I had gone just as far as I properly cld to impress upon Shah seriousness of ME situation and to stress necessity for decisive action. I deemed it useless and unwise intervene at this juncture. Emissary of Qavam said that if Qavam was told no (rpt no) help coming from me he - wld not (rpt not) call on Shah but wld instead send his resignation. I suggested that emissary - urge Qavam not (rpt not) to resign until latter had seen + wld not (rpt not) call on Shah but wld instead send his resignation. I suggested that emissary + urge Qavam not (rpt not) to resign until latter had seen Shah once more.

3. I am beginning to believe that Shah has never been really anxious for Qavam to succeed; that he @@ -17159,75 +14578,55 @@ success meant that Qavam shld have any considerable powers; and that for some time he has been secretly negotiating with Natl Front - leaders with idea of agreeing upon successor to Qavam who wld be acceptable to them. Unless some unexpected - development occurs during next two hours strong possibility Qavam will resign. Shah might + leaders with idea of agreeing upon successor to Qavam who wld be acceptable to them. Unless some unexpected + development occurs during next two hours strong possibility Qavam will resign. Shah might however, try to keep him on temporarily until he can complete arrangements for a successor. I am afraid that Shah’s hesitations and his surreptitious dealings with various opposing groups simultaneously are undermining his own prestige and may place country in great danger. - My refusal to go to Shah at this moment is not (rpt not) based so much my desire not (rpt not) to intervene in Iranian internal - affairs as upon my conviction that my visit wld serve no (rpt no) + My refusal to go to Shah at this moment is not (rpt not) based so much my desire not (rpt not) to intervene in Iranian internal + affairs as upon my conviction that my visit wld serve no (rpt no) useful purpose; that I wld find Shah evasive and vague and not (rpt not) responsive to appeals either to logic or patriotism.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
- 94. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 94. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1950–1952, classified general records, Box 29. Secret; Security - Information. Drafted by Melbourne and approved by Henderson in draft. Repeated to + Information. Drafted by Melbourne and approved by Henderson in draft. Repeated to London. The telegram is the Embassy copy as approved and has no time of transmission. - Tehran, July 21, 1952. + Tehran, July 21, 1952.

316. After weighing developments in Iran and public reaction thereto - during past four days it seems clear that Qavam resignation and triumph Natl Front due to two + during past four days it seems clear that Qavam resignation and triumph Natl Front due to two factors: 1) refusal of Shah, because of innate distrust, to grant powers to Qavam sufficient to maintain order and 2) resultant Govt impotency seized upon by Natl Front - organization to play on popular fear that return Qavam meant also return foreign + organization to play on popular fear that return Qavam meant also return foreign domination Iran.

Admittedly prestige Mosadeq and Kashani had materially declined by time Mosadeq resignation. However, as we have stated in past, successor regime to - Mosadeq which wld not clearly have Natl Front blessing, + Mosadeq which wld not clearly have Natl Front blessing, wld require strong measures to establish itself and to stop political, economic, and social - deterioration of Iran. For first 24 hours it appeared Qavam + deterioration of Iran. For first 24 hours it appeared Qavam wld be able to do this but Front, - quickly realizing he had not received and wld not receive real powers, speedily organized its forces. + quickly realizing he had not received and wld not receive real powers, speedily organized its forces. It proclaimed in series manifestos and political statements country in grave danger of foreign domination thru so-called “traitorous clique” as exemplified by Qavam. Deflated - figures Mosadeq, Kashani and other Natl Front + figures Mosadeq, Kashani and other Natl Front politicians were again inflated in popular mind to dimensions of time of oil nationalization.

Qavam had no organization in - country to beat drums for him. Majlis cld not meet in absence of Front deps and those deps who + country to beat drums for him. Majlis cld not meet in absence of Front deps and those deps who originally voted for Qavam kept silent. Press after first day likewise did not have temerity to give his regime support but adopted wait and see attitude. Papers did not even @@ -17236,25 +14635,19 @@ harbinger of changes for better in Iran.

Popular demonstrations in Tehran and certain other cities were beginning - to have revolutionary flavor. Anti-foreign pro-Mosadeq movement was rapidly assuming - anti-Shah, as well as anti-Qavam, attitude. As day progressed in Tehran there was + to have revolutionary flavor. Anti-foreign pro-Mosadeq movement was rapidly assuming + anti-Shah, as well as anti-Qavam, attitude. As day progressed in Tehran there was increasing tendency crowds to shout anti-Shah slogans. Similar tendency reported in Abadan. This growing opposition to Shah, taking into consideration Shah’s character together with Shah’s refusal to grant Qavam operating powers he - needed to survive, made inevitable resignation of Qavam and accommodation by Shah to + needed to survive, made inevitable resignation of Qavam and accommodation by Shah to wishes Natl Front.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
+
95. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files @@ -17263,27 +14656,18 @@ London, July 21, 1952, 6 p.m. -

382. Weekend developments Iran discussed at length with FonOff today. FonOff’s reports, while less full than +

382. Weekend developments Iran discussed at length with FonOff today. FonOff’s reports, while less full than ours, follow same gen lines. Fol points of interest:

-

1. As wld be expected, FonOff concerned at renewed indications - Shah’s indecision and lack of courage which Middleton attributes to his fear of retaliation against +

1. As wld be expected, FonOff concerned at renewed indications + Shah’s indecision and lack of courage which Middleton attributes to his fear of retaliation against throne in event National Front returns power.

2. Middleton expresses view Qavam may fall unless - US and UK intervene with Shah in effort persuade him back + US and UK intervene with Shah in effort persuade him back Qavam more strongly. - Working levels have drafted instructions to Middleton which have not (rpt not) yet been finally approved, authorizing him in + Working levels have drafted instructions to Middleton which have not (rpt not) yet been finally approved, authorizing him in consultation Henderson discuss - problem with Shah if that course appears desirable. FonOff suggests line Middleton might take is to play on + problem with Shah if that course appears desirable. FonOff suggests line Middleton might take is to play on Shah’s fear by pointing out way to protect himself against NFs retaliation is to support strongly those who want keep it out of power. Middleton @@ -17291,47 +14675,30 @@ of Shah’s fears re Qavam by assuring him categorically there is nothing between Brit and - Qavam which is not (rpt not) known to Shah.An apparent reference to Foreign Office telegram 453 + Qavam which is not (rpt not) known to Shah.An apparent reference to Foreign Office telegram 453 to the British Embassy in Tehran, July 21. In this telegram, the - Foreign Office directed Middleton to assist Henderson in his efforts to persuade the Shah to + Foreign Office directed Middleton to assist Henderson in his efforts to persuade the Shah to support Qavam. The Foreign Office advised that “the best line might be to play on the Shah’s - fears . . . and make him realize that it is by letting Qavam down, not by supporting + fears . . . and make him realize that it is by letting Qavam down, not by supporting him, that he is most likely to bring about his own downfall.” In - addition, “in view of the Shah’s suspicions of Qavam where the throne is + addition, “in view of the Shah’s suspicions of Qavam where the throne is concerned, you may also assure the Shah that we wish to see the best possible relations between H.M. and his Prime Minister and will use all our influence to that end.” (British National Archives, Files of the Oriental Counselor in Tehran, FO 248/1541)

3. Middleton concerned re alarmist BBC broadcasts to area which - play up unrest. He maintains sitn not (rpt not) nearly so bad as broadcasts indicate and that such - reports can only have effect of weakening Qavam + play up unrest. He maintains sitn not (rpt not) nearly so bad as broadcasts indicate and that such + reports can only have effect of weakening Qavam govt in eyes listeners in provinces. He consequently asks FonOff try persuade BBC play reports down for present. BBC has indicated willingness comply best its ability.

-

4. In addition instructions to Middleton re drawing Qavam out on oil negotiations (para 1, Embtel 359, July 19),In telegram 359 from London, July 19, Gifford reported that Makins had informed him that the - Foreign Office had instructed Middleton to discuss with Qavam the methods whereby the - United Kingdom and Iran could resolve the oil dispute. Gifford had also learned that the +

4. In addition instructions to Middleton re drawing Qavam out on oil negotiations (para 1, Embtel 359, July 19),In telegram 359 from London, July 19, Gifford reported that Makins had informed him that the + Foreign Office had instructed Middleton to discuss with Qavam the methods whereby the + United Kingdom and Iran could resolve the oil dispute. Gifford had also learned that the U.K. desired to “maintain flexibility until such time as it might know about Qavam’s intentions.” (National Archives, RG @@ -17340,10 +14707,7 @@ to inform Qavam HMG wld be willing find suitable - opportunity in Parl to make complimentary statement if Qavam thought it wld be helpful. Statement wld probably be tied to indications + opportunity in Parl to make complimentary statement if Qavam thought it wld be helpful. Statement wld probably be tied to indications Qavam’s desire settle oil controversy.

5. FonOff concerned re effect on @@ -17352,29 +14716,22 @@ (rpt no) matter which way court decides.

- Holmes + Holmes
-
- 96. Memorandum for the Record by Secretary of State AchesonSource: Truman +
+ 96. Memorandum for the Record by Secretary of State AchesonSource: Truman Library, Acheson Papers, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 71, July 1952. No classification marking. - Washington, July 21, 1952. + Washington, July 21, 1952.

Meeting with the President

1. The Iranian Situation

I described to the President the crisis which has developed in Iran over the weekend, in which the vacillation of the Shah, his refusal to give Qavam authority to dissolve - the Majlis and restore order has led to various attempts by Qavam to resign to the spreading of + the Majlis and restore order has led to various attempts by Qavam to resign to the spreading of disorder in Tehran, the joining of forces by the National Front and the Tudeh Party—in short the general disintegration of authority in Iran.

@@ -17387,27 +14744,18 @@ which we can extend help.

-
+
97. Position Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South - Asian, and African AffairsSource: National Archives, RG 59, + Asian, and African AffairsSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/7–2252. Secret; Security - Information. Drafted by Ferguson. The paper is attached to a covering - memorandum, July 22, from Byroade, through Matthews, to Acheson. It reads: “There is attached for your - information, in view of the urgency of the situation, an NEA draft of a new position paper on + Information. Drafted by Ferguson. The paper is attached to a covering + memorandum, July 22, from Byroade, through Matthews, to Acheson. It reads: “There is attached for your + information, in view of the urgency of the situation, an NEA draft of a new position paper on Iran. This paper has not been cleared with the appropriate Bureaus of the Department but is being transmitted to you so that you may see without delay the direction our thinking is taking.” - Washington, July 22, 1952. + Washington, July 22, 1952. SUBJECT The Iranian Situation @@ -17441,17 +14789,12 @@ went to the Shah on July 17 to present his new cabinet. In his cabinet list he reserved for himself the Portfolio of Minister of War which would have given him control over Iran’s armed forces, traditionally a - prerogative of the Shah. As was to be expected, the Shah categorically refused Mosadeq’s request. Mosadeq thereupon resigned immediately + prerogative of the Shah. As was to be expected, the Shah categorically refused Mosadeq’s request. Mosadeq thereupon resigned immediately and hoped that the Majlis would, when asked for a vote of inclination, again vote for him since the issue was now one between the Prime Minister and the Shah rather than the Prime Minister and the Parliament. - The Parliament, however, with 33 pro-Mosadeq deputies abstaining, gave its vote of - inclination to former Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam who was accordingly appointed by the Shah.

+ The Parliament, however, with 33 pro-Mosadeq deputies abstaining, gave its vote of + inclination to former Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam who was accordingly appointed by the Shah.

Qavam during the first day of his brief tenure of office proceeded vigorously and with commendable courage. There were a few disorders and the Prime Minister announced @@ -17459,22 +14802,17 @@ announced that he intended reaching an oil agreement with the British. With this announcement the nationalist forces of Prime Minister Mosadeq, agitated by the - fanatical religious leader, Kashani, who appealed to the Army not to obey orders, + fanatical religious leader, Kashani, who appealed to the Army not to obey orders, and other National Front leaders enjoying Parliamentary immunity, began - a campaign of violence against Qavam. If Qavam + a campaign of violence against Qavam. If Qavam had been able to receive authority from the Shah at once to proceed against all disturbing elements, there were indications that he probably could have coped with the situation.

Qavam requested the Shah to dissolve the Parliament and give him full authority to arrest whomever he felt necessary to assure the maintenance of law and order. At this - point the Shah began to hesitate. Long afraid of Qavam’s designs against the dynasty, the Shah was - unquestionably afraid to give him sweeping powers.This sentence was highlighted, apparently by + point the Shah began to hesitate. Long afraid of Qavam’s designs against the dynasty, the Shah was + unquestionably afraid to give him sweeping powers.This sentence was highlighted, apparently by Acheson. He also probably feared nationalist violence against himself personally should he permit Qavam to proceed in a @@ -17486,16 +14824,12 @@ civil war. Qavam, as early as July 19, submitted his resignation to the Shah since he did not have in his opinion sufficient powers to cope with the situation. The Shah - refused to accept the resignation but Qavam, assuming the attitude that he had resigned, + refused to accept the resignation but Qavam, assuming the attitude that he had resigned, remained at his house and did nothing.

On July 21, despite every effort on the part of moderate Iranian elements to persuade the Shah to act and despite the advice of the American - Ambassador and the British Chargé, the Shah refused to give Qavam the powers he sought. Qavam accordingly again submitted his - resignation and this time it was accepted. Qavam had no other course in the final analysis since he + Ambassador and the British Chargé, the Shah refused to give Qavam the powers he sought. Qavam accordingly again submitted his + resignation and this time it was accepted. Qavam had no other course in the final analysis since he had learned that the Shah not only would not give him the requested powers but was intriguing with nationalist elements at the very moment Qavam was asking for these @@ -17504,15 +14838,12 @@

With the resignation of Qavam, the rioting mobs turned into victorious celebrants and it became entirely clear that mob violence had triumphed over law and order. It - was learned that the Shah intended as soon as Qavam resigned to appoint a Prime + was learned that the Shah intended as soon as Qavam resigned to appoint a Prime Minister somewhere between the two camps, one acceptable to both nationalist and moderate elements. However, even if he so intended, before he had a chance to do so the Parliament reconvened and by an - overwhelming vote gave its inclination once again to Dr. Mosadeq. The Shah immediately signed - the royal decree appointing Mosadeq Prime Minister.

+ overwhelming vote gave its inclination once again to Dr. Mosadeq. The Shah immediately signed + the royal decree appointing Mosadeq Prime Minister.

Discussion:

While no predictions can of course be made as to the course that Mosadeq will now follow, @@ -17523,8 +14854,7 @@

2. Mosadeq is clearly in a stronger position now than at any time since the nationalization of Iran’s oil in April 1951. The Hague Court decision that it does not have - jurisdiction in the oil controversy, coinciding with Mosadeq’s return to power, will further + jurisdiction in the oil controversy, coinciding with Mosadeq’s return to power, will further strengthen his position.

3. The Shah has been discredited.

4. The opposition to Mosadeq can @@ -17539,28 +14869,23 @@ be expected that Iran will be able to ease its financial crisis probably until early next year.

The mere association of the Communists with the nationalists in the - rioting should not necessarily be interpreted to mean that Mosadeq will follow a more lenient + rioting should not necessarily be interpreted to mean that Mosadeq will follow a more lenient attitude towards the Communists than he has in the past and, indeed, there were indications during the riots that the responsible nationalist leaders were alarmed at the entry of the Communists into the picture. It - is not believed, therefore, that Mosadeq can be accused at the present moment of softness + is not believed, therefore, that Mosadeq can be accused at the present moment of softness towards alliance with communism.This sentence was highlighted and a question mark placed in the margin, - apparently by Acheson. The course of events during the last few + apparently by Acheson. The course of events during the last few days in Iran demonstrated fairly clearly the force of nationalist feeling in Iran. While it is admittedly true that the mobs were deliberately stirred up by such - unscrupulous persons as Kashani and that there was Communist participation, + unscrupulous persons as Kashani and that there was Communist participation, there can be no question but that deep national feeling was aroused by the appointment of Qavam and his announced intention of dealing with the British. In view of this, it is unlikely that any Iranian leaders can for a long time to come make - any substantial deviation from the Mosadeq policies.

+ any substantial deviation from the Mosadeq policies.

The position of the United States in the wake of these developments is not easy to determine. It is possible that everthing may revert to the status quo ante and that we may be able to continue to deal with @@ -17569,13 +14894,11 @@ feeling that has been stirred up is so great that he will find himself obliged to take further anti-Western measures. A favorite slogan of the rioters of the past few days was that the American military advisers to - Iran must be expelled. Should Dr. Mosadeq find himself obliged as a sop to nationalist + Iran must be expelled. Should Dr. Mosadeq find himself obliged as a sop to nationalist feeling to remove the American Military Missions from the picture, the United States might be forced to change its policies in Iran. There are a number of ways in which he could proceed against our Military Missions - which would call for varying reactions on our part. If Dr. Mosadeq should simply approach our + which would call for varying reactions on our part. If Dr. Mosadeq should simply approach our Ambassador and say that the presence of the two Missions on contract to the Iranian Government (Armish and Genmish) was no longer politically possible and that he would like to @@ -17584,10 +14907,8 @@ circumstances our military aid would continue and the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) would remain in Iran.This sentence was highlighted - and a question mark placed in the margin, apparently by Acheson.

-

On the other hand should Dr. Mosadeq make a dramatic gesture and announce that he was + and a question mark placed in the margin, apparently by Acheson.

+

On the other hand should Dr. Mosadeq make a dramatic gesture and announce that he was “kicking the Americans out” and terminating military aid, it is difficult to see how the United States under the Mutual Security concept could continue any aid to Iran. Should this occur it might be necessary @@ -17599,10 +14920,8 @@ general approach to the Iranian problem. During the course of the past few years, the United States has on a number of occasions at very high levels made public statements regarding its concern for the continued - independence and territorial integrity of Iran. In the case of its military aid and Point Four - Programs, it put great pressure on the Mosadeq Government to accept them, thus giving an + independence and territorial integrity of Iran. In the case of its military aid and Point Four + Programs, it put great pressure on the Mosadeq Government to accept them, thus giving an appearance of great concern to many Iranians. In connection with these aid programs it has been necessary to send a greatly increased number of American officials to Iran. We have repeatedly shown our concern by open @@ -17630,20 +14949,17 @@ technicians for this purpose. The Department has not received any reaction to date from the British as to the recent happenings in Iran but it can be anticipated that there will be no change in the basic - British policy of doing no business with Dr. Mosadeq unless he substantially reverses his well-known + British policy of doing no business with Dr. Mosadeq unless he substantially reverses his well-known policies. The British unquestionably are greatly disappointed over what has happened and may be expected to be very bitter against the Shah. The British have maintained ever since the original accession of Dr. Mosadeq that he could be - replaced by a Prime Minister such as Qavam and that the latter could maintain himself in + replaced by a Prime Minister such as Qavam and that the latter could maintain himself in power relatively easily. This thesis will probably have to be abandoned. It is believed essential therefore that the United States immediately discuss the matter further with the British.

Recommendations:

-

1. That the United States attitude towards the Mosadeq Government be correct but not +

1. That the United States attitude towards the Mosadeq Government be correct but not unduly friendly lest the impression be re-created that he enjoys American support.

2. That if Dr. Mosadeq requests @@ -17669,8 +14985,7 @@ whole range of Iranian problems.

8. That in its informational media and in its official conduct in Iran the United States insofar as may be possible maintain an attitude of - detachment, neither supporting nor opposing the Mosadeq Government.

+ detachment, neither supporting nor opposing the Mosadeq Government.

9. That the United States avoid exhibiting undue public concern over the Iranian situation.

10. That the United States, despite the tactical variations in policy it @@ -17680,42 +14995,32 @@ appear imminent, to alter its policies possibly in a drastic manner to make sure that Iran is not lost.

-
- 98. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 98. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1950–1952, classified general records, Box 29. Secret; Security - Information; Priority. Drafted by Henderson. Repeated to London. The telegram is the + Information; Priority. Drafted by Henderson. Repeated to London. The telegram is the Embassy copy as approved and has no time of transmission. - Tehran, July 24, 1952. -

377. Not for discussion with officials any other govt.

+ Tehran, July 24, 1952. +

377. Not for discussion with officials any other govt.

1. It is still too early to make sober assessment of situation here, to make estimate which wld be of any real - value of effects which events of last week may have upon future of Iran, or to make firm + value of effects which events of last week may have upon future of Iran, or to make firm recommendations re policies which US shld pursue re Iran in light of recent developments.

-

2. Altho situation is depressing we do not believe we shld throw up our hands while Iranians +

2. Altho situation is depressing we do not believe we shld throw up our hands while Iranians rush by in mad and suicidal career like so many million lemmings. Our tentative views are that there shld be - prompt and radical changes in policies of both Brit and ourselves. We do not believe even most sensitive + prompt and radical changes in policies of both Brit and ourselves. We do not believe even most sensitive and suspicious Britishers can say after events of last seven days that US has not supported up to hilt their policies re Iran. They can not charge that failure of these policies was due to lack US cooperation. They might say that plans miscarried because Shah failed them. If Shah shld be given chance to speak he - might insist in his own defense that he cld go no further than he had gone in face of Iranian + might insist in his own defense that he cld go no further than he had gone in face of Iranian public opinion particularly when he had no idea what kind of terms Brit had in mind for oil settlement. In any event in foreseeable future Shah is likely to be @@ -17740,26 +15045,20 @@ into modern effective force. We have as yet little reliable information re developments in provinces. In some of larger cities there appear to have been demonstrations resulting in violence and bloodshed. We know of - no area which at present is not under control of central govt.

+ no area which at present is not under control of central govt.

4. During most frenzied hours of rioting Americans were almost as great - hate target as Qavam, Brit and Shah. Incitations against US and Americans were primarily work of + hate target as Qavam, Brit and Shah. Incitations against US and Americans were primarily work of Tudeh altho certain Natl Front leaders, bitter at what they consider to be our policy of supporting Brit and refusing to give financial aid to Iran, undoubtedly gave certain amount encouragement to anti-Americanism. Natural suspicions of Iranians re foreigners, perhaps justified by centuries of experience, contributed to - cause them to believe various malicious rumors propagated against Americans. Among slogans which + cause them to believe various malicious rumors propagated against Americans. Among slogans which assisted were “American tanks and guns are killing Iranians”. Apparently more sober leaders of Natl Front are beginning to realize that creation anti-American sentiment will not be helpful to their Govt and are attempting to muffle attacks on US.

-

5. We do not as yet know what Mosadeq’s attitude towards US will be now that Natl Front has complete power. He is +

5. We do not as yet know what Mosadeq’s attitude towards US will be now that Natl Front has complete power. He is not likely to be entirely free agent since he must take into consideration views of Natl Front leaders. I have not as yet called on him and I do not consider it wise to do so, unless requested by him, @@ -17768,268 +15067,192 @@ he will never again ask US for financial aid. I doubt therefore that he will make such request during our first interview. My doubt is strengthened by fact that with full financial and - economic power which will now be accorded him, he shld be able print enough bank notes to + economic power which will now be accorded him, he shld be able print enough bank notes to finance Govt for months to come. He - may however ask if after decision Hague Court US - Govt will continue to work with Brit in order prevent Iran from exporting + may however ask if after decision Hague Court US + Govt will continue to work with Brit in order prevent Iran from exporting oil or whether US Govt will take attitude it will not object to purchase and transport of Iranian oil by American nationals. He may even suggest that if US is really - interested in maintenance Iranian independence it shld help Iran to find markets for its + interested in maintenance Iranian independence it shld help Iran to find markets for its oil.

-

6. If Mosadeq’s manner shld be sufficiently friendly to permit +

6. If Mosadeq’s manner shld be sufficiently friendly to permit me to talk with him frankly as I have on a number of occasions in past I might try to convince him that since Natl Front has crushed all opposition and has unchallenged control of country, and since decision - Intnatl Court has removed certain legal obstacles,On July 22, the International Court of Justice + Intnatl Court has removed certain legal obstacles,On July 22, the International Court of Justice supported the claim of the Government of Iran that the Court was without jurisdiction in the Iranian oil nationalization case. he can now afford to approach oil problem in more conciliatory manner. I might point out if I find him in tractable mood that if Iran is to make - real progress internally under his Govt it shld take + real progress internally under his Govt it shld take attitude which will help to remove suspicions and misunderstandings which are adversely affecting close cooperation between Iranians and peoples who are their natural friends. I hope that such approach will have more effect than some of my previous efforts at persuasion.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
+
99. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United KingdomSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files - 1950–1954, 888.2553/7–2652. Secret; Security Information; NIACT. Drafted by Byroade, cleared in draft by - Acheson and Nitze, and approved by Byroade. Repeated to Tehran. - Telegram 585 is also printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. + 1950–1954, 888.2553/7–2652. Secret; Security Information; NIACT. Drafted by Byroade, cleared in draft by + Acheson and Nitze, and approved by Byroade. Repeated to Tehran. + Telegram 585 is also printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 415–416 (Document 188). - Washington, July 26, 1952, + Washington, July 26, 1952, 6:07 p.m.

585. Tehran tels 387 July 25In telegram 387 - from Tehran, July 25, Henderson reported that Middleton had shown him the texts of two telegrams + from Tehran, July 25, Henderson reported that Middleton had shown him the texts of two telegrams he intended to send to London describing his latest conversations - with Mosadeq. Mosadeq had suggested that in + with Mosadeq. Mosadeq had suggested that in return for economic and financial aid, he would accept proposals for - an arbitration of the compensation issue. Henderson emphasized to Middleton his view that the - British Government should not reject this overture of Mosadeq’s without first consulting - with the U.S. Government. He pointed out that Mosadeq’s proposal “represents what + an arbitration of the compensation issue. Henderson emphasized to Middleton his view that the + British Government should not reject this overture of Mosadeq’s without first consulting + with the U.S. Government. He pointed out that Mosadeq’s proposal “represents what might well be the last chance under current conditions in Iran for Brit salvage settlement of oil problem which wld offer prospect compensation and use AIOC as distribution agency for such Iran oil as might be produced.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central - Files 1950–1954, 888.2553/7–2552) and 390 July 26In telegram 390 from Tehran, July 26, Henderson reported on his + Files 1950–1954, 888.2553/7–2552) and 390 July 26In telegram 390 from Tehran, July 26, Henderson reported on his instructions to Embassy staff to refrain from any suggestion that U.S. might take an active role in mediating the oil dispute, particularly as Mosadeq had approached British representatives himself. (Ibid., 888.2553/7–2652) rptd London as 136 and 138 have been - considered here together with texts of two Brit msgs referred to by Henderson which give further details of Mosadeq proposals. Request you inform + considered here together with texts of two Brit msgs referred to by Henderson which give further details of Mosadeq proposals. Request you inform FonOff our views are as fols:

As a result of the events of the last week, it appears to us that Mosadeq is clearly in a stronger position vis-à-vis the Shah, the Majlis and the public now than at any time since the nationalization of Iran oil in Apr 1951. The Hague - Court decision coinciding with Mosadeq’s return to power will further strengthen his + Court decision coinciding with Mosadeq’s return to power will further strengthen his public position. His position with respect to more radical elements - within the National Front, including Kashani, and with the Tudeh may, however, be weaker than + within the National Front, including Kashani, and with the Tudeh may, however, be weaker than before.

It appears that our worst fears as to the weakness of the Shah have been confirmed, that the Shah has been discredited and that it is highly unlikely that any other constructive polit elements will attempt to - exercise power in Iran after what has happened to Qavam and that if they did, it is + exercise power in Iran after what has happened to Qavam and that if they did, it is highly unlikely that they cld succeed. - We therefore believe that if Mosadeq were to lose power, there is far greater risk + We therefore believe that if Mosadeq were to lose power, there is far greater risk that he wld be succeeded by a group further to the Left than by a more constructive group.

Under these circumstances, it appears to us that there are three possible courses of development which we can look forward to in Iran:

(a) The first wld be a settlement of the - oil question somewhat along the lines outlined by Mosadeq in his most recent approach to + oil question somewhat along the lines outlined by Mosadeq in his most recent approach to Middleton;

(b) A gradual breakdown of the boycott on Iran oil shipments with the quantities of oil purchased by independents around the world gradually increasing and with the NIOC gradually obtaining increasing technical assistance from various engineering consulting firms. (While this course of development might eventually - result in Iran being persuaded that it cld neither sell or produce sufficient oil to satisfy its + result in Iran being persuaded that it cld neither sell or produce sufficient oil to satisfy its financial requirements without a long term purchase arrangement with AIOC and without more definite provisions for management and engineering advice, such an eventual outcome wld probably take a long time to develop); and

(c) a continuation of present trends without any easing of the oil - deadlock. It is hard to foresee how this wld end up but it wld + deadlock. It is hard to foresee how this wld end up but it wld appear that the risk of a further trend to the Left and the eventual loss of Iran wld be very great indeed.

-

In the light of this analysis we believe it wld be a great mistake to reject Mosadeq’s overture. It seems to us +

In the light of this analysis we believe it wld be a great mistake to reject Mosadeq’s overture. It seems to us plain that course (a) above is unfortunately the best; that course (c) is quite unacceptable to the West; and therefore that, if course (a) cannot be developed, course (b) becomes almost inevitable in spite of the disadvantages inherent in it.

- Acheson + Acheson
-
+
100. Editorial Note -

In telegram 422 from Tehran, July 28, 1952, Ambassador Henderson reported on his first - meeting with Prime Minister Mosadeq since the latter’s return to power on July 22. +

In telegram 422 from Tehran, July 28, 1952, Ambassador Henderson reported on his first + meeting with Prime Minister Mosadeq since the latter’s return to power on July 22. Describing the conversation as “both exhausting and depressing,” Henderson endeavored to explain to Mosadeq the nature of - the Embassy’s relationship with Qavam during the previous weeks. Henderson denied the charge the United + the Embassy’s relationship with Qavam during the previous weeks. Henderson denied the charge the United States had intervened illegitimately in Iran’s internal affairs. Mosadeq nevertheless concluded from Henderson’s - account that the United States had pressured Qavam to accept British conditions + account that the United States had pressured Qavam to accept British conditions for a solution to the oil dispute, that the United States had shown a - “more friendly attitude to Qavam than it had Mosadeq,” and that the United States “had given + “more friendly attitude to Qavam than it had Mosadeq,” and that the United States “had given encouragement to Qavam by - showing friendliness to him.” Henderson questioned all three conclusions. Mosadeq then engaged in a bitter critique of U.S. foreign policy + showing friendliness to him.” Henderson questioned all three conclusions. Mosadeq then engaged in a bitter critique of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and charged that the United States “in Mid-East was merely agent of Brit.” Telegram 422 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, volume X, Iran 1951–1954, pages 416–421 (Document 189).

-
+
101. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near - Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to Secretary of State AchesonSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 888.2553/7–2952. - Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Byroade. A note indicates + Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to Secretary of State AchesonSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 888.2553/7–2952. + Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Byroade. A note indicates Acheson saw this memorandum. - Washington, July 29, 1952. -

I suggest you read the attached three British messages from Middleton in Tehran. The first one - gives an excellent analysis of the situation and Middleton’s conclusions prior to + Washington, July 29, 1952. +

I suggest you read the attached three British messages from Middleton in Tehran. The first one + gives an excellent analysis of the situation and Middleton’s conclusions prior to withdrawal by Mosadeq of his arbitration offer. The second message describes how that offer was withdrawn, and the third message gives some indication of thinking of - both Henderson and Middleton as to the present + both Henderson and Middleton as to the present situation.The British messages cited by Byroade are not attached - and a note indicates they were returned to GTI on August 6. They were apparently copies of cables + and a note indicates they were returned to GTI on August 6. They were apparently copies of cables sent to London from Tehran provided by the British Government. The first referenced message might correspond to a copy of a telegram from Middleton, no earlier - than July 28, in which Middleton describes Mosadeq’s arbitration offer. (Ibid., GTI Files, Lot 57 D 155, Box 44)See + than July 28, in which Middleton describes Mosadeq’s arbitration offer. (Ibid., GTI Files, Lot 57 D 155, Box 44)See also footnote 2, Document 99. No message describing Mosadeq’s withdrawal of the offer of arbitration was found. In telegram 416 - from Tehran, July 27, Henderson reported some tentative conclusions about - the situation in Iran after consultation with Middleton. Henderson wrote that although he + from Tehran, July 27, Henderson reported some tentative conclusions about + the situation in Iran after consultation with Middleton. Henderson wrote that although he agreed with Middleton that Mosadeq was a - “particularly unsatisfactory person,” a response to Mosadeq’s offer of arbitration + “particularly unsatisfactory person,” a response to Mosadeq’s offer of arbitration should be made in a conciliatory spirit. “Proposal advanced by - Mosadeq to Brit + Mosadeq to Brit Govt as basic step toward oil settlement shld be considered most seriously as possibly last chance for such an arrangement. If it is not accepted as basis for serious conversations and pressed in good - faith, Front extremists may not give Mosadeq another opportunity.” (National Archives, + faith, Front extremists may not give Mosadeq another opportunity.” (National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1950–1952, classified general records, Box 29)

I have agreed with the British that we would send messages from London and Washington today requesting a joint analysis of the new situation by - Middleton and Henderson and their recommendations as - to the course of action to be followed immediately by the US and UK, + Middleton and Henderson and their recommendations as + to the course of action to be followed immediately by the US and UK, including recommendations as to possible alternatives to Mosadeq, method of bringing such a government into power, and the type of encouragement and support that would be necessary in such circumstances.

-

We are considering, in some cases in conjuction with CIA, every possible alternative on our +

We are considering, in some cases in conjuction with CIA, every possible alternative on our part to save Iran. This includes the probable position of the British and ourselves with the local tribes, which could be a big factor in any coup d’état type of action. Another thing still to consider, and in this - probably the British would not agree with us, is whether the US and UK - should take the initiative with Mosadeq in offering him a much simplified settlement of + probably the British would not agree with us, is whether the US and UK + should take the initiative with Mosadeq in offering him a much simplified settlement of the oil issue in return for our immediate assistance.

I am leaving this afternoon for a much overdue appointment with the Doctor (nothing serious). John Jernegan will clear such a cable with @@ -18037,25 +15260,16 @@ necessary with you. I have informed the British that I will call them if such a cable meets with the approval here in the Department.

-
- 102. Minutes of Director of Central Intelligence Smith’s MeetingSource: Central Intelligence Agency, +
+ 102. Minutes of Director of Central Intelligence Smith’s MeetingSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Intelligence, Job 80B01676R, Box 23, Folder 10, Minutes of Deputies’ Meetings. Top Secret; Security - Information. Drafted by Long. - Washington, July 29, 1952. + Information. Drafted by Long. + Washington, July 29, 1952. PRESENT General Smith, Messrs. - Dulles, Wisner, Becker, Hedden, Col. White, + Dulles, Wisner, Becker, Hedden, Col. White, Mr. Long

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Iran.]

@@ -18064,69 +15278,47 @@ Kermit Roosevelt on our efforts to operate in the Qashqai region of Southern Iran, and noted that we were encountering difficulties in getting under way in this - area. The Director mentioned the cable from Amb. Henderson - which reported recent conversations with Mossadeq and expressed the view that the Communist - threat was considerably enhanced by Mossadeq’s present attitude and by the likelihood of a + area. The Director mentioned the cable from Amb. Henderson + which reported recent conversations with Mossadeq and expressed the view that the Communist + threat was considerably enhanced by Mossadeq’s present attitude and by the likelihood of a dramatic anti-western move and that the disturbed mental condition of Mossadeq makes the situation virtually unpredictable.An apparent reference to Henderson’s - first conversation with Mosadeq following the Qavam interlude, as reported in telegram 422 from + first conversation with Mosadeq following the Qavam interlude, as reported in telegram 422 from Tehran, July 28. See Document 100. Reference was also made to a detailed situation analysis by our station in Iran.Not found. The Director expressed the belief that, - failing an attempt to get money from the West, Mossadeq would have no difficulty in - getting what he sought from Russia. He stressed the importance of US-British collaboration on Iran as the key - to our handling of the situation there. Mr. Dulles reported that the NSC paper on Iran is awaiting a State Department + failing an attempt to get money from the West, Mossadeq would have no difficulty in + getting what he sought from Russia. He stressed the importance of US-British collaboration on Iran as the key + to our handling of the situation there. Mr. Dulles reported that the NSC paper on Iran is awaiting a State Department contribution and undertook to discuss developments in Iran with Undersecretary Bruce at luncheon today.

-
- 103. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in IranSource: National Archives, +
+ 103. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in IranSource: National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1950–1952, classified general records, Box 25. Secret; Security - Information; Priority. Drafted by Stutesman; cleared in NEA by Jernegan, in S/P by + Information; Priority. Drafted by Stutesman; cleared in NEA by Jernegan, in S/P by Nitze; and approved by Matthews. Repeated to London. - Washington, July 29, 1952, + Washington, July 29, 1952, 8 p.m.

255. Brit Emb reps called this morning to discuss complicated and ominous Iran situation. We here do not see the - possibility at this time of a more constructive alternative to Mosadeq for the reasons outlined in our + possibility at this time of a more constructive alternative to Mosadeq for the reasons outlined in our 585 July 26.Document - 99. However, in view of Mosadeq’s attitude as expressed in your 423 July 28 we - believe that every possibility should be reexplored.Presumably a reference to telegram 422 from Tehran, + 99. However, in view of Mosadeq’s attitude as expressed in your 423 July 28 we + believe that every possibility should be reexplored.Presumably a reference to telegram 422 from Tehran, July 28; see Document 100. It was - therefore agreed request US-Brit + therefore agreed request US-Brit Emb in Tehran make joint reappraisal situation to include (A) recommendations as to possible joint courses - action by US–UK; (B) possible alternatives to Mosadeq (C) methods bring such + action by US–UK; (B) possible alternatives to Mosadeq (C) methods bring such alternative to power; (D) form encouragement and support which would be necessary.

FYI Brits expressed grave concern re @@ -18135,30 +15327,20 @@ willing capitulate entirely to Irans in oil dispute even though this position might mean loss Iran to West.

- Acheson + Acheson
-
- 104. Minutes of Director of Central Intelligence Smith’s MeetingSource: Central Intelligence Agency, +
+ 104. Minutes of Director of Central Intelligence Smith’s MeetingSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Intelligence, Job 80B01676R, Box 23, Folder 10, Minutes of Deputies’ Meetings. Top Secret; Security - Information. Drafted by Long. - Washington, July 30, 1952. + Information. Drafted by Long. + Washington, July 30, 1952. PRESENT General Smith, Messrs. - Dulles, Wisner, Becker, Hedden, Col. White, + Dulles, Wisner, Becker, Hedden, Col. White, Mr. Long

[Omitted here is discussion of matters unrelated to Iran.]

@@ -18168,10 +15350,8 @@ attitude is a bit too defeatist and that in fact there is some nationalism left in the National Front.Not found. Mr. Becker - observed that in his view Mossadeq, far from being unbalanced, is “crazy like a - fox”. The Director noted that Mossadeq and the National Front are the only + observed that in his view Mossadeq, far from being unbalanced, is “crazy like a + fox”. The Director noted that Mossadeq and the National Front are the only anti-Communist forces left in Iran. In his view, given the lack of a strong military figure around whom a coup might be engineered, the only real chance for forestalling Communist moves lay in a change in dynasty, @@ -18180,33 +15360,24 @@

[Omitted here is discussion of matters unrelated to Iran.]

-
+
105. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Richards) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and - African Affairs (Byroade)Source: National Archives, - RG 59, GTI Files, Lot 57 D 529, Box 40. Top Secret; Security - Information. Drafted by Stutesman. - Washington, July 30, 1952. -

Suggestions Regarding Certain CIA Actions Concerning Iran

+ African Affairs (Byroade)Source: National Archives, + RG 59, GTI Files, Lot 57 D 529, Box 40. Top Secret; Security + Information. Drafted by Stutesman. + Washington, July 30, 1952. +

Suggestions Regarding Certain CIA Actions Concerning Iran

During a conversation between Mr. Kermit Roosevelt, [name not declassified], Mr. Jernegan and officers of GTI, certain - suggestions were made regarding aspects of CIA action to prepare for possible developments in + suggestions were made regarding aspects of CIA action to prepare for possible developments in Iran.

1. In case of chaos or civil war in Iran, the United States might desire to support armed action by “friendly” tribal, army or government - elements. To prepare for such possible action CIA will need to stockpile weapons and ammunition near but + elements. To prepare for such possible action CIA will need to stockpile weapons and ammunition near but not in Iran. In view of the ominous course of events in Iran it seems desirable that such stockpiling be commenced urgently and a policy decision on this matter is desired.

@@ -18216,19 +15387,13 @@ obtained.

-
- 106. Memorandum of Telephone ConversationSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 888.2553/7–3152. Top - Secret: Security Information. Drafted by Byroade. Printed with redactions +
+ 106. Memorandum of Telephone ConversationSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 888.2553/7–3152. Top + Secret: Security Information. Drafted by Byroade. Printed with redactions in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, p. 428 (Document 193). - Washington, July 31, + Washington, July 31, 1952. SUBJECT @@ -18268,35 +15433,24 @@ amount of assistance.

-
- 107. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 107. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, - 788.13/7–3152. Top Secret; Security Information; NIACT. Repeated to London. Received - at 11:55 a.m. Printed with redactions in Foreign + 788.13/7–3152. Top Secret; Security Information; NIACT. Repeated to London. Received + at 11:55 a.m. Printed with redactions in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 427–428 (Document 192). Tehran, July 31, 1952, 2 p.m.

481. I have discussed Deptel 255, - London 648, July 29Document 103. briefly with Middleton. Recommendations requested - in (A) will be subject separate telegram.Reference is to telegram 480 from Tehran, printed in Foreign + London 648, July 29Document 103. briefly with Middleton. Recommendations requested + in (A) will be subject separate telegram.Reference is to telegram 480 from Tehran, printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 425–426 (Document 191).

-

Regarding (B), we were both of opinion that at present it did not (rpt not) seem likely any alternatives to +

Regarding (B), we were both of opinion that at present it did not (rpt not) seem likely any alternatives to Mosadeq could be brought into - power except perhaps by military coup d’état; that we knew of no (rpt no) outstanding military leaders with + power except perhaps by military coup d’état; that we knew of no (rpt no) outstanding military leaders with ability who had strength, standing or intelligence necessary for assuring success of coup d’état, and for governing Iran in case such coup d’état shld be successful; that @@ -18306,14 +15460,11 @@ political views since Zahedi sympathized with moderates of National Front whereas Hedjazi would probably be primarily interested in setting up strong government which - would strengthen hand of Shah and exterminate Communists (US impression of Zahedi is that he has rather weak + would strengthen hand of Shah and exterminate Communists (US impression of Zahedi is that he has rather weak character—British impression seems somewhat more favorable).

Regarding (C) coup d’état, to be successful, would have to be carried out and executed entirely by Iranian military in name of Shah without - knowledge of Shah since Shah would probably not (rpt not) have stamina to see it through + knowledge of Shah since Shah would probably not (rpt not) have stamina to see it through and might at certain stage weaken and denounce leaders; it would probably be necessary for at least commander of army division stationed in Tehran to be fellow conspirator and probably at some point commander @@ -18326,40 +15477,31 @@

Regarding (D) both Middleton and I agreed that neither British nor American Governments should undertake to encourage or support coup - d’état and that our two Embassies should not (rpt not) become involved in any way.

+ d’état and that our two Embassies should not (rpt not) become involved in any way.

We should also bear in mind that successful coup d’état almost certain result in Tudeh gaining control of national movement. Military dictatorship might therefore encounter increasing difficulties in controlling country and in carrying out constructive program.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
+
108. Memorandum From the Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence (Long) to the - Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of + Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Intelligence, Job 80R01731R, Box 33, Folder 1089, DDCI/PSB. Top Secret; Security Information. - Washington, July 31, 1952. + Washington, July 31, 1952.

Upon his return from the PSB luncheon, - the Director asked for you and Mr. Wisner. In your absence he asked me to take notes on his + the Director asked for you and Mr. Wisner. In your absence he asked me to take notes on his remarks and to pass these on to you. As presented here they have the benefit of Mr. Wisner’s recollection and are slightly expanded to include pertinent information known to him.

1. There will be a show down with the British on the Iranian question within 48 hours. The US will go ahead - with a proposal to support Mossadeq on a short-term basis whether or not the + with a proposal to support Mossadeq on a short-term basis whether or not the British come along, on the grounds that there is no other anti-Communist force of any apparent consequence which we could support.

CIA should move forward as rapidly as @@ -18375,19 +15517,14 @@ future developments.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Iran.]

- Robert E. - LongLong initialed above his typed + Robert E. + LongLong initialed above his typed signature.
-
- 109. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, +
+ 109. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, Iran 1951–1953. Top Secret; Security Information. Washington, @@ -18397,16 +15534,12 @@ SUBJECT State Guidance on Emergency Operations in Iran -

1. Mr. Joyce called Messrs. [name not declassified] and [name not declassified] to his office this morning and - subsequently took them to Mr. Jernegan’s office, together with Mr. Krentz, to report +

1. Mr. Joyce called Messrs. [name not declassified] and [name not declassified] to his office this morning and + subsequently took them to Mr. Jernegan’s office, together with Mr. Krentz, to report on a high-level meeting held last evening in the Department. This meeting was attended by the Secretary of State, the Under Secretary, Messrs. Bohlen, Byroade, - Jernegan and Joyce. The meeting decided that:

+ Jernegan and Joyce. The meeting decided that:

a. It is the policy of the Department of State to maintain the present government in Iran so long as this government has the authority to govern, or until it appears certain that the government will be taken @@ -18417,15 +15550,13 @@ government. CIA will report to State the proposed site or sites for stockpiling and receive concurrence therein.

-

c. CIA should be authorized to plan [less than 1 line not declassified] for +

c. CIA should be authorized to plan [less than 1 line not declassified] for unconventional activities in the event of the deterioration or collapse of the non-Communist central government. The thought here was to make plans and external preparations to work with and through the principal tribes, notably the Qashquai and the Bakhtiari, and any other friendly elements which might be available. In response to - CIA’s inquiry, the [less than 1 line not declassified] planning + CIA’s inquiry, the [less than 1 line not declassified] planning should relate only to the possible emergency and not to current unilateral Cold War operations. It is important to note that Mr. Jernegan made it clear that @@ -18437,10 +15568,8 @@ the past but without increased emphasis at this time.

2. Mr. Joyce said that he would like us to assume the responsibility for coordinating with the - Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff the guidance given to us by the Department - of State, reporting any comment in turn to the State Department.[text not + Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff the guidance given to us by the Department + of State, reporting any comment in turn to the State Department.[text not declassified] accordingly met with Generals Magruder and Balmer later that day (July 31). Generals Magruder and Balmer read this memorandum and agreed that discussions [text not @@ -18449,12 +15578,10 @@ the CIA’s charter. On the subject of the procurement of arms for use by tribes in Iran, General Balmer indicated that the JCS had directed - the Department of the Army to provide the CIA “appropriate assistance.” (Memorandum for the + the Department of the Army to provide the CIA “appropriate assistance.” (Memorandum for the record by [name not declassified]; ibid., DDO–IMS Files, Job 80–01795R, - Box 11, Folder 6, Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) History, 11Jul52–31Jul52) + Box 11, Folder 6, Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) History, 11Jul52–31Jul52)

3. Mr. Joyce also said that we should keep the Department of State informed of the progress of our @@ -18465,35 +15592,27 @@ convenient nearby location, for possible use among the tribes if needed.

- [name not - declassified]Printed from + [name not + declassified]Printed from a copy with [name not declassified] typed signature. - + Acting Chief, Division of the Near East and Africa
-
+
110. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to - the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Joyce)Source: + the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Joyce)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, Iran 1951–1953. Top Secret; Security Information. Copies were sent to Generals Magruder and Balmer. - Washington, undated. + Washington, undated. SUBJECT - Joint US–UK Planning on Emergency Operations in Iran + Joint US–UK Planning on Emergency Operations in Iran

1. Following a meeting held in the office of the Secretary of State, the Department of State, on 31 July 1952See @@ -18503,23 +15622,19 @@ collapse of the non-Communist central Government of Iran.

2. This proposal was taken up with the British, and we have been advised - by London that the British Foreign OfficeWisner deleted the word + by London that the British Foreign OfficeWisner deleted the word “Service” following “British” and added “Foreign Office.” feels it is premature to enter into discussions on this subject at this time.At the end of the memorandum is a handwritten note by Wisner that reads: “This memorandum not used—subject matter was fully covered orally with the three addressees at the Senior Consultants - meeting of August 6, 1952. F.G. Wisner.” At the “Senior Consultants meeting”, i.e. a + meeting of August 6, 1952. F.G. Wisner.” At the “Senior Consultants meeting”, i.e. a meeting with representatives from State, Defense, and the Joint - Chiefs, held on August 6, Wisner “recalled that the Representatives had + Chiefs, held on August 6, Wisner “recalled that the Representatives had previously agreed on a service to service approach to the British for the purpose of developing plans for implementation if, as and - when a total crisis situation developed in Iran. Mr. Wisner reported that the approach + when a total crisis situation developed in Iran. Mr. Wisner reported that the approach had been made to SIS and that an answer had been received to the effect that the Foreign Office felt it would be premature to enter into joint planning at this time. @@ -18529,35 +15644,27 @@ or that the British are in the process of developing a change in their current policy toward Iran.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 80–01795R, - Box 11, Folder 7, Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) History + Box 11, Folder 7, Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) History 8Aug52–29Aug52)

- Frank G. - WisnerPrinted from a + Frank G. + WisnerPrinted from a copy that bears Wisner’s typed signature.
-
+
111. Monthly Project Status Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 59–00133R, Box 5, Folder 13, [cryptonym not declassified]. Secret. - Washington, 1952. + Washington, 1952.

[Omitted here are operational details.]

C. REACTION: Political: The political atmosphere and the practical ruling authority of Iran has been in the throes of - upheaval during the last two weeks of this month. Mosadeq’s resignation, Qavam’s appointment, the wholesale - riot in Tehran, the Shah’s inability to take strong action, Qavam’s resignation, and Mossadeq’s re-appointment as Prime + upheaval during the last two weeks of this month. Mosadeq’s resignation, Qavam’s appointment, the wholesale + riot in Tehran, the Shah’s inability to take strong action, Qavam’s resignation, and Mossadeq’s re-appointment as Prime Minister has substantially changed the political picture of Iran. The Tudeh Party, with their advantage gained in joining with the National Front Party during the riots, plus the fact that loosely organized @@ -18565,8 +15672,7 @@ soundly defeated, is ensconced in a position similar to the one held in July 1951. At that time, the Tudeh Party offered a strong threat to the stability of the Government. - Now, if economic chaos forces the failure of the Mossadeq Government and the position of + Now, if economic chaos forces the failure of the Mossadeq Government and the position of the Shah, the Tudeh Party will in all probability be the only organized faction which will be in a position to “coup d’état” into power. Whether the Tudeh Party could maintain a consistent hold on the political ruling @@ -18578,52 +15684,37 @@

[2 paragraphs (27 lines) not declassified]

[Omitted here are operational details.]

-
- 112. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 112. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1950–1952, classified general records, Box 29, Iran—July through - December 1952. Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Melbourne and Henderson. Repeated to London. The + December 1952. Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Melbourne and Henderson. Repeated to London. The telegram is the Embassy copy as approved and has no time of transmission. - Tehran, August 3, 1952. -

514. Estimate Iranian situation follows (Deptel 255 Jul 29):Document + Tehran, August 3, 1952. +

514. Estimate Iranian situation follows (Deptel 255 Jul 29):Document 103.

(1) Natl Front

-

As result Natl Front victory thru return Mosadeq to power, past opponents of Front, such as +

As result Natl Front victory thru return Mosadeq to power, past opponents of Front, such as landowners, Royal Court, moderate clergy and moderate intellectuals, currently unable to resist any policies coalition may propose. Prestige leaders such as Mosadeq and Kashani higher than ever before. Kashani and extremist faction he represents will probably have greater influence in future on - Front policy. On basis unquestioned control of Majlis, Govt can secure needed emergency fin and + Front policy. On basis unquestioned control of Majlis, Govt can secure needed emergency fin and econ powers which will permit it to find funds needed by state admin for number mos to come.

-

Natl Front succeeded in overcoming Qavam because among reasons: A) Qavam had no organization with which +

Natl Front succeeded in overcoming Qavam because among reasons: A) Qavam had no organization with which to oppose on streets well-organized and disciplined groups of Tudeh and Natl Front, which were terrorizing city, except police and Army, and Shah wld not per-mit these law - enforcement agencies to go all out to maintain order. B) Qavam had no agitators to harangue population and, + enforcement agencies to go all out to maintain order. B) Qavam had no agitators to harangue population and, except for use limited facilities Radio Tehran, had no means of spreading propaganda favorable to his cause. Opponents in control of street terrorized any newspaper or person who might be suspected of - favoring him. Natl Front had public leaders like Kashani, who used press, mosques, - Parliament bldg, and loud speakers to agitate against Govt. C) Natl Front leaders had rec’d + favoring him. Natl Front had public leaders like Kashani, who used press, mosques, + Parliament bldg, and loud speakers to agitate against Govt. C) Natl Front leaders had rec’d assurances from Shah he wld not permit law enforcement agencies to be used against them; they had well-organized plans for stirring up population; they were confident of @@ -18642,23 +15733,17 @@ and periodically unstable. His decisions are not accepted passively by other leaders. Frequently, in order maintain unity he is obliged against his own wishes or judgment to yield to pressures other leaders’ - coalition, particularly Kashani. Kashani not fully satisfied with his present already + coalition, particularly Kashani. Kashani not fully satisfied with his present already powerful position and is clearly trying undermine influence other rival leaders and make himself complete master of Natl Front and Iran. In his efforts strengthen his own organization he accepts in it Communist activists, confident he can handle them. It looks as tho he intends - eventually effect replacement of Mosadeq, whom he finds too popular and at same time - stubborn, with more pliable, less appealing PriMin such as Dep PriMin Kazemi. Maki, + eventually effect replacement of Mosadeq, whom he finds too popular and at same time + stubborn, with more pliable, less appealing PriMin such as Dep PriMin Kazemi. Maki, altho personally popular, has no organization of street fighters except possibly in Abadan. Bagai has effective group street fighters within his Workers Party but lacks intelligence and popular appeal. Iran Party is - Tudeh infiltrated. Some its most influential mbrs favorable toward and cooperating with Tudeh. In case + Tudeh infiltrated. Some its most influential mbrs favorable toward and cooperating with Tudeh. In case circumstances shld make it appear momentarily advantageous to them, right and left extremists of Front wld probably not hesitate to force @@ -18675,9 +15760,7 @@

For immediate future Shah virtual prisoner of Natl Front. His public prestige seriously lowered as result indecisiveness he displayed during recent turbulent period. Control armed forces, which have been source - his authority, being transferred to Natl Front thru Mosadeq as Min Natl Defense. Altho for time Front may need Shah as + his authority, being transferred to Natl Front thru Mosadeq as Min Natl Defense. Altho for time Front may need Shah as symbol, it not impossible that as extremists gain further control Front he will be discarded. Shah does still have certain symbolic standing with public thruout country and Army. For this reason elimination of @@ -18685,19 +15768,15 @@

(3) The Armed Forces

Discipline and morale lower echelons armed forces thruout country not known but not believed greatly impaired. Recent events created - uncertainties in higher levels, which do not know what Mosadeq, who has never been friendly to + uncertainties in higher levels, which do not know what Mosadeq, who has never been friendly to Army, will do. There still considerable sentiment among general officers that only Shah can prevent Army from becoming prey to politicians. Altho possibility mil coup may not be - completely dismissed, it not likely. No mil leaders in sight possessing necessary organizational + completely dismissed, it not likely. No mil leaders in sight possessing necessary organizational ability, intelligence and strength. Coup by Army and later accretion - public support might require tacit assent of Shah, who wld probably take fright at very idea of + public support might require tacit assent of Shah, who wld probably take fright at very idea of coup. Both Natl Front and Tudeh are concerned about Army as source - potential trouble to them. Mosadeq taking steps place his adherents in key + potential trouble to them. Mosadeq taking steps place his adherents in key positions, such as Chief of Staff, Chief of Gendarmérie, and Chief of Police. He intends on grounds economy reduce Army in size, eliminate many genl officers and select for key positions younger men who will @@ -18715,13 +15794,9 @@ and armed forces. Party believed fully prepared exploit Natl Front future difficulties, hesitancies and future dissensions.

Tudeh activists, with their superior training, were important factor - during recent street demonstrations against Qavam. It is not believed, however, - Tudeh was prepared at that time to make bid for power. It wld appear Tudeh preferred strengthen - itself, weaken authority security forces, and further penetrate natl movement before openly challenging Natl Front. Tudeh + during recent street demonstrations against Qavam. It is not believed, however, + Tudeh was prepared at that time to make bid for power. It wld appear Tudeh preferred strengthen + itself, weaken authority security forces, and further penetrate natl movement before openly challenging Natl Front. Tudeh probably wld be reluctant try take over until it convinced that risks wld be small. It will not desire take action which might lead to destruction of @@ -18732,29 +15807,21 @@ seize power even tho it incurs risks in so doing. Tudeh of course acting under instructions Moscow which undoubtedly takes world as well as Iranian situation into consideration when issuing orders.

-

(5) Possible developments provided no changes in US and UK policies re Iran

-

Most Natl Front leaders are coming to opinion US is supporting basic UK +

(5) Possible developments provided no changes in US and UK policies re Iran

+

Most Natl Front leaders are coming to opinion US is supporting basic UK policies re Iran. US judge’s vote for Brit position at Hague Court and - willingness US to deal with Qavam have strengthened this view. As + willingness US to deal with Qavam have strengthened this view. As Front encounters increased difficulties in carrying out its econ and social policies there will be increased tendencies to blame West, particularly US, for all of Iran’s ills. Tudeh will of course do its utmost to exploit anti-Western prejudices - and disappointment of Iranians at failure US to render financial or massive econ aid. Mosadeq may at any time request + and disappointment of Iranians at failure US to render financial or massive econ aid. Mosadeq may at any time request withdrawal of US mil missions. As resentment against US increases there may be - progressive harassment of Pt 4 activities. If mil missions depart Tudeh will probably turn more attention - to Pt 4. There will be tendency to take measures against US institutions and natls similar to those + progressive harassment of Pt 4 activities. If mil missions depart Tudeh will probably turn more attention + to Pt 4. There will be tendency to take measures against US institutions and natls similar to those already taken against Brits. As agitation against West increases Iranians with Western background and sympathies will be compelled to hide their real feelings or be gradually eliminated from public life. @@ -18766,145 +15833,104 @@ pressures. It is more likely, however, this realization would come too late.

(6) Possible developments provided there certain - changes in US and UK policies re Iran

-

It is possible that certain changes in policies on part US and UK + changes in US and UK policies re Iran

+

It is possible that certain changes in policies on part US and UK might result in reversal of trend of events in Iran. Such changes might include (a) decision on part UK to come oil settlement on basis which wld be acceptable not only to Iran Govt but - to Iranian people; (b) decision on part US to extend fin aid to Iran to tide it over present crisis + to Iranian people; (b) decision on part US to extend fin aid to Iran to tide it over present crisis and also to accord significant aid for economic development. It may be however that such shifts in policies will not be successful in saving Iran. Antagonism toward West tinged with jealousy is so deep among articulate natl and religious extremists that most conciliatory and friendly gestures on part West may - not be able to prevent Iran from proceeding along its suicidal course. Furthermore, even if, as result - of future developments, including shifts in policies of UK and US, + not be able to prevent Iran from proceeding along its suicidal course. Furthermore, even if, as result + of future developments, including shifts in policies of UK and US, Mosadeq shld personally become convinced that energies shld be concentrated on saving country from internatl communism rather than on attacks upon West, there no guarantee that he might not at any time become - incapacitated by illness or assassination. Elimination Mosadeq likely result in struggle for - power among various elements of Front which wld give Tudeh chance further to strengthen self at Front’s + incapacitated by illness or assassination. Elimination Mosadeq likely result in struggle for + power among various elements of Front which wld give Tudeh chance further to strengthen self at Front’s expense.

-

(7) Copy of above has been given to Brit +

(7) Copy of above has been given to Brit Emb which in general agreement altho Middleton says there may be certain minor differences of emphasis.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
- 113. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 113. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1950–1952, classified general records, Box 25. Secret; Security - Information. Drafted by Henderson. The telegram is the Embassy copy as + Information. Drafted by Henderson. The telegram is the Embassy copy as approved and has no time of transmission. - Tehran, August 11, 1952. -

614. No distribution personal for Byroade - NEA and Richards + Tehran, August 11, 1952. +

614. No distribution personal for Byroade + NEA and Richards GTI.

-

1. It will be recalled that shortly after collapse Qavam +

1. It will be recalled that shortly after collapse Qavam Govt Kashani sent message to me alleging that he had proof that Brit - and Shah had agreed to bring Qavam into power and that American Govt had subsequently approved plan and + and Shah had agreed to bring Qavam into power and that American Govt had subsequently approved plan and that I sent message to Kashani denying that US was involved in any way in accession of Qavam to power. Kashani sent back reply - that despite my statements he knew that Brit and American Embassies and Shah had conspired to make + that despite my statements he knew that Brit and American Embassies and Shah had conspired to make Qavam PriMin. In discussing this matter with Ala I told latter that if Mosadeq and other members of Govt - shld choose to believe Kashani rather than myself I saw no - alternative other than for me to tell my Govt that it wld be preferable for it to recall me. + shld choose to believe Kashani rather than myself I saw no + alternative other than for me to tell my Govt that it wld be preferable for it to recall me. Ala, considerably disturbed, - without my authority repeated what I had said to Mosadeq and Mosadeq sent back message thru Ala that in no circumstances shld I become discouraged and ask for my + without my authority repeated what I had said to Mosadeq and Mosadeq sent back message thru Ala that in no circumstances shld I become discouraged and ask for my recall.

2. Whether above is basis for stories which are now circulating that (a) - I have asked to be withdrawn from Iran and (b) Iranian Govt has asked for my recall, I do not - know. Polowetzky of AP told Melbourne this morning that stories - this kind were in circulation and if they shld appear even in irresponsible Iranian press, he wld have no choice other than to report + I have asked to be withdrawn from Iran and (b) Iranian Govt has asked for my recall, I do not + know. Polowetzky of AP told Melbourne this morning that stories + this kind were in circulation and if they shld appear even in irresponsible Iranian press, he wld have no choice other than to report them. He asked Melbourne if Embassy cld give him something to use in story in case he shld write one. I authorized Melbourne to tell - Polowetzky that relations between members Govt and myself were cordial and on basis of mutual + Polowetzky that relations between members Govt and myself were cordial and on basis of mutual confidence and that I had not suggested that Washington recall me.

-

It is difficult for me to believe that Mosadeq has asked for my recall unless he is under great +

It is difficult for me to believe that Mosadeq has asked for my recall unless he is under great pressure from extreme elements cooperating with Tudeh. My popularity with Internatl Communism has been low during last ten years and Internatl Communism wld probably regard my recall as even more noteworthy victory in prevailing circumstances than recall of mil missions. I do not know whether American correspondents here will report these stories and - if so whether they will have wide circulation. I leave to Dept decision in case stories are + if so whether they will have wide circulation. I leave to Dept decision in case stories are published as to whether or not it shld issue denial. Iranian Govt in its present confusion not likely deny anything.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
- 114. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 114. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/8–1252. Secret; Security Information. Received at 1:43 p.m. - Tehran, August 12, + Tehran, August 12, 1952, 1 p.m.

636. Joint Emb, CAS and Service Atts estimate recent Tudeh activities fols:

-

After disturbances attendant on Qavam Premiership, Tudeh attempted capitalize on and +

After disturbances attendant on Qavam Premiership, Tudeh attempted capitalize on and inflate its role in events and strove unsuccessfully consolidate - informal working arrangement reached with NF during crisis. Once Mosadeq returned to power Front leaders repudiated tacit + informal working arrangement reached with NF during crisis. Once Mosadeq returned to power Front leaders repudiated tacit understanding and minimized Tudeh role in demonstrations. Altho Tudeh not (rpt not) able form open partnership with NF, it emerged from @@ -18914,39 +15940,24 @@ Seriously weakening opposition forces such as conservative “old guard,” Shah and Army; (3) Partial success in diverting popular emotions against US.

-

Tudeh also being aided by dissensions which have developed in NF leadership. It believed thru influence - Iran party on Mosadeq that PM made fol cabinet appointments: (1) Abdol +

Tudeh also being aided by dissensions which have developed in NF leadership. It believed thru influence + Iran party on Mosadeq that PM made fol cabinet appointments: (1) Abdol Ali Lotfi as Min Justice. He prominent leader “Society For Combatting Illiteracy” and “Society For Combatting - Imperialists”, both Tudeh–Front orgs. (2) Mehdiwazar, Min Health. His brother deserted Iran Army + Imperialists”, both Tudeh–Front orgs. (2) Mehdiwazar, Min Health. His brother deserted Iran Army to join Pishevari and now (rpt now) in - USSR. Azar brought to Min 3 men incl under secy who served under - Tudeh leader Keshavarz in Qavam’s 1946 cabinet. (3) Farman-Farmayan, acting Min Health, who noted for strong leftist - tendencies. Composition Cabinet increased Mosadeq’s estrangement from Kashani, Maki and Baqai + USSR. Azar brought to Min 3 men incl under secy who served under + Tudeh leader Keshavarz in Qavam’s 1946 cabinet. (3) Farman-Farmayan, acting Min Health, who noted for strong leftist + tendencies. Composition Cabinet increased Mosadeq’s estrangement from Kashani, Maki and Baqai which in turn may induce him depend further on Iran party. Certain leaders this party not (rpt not) adverse to collaboration with Tudeh. Hence such development likely facilitate Tudeh penetration govt.

Chief Staff Air Force Gen General - Guilanshah informed Air Att fol re conv with Mosadeq Aug 9. Guilanshah inquire whether he should - continue his anti-Tudeh campaign within Air Force. Mosadeq replied he did not (rpt not) wish anti-Tudeh measures - intensified or slowed down since wished avoid any indication his govt leaning toward either West powers or - USSR. Guilanshah believes order will in effect curtail action + Guilanshah informed Air Att fol re conv with Mosadeq Aug 9. Guilanshah inquire whether he should + continue his anti-Tudeh campaign within Air Force. Mosadeq replied he did not (rpt not) wish anti-Tudeh measures + intensified or slowed down since wished avoid any indication his govt leaning toward either West powers or + USSR. Guilanshah believes order will in effect curtail action against Tudeh elements in Air Force.

Cons Meshed and Tabriz report Tudeh attempted small mtgs Aug 5 on occasion Constitution Day which easily @@ -18959,50 +15970,36 @@ left-wing faction in govt depts, principally Min Education.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
+
115. Memorandum From the Director of the U.S. Technical Cooperation - Administration Mission in Iran (Warne) to the Ambassador to Iran (Henderson)Source: National Archives, RG 469, Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies + Administration Mission in Iran (Warne) to the Ambassador to Iran (Henderson)Source: National Archives, RG 469, Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies 1948–1961, Mission to Iran, Executive Office Subject Files (Central Files) 1951–1961, Box 6, Folder 7, Travel Development—Political 1952. Confidential. - Tehran, August 12, 1952. + Tehran, August 12, 1952.

My visit with Seyed Abdol Ayatollah Kashani

At his request brought to me by one of his sons and after discussing the matter with you, I went to a home in Shimron at 11 a.m. on August 11 to meet Ayatollah Kashani. Present at most of the conference also was Mr. Shams Ghanat-Abadi, a - mullah, reported son-in-law, and close follower of Kashani, who is a deputy from - Shahrod, and two sons of Kashani, one a mullah named Khashanizahed Kashani, and the other named Mostafa + mullah, reported son-in-law, and close follower of Kashani, who is a deputy from + Shahrod, and two sons of Kashani, one a mullah named Khashanizahed Kashani, and the other named Mostafa Kashani.

-

After waiting some 30 minutes while Kashani completed a conference with mullahs in another +

After waiting some 30 minutes while Kashani completed a conference with mullahs in another room, I was joined by Ayatollah Kashani. He appeared most interested in our conference; to the point indeed of keeping me there past 1 o’clock, which is his lunch time, through luncheon, and until his siesta period at 2 p.m. The conference, of course, was slower than those we might hold where only one language is spoken because of the necessity of translating carefully - everything that was said. I was accompanied by Mr. Ardeshir Zahedi, of Point 4, who acted + everything that was said. I was accompanied by Mr. Ardeshir Zahedi, of Point 4, who acted as interpreter for the conference.

-

At the outset, I congratulated Kashani on his election as President of the Majlis. I +

At the outset, I congratulated Kashani on his election as President of the Majlis. I said this was a great honor but also a great responsibility in these times. He replied that he considered it as a very small matter since long before he had been spiritual leader of most of the Middle East. I @@ -19013,21 +16010,16 @@ position as spiritual leader gave him great power as the events of last month had clearly shown. He said he would give his life for his country and was motivated only by its best interests. He said when Great Britain - and the United States brought in Qavam as Prime Minister his displeasure was based on the + and the United States brought in Qavam as Prime Minister his displeasure was based on the fact that it was not in the interests of Iran and his displeasure was - reflected in the demonstrations that overthrew Qavam. He said some people thought + reflected in the demonstrations that overthrew Qavam. He said some people thought the communists had joined him but he assured me that he was even more against the communists.

Kashani said long ago he was visited by a Mr. Dooher who - asked his help in bringing Razmara to power. He said he told Mr. Dooher the United States would be - making a mistake to bring Razmara forward and this had proved to be so. He said + asked his help in bringing Razmara to power. He said he told Mr. Dooher the United States would be + making a mistake to bring Razmara forward and this had proved to be so. He said that 20 days before Qavam came in he had evidence of Anglo-American joint action to that end and that such action had been a mistake, too.

@@ -19039,8 +16031,7 @@ said, however, if he wanted to discuss political and diplomatic questions they should be brought up with you, the United States Ambassador, and these were not my field of responsibility.

-

When this was translated to Kashani, he dropped the subject (a little to my +

When this was translated to Kashani, he dropped the subject (a little to my surprise) and political matters were not again discussed. The conference turned completely to a discussion of the Point 4 program and plans for the economic development of Iran. Several things stand out as very @@ -19072,8 +16063,7 @@ the work of the Bureau of Reclamation of the United States, in which I had served for many years, and as a result of a fairly good reconnaissance of the Karun River made earlier this year, I thought 200 - to 250 million dollars would be required to develop a satisfactory project on the Karun + to 250 million dollars would be required to develop a satisfactory project on the Karun involving storage of water, generation of electric power, irrigation by pumps and by direct diversion, and the possibility of navigation on the lower river and through large canals to Bandarshapur. He appeared amazed @@ -19112,15 +16102,13 @@ development they hoped I would write. I said I had been reporting the needs of the country and would try to continue to do so.

Throughout the conference reference to communist activities and the - threat of communism were made by Mr. Kashani and Mr. Ghanat-Abadi. They always spoke of the + threat of communism were made by Mr. Kashani and Mr. Ghanat-Abadi. They always spoke of the communist activities as something deleterious to the country and antagonistic to their positions.

At one point Ayatollah Kashani said the misery of the people alone could turn them away from their faith and to communism. He said he did not fear his ability to rally the - people to patriotic action unless the people became more desperately hungry when he + people to patriotic action unless the people became more desperately hungry when he feared they would turn to communism. The notes of my interpreter at this point contain “Mr. Kashani added that communism was the worst enemy of Iran and that to stop @@ -19158,8 +16146,7 @@ couple of wells to serve these people since they were needy and their lot was indeed hard. He thought that might keep them from desperate actions.

-

Near the close of the conference, Mr. Kashani said he appreciated the efforts of Point 4 to +

Near the close of the conference, Mr. Kashani said he appreciated the efforts of Point 4 to assist Iran but he wanted me to inform my countrymen of the conditions and needs of this country. He expressed his hope for the success of this American mission “Inshallah”—God willing.

@@ -19167,8 +16154,7 @@ up a matter or two with me. He said that some people had come to him and attacked Point 4 on the grounds that we did all our trucking business with Levant Express which was run by Armenians. He said that he did not - mean that we should avoid Armenians because of religious differences with the Moslems but + mean that we should avoid Armenians because of religious differences with the Moslems but that we should take into consideration that as a minority group they have for centuries acted as spies against the country and they welcomed the Russians with wreaths and they welcomed the British with wreaths. He @@ -19191,25 +16177,19 @@ Javadeyeh, which is close to the railroad station south of Tehran, for drinking water.

- William E. - WarnePrinted from a copy + William E. + WarnePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature with an indication that Warne signed the original.
-
- 116. Memorandum of Conversation Between Max Thornburg and the Director of the Psychological - Strategy Board (Allen)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, +
+ 116. Memorandum of Conversation Between Max Thornburg and the Director of the Psychological + Strategy Board (Allen)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Intelligence, Job 80R01731R, Box 12, - Folder 526, Middle East. Drafted by Thornburg. No classification marking. - Washington, August 20, + Folder 526, Middle East. Drafted by Thornburg. No classification marking. + Washington, August 20, 1952.

By appointment I met Ray Allen and two of his staff, later joined by Ned Bayne. We met at 3:30 P.M. I left @@ -19251,8 +16231,7 @@ analysis of a particular case we can’t always distinguish between aspects which are peculiar to it and those which are deeper and more general.

-

I then outlined the pattern of my own reasoning about the ME and the special cases presented by the +

I then outlined the pattern of my own reasoning about the ME and the special cases presented by the several countries. (This is described in detail in other memos and will not be repeated here except in bare outline.)

The problem can be entered at any one of several points, but since it has @@ -19265,15 +16244,13 @@

This rebellion is essentially a reaction, hence psychological, emotional and unreasoning.

This mass condition places a powerful instrument i.e. mass power of - hundreds of millions of people, say 100 million in the ME, 18 million in Persia, etc. in the hands + hundreds of millions of people, say 100 million in the ME, 18 million in Persia, etc. in the hands of rabble rousing leaders, either Communist or other extremists, which they can subvert or overthrow governments, block betterment programs, assassinate leaders, drive out foreigners, etc.

As long as this psychological climate remains hostile to us and to our (or other) constructive efforts, our aid programs which are based upon - the assumption that behaviour is determined by reason, will continue to fail.

+ the assumption that behaviour is determined by reason, will continue to fail.

Our first objective, therefore, must be to change this psychological climate, as far as possible—and as quickly as possible—replacing distrust with confidence, hostility with friendliness, despair with @@ -19305,16 +16282,14 @@ activities to indicate new interest in popular welfare, such as local councils, tax relief, formation of local cooperatives etc.

-

Generally speaking each village (or other social group) need get only one of the foregoing evidences to begin with, but +

Generally speaking each village (or other social group) need get only one of the foregoing evidences to begin with, but through the propaganda program and by the normal spread of news (rapid in these countries) must know that other villages (groups) are getting other kinds of benefits which, in due course, will come to it also.

The requirement that this program be widespread throughout the country (and region), touching a majority of the villages or other groups during 1953 (there are about 40,000 villages in Persia - alone), discloses at once that the program must be executed through institutions which are capable of reaching vast + alone), discloses at once that the program must be executed through institutions which are capable of reaching vast numbers of people. (i.e. this is not to be confused with a Near East Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation type of endeavour, nor is it “demonstration” projects, which @@ -19365,8 +16340,7 @@ point applies to Persia, equally with the others.

In Persia, which is the most critical case facing us now, the unreasoning reaction of the “masses” against past oppressions and misery has been - whipped up by (a) Mossedegh’s Nationalists, (b) Kashani’s religious fanatics, and + whipped up by (a) Mossedegh’s Nationalists, (b) Kashani’s religious fanatics, and (c) Tudeh Party Communists—each leader with a different ultimate objective in mind—to a state of virtual anarchy.

Both the Right (Kashani) and @@ -19383,10 +16357,8 @@ desire on his own part for the kinds of reforms which we believe are needed in his country. He lacks personal strength and resolution, which, fortunately, is the one deficiency which we can help make up.

-

Twice we have refused to support the Shah, once with Razmara (despite the Shah’s urgent - appeal to Washington) and once with Qavam. We will have one more chance, presumably, when +

Twice we have refused to support the Shah, once with Razmara (despite the Shah’s urgent + appeal to Washington) and once with Qavam. We will have one more chance, presumably, when Mossedegh goes, if we can make up our minds in time and reach the necessary understandings with the British (essential) and with the Shah.

@@ -19396,24 +16368,18 @@ the same route as Persia. We are doing nothing to stop it now.

-
- 117. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans (Wisner) to Director of Central - Intelligence SmithSource: Central Intelligence Agency, +
+ 117. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans (Wisner) to Director of Central + Intelligence SmithSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11 Folder 14, Iran 1951–1953. Secret; Security Information. Noted by the DCI on August 27. - Washington, August 20, 1952. + Washington, August 20, 1952. SUBJECT Plan for Arming Iranian Tribal Groups -

1. Pursuant to your instructions of two weeks ago,See footnote 2, Document +

1. Pursuant to your instructions of two weeks ago,See footnote 2, Document 109. the attached plan for arming Iranian tribal groups has been developed by the Near East Division with the assistance of other appropriate elements of the Agency. This is an emergency plan @@ -19438,8 +16404,7 @@ plan should be developed. The only reply which we have received as yet is to the effect that the Foreign Office considers that it is “premature” for the British Service to engage in any joint planning - effort with us.See Document 110. We are still uncertain as to the + effort with us.See Document 110. We are still uncertain as to the underlying significance of this position of the British Foreign Office, but the fact remains that we are presently unable to coordinate our planning with any plans which the British Service may have in being or @@ -19467,23 +16432,19 @@ Department of the Army, on 30 July 1952.Not further identified.

3. Memorandum for the Record by DCNEA/O, Subject: “State Guidance on - Emergency Operations in Iran”, dated 31 July 1952.Document 109.

+ Emergency Operations in Iran”, dated 31 July 1952.Document 109.

4. Further oral instructions by DD/P to DCNEA/O on 31 July 1952.

5. Memorandum for the Record by DCNEA/O, Subject: “Meeting with General Balmer and General Magruder on Emergency Operations in Iran”, dated 31 - July 1952.See footnote 2, Document 109.

+ July 1952.See footnote 2, Document 109.

6. Iran Country Plan—Part II, Cold War, Annex D, Guerrilla Warfare - Program, particularly the objective, which is to “Develop guerrilla warfare organizations and + Program, particularly the objective, which is to “Develop guerrilla warfare organizations and resources for activation in support of United States political and military aims”.Apparent reference to Annex D to the Iran Country Plan as of June 10, 1952. The “Country Plan for Iran” is undated, but in its final form probably dates from late December 1951. Drafted in the Office of Policy Coordination in the - Directorate of Plans, a Country Plan aimed to describe OPC objectives and activities within a + Directorate of Plans, a Country Plan aimed to describe OPC objectives and activities within a given country. The introductory remarks of “Operational Annex D” established the need for the United States Government to prepare for the contingency in which Communists might take control of the @@ -19497,8 +16458,7 @@ provide such assistance since it was rapidly becoming the only Western country capable to doing so. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 80–01795R, - Box 8, Folder 2, Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) History + Box 8, Folder 2, Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) History 21Dec51–27Dec51)

7. The following restrictions on the scope of this plan are imposed by the Department of State in the above referenced Memorandum for the @@ -19556,30 +16516,21 @@ alliance against a Communist central government.

II. Mission

To make preparations for combating, by paramilitary methods, the efforts - of Communist elements to seize control in Iran.In a covering note, Helms wrote: “Meeting with Director was held 28 + of Communist elements to seize control in Iran.In a covering note, Helms wrote: “Meeting with Director was held 28 August 1952 at which time he approved this plan. He gave certain oral instructions with regard to the arms to be acquired. The - program is now being implemented by the NE Division.”

+ program is now being implemented by the NE Division.”

[Omitted here are 25 pages of operational details of the plan.]

-
+
118. Memorandum Prepared by Max - ThornburgSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of + ThornburgSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Intelligence, Job 80B01676R, Box 41, Folder 20, Shah of Iran Operations. Confidential. The memorandum is attached to a letter from Dulles to Bruce, - September 3, which is itself attached to a memorandum from Dulles to Roosevelt, also September 3. In his - letter to Bruce, Dulles commented about Thornburg’s memorandum: “I would point out that the + September 3, which is itself attached to a memorandum from Dulles to Roosevelt, also September 3. In his + letter to Bruce, Dulles commented about Thornburg’s memorandum: “I would point out that the memorandum of 22 August 1952 and very possibly the section on Iran in his memorandum enclosed with his letter of 28 August were prepared before he had information regarding the latest developments @@ -19589,11 +16540,9 @@ Smith, Dulles reported “that (1) Max Thornburg, an expert on Iran, was in the city and he expected to seem him today; (2) he - would furnish a report of his conversation with Thornburg to the Director; (3) + would furnish a report of his conversation with Thornburg to the Director; (3) Thornburg had submitted a - plan for Iran which has been sent to NE for study.” (Ibid., Folder 10, Minutes of Deputies’ + plan for Iran which has been sent to NE for study.” (Ibid., Folder 10, Minutes of Deputies’ Meetings) August 22, 1952. @@ -19628,24 +16577,16 @@

What would the Shah have to do?

The Shah’s basic program probably still remains what was outlined in our - Embassy’s dispatch of 21 June, 1952,Presumably a reference to telegram 1168 from Tehran, June 21, 1950, - describing Prime Minister Razmara’s reform program. Richards, Counselor of Embassy, + Embassy’s dispatch of 21 June, 1952,Presumably a reference to telegram 1168 from Tehran, June 21, 1950, + describing Prime Minister Razmara’s reform program. Richards, Counselor of Embassy, commented favorably and wrote that “the achievement of stability in - Iran with restoration faith in Government would be in US interests and is essential if our + Iran with restoration faith in Government would be in US interests and is essential if our military and economic aid is to be effective.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, - 788.00/6–2150) In a memorandum to Jernegan on September 10, 1952, Richards wrote that the Razmara program “was idealistic + 788.00/6–2150) In a memorandum to Jernegan on September 10, 1952, Richards wrote that the Razmara program “was idealistic and was proved to be utterly impracticable. There has even been suspicion that Razmara, who - could play the game of intrigue as well as Thornburg or better, deliberately + could play the game of intrigue as well as Thornburg or better, deliberately allowed this Utopian plan to be created in order to impress the Americans that he was a good man to support.” In connection with Thornburg’s proposals of @@ -19657,8 +16598,7 @@ would probably appear again in any similar situation.” (Ibid., 788.00/9–1052) which outlined his situation and intentions as of that date, based upon personal discussions between members of the - Embassy (and myself) and both the Shah and General Razmara (immediately before he became + Embassy (and myself) and both the Shah and General Razmara (immediately before he became Prime Minister).

The significant change since then is that Mossedegh is now Prime Minister, which introduces an unpredictable factor at the outset of any @@ -19685,8 +16625,7 @@ conditions which we cannot be sure of and which the Shah himself might best appraise, Mossedegh’s own decision or willingness to collaborate with the Shah to save himself - and whatever he stands for, from Kashani and the Tudeh forces.

+ and whatever he stands for, from Kashani and the Tudeh forces.

In any event the decision as to whether Mossedegh would remain as Prime Minister or be replaced, must depend upon his importance as a leader at the time of the Shah’s action, and upon his own readiness to support the @@ -19791,8 +16730,7 @@ the population is psychologically prepared. Even then a step by step solution may be necessary.

Broadly, the following “principles” might have a part in determining the - ultimate oil settlement: (1) Substitution of private for HMG ownership in Company operations within + ultimate oil settlement: (1) Substitution of private for HMG ownership in Company operations within Persia; (2) Recognition of legality of nationalization with compensation; (3) Offset compensation due Company by rentals due Government under an operating contract between them which provides for @@ -19804,32 +16742,22 @@ provide for different degrees of Persian control.

-
- 119. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans (Wisner) to the Chief of the Near East +
+ 119. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans (Wisner) to the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency - (Roosevelt)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, + (Roosevelt)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Intelligence, Job 80B01676R, Box 41, Folder 20, Shah of Iran Operations. Secret; Security Information. - Washington, undated. + Washington, undated. SUBJECT Views of Mr. Max Thornburg

1. Submitted herewith for your information and comment is a copy of a - Memorandum of Conversation between Mr. Thornburg and Dr. Raymond - Allen of the PSB.Dated August 24; attached but not printed. + Memorandum of Conversation between Mr. Thornburg and Dr. Raymond + Allen of the PSB.Dated August 24; attached but not printed. Thornburg’s memorandum of this conversation is Document 116. During a conversation with Mr. Thornburg in the office of @@ -19837,24 +16765,20 @@ morning,August 22. I gathered that Mr. Thornburg has also had some conversations with officials of the State Department, including Mr. - David Bruce. I further understood that Mr. Thornburg had been requested to put down in writing a + David Bruce. I further understood that Mr. Thornburg had been requested to put down in writing a further expression of his views and recommendations with regard to the - situation in the Middle East,See Document 118. and return to + situation in the Middle East,See Document 118. and return to Washington sometime during the course of next week for a further presentation and discussion of his views.

2. Mr. Thornburg was somewhat diffident regarding his ability to prepare alone a paper that would be - really useful from the standpoint of the State Department and CIA. He said that it would be much more + really useful from the standpoint of the State Department and CIA. He said that it would be much more profitable if he were able to sit down with certain other Near Eastern experts and exchange views, on the theory that while he might be able to make a contribution of some value, not he nor any other single person could be expected to produce a well-rounded and entirely well-grounded appreciation of the situation. He said, for example, that he did not - even know what you thought of the last paper which he producedNot further identified. and he felt + even know what you thought of the last paper which he producedNot further identified. and he felt sure that you would be able to pick loopholes and find soft spots in portions of it. This Agency and the State Department would be sure to have information which, in some instances, would entirely reverse his @@ -19863,56 +16787,42 @@

3. Mr. Dulles, nevertheless, encouraged him to put something down in writing in the form of a “think piece” which might serve as a - basis for further discussions with us and with Messrs. Bruce and Byroade of the Department of State. + basis for further discussions with us and with Messrs. Bruce and Byroade of the Department of State. Mr. Thornburg undertook to do this and states that he would return about Wednesday of next week and hoped at that time to have the opportunity of participating in a round table discussion.

4. Accordingly, I recommend that you hold yourself in readiness for such - a meeting; that you inform Mr. Dulles that you are expecting to participate; and that - you give thought to what other persons from this Agency—including ONE, OCI + a meeting; that you inform Mr. Dulles that you are expecting to participate; and that + you give thought to what other persons from this Agency—including ONE, OCI and ORR—would be the most suitable additional participants.

- Frank G. - Wisner + Frank G. + Wisner
-
+
120. Telegram From the Station in Iran to the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 89–00176R, Box 1, Folder 15, Political Activities—Iran. Secret; Security Information; Routine. - Tehran, September 5, + Tehran, September 5, 1952, 1143Z. -

TEHE 061. Ref TEHE 060 (IN 33256).Not +

TEHE 061. Ref TEHE 060 (IN 33256).Not found. Source: [less than 1 line not - declassified]. Eval: F–3. Dissem: [less than 1 line not + declassified]. Eval: F–3. Dissem: [less than 1 line not declassified].

-

1. During latter part August source was told separately by [1½ lines not declassified] that Kashani definitely planning +

1. During latter part August source was told separately by [1½ lines not declassified] that Kashani definitely planning Mossadegh overthrow. These [less than 1 line not declassified] individuals who currently cooperating with Kashani are themselves involved in plan.

2. Timing of plan not known by source although it believed to be - scheduled shortly after Kashani’s return to Iran. Immediately prior Kashani’s departure for Mecca he + scheduled shortly after Kashani’s return to Iran. Immediately prior Kashani’s departure for Mecca he sent word to PriMin via Deputy - Majlis President Razavi warning PriMin to expect his opposition, if something were not done + Majlis President Razavi warning PriMin to expect his opposition, if something were not done to alleviate situation Iran.

3. Kashani is relying heavily on his Majlis support to cause Mossadegh overthrow. It source opinion @@ -19920,29 +16830,20 @@ Tudeh street support.

4. For Wash only: [less than 1 line not declassified].

-

A. [less than 1 line not declassified] [1 paragraph (2½ lines) not declassified]

+

A. [less than 1 line not declassified] [1 paragraph (2½ lines) not declassified]

B. [1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]

C. Station feels that above info could be true in view confirmation per ref, and should be taken seriously [less than 1 line not declassified].

-
+
121. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near - Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to Secretary of State AchesonSource: National Archives, RG 59, GTI Files, Lot - 57 D 155, Box 44. Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Stutesman and sent through + Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to Secretary of State AchesonSource: National Archives, RG 59, GTI Files, Lot + 57 D 155, Box 44. Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Stutesman and sent through Matthews. Printed from an uninitialed copy. - Washington, September 10, 1952. + Washington, September 10, 1952. SUBJECT Recommended Change in United States Policy Towards Iran @@ -19951,42 +16852,32 @@

To determine the policy to be followed by the United States in the light of recent developments in the Iranian situation.

Background

-

On August 30, 1952 there was formally delivered to Dr. Mosadeq a joint message from President +

On August 30, 1952 there was formally delivered to Dr. Mosadeq a joint message from President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill containing proposals for action by all three governments to bring about an “early - and equitable solution” of the oil dispute (Enclosure No. 1).See Foreign Relations, - 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 455–458, 461–469 (Documents 207 and 209–214). These proposals + and equitable solution” of the oil dispute (Enclosure No. 1).See Foreign Relations, + 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 455–458, 461–469 (Documents 207 and 209–214). These proposals were based upon British and American reappraisals of the situation in Iran and represented certain basic changes in British and American attitudes towards solving the oil dispute which is the prime factor for instability in Iran.

British policy had previously been based on assumptions that economic and - political pressures on Iran, following the nationalization of the AIOC concession, would bring to power a + political pressures on Iran, following the nationalization of the AIOC concession, would bring to power a conservative government which would then reverse the policies of Dr. Mosadeq. After nearly a year and a half of waiting, the first of these assumptions was proved to be correct. The Mosadeq government - fell and the conservative Ahmad Qavam was appointed Prime Minister. The second - assumption, however, proved to be less sound. Qavam’s first and only public - declaration expressed hostility to previous nationalist policies in Iran and assured the world + fell and the conservative Ahmad Qavam was appointed Prime Minister. The second + assumption, however, proved to be less sound. Qavam’s first and only public + declaration expressed hostility to previous nationalist policies in Iran and assured the world that the oil dispute would soon be ended on reasonable terms. There was an immediate public reaction to this announcement which approximated a revolt in Tehran. The Shah’s indecisiveness and communist agitators contributed measurably to the violent outbreak of July 21 against Qavam but reflective reports from the Embassy ascribe to nationalist, predominantly - middle-class, organizations the main force in the anti-Qavam demonstrations. The utter + middle-class, organizations the main force in the anti-Qavam demonstrations. The utter failure of the Qavam government has been taken as evidence that no Iranian politician can hope in present circumstances successfully to moderate extreme nationalist @@ -19998,8 +16889,7 @@

American policy toward Iran was also reviewed following the restoration of Dr. Mosadeq and his nationalist colleagues to unquestioned dominance in Iranian affairs. It - had been generally assumed that Dr. Mosadeq would welcome settlement of the oil dispute if + had been generally assumed that Dr. Mosadeq would welcome settlement of the oil dispute if certain legitimate Iranian national aspirations were taken into consideration. The United States had maintained, since nationalization of the British oil concession in Iran, a position as moderator, @@ -20021,15 +16911,12 @@ Iranian Government.

2. The AIOC or some other agency designated by the British Government will purchase from Iran all of the - oil products presently held in storage by the NIOC at commercial Persian Gulf prices less an appropriate + oil products presently held in storage by the NIOC at commercial Persian Gulf prices less an appropriate discount.

-

3. On the basis of the proposal discussed between Dr. Mosadeq and the British Chargé in +

3. On the basis of the proposal discussed between Dr. Mosadeq and the British Chargé in Tehran on July 25, it would be agreed that an arbitral commission consisting of three persons should be set up immediately to consider the - question of compensation. Neither the American grant of $10 million nor the start of British oil + question of compensation. Neither the American grant of $10 million nor the start of British oil purchases would be held up pending the commencement of the arbitral procedure.

4. Negotiations looking toward a more permanent arrangement for the @@ -20044,8 +16931,7 @@ former AIOC . . . to look into the legitimate claims of the company within the nationalization law and also to look into the claims of the Iranian Government.” The note added that - if direct discussions were not satisfactory to the AIOC, the company could “present its case + if direct discussions were not satisfactory to the AIOC, the company could “present its case in the competent Iranian courts.”

The British reaction to our Aide-Mémoire was, at first, not very encouraging and revealed a continuing unwillingness to face what we @@ -20056,22 +16942,18 @@ psychological and political issues of the dispute.

On August 20 a message was received by the President directly from Prime Minister Churchill, then acting - as Foreign Secretary in the temporary absence of Mr. Eden.See + as Foreign Secretary in the temporary absence of Mr. Eden.See ibid., pp. 447–449 (Document - 203). Mr. Churchill proposed that a joint message from him and + 203). Mr. Churchill proposed that a joint message from him and President Truman be sent to Prime Minister Mosadeq suggesting that “If you Musaddiq will do (A), (B), and (C), we two will do (X), (Y), and (Z).” The subsequent conditions for settlement which the British Government put forward were carefully studied and were found to - meet generally the United States view that Dr. Mosadeq might find it possible to + meet generally the United States view that Dr. Mosadeq might find it possible to accept a simple but rather vague basis for negotiations to settle the oil dispute. In their essence, the proposals provided for international - arbitration of all claims and counter-claims and required the AIOC to open discussions on a purely + arbitration of all claims and counter-claims and required the AIOC to open discussions on a purely commercial basis for the purchase and marketing of Iranian oil. Furthermore, immediate sums were to be made available to the Iranian Government to cover its budgetary expenses for the interim period until @@ -20083,27 +16965,21 @@ and (c) providing that AIOC should not be the sole purchaser of Iranian oil.

The reaction of the Iranian Government has not yet been finally and - officially determined. Prime Minister Mosadeq in his private conversation with United States + officially determined. Prime Minister Mosadeq in his private conversation with United States Ambassador Henderson and British Chargé d’Affaires Middleton declared the proposals flatly unacceptable. During the week which - followed delivery of this message, Dr. Mosadeq became more moderate in his view of these + followed delivery of this message, Dr. Mosadeq became more moderate in his view of these proposals. It is believed that the public clarification of certain - aspects of the proposals by the Secretary and Mr. Harriman helped to create growing + aspects of the proposals by the Secretary and Mr. Harriman helped to create growing feeling among Iranian leaders that the proposals should be given more - careful consideration. In face of this weight of opinion, Dr. Mosadeq issued a press statement + careful consideration. In face of this weight of opinion, Dr. Mosadeq issued a press statement (Attachment No. 2)Attached but not printed. which attempted again to cloud the issues in the dispute and placed him in his usual position so that he could assert his sponsorship of almost any resolution which Parliament passes in response - to the joint US–UK proposals.

-

In attempting to understand the reasons for Dr. Mosadeq’s immediate emotional revulsion + to the joint US–UK proposals.

+

In attempting to understand the reasons for Dr. Mosadeq’s immediate emotional revulsion when presented with the joint message it is useful to keep the following points in mind:

1. Dr. Mosadeq has long enjoyed @@ -20113,8 +16989,7 @@ confronted with British willingness to attempt to meet his demands as understood, he has either flatly denied his previous assurances or has asserted that he could make no commitment without Parliamentary - approval. Publication of the joint US–UK proposals forced Dr. + approval. Publication of the joint US–UK proposals forced Dr. Mosadeq into the open. In rejecting the proposals he must publicly describe his reasons and his true position.

@@ -20128,11 +17003,8 @@ the United States Government, for strategic considerations, will break with the British rather than allow Iran to fall into communist hands. The fact that President Truman - joined with Prime Minister Churchill in public support of the proposals of August - 30 must have disabused Dr. Mosadeq of his belief that the US and UK were on the point + joined with Prime Minister Churchill in public support of the proposals of August + 30 must have disabused Dr. Mosadeq of his belief that the US and UK were on the point of splitting on the Iranian issue.

3. Dr. Mosadeq has continually @@ -20140,8 +17012,7 @@ settlement of the oil dispute was British insistence on forcing Iran to accept a British oil concession in contravention of Iran’s legitimate national rights. By keeping secret most of the previous negotiations to - achieve settlement of the oil dispute, Dr. Mosadeq has been able to maintain a position in Iran and + achieve settlement of the oil dispute, Dr. Mosadeq has been able to maintain a position in Iran and before much of world opinion that he is a sort of George Washington fighting in the cause of independence to keep the British imperialists out of Iran. The proposals of August 30 clearly contain nothing which @@ -20172,25 +17043,18 @@ basis for expectation that an anti-nationalist government could survive, there is evidence that the leaders in the National Front are increasingly at odds. The major struggle which seems to be developing is - between Dr. Mosadeq and Mullah Kashani. Ambassador Henderson has reported his observation + between Dr. Mosadeq and Mullah Kashani. Ambassador Henderson has reported his observation of Prime Minister Mosadeq’s dismay when he heard that Kashani had been elected President of the Majlis. In the Parliamentary debates concerning continuation of martial law after the July 21 riots, there was a - definite split in nationalist ranks as the newly created pro-Kashani national movement faction of + definite split in nationalist ranks as the newly created pro-Kashani national movement faction of approximately thirty deputies directly opposed the smaller group of - National Front politicians. There are rumors that Mullah Kashani, on his way to Mecca, - recently sent a message to Dr. Mosadeq that he expected to assume control of the - situation upon his return to Tehran unless Dr. Mosadeq had successfully improved - conditions. In the past few days Ambassador Henderson has been informed by high Iranian sources of + National Front politicians. There are rumors that Mullah Kashani, on his way to Mecca, + recently sent a message to Dr. Mosadeq that he expected to assume control of the + situation upon his return to Tehran unless Dr. Mosadeq had successfully improved + conditions. In the past few days Ambassador Henderson has been informed by high Iranian sources of intrigues to replace Mosadeq with another leader who has not been described but obviously will depend upon the support of Mullah @@ -20227,8 +17091,7 @@ for Iran

United States policy toward Iran has been influenced by an understanding that the United Kingdom is responsible for the initiative in military - support of Iran in the event of communist subversion or aggression. This understanding was based + support of Iran in the event of communist subversion or aggression. This understanding was based on United States inability to extend its military responsibilities at the present time and upon the extensive influence which the British had in Iran before nationalization of the oil industry. The first of these @@ -20240,8 +17103,7 @@ power and prestige that they cannot be expected to act independently of nationalist sentiments even in the face of a communist coup. Anti-British feeling has, in fact, reached such a point that many - Iranian leaders are sincere in believing as Nasser + Iranian leaders are sincere in believing as Nasser Khan Qashqai said to Department of State officials on September 4, “We would prefer the Russians to the British”.

@@ -20283,10 +17145,8 @@ holds the loyalty of the majority of Army officers, has become a shadowy and generally uninfluential figure in the background of political affairs. Scrutiny of Army ranks gives little reason to hope that a - strong military leader will arise like Naguib Bey in Egypt. However, the Army is still a potent - force for maintaining internal security in Iran and so far the Mosadeq Government has not taken + strong military leader will arise like Naguib Bey in Egypt. However, the Army is still a potent + force for maintaining internal security in Iran and so far the Mosadeq Government has not taken measures which would destroy the Army’s effectiveness to meet internal situations.

Amid rumors and counter-rumors of British intrigue, the tribes in Iran @@ -20312,8 +17172,7 @@ review of Iran’s economic situation.

The so-called “blockade” of Iranian oil sales has been largely the product of (a) commercial concern regarding the price, specifications, - and guaranteed flow of Iranian oil, (b) AIOC legal claims to ownership of oil products presently + and guaranteed flow of Iranian oil, (b) AIOC legal claims to ownership of oil products presently stored in Abadan, (c) major oil companies’ cooperation in refusal to take advantage of the AIOC’s misfortunes, (d) United States Government discouragement of private @@ -20321,8 +17180,7 @@ or assisting in operation of the Iranian oil industry. Since the decision of the ICJ that it had no competence over a dispute between the Iranian sovereign government and a - private foreign oil company on Iranian territory, the AIOC legal claim against Iranian oil + private foreign oil company on Iranian territory, the AIOC legal claim against Iranian oil products is in considerable question and according to informal Department legal opinion might well not stand up in the courts. Although major oil companies have made no @@ -20355,23 +17213,17 @@ time when the communists might take control of the Iranian Government but all agree that if the economic situation continues to deteriorate hopelessly, a communist coup must eventually be expected.

-

The leaders in the National Front are increasingly at odds. Mullah Kashani’s ascendency to power +

The leaders in the National Front are increasingly at odds. Mullah Kashani’s ascendency to power has undoubtedly fed his known ambitions to be sole authority in Iran. His position in Parliament is such that he could lead a strong - Parliamentary group against Dr. Mosadeq or any other target he chose. His street + Parliamentary group against Dr. Mosadeq or any other target he chose. His street organization has been one of the most important elements in recent nationalist successes. His alliance with the communist organization during the anti-Qavam riots has - apparently not been lasting but Kashani’s over &twoemrule;?&twoemrule;Underscore and query in the original. + apparently not been lasting but Kashani’s over &twoemrule;?&twoemrule;Underscore and query in the original. has led him to declare on various occasions that he could “swallow up” the communists in any alliance. He has joined hands with the Qashqais in - destroying the old clique of top army officers. Upon his return from Mecca, Kashani can exert a very forceful + destroying the old clique of top army officers. Upon his return from Mecca, Kashani can exert a very forceful influence in Iranian affairs in any direction he desires.

While reportedly Iran’s military forces are not demoralized and are still being paid, there is little doubt that the Army’s old political @@ -20398,9 +17250,7 @@ would be a more extreme nationalist than he is and would possibly be more difficult for the West to support against communist agitation.

2. It is expected that the Iranian Parliament will support the general - line of response which Dr. Mosadeq has made publicly to the joint US–UK + line of response which Dr. Mosadeq has made publicly to the joint US–UK proposals. It is unlikely although the possibility cannot be discounted that the British will be willing or even able to come much farther forward from the position taken in the proposals delivered to Dr. @@ -20411,12 +17261,10 @@ United States to continue to press both sides to come to a mutually satisfactory agreement in the oil dispute, particularly since the United States publicly gave up its position as moderator when it joined with - the British in the joint message of August 30.See footnote 2 above.

+ the British in the joint message of August 30.See footnote 2 above.

3. Before Iran can achieve any measure of political stability, its economy must be restored to some measure of health by receipt of oil - income. There is of course an alternative of providing Iran with a United States Government dole + income. There is of course an alternative of providing Iran with a United States Government dole of monthly budgetary aid. Such a dole would obviously make political blackmail and commercial stubbornness pay well and would not salve the constant irritation of the oil dispute nor would such a dole be likely @@ -20429,8 +17277,7 @@ understanding that the United Kingdom is responsible for the initiative in military support of Iran in the event of communist subversion or aggression. This understanding is very questionable in the present - situation. The extensive British organizationThis word is struck through in the + situation. The extensive British organizationThis word is struck through in the original. in Iran which was based primarily upon British commercial installations and interests has been totally destroyed. Public antagonism to the British has been so inflamed over the past two @@ -20441,8 +17288,7 @@ prestige that they should not be expected to act independently of nationalist sentiments even in the face of a communist coup. Anti-British feeling has, in fact, reached such a point that many - Iranian leaders believe themselves to be sincere in saying, as Nasser + Iranian leaders believe themselves to be sincere in saying, as Nasser Khan Qashqai said in Washington on September 4, “We would prefer the Russians to the British”. Other developments in the Middle East have also strongly affected the British @@ -20452,8 +17298,7 @@

5. The so-called “blockade” of Iranian oil sales has been based upon the legal claim of the AIOC to ownership of the oil products presently stored in Abadan. Legal opinion in the - Department of State informally holds that the decision of the ICJ that it had no jurisdiction over the + Department of State informally holds that the decision of the ICJ that it had no jurisdiction over the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute was based upon a decision that the dispute was not between two nations but between the Iranian sovereign and a private company on Iranian territory. It is held that a court, deciding upon the @@ -20461,12 +17306,9 @@ lifted by any tanker from Iran, would be required to discuss the validity of the 1933 oil concession and Iran’s sovereign right to abrogate a contract with a private company. It is entirely possible, - therefore, that many courts would reject the British claim should a tanker be willing + therefore, that many courts would reject the British claim should a tanker be willing to take the legal risk of lifting Iranian oil.

-

6. The question of compensation due the AIOC is far from settled. The gap between the joint US–UK +

6. The question of compensation due the AIOC is far from settled. The gap between the joint US–UK proposals and Dr. Mosadeq’s unofficial counter-proposals is very wide. It is the conclusion of NEA political observers that Dr. @@ -20489,8 +17331,7 @@ old line senior officers in the Army have recently been purged by Dr. Mosadeq and it is not yet apparent what type of officers will appear in senior positions, whether - political appointees under Kashani–Qashqai influence or officers of military + political appointees under Kashani–Qashqai influence or officers of military quality and forceful character definitely anti-communist or at least essentially nationalist in motivation. Social unrest is increasing as are economic difficulties in Iran. Opportunities for successful action @@ -20532,8 +17373,7 @@ Government to the belief that consideration of maintaining Iran independent from the communist world must override legal considerations in the oil dispute. It should be pointed out that the “blockade” which - has been maintained by major oil companies in deference to the AIOC’s legal claim to Iranian oil is + has been maintained by major oil companies in deference to the AIOC’s legal claim to Iranian oil is breaking and that the United States Government considers it necessary for the strategic considerations described above to assist and encourage sales of Iranian oil setting aside the British legal claim.

@@ -20556,8 +17396,7 @@ with unknown backing such as Denver, Consolidated have indicated definite interest in purchasing Iranian oil.

It would also seem that the market for Iranian oil probably could be - expanded. Brazil has already expressed an interest in purchasing Iranian crude for its + expanded. Brazil has already expressed an interest in purchasing Iranian crude for its refineries and tankers presently being constructed. These would be owned by private Brazilian interests and by the Brazilian Government. In regard to availability of tankers, the Department’s experts have @@ -20584,13 +17423,11 @@ Iranian situation, briefly reviewing in general terms the numerous U.S. efforts to bring the parties in the oil dispute together and declaring that it seems impossible at the moment to go farther in this role of - moderator. Ambassador Henderson’s instructions should be publicized with the + moderator. Ambassador Henderson’s instructions should be publicized with the statement that the United States Government hopes that Iran will utilize its natural resources by making commercial arrangements with oil companies, assuming that the products of the Iranian oil industry would - be available for purchase on reasonable terms by the AIOC as well as others in such a path as + be available for purchase on reasonable terms by the AIOC as well as others in such a path as to minimize the disruption of normal commercial flows in the international oil trade. The statement could contain a declaration that this United States action does not imply judgment on the merits of @@ -20600,16 +17437,13 @@ of British and Iranian claims arising out of the oil dispute will be reached through amicable negotiation.

5. It is recommended that the U.S. go slowly in the situation regarding - the question of budgetary aid to the Mosadeq Government. Dr. Mosadeq’s relations with the free world have been + the question of budgetary aid to the Mosadeq Government. Dr. Mosadeq’s relations with the free world have been characterized by an assumption that strategic dangers implied in the loss of Iran to the free world can be used to cloud any issue of a primarily commercial nature. Iran should be made to realize that it is responsible for its own budgetary position and that the world expects Iran to utilize its great - petroleum assets. However, Ambassador Henderson should be informed that if he considers the + petroleum assets. However, Ambassador Henderson should be informed that if he considers the situation requires immediate financial aid to the Iranian Government, such money may be available. Furthermore, the Export-Import Bank will probably be willing to complete arrangements for a $25 million loan if @@ -20617,19 +17451,14 @@ draw a sizeable sum from the International Monetary Fund before it would be necessary for the United States to provide grant or other aid.

-
+
122. Memorandum From the Chief of the Iran Branch, Near East and Africa Division (Leavitt) to the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans, - Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of + Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Intelligence, Job 80B01676R, Box 41, Folder 20, Shah of Iran Operations. Secret. - Washington, September 22, 1952. + Washington, September 22, 1952. SUBJECT Program to Support the Shah @@ -20651,8 +17480,7 @@ the coup; (b) the formation of a new Government; (c) the carrying out of necessary reforms; and (d) the settlement of the oil controversy.

3. From what we know of the Shah’s character, and particularly in view of - his attitude during the July crisis, it seems to me extremely unlikely that he would seriously + his attitude during the July crisis, it seems to me extremely unlikely that he would seriously consider leading a military coup, no matter what inducements in the way of economic and military aid were held out to him. It also seems very probable that, if attempted in the present political situation, such a @@ -20662,8 +17490,7 @@ induced to adopt strong-arm methods initially, I find it difficult to believe that he would be willing to continue to sanction such methods indefinitely.

-

4. A further weakness in Thornburg’s program, it seems to me, is the role assigned to +

4. A further weakness in Thornburg’s program, it seems to me, is the role assigned to the U.S. and the U.K. Official U.S., and particularly U.K., support of the Shah’s new Government would lay the Shah open to charges of being a Western puppet, and would greatly increase rather than reduce opposition @@ -20689,22 +17516,18 @@

6. Initial Approach to the Shah:

(a) Send Ambassador Allen to Iran in the near futureThere might be - considerable advantage in delaying Allen’s visit until after 4 November, coordinate and + considerable advantage in delaying Allen’s visit until after 4 November, coordinate and obtain approval for the entire program from the President-elect, and provide Allen with a letter - to the Shah from the latter. Allen might then indicate to the Shah that the new + to the Shah from the latter. Allen might then indicate to the Shah that the new administration would be fully prepared, when it took office in January, to provide generous assistance to Iran provided the Shah effectively carried out the following program. [Footnote is in the original.] under cover of a Middle East Inspection tour to - induce the Shah to undertake a carefully planned program to increase his popularity + induce the Shah to undertake a carefully planned program to increase his popularity and prestige. The Shah would be told that it is our hope that by increasing his influence he will be able, by constitutional means, to - offset the dangerous influence of such extremists as Kashani and thereby not only + offset the dangerous influence of such extremists as Kashani and thereby not only increase the Government’s stability but also strengthen the Pahlevi dynasty.

(b) The program to increase the Shah’s popularity and prestige should be @@ -20714,8 +17537,7 @@ leader. The objective would be to condition the Iranian public in such a way that in the event of a crisis the public would be as willing to accept the leadership of the Shah as to accept the leadership of - Mossadeq, Kashani, or any other leader.

+ Mossadeq, Kashani, or any other leader.

(c) The program would require the following action by the Shah:

(1) A greatly increased number of public appearances and public statements.

@@ -20725,8 +17547,7 @@

(4) Determined action to obtain cooperation from other members of royal family in the program and to curb all activity by them impairing the prestige of the dynasty.

-

(5) While fully supporting Mossadeq (at least initially), determined efforts to +

(5) While fully supporting Mossadeq (at least initially), determined efforts to cultivate conservative religious, and moderate political, leaders and to strengthen his ties with the Army.

(6) Insofar as possible, avoidance of actions which would give rise to @@ -20749,14 +17570,10 @@

8. Official U.S. Policy:

(a) Unless there were real prospects of an oil settlement, every effort should be made on the official level to de-emphasize the oil issue and - thus remove the international spot-light from Mossadeq. It is suggested, for + thus remove the international spot-light from Mossadeq. It is suggested, for instance, that the U.S. and U.K. insist that any further oil discussions be held in London or Washington rather than in Teheran. At the same time - it might be advisable for Ambassador Henderson to attempt to see more of the Shah and less of Mossadeq, although here again (as in paragraph 7(a) + it might be advisable for Ambassador Henderson to attempt to see more of the Shah and less of Mossadeq, although here again (as in paragraph 7(a) timing would be all-important. Moreover, nothing should be done by U.S. officials, after Allen’s visit, to suggest that the U.S. is in any way responsible for the Shah’s @@ -20802,27 +17619,21 @@ connected.

(f) An oil settlement should be negotiated secretly and implemented only - after reform and development programs (as outlined by Mr. Thornburg) were well under way.

+ after reform and development programs (as outlined by Mr. Thornburg) were well under way.

- John H. - Leavitt + John H. + Leavitt
-
+
123. Memorandum for the Record by Donald Wilber of the Iran Branch, Near East and Africa Division, - Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, + Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Intelligence, Job 80B01676R, Box 41, Folder 20, Shah of Iran Operations. Secret; Security Information. - Washington, September 23, 1952. -

1. Let me get the negative comments out of the way first.Wilber is + Washington, September 23, 1952. +

1. Let me get the negative comments out of the way first.Wilber is commenting on Document 122. As follows, they are so numerous and important as to cast serious doubt on the practicality of the program:

@@ -20854,66 +17665,52 @@

2. Positive approach.

I don’t believe the program to support the Shah will work. What then do we do?

-

Assume, first of all, that Mossadeq is mortal. That a heart attack, or his own +

Assume, first of all, that Mossadeq is mortal. That a heart attack, or his own decision to retire, or a shift in popular sentiment will remove him from power within a year at the most. Who takes his place? We have to consider several possibilities:

-

a. Some figure conspicuous in his entourage, such as Saleh, Baghai, Makki, etc.

+

a. Some figure conspicuous in his entourage, such as Saleh, Baghai, Makki, etc.

b. Kashani

c. An old line politician

-

d. A conservative collaborator of Mossadeq.

+

d. A conservative collaborator of Mossadeq.

Which possibility is most likely? Not a. for no one of the entourage has - personal following and political astuteness to follow Mossadeq. Probably not b. as he is + personal following and political astuteness to follow Mossadeq. Probably not b. as he is thoroughly hated and distrusted by elements whose support he would have - to have. Not c., following fiasco of Qavam. Probably d. with Kasemi most likely + to have. Not c., following fiasco of Qavam. Probably d. with Kasemi most likely successor.

It is possible that key to future lies in position taken by Iran party which I believe to be much more powerful than is realized here. The key to Iran party is Allahyer Saleh and the treatment given to him in Washington may well determine the future of the Government of Iran. I believe we should know whether State - has a firm and consistent line of approach to Saleh. If not, we should take a hand in + has a firm and consistent line of approach to Saleh. If not, we should take a hand in drafting one and should also attempt to find out what he believes will - be the course of events in replacing Mossadeq.

+ be the course of events in replacing Mossadeq.

This proposal does not take us very far nor is it a concrete plan for action, but all the paper plans made to date seem to me much too ambitious. We should realize we cannot effect immediate solutions to anything and try to build more firmly and slowly.

- Don - WilberPrinted from a + Don + WilberPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
-
- 124. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 124. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1950–1952, classified general records, Box 42. Secret; Security - Information. Drafted by Henderson. Repeated to London and Karachi. The + Information. Drafted by Henderson. Repeated to London and Karachi. The telegram is the Embassy copy as approved and has no time of transmission. - Tehran, September 28, 1952. + Tehran, September 28, 1952.

1309. 1. Rumors unconfirmed but nevertheless disquieting since some of them appear fairly circumstantial continue to circulate re growing cooperation between Kashani and Tudeh. Yesterday afternoon we were informed by one source that 90 - minutes previously long negotiation between Kashani–Tudeh had come successful - conclusion. Tudeh promised give Kashani full support (perhaps including monetary). + minutes previously long negotiation between Kashani–Tudeh had come successful + conclusion. Tudeh promised give Kashani full support (perhaps including monetary). Kashani would within near future endeavor by parliamentary methods to become Primin. In such capacity he would expel US military @@ -20923,45 +17720,31 @@ “anti-imperialist leagues” of bygone days in which many prominent Asian leaders, including Nehru, had participated. This source not thoroughly tested and its info may be - incorrect. Nevertheless in view Kashani’s recent activities and statements we cannot - dismiss this story entirely. We are therefore seeking confirmation.In telegram TEHE 152 to CIA, - September 26, the Station in Tehran reported that Kashani now planned to attempt + incorrect. Nevertheless in view Kashani’s recent activities and statements we cannot + dismiss this story entirely. We are therefore seeking confirmation.In telegram TEHE 152 to CIA, + September 26, the Station in Tehran reported that Kashani now planned to attempt the overthrow of Mosadeq and to replace him with General Fazlullah - Zahedi. The Station reported further that “Kashani since return from Mecca - has met frequently with Mossadeq opposition leaders and has been successful - in getting their backing against Mossadeq. Kashani has given certain promises to them that he + Zahedi. The Station reported further that “Kashani since return from Mecca + has met frequently with Mossadeq opposition leaders and has been successful + in getting their backing against Mossadeq. Kashani has given certain promises to them that he will not adopt hostile attitude toward them or Shah. In source opinion, Mossadeq opposition motivated mainly by desperation and following reasoning. (1) Kashani only person capable ousting Mossadeq. (2) - They can either do business with Kashani or at least latter would represent force - easier to cope with than that of Mossadeq.” The Station made no mention of the Tudeh + They can either do business with Kashani or at least latter would represent force + easier to cope with than that of Mossadeq.” The Station made no mention of the Tudeh until later in the telegram, when it commented that “in Field - opinion that whether or not any secret agreement between Kashani and Tudeh, latter would - not be adverse to Kashanis replacement of Mossadeq. De facto Tudeh support of + opinion that whether or not any secret agreement between Kashani and Tudeh, latter would + not be adverse to Kashanis replacement of Mossadeq. De facto Tudeh support of Kashani at least until latter in power is strong possibility.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 89–00176R, Box 1, Folder 15, Political Activities—Iran)

-

2. Arab Minister told me last night that several days ago Kashani in presence visiting +

2. Arab Minister told me last night that several days ago Kashani in presence visiting religious leader from Minister’s country had strongly defended Tudeh as - loyal Moslem organization; Kashani had maintained he would not be happy until he + loyal Moslem organization; Kashani had maintained he would not be happy until he had rid Iran and other ME Moslem countries of westerners who had been interfering too long in Moslem affairs; and that he had assurances that if necessary he could obtain @@ -20970,72 +17753,57 @@

3. Pak Amb who is ardent Shiah continues postpone leaving Iran for his new post at Ankara. He is showing - tendencies to become progressively fanatical in support of Kashani. Two evenings ago in + tendencies to become progressively fanatical in support of Kashani. Two evenings ago in conversation with Yugoslav Min and myself he maintained Tudeh was composed Moslems; therefore could never be under communist control; US and UK responsible for present situation - Iran and had only themselves to blame if Kashani would find it necessary look north for support. + Iran and had only themselves to blame if Kashani would find it necessary look north for support. When I raised question re US responsibility he said US had not made - sufficient efforts to change attitude UK. He insisted his Govt fully supported his views re partial + sufficient efforts to change attitude UK. He insisted his Govt fully supported his views re partial responsibility US for situation here and, becoming more excited, he said he prepared issue public statement at once to that effect. He expressed pleasure Zafrullah had welcomed - invitation Kashani to ME Moslem Conference and said all Moslems + invitation Kashani to ME Moslem Conference and said all Moslems must stand together during this trying period.

4. My impression is that Arab diplomats here in general have no admiration for Kashani but fear that in their various countries there might be anti-western or leftist Moslem groups who will support and attend his projected conference despite attitude their respective govts.

-

Dept please rpt Moscow.

+

Dept please rpt Moscow.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
+
125. Monthly Report Prepared in the Office of Policy Coordination, - Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence + Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency-09-01"cy, DDO–IMS Files, Job - 80–01795R, Box 2, Folder 5, Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) History. Top + 80–01795R, Box 2, Folder 5, Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) History. Top Secret. - Washington, 1952. + Washington, 1952.

[Omitted here is part of the report unrelated to Iran.]

IRAN

The possibility of the rise to power by the politically ambitious Kashani increased during September. Kashani returned - from Mecca and began to organize various anti-Mossadeq political, military and + from Mecca and began to organize various anti-Mossadeq political, military and religious factions. [4 lines not declassified] Efforts to induce Kashani to take a strong anti-Soviet stand have failed, although Moslem clerics in Isfahan have obtained a statement from him denouncing “worshipers of foreigners.”

[1½ lines not declassified] This development - satisfies a long-standing need in the anti-Soviet campaign. [2 lines not declassified]

+ satisfies a long-standing need in the anti-Soviet campaign. [2 lines not declassified]

Muzaffar Baghai, an important leader in the National Front, attempted [less than 1 line not declassified] to contact the CIA Senior Representative in Tehran. [3½ lines not declassified] Baghai - controls a political party, the National Workers Party, a newspaper, Shahed, and both he and his deputy have seats in + controls a political party, the National Workers Party, a newspaper, Shahed, and both he and his deputy have seats in the Majlis. Furthermore, Baghai is a national figure in Iran, and - control of him would be a very valuable asset.[text not + control of him would be a very valuable asset.[text not declassified]

[2 paragraphs (10 lines) not declassified]

The station reports that the results of its dissemination program are @@ -21046,23 +17814,17 @@ apparent.

[1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

-
+
126. Memorandum From the Chief of the Political Action Division, Directorate of Plans ([name not declassified]) to the Acting Chief of the Political and Psychological Warfare Division, - Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency ([name not declassified])Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the + Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency ([name not declassified])Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Intelligence, Job 80B01676R, Box 41, Folder 20, Shah of Iran Operations. Secret; Security Information. - Washington, October 1, 1952. + Washington, October 1, 1952. SUBJECT - Attached Program to Support the Shah, from NE–4 + Attached Program to Support the Shah, from NE–4

1. If the briefing on Thornburg in our last meeting with NEA was @@ -21071,8 +17833,7 @@ to the main paper, Thornburg is full of ideas if occasionally vague as to their implementation and not always aware of - area problems.See Documents 117 and 118. In the + area problems.See Documents 117 and 118. In the margin is a handwritten note by [name not declassified] to Kermit Roosevelt that reads: “Kim—will appreciate your @@ -21094,20 +17855,16 @@

c. Timing will be a vital problem once the program is translated into a project.

5. Once you have reviewed this program, the obvious next step is to get - Byroade or Jernegan in State to study it.On October 24, [name not + Byroade or Jernegan in State to study it.On October 24, [name not declassified], Special Assistant for Liaison with the Department of State, wrote a memorandum to NEA/CPP stating, “I - discussed this matter in State with Mr. Berry, who said you would find one hundred per cent + discussed this matter in State with Mr. Berry, who said you would find one hundred per cent support in the Department of State for the premise that Mr. Thornburg’s program, based as it is on strong action by the Shah of Iran, is completely unrealistic. He said that he had discussed this problem with Mr. Joyce, who concurred. If - the Shah were such a man as his father had been, Thornburg’s suggestions might prove + the Shah were such a man as his father had been, Thornburg’s suggestions might prove of value. As it is, there is a universal acceptance in the Department of State of the view that the personality of the Shah is such that he would be incapable of carrying out the action suggested @@ -21121,8 +17878,7 @@

Memorandum From a Consultant to the Near East and Africa Division ([name not declassified]) to the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of - Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt)

+ Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt)

October 9, 1952.

SUBJECT @@ -21132,19 +17888,16 @@

I agree with NE–4’s estimate of the Shah’s character, which is the key to the success or failure of such a program. [2½ lines not declassified] Accordingly, - it would appear that a one-shot approach by Ambassador Allen would have at best an ephemeral + it would appear that a one-shot approach by Ambassador Allen would have at best an ephemeral effect on the Shah’s morale and determination. There seems to be some - possibility, however, that Allen’s appointment as chief of mission, with the + possibility, however, that Allen’s appointment as chief of mission, with the opportunity of renewing his close and influential friendship with the Shah, might provide a continuing stimulus and incentive to the latter. The State Department has in the past given some unenthusiastic thought to the reassignment of Allen to Tehran, but NEA thought there were strong disadvantages in returning an ambassador to a post which he had - previously held. The implied disapproval of Amb. Henderson + previously held. The implied disapproval of Amb. Henderson which such an appointment would entail would probably also be a serious deterrent from the Department’s point of view.

In any event, at the present time and for the foreseeable future, it @@ -21172,36 +17925,27 @@ flexible instrumentalities which could be utilized in support of the program.

- [name not declassified] + [name not declassified]
-
+
127. Telegram From the Station in Iran to the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 89–00176R, Box 1, Folder 15, Political Activities—Iran. Secret; Security Information. - Tehran, October 2, + Tehran, October 2, 1952, 0824Z.

TEHE 170. Source: [1 line not declassified]. Eval: C–3. Date Info: Last week - September. Dissem: [less than 1 line not declassified].

+ September. Dissem: [less than 1 line not declassified].

1. It is being rumored Tehran that an agreement has been reached between Kashani and Tudeh to bring - in Kashani or Kashani puppet as premier in place - Mohammed Mossadegh possibly within next 30 days.In telegram TEHE + in Kashani or Kashani puppet as premier in place + Mohammed Mossadegh possibly within next 30 days.In telegram TEHE 167, September 29, but transmitted on October 2, the Station - commented that “Growing wave of rumors on replacement Mossadeq all link Kashani as prime mover in ouster - Mossadeq. While Zahedi most frequently cited as + commented that “Growing wave of rumors on replacement Mossadeq all link Kashani as prime mover in ouster + Mossadeq. While Zahedi most frequently cited as Kashani choice for Prime Minister, Busheri, Kazemi and Baghai also mentioned. While Station not discounting possibility military junta might ultimately @@ -21219,30 +17963,21 @@

3. Faced with threat Kashani Tudeh coalition, Baqai’s newspaper Shahed has taken unequivocal stand - support Mossadegh which represents reversal Baqai policy which in past several weeks has been closer + support Mossadegh which represents reversal Baqai policy which in past several weeks has been closer aligned with Kashani than with Mossadegh.

4. [less than 1 line not declassified] believes rumor para 1 well founded and is seriously concerned. However also believes other prominent - political figures national front will follow Baqai lead and that army and Shah are firmly committed + political figures national front will follow Baqai lead and that army and Shah are firmly committed to Mossadegh.

5. For Wash only: Source above [less than 1 line not declassified].

-
- 128. Draft Paper Prepared in the Department of DefenseSource: National Archives, RG 273, Records of the National - Security Council, Policy Papers, Box 213, NSC 136—US Pol re Iran. - Top Secret; Security Information; For NSC Staff Consideration Only. Lay circulated the paper with +
+ 128. Draft Paper Prepared in the Department of DefenseSource: National Archives, RG 273, Records of the National + Security Council, Policy Papers, Box 213, NSC 136—US Pol re Iran. + Top Secret; Security Information; For NSC Staff Consideration Only. Lay circulated the paper with suggested revisions of NSC 107/2 to the NSC Senior Staff on October 1 and stated that “the Senior Defense Member recommended that in view @@ -21251,9 +17986,7 @@ appropriate amendments thereto for consideration by the National Security Council.” (Ibid.) NSC 107/2 is Document 35. - Washington, undated. + Washington, undated.

MODIFICATIONS OF NSC 107/2

PROPOSED BY THE SENIOR DEFENSE MEMBER

@@ -21305,20 +18038,15 @@ recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time.”

-
+
129. Memorandum From the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans (Roosevelt) to the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency - (Becker)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, + (Becker)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 33R00601A, Box 17, Folder 4, National Security Council 107 Series. Secret; Security - Information. The memorandum was sent through Wisner. - Washington, October 6, 1952. + Information. The memorandum was sent through Wisner. + Washington, October 6, 1952. SUBJECT Proposed Modifications of NSC @@ -21348,40 +18076,32 @@ that our PW activities would be hampered for the reasons indicated in the last section of paragraph 2 above.

- Kermit - Roosevelt + Kermit + Roosevelt
-
+
130. Memorandum From the Chief of the Inspection and Review Branch, Directorate of Plans ([name not declassified]) to the Assistant Chief of Political and Psychological Warfare, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency ([name not declassified]) - Washington, October 7, 1952. + Washington, October 7, 1952. [Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 59–00133R, Box 5, Folder 13, [text not declassified]. Secret; Security Information. 8 pages not declassified.]
-
+
131. Memorandum From the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans (Roosevelt) to the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency - (Becker)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, + (Becker)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 33R00601A, Box 17, Folder 4, National Security Council 107 Series. Secret; Security - Information. The memorandum was sent through Wisner. - Washington, October 9, 1952. + Information. The memorandum was sent through Wisner. + Washington, October 9, 1952. SUBJECT Proposed Revision of NSC @@ -21403,8 +18123,7 @@ special political operations, to endeavor to develop or maintain localized centers of resistance and to harass, undermine, and if possible, to bring about the overthrow of the communist - government.” (National Archives, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, + government.” (National Archives, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Policy Papers, Box 210, NSC 136—US Pol re Iran) @@ -21413,8 +18132,7 @@ “special political measures”. It seems to me that we have taken the place of the token forces contemplated in Defense’s proposal.

-

2. This is very flattering but it seems to me that if the NSC proposes to depend heavily upon our +

2. This is very flattering but it seems to me that if the NSC proposes to depend heavily upon our operations, they had better have a clear understanding of what our operational capabilities are. I would suggest, therefore, the appointment of an ad hoc committee with representation from State, @@ -21423,18 +18141,13 @@ paper. You might also wish to consider the desirability of having a member of the DD/P staff accompany you in discussion of this paper.

- Kermit - Roosevelt + Kermit + Roosevelt
-
- 132. Special EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79S01011A, Box 8, Folder 2, SE–33 - Prospects for Survival of Mossadeq Regime in Iran. Secret. The intelligence +
+ 132. Special EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79S01011A, Box 8, Folder 2, SE–33 + Prospects for Survival of Mossadeq Regime in Iran. Secret. The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate. All members @@ -21445,17 +18158,14 @@ SE–33 - Washington, October 14, 1952. -

PROSPECTS FOR SURVIVAL OF Mossadeq REGIME IN IRANThis + Washington, October 14, 1952. +

PROSPECTS FOR SURVIVAL OF Mossadeq REGIME IN IRANThis estimate has been prepared in response to an urgent, specific request and is an interim estimate pending the preparation of a more comprehensive one which is under way. [Footnote is in the original.]

Conclusions

-

1. On the basis of available evidence we believe that the Mossadeq Government can survive at +

1. On the basis of available evidence we believe that the Mossadeq Government can survive at least for the next six months unless ill-health or death removes Mossadeq from the Iranian political scene.

@@ -21465,13 +18175,11 @@ Tudeh.

Estimate

The Oil Issue

-

3. An early settlement of the oil dispute with the UK is unlikely. Political forces which +

3. An early settlement of the oil dispute with the UK is unlikely. Political forces which Mossadeq himself encouraged in the past now require him to insist upon greater concessions than the British have given any - indication of finding acceptable. On the other hand, Mossadeq’s prestige would be greatly + indication of finding acceptable. On the other hand, Mossadeq’s prestige would be greatly enhanced if he succeeded in effecting the sale of oil despite the British boycott.

The Economic Situation

@@ -21486,26 +18194,19 @@

5. a. Recent events have produced far-reaching changes in the traditional factors of political power in Iran. As a practical matter, the Shah has almost completely lost his capability for - independent action, but is a useful tool for Mossadeq, should need arise. The formerly dominant + independent action, but is a useful tool for Mossadeq, should need arise. The formerly dominant landowning class has also lost political initiative. The Armed Forces, if given effective direction, are probably capable of coping with any type of domestic disturbance presently foreseeable. We do not believe - that their effectiveness has been materially reduced by Mossadeq’s changes in the high command. + that their effectiveness has been materially reduced by Mossadeq’s changes in the high command. Mossadeq’s popular prestige makes him still the dominant political force in Iran.

-

b. A major threat to Mossadeq’s continued control over the heterogeneous - National Front arises from the activities of Mullah Kashani, ambitious Moslem +

b. A major threat to Mossadeq’s continued control over the heterogeneous + National Front arises from the activities of Mullah Kashani, ambitious Moslem leader. Kashani’s extreme intransigeance on the oil issue and his uncompromising demands for the - termination of all foreign interference in Iran severely limit Mossadeq’s freedom of action. He has - successfully separated many National Front politicians from Mossadeq. Although Kashani has expressed optimism + termination of all foreign interference in Iran severely limit Mossadeq’s freedom of action. He has + successfully separated many National Front politicians from Mossadeq. Although Kashani has expressed optimism publicly with respect to his ability to control Tudeh, he is basically opposed to their aims, probably can weigh with shrewdness and accuracy the potential value and danger to him of Tudeh support, and is not @@ -21514,17 +18215,12 @@ recent months, it is almost certainly incapable by itself of overthrowing the government by force or subversion at present. Although the Tudeh Party has an organization, has a significant degree of - favorable public opinion, and has the cooperation of the USSR, it still lacks a legal status and + favorable public opinion, and has the cooperation of the USSR, it still lacks a legal status and the power in the Majlis and control of the key Cabinet positions which would be necessary to take over the government by constitutional means. - The Tudeh Party will, however, probably support Kashani in the belief that if Kashani were in power its opportunities for taking over + The Tudeh Party will, however, probably support Kashani in the belief that if Kashani were in power its opportunities for taking over the country would be improved.

-

Likelihood of an Attempt to Overthrow Mossadeq

+

Likelihood of an Attempt to Overthrow Mossadeq

6. Since Mossadeq’s return to power in July 1952 there have been continuous reports of plots to overthrow him. Kashani and @@ -21541,34 +18237,25 @@ require.

Probable Outcome of an Attempt to Overthrow Mossadeq

-

7. In the event that an attempt is made to overthrow Mossadeq, the following means are +

7. In the event that an attempt is made to overthrow Mossadeq, the following means are available:

a. Violent Means:

-

i. Military Coup: A military coup against Mossadeq is not likely to succeed because Mossadeq has had the opportunity to +

i. Military Coup: A military coup against Mossadeq is not likely to succeed because Mossadeq has had the opportunity to eliminate elements in the Army hostile to him, and none of the Army personnel reported as currently being involved in plots against Mossadeq are believed to have the prestige or influence to obtain the necessary support from the Army.

ii. Mob Violence: A contest in the streets between the forces supporting - Mossadeq and Kashani would be bitter and + Mossadeq and Kashani would be bitter and destructive. The lineup of forces would depend in large part on the specific issues involved at the time the rioting broke out. If there - should be a break now between Mossadeq and Kashani, we believe that Mossadeq could rally greater forces than Kashani. The lineup would probably + should be a break now between Mossadeq and Kashani, we believe that Mossadeq could rally greater forces than Kashani. The lineup would probably be as follows:

(a) Mossadeq: the bulk of the National Front rank and file in the cities; Dr. Baghai’s Iranian Workers’ Party with their organized street-fighting forces; the Somka - (Fascist) Party, provided the Tudeh supported Kashani; the Pan Iranian Party; and + (Fascist) Party, provided the Tudeh supported Kashani; the Pan Iranian Party; and the Army and part of the Police Force, providing they were given specific and direct orders.

(b) Kashani: his followers in @@ -21576,25 +18263,20 @@ the Fedayan terrorist organization of Moslem extremists; the Tudeh and its various subsidiaries; and possibly some support from the tribes if the Army sided with Mossadeq.

-

iii. Assassination: Assassination of Mossadeq would probably result in the accession to power - of Kashani. (Note: Kashani would probably also come to +

iii. Assassination: Assassination of Mossadeq would probably result in the accession to power + of Kashani. (Note: Kashani would probably also come to power if Mossadeq should retire or die a natural death.)

b. Constitutional means: An attempt may be made to overthrow Mossadeq after the - Majlis reconvenes on 9 October. It appears unlikely that Kashani could persuade the Majlis to + Majlis reconvenes on 9 October. It appears unlikely that Kashani could persuade the Majlis to vote to oust Mossadeq in view of the absence of any issue which could serve as a basis for attacking Mossadeq, the resources at Mossadeq’s disposal for - controlling the deliberations of the Majlis and Mossadeq’s record as champion of - nationalist aspirations. Moreover, Mossadeq in opposition would possess much of the + controlling the deliberations of the Majlis and Mossadeq’s record as champion of + nationalist aspirations. Moreover, Mossadeq in opposition would possess much of the strength which enabled him to regain power in July 1952, and his return to office would not be unlikely.

Consequences of the Assumption of Power by @@ -21604,8 +18286,7 @@ take-over and upon the group or groups supporting him at that time. Kashani might come to power by:

-

a. A vote of the Majlis unseating Mossadeq.

+

a. A vote of the Majlis unseating Mossadeq.

b. Assuming control over another National Front regime if Mossadeq were removed from the political scene.

@@ -21628,34 +18309,25 @@ eventual assumption of power by the Tudeh.

-
+
133. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near - Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State - (Matthews)Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, + Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State + (Matthews)Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 888.2553/10–1552. Top Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Stutesman and cleared by Jernegan. Copies were - sent to Joyce, Nitze, Bonbright, and Roosevelt. A handwritten note in + sent to Joyce, Nitze, Bonbright, and Roosevelt. A handwritten note in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum reads: “Comments passed on to Mr. Jernegan, 10/17/52—F.E.W.” All of the handwritten comments on the memorandum are in an unknown hand. - Washington, October 15, 1952. + Washington, October 15, 1952. SUBJECT Comments on the British Paper entitled “The Communist Danger in Persia”The undated paper and its annex are attached below. It was conveyed to the Department on - October 8 by the British Embassy; see Document 134. + October 8 by the British Embassy; see Document 134.

Summary:

Although the British paper under reference appears generally factually @@ -21667,8 +18339,7 @@

1. Present Situation—Although this section is somewhat oversimplified, there is no point of fact or conclusion with which NEA does not agree.

-

2. Possible Openings for the Tudeh—NEA has no reason to dispute the facts +

2. Possible Openings for the Tudeh—NEA has no reason to dispute the facts presented or the conclusion, but suggests that the wording of the penultimate paragraph should be clarified.

3. Persian Action to Forestall these @@ -21676,19 +18347,15 @@ that this section suffers from oversimplification and can be confused with section 4 as regards possible eventualities and possible courses of action. In this connection, it would be useful to review the six - contingencies foreseen and studied in the Annex to NSC 107/1 dated June 20, 1951 and the + contingencies foreseen and studied in the Annex to NSC 107/1 dated June 20, 1951 and the existing Statement of Policy, 107/2, which is under current - revision.See Document 35 and footnote 2 thereto.

+ revision.See Document 35 and footnote 2 thereto.

II. Possible Courses of Action

4(a) There is real question whether “whatever course of action is chosen, absolute Anglo-United States solidarity is essential”. If this is taken - to mean that prior consultation, general agreement and mutual understanding between the - United States and United Kingdom are essential, NEA has no objection. However, if the sentence means that + to mean that prior consultation, general agreement and mutual understanding between the + United States and United Kingdom are essential, NEA has no objection. However, if the sentence means that there is no circumstance in which the United States or the United Kingdom should carry out a course of action alone in Iran, there is ground for much discussion. It is entirely possible that the @@ -21697,15 +18364,13 @@ to remain capable of independent action vis-à-vis Iran.

4(b) If there is no implication that an anti-nationalist dictator could be successful, NEA has no objection to - this statement. A “suitable figure” in NEA’s opinion must be someone capable of identifying + this statement. A “suitable figure” in NEA’s opinion must be someone capable of identifying himself with nationalist issues and emotions although he might gradually deflect the present course of nationalist fanaticism.

4(c) There is a tendency today utterly to disregard the Shah’s importance in the Iranian political scene. As a matter of fact, although he certainly does not exert any independent influence, he is of - considerable usefulness to Dr. Mosadeq at this time as an ally. There is still + considerable usefulness to Dr. Mosadeq at this time as an ally. There is still reportedly considerable loyalty to the Shah in the armed forces, and, throughout Iran, there remains the ancient identification of the Central Government with the figure of the Great King. The Shah does not exert @@ -21734,10 +18399,8 @@ absolute Anglo-United States solidarity. Two such courses of action are listed below:

-

A. Without requiring commitments from Mosadeq regarding a settlement of the Anglo-Iranian oil - dispute, the United States could support the Mosadeq Government with substantial financial aid and a +

A. Without requiring commitments from Mosadeq regarding a settlement of the Anglo-Iranian oil + dispute, the United States could support the Mosadeq Government with substantial financial aid and a program of economic development.

B. The United States Government could take a position that American or other concerns should no longer be discouraged from assisting in the @@ -21754,10 +18417,8 @@ officials believe that Mosadeq is the worst possible Premier Iran could have and that his ability to resist the Tudeh Party is nil. This is in complete contrast to a United - States view that the nationalist Mosadeq Government constitutes at least a chance, - perhaps the last one, to combat Tudeh rule and that although Mosadeq is admittedly very weak, there + States view that the nationalist Mosadeq Government constitutes at least a chance, + perhaps the last one, to combat Tudeh rule and that although Mosadeq is admittedly very weak, there is no better alternative presently in sight.

5. Persian-Soviet Relations

5(a) NEA concurs.

@@ -21773,15 +18434,13 @@ Soviet interests in Iran derive primarily from Russian suspicions of “aggressive western influence”, it seems naive to assume that the Russians would lessen their support of the Tudeh if the West showed an - inclination also to restrict its interest in Iran. In fact, NEA considers that western withdrawal from + inclination also to restrict its interest in Iran. In fact, NEA considers that western withdrawal from Iran would only strengthen Soviet pressures there.

6. Possible Action After the Establishment of a Tudeh Regime

6(a) NEA concurs and adds a qualification that, at present, neither the United States nor the United - Kingdom is willing to assume military responsibility for intervention in Iran in the + Kingdom is willing to assume military responsibility for intervention in Iran in the event of communist aggression.In the left margin next to this paragraph is a handwritten question mark.

@@ -21804,15 +18463,12 @@ communist influence in Persia”. We know of no practicable way to “compel” the Iranian Government to do anything. Furthermore, it is not entirely certain that the best way to prevent a - Tudeh coup is to urge the Iranian Government to take action. The best way in NEA’s view would be to negotiate an oil settlement and the next + Tudeh coup is to urge the Iranian Government to take action. The best way in NEA’s view would be to negotiate an oil settlement and the next best would be to provide financial assistance.

8. The arguments against the statements of section 8(a) have been made above and NEA suggests a substitute paragraph:

-

8(a) “Whether to inform Dr. Mosadeq that we believe his government represents a +

8(a) “Whether to inform Dr. Mosadeq that we believe his government represents a nationalist bulwark against communism and that without requiring commitments regarding the oil dispute, financial aid will be forthcoming so long as he maintains control of the communists.”

@@ -21829,8 +18485,7 @@

Covert Activities

The opening paragraph of the Annex summarizes the main paper and therefore includes the major points which have already been discussed. - Sub-paragraph (d) is particularly in question in NEA, although, so far as it relates to + Sub-paragraph (d) is particularly in question in NEA, although, so far as it relates to liaison and collaboration [less than 1 line not declassified] it would obviously be very difficult to attempt such liaison in the absence of basic agreement on policies.

@@ -21838,8 +18493,7 @@

In general, NEA has no objection to the points raised in this section of the British annex, except that for the reasons stated previously it would seem most unwise to allow “leakage” - to reach the Russians indicating that the United States [less than 1 line not declassified] were prepared + to reach the Russians indicating that the United States [less than 1 line not declassified] were prepared to “write off Persia”.In the left margin next to this sentence is a handwritten note that reads: “I agree.” This could easily set in movement events which would @@ -21855,13 +18509,11 @@ Iran should be stirred to activity by the United States and the United Kingdom only after a Tudeh coup, but without waiting for a general war, on the ground that if the Tudeh were given time to consolidate it could - eliminate the tribes as a factor in the picture.In the left margin next to this sentence is a + eliminate the tribes as a factor in the picture.In the left margin next to this sentence is a handwritten note that reads: “Yes.” Another point which is pertinent to section 5 concerns the United States Consulate at Isfahan where there is no CIA representative, a - lack which could be made up if it is found desirable. [5½ lines not declassified]

+ lack which could be made up if it is found desirable. [5½ lines not declassified]

5(b) Big Bluff

NEA holds considerable reservation regarding the advisability of the “big bluff”, not only for the reasons @@ -21990,38 +18642,25 @@

[4 pages not declassified]

-
+
134. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near - Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State - (Matthews)Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, + Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State + (Matthews)Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 888.2553/10–2352. Top Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Jernegan. Copies were sent to Richards, Beale, - Berry, and Roosevelt. - Washington, October 23, 1952. + Berry, and Roosevelt. + Washington, October 23, 1952. SUBJECT Discussion of British Paper on “The Communist Danger in - Persia”Attached to Document 133. + Persia”Attached to Document 133.

The first discussion with the British Embassy of the paper which they handed in on October 8 was held yesterday. Those participating on the British side were Mr. Burrows, - Mr. Adam Watson, and Mr. Ronald Bailey. The Americans were Mr. Kermit Roosevelt and [name not declassified] of CIA, Mr. Beale of BNA, Mr. - Lampton Berry of S/P, Mr. Richards of GTI and + Mr. Adam Watson, and Mr. Ronald Bailey. The Americans were Mr. Kermit Roosevelt and [name not declassified] of CIA, Mr. Beale of BNA, Mr. + Lampton Berry of S/P, Mr. Richards of GTI and myself.

Mr. Burrows provided a certain amount of background as to the British thinking behind the paper, which @@ -22036,15 +18675,12 @@ British policy toward Iran. So far as we could determine, all of the suggestions in the document must be read within the context of the existing British attitude toward the oil problem.

-

3. The suggestion in Paragraph 4(f) of the British paper that Mosadeq should be influenced by +

3. The suggestion in Paragraph 4(f) of the British paper that Mosadeq should be influenced by economic pressure through “negotiating an oil settlement” and “arranging - financial assistance” merely means, according to Burrows, that if and when a + financial assistance” merely means, according to Burrows, that if and when a settlement is negotiated or financial assistance is extended, conditions should be attached to require the Iranian Government to take suitable - anti-communist measures. Burrows does not believe the Foreign Office is in fact + anti-communist measures. Burrows does not believe the Foreign Office is in fact considering the extension of financial assistance to Iran under any circumstances. He suggests that this item was included in the paper merely in order to list all possibilities, and he reminded us that for @@ -22061,15 +18697,13 @@ an oil settlement when it had so far been impossible to arrive at a settlement even without attaching conditions. After some discussion, however, both the British and we ourselves agreed that if he achieved a - satisfactory oil settlement Dr. Mosadeq might be disposed to move against the Tudeh of + satisfactory oil settlement Dr. Mosadeq might be disposed to move against the Tudeh of his own volition, since he would be relieved of the Western pressure and would no longer need to be so cautious about antagonizing the Russians and their stooges. He would also no longer need the Tudeh as a “bogie” with which to scare the Western Powers.

4. There was some discussion of the British emphasis on “absolute - Anglo-United States solidarity”. It appeared from what Burrows said that this meant in their + Anglo-United States solidarity”. It appeared from what Burrows said that this meant in their minds just what it said. We did not belabor the point but I suggested there might be tactical advantages in maintaining at least the appearance of independent action in certain cases. No attempt was made, @@ -22096,8 +18730,7 @@ and discourage other countries from standing firm against the Russians.

6. With regard to the suggestions of military intervention or tribal - revolt after a Tudeh coup, we advanced the idea that such measures would be politically more + revolt after a Tudeh coup, we advanced the idea that such measures would be politically more feasible if there were a legitimate Iranian authority, some remnant of the former legal government, which would ask our assistance and call on the tribes to defend it. We also suggested the tribes should be @@ -22116,10 +18749,8 @@ of holding only a portion of it.

8. The British put forward very strongly the view that the greatest danger of a communist take-over in Iran does not arise out of the - country’s bad financial situation but rather Dr. Mosadeq’s unwillingness to take - measures to check the growth of communist strength. Burrows argued that there are many + country’s bad financial situation but rather Dr. Mosadeq’s unwillingness to take + measures to check the growth of communist strength. Burrows argued that there are many things within the power of the Government to do which do not depend on money and which are simply not being done. Our objective, they said, should be to induce Mosadeq to @@ -22140,11 +18771,8 @@ text”. No time was set for the next meeting.

-
- 135. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 135. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/10–2752. Confidential; Security Information. Drafted by Finch. Received November 18. @@ -22152,8 +18780,7 @@ No. 314 - Tehran, October 27, 1952. + Tehran, October 27, 1952. SUBJECT Conversation with a Prominent Leader of the National Front @@ -22172,13 +18799,10 @@ buried, but early recognized by Bagai. The beginning was in 1948 when Bagai believed that he could make a strong labor party, based on socialist convictions, if he could unite with him in a - middle-of-the-road policy the anti-communist socialists led by Maleki and the largely leaderless - religious elements. He found the Maleki-men to be hard and efficient workers but not good + middle-of-the-road policy the anti-communist socialists led by Maleki and the largely leaderless + religious elements. He found the Maleki-men to be hard and efficient workers but not good socialists and too ambitious to attempt to dominate the party through - their own faction. Dr. Bagai alleged that Mr. Maleki supported a change of government + their own faction. Dr. Bagai alleged that Mr. Maleki supported a change of government from a monarchy to a republic. When Dr. Bagai left on his trip to Europe and to the United States (and more lately) when he was ill, he left the power of the party in their hands. On his return to active participation @@ -22188,8 +18812,7 @@

Bagai therefore forced the issue and said that unless the party was purged of those elements, he would resign. Asked if he would return if the Maleki faction were forced - out he agreed, and (having witnessed the discrediting of Maleki) he had no alternative but to + out he agreed, and (having witnessed the discrediting of Maleki) he had no alternative but to keep his word and resume active participation, as leader, of the party. During this part of the conversation Dr. Bagai seemed abstracted and warmed up during the second phase of the talk.

@@ -22219,9 +18842,7 @@ He said that earlier he had proposed to the Government that it use the unskilled labor to build irrigation canals in the south and roads in the north but the Government did not favor it.

-

5. He believes that his split with Maleki will go on indefinitely, with Maleki gradually losing the +

5. He believes that his split with Maleki will go on indefinitely, with Maleki gradually losing the intellectuals’ support he now has; that no worker does, or will, support Maleki. He pictures a withering away of Maleki as a @@ -22254,8 +18875,7 @@ the machinations of the AIOC influence with the government just after the Second World War (when the labor law was passed). He stated that the proof of his allegations were in the - documents captured by the Workers’ Party from the AIOC information office. Dr. Bagai stated + documents captured by the Workers’ Party from the AIOC information office. Dr. Bagai stated that it should be a primary responsibility of the deputies of the Parliament to pass a new, and enforceable, labor law. He personally believes that the only hope for effective enforcement is in the control @@ -22274,35 +18894,25 @@ the oil question, or that it will generate an American urge to underwrite whatever budget deficits might exist.

For the Ambassador:

- - Roy M. - Melbourne - First Secretary of Embassy - - +
-
- 136. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 136. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 84, London Embassy Files, Lot 59 F 59, classified general records, Box 274. Secret; Security Information. Received at 6:21 p.m. Repeated to London and pouched to Moscow, Ankara, Baghdad, Kabul, Karachi, Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Tel Aviv, Jidda, Dhahran, Rome for Unger, Isfahan, Meshed, and Tabriz. - Tehran, October 30, + Tehran, October 30, 1952, 3 p.m.

1765. On occasion Iran break in diplomatic relations with United Kingdom,Iran severed diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom on October 22. following general estimate Iran situation made by Embassy, Svc Attachés and CAS:

-

1. General: Events since accession second Mosadeq +

1. General: Events since accession second Mosadeq NF government have impressed us with fact that political and social revolution in progress here. We believe it improbable, except under aegis dictatorship, that former Iran ruling @@ -22324,19 +18934,13 @@ been effectively disrupted, cowed, or has joined Front. Majlis remains in its unrelaxed grip and government apparently intends it be mere echo. This position strength we consider transitory, since internal coalition - rivalries may be expected develop to point of schism. If Mosadeq should disappear from political + rivalries may be expected develop to point of schism. If Mosadeq should disappear from political scene, result would probably be still weaker government. There not believed any recognized NF leader with - prestige sufficient replace Mosadeq and keep in check personal ambitions other - NF chiefs. For moment, Mosadeq, apparently with Fatemi as chief adviser, has + prestige sufficient replace Mosadeq and keep in check personal ambitions other + NF chiefs. For moment, Mosadeq, apparently with Fatemi as chief adviser, has temporarily rebuffed Kashani’s - intrigues by repressive measures against so called General Zahedi plot and thru striking action in breaking relations + intrigues by repressive measures against so called General Zahedi plot and thru striking action in breaking relations with U.K. There is real division within Front over feasibility internal reforms on basis oilless economy and no Front leader can answer how miracle can be accomplished. This looms as possible future cause of @@ -22353,8 +18957,7 @@ which once stronghold of Shah’s influence. Shah has successively alienated groups of supporters thru course he had followed so that one embittered Senator has called him “most dangerous man in Iran”. While - armed forces still ostensibly loyal to him, time and NF administration will progressively weaken + armed forces still ostensibly loyal to him, time and NF administration will progressively weaken this tie. We believe Front considers him useful as symbol so long as he concurs with their purposes.

4. Landowners and Merchants: No @@ -22371,19 +18974,15 @@ heightened by confusion over government’s agrarian reform intentions.

6. Labor: Trade Union movement divided seriously, with further divisions - expected, so that Commie Central United Council Trade Unions (CUCTU) presently has dominant position. + expected, so that Commie Central United Council Trade Unions (CUCTU) presently has dominant position. Labor Minister has been unable stem trend. Within Front, Baghai’s anti Commie Workers Party has split, while new trade union projected by Under - Secretary Labor expected have little success. CUCTU only labor organization efficiently run, possessing - zeal and with available funds. Recently CUCTU overcame long ministry opposition and secured legal + Secretary Labor expected have little success. CUCTU only labor organization efficiently run, possessing + zeal and with available funds. Recently CUCTU overcame long ministry opposition and secured legal registration Commie dominated Telephone and Telegraph Workers Union.

7. Religious Influences: Altho religious elements of extremist character appear be gaining influence in political and social affairs of country, - they thus far provide no real reason believe they would be practical obstruction to Tudeh control + they thus far provide no real reason believe they would be practical obstruction to Tudeh control or that they could not be manipulated by Commies. Conservative intellectual leaders being neutralized by demagogic types such as Kashani, who, despite any @@ -22407,8 +19006,7 @@ apparently believes he can control armed forces and that their existence under such control essential to maintenance his regime. He arranged series arbitrary shifts among senior officers for political reasons, - notably in general staff with appointment Chief of Staff Baharmast. He further reduced + notably in general staff with appointment Chief of Staff Baharmast. He further reduced possibility military coup by decentralizing command of Tehran garrison. Prime Minister avoids serious damage morale by still resisting pressure to punish certain officers for attempts maintain order at time July @@ -22482,15 +19080,11 @@ provide political support and economic assistance which will enable Iran cope with its internal problems.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
- 137. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 137. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 469, Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies 1948–1961, Mission to Iran, Executive Office Subject Files (Central Files) 1951–1961, Box 4, Folder 4, Point @@ -22500,27 +19094,21 @@ Warne’s account of this same meeting, October 30, was sent to the Department in despatch 347, November 2. (Ibid.) - Tehran, October 30, 1952. + Tehran, October 30, 1952.

1771. 1. At Mosadeq’s request Warne and I called on him this morning. He opened conversation by expressing deepest appreciation - of work which Point IV under Warne’s direction was accomplishing in Iran. He said his + of work which Point IV under Warne’s direction was accomplishing in Iran. He said his various ministers who were cooperating with Point IV had unanimously expressed to him their appreciation of what Point IV was doing and - admiration and affection for Warne. They were convinced that Warne and Point IV personnel were + admiration and affection for Warne. They were convinced that Warne and Point IV personnel were really friends of Iran and doing all they could to assist Iran and Iranian people. Warne thanked PriMin, pointing out that he had - always received full cooperation from ministers in Mosadeq’s Cabinet and from other + always received full cooperation from ministers in Mosadeq’s Cabinet and from other Iranian officials. He described certain recent activities of Point IV and assured PriMin that spirit of - cooperation between Point IV and members Iranian Govt and Iranian officials could not be + cooperation between Point IV and members Iranian Govt and Iranian officials could not be better.

2. PriMin said there were two matters in particular which he would like to discuss. He hoped that we would @@ -22528,54 +19116,43 @@ work of Point IV be successful in Iran. Point IV was so closely interwoven with present Iranian Govt that its failure wld not only damage - Iran but it wld damage present Govt and its success wld be of benefit both to Iran and to + Iran but it wld damage present Govt and its success wld be of benefit both to Iran and to Iranian Govt.

3. Mosadeq referred to salaries being paid Iranians employed by Point IV. According to his info scale salaries was higher than that of Iranian Governmental employees. This - difference was giving rise to certain amount resentment and jealousy. He hoped that Warne could take steps to bring Point + difference was giving rise to certain amount resentment and jealousy. He hoped that Warne could take steps to bring Point IV salaries into harmony with those paid to Iranian Governmental - officials and employees. If Warne could successfully take these steps it might + officials and employees. If Warne could successfully take these steps it might prevent development of friction which could seriously injure work of Point IV in Iran.

4. Warne said that he had already gone into this matter and in fact had asked a committee to make further investigations and recommendations. In meantime he inclined believe there was really no great disparity between Point IV salary scales and - those of Iranian Govt. It shld be borne in mind that (a) Point IV + those of Iranian Govt. It shld be borne in mind that (a) Point IV employees were required to give full time to Point IV work; they put in longer hours and were not permitted to accept other employment or resort - to other means of adding to their income whereas many Iranian Govt officials and employees were in a + to other means of adding to their income whereas many Iranian Govt officials and employees were in a position because of their short working day to augment their salaries by engaging in other types of work. (b) Point IV employees had been carefully selected and in general had higher qualifications than average Iranian Governmental employees. Most of them for instance were bi-lingual. Some of them upon entering Point IV had been given [more?] - responsible positions than those which they had occupied in the Govt. It was understandable therefore + responsible positions than those which they had occupied in the Govt. It was understandable therefore that number were receiving higher salaries. Nevertheless he prepared go further into matter and take steps adjust certain salary scales which might seem out of line with Iranian Governmental salaries.

Mosadeq said he was not insisting that income of Point IV employees shld - necessarily be reduced. He hoped that their salary scales cld be put on same level as that of Govt employees and that such addl amts as + necessarily be reduced. He hoped that their salary scales cld be put on same level as that of Govt employees and that such addl amts as they might receive be paid in form of overtime, bonuses for special qualifications, etc. Salary scales might be published in order to counter exaggerated rumors.

5. Mosadeq said he wished discuss another problem of delicate nature. Before doing so he wanted to make sure that Warne agreed with him - that extremely close cooperation between Point IV and Iranian Govt was necessary in interest of both + that extremely close cooperation between Point IV and Iranian Govt was necessary in interest of both organizations. When Warne expressed agreement, PriMin said unfortunately there were some Point IV employees hostile to Iranian @@ -22586,76 +19163,53 @@ statements made to Mosadeq by prominent member Majlis in presence of several Natl Front leaders, was engaging in activities hostile to Govt - Iran. It was not necessary for Mosadeq to point out that Zahedi was son of and undoubtedly under influence of + Iran. It was not necessary for Mosadeq to point out that Zahedi was son of and undoubtedly under influence of Gen. Zahedi, who had been connected with Brit and who had been carrying on - activities aimed at overthrow of Mosadeq. Presence man like Zahedi in Point IV wld - strengthen propaganda which certainly would be instituted by mbrs Tudeh and other enemies US + activities aimed at overthrow of Mosadeq. Presence man like Zahedi in Point IV wld + strengthen propaganda which certainly would be instituted by mbrs Tudeh and other enemies US to effect that US was now taking place of Brit in intriguing for overthrow present Iranian Govt.

6. Warne said he had been - conscious of fact that presence Zahedi in Point IV might give rise to criticisms. PriMin would recall that Zahedi had been lent to Point IV by - MinAgriculture over year and half ago; that Zahedi’s father at that time was cooperating closely - with Natl Front and was subsequently MinInt in Mosadeq’s - Cabinet; and that only recently had Zahedi’s father come out in opposition to present Govt. Point IV was not political + conscious of fact that presence Zahedi in Point IV might give rise to criticisms. PriMin would recall that Zahedi had been lent to Point IV by + MinAgriculture over year and half ago; that Zahedi’s father at that time was cooperating closely + with Natl Front and was subsequently MinInt in Mosadeq’s + Cabinet; and that only recently had Zahedi’s father come out in opposition to present Govt. Point IV was not political organization; practically all of its personnel had been lent to it by various agencies of Iranian Govt with approval of Iranian Cabinet mbrs. It had been his policy not to remove Point IV personnel thus employed unless there was no longer need [for] their services, or unless they shld be found to be incompetent or - engaged in improper activities. Zahedi had been under special supervision in view + engaged in improper activities. Zahedi had been under special supervision in view father’s present opposition to Govt and no evidence of improper activities had thus far been found.

-

7. I told PriMin he shld be able as experienced administrator - to understand that if employees of Point IV shld obtain impression that whenever some mbr of Majlis or +

7. I told PriMin he shld be able as experienced administrator + to understand that if employees of Point IV shld obtain impression that whenever some mbr of Majlis or other influential Iranian shld make unsubstantiated charge against them, they would be discharged, morale whole organization wld be lowered and - it will be difficult for Point IV to operate effectively. PriMin replied it might well be + it will be difficult for Point IV to operate effectively. PriMin replied it might well be impossible to prove subversive political activities of Point IV employees engaging in them because these personnel might succeed in - concealing such activities. In certain instances it shld be clear without proof that - individual employees were disloyal to Govt and that their continued presence in Point IV was + concealing such activities. In certain instances it shld be clear without proof that + individual employees were disloyal to Govt and that their continued presence in Point IV was harmful to Point IV and Iran.

8. I said that Warne and I had discussed problem Zahedi shortly - after latter’s father had come out in opposition to Govt. We had decided it wld be unfair to discharge him unless we + after latter’s father had come out in opposition to Govt. We had decided it wld be unfair to discharge him unless we cld find some evidence of his involvement but that he shld be kept under close observation. Thus far we had not detected any improper - activity on his part. In response my question Mosadeq said that at present he had no + activity on his part. In response my question Mosadeq said that at present he had no complaint against any other Point IV personnel.

9. Warne said he desired to cooperate closely with Govt and asked PriMin if he wished that Zahedi’s connection with - Point IV be severed completely or that Zahedi merely be moved to some technical post where he + Point IV be severed completely or that Zahedi merely be moved to some technical post where he wld not have wide contacts and where his presence in Point IV wld not attract undue attention. PriMin @@ -22663,19 +19217,12 @@ taken at present re Zahedi. He wld investigate charges which had been made and wld let us know results - later. He added with smile that perhaps General Zahedi might find it advantageous in present situation again to + later. He added with smile that perhaps General Zahedi might find it advantageous in present situation again to become supporter of Govt. In that - event there need not be so much concern re son.In telegram 1893 from Tehran, November 7, Henderson reported the following: + event there need not be so much concern re son.In telegram 1893 from Tehran, November 7, Henderson reported the following: “Mosadeq sent word to me - today that after careful investigation Zahedi he convinced latter had been engaged in - activities incompatible with his duties employee TCA and shld be separated from that organization. “Accordingly, + today that after careful investigation Zahedi he convinced latter had been engaged in + activities incompatible with his duties employee TCA and shld be separated from that organization. “Accordingly, Warne is informing Zahedi today that he is being removed at least temporarily from role active employee.” @@ -22686,18 +19233,13 @@ they might also insist upon Soviet nationals being allowed engage in activities in that area parallel those of Point IV. He therefore hoped that Point IV work in northern Iran wld - be carried on from Tehran exclusively by Iranian officials. Mosadeq apparently was not aware that + be carried on from Tehran exclusively by Iranian officials. Mosadeq apparently was not aware that Point IV offices were operating in North. He seemed particularly interested in Azerbaijan. We explained to him that Point IV office had been opened in Tabriz many months ago; that American Point IV personnel were directing its activities; and that these activities were being - carried on for most part through Iran Govt agencies. We pointed out that thus far there had been - no serious repercussions because of presence of US Point IV personnel in Azerbaijan. Mosadeq finally stated he wld not insist upon withdrawal these + carried on for most part through Iran Govt agencies. We pointed out that thus far there had been + no serious repercussions because of presence of US Point IV personnel in Azerbaijan. Mosadeq finally stated he wld not insist upon withdrawal these officials but he hoped that they wld carry on their work quietly and not attract undue attention to themselves. He also again expressed hope no high Point IV officials @@ -22705,61 +19247,40 @@ visits wld be sure to cause sharp Soviet reaction. Soviet Union likely to bring further embarrassing pressure on him. It might even instigate acts of violence against Point - IV residents or visitors in northern Iran. It wld be disastrous to Iran if any Point IV officials in + IV residents or visitors in northern Iran. It wld be disastrous to Iran if any Point IV officials in northern Iran shld suffer physical injury. Warne said that neither - he nor any visiting high Point IV officials wld go to Azerbaijan without first consulting with PriMin.

+ he nor any visiting high Point IV officials wld go to Azerbaijan without first consulting with PriMin.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
- 138. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Eisenhower Library, Disaster File Series, NSC Staff Papers, Box 65, Iran +
+ 138. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Eisenhower Library, Disaster File Series, NSC Staff Papers, Box 65, Iran Section. Top Secret; Security Information; Eyes Only. There is no drafting information on the memorandum, which is attached to a - memorandum from the Deputy Director of Intelligence, Loftus E. Becker, to Lay, November 3. According to + memorandum from the Deputy Director of Intelligence, Loftus E. Becker, to Lay, November 3. According to Becker, this memorandum - was “prepared in connection with the current revision of NSC 107/2, ‘The Position of the United + was “prepared in connection with the current revision of NSC 107/2, ‘The Position of the United States with Respect to Iran.’” - Washington, undated. + Washington, undated.

STUDY OF CIA CAPABILITIES IN IRAN

REFERENCE Memorandum for the Senior NSC Staff Entitled The Position of the United States - with Respect to Iran, dated 13 October 1952Reference is to a draft revision of NSC 107/2, prepared and ciculated + with Respect to Iran, dated 13 October 1952Reference is to a draft revision of NSC 107/2, prepared and ciculated by the NSC Staff, October 13. (National Archives, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Policy Papers, Box - 210, NSC 136 US Pol re Iran) + 210, NSC 136 US Pol re Iran)

A. CIA Capabilities Under Present - Conditions (Para. 4.d., 13 October draft NSC 107/2)Paragraph 4 and - sub-paragraph d of the draft revision of NSC 107/2, October 13, read: “To prevent communist + Conditions (Para. 4.d., 13 October draft NSC 107/2)Paragraph 4 and + sub-paragraph d of the draft revision of NSC 107/2, October 13, read: “To prevent communist capture of power in Iran, either through perversion of the nationalist movement or by armed uprising, and to promote a government in power in Iran capable of maintaining internal order @@ -22771,31 +19292,26 @@ operations have had some success in delaying the trend toward Tudeh domination, they have not succeeded in reversing that trend, primarily because of the widespread anti-Western feeling which makes Iran so - fertile a field for Tudeh exploitation. CIA has been unable to attack successfully this more basic + fertile a field for Tudeh exploitation. CIA has been unable to attack successfully this more basic problem because of the Iranian reaction to past and present U.S. and - U.K. policies toward Iran. In its operations, CIA has been forced to rely on strongly nationalistic + U.K. policies toward Iran. In its operations, CIA has been forced to rely on strongly nationalistic elements. While these elements are strongly motivated against the Tudeh threat, they share the common Iranian views that all British influence must be eliminated from Iran and that the U.S. has supported the U.K. in - the oil controversy. Because of this situation CIA has been unable to mount operations designed to reduce + the oil controversy. Because of this situation CIA has been unable to mount operations designed to reduce anti-Western feeling in Iran.

2. Under present conditions, CIA is in a position to influence specific political, military and religious leaders to speak out strongly against the Tudeh threat on particular occasions and to induce certain political and military leaders to institute administrative and security actions to curb Tudeh activities - (demonstrations, strikes, etc.) on specific occasions. It can also assist certain + (demonstrations, strikes, etc.) on specific occasions. It can also assist certain political factions to oppose Tudeh candidates in elections, to maintain anti-Tudeh propaganda, and to attack physically Tudeh facilities and demonstrations. CIA is also in a position to obtain the publication of anti-Tudeh material in the press, and in pamphlets, books, posters, etc.

-

3. However, CIA is not in a position to influence the Iranian Government (as +

3. However, CIA is not in a position to influence the Iranian Government (as opposed to individuals in the Government) to adopt a consistent policy to curb the activities and reduce the growing influence of the Tudeh Party. Nor is CIA able to influence the @@ -22804,29 +19320,25 @@ to adopt necessary financial, judicial, and administrative reforms. If, however, the U.S. Government were to intervene, with or without British agreement, to bring about an oil settlement and aid program which an - Iranian government could justify to its own people, CIA’s ability to influence significant + Iranian government could justify to its own people, CIA’s ability to influence significant elements of the Iranian Government to take anti-Tudeh as well as more positive constructive measures to improve the internal situation would, of course, be greatly increased. (Paras. 4.c. and e., NSC draft)

4. In the event of a government crisis involving the resignation of - Mossadeq, CIA might conceivably have some influence + Mossadeq, CIA might conceivably have some influence on the choice of a successor.

5. In addition to these operations, CIA is making plans and taking other preliminary steps to assist potential resistance groups in Iran in the event of a Tudeh coup. Planning for such activity is underway and limited stockpiling of matériel has been carried out. However, CIA’s assets in - Iran for such activity are limited and CIA is unable (for obvious reasons) to concert its plans + Iran for such activity are limited and CIA is unable (for obvious reasons) to concert its plans with the potentially friendly resistance groups until the emergency actually arises. While, therefore, liaison on hot war stay-behind plans is being maintained with certain potential resistance groups, nothing - has been done to alert them to the fact that CIA is planning to support them in circumstances short of + has been done to alert them to the fact that CIA is planning to support them in circumstances short of global war. This could of course be done, if the urgency of the situation were thought to require it, but it must be recognized that to do so would run definite security and political hazards. The existing @@ -22837,14 +19349,11 @@ CIA Capabilities in the Event of a Significant Increase in Tudeh Influence

1. Any great increase in Tudeh influence, whether or not accompanied by - legalization of the Tudeh Party, would seriously reduce CIA capabilities in the political and - psychological fields in Iran. Such a development would probably result in still greater + legalization of the Tudeh Party, would seriously reduce CIA capabilities in the political and + psychological fields in Iran. Such a development would probably result in still greater leniency being shown by the Iranian security forces toward Tudeh and a disposition on the part of the government to crack down on certain - political factions that are Tudeh’s most bitter opponents. CIA would thus find it increasingly + political factions that are Tudeh’s most bitter opponents. CIA would thus find it increasingly difficult to induce anti-Tudeh individuals and groups to speak out or take action against Tudeh. CIA-induced or supported anti-Tudeh propaganda activities would be particularly hard @@ -22853,17 +19362,14 @@ destruction of their facilities by Tudeh activists.

2. A significant increase in Tudeh influence would probably have a less serious effect on CIA preparations to - support potential resistance groups and might, in fact, increase CIA capabilities. Such a development might + support potential resistance groups and might, in fact, increase CIA capabilities. Such a development might well increase the willingness of these groups to deal more closely with the U.S. and might even induce them to request assistance in opposing Tudeh.

C. CIA Capabilities in the Event of Tudeh Domination of the Iranian Government and Army (Para 6, - NSC Draft)Paragraph 6 of the draft revision of NSC 107/2, October 13, reads: “In the + NSC Draft)Paragraph 6 of the draft revision of NSC 107/2, October 13, reads: “In the event that a communist government achieves complete control of Iran so rapidly that no legal Iranian Government is available to request assistance, the position of the United States would have to be @@ -22876,15 +19382,12 @@ develop or maintain localized centers of resistance and to harass, undermine, and if possible, to bring about the overthrow of the communist government.”

-

1. Special political operations would probably largely cease. Many CIA agents would almost certainly have to - leave the country. The most optimistic estimate is that CIA could induce sporadic terrorist +

1. Special political operations would probably largely cease. Many CIA agents would almost certainly have to + leave the country. The most optimistic estimate is that CIA could induce sporadic terrorist activity against Tudeh leaders, initiate rumor campaigns, and in general keep the public aware of an underground, Western-oriented resistance movement.

-

2. In view of its current limited resistance assets in Iran, CIA could do almost nothing directly to +

2. In view of its current limited resistance assets in Iran, CIA could do almost nothing directly to oppose the establishment of a Tudeh regime. It could, however, encourage and assist certain tribal groups to maintain control of their own territory against a Tudeh central government. Under the assumed @@ -22893,14 +19396,11 @@ U.S. representatives on the subject.

3. The establishment of a U.S. military base in Iraq, which we understand to be under consideration in the Department of Defense, would greatly - improve prospects for maintaining special political operations in Iran and would obviously be + improve prospects for maintaining special political operations in Iran and would obviously be of tremendous advantage to CIA in - mounting and maintaining resistance operations. It would provide CIA with a secure base near the area of + mounting and maintaining resistance operations. It would provide CIA with a secure base near the area of operations; provide on-the-spot communications and logistical - assistance; and possibly make available to CIA aircraft for clandestine operations into Iran. Perhaps + assistance; and possibly make available to CIA aircraft for clandestine operations into Iran. Perhaps most important of all, such a military base would help to maintain the morale of all Iranians opposed to the Tudeh Party. It would probably also have a decisive effect on the degree of U.S. control over @@ -22916,9 +19416,7 @@ CIA Capabilities in the Event of a Tudeh Coup Followed by the Withdrawal to the South of a Significant Proportion of Iran’s Armed Forces (para 5.b., - NSC Draft)Paragraph 5 and sub-paragraph b of the draft revision of NSC 107/2, October 13, read: “In the + NSC Draft)Paragraph 5 and sub-paragraph b of the draft revision of NSC 107/2, October 13, read: “In the event of either an attempted or an actual communist seizure of power in one or more of the provinces of Iran or in Tehran, the United States should be prepared to support a legal Iranian Government, if @@ -22942,65 +19440,47 @@ were to accompany the anti-Tudeh regime in its withdrawal to the south and were to be expanded, CIA capabilities would be still further increased.

-

3. However, in view of the fact that the USSR would presumably give the Tudeh regime substantial +

3. However, in view of the fact that the USSR would presumably give the Tudeh regime substantial assistance, and would increase its assistance proportionately as our assistance appeared to threaten Tudeh control of the north, it is unlikely that the Tudeh regime could be overthrown by Iranian action supported solely by clandestine means.

-
- 139. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 139. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1950–1952, classified general records, Box 25. Secret; Security - Information; Priority; No Distribution. Drafted by Henderson. The telegram is the + Information; Priority; No Distribution. Drafted by Henderson. The telegram is the Embassy copy as approved and has no time of transmission. - Tehran, November 4, 1952. + Tehran, November 4, 1952.

1836. 1. During my talk with PriMin - this morning he said several days ago info had come to him that Brit agent was circulating among tribes + this morning he said several days ago info had come to him that Brit agent was circulating among tribes in area of Luristan; stopping at houses of tribal leaders; asking numerous questions re matters domestic concern; and in general stirring up tribesmen. He had given orders for arrest this agent but was later - astonished to learn that foreigner in question was Amer citizen named Dubois; who claimed to + astonished to learn that foreigner in question was Amer citizen named Dubois; who claimed to be mbr State Dept traveling in Iran. This foreigner cld not give convincing - explanation for his presence among tribesmen. PriMin asked if I cld tell him more about Dubois.

+ explanation for his presence among tribesmen. PriMin asked if I cld tell him more about Dubois.

2. I said Arthur Dubois arrived Tehran several months ago. He was mbr Dept State engaged in research. He had not been in Iran for many years. Purpose this visit was to spend several months in country getting acquainted with changed conditions. It was not easy for researcher in Dept to - obtain accurate picture Iran from written reports. PriMin remarked that Dubois was - therefore really a spy. I said that if US official, friendly to Iran and working on Iranian + obtain accurate picture Iran from written reports. PriMin remarked that Dubois was + therefore really a spy. I said that if US official, friendly to Iran and working on Iranian matters in US, was engaging in espionage if he traveled thru country endeavoring obtain first hand impressions - then Dubois was spy. Scores of prominent Iranians went to US annually for same purpose and no one + then Dubois was spy. Scores of prominent Iranians went to US annually for same purpose and no one considered them as spies.

3. PriMin said tribal areas in Iran extremely sensitive. Amers going into such areas likely be exploited by - tribal leaders disloyal to central govt, who by entertaining these Amers wld endeavor give impression they had - support of US. Furthermore, PriMin was afraid that Amers going into - these areas might unconsciously become agents of Brit who no longer dare send their own - nationals to tribes. He hoped that Amer + tribal leaders disloyal to central govt, who by entertaining these Amers wld endeavor give impression they had + support of US. Furthermore, PriMin was afraid that Amers going into + these areas might unconsciously become agents of Brit who no longer dare send their own + nationals to tribes. He hoped that Amer natls, particularly during this period, wld refrain from visits among tribes other than those of official character.

@@ -23008,16 +19488,13 @@ Dubois had not conducted himself improperly or had not engaged in political activities. Dubois was planning in any event to return to US shortly after he had completed - his trip. I said I wld ask all Amer Governmental officials in Iran to + his trip. I said I wld ask all Amer Governmental officials in Iran to refrain from traveling among tribes merely for purposes of visiting friends, satisfying curiosity, engaging in shooting expeditions, etc. I added that of course it wld be - necessary in pursuance of their work for various + necessary in pursuance of their work for various Amer officials to visit or pass thru - tribal areas. Whenever this necessity arose I wld make special effort to see that appropriate + tribal areas. Whenever this necessity arose I wld make special effort to see that appropriate governmental authorities were fully informed in advance re contemplated trips.

5. Shortly after my return to Emb I @@ -23030,42 +19507,32 @@ police had stopped Dubois in southern Iran for purpose checking his documents, but that they had not held him, and that he was returning to Tehran. Mosadeq agreed with this - explanation except that he insisted that Iranian Govt + explanation except that he insisted that Iranian Govt wld state that Dubois was returning to Tehran on request Iranian Govt.

6. I believe it wld be wise for Dubois to leave Iran several days after his arrival in Tehran. I also venture - recommend that during this difficult period visits of US officials to Iran for purposes of + recommend that during this difficult period visits of US officials to Iran for purposes of “orientation” be reduced to minimum.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
- 140. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 140. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1950–1952, classified general records, Box 42. Secret; Security - Information; Limited Distribution; Noforn. Drafted by Henderson. Repeated to London. The telegram is the + Information; Limited Distribution; Noforn. Drafted by Henderson. Repeated to London. The telegram is the Embassy copy as approved and has no time of transmission. - Tehran, November 9, 1952. + Tehran, November 9, 1952.

1907. 1. Two days ago Kashani sent message asking me to call on him. I did so Nov 8. Our conversation somewhat disjointed and inconclusive since after one hour another appointment compelled me leave. I shall see him again evening Nov 10.

2. It not yet clear just why he wanted see me unless he wished give - impression to friends or enemies or both he was in touch with US. He started conversation by saying + impression to friends or enemies or both he was in touch with US. He started conversation by saying policies US Govt ruining his health and damaging Iran and if continued might lead to third world war, destruction modern @@ -23078,17 +19545,14 @@ world unity. United Moslem world would devote itself to combatting aggressive communism, tyrannical imperialism, and colonialism. He needed US help in his enterprise which if - successful would prevent another world war. If US was really working for peace and against oppression it + successful would prevent another world war. If US was really working for peace and against oppression it should give him help.

3. When I asked him what kind help he needed he said he was not asking for money. What he wanted was for US to come out openly against imperialism and colonialism as it had come out against communism. If US should remain - silent in face of imperialistic and colonial policies of UK and France, opponents of imperialism and - colonialism could only draw inference that US was partner of imperialist and colonial powers. I told + silent in face of imperialistic and colonial policies of UK and France, opponents of imperialism and + colonialism could only draw inference that US was partner of imperialist and colonial powers. I told him US was against imperialism and against kind of oppression of colonies which was usually referred to as colonialism. Main objective US at @@ -23097,66 +19561,47 @@ world peace. This unity could not be obtained if one mbr free world wld publicly attack other members of free world for certain practices or policies which it did not happen - to approve. In present world situation US was of opinion it could contribute most to cause of + to approve. In present world situation US was of opinion it could contribute most to cause of peace by endeavoring through persuasion and by private conversations to prevail upon other free countries to desist from policies or practices - which might seem contrary to spirit of UN. Kashani said + which might seem contrary to spirit of UN. Kashani said only real way to combat imperialism and colonialism was to come out publicly against them. If US should not openly take sides in this struggle he would denounce it just as much as he intended to denounce countries guilty of imperialism and colonialism. - He gave number alleged illustrations of US partnership with imperialism and colonialism and + He gave number alleged illustrations of US partnership with imperialism and colonialism and oppression in general, touching particularly on Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Palestine. He said US partnership with imperialist powers in exploiting weaker peoples not in keeping with principles to which US maintained it - adhered. Turning to Iran he wanted to know why if US was not taking side of imperialism it + adhered. Turning to Iran he wanted to know why if US was not taking side of imperialism it was supporting Brit blockade by boycotting Iranian oil. It was difficult to explain to excitable and - unreasoning person like Kashani why Iranian oil was not being sold to US. I did my best however do so.

-

4. In spite of his intemperate language Kashani seemed to be in personally friendly mood and + unreasoning person like Kashani why Iranian oil was not being sold to US. I did my best however do so.

+

4. In spite of his intemperate language Kashani seemed to be in personally friendly mood and from time to time softened conversation with jokes and anecdotes. I do not know what he intends to discuss during our next conversation. He may be more specific in indicating kind of help he would like have. Few days ago Busheri, former mbr Mosadeq’s - cabinet who is on friendly terms with Kashani, intimated to me that Kashani - wld be happy if US + cabinet who is on friendly terms with Kashani, intimated to me that Kashani + wld be happy if US cld help finance cost of transport of some of delegates to Moslem conference. Kashani thus far however has not given any indication that he desired such aid.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
- 141. Letter From Secretary of Defense Lovett to Secretary of State AchesonSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.5/11–1052. Top +
+ 141. Letter From Secretary of Defense Lovett to Secretary of State AchesonSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.5/11–1052. Top Secret; Security Information. On another copy of this letter is a handwritten note, dated November 19, that reads: “Delivered to the - President for information, and returned.” (Eisenhower Library, Disaster File + President for information, and returned.” (Eisenhower Library, Disaster File Series, NSC Staff Papers, Box 69, Iran Section) - Washington, November 10, 1952. + Washington, November 10, 1952. Dear Mr. Secretary: @@ -23166,8 +19611,7 @@ on assumptions contained in the request for advice. The studies undertaken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff have now proceeded sufficiently to produce tentative conclusions. Their views are forwarded as inclosure - for use in connection with the current revision of NSC 107/2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have + for use in connection with the current revision of NSC 107/2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated they will re-examine the courses of action, and initiate planning as appropriate to implement any course(s) of action which the revision of NSC 107/2 may indicate.

@@ -23187,8 +19631,7 @@ Iran

1. Reference is made to paragraph 3 of the memorandum by the Joint Chiefs - of Staff, dated 5 September 1952, on the above subject.Not found. The studies referred to have + of Staff, dated 5 September 1952, on the above subject.Not found. The studies referred to have proceeded sufficiently to produce tentative conclusions which are forwarded herewith for such use as may be appropriate in considering the revision of NSC 107/2. The Joint Chiefs @@ -23207,10 +19650,8 @@ world that the United States is not going to permit Soviet domination of the Middle East.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to emphasize that the United States - cannot deploy forces to Iran without a grave risk of inciting the USSR to invoke, with or without Iranian - consent, the Soviet-Iranian Mutual Defense Pact of 1921.See footnote 5, Document + cannot deploy forces to Iran without a grave risk of inciting the USSR to invoke, with or without Iranian + consent, the Soviet-Iranian Mutual Defense Pact of 1921.See footnote 5, Document 145.

4. Studies were made to determine whether or not, under present conditions, there are feasible U.S. military courses of action which @@ -23283,8 +19724,7 @@ the U.S. war plans, stationing of U.S. Air Forces in Turkey would materially demonstrate evidence of U.S. support. Additionally, the combination of the U.K. forces in Iraq mentioned above and the U.S. - forces in southern Turkey would further deployments in support of NATO war plans.

+ forces in southern Turkey would further deployments in support of NATO war plans.

d. Deploy U.S. forces on the order of 1 Division reinforced and necessary supporting air and naval forces to the vicinity of Basra with a mission of assisting Middle East governments in @@ -23304,8 +19744,7 @@

b. These limited U.S., U.K., and/or other Commonwealth forces probably could not insure the re-establishment of a Western oriented government in Iran, but could cooperate with and - covertly support the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as required in the overthrow of a + covertly support the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as required in the overthrow of a Tudeh regime and re-establishment of a friendly government.

8. Under Condition III—Anti-Communist Iranian forces @@ -23342,33 +19781,24 @@ and other logistical support.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

- W.M. - FechtelerPrinted from a + W.M. + FechtelerPrinted from a copy with this typed signature and an indication that the original was signed. Chief of Naval Operations
-
- 142. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 142. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1950–1952, classified general records, Box 42. Secret; Security - Information; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Henderson. Repeated to London and + Information; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Henderson. Repeated to London and pouched to Moscow. The telegram is the Embassy copy as approved and has no time of transmission. - Tehran, November 11, 1952. -

1933. 1. I concluded my conversation with Kashani yesterday afternoon (Embtel 1907 Nov 9).Document 140. During our talk which - lasted approx two hours Kashani stated little that was new. He devoted + Tehran, November 11, 1952. +

1933. 1. I concluded my conversation with Kashani yesterday afternoon (Embtel 1907 Nov 9).Document 140. During our talk which + lasted approx two hours Kashani stated little that was new. He devoted considerable time to expounding his religious views, quoting liberally from Koran; in friendly but unvarnished language he again criticized US @@ -23399,10 +19829,8 @@ communists during last thirty years had made considerable progress in replacing Islam with atheism in that area. It had been impossible for new religious leaders to be trained; many of them had been eliminated - and those who survived had become mere puppets of Sov States; Moslem children were being - educated in atheistic schools. Kashani said he could admit that if communists once in + and those who survived had become mere puppets of Sov States; Moslem children were being + educated in atheistic schools. Kashani said he could admit that if communists once in control Iranian educational system they could gradually eliminate religion. This situation made it all more important that Christian US cooperate with Moslem Iran to @@ -23417,9 +19845,7 @@ Min Fonaff to Iran diplomatic reps in various countries asking they submit lists of influential religious-political leaders whom it would be appropriate to invite and - who might be willing come. After these lists had been recd invitations would be sent. Kashani maintained that delegates to + who might be willing come. After these lists had been recd invitations would be sent. Kashani maintained that delegates to conference would be restricted to responsible religious-political leaders and no one could attend without invitation from him.

4. Kashani said it was his @@ -23433,12 +19859,10 @@ religious leaders in other Moslem countries also organize similar “national armies”. Armies of this kind were necessary in order restore religious fervor and unity to peoples of Islam.

-

5. During our talk I told Kashani in confidence I would probably be going to +

5. During our talk I told Kashani in confidence I would probably be going to Washington within few days for consultation. He said he hoped I would inform my Govt fully re his - conversation with me and that I would endeavor make my Govt understand that it would be in + conversation with me and that I would endeavor make my Govt understand that it would be in US interest and interest of world peace if it would give serious attention to his statements. “I am not an ordinary person. I am leader of Moslem world and Moslem world will soon @@ -23446,17 +19870,12 @@ everywhere that Moslem world and US cooperate.”

- Henderson + Henderson
-
- 143. National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79R01012A, Box 25, +
+ 143. National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79R01012A, Box 25, Folder 3, (NIE–75) Probable Developments in Iran. Secret. The following member organizations of the Intelligence Advisory Committee participated with the Central @@ -23470,8 +19889,7 @@ NIE–75 - Washington, November 13, 1952. + Washington, November 13, 1952.

PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN THROUGH 1953

The Problem

To estimate probable future developments in Iran through 1953.

@@ -23505,8 +19923,7 @@ government authority and open the way for at least a gradual assumption of control by Tudeh.

-

4. Settlement of the oil dispute with the UK is unlikely in 1953.

+

4. Settlement of the oil dispute with the UK is unlikely in 1953.

5. During 1953 Iran will attempt to sell oil to other buyers, both in the Soviet Bloc and the West. Shortage of tankers will limit sales to the Soviet Bloc to token amounts. Small independent Western oil companies @@ -23516,15 +19933,12 @@ obstacles exist. Nevertheless, some moderate-sized oil companies are becoming restive, and it is possible that combinations for the purchase and transport of substantial quantities of Iranian oil may be made - unless there is direct and strong objection by the US Government. The British would probably + unless there is direct and strong objection by the US Government. The British would probably regard any arrangement between US oil companies and Iran, in the absence of British concurrence, as a serious - breach of UK–US solidarity.

+ breach of UK–US solidarity.

6. Kashani or possibly another - National Front leader might replace Mossadeq during 1953. Any successor would probably be + National Front leader might replace Mossadeq during 1953. Any successor would probably be forced to resort to ruthless tactics to eliminate opposition. In his struggle to eliminate his opposition and particularly if he failed to do so, Tudeh influence and opportunities for gaining control would increase @@ -23542,8 +19956,7 @@ military missions are likely to find it even more difficult to operate during 1953 than at present. They would probably be placed under severe restrictions if Kashani or - other extremists came to power. However, neither the Mossadeq Government nor a successor + other extremists came to power. However, neither the Mossadeq Government nor a successor National Front regime is likely to expel these missions during 1953.

9. The USSR appears to believe that the Iranian situation is developing favorably to its objectives. We do not @@ -23559,8 +19972,7 @@

10. Events since the nationalization of oil in 1951 have profoundly changed the political climate in Iran. The political forces which brought Mossadeq and the National - Front to power are powerful and lasting. The Shah and the formerly dominant landowning + Front to power are powerful and lasting. The Shah and the formerly dominant landowning class have lost the political initiative, probably permanently. Nevertheless, the coalition of urban nationalists and religious zealots which Mossadeq heads has no @@ -23576,11 +19988,9 @@ this dispute nonetheless has become the focal point of political activity. Mossadeq rode to power on the issue of nationalization of oil, and his present political - strength derives largely from his continued defiance of the UK.

+ strength derives largely from his continued defiance of the UK.

Prospects for a Negotiated Oil Settlement

-

12. British Attitude: We believe that the UK will almost certainly continue to insist +

12. British Attitude: We believe that the UK will almost certainly continue to insist that there be some form of neutral arbitration of the amount of compensation for the seizure of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company properties even though nationalization per se is no longer @@ -23599,31 +20009,26 @@ Mossadeq. In the first place, increased production in other areas has already made up for the loss of Iranian crude oil production, although the refining capacity at Abadan - has not been fully replaced. Secondly, although the UK believes that lack of oil revenues will + has not been fully replaced. Secondly, although the UK believes that lack of oil revenues will result in progressive economic and political deterioration in Iran, it does not appear to regard a Communist takeover in Iran as imminent.

14. Moreover, the British are not likely to be induced to make greater concessions to Iran by the prospect of Iran’s selling oil in the absence - of a settlement with AIOC. The UK probably believes that in the absence of + of a settlement with AIOC. The UK probably believes that in the absence of an agreement between Iran and a major US oil company, it can continue to exert economic pressure on Iran and prevent the shipment and sale of significant quantities of Iranian oil in world markets. The British would probably regard such an agreement, - in the absence of British concurrence, as a serious breach of UK–US + in the absence of British concurrence, as a serious breach of UK–US solidarity.

-

15. Iranian Attitude: Although the Mossadeq Government desires and needs +

15. Iranian Attitude: Although the Mossadeq Government desires and needs revenues from the sale of oil, its attitude toward the oil dispute is conditioned largely by political considerations. The National Front has manipulated oil nationalization into such a powerful symbol of national independence that no settlement would be acceptable unless it could be presented to the Iranian public as a clear political victory over the - UK. Mossadeq has been under growing pressure from extremists + UK. Mossadeq has been under growing pressure from extremists such as Kashani who maintain that Iran’s oil resources are a curse rather than a blessing and that Iran should reorganize its economy to avoid dependence on oil revenues. @@ -23631,8 +20036,7 @@ strength with other elements in the National Front has depended largely on his continued success in persuading the Iranian people that he is doing his best to restore oil revenues but that he is being blocked by - British intransigeance, injustice, and greed. Whether or not Mossadeq has the political strength and + British intransigeance, injustice, and greed. Whether or not Mossadeq has the political strength and prestige to persuade the Iranian public to agree to an oil settlement on terms which the UK could accept, his performance to date provides no indication that he desires to or will do @@ -23643,8 +20047,7 @@

Probable Developments in the Absence of a Negotiated Settlement

The Oil Problem

-

17. Despite the severance of diplomatic relations with the UK, Iran will probably be receptive during +

17. Despite the severance of diplomatic relations with the UK, Iran will probably be receptive during the coming year to further proposals for a settlement of the oil dispute. For political as well as economic reasons it will also make every effort to sell oil to other buyers, both in the Soviet Bloc and @@ -23667,14 +20070,12 @@ companies are becoming restive, and it is possible that combinations for the purchase and transport of substantial quantities of Iranian oil may be made unless - there is direct and strong objection by the US Government.

+ there is direct and strong objection by the US Government.

19. Barring an agreement with a major Western concern or combination of moderate-sized firms, Iran will not realize sufficient revenue from oil to alleviate appreciably either the government’s fiscal problem or the nation’s economic difficulties. The principal effect of such limited - sales would be political. They would enhance Mossadeq’s prestige by enabling him to claim success in + sales would be political. They would enhance Mossadeq’s prestige by enabling him to claim success in defying the UK and to claim that his government was making progress toward restoring oil revenues.

Economic and Financial

@@ -23700,8 +20101,7 @@ order throughout the country. He cannot afford to stop payments to the unemployed oil workers at Abadan. Although he may attempt to resettle some of those workers in other areas, he will be reluctant to do so as - long as there is a possibility of reviving the oil industry. Mossadeq may, in fact, be forced to + long as there is a possibility of reviving the oil industry. Mossadeq may, in fact, be forced to increase government expenditures, to provide, for example, working capital for factories and to finance the small economic development projects already under way. Moreover, he must find funds for relief @@ -23709,10 +20109,8 @@ construction workers customarily migrate to the cities.

23. Prospects for increasing government revenues during 1953 are slight. The only significant sources of increased tax revenue are the wealthy - landlords and capitalists. Although Mossadeq has the authority and will probably make - greater efforts to tap these sources, perhaps in some cases by outright confiscation, + landlords and capitalists. Although Mossadeq has the authority and will probably make + greater efforts to tap these sources, perhaps in some cases by outright confiscation, even full exploitation of these sources would not eliminate the government deficit. On the basis of recent experience, further bond issues are not likely to raise adequate amounts.

@@ -23799,8 +20197,7 @@ control.

31. Mossadeq will probably continue to benefit from the inability of the opposition to unite or - exert effective power. In the past, Mossadeq has shown great skill in isolating his + exert effective power. In the past, Mossadeq has shown great skill in isolating his opponents and attacking them one by one. He is likely to continue those tactics and to adopt progressively forceful measures against the opposition. The Majlis has @@ -23811,23 +20208,16 @@ 1953. It is likely to retain the backing of the Shah and control over the security forces. The groups opposing the National Front are not likely to have the strength or unity to overthrow it. However, we are - unable to estimate with confidence whether Mossadeq himself will remain in power during 1953. - Kashani, Mossadeq’s strongest potential + unable to estimate with confidence whether Mossadeq himself will remain in power during 1953. + Kashani, Mossadeq’s strongest potential opponent, will probably continue to exert a strong influence on Mossadeq and consequently - will probably prefer to remain in the background while Mossadeq continues to shoulder - responsibility. On the other hand, Kashani is building up his own political strength and - might, should he so desire, be able to oust Mossadeq by parliamentary means during 1953.

+ will probably prefer to remain in the background while Mossadeq continues to shoulder + responsibility. On the other hand, Kashani is building up his own political strength and + might, should he so desire, be able to oust Mossadeq by parliamentary means during 1953.

33. Kashani would also be the probable successor to Mossadeq in - the event of the latter’s death. Regardless of how Mossadeq is replaced, Kashani or any other National Front + the event of the latter’s death. Regardless of how Mossadeq is replaced, Kashani or any other National Front successor could not be assured of the support of all the diverse elements of the National Front. Any successor regime would, therefore, be likely to resort to ruthlessness to destroy opposition. In its @@ -23839,11 +20229,9 @@ of the budgetary position of the government might lead to a breakdown of government authority and open the way for at least a gradual assumption of control by Tudeh.

-

Probable Developments if the UK and Iran Reach Agreement on the Oil +

Probable Developments if the UK and Iran Reach Agreement on the Oil Question

-

35. If the Iranian Government reached an oil settlement with the UK—no matter how favorable to Iran—it would +

35. If the Iranian Government reached an oil settlement with the UK—no matter how favorable to Iran—it would almost certainly be confronted with violent demonstrations in urban centers by the Tudeh Party and probably by extremist elements in the National Front. There would also be immediate danger of Tudeh sabotage @@ -23873,17 +20261,14 @@ enhanced. Basic causes of instability would remain, but the government would be in a stronger position to arrest the trend toward eventual Tudeh control.

-

Iranian Relations with the US and USSR

+

Iranian Relations with the US and USSR

37. The Mossadeq regime will probably continue its pressure on the US to persuade the UK to agree to Iranian terms in the oil dispute and will be quick to criticize any signs of what it considers US support for the UK. It will also continue to request - financial assistance, arguing that the withholding of US aid increases the danger of ultimate + financial assistance, arguing that the withholding of US aid increases the danger of ultimate Tudeh control.

38. The Mossadeq regime will not wish completely to alienate the US. @@ -23894,24 +20279,19 @@ Nevertheless, as internal tensions mount, there will be an increasing tendency to blame the US, not only for the failure to restore substantial oil revenues, but also for Iran’s - financial and economic difficulties. The US military and Point Four missions in Iran may therefore + financial and economic difficulties. The US military and Point Four missions in Iran may therefore find it even more difficult to operate during 1953 than at present.

39. Kashani or other extremist - National Front leaders who might succeed Mossadeq would probably be more opposed than the + National Front leaders who might succeed Mossadeq would probably be more opposed than the Mossadeq regime to the exercise of US influence in Iran and - would probably place greater restrictions on US missions in Iran. However, their recognition of the need + would probably place greater restrictions on US missions in Iran. However, their recognition of the need of US support to counter Soviet pressure and their acknowledgment of the value to Iran of Point Four aid would probably check any inclination they might have either to terminate Point Four aid or to expel the military missions.

-

40. Iran’s official relations with the USSR will probably remain cool and guarded. Although both - governments will seek to increase trade between Iran and the Soviet Bloc, the +

40. Iran’s official relations with the USSR will probably remain cool and guarded. Although both + governments will seek to increase trade between Iran and the Soviet Bloc, the National Front will almost certainly avoid any action which would subject Iran to Soviet domination. On the other hand, it will not wish to destroy the USSR’s value as a @@ -23932,43 +20312,33 @@ disaffection and subversion in Azerbaijan, including the infiltration of Soviet Azerbaijanis; greatly increased financial support for Tudeh; offer of economic and financial inducements to Iran; stirring up of the - Kurds; and heavy pressure for the removal of the US missions, legalization of Tudeh, and removal of legal + Kurds; and heavy pressure for the removal of the US missions, legalization of Tudeh, and removal of legal bans on the Tudeh press. The USSR would probably refrain from use of Soviet armed forces in Iran, because of the possible global consequences of such intervention. Soviet intervention short of the use of Soviet armed forces would probably not result during 1953 in the direct overthrow of the Iranian Government or the detachment of Azerbaijan but could have a seriously adverse effect - on the stability and integrity of Iran and on US security interests there.

-

43. Negotiations on the future of the USSR’s Caspian Sea Fisheries concession, which expires 31 + on the stability and integrity of Iran and on US security interests there.

+

43. Negotiations on the future of the USSR’s Caspian Sea Fisheries concession, which expires 31 January 1953, may provide an indication of a change in Soviet-Iranian - relations, although both Iran and the USSR will probably confine themselves at most to hard + relations, although both Iran and the USSR will probably confine themselves at most to hard bargaining.

-
- 144. Draft Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence +
+ 144. Draft Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 33R00601A, Box 24, Folder 2, National Security Council 136 Series. Top Secret; Security Information; For NSC Staff Consideration Only. The paper is attached to a transmittal memorandum from Lay to the Senior NSC Staff, November 14, that - reads: “The enclosed changes to paragraphs 2 and 3 of NSC 136, including omission of - bracketed footnote, proposed by the Senior CIA Member, are transmitted herewith for consideration + reads: “The enclosed changes to paragraphs 2 and 3 of NSC 136, including omission of + bracketed footnote, proposed by the Senior CIA Member, are transmitted herewith for consideration by the Senior Staff at its meeting on Tuesday, November 18, 1952, at 2:30 p.m.” - Washington, November 14, 1952. + Washington, November 14, 1952.

CIA Proposed Re-wording, Paragraphs 2–3 of NSC 136 Draftof 6 November 1952

@@ -23985,9 +20355,7 @@ nationalist failure to restore the oil industry to operation has led to near-exhaustion of the government’s financial reserves and to deficit financing to meet current expenses, and is likely to produce a - progressive deterioration of the economy at large.Paragraph 2 of the November 6 draft of NSC 136 reads: “The situation in Iran + progressive deterioration of the economy at large.Paragraph 2 of the November 6 draft of NSC 136 reads: “The situation in Iran presents widening opportunities to the communist organization there. Social unrest is spreading in the wake of nationalist agitation and of disruption of the traditional structure of Iranian leadership and @@ -24010,9 +20378,7 @@ 1947–1961, Box 22, 125th Meeting)

3. It is now estimated that communist forces will probably not gain - control of the Iranian government during 1953.Paragraph 3 of the November 6 draft of NSC 136 reads: “It is now estimated + control of the Iranian government during 1953.Paragraph 3 of the November 6 draft of NSC 136 reads: “It is now estimated that communist forces will probably not gain control of the Iranian Government during 1953. Nevertheless the Iranian situation contains very great elements of instability and there is a continuing danger @@ -24024,8 +20390,7 @@ take-over of the Iranian Government. Failure to arrest present trends in Iran involves a serious risk to the national security of the United States.” (Ibid.) Nevertheless, the Iranian - situation contains very great elements of instability. Any US policy regarding Iran must accordingly + situation contains very great elements of instability. Any US policy regarding Iran must accordingly take into account the danger that the communists might be enabled to gain the ascendency as a result of such possible developments as a struggle for power within the National Front, more effective communist @@ -24037,57 +20402,43 @@ could be effectively lost to the free world before an actual Communist take-over of the Iranian Government. Failure to arrest present trends in Iran involves a serious risk to the national security of the United - States.See also NIE–75, “Probable Developments in Iran + States.See also NIE–75, “Probable Developments in Iran during 1953,” approved 6 November 1952. [Footnote is in the - original. NIE–75 is Document 143.]

+ original. NIE–75 is Document 143.]

-
+
145. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff - (Bradley) to Secretary of Defense LovettSource: + (Bradley) to Secretary of Defense LovettSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 33R00601A, Box 24, Folder 2, National Security Council 136 Series. Top Secret; Security Information. The memorandum is - attached to a transmittal memorandum from Lay to the NSC, November 18, that reads: “At the + attached to a transmittal memorandum from Lay to the NSC, November 18, that reads: “At the request of the Secretary of Defense, the attached views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the reference report on the subject are circulated herewith for the information of the National Security - Council in connection with its consideration of NSC 136 at its meeting on November 19, + Council in connection with its consideration of NSC 136 at its meeting on November 19, 1952.” - Washington, November 18, 1952. + Washington, November 18, 1952. SUBJECT NSC 136—The Present Situation in IranReference is to a draft of NSC 136, dated November 6. - See Document 144, footnotes 1, 2, and 3. + See Document 144, footnotes 1, 2, and 3.

1. This memorandum is in response to your memorandum of 10 November 1952, subject as above, in which you request the comments and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the draft statement of policy by the National Security Council Staff entitled “United States - Policy Regarding the Present Situation in Iran” (NSC 136).Not + Policy Regarding the Present Situation in Iran” (NSC 136).Not found.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied the proposed statement of policy and are in general agreement with those parts of the policy having military implications. The Joint Chiefs of - Staff recommend, however, that subparagraph 5 b, page 6, of NSC 136 should + Staff recommend, however, that subparagraph 5 b, page 6, of NSC 136 should be marked with an asterisk and that there should be inserted a - corresponding footnote which reads:See Document 147.

+ corresponding footnote which reads:See Document 147.

“If for overriding political reasons it is found necessary for the United States to provide military forces in this area, implementation will require either a substantial augmentation of over-all United States @@ -24097,57 +20448,42 @@ of the Treaty of Friendship Between Persia and the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, signed at Moscow, 26th February, 1921 and it is believed that this particular aspect of - the problem should not be overlooked by the National Security Council + the problem should not be overlooked by the National Security Council when the Council takes action on NSC 136.An attached memorandum from R. Armory to Under Secretary of State Smith, November 19, discussed the Russo-Persian Treaty of 1921. It reads: - “Concerning the last sentence of the JCS memo, State’s position is that legally the 1921 - Treaty is no longer in force. D/DCI, from personal legal experience with the Treaty, - concurs in this legal view. Possibility that the USSR might invoke the Treaty, as a + “Concerning the last sentence of the JCS memo, State’s position is that legally the 1921 + Treaty is no longer in force. D/DCI, from personal legal experience with the Treaty, + concurs in this legal view. Possibility that the USSR might invoke the Treaty, as a pretended justification for any action, was informally considered in the drafting of NSC 136, and it is believed that further consideration is not necessary prior to action - on NSC 136. In D/DCI’s and my judgment, the Treaty + on NSC 136. In D/DCI’s and my judgment, the Treaty would play only a secondary role in any Soviet action. The general - question of Soviet and world reaction to use of force by US or UK might be an appropriate one for a National - Intelligence Estimate, and for use in the execution of paragraph 5 of NSC 136. The Treaty would be considered in such an + question of Soviet and world reaction to use of force by US or UK might be an appropriate one for a National + Intelligence Estimate, and for use in the execution of paragraph 5 of NSC 136. The Treaty would be considered in such an NIE.”

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

- Omar N. BradleyPrinted from a copy + Omar N. BradleyPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature with an indication that Bradley - signed the original. + signed the original.
-
- 146. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Truman +
+ 146. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Truman Library, Acheson Papers, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 71, November 1952. Secret; Security - Information. The meeting between President Truman and President-elect + Information. The meeting between President Truman and President-elect Eisenhower took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. A handwritten note in the upper right-hand margin of the memorandum reads: “Secretary’s original dictation. Revised by Nitze, Bohlen, etc.” - Washington, November 18, 1952, 2 p.m. + Washington, November 18, 1952, 2 p.m. PRESENT President Truman, @@ -24214,34 +20550,25 @@

[Omitted here is discussion of matters unrelated to Iran.]

-
+
147. Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security CouncilSource: National Archives, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Minutes 1947–1961, Box 22, 125th Meeting. Top Secret; Security Information. The statement is printed - with redactions in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, + with redactions in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 529–534 (Document 240). In a covering - memorandum, November 20, Lay recorded that “at the 125th Council meeting with + memorandum, November 20, Lay recorded that “at the 125th Council meeting with the President presiding the National Security Council and Mr. - Emmerglick for the Attorney General considered and adopted NSC 136, subject to the revisions - recommended therein by the Senior NSC Staff . . . . The report, as amended and adopted, + Emmerglick for the Attorney General considered and adopted NSC 136, subject to the revisions + recommended therein by the Senior NSC Staff . . . . The report, as amended and adopted, was subsequently submitted to the President for consideration. The - President has this date approved NSC 136, as amended and enclosed herewith, and directs + President has this date approved NSC 136, as amended and enclosed herewith, and directs its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the coordination of the Secretary of State.” Lay’s memorandum also noted that NSC - 136/1 superseded NSC 107/2. NSC 136 was discussed by the NSC on November 19; see ibid., pp. + 136/1 superseded NSC 107/2. NSC 136 was discussed by the NSC on November 19; see ibid., pp. 525–527 (Document 238). @@ -24249,12 +20576,10 @@ NSC 136/1 - Washington, November 20, 1952. + Washington, November 20, 1952.

THE PRESENT SITUATION IN IRAN

1. It is of critical importance to the United States that Iran remain an - independent and sovereign nation, not dominated by the USSR. Because of its key strategic + independent and sovereign nation, not dominated by the USSR. Because of its key strategic position, its petroleum resources, its vulnerability to intervention or armed attack by the USSR, and its vulnerability to political subversion, Iran must be regarded as a @@ -24280,8 +20605,7 @@ the political initiative from the Shah, the landlords, and other traditional holders of power, the National Front politicians now in power have at least temporarily eliminated every alternative to their - own rule except the Communist Tudeh Party. However, the ability of the National Front to maintain + own rule except the Communist Tudeh Party. However, the ability of the National Front to maintain control of the situation indefinitely is uncertain. The political upheaval which brought the nationalists to power has heightened popular desire for promised economic and social betterment and has increased @@ -24291,11 +20615,9 @@ and is likely to produce a progressive deterioration of the economy at large.

3. It is now estimated that communist forces will probably not gain - control of the Iranian Government during 1953.See NIE–75, + control of the Iranian Government during 1953.See NIE–75, “Probable Developments in Iran Through 1953,” published November 13, - 1952. [Footnote is in the original. NIE–75 is Document + 1952. [Footnote is in the original. NIE–75 is Document 143.] Nevertheless, the Iranian situation contains very great elements of instability. Any US policy regarding Iran must accordingly take into account the danger that @@ -24393,8 +20715,7 @@ special political operations, to endeavor to develop or maintain localized centers of resistance and to harass, undermine, and if possible, to bring about the overthrow of the communist government.

-

7. In the event of a Soviet attack by organized USSR military forces against Iran, the United States in +

7. In the event of a Soviet attack by organized USSR military forces against Iran, the United States in common prudence would have to proceed on the assumption that global war is probably imminent. Accordingly, the United States should then immediately:

@@ -24425,35 +20746,24 @@ Government-in-exile.

-
+
148. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near - Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State + Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) - Washington, November 26, 1952. - [Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, + Washington, November 26, 1952. + [Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/11–2652. Top Secret; Special Handling. 4 pages not declassified.]
-
+
149. Memorandum of Conversation - Washington, December 3, + Washington, December 3, 1952. - [Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, + [Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/12–352. Top Secret; Security Information; Special Handling. 2 pages not declassified.]
-
+
150. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI @@ -24464,18 +20774,15 @@ Staff Memorandum No. 296 - Washington, December 11, 1952. + Washington, December 11, 1952. SUBJECT - De-briefing of Ambassador Henderson + De-briefing of Ambassador Henderson

(The bulk of the following notes were made at the Ambassador’s conference with the NSC Senior Staff on Tuesday, 2 December. Additional points have been inserted on the basis of - statements made by the Ambassador to CIA and State intelligence personnel at an earlier session + statements made by the Ambassador to CIA and State intelligence personnel at an earlier session on the same day.)

1. Background. By reason of their Shiite religion and Aryan racial background, the Iranians were isolated among the @@ -24493,36 +20800,27 @@ desire to expel all foreign influence from Iran had become an obsession. On the other hand, the departure of the British had also created at least a temporary feeling of loneliness, and this had contributed to the - fact that the Iranians were looking to the US more than at any previous time. They had no thought of + fact that the Iranians were looking to the US more than at any previous time. They had no thought of taking the British back or of having foreigners running the oil industry. On the compensation question, they were willing to give “reasonable” compensation as a gesture, but were not willing to - “mortgage the country.” As to oil purchases, they badly wanted US companies to buy oil, even if only at + “mortgage the country.” As to oil purchases, they badly wanted US companies to buy oil, even if only at the rate of 4–5 million tons a year. If this was not possible, they wanted US financial assistance, though because of the rebuffs to this suggestion a year ago they would not ask directly for this, but would only hint.

3. NIE–75: possibilities if US aid not - forthcoming.Document 143. The Ambassador called NIE–75 an “admirable paper,” but added + forthcoming.Document 143. The Ambassador called NIE–75 an “admirable paper,” but added quickly that he would stress its qualifications and dark side. Logically, he said that the estimate was correct, but the situation was such that it was dangerous to rely on logic. The most critical danger - was that if the Iranians became convinced that the US would not help, they might do “very rash + was that if the Iranians became convinced that the US would not help, they might do “very rash things,” and relations with the US could disintegrate very fast. From a very low point three months ago (the time - of the US–UK joint offer),See Document 121. the stock of the - US had risen greatly, and the US was now looked to for vital assistance. - However, the Iranians must have something to show that the US was supporting them, and this + of the US–UK joint offer),See Document 121. the stock of the + US had risen greatly, and the US was now looked to for vital assistance. + However, the Iranians must have something to show that the US was supporting them, and this “something” must be forthcoming very soon, at the latest by the end of February. The Ambassador said that he himself was very nearly at the end of his tether in making explanations for delay, and that a newly @@ -24530,25 +20828,20 @@ US assistance, resumed oil sales would probably be too small to help much from a strictly economic standpoint, but would help US prestige. - On the economic side, the Iranians did not want grandiose US-sponsored projects, but rather would + On the economic side, the Iranians did not want grandiose US-sponsored projects, but rather would like the US to take over and support some of the projects they - themselves had started. Above all, the US must not interfere in the government. The Iranians + themselves had started. Above all, the US must not interfere in the government. The Iranians regarded US economic aid as in effect a “debt” (presumably for their past resistance to Communism and for the wartime occupation).

-

4. Soviet offers. In response to Mr. Dulles’ question about the possibility +

4. Soviet offers. In response to Mr. Dulles’ question about the possibility that the Soviets might use the expiration of the Caspian Fisheries - rights to make inviting offers, the Ambassador thought that Mossadeq would seek to stall off this + rights to make inviting offers, the Ambassador thought that Mossadeq would seek to stall off this issue, perhaps by asking for a de facto continuation of the concession, to avoid making any firm answer to what might be extensive Soviet demands.

-

5. Political forces within Iran. The Tudeh was growing influence all the time, for +

5. Political forces within Iran. The Tudeh was growing influence all the time, for negative reasons in the Ambassador’s judgment. The Ambassador gave credence to reports that 20–30 trained revolutionaries had entered Iranian early July 1952. These had been taken by surprise by the @@ -24556,27 +20849,21 @@ been in a position to take decisive action then. They were probably now doing everything to lay a better groundwork for another opportunity when it arose. The Shah had been reduced to a - negligible influence. Kashani, who three months ago had been flirting + negligible influence. Kashani, who three months ago had been flirting with Tudeh to take over the government, now did not have Tudeh support. Within the National Front, there did not appear - to be any strong potential leader. Saleh (Ambassador to the US) was probably the best, but his leadership ability was + to be any strong potential leader. Saleh (Ambassador to the US) was probably the best, but his leadership ability was doubtful. Fatemi, the foreign minister, was ruthless, ambitious, and capable of strong arm tactics, - and might increase in power. On the military side, Zahedi was probably the “best of the + and might increase in power. On the military side, Zahedi was probably the “best of the lot,” but it was doubtful whether he had any real following. Any military man would suffer from the fact that civilians generally distrusted the military. Moreover, the Army was very limited and narrow in its outlook.

6. Situation in the Iranian Army. The Army was now “in the wings” marking time. The top command was largely demoralized and - going through the motions only. Mossadeq had deliberately sought to create a cleavage - between the top command (down to Lt. Col. level) and junior officers, and had largely succeeded. + going through the motions only. Mossadeq had deliberately sought to create a cleavage + between the top command (down to Lt. Col. level) and junior officers, and had largely succeeded. The Army as a whole was probably still an effective force if given adequate leadership. However, the present Chief of Staff probably would not act decisively in any major disturbance, but would wait to see what @@ -24593,31 +20880,22 @@ payment. (The Ambassador thought that Iran would accept compensation in the form of 4 million tons of oil a year over a ten-year period.)

- William P. - Bundy + William P. + Bundy
-
- 151. Letter From the Chargé d’Affaires in Iran (Mattison) to the Director of the +
+ 151. Letter From the Chargé d’Affaires in Iran (Mattison) to the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, - South Asian and African Affairs, Department of State (Richards)Source: National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1950–1952, classified + South Asian and African Affairs, Department of State (Richards)Source: National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1950–1952, classified general records, Box 10. Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Melbourne. A copy was - sent to Stutesman. - Tehran, December 18, 1952. + sent to Stutesman. + Tehran, December 18, 1952. Dear Arthur: -

As a result of receiving the National Intelligence Estimate on IranDocument +

As a result of receiving the National Intelligence Estimate on IranDocument 143. we have worked out the following comments, which I am sending in a letter to you for such use as you may care to make. There also is attached a memorandum upon certain economic sections of @@ -24627,39 +20905,27 @@ Estimate may be boiled down to a differing concept of the present Government. Here we consider that even the concept of a National Front organization, beset as it may have been by potential dissensions, has - become outmoded. In essence, what we have is a Mosadeq Government with full support + become outmoded. In essence, what we have is a Mosadeq Government with full support from only a portion of the traditional National Front groupings—the - others being too untrustworthy, if not at odds with Mosadeq. At present the Iran Party and - a few ambitious men such as Fatami are the only “certain” Mosadeq henchmen, whereas Kashani and Baqai maintain but a surface + others being too untrustworthy, if not at odds with Mosadeq. At present the Iran Party and + a few ambitious men such as Fatami are the only “certain” Mosadeq henchmen, whereas Kashani and Baqai maintain but a surface cooperation with the Prime Minister. This really means that the only - true organizational support for Mosadeq rests with the Armed Forces. Mosadeq for the time is not challenged + true organizational support for Mosadeq rests with the Armed Forces. Mosadeq for the time is not challenged as Prime Minister, but to go on the assumption, as the Intelligence - Estimate does, that “a National Front Government” can carry on through 1953 seems + Estimate does, that “a National Front Government” can carry on through 1953 seems unrealistic to us in view of what I have said above and in view of the fact that only Mosadeq might possibly be able to do the trick.

It is not unlikely that the elements becoming more antagonistic to Mosadeq might even turn to - the Tudeh Party for support. Kashani might do this if he became convinced, as we - believe, that his political importance is declining vis-à-vis Mosadeq. This would indeed be serious, - as the Intelligence Estimate implied, if Mosadeq should disappear from the political arena and if + the Tudeh Party for support. Kashani might do this if he became convinced, as we + believe, that his political importance is declining vis-à-vis Mosadeq. This would indeed be serious, + as the Intelligence Estimate implied, if Mosadeq should disappear from the political arena and if political factions should bid against each other for Tudeh support. Our hope (because this is speculative) would be that the Armed Forces would not be too weakened by Mosadeq maneuvers designed to assure political loyalty among the military - officers, so that a virtual military regime could take over if Mosadeq disappeared from the political + officers, so that a virtual military regime could take over if Mosadeq disappeared from the political scene.

The political factors that are given in the Intelligence Estimate as potentially operative after 1953 are just as inherent in the situation @@ -24684,8 +20950,7 @@ Mosadeq might continue to welcome since he controls the Armed forces—that the present regime would actively seek to sell oil to the Soviet bloc.

-

This week we have received a visit from a pleasant G–2 colonel, who works on Iran at the +

This week we have received a visit from a pleasant G–2 colonel, who works on Iran at the Pentagon and who told us that the Embassy’s two estimate telegrams were considered too alarmist. We asked him on what basis this impression was acquired and he stated that some like himself, “perhaps taking the long @@ -24693,8 +20958,7 @@ getting into scrapes during that time, and had been getting out of them, with something turning up to save the situation. Our only reply, of course, to such an argument was that all of us at times, in order to - keep a sense of balance, could not help but hope that some unknown “X-factor” or deus ex machina + keep a sense of balance, could not help but hope that some unknown “X-factor” or deus ex machina would intervene favorably to change the complexion of things. This contingency we had provided for by emphasizing that our estimates were made on the basis of present political factors. The so-called “X-factor” @@ -24712,30 +20976,23 @@ shortly.

Sincerely yours,

- Gordon H. - MattisonPrinted from a + Gordon H. + MattisonPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
-
- 152. National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 98–00979R, Box 1, +
+ 152. National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 98–00979R, Box 1, Folder 74, NIE 75/1–53 Probable Developments in Iran—1953. Secret. A note on the cover sheet indicates that the following member organizations of the Intelligence Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, - the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff. This estimate, NIE–75/1, incorporates certain - amendments to the conclusions of NIE–75 made by the IAC - on December 11. It therefore supersedes NIE–75, which was published November 13, 1952. All + the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff. This estimate, NIE–75/1, incorporates certain + amendments to the conclusions of NIE–75 made by the IAC + on December 11. It therefore supersedes NIE–75, which was published November 13, 1952. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on January 2, 1953. NIE–75 is Document 143. @@ -24744,8 +21001,7 @@ NIE–75/1 - Washington, January 9, 1953. + Washington, January 9, 1953.

PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN THROUGH 1953

The Problem

To estimate probable future developments in Iran through 1953.

@@ -24774,15 +21030,13 @@ bureaucracy continues, Tudeh is also unlikely to gain control by this means during 1953. Nevertheless, unexpected events, such as a serious crop failure or a split in the National Front as a result of rivalry - among its leaders, would increase Tudeh capabilities greatly. And if present trends in Iran + among its leaders, would increase Tudeh capabilities greatly. And if present trends in Iran continue unchecked beyond the end of 1953, rising internal tensions and continued deterioration of the economy and of the budgetary position of the government are likely to lead to a breakdown of governmental authority and open the way for at least a gradual assumption of control by Tudeh.

-

4. Settlement of the oil dispute with the UK is unlikely in 1953.

+

4. Settlement of the oil dispute with the UK is unlikely in 1953.

5. During 1953 Iran will attempt to sell oil to other buyers, both in the Soviet Bloc and the West. Shortage of tankers will limit sales to the Soviet Bloc to token amounts. Small independent Western oil companies @@ -24792,15 +21046,12 @@ obstacles exist. Nevertheless, some moderate-sized oil companies are becoming restive, and it is possible that combinations for the purchase and transport of substantial quantities of Iranian oil may be made - unless there is direct and strong objection by the US Government. The British would probably + unless there is direct and strong objection by the US Government. The British would probably regard any arrangement between US oil companies and Iran, in the absence of British concurrence, as a serious - breach of UK–US solidarity.

+ breach of UK–US solidarity.

6. Kashani or possibly another - National Front leader might replace Mossadeq during 1953. Any successor would probably be + National Front leader might replace Mossadeq during 1953. Any successor would probably be forced to resort to ruthless tactics to eliminate opposition. In his struggle to eliminate his opposition and particularly if he failed to do so, Tudeh influence and opportunities for gaining control would increase @@ -24818,8 +21069,7 @@ military missions are likely to find it even more difficult to operate during 1953 than at present. They would probably be placed under severe restrictions if Kashani or - other extremists came to power. However, neither the Mossadeq Government nor a successor + other extremists came to power. However, neither the Mossadeq Government nor a successor National Front regime is likely to expel these missions during 1953.

9. The USSR appears to believe that the Iranian situation is developing favorably to its objectives. We do not @@ -24852,11 +21102,9 @@ this dispute nonetheless has become the focal point of political activity. Mossadeq rode to power on the issue of nationalization of oil, and his present political - strength derives largely from his continued defiance of the UK.

+ strength derives largely from his continued defiance of the UK.

Prospects for a Negotiated Oil Settlement

-

12. British Attitude: We believe that the UK will almost certainly continue to insist +

12. British Attitude: We believe that the UK will almost certainly continue to insist that there be some form of neutral arbitration of the amount of compensation for the seizure of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company properties even though nationalization per se is no longer @@ -24875,31 +21123,25 @@ Mossadeq. In the first place, increased production in other areas has already made up for the loss of Iranian crude oil production, although the refining capacity at Abadan - has not been fully replaced. Secondly, although the UK believes that lack of oil revenues will + has not been fully replaced. Secondly, although the UK believes that lack of oil revenues will result in progressive economic and political deterioration in Iran, it does not appear to regard a Communist takeover in Iran as imminent.

14. Moreover, the British are not likely to be induced to make greater - concessions to Iran by the prospect of Iran’s selling oil in the absence of a settlement with - AIOC. The UK probably believes that in the absence of an agreement + concessions to Iran by the prospect of Iran’s selling oil in the absence of a settlement with + AIOC. The UK probably believes that in the absence of an agreement between Iran and a major US oil company, it can continue to exert economic pressure on Iran and prevent the shipment and sale of significant quantities of Iranian oil in world markets. The British would probably regard such an agreement, in the - absence of British concurrence, as a serious breach of UK–US + absence of British concurrence, as a serious breach of UK–US solidarity.

-

15. Iranian Attitude: Although the Mossadeq Government desires and needs +

15. Iranian Attitude: Although the Mossadeq Government desires and needs revenues from the sale of oil, its attitude toward the oil dispute is conditioned largely by political considerations. The National Front has manipulated oil nationalization into such a powerful symbol of national independence that no settlement would be acceptable unless it could be presented to the Iranian public as a clear political victory over the - UK. Mossadeq has been under growing pressure from extremists + UK. Mossadeq has been under growing pressure from extremists such as Kashani who maintain that Iran’s oil resources are a curse rather than a blessing and that Iran should reorganize its economy to avoid dependence on oil revenues. @@ -24907,8 +21149,7 @@ strength with other elements in the National Front has depended largely on his continued success in persuading the Iranian people that he is doing his best to restore oil revenues but that he is being blocked by - British intransigeance, injustice, and greed. Whether or not Mossadeq has the political strength and + British intransigeance, injustice, and greed. Whether or not Mossadeq has the political strength and prestige to persuade the Iranian public to agree to an oil settlement on terms which the UK could accept, his performance to date provides no indication that he desires to or will do @@ -24919,8 +21160,7 @@

Probable Developments in the Absence of a Negotiated Settlement

The Oil Problem

-

17. Despite the severance of diplomatic relations with the UK, Iran will probably be receptive during +

17. Despite the severance of diplomatic relations with the UK, Iran will probably be receptive during the coming year to further proposals for a settlement of the oil dispute. For political as well as economic reasons it will also make every effort to sell oil to other buyers, both in the Soviet Bloc and @@ -24949,8 +21189,7 @@ moderate-sized firms, Iran will not realize sufficient revenue from oil to alleviate appreciably either the government’s fiscal problem or the nation’s economic difficulties. The principal effect of such limited - sales would be political. They would enhance Mossadeq’s prestige by enabling him to claim success in + sales would be political. They would enhance Mossadeq’s prestige by enabling him to claim success in defying the UK and to claim that his government was making progress toward restoring oil revenues.

Economic and Financial

@@ -24976,18 +21215,15 @@ order throughout the country. He cannot afford to stop payments to the unemployed oil workers at Abadan. Although he may attempt to resettle some of those workers in other areas, he will be reluctant to do so as - long as there is a possibility of reviving the oil industry. Mossadeq may, in fact, be forced to + long as there is a possibility of reviving the oil industry. Mossadeq may, in fact, be forced to increase government expenditures, to provide, for example, working capital for factories and to finance the small economic development - projects already under way. Moreover, he must find funds for relief during the slack winter + projects already under way. Moreover, he must find funds for relief during the slack winter months, when some unemployed agricultural and construction workers customarily migrate to the cities.

23. Prospects for increasing government revenues during 1953 are slight. The only significant sources of increased tax revenue are the wealthy - landlords and capitalists. Although Mossadeq has the authority and will probably make + landlords and capitalists. Although Mossadeq has the authority and will probably make greater efforts to tap these sources, perhaps in some cases by outright confiscation, even full exploitation of these sources would not eliminate the government deficit. On the basis of recent experience, @@ -25070,13 +21306,11 @@ remain loyal to the government and if given explicit orders will probably be capable of maintaining order except in the unlikely event of simultaneous nation-wide riots and disturbances. We do not believe that - the Tudeh Party will develop sufficient strength during 1953 to instigate disturbances beyond the + the Tudeh Party will develop sufficient strength during 1953 to instigate disturbances beyond the capability of the security forces to control.

31. Mossadeq will probably continue to benefit from the inability of the opposition to unite or - exert effective power. In the past, Mossadeq has shown great skill in isolating his + exert effective power. In the past, Mossadeq has shown great skill in isolating his opponents and attacking them one by one. He is likely to continue those tactics and to adopt progressively forceful measures against the opposition. The Majlis has granted him authority to rule by decree until @@ -25086,23 +21320,16 @@ 1953. It is likely to retain the backing of the Shah and control over the security forces. The groups opposing the National Front are not likely to have the strength or unity to overthrow it. However, we are - unable to estimate with confidence whether Mossadeq himself will remain in power during 1953. - Kashani, Mossadeq’s strongest potential + unable to estimate with confidence whether Mossadeq himself will remain in power during 1953. + Kashani, Mossadeq’s strongest potential opponent, will probably continue to exert a strong influence on Mossadeq and consequently - will probably prefer to remain in the background while Mossadeq continues to shoulder - responsibility. On the other hand, Kashani is building up his own political strength and - might, should he so desire, be able to oust Mossadeq by parliamentary means during 1953.

+ will probably prefer to remain in the background while Mossadeq continues to shoulder + responsibility. On the other hand, Kashani is building up his own political strength and + might, should he so desire, be able to oust Mossadeq by parliamentary means during 1953.

33. Kashani would also be the probable successor to Mossadeq in - the event of the latter’s death. Regardless of how Mossadeq is replaced, Kashani or any other National Front + the event of the latter’s death. Regardless of how Mossadeq is replaced, Kashani or any other National Front successor could not be assured of the support of all the diverse elements of the National Front. Any successor regime would, therefore, be likely to resort to ruthlessness to destroy opposition. In its @@ -25114,11 +21341,9 @@ of the budgetary position of the government might lead to a breakdown of government authority and open the way for at least a gradual assumption of control by Tudeh.

-

Probable Developments if the UK and Iran Reach Agreement on the Oil +

Probable Developments if the UK and Iran Reach Agreement on the Oil Question

-

35. If the Iranian Government reached an oil settlement with the UK—no matter how favorable to Iran—it would +

35. If the Iranian Government reached an oil settlement with the UK—no matter how favorable to Iran—it would almost certainly be confronted with violent demonstrations in urban centers by the Tudeh Party and probably by extremist elements in the National Front. There would also be immediate danger of Tudeh sabotage @@ -25148,17 +21373,14 @@ enhanced. Basic causes of instability would remain, but the government would be in a stronger position to arrest the trend toward eventual Tudeh control.

-

Iranian Relations With the US and USSR

+

Iranian Relations With the US and USSR

37. The Mossadeq regime will probably continue its pressure on the US to persuade the UK to agree to Iranian terms in the oil dispute and will be quick to criticize any signs of what it considers US support for the UK. It will also continue to request - financial assistance, arguing that the withholding of US aid increases the danger of ultimate + financial assistance, arguing that the withholding of US aid increases the danger of ultimate Tudeh control.

38. The Mossadeq regime will not wish completely to alienate the US. @@ -25169,23 +21391,19 @@ Nevertheless, as internal tensions mount, there will be an increasing tendency to blame the US, not only for the failure to restore substantial oil revenues, but also for Iran’s - financial and economic difficulties. The US military and Point Four missions in Iran may therefore + financial and economic difficulties. The US military and Point Four missions in Iran may therefore find it even more difficult to operate during 1953 than at present.

39. Kashani or other extremist - National Front leaders who might succeed Mossadeq would probably be more opposed than the + National Front leaders who might succeed Mossadeq would probably be more opposed than the Mossadeq regime to the exercise of US influence in Iran and - would probably place greater restrictions on US missions in Iran. However, their recognition of the need + would probably place greater restrictions on US missions in Iran. However, their recognition of the need of US support to counter Soviet pressure and their acknowledgment of the value to Iran of Point Four aid would probably check any inclination they might have either to terminate Point Four aid or to expel the military missions.

-

40. Iran’s official relations with the USSR will probably remain cool and guarded. Although both +

40. Iran’s official relations with the USSR will probably remain cool and guarded. Although both governments will seek to increase trade between Iran and the Soviet Bloc, the National Front will almost certainly avoid any action which would subject Iran to Soviet domination. On the other hand, it will not @@ -25207,47 +21425,34 @@ disaffection and subversion in Azerbaijan, including the infiltration of Soviet Azerbaijanis; greatly increased financial support for Tudeh; offer of economic and financial inducements to Iran; stirring up of the - Kurds; and heavy pressure for the removal of the US missions, legalization of Tudeh, and removal of legal + Kurds; and heavy pressure for the removal of the US missions, legalization of Tudeh, and removal of legal bans on the Tudeh press. The USSR would probably refrain from use of Soviet armed forces in Iran, because of the possible global consequences of such intervention. Soviet intervention short of the use of Soviet armed forces would probably not result during 1953 in the direct overthrow of the Iranian Government or the detachment of Azerbaijan but could have a seriously adverse effect - on the stability and integrity of Iran and on US security interests there.

-

43. Negotiations on the future of the USSR’s Caspian Sea Fisheries concession, which expires 31 + on the stability and integrity of Iran and on US security interests there.

+

43. Negotiations on the future of the USSR’s Caspian Sea Fisheries concession, which expires 31 January 1953, may provide an indication of a change in Soviet-Iranian - relations, although both Iran and the USSR will probably confine themselves at most to hard + relations, although both Iran and the USSR will probably confine themselves at most to hard bargaining.

-
+
153. Briefing Notes Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for - Acting Director of Central Intelligence DullesSource: + Acting Director of Central Intelligence DullesSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI - Files, Job 80R01443R, Box 1, Folder 4, NSC Briefing 18 Feb 53. Top Secret; Security - Information; Canoe. Prepared for Dulles for his briefing to the NSC on February 18. The official + Files, Job 80R01443R, Box 1, Folder 4, NSC Briefing 18 Feb 53. Top Secret; Security + Information; Canoe. Prepared for Dulles for his briefing to the NSC on February 18. The official minutes of the NSC meeting of February 18 record under the heading “Significant World Developments - Affecting U.S. Security,” that the NSC “discussed the subject in the light of an oral + Affecting U.S. Security,” that the NSC “discussed the subject in the light of an oral briefing by the Acting Director of Central Intelligence on Latin - America and on the situation in Iran.” (National Archives, RG 273, Records of the National + America and on the situation in Iran.” (National Archives, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Minutes 1947–1961, Box 23, 132nd Meeting) - Washington, February 18, 1953. + Washington, February 18, 1953.

INTERNAL THREAT TO IRANIAN SECURITY

Continuing deterioration of Iranian situation, confusion in Tehran highlighted by:

@@ -25292,35 +21497,26 @@ past two years when Iran’s collapse seemed imminent, but the situation now appears more explosive than at any time in immediate past.

-
- 154. Memorandum From Acting Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to the Under Secretary of State - (Smith)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, +
+ 154. Memorandum From Acting Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to the Under Secretary of State + (Smith)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Intelligence, Job 80R01731R, Box 13, Folder 563, State. Secret; Security Information. - Washington, February 19, 1953. + Washington, February 19, 1953.

In connection with your mention of Max Thornburg, I attach as of possible interest a copy of a letter I have just received from him under date of 10 February with regard to Iran.

-

Following our conversation and one I had with Foster, I have cabled Max Thornburg at Bahrain to inquire as +

Following our conversation and one I had with Foster, I have cabled Max Thornburg at Bahrain to inquire as to his plans regarding return and asking whether he could make a visit to the United States at this time if it proved desirable. I have not yet had a reply.

-

Allen W. DullesPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.

+

Allen W. DullesPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Since dictating the above, I received this morning the following cable from Max Thornburg: “Yours 16th can come anytime after few days if your judgement warrants stop. Would appreciate whatever notice possible also probable duration visit so can - rearrange other plans as otherwise not returning USA until early summer. Max.” Shall I ask + rearrange other plans as otherwise not returning USA until early summer. Max.” Shall I ask him to come here?

AttachmentNo @@ -25334,8 +21530,7 @@ attached. Because of that apparent parallelism it caught my attention.

According to McGaffin, a “new” development faces us in Persia—new, that - is, in December. During these last weeks in office Dean has had revealed to him that + is, in December. During these last weeks in office Dean has had revealed to him that Mossedegh is now faced with a struggle between two rival factions—Kashani and Tudeh—as a result of which he might be replaced with someone even less @@ -25345,8 +21540,7 @@ Foster) with this disquieting intelligence, and to urge that Mossedegh be supported by us at all costs, even though this means disregarding British views. “They - say” that Dean told Eisenhower that the next forty days + say” that Dean told Eisenhower that the next forty days might mean either peace or war, depending upon events in Tehran.

Accepting this depiction of the good Doctor’s dilemma, what is “new” about it?

@@ -25357,27 +21551,22 @@

You are quite familiar with my views concerning Persia, but just to put my mind at ease—and to keep yours from getting that way—I would like to restate my own appraisal of that situation briefly. You will recognize - it as the same appraisal I expressed in Tehran in 1950, to Dean in 1951, to David Bruce in 1952, and to many + it as the same appraisal I expressed in Tehran in 1950, to Dean in 1951, to David Bruce in 1952, and to many others throughout that period.

-

Mossedegh was put into power by the unholy coalition between Kashani and Tudeh in the summer of +

Mossedegh was put into power by the unholy coalition between Kashani and Tudeh in the summer of 1951 following Razmara’s murder and Husain Ala’s brief interregnum. His popularity, based upon the emotional appeal of a skillfully conducted “out-with-all-foreigners” propaganda campaign, and supported by terrorist control of the government, made him the logical compromise candidate of the rival factions, until they were ready to - fight it out between themselves. From time to time he has been able to strike out at one or the other + fight it out between themselves. From time to time he has been able to strike out at one or the other of them, where their interests differ, but at no time has he been in a position to move against them both where their interests coincide—as they do in blocking any kind of an oil agreement that might help to restore order and prosperity in the country, which neither of the rival factions wants. Mossedegh just isn’t that kind of a Prime Minister, - whatever his personal virtues may be, nor has he ever been. Naguib is, and Shishakly may be, but + whatever his personal virtues may be, nor has he ever been. Naguib is, and Shishakly may be, but Mossedegh is not. He is as much a captive as the Shah himself, and as unable to make a deal which would stand up against the opposition of Kashani and Tudeh, or @@ -25390,8 +21579,7 @@ to produce an oil agreement, thereafter supplementing this with aids of various kinds, and a month later he retires or perhaps joins his fathers, one or the other of which may reasonably be expected. We would - be right back where we were in 1950—looking for another Razmara.

+ be right back where we were in 1950—looking for another Razmara.

Anyone who knows the men around Mossedegh as well as I do must know that they are not the kind of men who can carry any practical program through to completion. Fatemi, Kazemi, @@ -25415,8 +21603,7 @@ only as young, beaten-down and understandably sceptical about any real support coming from the United States or Britain.

For some time I have not been in a position to know details, but it - appears that instead of putting this kind of a proposition up to Mossedegh we have continued to + appears that instead of putting this kind of a proposition up to Mossedegh we have continued to pester him with the oil agreement—just as though he could make one stick if he wanted to.

The question as I see it is not how to make an oil agreement that will @@ -25429,24 +21616,19 @@ Curtain.

As ever,

- MaxPrinted from a copy with an - indication that the original was signed. + MaxPrinted from a copy with an + indication that the original was signed.
-
- 155. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 155. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/2–2053. Secret; Security Information. Repeated to London and pouched to Moscow, Kabul, Karachi, Baghdad, Ankara, Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Rome, Dhahran, Isfahan, Tabriz, and Meshed. Received at 12:06 p.m. - Tehran, February 20, 1953, 6 p.m. -

3306. 1. Available information indicates Mosadeq Government being subjected to opposition forces + Tehran, February 20, 1953, 6 p.m. +

3306. 1. Available information indicates Mosadeq Government being subjected to opposition forces whose lines have not (repeat not) yet hardened. National movement organization continues disintegrate. Such pressure is having adverse effect upon health Prime Minister and upon his relations with @@ -25454,8 +21636,7 @@ take place. Talk again reviving among Prime Minister’s opponents as to type of successor regime which it assumes Shah would support. This talk assumes such government would be able handle any int disturbances.

-

2. Embassy and CAS sources indicate decline in Mosadeq’s mental stability. He +

2. Embassy and CAS sources indicate decline in Mosadeq’s mental stability. He apparently depressed by growing sense of frustration and at times has evidenced paranoid distrust of everyone, including even his closest advisers. Some of closest associates admit Prime Minister increasingly @@ -25464,19 +21645,15 @@

3. Both Police Chief Afshartus and Deputy Prime Minister Kazemi reliably reported to have expressed private belief that change of government would take place “within few weeks”. - Source close to Deputy Hasibi, member pro-Mosadeq Iran Party, alleged even Hasibi had stated + Source close to Deputy Hasibi, member pro-Mosadeq Iran Party, alleged even Hasibi had stated “Mosadeq must go”. According to one reliable source Prime Minister collecting documentary evidence to prove that some failures of his government were due to bad counsel given - by his closest advisers. Kashani reported by press to have said in February 16 + by his closest advisers. Kashani reported by press to have said in February 16 meeting of deputies that government was failing to improve conditions in country but “situation will change and all will be well again”. Other - factors indicate progressive weakening of Mosadeq’s political position. Disintegration national - movement coalition seems to be accelerating (Embtels 3074,Telegram 3074 + factors indicate progressive weakening of Mosadeq’s political position. Disintegration national + movement coalition seems to be accelerating (Embtels 3074,Telegram 3074 from Tehran, February 7, reported on Dr. Seyid Ali Shayegan’s conversation with Melbourne. Shayegan, as the Mosadeq @@ -25484,33 +21661,21 @@ Front, as previously understood, no longer existed. In fact, the government no longer termed itself a “National Front” government. “According Dr. Shayegan, current definition of government is - nationalist movement embodied in Dr. Mosadeq and his friends.” Shayegan blamed this development - on the “personal ambitions” of Kashani, Baqai, and Maki. Nevertheless, “Shayegan believed that fraction as result new + nationalist movement embodied in Dr. Mosadeq and his friends.” Shayegan blamed this development + on the “personal ambitions” of Kashani, Baqai, and Maki. Nevertheless, “Shayegan believed that fraction as result new situation had gained materially in efficiency and vitality, since disruptive intrigues within it would now cease.” (Ibid., - 788.00/2–653) February 7; 3233,Telegram 3233 from Tehran, February 17, reported on the resignation + 788.00/2–653) February 7; 3233,Telegram 3233 from Tehran, February 17, reported on the resignation of 17 parliamentary members from the Iran Party to form a “splinter party called Association for Liberty of Iranian People.” (Ibid., - 788.00/2–1753) February 17; 3258,In telegram 3258 from Tehran, February 18, Henderson discussed the situation + 788.00/2–1753) February 17; 3258,In telegram 3258 from Tehran, February 18, Henderson discussed the situation of the National Front in the Majlis. “Only one (Shayegan) of 9 nationalist deputies who sponsored oil nationalization in 16 Majlis - remains in nationalist movement fraction supporting Mosadeq. Approximately half + remains in nationalist movement fraction supporting Mosadeq. Approximately half remaining members nationalist movement fraction openly demonstrated - attachment to Prime Minister only after fall Qavam and formation second + attachment to Prime Minister only after fall Qavam and formation second Mosadeq Government.” - (Ibid., 788.00/2–1853) February 18; 3271,Telegram 3271 from Tehran, February 19, reported on + (Ibid., 788.00/2–1853) February 18; 3271,Telegram 3271 from Tehran, February 19, reported on the split in the Iran Party. (Ibid., 788.00/2–1953) February 19).

As usual, in period of apparent declining fortunes of Prime Minister, @@ -25521,10 +21686,7 @@ Kashani’s orbit to achieve common purpose. Some of these elements have no basic sympathy for Kashani but gather around - him as most effective symbol in fight against Mosadeq. Perennial candidates Ali Mansur and General Zahedi are once more being talked about + him as most effective symbol in fight against Mosadeq. Perennial candidates Ali Mansur and General Zahedi are once more being talked about and there are varied suggestions of types coalition government which would achieve greatest future support and which would be capable handling int disturbances, such as current Bakhtiari tribal @@ -25541,45 +21703,30 @@ conversations may ultimately strengthen those heterogeneous forces opposed to him.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
- 156. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 156. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, - 788.00/2–2353. Top Secret; Security Information; NIACT. Repeated to London. Received + 788.00/2–2353. Top Secret; Security Information; NIACT. Repeated to London. Received at 12:15 p.m. - Tehran, February 23, 1953, 3 p.m. + Tehran, February 23, 1953, 3 p.m.

3342. 1. Ardeshir Zahedi, son of Zahedi who severed relations with Point IV several months ago at request Prime Minister, called on Commander Pollard, Naval Attaché, at latter’s residence last evening. They are old friends and have maintained friendly contact during last two years. During course - evening Ardeshir outlined to Pollard present differences between Shah and Mosadeq and said it possible father + evening Ardeshir outlined to Pollard present differences between Shah and Mosadeq and said it possible father would become Prime Minister within few days. He stated that there had - been two groups working for successor to Mosadeq. One group had supported Ali Mansur, other Zahedi. Mansur group several days ago had decided to throw in + been two groups working for successor to Mosadeq. One group had supported Ali Mansur, other Zahedi. Mansur group several days ago had decided to throw in its lot with Zahedi. Also - supporting Zahedi were Kashani, Baqai, leading officers of armed forces, et cetera. + supporting Zahedi were Kashani, Baqai, leading officers of armed forces, et cetera. Zahedi was determined that before he would take over power an organization should be perfected and plans would be laid to maintain law and order so that incidents of last - July would not (repeat not) be repeated. Zahedi thought he would have support of Shah but he was + July would not (repeat not) be repeated. Zahedi thought he would have support of Shah but he was not (repeat not) sure. He would act, however, regardless of Shah’s attitude. Ardeshir added that his father had always been friendly to US and Western world and must depend @@ -25592,11 +21739,9 @@ personalities who might make good Cabinet members he sure his father would be glad consider them.

2. Pollard thanked Ardeshir for - giving him this information and pointed out that it was US Government policy not (repeat not) to + giving him this information and pointed out that it was US Government policy not (repeat not) to interfere in any way in internal affairs Iran.

-

3. This morning Ardeshir again saw Pollard for few moments. He said that his father was at +

3. This morning Ardeshir again saw Pollard for few moments. He said that his father was at time participating in meeting for purpose deciding what measures should be taken to guarantee public security in case General should become Prime Minister. During this meeting they would select officer for @@ -25607,44 +21752,33 @@ government he did not (repeat not) propose to ask Shah to dismiss Majlis and call for new elections. He would prefer, if possible, to work at least temporarily with present Majlis.

-

4. Ardeshir also had brief conversation yesterday with Warne. He told Warne that his father might become +

4. Ardeshir also had brief conversation yesterday with Warne. He told Warne that his father might become Prime Minister in next few days. Although his father would be anxious to settle oil problem at early date it would not (repeat not) be possible in view internal political situation for him to do so immediately. He - probably would need some kind financial assistance from US before he would be in position to settle + probably would need some kind financial assistance from US before he would be in position to settle oil dispute. It might be fatal for him to settle oil dispute at once and then receive financial assistance because he would be charged with selling out country.

-

5. Both Warne and Pollard realize delicacy of situation +

5. Both Warne and Pollard realize delicacy of situation and have stated they will use circumspection in any relations they may have with Ardeshir. Pollard, however, had agreed to see Ardeshir for few moments shortly after noon today.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
+
157. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence, - Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, + Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 80R01443R, Box 1, Folder 6, NSC Briefing 25 Feb 53. Top Secret; Information Only. - Washington, February 24, 1953. -

PRIME MINISTER MOSSADEQ’S THREAT TO RESIGN

-

On 20 February Prime Minister Mossadeq sent a brusque message to the Shah stating that + Washington, February 24, 1953. +

PRIME MINISTER MOSSADEQ’S THREAT TO RESIGN

+

On 20 February Prime Minister Mossadeq sent a brusque message to the Shah stating that he could no longer tolerate his unfriendly attitude and would therefore resign on 24 February. Mossadeq said he would announce publicly that he was forced to offer his @@ -25652,58 +21786,41 @@ charged that the Shah was responsible for the current tribal unrest as well as encouraging retired army officers to plot against the government.

-

On this same day, 20 February, Ambassador Henderson presented to Mossadeq the latest draft of the British offer to settle +

On this same day, 20 February, Ambassador Henderson presented to Mossadeq the latest draft of the British offer to settle the oil dispute and the American offer to purchase oil when an agreement was reached. Mossadeq appeared friendly, but said he was sure that the proposals in their present form - would be unacceptable to Iran. He promised to answer soon.For Henderson’s account of this meeting, see Foreign + would be unacceptable to Iran. He promised to answer soon.For Henderson’s account of this meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 670–674 (Document 300).

-

On 22 February Iranian Foreign Minister Fatemi announced that a decision might be delayed +

On 22 February Iranian Foreign Minister Fatemi announced that a decision might be delayed several days. Subsequently, press reports from Tehran predicted a - rejection of the British offer and the threat of Mossadeq’s resignation.

+ rejection of the British offer and the threat of Mossadeq’s resignation.

Mossadeq has recently taken several steps to reduce drastically the Shah’s influence, probably to - keep him from injecting himself into the situation. Mossadeq has cut off the government + keep him from injecting himself into the situation. Mossadeq has cut off the government subsidy for the Shah’s important “Imperial Organization for Social Welfare” and is also attempting to take from him the guardianship of the - funds from the wealthy Meshed Shrine. Mossadeq has also criticized the manner in which the - Shah is distributing Crown lands. Minister of Court Ala believes that Mossadeq is trying to reduce the Shah + funds from the wealthy Meshed Shrine. Mossadeq has also criticized the manner in which the + Shah is distributing Crown lands. Minister of Court Ala believes that Mossadeq is trying to reduce the Shah to a state of “servile dependence.”

-

The Shah has repeatedly placated Mossadeq by making concessions. He apparently has no +

The Shah has repeatedly placated Mossadeq by making concessions. He apparently has no definite plans for action should the Prime Minister resign, and has given no indication that he has the necessary determination either to take over control or to give resolute support to any new Prime Minister named by him.

Mullah Kashani, president of - the Majlis, seemed pleased when Minister of Court Ala informed him of Mossadeq’s threat to resign.

+ the Majlis, seemed pleased when Minister of Court Ala informed him of Mossadeq’s threat to resign.

Kashani appears ready to line-up with the Court but such a maneuver would deprive him of - extremist support, notably Tudeh. Despite Kashani’s assertion that the Majlis would support the + extremist support, notably Tudeh. Despite Kashani’s assertion that the Majlis would support the Shah if Mossadeq were to attack him, the Prime Minister reportedly feels confident that he can handle the mullah.

-

A grave situation would be likely to develop if Mossadeq resigns or disappears from the +

A grave situation would be likely to develop if Mossadeq resigns or disappears from the scene. Kashani, the most - influential figure after Mossadeq, is a venal, unreliable opportunist and a religious + influential figure after Mossadeq, is a venal, unreliable opportunist and a religious fanatic. The individuals currently mentioned by the Shah as possible successors to Mossadeq do not have either stature or popular support.

@@ -25722,9 +21839,7 @@ the memorandum is a handwritten note that reads: “PD 224, 23 Feb-Iran.”

-
+
158. Editorial Note

On February 24, 1953, representatives of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom met in Nicosia, Cyprus, to prepare for the @@ -25735,11 +21850,9 @@ outside, lead a resistance movement against a Tudeh-dominated Iran. To that end, the U.S. and U.K. officials agreed to (1) establish contact with the Shah to strengthen his resolve to resist a Tudeh push for - power; (2) establish contact with an Iranian political leader upon whom Anglo-American + power; (2) establish contact with an Iranian political leader upon whom Anglo-American representatives could rely to preserve the vestiges of a free government - (among those Iranian politicians considered for this role were Zahedi, Makki, Buruijirdi, Sayed Zia, + (among those Iranian politicians considered for this role were Zahedi, Makki, Buruijirdi, Sayed Zia, and Mosadeq); (3) initiate a propaganda campaign, using Anglo-American facilities, against the Tudeh both within Iran and outside it; (4) activate a stay-behind program; and @@ -25747,27 +21860,19 @@ including the Qashqai and Bakhtiari. The meeting established the guiding principles of Anglo-American cooperation, at both the policy and intelligence levels, and agreed that specific contingency plans would be - developed in the months ahead. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder + developed in the months ahead. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 12, TPAJAX)

-
+
159. Briefing Notes Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for - Director of Central Intelligence DullesSource: + Director of Central Intelligence DullesSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI - Files, Job 80R01443R, Box 1, Folder 6, NSC Briefing 25 Feb 53. Top Secret; Security - Information. Prepared on February 25 for DCI + Files, Job 80R01443R, Box 1, Folder 6, NSC Briefing 25 Feb 53. Top Secret; Security + Information. Prepared on February 25 for DCI Dulles’ briefing to the NSC. There is a notation on the notes indicating they were “used.” - Washington, undated. + Washington, undated.

IRAN

1. On 20 February Mossadeq advised Shah he would resign 24 FebruaryThe phrase @@ -25788,16 +21893,13 @@ of point 4, “This major step in destroying Shah’s power. Shah has promised” were crossed out in pencil and replaced with the words, “Shah capitulated:”

-

1. To make clear Army takes orders from Mossadeq.

+

1. To make clear Army takes orders from Mossadeq.

2. Stop seeing unfriendly persons.

3. Discuss distribution crown lands.

-

5. Danger lies in leaving entire control in Mossadeq’s hands because his elimination by +

5. Danger lies in leaving entire control in Mossadeq’s hands because his elimination by assassination or otherwise would leave vacuum into which Tudeh Party might move.At the 134th meeting of the - NSC on February 26, Dulles noted that “the most recent + NSC on February 26, Dulles noted that “the most recent intelligence had made clear that Mossadegh’s maneuvers, begun on January 20 to reduce the Shah to impotence, had pretty well succeeded. Mossadegh had made three demands on the Shah—one with @@ -25811,25 +21913,17 @@ power was completely gone, it would be extremely difficult to find any constitutional alternative to Mossadegh if he were driven from power. The possibilities that the Communists would fill this power - vacuum had been heightened.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Box 4, NSC Series, 134th NSC Meeting)

-
-
+ vacuum had been heightened.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Box 4, NSC Series, 134th NSC Meeting)

+
+
160. Memorandum for the Record Prepared in the Directorate of Plans, - Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 80–01795R, Box 9, Folder 6, Office + Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 80–01795R, Box 9, Folder 6, Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) History 01Mar52–11Mar52. Top Secret; Security Information; Eyes Only. Drafted by [text not declassified] Prepared by [name not declassified] on March 3. - Washington, February 25, 1953. + Washington, February 25, 1953. SUBJECT Minutes of Meeting with Representatives of State, Defense, and @@ -25848,17 +21942,14 @@ Defense Colonel Wright (JSPD) - Lieutenant Colonel Black (OSD) + Lieutenant Colonel Black (OSD) CIA Brigadier General Balmer, [less than 1 line not declassified] [4 lines not declassified] - Mr. Waller [less than 1 line not + Mr. Waller [less than 1 line not declassified] [2 lines not declassified] @@ -25873,8 +21964,7 @@ rational government oriented toward the West; (c) a more hostile government; (d) a government under absolute Tudeh control; and (e) Soviet occupation.

-

Under present conditions, the prime target is the Tudeh Party, and CIA is conducting operations to counteract +

Under present conditions, the prime target is the Tudeh Party, and CIA is conducting operations to counteract its influence. Although there is widespread feeling in Iran against British and U.S. policies, CIA has influenced specific leaders, has tended to curb Tudeh’s outward @@ -25885,13 +21975,11 @@ also conducted operations against Soviet influence and has met with some success in influencing the government not to renew the Soviet fisheries concessions. CIA has also engaged in - operations against the Nationalist leader, Kashani, and has tried to provoke + operations against the Nationalist leader, Kashani, and has tried to provoke him into taking a stand for or against the Tudeh Party.

If a more moderate government, oriented toward the West, should come into power, its greatest opposition would be that of the Tudeh Party. In Mr. - Waller’s opinion, if CIA had the cooperation of such a moderate + Waller’s opinion, if CIA had the cooperation of such a moderate government, CIA could help restrict the Tudeh Party, at least temporarily, and help neutralize the influence of Kashani.

@@ -25902,30 +21990,22 @@ to speak out. Such a situation would probably not, however, interfere with CIA’s dealings with potential resistance groups. Under the condition of actual Tudeh control, Mr. - Waller said that CIA’s political and psychological warfare - capabilities would be severely curtailed, but that CIA could encourage and assist tribal - groups to maintain control within their zones, Mr. Waller reported that CIA has stockpiled enough arms and + Waller said that CIA’s political and psychological warfare + capabilities would be severely curtailed, but that CIA could encourage and assist tribal + groups to maintain control within their zones, Mr. Waller reported that CIA has stockpiled enough arms and demolition material to support a 10,000-man guerrilla organization for - six months and has entered into a tentative agreement with certain tribal elements in the south + six months and has entered into a tentative agreement with certain tribal elements in the south of Iran to establish safe haven bases. [1½ lines not declassified]

Mr. Waller said that cartoons are especially effective in Iran because of the high illiteracy rate, and showed samples of cartoons in use at present.

-

Mr. Horsey asked what can be done to temper nationalism. Mr. Waller reported that CIA has tried to encourage moderate +

Mr. Horsey asked what can be done to temper nationalism. Mr. Waller reported that CIA has tried to encourage moderate elements within the National Front and to oppose extremists, but so far this has consisted more in opposing than encouraging.

In answer to Mr. Berry’s question, Mr. Waller said that - CIA is both attacking Kashani and trying to smoke him out + CIA is both attacking Kashani and trying to smoke him out on the Tudeh Party issue. In answer to [name not declassified] question about the British psychological warfare effort in Iran, Mr. Waller said @@ -25943,65 +22023,45 @@ armed forces is difficult because of frequent re-shuffling of army commands. Colonel Black asked about a recent article in the New York Times - reporting the presence of a Soviet agent in Iran. Mr. Waller said that CIA has had reports of Soviet agents among + reporting the presence of a Soviet agent in Iran. Mr. Waller said that CIA has had reports of Soviet agents among the Azerbaijani Kurds, but that CIA had been able to make little or no progress in counteracting Soviet - influence in this very remote country. In answer to Mr. Berry’s question about the loyalty of + influence in this very remote country. In answer to Mr. Berry’s question about the loyalty of the armed forces, Mr. Waller gave his opinion that it was doubtful if they would fire on their own people - in the event of urban demonstrations or riots. Mr. Waller also expressed his view that one + in the event of urban demonstrations or riots. Mr. Waller also expressed his view that one of the main troubles with Iranian security forces is lack of adequate riot control techniques.

-

Mr. Waller said that CIA’s operations could probably be more +

Mr. Waller said that CIA’s operations could probably be more effective if more specific policy direction could be given as far as - possible in advance. Colonel Black asked about the reason for the Soviet reaction to - the Iranian cancellation of fishing rights, and Mr. Waller said it was possibly designed to + possible in advance. Colonel Black asked about the reason for the Soviet reaction to + the Iranian cancellation of fishing rights, and Mr. Waller said it was possibly designed to contrast with the British reaction to the oil concession cancellation.

[name not declassified] raised the question of operational direction in case of gradual Tudeh infiltration of government agencies in which it is difficult to ascertain when the Tudeh - has actually gained the upper hand. Mr. Berry agreed there is dangerous possibility that we - would be too late in realizing Tudeh domination, and [name not declassified] asked if the Iranian Army is capable of proper - assessment of Tudeh infiltration. Mr. Waller indicated in the negative, but said that the U.S. + has actually gained the upper hand. Mr. Berry agreed there is dangerous possibility that we + would be too late in realizing Tudeh domination, and [name not declassified] asked if the Iranian Army is capable of proper + assessment of Tudeh infiltration. Mr. Waller indicated in the negative, but said that the U.S. and British were more successful in so doing.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Iran.]

- [name not declassified] + [name not declassified]
-
- 161. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 161. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, - 788.11/2–2553. Top Secret; Security Information; NIACT; Noforn. Repeated to London, Baghdad, and Madrid. - Received at 6:05 p.m. Also printed in Foreign + 788.11/2–2553. Top Secret; Security Information; NIACT; Noforn. Repeated to London, Baghdad, and Madrid. + Received at 6:05 p.m. Also printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 681–683 (Document 305). - Tehran, February 25, + Tehran, February 25, 1953, 11 p.m.

3393. 1. Ala Minister Court came - to see me tonight, obviously worried and distressed. Said he wanted to talk in utmost - secrecy. During conversation between Shah and Mosadeq on February 24, latter had + to see me tonight, obviously worried and distressed. Said he wanted to talk in utmost + secrecy. During conversation between Shah and Mosadeq on February 24, latter had indicated that it might be good idea after all for Shah leave country as soon as possible and to remain abroad until situation Iran had become more stable. Shah had jumped at chance get out of country; had said he @@ -26018,39 +22078,32 @@ February 28; he desired leave Tehran by auto morning February 26 for Baghdad, visit Holy Cities Qerbala and Najaf, and then go to Europe. Ala in vain tried persuade - Shah postpone his departure. Shah insisted Ala immediately request travel documents.

+ Shah postpone his departure. Shah insisted Ala immediately request travel documents.

3. Prime Minister told Ala he thought it good idea for Shah leave tomorrow. He could arrange travel documents at once. Ala finally persuaded Prime Minister it would look better if Shah would not (repeat not) go until Saturday. Ala asked - re regency in Shah’s absence. Mosadeq said he had not (repeat not) thought of that. He then suggested - himself, Ghulam Reza (younger half-brother Shah), and Ala. He refused consider Ali Reza, + re regency in Shah’s absence. Mosadeq said he had not (repeat not) thought of that. He then suggested + himself, Ghulam Reza (younger half-brother Shah), and Ala. He refused consider Ali Reza, Shah’s full brother who usually considered next in line of succession.

-

4. Shah was perplexed when he learned Mosadeq passing over Ali in favor Ghulam for regency. He +

4. Shah was perplexed when he learned Mosadeq passing over Ali in favor Ghulam for regency. He feared family rift. Decided to ask Ali accompany him abroad for sake of appearances.

5. Ala fears hasty departure Shah will be interpreted as flight and will lower Shah’s prestige to such extent as to endanger institution of monarchy. Shah also thinks it possible Mosadeq may follow - Naguib’s example. Ala told me he personally in difficult - situation. He bound to secrecy by both Shah and Mosadeq. He sees disaster coming yet + Naguib’s example. Ala told me he personally in difficult + situation. He bound to secrecy by both Shah and Mosadeq. He sees disaster coming yet cannot (repeat not) appeal to other Iranian representatives or leaders for counsel and assistance. He would not (repeat not) remain silent if he convinced any useful purpose could be served in persuading Shah not (repeat not) to leave. Shah at present in almost hysterical state. Ala feared complete nervous breakdown and irrational action if Shah compelled to stay in present - circumstances. In order preserve appearances Ala trying arrange for Spanish Government invite Shah + circumstances. In order preserve appearances Ala trying arrange for Spanish Government invite Shah for visit. If this arrangement could be effected, it was hoped that first announcement would merely be Shah going on pilgrimage to Iraq. While Shah was in Iraq, announcement could then be made he had accepted @@ -26060,9 +22113,7 @@ was anything which I could do. He said that he feared not (repeat not). I was not (repeat not) supposed to know of these plans and it might do more harm than good for me to take any step which might give impression - that he had talked to me about them. In any event, Ala thought neither Mosadeq nor Shah was to be swayed from + that he had talked to me about them. In any event, Ala thought neither Mosadeq nor Shah was to be swayed from their decision. Mosadeq so unpredictable it useless for me try prophesy what he will do. Although he has assured both Ala and Shah @@ -26070,29 +22121,21 @@ are opposed to monarchy may persuade him in not (repeat not) distant future to demand Shah’s abdication.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
- 162. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 162. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, - 788.00/2–2653. Top Secret; Security Information; NIACT. Repeated NIACT to Madrid, London, and + 788.00/2–2653. Top Secret; Security Information; NIACT. Repeated NIACT to Madrid, London, and Baghdad. Received at 9:24 a.m. - Tehran, February 26, + Tehran, February 26, 1953, 1 p.m.

3397. 1. I dislike remaining inactive at time when monarchical institution which we have in past regarded as stabilizing influence country is in grave danger (Embassy telegram 3393, February 25 repeated - London 1102, Baghdad 80, Madrid Unn).Document 161. I realize that for + London 1102, Baghdad 80, Madrid Unn).Document 161. I realize that for number years in view of peculiar situation Iran it has been one of our policies to support Shah. During last two years it has become increasingly clear that Shah is weak reed. His inability to take @@ -26104,14 +22147,12 @@ best neutral. It would be mistake for us to take position re dispute between Mosadeq and court which would result in coalescence nationalist movement and Tudeh. On other - hand collapse of monarchy at this moment leaves clear field to Mosadeq who surrounded by influences + hand collapse of monarchy at this moment leaves clear field to Mosadeq who surrounded by influences not (repeat not) particularly friendly to West.

2. One of our problems is that those groups in Iran which are anti-West or neutralist are in general inclined to be dynamic while those which are inherently friendly toward West are for most part passive and - seemingly incapable of organized action. Even Zahedi who has been more dynamic than + seemingly incapable of organized action. Even Zahedi who has been more dynamic than most political leaders fairly friendly to West, has allowed himself meekly to be arrested. His arrest would seem eliminate any action against Mosadeq by army.

@@ -26129,22 +22170,17 @@ would prefer details not (repeat not) be furnished which if leaked might serve in identifying source my information.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
+
163. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of the Office of National Estimates (Kent) to Director of - Central Intelligence DullesSource: Central Intelligence + Central Intelligence DullesSource: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79R00904A, Box 1, Folder 4, Memos for DCI (1953) (Substantive). Top Secret. - Washington, February 27, 1953. + Washington, February 27, 1953. SUBJECT Developments in Iran @@ -26159,94 +22195,69 @@

b. The nature of Mossadeq’s victory emphasizes again that his power is personal; it is not based upon a well-knit political and security organization. Opposition has not - been permanently suppressed. Un-less Mossadeq consolidates his power to a greater degree than + been permanently suppressed. Un-less Mossadeq consolidates his power to a greater degree than seems likely he will feel obliged repeatedly to rely upon unpredictable coups like that of the past weekend.

-

c. We believe it likely that Mossadeq will continue to dominate the situation at - least through 1953—as concluded in NIE–75/1.Document 152. It is possible, but we believe it +

c. We believe it likely that Mossadeq will continue to dominate the situation at + least through 1953—as concluded in NIE–75/1.Document 152. It is possible, but we believe it unlikely, that news of the departure of the Shah might precipitate - unrest beyond the power of Mossadeq’s government to control.

+ unrest beyond the power of Mossadeq’s government to control.

d. Unless such a state of unrest should develop, we see no immediate advantage to the Tudeh Party arising from the events of the past week. In the longer run, however, the departure of the Shah would enhance the - importance of the Tudeh Party as a center of effective opposition to Mossadeq, and thus would make it more attractive as an - ally to extremist dissidents such as Kashani and Baghai. Moreover, departure of the Shah, by + importance of the Tudeh Party as a center of effective opposition to Mossadeq, and thus would make it more attractive as an + ally to extremist dissidents such as Kashani and Baghai. Moreover, departure of the Shah, by weakening the monarchy as a symbol of unity and stability in Iran, would contribute to the accomplishment of an important Tudeh Party objective.

e. Inasmuch as Mossadeq’s maneuvers of the last ten days were largely directed against those who had criticised him for not concluding an oil agreement, it appears - likely that he will now be more insistent than ever that the US and UK + likely that he will now be more insistent than ever that the US and UK agree to his terms.

2. In the present fluid situation we do not feel that an immediate revision of NIE–75/1 would be useful.

- Sherman - KentPrinted from a copy + Sherman + KentPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
-
- 164. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in IranSource: National Archives, +
+ 164. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in IranSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.11/2–2753. Top Secret; Security Information; Limited - Distribution; Priority. Drafted by Stutesman and approved by Richards. Repeated to + Distribution; Priority. Drafted by Stutesman and approved by Richards. Repeated to London. - Washington, February 27, + Washington, February 27, 1953, 5:43 p.m. -

2238. In view Shah’s apparent desire leave Iran and Mosadeq’s position that Shah should +

2238. In view Shah’s apparent desire leave Iran and Mosadeq’s position that Shah should leave, Department sees little which could usefully be done to prevent Shah’s departure. We are currently assessing significance this crisis and developments likely flow from Shah’s departure, and would appreciate - any comments you may have in amplification urtel 3397Document 162. + any comments you may have in amplification urtel 3397Document 162. rpt London 1103. Department will attempt minimize to press significance Shah’s departure Iran but there is every likelihood press will take line that Shah has fled Iran and his case is similar to Farouk’s.

- Dulles + Dulles
-
- 165. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 165. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, - 788.11/2–2753. Top Secret: Security Information; NIACT. Repeated NIACT to London and Baghdad. + 788.11/2–2753. Top Secret: Security Information; NIACT. Repeated NIACT to London and Baghdad. Received at 12:14 p.m. The telegram is printed with redactions in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, p. 683 (Document 306). - Tehran, February 27, + Tehran, February 27, 1953, 5 p.m.

3431. 1. Court source extremely close Shah told Embassy Attaché yesterday - evening that Shah on insistence Mosadeq planning leave country very soon. I authorized + evening that Shah on insistence Mosadeq planning leave country very soon. I authorized Attaché convey through this source to Shah my opinion that it might have extremely unfortunate consequences for Iran if latter should leave country just now in apparently hasty manner. Shah sent back message he @@ -26254,16 +22265,12 @@ Mosadeq’s benefit. Message continued that Mosadeq had changed his mind and was now (repeat now) insisting that Shah remain. - Shah intended at last moment to defer to Mosadeq’s urging and abandon trip.

+ Shah intended at last moment to defer to Mosadeq’s urging and abandon trip.

2. I had lunch with Ala today. He had just received phone call from Shah who apparently was disturbed at - leaks re his departure plans. Shah had asked Ala impress on me secrecy. Ala said Shah had told him that if his plans should + leaks re his departure plans. Shah had asked Ala impress on me secrecy. Ala said Shah had told him that if his plans should become known prematurely, developments might take place which would - prevent his departure. I asked Ala if Shah seriously intended leave. He replied in + prevent his departure. I asked Ala if Shah seriously intended leave. He replied in affirmative; arrangements were being made for Shah to broadcast message to his people at about 4 p.m. February 28 stating reasons for departure. Shah would leave by car at 5 p.m. accompanied by Queen, two servants, @@ -26276,40 +22283,30 @@ that so far as possible press US be influenced to take line that there no (repeat no) great political significance in Shah’s departure. Speculation comparing Shah with Farouk - would weaken Shah’s position. No (repeat no) real parallel. Mosadeq has given word of honor he will + would weaken Shah’s position. No (repeat no) real parallel. Mosadeq has given word of honor he will not (repeat not) undermine Shah in latter’s absence and Shah believes Mosadeq. They are lunching together today.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
- 166. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 166. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, - 788.11/2–2853. Top Secret; Security Information; NIACT. Repeated to London, Baghdad, + 788.11/2–2853. Top Secret; Security Information; NIACT. Repeated to London, Baghdad, Ankara, and Dhahran. Received at 12:11 p.m. This telegram is printed - with redactions in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, + with redactions in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 685–688 (Document 308). - Tehran, February 28, + Tehran, February 28, 1953, 5 p.m.

3449. Early this morning stories regarding imminent departure Shah pouring in from many sources. These stories had conflicting details. Altho some reflected confusion and bewilderment, there seemed be general impression that Shah’s decision depart was in some way connected with friction between him and Prime Minister. Most common version was that - Shah had decided leave because Mosadeq was threatening if Shah did not (rpt not) do so he would issue proclamation + Shah had decided leave because Mosadeq was threatening if Shah did not (rpt not) do so he would issue proclamation to country criticizing Shah and asking people to choose between Shah and himself.

2. Embassy Attaché reported that at dinner yesterday evening attended by @@ -26324,35 +22321,27 @@

3. I decided this morning that since news was now out I was more free than hitherto to try to effect cancellation or at least postponement Shah’s plans leave country. Unable obtain appointment with Foreign - Minister I was able arrange see Ala, Minister Court, at 11:15. Ala had just returned from audience + Minister I was able arrange see Ala, Minister Court, at 11:15. Ala had just returned from audience with Shah. He told me he had done utmost persuade Shah at last moment not (repeat not) to leave. Shah however was determined insisting that if - he did not (repeat not) depart Mosadeq would issue proclamation attacking him and + he did not (repeat not) depart Mosadeq would issue proclamation attacking him and members his family; it would be difficult for him without necessary facilities effectively to answer charges which would be made against him. He preferred leave country to becoming involved in one-sided squabble. Ala said that while he - was with Shah word had been received that at instance Kashani, President Majlis, who + was with Shah word had been received that at instance Kashani, President Majlis, who claimed to have heard news of Shah’s departure only this morning, informal closed meeting of some 57 members Majlis was taking place to discuss situation. When Shah received this news he had become excited - and insisted on leaving at once before lunch because he was afraid that if he did not (rpt not) get away so much pressure would + and insisted on leaving at once before lunch because he was afraid that if he did not (rpt not) get away so much pressure would be brought upon him that he would have difficulty leaving without incident. I told Ala that as Minister Court I conceived it to be his duty to inform Shah that in - interest of country Shah should not (rpt not) leave in this fashion. I also asked him tell Shah + interest of country Shah should not (rpt not) leave in this fashion. I also asked him tell Shah that I had just received message indicating that very important personage for whom Shah had most friendly feelings had also expressed sincere hope that Shah could be dissuaded from leaving country (London - telegram 195, February 27 repeated Washington 4844).In telegram 4844 to Tehran, February 27, the + telegram 195, February 27 repeated Washington 4844).In telegram 4844 to Tehran, February 27, the Department relayed a message from the Embassy in London that reads in part: “Foreign Office this afternoon informed us of receipt message from Eden from Queen @@ -26363,8 +22352,7 @@ Ala asked if Shah’s present adviser, Valatbar, could join our conversation. I agreed and at Ala’s request repeated to - Valatbar what I had just told Ala. Ala said he + Valatbar what I had just told Ala. Ala said he thought it would be good idea if I could talk directly with Shah. Would I object? I said in circumstances even though I might later be charged with interference in Iran affairs, I would welcome opportunity. @@ -26378,8 +22366,7 @@ precaution taken in this respect.

4. Despite risks involved I talked with Shah. I told him that in present emergency I had had no (rpt no) time to - obtain instructions from Washington but I knew US Government policies sufficiently well to be confident + obtain instructions from Washington but I knew US Government policies sufficiently well to be confident that US Government just as I considered it would not (rpt not) be in interest Iran for him leave country so hastily in present circumstances. No @@ -26388,8 +22375,7 @@ created through-out world that he was departing under duress. Furthermore after he departed Communist and other internal enemies of independent Iran would fabricate stories against him. It would be - charged that his sudden departure was proof he was not (rpt not) worthy remaining as Shah. He + charged that his sudden departure was proof he was not (rpt not) worthy remaining as Shah. He represented symbol unity and also hope for future Iran throughout country. His departure would be sure to lower morale of those enlightened elements of country who understood Iran’s external dangers @@ -26406,24 +22392,19 @@ denouncing you and your family. No (rpt no) one would believe that your departure entirely voluntary. Shah replied, “I not (rpt not) leaving under - duress. Prime Minister insists that I do not (rpt not) have to go unless I desire do so. He says, + duress. Prime Minister insists that I do not (rpt not) have to go unless I desire do so. He says, however, that if I remain he will be compelled issue proclamation attacking me and my family. In such circumstances I prefer to leave.” I said I quite prepared to take this matter up with Prime Minister personally. He replied, “it will be useless. He will tell you I am - leaving on my own volition and he cannot stop me.” I said “not (rpt not) only US Government and American people in my opinion will be + leaving on my own volition and he cannot stop me.” I said “not (rpt not) only US Government and American people in my opinion will be shocked at your departure in present situation but many other friends of yourself and Iran throughout world.” I pointed out that rumors of his impending departure had already penetrated other countries. In indirect way I gave him understand views regarding his departure of person referred to in reference telegram. Shah expressed appreciation, but - insisted he must go. He said he wished to thank US Government and myself personally for friendship and - support. He would now (rpt now) bid me farewell. He hoped and expected to + insisted he must go. He said he wished to thank US Government and myself personally for friendship and + support. He would now (rpt now) bid me farewell. He hoped and expected to return.

5. After this conversation Ala said “you see how hopeless it is”. He expressed hope despite Shah’s @@ -26433,30 +22414,23 @@ (repeat not) insofar as court was concerned. He not (repeat not) sure that Prime Minister would appreciate my intervention. At that moment messenger informed Ala that - Bureau of Majlis had arrived with request that Ala arrange for it deliver urgent + Bureau of Majlis had arrived with request that Ala arrange for it deliver urgent message to Shah. I returned to Embassy.

6. On my arrival I learned that members Majlis in secret session had decided send message to Shah to effect that his departure from country at this time would be inadvisable. I was also told by acting Air Attaché - that Chief Air Staff had just informed him that General Baharmast Chief of Staff was en route + that Chief Air Staff had just informed him that General Baharmast Chief of Staff was en route Palace to inform Shah that whole General Staff had decided to resign in case Shah should leave country. Thus far unable to obtain confirmation firmness of resolve General Staff in this respect.

Baharmast not (repeat not) strong character and he might well wilt in delivering General Staff - message to Shah. General Zimmerman thinks Baharmast rather weak character.

-

7. I decided make endeavor see Prime Minister at once and asked Saleh Embassy Iranian Adviser seek + message to Shah. General Zimmerman thinks Baharmast rather weak character.

+

7. I decided make endeavor see Prime Minister at once and asked Saleh Embassy Iranian Adviser seek appointment. Saleh learned from Mosadeq Secretary that Prime - Minister in Palace with Shah. At Saleh’s - request Secretary left at once for Palace to tell Mosadeq I wished see him urgently. I + Minister in Palace with Shah. At Saleh’s + request Secretary left at once for Palace to tell Mosadeq I wished see him urgently. I called on Mosadeq at 1:15.

8. Mosadeq back in bed apparently suffering from severe headache. He received me in friendly though @@ -26467,8 +22441,7 @@ denouncing him and family. As friend of Iran and as his personal friend I considered it my duty tell him that departure Shah just now would tend confirm these rumors. Support of Iran independence was basic policy re - Iran. In my opinion and I sure my opinion represented that of US Government Shah’s hasty departure in + Iran. In my opinion and I sure my opinion represented that of US Government Shah’s hasty departure in these circumstances would weaken security country and I therefore, had come to him in hope that he could take some last minute measure to prevail on Shah not (repeat not) to leave or at least to postpone his @@ -26495,16 +22468,13 @@ Prime Minister I regretted having troubled him personally at time when I knew he harassed with many worries. I had hoped discuss matter in preliminary way with Foreign Minister but had been unable to obtain - appointment today. I had therefore called on Ala who clearly was not (rpt not) in position deny Shah was leaving almost + appointment today. I had therefore called on Ala who clearly was not (rpt not) in position deny Shah was leaving almost immediately. My call on Prime Minister had been prompted by hope that latter would cooperate in preventing developments which might ultimately if not (rpt not) almost immediately have consequences unfavorable to Iran. Prime Minister said it would be better for me if I did not (rpt not) - make calls on Ala or anyone else connected with court + make calls on Ala or anyone else connected with court at this critical time. I was opening myself to charges of interfering in internal affairs Iran. I said I fully conscious this danger but in my profession it sometimes necessary take risks just as it was necessary @@ -26513,15 +22483,12 @@ feeling that I had failed to do all that I possibly could to advance interests of friendly country to which I was accredited as well as interests world peace. Prime Minister altered his attitude and in more - friendly manner repeated that he was not (rpt not) insisting that Shah leave country. If Shah did not - (rpt not) do so he had no (rpt no) choice other than to issue + friendly manner repeated that he was not (rpt not) insisting that Shah leave country. If Shah did not + (rpt not) do so he had no (rpt no) choice other than to issue proclamation to Iran people. I said that in his political career he had undoubtedly on previous occasions found it possible to prevent differences from developing into open conflict which would be harmful to - country. Was he sure that he had no (rpt no) alternative other than to issue proclamation + country. Was he sure that he had no (rpt no) alternative other than to issue proclamation critical of Shah and court unless Shah should leave country? Prime Minister said he had given this matter much thought and he considered that he was following proper course.

@@ -26531,8 +22498,7 @@ printed. (Ibid., 888.2553/2–2753) We agreed that in case of press inquiries both he and I should merely state that during course my visit I had corrected minor omission in one of documents which I had - handed him on February 20.See Foreign + handed him on February 20.See Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 670–674 (Document 300).

10. On my way to Prime Minister’s residence I found all neighboring @@ -26541,86 +22507,55 @@ ready for demonstrations of some kind were observed gathering in vicinity.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
- 167. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in IranSource: National Archives, +
+ 167. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in IranSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, - 788.11/2–2853. Top Secret; Security Information; NIACT. Drafted by Stutesman, cleared by Jernegan, and approved by + 788.11/2–2853. Top Secret; Security Information; NIACT. Drafted by Stutesman, cleared by Jernegan, and approved by Richards. Repeated to London. - Washington, February 28, + Washington, February 28, 1953, 6:50 p.m.

2254. Dept completely concurs your - decision take energetic measures discourage Shah’s departure (Urtel 3449 rptd London 1124),Document 166. believing that risk - involved was worth taking in fluid situation. Deptel 2238 rptd London 5752Document 164. was not rpt not intended discourage you from + decision take energetic measures discourage Shah’s departure (Urtel 3449 rptd London 1124),Document 166. believing that risk + involved was worth taking in fluid situation. Deptel 2238 rptd London 5752Document 164. was not rpt not intended discourage you from taking such action, but, since we then unable foresee circumstances - where intervention could be useful (Urtel 3397 rptd London + where intervention could be useful (Urtel 3397 rptd London 1103),Document 162. only to assure you that inactivity in crisis would be understood here.

- Dulles + Dulles
-
+
168. Monthly Report Prepared in the Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence AgencySource: - Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 81–01061R, Box 1, Folder 2, Monthly + Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 81–01061R, Box 1, Folder 2, Monthly Report—February 1953—Country Summaries and Analyses. Top Secret. - Washington, undated. + Washington, undated.

IRAN

February 1953

A. General Developments

1. The operational implications of the struggle for power between Mossadeq and his political opponents are not as yet entirely clear. On the one hand, the communist - Tudeh Party is rallying to Mossadeq’s support while on the other, the major force + Tudeh Party is rallying to Mossadeq’s support while on the other, the major force behind the Shah appears to be - the dangerous and irresponsible Mullah Kashani.In its report for January 1953, signed by John H. Leavitt, the Iran Branch + the dangerous and irresponsible Mullah Kashani.In its report for January 1953, signed by John H. Leavitt, the Iran Branch reported that “the most significant January development affecting - operations in Iran was Mossadeq’s successful showdown with Kashani, who for some time had + operations in Iran was Mossadeq’s successful showdown with Kashani, who for some time had been challenging the Prime Minister’s authority in the National Front. Kashani, as Speaker - of the Majlis, tried to keep from coming to a vote Mossadeq’s request for a year’s + of the Majlis, tried to keep from coming to a vote Mossadeq’s request for a year’s extension of his special powers. Public clamor and the militancy of - the Prime Minister’s Majlis adherents forced Kashani to back down on the - pretext he had been ‘misunderstood’. As a result, Mossadeq’s request was - overwhelmingly approved, and Kashani’s prestige received a set-back. NEA–4 has for some time been trying to + the Prime Minister’s Majlis adherents forced Kashani to back down on the + pretext he had been ‘misunderstood’. As a result, Mossadeq’s request was + overwhelmingly approved, and Kashani’s prestige received a set-back. NEA–4 has for some time been trying to undermine Kashani because of his frenetic anti-westernism and the suspicion that he might ally himself with the Tudeh (communist) Party in a bid for power.” @@ -26632,15 +22567,12 @@ below) will have an important bearing on the direction of these efforts.

2. In preparation for a possible Tudeh coup in Iran: (a) the - interdepartmental committee (State–Defense–CIA) has completed the draft of its first progress report + interdepartmental committee (State–Defense–CIA) has completed the draft of its first progress report which, upon obtaining interagency concurrence, will be submitted to the NSC; (b) service level talks with representatives of the British Intelligence Service were held 24–28 February in Cyprus to discuss possible joint action in the event of an - emergency in Iran;See Document 158. (c) a POS specialist inspected [less than 1 line not declassified] military + emergency in Iran;See Document 158. (c) a POS specialist inspected [less than 1 line not declassified] military equipment [less than 1 line not declassified] and found a number of deficiencies mostly in connection with the ammunition supply, and steps are being taken to correct these deficiencies as @@ -26652,43 +22584,31 @@

-
+
Planning and Implementation of Operation TPAJAX, March–August 1953 -
- 169. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to President EisenhowerSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the +
+ 169. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to President EisenhowerSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Intelligence, Job 80R01731R, Box 9, Folder 350, White House. Secret; Security Information. A shorter version of this - memorandum is printed with redactions in Foreign + memorandum is printed with redactions in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 689–691 (Document 310). - Washington, March 1, 1953. + Washington, March 1, 1953. SUBJECT The Iranian Situation -

Ever since the assassination of General Razmara in March 1951, and the subsequent impasse and +

Ever since the assassination of General Razmara in March 1951, and the subsequent impasse and diplomatic break with Britain over the oil negotiations, the Iranian situation has been slowly disintegrating. The result has been a steady decrease in the power and influence of the Western democracies and the building up of a situation where a Communist takeover is becoming more and more of a possibility. However, even the present crisis is likely to be unsatisfactorily compromised without a Communist Tudeh victory. Of - course, the elimination of Mossadeq by assassination or otherwise might precipitate + course, the elimination of Mossadeq by assassination or otherwise might precipitate decisive events except in the unlikely alternative that the Shah should regain courage and decisiveness. The events of the past 48 hours have - brought a few surprises. The fanatical Moslem leader, Kashani, who is also President of + brought a few surprises. The fanatical Moslem leader, Kashani, who is also President of the Majlis, has shown more power than expected both in influencing the Majlis and in quickly marshaling for mob action his fanatical followers. The institution of the Crown may have more popular backing than was @@ -26699,11 +22619,9 @@

The principal opposing forces are represented on the one hand by Prime Minister Mossadeq and, on the other, by Mullah Kashani, with - the Shah apparently being used by Kashani.

+ the Shah apparently being used by Kashani.

The Communist Tudeh Party may be expected to capitalize on, and increase, - the tension in every possible way. The Tudeh Party, which has always been anti-Shah, will + the tension in every possible way. The Tudeh Party, which has always been anti-Shah, will probably back Mossadeq for the time being.

Significant elements of the Army will probably remain loyal to the Shah, @@ -26712,9 +22630,7 @@ use them. So far this determination has not appeared. On the other hand, Mossadeq appears to retain control of the chain of command.

-

As between Mossadeq and Kashani, it appears that Mossadeq has still the greater strength +

As between Mossadeq and Kashani, it appears that Mossadeq has still the greater strength although he has obviously lost some prestige in Parliament and among the people. Kashani’s following, however, is better consolidated in the capital through a well organized @@ -26729,13 +22645,10 @@ Majlis by his oratory. After an initial indication that he intended to seek official “refuge” in Parliament, he returned to his heavily guarded home at 2:30 Sunday morning.

-

Despite the weakening of Mossadeq’s position, he still appears to be able to recoup. +

Despite the weakening of Mossadeq’s position, he still appears to be able to recoup. His National Movement faction, some 28 deputies, has come up strongly in his favor; demonstrations have been staged in his support, and he has - replaced Chief of Staff Baharmast (on the grounds that Baharmast failed to maintain public + replaced Chief of Staff Baharmast (on the grounds that Baharmast failed to maintain public security) with General Riyahi.

If Mossadeq maintains control he will increase his efforts to remove or neutralize all opposition. His @@ -26753,8 +22666,7 @@

Kashani, with a record of venality, would bring a large degree of opportunism to the government. He has consistently followed a policy of extreme nationalism - antagonistic to the U.S. If he succeeded Mossadeq, he would have a much narrower basis of support + antagonistic to the U.S. If he succeeded Mossadeq, he would have a much narrower basis of support than Mossadeq enjoyed before the current crisis and would, therefore, be likely to resort to ruthlessness to destroy opposition. In his struggle to do so Tudeh influence and @@ -26774,18 +22686,14 @@ of Mossadeq and the Shah insofar as it is possible to have the respect of each in the present situation. In addition to attachés of the three U.S. services, there is an - experienced CIA mission [less than 1 line not declassified] with [less than 1 line not declassified] a pipe line to - the leaders of the Quasqai tribal leaders. The Chief of CIA’s Middle Eastern desk is en route to + experienced CIA mission [less than 1 line not declassified] with [less than 1 line not declassified] a pipe line to + the leaders of the Quasqai tribal leaders. The Chief of CIA’s Middle Eastern desk is en route to Teheran. Except for the Soviet Embassy, with a large and highly competent staff and a fortress-like compound covering a city block in the middle of Teheran, no foreign mission other than our own enjoys enough prestige or power to play an effective role in the situation. [2 lines not declassified]

-

2. An American military mission, headed by Major General Zimmerman and including some 35 +

2. An American military mission, headed by Major General Zimmerman and including some 35 officers and about the same number of enlisted men, is in Iran, mostly in Teheran, for Army training purposes. This mission has been the object of vigorous Soviet attack, and as its contract has not been renewed, it @@ -26815,26 +22723,21 @@ emergency. They are hardly adequate. Study is being given the possibility of supplementing them.

- Allen DullesPrinted from a copy - that indicates the original was signed. + Allen DullesPrinted from a copy + that indicates the original was signed.
-
+
170. Memorandum Prepared in the Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 80R01443R, Box 1, Folder 7. Secret; Security Information. A handwritten note on a sheet of paper attached to the memorandum - indicates that it was prepared for the March 5 NSC meeting, but was not used. Another + indicates that it was prepared for the March 5 NSC meeting, but was not used. Another copy of the memorandum indicates that it was prepared in the Iran - Branch of the Directorate of Plans. (Ibid., DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 12, Misc. + Branch of the Directorate of Plans. (Ibid., DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 12, Misc. Correspondence TPAJAX) - Washington, March 3, 1953. + Washington, March 3, 1953.

CAPABILITIES OF CIA CLANDESTINE SERVICES IN IRAN

1. To Prevent Assumption of Power by Tudeh: @@ -26844,11 +22747,9 @@ depends upon the use to which they will be put. For example, there are propaganda groups which could operate effectively to support Mossadegh but which would refuse to work against him. The - same applies to other groups as regards the Shah. Specifically, CIA capabilities in the clandestine field + same applies to other groups as regards the Shah. Specifically, CIA capabilities in the clandestine field are as follows:

-

a. Mass propaganda means (press, etc.): CIA controls a network with numerous press, political, and +

a. Mass propaganda means (press, etc.): CIA controls a network with numerous press, political, and clerical contacts which has proven itself capable of disseminating large-scale anti-Tudeh propaganda. The network can also give effective propaganda support to Prime Minister Mossadegh. It could not, however, @@ -26857,8 +22758,7 @@ CIA which is capable of providing reasonably effective pro-Shah propaganda. It would not, however, support a pro-Shah candidate for the Prime Ministry unless the views of that - individual were acceptable to this group. CIA presently has + individual were acceptable to this group. CIA presently has no group which would be effective in spreading anti-Mossadegh mass propaganda.

b. Poison pen, personal denunciations, rumor spreading, @@ -26880,8 +22780,7 @@ than 1 line not declassified] could also provide effective pro-Mossadegh demonstrations and it could provide fairly effective pro-Shah demonstrations on the condition that these demonstrations not - be in effect anti-Mossadegh demonstrations. CIA has no group in Iran which could effectively promote + be in effect anti-Mossadegh demonstrations. CIA has no group in Iran which could effectively promote riots demonstrating against Mossadegh.

d. Tribal support: The only tribal leaders now cooperating with CIA are pro-Mossadegh @@ -26921,21 +22820,16 @@ government.

[5 paragraphs (25 lines) not declassified]

-
+
171. Memorandum of Discussion at the 135th Meeting of the National Security CouncilSource: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 4, 135th Meeting of the National Security Council. Top Secret; Security - Information; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on March 5. Printed with redactions in Foreign + Information; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on March 5. Printed with redactions in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 692–701 (Document 312). - Washington, March 4, 1953. + Washington, March 4, 1953. SUBJECT Discussion at the 135th Meeting of the National Security Council @@ -26945,8 +22839,7 @@ United States, presiding, the Vice President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury, the - Director, Bureau of the Budget, General Vandenberg for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the + Director, Bureau of the Budget, General Vandenberg for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Administrative Assistant to the President for National Security Matters, the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Operations, the Military Liaison Officer, the @@ -26961,17 +22854,13 @@ Affecting U.S. Security (NSC 136/1)Document 147.

-

When the Council turned to this item on the agenda Mr. Cutler sketched briefly current United - States policy on Iran as set forth in NSC 136/1. He further informed the Council that the Senior +

When the Council turned to this item on the agenda Mr. Cutler sketched briefly current United + States policy on Iran as set forth in NSC 136/1. He further informed the Council that the Senior NSC Staff had discussed this policy - and the situation in Iran at its meeting on the previous Monday.The record of the meeting of the Senior + and the situation in Iran at its meeting on the previous Monday.The record of the meeting of the Senior NSC Staff on March 2 is not printed. (National Archives, RG 59, - S/P–NSC Files, Lot 62 D 1, 1953—Record of Planning Board + S/P–NSC Files, Lot 62 D 1, 1953—Record of Planning Board Meetings NSC Files) At that time the Staff had requested that the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretaries of State and Defense be prepared to answer certain @@ -27001,8 +22890,7 @@ was but little danger, but if he were to be assassinated or otherwise to disappear from power, a political vacuum would occur in Iran and the Communists might easily take over. The consequences of such a take-over - were then outlined in all their seriousness by Mr. Dulles. Not only would the free world + were then outlined in all their seriousness by Mr. Dulles. Not only would the free world be deprived of the enormous assets represented by Iranian oil production and reserves, but the Russians would secure these assets and thus henceforth be free of any anxiety about their petroleum situation. Worse @@ -27021,15 +22909,13 @@ really determined to take it. We do not have sufficient troops to put into the area in order to prevent a Communist take-over, and the Soviets had played their game in Iran very cleverly and with a good sense of - timing. Nevertheless, continued Secretary Dulles, he believed it was possible to gain time if we + timing. Nevertheless, continued Secretary Dulles, he believed it was possible to gain time if we followed certain courses of action. The real problem, it seemed to him, was what to do with the time thus gained, in view of the apparent hopelessness of Iran’s ultimate fate. Perhaps, he suggested, the Joint Chiefs of Staff might provide some answer as to what we could do with the time we could save.

-

In commencing his outline of these courses of action, Secretary Dulles noted that all three courses +

In commencing his outline of these courses of action, Secretary Dulles noted that all three courses were hazardous and all of them subject to change in case Mossadegh was assassinated. The first course of action suggested by Secretary Dulles was to recall @@ -27043,16 +22929,14 @@ the United States to disassociate itself, regarding Iran, from the British in an effort to regain popularity on the merits of a policy of our own. This subject, he added, he desired to discuss with the - President and Foreign Secretary Eden. But, he said, it was well known that our + President and Foreign Secretary Eden. But, he said, it was well known that our unpopularity in Iran is largely a derivation of British unpopularity and our previous association in the minds of Iranians with unpopular British policies. The trouble with such a course of action as this was whether we should not lose more by going it alone, in the face of British opposition in many other areas of the world, than we should gain in Iran itself.

-

At this point the President interrupted Secretary Dulles’ outline to state his firm +

At this point the President interrupted Secretary Dulles’ outline to state his firm belief that in such countries as Syria and Iraq, America was hated even more than Britain, because of the policy which we had been pursuing toward Israel. Had anyone ever thought, continued the President, of @@ -27067,20 +22951,17 @@

The third course, he said, was to go ahead and purchase oil from the National Iranian Oil Company, supply that company with the technicians it needed, and furthermore to give material support to the Mossadegh - regime. This completed, said Secretary Dulles, the courses of action which seemed open to us to + regime. This completed, said Secretary Dulles, the courses of action which seemed open to us to gain time in the emergency. We were not obliged to take all three of the courses he outlined, but one or more of them seemed to him the best way to gain time. Unless, however, the Defense people really believed that it was desirable to gain time and had specific reasons for this view, Secretary Dulles again expressed doubts as to the genuine desirability of pursuing any of these courses - of action except, perhaps, to recall Ambassador Henderson. The reason for his doubt, + of action except, perhaps, to recall Ambassador Henderson. The reason for his doubt, he said, was that the losses we might anticipate in other parts of the world were likely to overweigh any gain in Iran.

-

The President said he understood why Secretary Dulles hesitated about these courses +

The President said he understood why Secretary Dulles hesitated about these courses of action, but thought it possible that the British themselves might be persuaded by the course of events lately to agree to an independent policy vis-à-vis Iran by the United States.

@@ -27108,10 +22989,8 @@ States to do what it thought necessary to do in Iran, but we certainly don’t want a break with the British.

-

With this statement Secretary Wilson expressed strong agreement.

-

In commenting on the President’s statement, Secretary Dulles pointed out his fear that it +

With this statement Secretary Wilson expressed strong agreement.

+

In commenting on the President’s statement, Secretary Dulles pointed out his fear that it was now too late to hope that any reasonable concession by the British to the Iranians could result in a settlement. The only thing which would produce a settlement would be a complete British capitulation.

@@ -27157,21 +23036,17 @@ Iran. He thought that if the United States could manage to secure a peace between Egypt and Israel, and that if the Roman Catholic Church, as seemed likely, would agree to the internationalization of the Holy - Places in Jerusalem, and finally, if the British could be persuaded to go along, the Arab + Places in Jerusalem, and finally, if the British could be persuaded to go along, the Arab powers would fall in line and the United States would be able to create a position of reasonable strength in the whole Middle East area, including Iran.

-

The President said that Mr. Jackson was absolutely right, but, unhappily, what he +

The President said that Mr. Jackson was absolutely right, but, unhappily, what he proposed would take a long time, and we are in the midst of a crisis. “I’d pay a lot”, said the President, “for this peace between Egypt and Israel.”

Secretary Dulles added that this - case was on the agenda for his forthcoming talks with Anthony Eden.

-

The President then reverted to Secretary Dulles’ third course of action, which involved giving + case was on the agenda for his forthcoming talks with Anthony Eden.

+

The President then reverted to Secretary Dulles’ third course of action, which involved giving material and financial support to Mossadegh.

That, said Secretary Dulles, would certainly give us time, but he would like to hear now from the @@ -27180,10 +23055,8 @@ statement that the only real reason for gaining time was to get the Middle East Defense Organization started. If the MEDO begins to function it might very well provide the stability that we so desperately needed - in the Middle East. General Vandenberg, however, confirmed the President’s opinion - that it would take a very long time to get US or UN troops in position + in the Middle East. General Vandenberg, however, confirmed the President’s opinion + that it would take a very long time to get US or UN troops in position in Iran. We do, however, have plans, he added, to send in a division of American forces if this is the policy adopted by the President. General Vandenberg estimated that it @@ -27215,14 +23088,9 @@ Dulles that he ought to try to work out a position with the British that would save their face but actually give the United States control of the situation and freedom to - act along the lines suggested by Mr. Cutler.

+ act along the lines suggested by Mr. Cutler.

Secretary Dulles answered that he - had already talked about this to Mr. Eden in the course of his recent visit to London.Dulles and Eden met on February 4 in London. (Memorandum of + had already talked about this to Mr. Eden in the course of his recent visit to London.Dulles and Eden met on February 4 in London. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., Central Files 1950–1954, 611.41/2–453) He had found that the British did not anticipate any real crisis in Iran for a long time to come.

@@ -27233,8 +23101,7 @@

The President said that the latest illustration of their wrongness was in Egypt.

The Vice President said that there was yet another factor to be - considered in discussing this problem with Mr. Eden. It was the Vice President’s + considered in discussing this problem with Mr. Eden. It was the Vice President’s opinion that greater rather than less hostility was to be expected from the Russians after Stalin’s death. It was quite likely, therefore, that they would increase their pressure in Iran to secure its control as @@ -27261,8 +23128,7 @@ status of a second-rate power. “If”, said the President, “I had $500,000,000 of money to spend in secret, I would get $100,000,000 of it to Iran right now.”

-

The President then inquired of Secretary Dulles how soon it would be possible for the President +

The President then inquired of Secretary Dulles how soon it would be possible for the President and Secretary Dulles to sit down with Mr. Eden. Would it be possible this evening? We must find out immediately how the British @@ -27290,24 +23156,20 @@

Mr. Stassen had already stated, in reply to the President’s wish that he had money, that the Mutual Security Administration had available funds.

-

The President therefore turned to Mr. Stassen and asked him how much he could actually dig +

The President therefore turned to Mr. Stassen and asked him how much he could actually dig up.

Mr. Stassen replied that he could probably find as much as the situation required—five million, ten - million, forty million—if Secretary Dulles decided that he could make headway by the use of + million, forty million—if Secretary Dulles decided that he could make headway by the use of such funds.

Apropos of a statement by the President, that he also wished that for a change he could read about mobs in these Middle Eastern states rioting - and waving American flags, Mr. Jackson said that if the President wanted the mobs he + and waving American flags, Mr. Jackson said that if the President wanted the mobs he was sure he could produce them.

The President said in any case it was a matter of great distress to him that we seemed unable to get some of the people in these downtrodden countries to like us instead of hating us.

-

At this point in the discussion Mr. Cutler interposed to read a four-point record of +

At this point in the discussion Mr. Cutler interposed to read a four-point record of possible action by the Council on this particular item, which included an attempt to explore with the British the possibility of unilateral United States action in Iran.

@@ -27324,8 +23186,7 @@ was indeed a festering sore, but pointed out that the Arab countries themselves were unwilling to absorb these 800,000 unfortunate people, since to do so would deprive them of a bargaining point in their - dealings with the Israelis. Accordingly, said Secretary Dulles, he did not see what could be + dealings with the Israelis. Accordingly, said Secretary Dulles, he did not see what could be done about them.

Mr. Jackson replied that it would certainly be possible to resettle 200,000 of these refugees, and that @@ -27336,18 +23197,15 @@

After General Vandenberg had informed the Council that there was one point relevant to the military aspects of the Iranian problem, namely, the existence of a fair-sized - British force in Iraq, Mr. Stassen inquired whether it was indeed the President’s + British force in Iraq, Mr. Stassen inquired whether it was indeed the President’s view that some funds should be expended at once in Iran if the Secretary of State agreed.

The President replied that of course this was a gamble, but if upon examination it seemed a good gamble, he was prepared to take it.

-

The National Security Council:Paragraphs a and b constitute +

The National Security Council:Paragraphs a and b constitute NSC Action No. 729. (Ibid., RG 273, Records of the National - Security Council, Records of Actions, Box 95, NSC Actions 697–1001)

+ Security Council, Records of Actions, Box 95, NSC Actions 697–1001)

a. Discussed the subject in the light of an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence.

b. Agreed that the following possible courses of @@ -27358,50 +23216,38 @@ of the Anglo-Iranian controversy.

(2) The military feasibility of holding a line through the Zagros Mountain range.

-

(3) Replacement of Ambassador Henderson.

+

(3) Replacement of Ambassador Henderson.

(4) Provision of limited economic aid to strengthen Mossadegh’s position.

[Omitted here is discussion of basic national security policies and the NSC Status of Projects.]

- S. Everett - Gleason + S. Everett + Gleason Deputy Executive Secretary
-
+
172. Editorial Note

Foreign Secretary Eden and - Chancellor of the Exchequer Butler visited Washington March 4–7, 1953, for talks + Chancellor of the Exchequer Butler visited Washington March 4–7, 1953, for talks with U.S. officials on a wide array of strategic, political, and - financial issues, including Iran. In a meeting with Eden on March 6, Secretary Dulles stated that “we felt while it + financial issues, including Iran. In a meeting with Eden on March 6, Secretary Dulles stated that “we felt while it was still obscure that the authority of the Shah had probably largely - and permanently disappeared. We felt Mosadeq would probably come through the present + and permanently disappeared. We felt Mosadeq would probably come through the present situation remaining in authority. We felt further, however, that with - the Shah gone or his authority gone that when Mosadeq disappears by one means or + the Shah gone or his authority gone that when Mosadeq disappears by one means or another, that there was increased doubt as to whether there would be an orderly transition to another government.” This discussion of Iran - focused on the appropriate U.S. response should Mosadeq reject the joint U.S.–U.K. oil - proposal of February 20. (See Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, volume X, Iran, - 1951–1954, pages 670–674 (Document 300).) Eden agreed that any U.S. aid designed + focused on the appropriate U.S. response should Mosadeq reject the joint U.S.–U.K. oil + proposal of February 20. (See Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, volume X, Iran, + 1951–1954, pages 670–674 (Document 300).) Eden agreed that any U.S. aid designed to sustain the Iranian Government under such a scenario should not concern oil. Secretary Dulles added, near the end of the discussion, that “he thought we would have to play certain aspects of this problem by ear as the situation developed. - . . . It might be possible that in the immediate future the USSR will lose interest in external + . . . It might be possible that in the immediate future the USSR will lose interest in external aggression although, of course, the reverse also was possible. The major objective for both of us should be to keep going in Iran a government which will be non-Communist. Additionally, he felt that no great premium @@ -27409,42 +23255,33 @@ as he has. There should, for instance, be no major United States purchases of oil, but, on the other hand, we should do what we can on a small scale to keep the Mosadeq - government in existence.” See ibid., volume VI, Part 1, Western Europe and Canada, pages 907–917 + government in existence.” See ibid., volume VI, Part 1, Western Europe and Canada, pages 907–917 (Document 381). For full documentation of the U.S.–U.K. discussions in Washington March 4–7, 1953, see ibid., pages 887–964 - (Documents 375–391).

+ (Documents 375–391).

-
- 173. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 173. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/3–853. Top Secret; Security Information. Repeated to London. Received at 8:09 a.m. - Tehran, March 8, 1953, noon. + Tehran, March 8, 1953, noon.

3597. 1. We agree in general Secretary’s evaluation Iran political situation (paragraph one Deptel 2337 March 7 repeated London 5959).Telegram 5959 - to London, March 7, reported that Secretary Dulles, in a March 6 meeting with + to London, March 7, reported that Secretary Dulles, in a March 6 meeting with President Eisenhower and Eden, “expressed view situation so dangerous and unpredictable might be necessary act promptly and U.S. wld have to have - considerable measure discretion as to what it did. Eden repeated plea that U.S. + considerable measure discretion as to what it did. Eden repeated plea that U.S. measures adopted to ‘maintain a state of friendly stability in Iran’ should be unrelated any purchase of oil or activation of the refinery. Eden reemphasized that bitter resentment wld be aroused in U.K. by presence American technicians in Abadan.” - Telegram 5959 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, + Telegram 5959 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 702–703 (Document 314). The record of the meeting is printed ibid., vol. VI, Part 1, Western Europe and Canada, pp. 918–919, (Document @@ -27458,30 +23295,20 @@ up idea making some move on his behalf even though without his advance consent or knowledge.

2. As we see situation from Tehran we also agree with Secretary’s outline - our future policy re Iran as expressed to Eden. In view fluidity Iran situation we may be + our future policy re Iran as expressed to Eden. In view fluidity Iran situation we may be compelled as Secretary points out to play to extent by ear.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
+
174. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near - Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to Secretary of State DullesSource: National Archives, RG 59, GTI Files, Lot + Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to Secretary of State DullesSource: National Archives, RG 59, GTI Files, Lot 57 D 529, Box 40, NSC 1951–1954. - Top Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Stutesman. Printed from an + Top Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Stutesman. Printed from an uninitialed copy. - Washington, March 10, 1953. + Washington, March 10, 1953. SUBJECT Proposed Discussion of Iran in the National Security Council, @@ -27494,26 +23321,20 @@ present internal political struggle in Iran and what the Iranian position will be on the oil question and other matters affecting the West.

-

At the moment, it appears that Mosadeq is gaining the upper hand. He has indicated to +

At the moment, it appears that Mosadeq is gaining the upper hand. He has indicated to Ambassador Henderson that he will turn down recent oil proposals and will attempt to place the blame - upon the United States. He asked Ambassador Henderson whether the U.S. Government, in the absence of an agreement regarding compensation between the + upon the United States. He asked Ambassador Henderson whether the U.S. Government, in the absence of an agreement regarding compensation between the British and the Iranians, (A) would buy Iranian oil; (B) would encourage private American firms (1) to purchase Iranian oil and (2) otherwise assist Iran in production and export of oil; (C) would extend immediately to Iran a loan to be repaid subsequently in the form of oil.

It is our recommendation, in the present fluid situation, that we - consider the adoption of Henderson’s recommended “Course C”, an analysis of which + consider the adoption of Henderson’s recommended “Course C”, an analysis of which is attached (Tab 1).

On March 4, NSC suggested three possible - courses of action in regard to Iran (NSC Action No. 729).See footnote 5, Document 171. Brief + courses of action in regard to Iran (NSC Action No. 729).See footnote 5, Document 171. Brief notes which you may wish to see in an oral response are attached (Tab 2).Attached but not printed.

@@ -27522,8 +23343,7 @@ SUBJECT Ambassador Henderson’s - Recommended Course of Action to be followed should Mosadeq reject recent oil + Recommended Course of Action to be followed should Mosadeq reject recent oil proposals

Ambassador Henderson in his @@ -27536,8 +23356,7 @@ oil in the absence of a compensation agreement and not to encourage or discourage U.S. firms in this respect. The U.S. Government not to furnish Iran financial assistance in such circumstances. The U.S. - Government would continue, however, to give TCA and military assistance and perhaps a certain amount of + Government would continue, however, to give TCA and military assistance and perhaps a certain amount of economic development assistance so long as Iran desired such assistance and appeared to benefit from it.”The quotation is from telegram 2865 from Tehran, January 24. (National @@ -27558,8 +23377,7 @@ give financial aid, may so blur fact that we are acting on principle, not expediency, that decision when reached may create more resentment than one made now. He points, however, to grave risks which will be - involved in adoption of Course C. There is a possibility that Mosadeq and other Iranian political + involved in adoption of Course C. There is a possibility that Mosadeq and other Iranian political leaders may in their disappointment and resentment take steps to stimulate increased Iranian hostility against the West in general and the U.S. in particular. In their efforts to cause us to change our @@ -27569,8 +23387,7 @@ acts are leading Iran to destruction might merely encourage them to take additional rash measures.

-

The Iranians might assume attitudes toward TCA, military missions, and U.S. Consulates which would +

The Iranians might assume attitudes toward TCA, military missions, and U.S. Consulates which would leave us no choice other than to withdraw. They might create so many difficulties for the Embassy that it could no longer function properly. They might harass U.S. officials, missionaries and other U.S. nationals @@ -27581,8 +23398,7 @@ of the Soviet bloc, possibly including sales of petroleum or other products which would bring Iran into conflict with Battle Act legislation.

-

Nevertheless, regardless what occurs, Ambassador Henderson believes we should continue +

Nevertheless, regardless what occurs, Ambassador Henderson believes we should continue to stand firmly and calmly on the rock of principle. In his opinion, if we do not permit ourselves to be goaded by Iranian actions into some ill-tempered impulsive action of retribution, eventually we shall obtain @@ -27599,21 +23415,14 @@ morass in which as we proceed we shall become progressively more deeply entangled.

-
- 175. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, +
+ 175. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 80R01443R, Box 1, Folder 8, NSC Briefing 11 Mar 53. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. - Presumably prepared for the March 11 NSC meeting but there is no indication that it was - circulated to the NSC. - Washington, undated. + Presumably prepared for the March 11 NSC meeting but there is no indication that it was + circulated to the NSC. + Washington, undated.

IRANIAN TRIBES MAY BE FACTOR IN ANY NEW ATTEMPT TO OUST MOSSADEQ

A request in early January by a Bakhtiari tribal leader in Iran for @@ -27622,8 +23431,7 @@ Minister Mossadeq’s opponents will try to use the tribes in an effort to oust him.

This request, which was made to American representatives in both Tehran - and Isfahan, is the first approach to the United States. [2½ lines not declassified] There is no + and Isfahan, is the first approach to the United States. [2½ lines not declassified] There is no confirmation, however, of reports that the Bakhtiari have obtained Russian, British or any other foreign backing for such an attempt or that they are in a position to challenge successfully the government’s @@ -27637,8 +23445,7 @@ units in the Kurdish areas in the northwest are constantly ordered to investigate reports that British agents have visited this tribe.

Iranian suspicion of Russian intrigue among the tribes is reflected by - the 1 December order of Chief of Staff Baharmast to military units in northwestern Iran to + the 1 December order of Chief of Staff Baharmast to military units in northwestern Iran to investigate reports that the Russians were arming the Kurds and the Tudeh in preparation for joint Tudeh–tribal action. The Azerbaijan Democratic radio in Baku accused the British in early January of arming @@ -27650,8 +23457,7 @@ made impotent by an unsuccessful effort to unseat Prime Minister Mossadeq. Their aspirations for regaining some of their lost autonomy have been increased by the - gradual transfer of power under Mossadeq from the landlords and the army to the + gradual transfer of power under Mossadeq from the landlords and the army to the nationalistic middle class.

[less than 1 line not declassified] show army concern over intrigues among the Bakhtiari, the Kurds and even the @@ -27663,11 +23469,8 @@ year in consolidating its branches and in gaining some measure of independence of the government.

However, traditional frictions between the tribes and the government have - been aggravated by the army’s current efforts to carry out Mossadeq’s program of disarming the tribes. Their - susceptibilities to manipulation by Mossadeq’s opponents will be increased if the Prime + been aggravated by the army’s current efforts to carry out Mossadeq’s program of disarming the tribes. Their + susceptibilities to manipulation by Mossadeq’s opponents will be increased if the Prime Minister makes a serious attempt, as Iranian military orders suggest that he will, to disarm the Qashqai and the other more powerful tribes.

@@ -27682,21 +23485,16 @@ against each other, and thus weaken, two of the Tudeh’s strongest adversaries.

-
+
176. Memorandum of Discussion at the 136th Meeting of the National Security CouncilSource: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 4, 136th Meeting of the National Security Council. Top Secret; Security - Information; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason. Printed with redactions in Foreign + Information; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason. Printed with redactions in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 711–714 (Document 318). - Washington, March 11, 1953. + Washington, March 11, 1953. SUBJECT Discussion at the 136th Meeting of the National Security Council @@ -27707,8 +23505,7 @@ Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission - (for Item 1 only); General Collins for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the + (for Item 1 only); General Collins for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Administrative Assistant to the President for National Security Matters; the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Operations; the Military Liaison Officer; the @@ -27724,29 +23521,22 @@

3. Developments in Iran Affecting U.S. Security (NSC Action No. 729–b; NSC - 136/1)For NSC Action No. 729–b, see footnote 5, Document 171. For NSC 136/1, see Document 147.

+ 136/1)For NSC Action No. 729–b, see footnote 5, Document 171. For NSC 136/1, see Document 147.

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the latest available information on Iran, which included the probability that Mossadegh was about to turn down the latest plan for settlement of the oil controversy. Mr. Cutler also outlined to the Council the three questions which Mossadegh was - thought to be about to present to Ambassador Henderson by way of eliciting what + thought to be about to present to Ambassador Henderson by way of eliciting what assistance this Government was prepared to give to his regime.

Secretary Dulles then stated that - he had just received that morning a telegram from Ambassador Henderson, stating that he had now + he had just received that morning a telegram from Ambassador Henderson, stating that he had now reached the conclusion that Mossadegh would not solicit an answer to these questions unless he judged that he could expect a favorable reply by the United States.Reference is to questions posed by Mosadeq and reported by Henderson in - telegram 3605 from Tehran, March 9. Mosadeq had rejected the British proposals of + telegram 3605 from Tehran, March 9. Mosadeq had rejected the British proposals of February 20 for a resolution of the oil dispute. He then informed Henderson that he was considering the following question for the United States: “In @@ -27757,31 +23547,22 @@ United States firms (1) to purchase Iranian oil and (2) otherwise assist Iran in production and export of its oil; (C) to extend to Iran immediately loan to be repaid subsequently in form of oil?” - Telegram 3605 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, + Telegram 3605 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 703–706 (Document 315). Here Dulles is referring to - telegram 3644 from Tehran, March 11, in which Henderson reported that Mosadeq would not officially ask + telegram 3644 from Tehran, March 11, in which Henderson reported that Mosadeq would not officially ask the above questions unless he could expect a favorable reply. (Ibid., pp. 709–710; Document - 317) We should not, said Secretary Dulles, in his opinion give any hint + 317) We should not, said Secretary Dulles, in his opinion give any hint to Mossadegh that he could expect a favorable response to these questions. Any proposal that the United States purchase Iranian oil at this time would constitute a terrific blow to the British. In discussing - this idea with him during his visit, Foreign Secretary Eden had told Secretary Dulles that if we even sent - technicians to assist in reopening the Abadan refinery, Eden would be unable to survive as + this idea with him during his visit, Foreign Secretary Eden had told Secretary Dulles that if we even sent + technicians to assist in reopening the Abadan refinery, Eden would be unable to survive as Foreign Secretary. Anything more than the technicians would, of course, be that much worse. It was the feeling generally in the State - Department, continued Secretary Dulles, that we should not encourage the Iranian - Government as to any hope of reactivating the refinery or of buying Iranian oil. We might, however, + Department, continued Secretary Dulles, that we should not encourage the Iranian + Government as to any hope of reactivating the refinery or of buying Iranian oil. We might, however, give some slight added technical and military aid in order to assure the Iranian Government of our friendly intentions.

Mr. Cutler raised the questions of @@ -27793,8 +23574,7 @@ whether Prime Minister Mossadegh had not framed his three questions in anticipation of a negative response from this Government. The monkey would then be on our back, and Mossadegh could point to the United - States as hostile to Iranian aspirations. Secretary Wilson, however, agreed that there was + States as hostile to Iranian aspirations. Secretary Wilson, however, agreed that there was no alternative but to say “no” to these questions. If we replied in the affirmative we would not only help to destroy what was left of the idea of sanctity of contracts, but if we entered into an agreement to @@ -27813,8 +23593,7 @@ from the negotiations, it would not probably be difficult to get results from Iran, but the United Kingdom was involved deeply in concern for its own prestige, and this was a much more difficult thing to deal with than - any mere matter of compensation. It seemed to Secretary Dulles that we must somehow try to + any mere matter of compensation. It seemed to Secretary Dulles that we must somehow try to become senior partners with the British in this area and work in that context.

Secretary Wilson expressed @@ -27827,8 +23606,7 @@

Secretary Dulles did so, and explained at some length the Iranian fear that if they submitted the issue of compensation to arbitration at The Hague, they would undergo a - protracted economic bondage to Great Britain. But Secretary Dulles was inclined to think that even + protracted economic bondage to Great Britain. But Secretary Dulles was inclined to think that even if the Mossadegh regime refused to accept the latest proposals, these were not the last possible terms. We might yet be able to meet this Iranian dread of indefinite tutelage to the British. In any case, @@ -27851,8 +23629,7 @@ undertake to discuss the feasibility of holding a line through the Taurus–Zagros Mountain ranges in the event that military action to defend Iran became necessary.

-

With the aid of charts and maps, General Collins proceeded to discuss the feasibility of this +

With the aid of charts and maps, General Collins proceeded to discuss the feasibility of this holding operation and the very great difficulty which was to be anticipated in the attempt. The mountain line, he indicated, was some 1750 miles in length from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea. @@ -27862,15 +23639,13 @@ Collins’ personal opinion that it could not be done in time of war with a force of this size, even if the forces were available and could be placed in position in time. - For that matter, said General Collins, it seemed plain to him that in event of hot war + For that matter, said General Collins, it seemed plain to him that in event of hot war neither side—the Russians or ourselves—would ever get any oil from the Middle East. The fields were too vulnerable to attack by air and otherwise, and could be counted out of production during hostilities.

Turning then to what could be done to defend the oil fields in the event - of a cold war situation, General Collins said that the Joint Chiefs had likewise various + of a cold war situation, General Collins said that the Joint Chiefs had likewise various plans under consideration. If a Tudeh government were established in Teheran, we could of course fly a certain number of aircraft over the area. If some kind of an Iranian government asked for our assistance @@ -27894,20 +23669,16 @@ this might be possible in very favorable circumstances, but it was much more likely that the Russians would come to the assistance of the Iranian Communists in the guise of volunteers. We would then be faced - with a most difficult decision. It seemed to General Collins, in conclusion, that about - the most feasible solution in the contingency envisaged by Mr. Cutler, was for the Central + with a most difficult decision. It seemed to General Collins, in conclusion, that about + the most feasible solution in the contingency envisaged by Mr. Cutler, was for the Central Intelligence Agency to work out plans by which the free tribesmen in Southern Iran could be armed. With some outside assistance such forces might conceivably be able to hold the south in the event of civil war in Iran.

-

The National Security Council:Paragraphs a and b and the Note +

The National Security Council:Paragraphs a and b and the Note constitute NSC Action No. 735. (National Archives, RG 273, Records - of the National Security Council, Records of Action, Box 95, NSC Actions 697–1001)

+ of the National Security Council, Records of Action, Box 95, NSC Actions 697–1001)

a. Noted an oral report by the Secretary of State on possible courses of action with respect to the current situation in Iran, and agreed:

@@ -27920,8 +23691,7 @@ time.

(4) To explore the possibility of more equitable procedures for an Anglo-Iranian settlement.

-

b. Noted an oral briefing by General Collins on the military difficulties +

b. Noted an oral briefing by General Collins on the military difficulties of defending a line through the Taurus–Zagros Mountain ranges under either hot or cold war operations.

Note: The action in a above @@ -27931,30 +23701,25 @@ United States objectives and courses of action with respect to Latin America.]

- S. Everett - Gleason + S. Everett + Gleason
-
+
177. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 79T00937A, Box 2, Folder 2, Staff Memoranda—1953 (Substantive). Top Secret; Security Information. - Washington, March 11, 1953. + Washington, March 11, 1953. SUBJECT The Situation in Iran -

1. The almost three-week-old political crisis precipitated by Mossadeq’s attack on the Shah’s +

1. The almost three-week-old political crisis precipitated by Mossadeq’s attack on the Shah’s position and his subsequent effort to force the monarch into exile has - now died down in intensity but is still unresolved. Mossadeq retains control of the + now died down in intensity but is still unresolved. Mossadeq retains control of the government and has steadily consolidated his position. However, some disorder continues, the Shah and other opposition elements have not yet made their peace with Mossadeq, @@ -27982,13 +23747,9 @@ resulted in the Shah’s decision not to leave Iran. Although pro-Kashani deputies have blocked a vote of confidence by absenting themselves from the Majlis and - some religious extremists are still fulminating against Mossadeq and his circle, Kashani has stated that Mossadeq as well as the Shah should + some religious extremists are still fulminating against Mossadeq and his circle, Kashani has stated that Mossadeq as well as the Shah should remain and is reportedly now “sulking in his tent.”

-

(2) The pro-Shah elementAn unknown hand wrote “faction” above this +

(2) The pro-Shah elementAn unknown hand wrote “faction” above this word. in the army and air force, which also participated in the 28 February riots, has been greatly weakened by the @@ -28004,20 +23765,17 @@ but have otherwise been quiescent.

c. The Shah has continued in a state of nervous indecision. He has apparently given some covert encouragement - to advocates of strong action to overthrow Mossadeq but has taken no positive action himself and + to advocates of strong action to overthrow Mossadeq but has taken no positive action himself and evidently would be quite content with a settlement allowing him to remain in peace. He may still decide to leave Iran.

d. The tribes have played little part in the crisis. The fiercely anti-Palace Qashqai leaders have continued to support Mossadeq. While some Bahktiari leaders are still at odds with the government, there is no - evidence that they have attempted to capitalize on Mossadeq’s current troubles. Other + evidence that they have attempted to capitalize on Mossadeq’s current troubles. Other tribes, including the Kurds, have been quiet.

a. The Tudeh Party has attempted to capitalize on the - situation by joining or sponsoring pro-Mossadeq anti-Shah demonstrations. + situation by joining or sponsoring pro-Mossadeq anti-Shah demonstrations. However, it has generally been physically rebuffed by both the police and Mossadeq’s followers and has gained little more than experience and some propaganda effect.

@@ -28027,12 +23785,10 @@

(1) It is extremely unlikely that the opposition will successfully rally to unseat Mossadeq at this late stage. Such a development would almost certainly require army - participation, which is improbable now that Mossadeq’s principal military opponents have been + participation, which is improbable now that Mossadeq’s principal military opponents have been dismissed or sent to pounding beats in the hinterland.

(2) There is still some possibility that the Shah might leave Iran, on - his own initiative or under pressure from Mossadeq.

+ his own initiative or under pressure from Mossadeq.

(3) It appears most probable, however, that the crisis will end in some sort of compromise whereby the Palace would be weakened but not destroyed as a political influence in Iran.

@@ -28056,15 +23812,13 @@ major and minor objections, finally urging that impartial adjudication of claims be dropped in favor of a directly negotiated lump sum settlement, thus protecting Iran against being saddled with an “unending - burden.” After much consultation between the US and UK, a new and + burden.” After much consultation between the US and UK, a new and “final” set of proposals was prepared. These included concessions to Mossadeq on many minor points and provided an alternate mechanism for limiting Iranian payments to 20 years, but they preserved the concept of impartial adjudication and terms of reference which enabled AIOC - to claim future profits. Henderson presented these proposals on 20 February, just + to claim future profits. Henderson presented these proposals on 20 February, just after the political crisis started.

b. Mossadeq appears to be on the verge of rejecting these proposals. He immediately pointed to the @@ -28074,9 +23828,7 @@ Legation, the amount of AIOC’s claims. On 9 March he told Henderson that the oil talks should be abandonedAn - apparent reference to a March 9 conversation Henderson had with Mosadeq and reported on in telegram + apparent reference to a March 9 conversation Henderson had with Mosadeq and reported on in telegram 3605, March 9. See footnote 3, Document 176. but phoned later to say that he had spoken prematurely and would consult the cabinet before making a final @@ -28089,23 +23841,19 @@ in Iranian affairs for urging the Shah not to leave the country, though Mossadeq finally consented to accept Henderson’s protestations - of good faith. Apparently in response to Soviet pressure, Mossadeq has called for withdrawal of + of good faith. Apparently in response to Soviet pressure, Mossadeq has called for withdrawal of TCI personnel from the Caspian area. In discussing the oil question, he has repeatedly asserted that the US would buy oil from Iran even without a compensation agreement if it really had Iran’s best interests - at heart and has reiterated his old contention that the US was bound to provide financial aid to + at heart and has reiterated his old contention that the US was bound to provide financial aid to Iran to prevent it from going Communist.

5. Mossadeq faces a difficult decision. His instincts tell him to reject the present oil proposals. Yet rejection of the oil proposals will subject Iran to a further period of economic uncertainty and increase general pessimism and criticism of - his leadership in Iran. He is probably also angry with the US for its role in the oil talks and its - support of the Shah. Yet open defiance of the US would deprive Iran of an important counterweight against + his leadership in Iran. He is probably also angry with the US for its role in the oil talks and its + support of the Shah. Yet open defiance of the US would deprive Iran of an important counterweight against Soviet pressure and a potential source of financial help. In the end, he will probably reject the oil proposals but stop short of a direct rebuff to the US, hoping that a successful oil @@ -28113,13 +23861,11 @@ out or that the US may finally be persuaded to come to Iran’s assistance.

- R.L. - Hewitt + R.L. + Hewitt
-
+
178. Information Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job @@ -28131,16 +23877,14 @@ CS–5029a - Washington, March 16, 1953. + Washington, March 16, 1953. SUBJECT Attitude of Shah Concerning His Present Position SOURCE - A source with close contacts with the Shah (F). Appraisal of Content: 3 + A source with close contacts with the Shah (F). Appraisal of Content: 3

1. The Shah told source on 11 March 1953 that his duty to his people was making him a virtual prisoner by frustrating his desire to go abroad and @@ -28157,57 +23901,40 @@ that these were used against him (the Shah) and his family as “evidence” that they were participating in anti-Government intrigues.

3. The Shah denied that he “knew anything” about the tribal disturbance - set off in February 1953 by Abul Ghasem BakhtiarField Comment. According to + set off in February 1953 by Abul Ghasem BakhtiarField Comment. According to same source as Comment 1 above, unless Abul Ghasem were captured and his followers dispersed before the mountain passes thawed (probably - in late March), minor tribes adjacent to the Bakhtiar country would flock to + in late March), minor tribes adjacent to the Bakhtiar country would flock to their support, thus precipitating a major revolt. [Footnote is in - the original.] and blamed, by Mossadeq supporters, on anti-Government individuals who + the original.] and blamed, by Mossadeq supporters, on anti-Government individuals who allegedly were influencing the Shah.

-
- 179. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, +
+ 179. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, Iran 1951–1953. Confidential. A handwritten note on the - memorandum indicates that it was seen by Wisner. No other record of this meeting has been + memorandum indicates that it was seen by Wisner. No other record of this meeting has been found. - Washington, March 18, 1953. + Washington, March 18, 1953. REFERENCE Mr. Roosevelt’s recent talk with Woodhouse and Firth on Iran

The general subject of Mossadegh’s continuance in office was discussed - here by top State Department officials with Mr. Eden.See - Document 172 and footnote 2, Document 173. Gist of + here by top State Department officials with Mr. Eden.See + Document 172 and footnote 2, Document 173. Gist of discussion was to effect that situation has materially altered since December. While there is no obvious choice in sight to replace Mossadegh it is felt that any assets which could be rallied to support a replacement should, if at all possible, he preserved for at least a few months more until the course of events may be clarified.

-
- 180. Progress Report to the National Security CouncilSource: National Archives, RG 273, Records of the National - Security Council, Policy Papers, Box 210, NSC 136 US Pol re Iran. +
+ 180. Progress Report to the National Security CouncilSource: National Archives, RG 273, Records of the National + Security Council, Policy Papers, Box 210, NSC 136 US Pol re Iran. Top Secret. - Washington, March 20, 1953. + Washington, March 20, 1953. SUBJECT First Progress Report on Paragraph 5–a of @@ -28215,28 +23942,22 @@ Regarding the Present Situation in Iran”

NSC 136/1 was approved as governmental - policy on November 20, 1952.Document 147. It is requested that + policy on November 20, 1952.Document 147. It is requested that this progress report as of March 11, 1953, be circulated to the members of the Council for their information.

Introduction

-

1. Paragraph 5–a of NSC 136/1 reads as follows:

-

[Omitted here is paragraph 5–a of Document 147.]

+

1. Paragraph 5–a of NSC 136/1 reads as follows:

+

[Omitted here is paragraph 5–a of Document 147.]

2. In accordance with the foregoing, a Working Group consisting of - representatives from the Departments of State and Defense, CIA and the JCS was formed to develop plans for the specific measures + representatives from the Departments of State and Defense, CIA and the JCS was formed to develop plans for the specific measures indicated.

3. Although many of the specific plans required are still in the process of preparation, the Working Group submits herewith a Progress Report as of March 11, 1953, for the information of the members of the Council.

4. The Working Group desires to point out that in addition to the two - conditions envisioned in paragraph 5–a of NSC 136/1, there is also the possibility + conditions envisioned in paragraph 5–a of NSC 136/1, there is also the possibility that a communist seizure of power in Iran may take place imperceptibly over a considerable period of time. Under this contingency, it would be extremely difficult to identify and demonstrate to our allies that @@ -28245,8 +23966,7 @@ influence the policies of the Iranian Government. In such circumstances, it might be desirable to implement certain of the plans discussed in the attached Report,Reference is to the section - below on measures to be taken to implement paragraph 5–a of NSC + below on measures to be taken to implement paragraph 5–a of NSC 136/1. prior to an identifiable attempted or actual communist seizure of power.

5. Because of the sensitive nature of the information contained in this @@ -28254,8 +23974,7 @@ taken in its handling and that access be limited strictly to individuals requiring this information in the performance of their official duties.

-

MEASURES BEING TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT PARAGRAPH 5–a OF NSC +

MEASURES BEING TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT PARAGRAPH 5–a OF NSC 136/1

Condition I

1. Measures to be taken to support a non-communist @@ -28267,15 +23986,11 @@ three feasible U.S. military courses of action, namely:

(1) To conduct a show of force by periodic flights of carrier aircraft, or aircraft from land bases outside of Iran, over key centers. - Recommendations concerning possible employment of U.S. naval and SAC units have been requested from CINCNELM and CGSAC, respectively. To date these + Recommendations concerning possible employment of U.S. naval and SAC units have been requested from CINCNELM and CGSAC, respectively. To date these recommendations have not been received.

(2) To assist the legal Iranian Army with logistic support by augmenting the present policy of arms aid. Since there is no way of foretelling - what assistance might be needed or requested by the Iranians, meaningful plans cannot be + what assistance might be needed or requested by the Iranians, meaningful plans cannot be prepared in advance. However, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, could draw up the necessary plans very quickly when the necessary specific information became available.

@@ -28294,8 +24009,7 @@ assistance should such a request be received. The Department of State has recommended that a contingency fund of $45 million be set aside for this purpose, and the matter is currently under consideration by the - Bureau of the Budget. This action would be consistent with NSC 136/1, but would have to be justified + Bureau of the Budget. This action would be consistent with NSC 136/1, but would have to be justified in the light of the situation existing at the time the request is made.

c. Diplomatic: An attempted communist seizure of @@ -28308,8 +24022,7 @@ the prompt use of security forces, upon such Iranian authorities as may be capable of such action with a view to preventing a communist seizure of power.

-

d. Psychological: The PSB on January 15, 1953, approved a “Psychological Strategy +

d. Psychological: The PSB on January 15, 1953, approved a “Psychological Strategy Program for the Middle East” (D–22)D–22, “Psychological Strategy Program for the Middle East,” January 8, is in Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of @@ -28320,9 +24033,7 @@ attempted communist coup in Iran will be consistent with this program and with the approved PSB policies contained in “A Strategic Concept for a National Psychological Program - with Particular Reference to ‘Cold War’ Operations under NSC 10/5” (D–31).D–31, “A Strategic Concept for National + with Particular Reference to ‘Cold War’ Operations under NSC 10/5” (D–31).D–31, “A Strategic Concept for National Psychological Program with Particular Reference to ‘Cold War’ Operations under NSC 10/5,” is ibid., Box 1, Folder 11, Psychological Strategy Board Files @@ -28343,14 +24054,12 @@ demonstrations.

(5) Obtain the publication of anti-Tudeh material in the press, and in pamphlets, books, posters, etc.

-

(6) Influence the choice of a successor to Mosadeq in the event of his resignation or death.

+

(6) Influence the choice of a successor to Mosadeq in the event of his resignation or death.

(7) Maintain liaison with potential resistance groups, in particular elements of certain strong tribal elements in southern Iran.

(It should be noted that: (a) CIA’s detailed plan for covert operations in Iran during 1953 was approved by - the PSB on January 8, 1953,The official minutes of the January 8 meeting of + the PSB on January 8, 1953,The official minutes of the January 8 meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board do not record a specific discussion on Iran; the minutes of the January 15 meeting discuss the adoption of D–22, cited in footnote 4 above. and (b) certain of the @@ -28371,8 +24080,7 @@

(2) Deploy appropriate Air Force units, on the order of 1½ wings plus support units, to southern Turkey with a mission of assisting Middle East governments in preventing the spread of communist power to their - countries. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, has been requested to recommend the composition of + countries. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, has been requested to recommend the composition of the Air Force organization to be deployed to southern Turkey under this contingency.

(3) Deploy U.S. ground forces on the order of one Division, reinforced, @@ -28381,8 +24089,7 @@ spread of communist power to their countries. This would be accomplished by the physical presence of U.S. military power, demonstrations of strength and as a last resort, when authorized by - proper authority, combat operations. CINCNELM has been requested to make appropriate + proper authority, combat operations. CINCNELM has been requested to make appropriate recommendation with regard to this course of action but his reply has not yet been received. Our present state of preparedness is such that the 82nd Airborne Division, the 2nd Marine Division or an infantry @@ -28419,8 +24126,7 @@ Shah.

(2) Any anti-communist Iranian Government will under such circumstances undoubtedly appeal to the United Nations for diplomatic and military - support. This appeal should be exploited in the United Nations to demonstrate the aggressive + support. This appeal should be exploited in the United Nations to demonstrate the aggressive character of Soviet communism. However, major policy decisions would be required before active military support could be given by the United Nations.

@@ -28481,8 +24187,7 @@

(5) [1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

(6) Representatives of CIA and the British Intelligence Service met during the latter part of February to - consider joint activities in Iran in the event of a Tudeh coup.See Document + consider joint activities in Iran in the event of a Tudeh coup.See Document 158. The report of this meeting has not yet been received, but the discussions included the following topics:

(a) Potential resistance groups.

@@ -28493,8 +24198,7 @@

(f) Establishment of advance supply bases outside of Iran.

Responsibilities for Future Planning

3. In the preparation of the plans for specific military, economic, - diplomatic and psychological measures required by paragraph 5–a of NSC 136/1, + diplomatic and psychological measures required by paragraph 5–a of NSC 136/1, the Working Group has agreed that responsibilities for future action in this regard will be as follows:

a. State: (1) Recommendations as to possible @@ -28513,8 +24217,7 @@ joint action in support of the Iranian Government under Conditions I and II.

-

b. Defense (assisted by the JCS): (1) Plans for a show of force by periodic +

b. Defense (assisted by the JCS): (1) Plans for a show of force by periodic flights of carrier or land-based aircraft over key centers in Iran, under Condition I.

(2) Recommendations as to possible levels of increased logistic support @@ -28539,8 +24242,7 @@ to bases as close to Iran as possible.

(3) Continue to increase its capability to conduct para-military operations in Iran under Condition II.

-

(4) Conduct joint planning with the MAAG mission in Iran for para-military operations in Iran +

(4) Conduct joint planning with the MAAG mission in Iran for para-military operations in Iran under Condition II.

(5) As considered desirable in the light of U.S. national objectives in Iran, continue joint planning with the British clandestine services for @@ -28552,8 +24254,8 @@ preparation of plans for specific psychological measures in Iran and in the Middle East under Conditions I and II.

- Walter B. - SmithPrinted from a copy + Walter B. + SmithPrinted from a copy that indicates Smith signed the original. @@ -28561,9 +24263,7 @@
-
+
181. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Intelligence and Research, Department of StateSource: British National Archives, General Correspondence of the Foreign @@ -28586,23 +24286,15 @@

IRAN: POTENTIAL CHARACTER OF A KASHANI-DOMINATED GOVERNMENT

The displacement of Prime Minister Mohammed - Mosadeq of Iran by his nearest political rival, Mullah Abol Qasem Kashani, would be - disadvantageous to Western interests. Both Kashani and Mosadeq are political opportunists, but + Mosadeq of Iran by his nearest political rival, Mullah Abol Qasem Kashani, would be + disadvantageous to Western interests. Both Kashani and Mosadeq are political opportunists, but whereas Mosadeq, despite his passionate nationalism, has an underlying respect for certain aspects of Western liberalism, Kashani views contemporary problems from a narrowly Moslem outlook, severely - warped by many years of bitter conflict with British authority.OIR prepared - this assessment as a result of discussions between Eden and Smith and Byroade in Washington on March 6. - As recorded in Foreign Office telegram 526, March 9, Eden raised the possibility of + warped by many years of bitter conflict with British authority.OIR prepared + this assessment as a result of discussions between Eden and Smith and Byroade in Washington on March 6. + As recorded in Foreign Office telegram 526, March 9, Eden raised the possibility of Kashani acting as a successor to Mosadeq. Smith responded that as @@ -28612,31 +24304,23 @@ in terms of any urgent need to find a successor to Musaddiq. The conclusion seemed to be that there was nothing we could usefully do and that we must wait on events. We agreed, however, to examine the - possibilities of (a) dealing with Kashani as an alternative to Musaddiq and (b) using + possibilities of (a) dealing with Kashani as an alternative to Musaddiq and (b) using some intermediary such as the Swiss or Camille Gutt.” (Ibid., FO 371/104614)

-

Kashani’s Potentialities for Gaining Power

+

Kashani’s Potentialities for Gaining Power

Mosadeq’s prestige and political - skill virtually preclude Kashani from coming to power as long as the incumbent - Prime Minister is alive and politically active. Should Mosadeq retire or die, however, + skill virtually preclude Kashani from coming to power as long as the incumbent + Prime Minister is alive and politically active. Should Mosadeq retire or die, however, Kashani would be the leading contender for his mantle, since he has the largest bloc of votes (after Mosadeq) in the Majlis and controls the largest potential force, except for Tudeh, for public demonstrations and physical intimidation of his opposition. Power to choose the Prime Minister resides in the Majlis, and it is very unlikely - that the Shah would risk another “Qavam incident” by appointing as Prime Minister anyone + that the Shah would risk another “Qavam incident” by appointing as Prime Minister anyone who did not have controlling Majlis support.

-

Despite these initial elements of strength, the succession of Kashani cannot be regarded as a - cut-and-dried proposition. His election as president of the Majlis despite Mosadeq’s disapproval was the result of +

Despite these initial elements of strength, the succession of Kashani cannot be regarded as a + cut-and-dried proposition. His election as president of the Majlis despite Mosadeq’s disapproval was the result of a tactical maneuver of the moment, and provides no assurance that the Majlis would support Kashani for Prime Minister. Opposition to the Mullah, which would be formidable, @@ -28646,8 +24330,7 @@ (3) his well-known record for unscrupulousness and opportunism; (4) his open antagonism toward the Shah and the army; (5) his outspoken support of various bigoted practices; (6) his lack of business experience; and - (7) his lack of executive experience at any level of government.In the left margin of the memorandum is the + (7) his lack of executive experience at any level of government.In the left margin of the memorandum is the handwritten question, “no opposition of mujtahids?” This question is in an unknown hand. Should he gain power his tenure might well be short, especially if his resort to violent methods should result @@ -28657,13 +24340,11 @@ not want the responsibility of being Prime Minister. He would probably prefer the power without the office, and may actually envisage himself as president or titular head of an Iranian republic.

-

What Is Kashani’s Appeal?

+

What Is Kashani’s Appeal?

Kashani’s support derives from two factors: (1) political and religious emotion, and (2) material self-interest. Since World War I, when his father lost his life - allegedly as a result of British action in Iraq and when Kashani participated in the + allegedly as a result of British action in Iraq and when Kashani participated in the declaration of Jihad (Holy War) against the Allies, he has been in frequent bitter clashes with British authority. During World War II he was interned by the British Army. This record of suffering at British @@ -28677,8 +24358,7 @@ receives contributions from Iranians of all classes for favors promised or received are undoubtedly true. But it is significant that this is a usual Iranian practice to which no stigma is attached.

-

Kashani has—like Mosadeq—built his political career on +

Kashani has—like Mosadeq—built his political career on opportunism, i.e., by taking advantage of developments for which he was not primarily responsible. The most important of these, of course, was the growing resentment of foreign interference and pressure in Iran @@ -28687,8 +24367,7 @@ did not lead the move to oust the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, but once it was underway he made tremendous personal capital out of it.

-

In building his political power, Kashani has taken full advantage of his unusual +

In building his political power, Kashani has taken full advantage of his unusual theatrical talents, displaying exceptional skill in exploiting the rural contacts and the self-interest of the Iranian clergy, and appealing to the piety of small merchants in urban centers. He has not hesitated to @@ -28696,32 +24375,22 @@ suspicions of the Christian West, and many of his political activities have followed the pattern of a ward boss, and sometimes even that of a gangster.

-

The political supporters of Kashani and Mosadeq—as well as those of the Communist-dominated - Tudeh Party—are drawn from much the same social groups. The Mosadeq–Kashani followers constitute the +

The political supporters of Kashani and Mosadeq—as well as those of the Communist-dominated + Tudeh Party—are drawn from much the same social groups. The Mosadeq–Kashani followers constitute the socialistically-inclined National Front group which became politically vocal in 1950 and which derives its strength from government workers, skilled labor, small property owners, teachers, students, and some clerics. Its concentration is greatest in urban areas where problems of organization and communication are relatively easy. Adherents who are - religiously inclined tend to turn to Kashani for guidance. On the other hand, the aristocrats + religiously inclined tend to turn to Kashani for guidance. On the other hand, the aristocrats and the Western-educated youth who form the hard core of the National - Front, in general, prefer Mosadeq. Mosadeq’s + Front, in general, prefer Mosadeq. Mosadeq’s advantage lies in his integrity, his current control of the government - organization, and his political astuteness. Aside from Mosadeq, the only other National Front - leader whose prestige approaches that of Kashani is Allahyar - Saleh, currently Iranian Ambassador to the US.

+ organization, and his political astuteness. Aside from Mosadeq, the only other National Front + leader whose prestige approaches that of Kashani is Allahyar + Saleh, currently Iranian Ambassador to the US.

Kashani’s major domestic - political targets are the Court, the army, and more recently, Mosadeq. His resentment toward the + political targets are the Court, the army, and more recently, Mosadeq. His resentment toward the Court probably arises from (1) the ruthless destruction of the clergy’s power by the late Reza Shah; (2) a belief that the present Shah is dominated by British-oriented @@ -28732,25 +24401,19 @@ Shah’s domination, and (2) the manhandling which Kashani received at the hands of army officers following his arrest and exile at the time of the - attempted assassination of the Shah in February 1947 [1949].Brackets and corrected date + attempted assassination of the Shah in February 1947 [1949].Brackets and corrected date are on the original.

Kashani’s present opposition to Mosadeq appears to stem from personal pique that Mosadeq is - not more amenable to persuasion or direction from Kashani in appointments and + not more amenable to persuasion or direction from Kashani in appointments and policies. Kashani is also jealous of Mosadeq’s justifiably - higher reputation for integrity, and his better domestic and foreign press. Kashani’s present tactics against + higher reputation for integrity, and his better domestic and foreign press. Kashani’s present tactics against Mosadeq seem designed more to embarrass the Prime Minister and “cut him down to size” than to - strengthen the Shah or bring about Mosadeq’s replacement as Prime Minister.

-

Probable Policies of a Kashani-Dominated Government

+ strengthen the Shah or bring about Mosadeq’s replacement as Prime Minister.

+

Probable Policies of a Kashani-Dominated Government

A government under Kashani’s domination would be likely to pursue the present policies of the National Front, though with increased use of violence and even @@ -28759,21 +24422,18 @@

Unless Kashani could establish an immediate dictatorship—and there are no indications at present that he has that capability—his freedom of action would be severely limited - by his need for political allies. Since Kashani would not enjoy the popular confidence and + by his need for political allies. Since Kashani would not enjoy the popular confidence and prestige accorded Mosadeq, his need for support would be greater, and the obligation to use force more compelling.

-

The Kashani and ex-Mosadeq forces would probably unite in +

The Kashani and ex-Mosadeq forces would probably unite in the face of any serious threat from either the Court or the Tudeh Party. Kashani’s potential opponents, including the army, are likely to be disunited and to calculate that their chances for survival would be greater as a result of negotiation with Kashani than if they joined the Court or Tudeh in open opposition. His - opposition probably would be strong enough to force Kashani to carry out minimum social, + opposition probably would be strong enough to force Kashani to carry out minimum social, economic, and political improvements and prevent him from implementing any inclination to transform Iran into a theocratic state.

Kashani has strongly supported @@ -28797,29 +24457,20 @@ that control of the AIOC was in foreign hands. He has therefore urged that Iran forget its oil resources and develop a self-sustaining economy and governmental structure not - dependent on them. Secondly, Kashani—unlike Mosadeq—advocates violent means, including demonstrations and + dependent on them. Secondly, Kashani—unlike Mosadeq—advocates violent means, including demonstrations and political assassination, to free Iran from the grip of those - leaders—such as the assassinated Prime Minister Ali Razmara—whom Kashani regards as traitors + leaders—such as the assassinated Prime Minister Ali Razmara—whom Kashani regards as traitors responsive to foreign influence.

Attitude toward the West

-

There is no convincing evidence that Kashani has (1) sought substantial foreign aid in his +

There is no convincing evidence that Kashani has (1) sought substantial foreign aid in his quest for power, (2) received substantial foreign aid from any source, or (3) if he did so, either could or would carry out any commitments he might make as a quid pro quo. In the current power struggle in Iran, public knowledge of any acceptance of aid either from the West or the - Soviet bloc would rapidly destroy Kashani’s power, and the likelihood that such assistance + Soviet bloc would rapidly destroy Kashani’s power, and the likelihood that such assistance could be concealed in a society such as Iran’s is practically nil. - Furthermore, it appears improbable that Kashani needs at this time the type of aid which any - foreign source could supply. The instruments Kashani must deal with are Moslem + Furthermore, it appears improbable that Kashani needs at this time the type of aid which any + foreign source could supply. The instruments Kashani must deal with are Moslem and Iranian, all intensely nationalistic and therefore anxious to avoid the charge of subservience to any foreign power.

In view of Kashani’s @@ -28827,8 +24478,7 @@ limit his freedom of action, there are no grounds for believing that he could or would wish to promote closer relations between Iran and the UK except if accompanied by further - British surrender of power or prestige. Insofar as he regarded US activities as attempts to restore or + British surrender of power or prestige. Insofar as he regarded US activities as attempts to restore or replace British activities, he would be likely to oppose them. At the same time, he would probably try to maintain friendly relations with the US Government and Americans and to @@ -28838,21 +24488,17 @@ regard any foreign efforts to further his political or personal ambitions as motivated only by self-interest, therefore requiring no quid pro quo on his part.

-

There is no likelihood that a government dominated by Kashani would abandon the current - Iranian policy of neutrality in the East-West struggle. A Kashani government might attempt to +

There is no likelihood that a government dominated by Kashani would abandon the current + Iranian policy of neutrality in the East-West struggle. A Kashani government might attempt to establish a strong neutral Moslem bloc. Under his guidance, Iranian relations with Turkey and Iraq would not improve as long as Western - influence remains strong in these two countries.The Foreign Office produced its own assessment of + influence remains strong in these two countries.The Foreign Office produced its own assessment of Kashani and handed it to the U.S. Embassy in London on April 16. It concluded that “Kashani would be of no use to us, and almost certainly a hindrance, as a successor to Dr. Mussadiq both generally and in an oil settlement.” In a covering - memorandum, A.D.M. Ross of the Foreign Office informed Harold Beeley, the U.K. Counselor + memorandum, A.D.M. Ross of the Foreign Office informed Harold Beeley, the U.K. Counselor in Washington, that “while there is perhaps a chance that he [Kashani] could be brought to power by foreign aid, there is no likelihood of his @@ -28862,9 +24508,7 @@ 371/104566)

-
+
182. Information Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job @@ -28876,12 +24520,10 @@ CS–6360 - Washington, March 31, 1953. + Washington, March 31, 1953. SUBJECT - Planned Coup d’État against Mossadeq Government + Planned Coup d’État against Mossadeq Government REFERENCES @@ -28898,61 +24540,48 @@

1. Anti-Mossadeq Majlis deputies and retired Army officers are planning a coup d’état which is tentatively scheduled to take place “two or three weeks hence.”

-

2. Those prominent in planning the coup are: Majlis Deputy Seyyed Abul Hasan Haerizadeh, General - Nadr Batmangelitch, and retired Generals Abbas Garzan, Bahadori,Washington Comment. This may refer to Ahmad +

2. Those prominent in planning the coup are: Majlis Deputy Seyyed Abul Hasan Haerizadeh, General + Nadr Batmangelitch, and retired Generals Abbas Garzan, Bahadori,Washington Comment. This may refer to Ahmad Bahadori, a member of the Majlis (see CS–3238). [Footnote is in the original. CS–3238 is ibid., Box 4, Folder 27, Information Reports 3238CS.] and Fazollah Zahedi.

-

3. In the event that the coup were successful, General Zahedi would become Prime Minister and +

3. In the event that the coup were successful, General Zahedi would become Prime Minister and General Garzan would become Chief of Staff.

4. The group which is planning the coup claims that the United States - Embassy in Tehran is “fully supporting” the move.Field Comment. The + Embassy in Tehran is “fully supporting” the move.Field Comment. The information in Paragraph 4 presumably stems from wishful thinking. [Footnote is in the original.]

5. Colonel Mohammad Adhavi (retired) stated on 17 March 1953 that the - coup would take place in “about twenty days” and that General Afshartus, the Chief of Police, + coup would take place in “about twenty days” and that General Afshartus, the Chief of Police, probably would take part, along with one Army “motorized division.”

6. On 18 March 1953 General Hoseyn Mozayeni (retired), a supporter of Zahedi, remarked to source, “We are not finished; we will be in power before summer.”

-
+
183. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Psychological Strategy Board (Morgan) to Director of - Central Intelligence DullesSource: Central Intelligence + Central Intelligence DullesSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Intelligence, Job 80R01731R, Box 33, Folder 1095, DCI/PSB. Confidential; Security Information. - Washington, April 3, 1953. + Washington, April 3, 1953. SUBJECT - Psychological Measures in Connection with NSC 136/1 + Psychological Measures in Connection with NSC 136/1

The Department of State has requested that the Psychological Strategy Board supervise the preparation of plans for specific psychological measures in connection with NSC 136/1. This is in line with the progress report of the Department of State on - Paragraph 5(a) of NSC 136/1.Document 180. It + Paragraph 5(a) of NSC 136/1.Document 180. It has further recommended that there be established a special panel for this purpose.

Please inform me if this recommendation meets with your approval and if - you wish to be represented on the panel.DCI + you wish to be represented on the panel.DCI Dulles responded to Morgan in an April 23 memorandum stating that “it is my understanding that the panel will @@ -28964,37 +24593,26 @@ Intelligence, Job 80R01731R, Box 33, Folder 1095, DCI/PSB)

- George A. - MorganPrinted from a + George A. + MorganPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
-
+
184. Memorandum From the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans (Roosevelt) - to the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 29, Folder 1, Outlines - and Renewals of Projects. Secret; Eyes Only. Wisner recommended approval and + to the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 29, Folder 1, Outlines + and Renewals of Projects. Secret; Eyes Only. Wisner recommended approval and Dulles approved. - Washington, April 4, 1953. + Washington, April 4, 1953. SUBJECT - Support for Special Operation TP AJAX“TP AJAX” is a handwritten addendum to the subject + Support for Special Operation TP AJAX“TP AJAX” is a handwritten addendum to the subject line. -

1. Pursuant to our discussions of 2 April 1953,No record of a conversation between Roosevelt and Dulles on April 2 has been +

1. Pursuant to our discussions of 2 April 1953,No record of a conversation between Roosevelt and Dulles on April 2 has been found. authorization is requested for the expenditure of funds up to [dollar amount not declassified] for the specific purpose agreed to, with the understanding that:

@@ -29010,17 +24628,15 @@ adhered to, and it is therefore requested that written receipts from the recipients not be required.

- Kermit - RooseveltPrinted from a + Kermit + RooseveltPrinted from a copy with Roosevelt’s typed signature and an indication that the original was signed.
-
+
185. Information Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job @@ -29031,12 +24647,10 @@ CS–6708 - Washington, April 6, 1953. + Washington, April 6, 1953. SUBJECT - Tudeh Instructions Concerning Activities in Case of Anti-Mossadeq Coup + Tudeh Instructions Concerning Activities in Case of Anti-Mossadeq Coup SOURCE @@ -29045,30 +24659,22 @@

Tudeh Party weekly instructions for “this week” included the following:

1. Be on the alert for a possible coup d’état attempt by the Royal Court - and the group in opposition to Mossadeq.

-

2. In case trouble develops, be ready to “protect” the Mossadeq Government because the Party + and the group in opposition to Mossadeq.

+

2. In case trouble develops, be ready to “protect” the Mossadeq Government because the Party does not yet deem circumstances favorable for seizure of power.

3. Agitate everywhere for a single anti-imperialistic front but avoid any - statement which might tend to arouse the people against Mossadeq.Field Comment. On 4 April there was a + statement which might tend to arouse the people against Mossadeq.Field Comment. On 4 April there was a noticeable increase in the size of security forces in sections of Tehran. [Footnote is in the original.]

-
+
186. Monthly Report Prepared in the Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence AgencySource: - Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 81–01061R, Box 1, Folder 3, Monthly + Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 81–01061R, Box 1, Folder 3, Monthly Report—March 1953—Country Summaries and Analyses. Top Secret. - Washington, April 6, 1953. + Washington, April 6, 1953.

IRAN

March 1953

A. General Developments

@@ -29083,15 +24689,10 @@

3. In preparation for a possible Tudeh coup in Iran: (a) the final draft of the first progress report of the interdepartmental committee on NSC 136/1 has been disseminated by - NSC;Document 180. (b) [2½ lines not declassified]; (c) an NE–4 Branch task force has completed a + NSC;Document 180. (b) [2½ lines not declassified]; (c) an NE–4 Branch task force has completed a draft estimate of the situation in Iran with recommendations for preparations to be made and action to be taken in the event of an - emergency;An apparent reference to Document 170. and (d) [2 lines not declassified].

+ emergency;An apparent reference to Document 170. and (d) [2 lines not declassified].

B. Station Synopsis

[3 paragraphs (21 lines) not declassified]

C. Operational Summary

@@ -29100,50 +24701,38 @@

Paramilitary Operations

8. [1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

- John H. - Waller[name not declassified] signed for Waller above Waller’s typed + John H. + Waller[name not declassified] signed for Waller above Waller’s typed signature.
-
- 187. Memorandum Prepared in the Embassy in the United KingdomSource: British National +
+ 187. Memorandum Prepared in the Embassy in the United KingdomSource: British National Archives, General Correspondence of the Foreign Office, FO 371/4564. Top Secret. According to a covering memorandum by A.K. Rothnie of the British Foreign Office, this memorandum is a paraphrase of a telegram from Henderson, which was handed to the British by Houghton of the U.S. Embassy in London. - London, April 7, 1953. + London, April 7, 1953.

Minister of Court Ala called on Ambassador Henderson on the morning of April 4. He said that he had just returned from spending two days with the Shah at a Caspian Sea resort. During the two days Ala said that he had done - everything he could to persuade the Shah that Mossadeq would probably obtain all the + everything he could to persuade the Shah that Mossadeq would probably obtain all the reins of power unless the Shah took some definite step in opposition. He pointed out that the Shah’s position might become practically hopeless. The Prime Minister was set on forcing the Majlis to approve the report of the 8-man committee. He would interpret the committee’s approval as authorization for his becoming the actual Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and also for his controlling revenues which were currently - accruing directly to the Crown. Ala also told the Shah that the only candidate who had - the necessary energy and backing to succeed Mossadeq was General Zahedi. The latter had agreed to present his undated + accruing directly to the Crown. Ala also told the Shah that the only candidate who had + the necessary energy and backing to succeed Mossadeq was General Zahedi. The latter had agreed to present his undated resignation to the Shah in advance so that should the Shah be displeased with him he could dismiss him at any time. Among the General’s support - was Kashani, Haerizadeh and other dissident + was Kashani, Haerizadeh and other dissident members of the national movement, influential political leaders not connected with that movement and many mullahs, merchants, army officers, etc.

@@ -29155,11 +24744,9 @@ These demonstrations would probably be supported by certain disguised Tudeh groups as well as other groups imported from outlying districts and provinces.

-

In reply to a question by Ambassador Henderson, Ala +

In reply to a question by Ambassador Henderson, Ala said that Kashani supported - Zahedi but, as with Maki, he hesitated to go all out. While + Zahedi but, as with Maki, he hesitated to go all out. While giving lip service, both appeared to prefer to maintain a position which would allow them to plead non-involvement should the attempt to overthrow Mossadeq by peaceful or @@ -29169,9 +24756,7 @@ position.

-
+
188. Information Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job @@ -29183,33 +24768,24 @@ RSEN–76 - Washington, April 8, 1953. + Washington, April 8, 1953. SUBJECT - 1. Further Details Concerning General Zahedi’s Plans for Supplanting Mossadeq - 2. Counter Measures by Mossadeq Government + 1. Further Details Concerning General Zahedi’s Plans for Supplanting Mossadeq + 2. Counter Measures by Mossadeq Government REFERENCES CS–6360, CS–6434, CS–6672, CS–6961For CS–6360, see Document 182. CS–6434, - April 1, reported that “General Fazollah Zahedi continues to be active in his - efforts to organize a coup d’état against the Mossadeq Government.” (Central + April 1, reported that “General Fazollah Zahedi continues to be active in his + efforts to organize a coup d’état against the Mossadeq Government.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 80–00810A, Box 9, Folder 12, CS Information Reports - 6430–6439) In CS–6672, April 6, the CIA reported that Mosadeq had said he was in direct contact with + 6430–6439) In CS–6672, April 6, the CIA reported that Mosadeq had said he was in direct contact with the Tudeh “and that a ‘sizable portion’ of Iranian Government intelligence concerning possible military coups comes from the - Tudeh. The Party promised Mossadeq that, if a coup were successful, the + Tudeh. The Party promised Mossadeq that, if a coup were successful, the Tudeh would kill the coup leaders within a matter of days.” (Ibid., Folder 36, CS Intelligence Reports 6670–6679) CS–6961, April 8, reported that the Ayatollah Borujerdi had “written to @@ -29226,43 +24802,30 @@ Zahedi, son of General Fazullah Zahedi, told [less than 1 line not declassified] the following:

-

a. The forces in opposition to Prime Minister Mossadeq are “marking time” until they are able to - assess the reaction of the Shah and the public to Mossadeq’s policy speech to be - broadcast at 1430 hours (Tehran time) on 6 April.The text of Mosadeq’s radio address on April 6 was transmitted +

a. The forces in opposition to Prime Minister Mossadeq are “marking time” until they are able to + assess the reaction of the Shah and the public to Mossadeq’s policy speech to be + broadcast at 1430 hours (Tehran time) on 6 April.The text of Mosadeq’s radio address on April 6 was transmitted to the Department on April 8 in despatch 819 from Tehran. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.13/4–853)

b. Although the Shah returned to Tehran on the evening of 5 April, General Zahedi decided not to - contact the Shah until the latter had heard Mossadeq’s address.Field Comment. A report from the same source, + contact the Shah until the latter had heard Mossadeq’s address.Field Comment. A report from the same source, dated 2 April 1952 [1953], stated that General Zahedi intended to - visit the Shah in order to request that Mossadeq be dismissed as Prime Minister and he + visit the Shah in order to request that Mossadeq be dismissed as Prime Minister and he (Zahedi) appointed in his place. [Footnote is in the original.]

-

c. In the interim, the Minister of Court, Hoseyn Ala, has been charged by the Zahedi group with the task of - prevailing on the Shah to support General Zahedi.

+

c. In the interim, the Minister of Court, Hoseyn Ala, has been charged by the Zahedi group with the task of + prevailing on the Shah to support General Zahedi.

d. General Zahedi will “delay” his planned effort to unseat Mossadeq - if the Shah refuses to support the opposition. However, the Zahedi forces plan to stage a + if the Shah refuses to support the opposition. However, the Zahedi forces plan to stage a demonstration when and if enough deputies return to Tehran to permit a meeting of the Majlis.

-

e. If the Shah, after hearing Mossadeq’s radio address, “takes a firm stand” against - Mossadeq, the Zahedi group is “ready to take over the +

e. If the Shah, after hearing Mossadeq’s radio address, “takes a firm stand” against + Mossadeq, the Zahedi group is “ready to take over the Government.”

f. The Retired Army Officers’ Association, which is part of the group supporting Zahedi, has set up @@ -29275,13 +24838,10 @@

(2) The homes of retired Generals Zahedi, Taqizadeh, and Gilanshah.

(3) The homes of all the Bakhtiari khans.

-

2. The Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed forces, General Taghi Riahi, has appointed his cousin, +

2. The Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed forces, General Taghi Riahi, has appointed his cousin, General Esmail Riahi, as Commander-in-Chief of Kurdistan, Luristan, and Kermanshah, with headquarters at Kermanshah. The purpose of this move is - to halt the pro-Shah, anti-Mossadeq conspiracies in northern and western Iran.See Paragraph 3, CS-6961. [Footnote is in the + to halt the pro-Shah, anti-Mossadeq conspiracies in northern and western Iran.See Paragraph 3, CS-6961. [Footnote is in the original. Paragraph 3 of CS–6961, April 8, reads: “Milani and Angaji told Borujerdi that the people of Azerbaijan were ‘demanding’ that they (Milani and Angaji) abandon the National Front and Prime @@ -29289,27 +24849,21 @@ the latter’s attitude toward the Shah.”]

3. Prime Minister Mossadeq has instructed General Mahmud - Afshartus,Washington Comment. A report from a fairly reliable source + Afshartus,Washington Comment. A report from a fairly reliable source [1 line not declassified] date of - information 17–25 March 1953, stated that General Afshartus probably would - participate in a coup d’état against Mossadeq. See Paragraph 5, CS–6360. [Footnote is in + information 17–25 March 1953, stated that General Afshartus probably would + participate in a coup d’état against Mossadeq. See Paragraph 5, CS–6360. [Footnote is in the original.] Chief of the Iranian National Police, to visit Azerbaijan and investigate personally reports of a “strong anti-Mossadeq movement” there.

-
+
189. Telegram From the Station in Iran to the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency. Secret. This telegram was transcribed from - microfilm in the Central Intelligence Agency specifically for Foreign + microfilm in the Central Intelligence Agency specifically for Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, volume X, Iran, 1951–1954, although it was not released in that volume. The original telegram and its microfilm copy no longer exist. This is the case for all @@ -29317,15 +24871,11 @@ been transcribed for the Foreign Relations series. Please see the “Sources” chapter for more details. - Tehran, April 12, 1953. -

TEHE 945. Re: TEHE 941 (IN 15134?).Not - found. Question mark is in the transcript. For K. Roosevelt.

+ Tehran, April 12, 1953. +

TEHE 945. Re: TEHE 941 (IN 15134?).Not + found. Question mark is in the transcript. For K. Roosevelt.

1. Station asset meeting with COS took - place 11 April at 0900 hours as scheduled (TEHE 932–IN 14994).Not + place 11 April at 0900 hours as scheduled (TEHE 932–IN 14994).Not found.

2. Following statements made by asset:

A. Shah will not fight against govt for @@ -29356,27 +24906,22 @@ in support “report.” Since incidents 23 Feb when his gate stormed and he had to climb over wall to save own life he has developed healthy fear against crowd.This incident occurred on - February 28, when a mob attacked Mosadeq’s home.

+ February 28, when a mob attacked Mosadeq’s home.

D. Thus neither opposition nor govt likely start acts violence.

E. Source sums up situation as follows. [illegible]

End of message.

-
+
190. Telegram From the Station in Iran to the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 89–00176R, Box 1, Folder 18, Political Activities—Iran (Serial 440–579). Secret; Security Information. CS–7982, April 21, - disseminated the information in this telegram. (Ibid., DDI Files, Job 8000810A, Box 10, + disseminated the information in this telegram. (Ibid., DDI Files, Job 8000810A, Box 10, Folder 69, CS Information Reports 7980–7989) - Tehran, April 14, 1953. + Tehran, April 14, 1953.

TEHE 959. [3 lines not declassified]

1. Political situation Iran “completely changed” over weekend with @@ -29385,26 +24930,20 @@ “direct” attempt replace Mossadeq at present.

B. “Important” elements both National Front and opposition now - considering possibilities Mossadeq’s voluntary retirement in favor candidate + considering possibilities Mossadeq’s voluntary retirement in favor candidate acceptable both sides, possibly Alayar Saleh, Iran Ambassador to U.S.

C. Zahedi: Action agreeable “solution” mentioned in B above and willing cooperate therein with - National Front in exchange for a cabinet post for Zahedi himself.

+ National Front in exchange for a cabinet post for Zahedi himself.

2. In meeting with Shah on 1 April deputy Hosein Makki urged Shah - “prevent” any opposition action against Mossadeq now “because Mossadeq will retire voluntarily within 2 months”.

-

3. Ayatollahs Kasanf [Kashani] and Ehbeganq [garbled].

+ “prevent” any opposition action against Mossadeq now “because Mossadeq will retire voluntarily within 2 months”.

+

3. Ayatollahs Kasanf [Kashani] and Ehbeganq [garbled].

4. Above source feels declaration will not be written.

5. Mossadeq cabinet member expressed opinion that “Mossadeq is trapped by anti-foreign forces he unleashed but which have now become - uncontrollable “and even if Mossadeq + uncontrollable “and even if Mossadeq govt falls” there no possibility oil settlement with British because “anti British feeling is too deeply rooted for anyone to solve problem”.

@@ -29416,17 +24955,13 @@

7. Source comment: Re para 2 above. This may be entirely selfish move by Makki because of business deals in which he and partner, (Mabugdji—also rec’d Malugdji) (FNU) man - representatives selling machinery to 7 year plan and desire keep govt in power at least until commissions + representatives selling machinery to 7 year plan and desire keep govt in power at least until commissions paid.

8. Wash only: Source paras 1–4 [less than 1 line not - declassified] source para (portion garbled being serviced) [less than 1 line not declassified].

+ declassified] source para (portion garbled being serviced) [less than 1 line not declassified].

End of message.

-
+
191. Information Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job @@ -29438,12 +24973,10 @@ CS–7704 - Washington, April 16, 1953. + Washington, April 16, 1953. SUBJECT - Opposition Test of Strength with Mossadeq + Opposition Test of Strength with Mossadeq SOURCE @@ -29453,14 +24986,12 @@ Mossadeq taking the initiative in a planned surprise attack in which the Government plans to use all of its assets to try to crush the opposition and to force Majlis - acceptance of the report of the “Committee of Eight”Washington Comment. The + acceptance of the report of the “Committee of Eight”Washington Comment. The “Committee of Eight” was formed on 5 March 1953 to define the powers of the Shah. [Footnote is in the original.] on 16 April 1953. Mass demonstrations, Government-and Tudeh-sponsored, are to be staged that day in the Majlis Square.

-

2. On 15 April a Court representative attempted to enlist Mullah Kashani’s support of the +

2. On 15 April a Court representative attempted to enlist Mullah Kashani’s support of the following plan (to which the Shah “appeared favorably disposed”) to oust Prime Minister Mossadeq and replace him by General Fazullah @@ -29471,23 +25002,19 @@ function.

b. On the same day the above-mentioned Court representative would prevail - upon the Shah to issue a firman and proclamations quoting Kashani’s letter, relieving + upon the Shah to issue a firman and proclamations quoting Kashani’s letter, relieving Mossadeq, and appointing General Zahedi as “Director of Public Security” to maintain order so that the Majlis could designate an able and capable new prime minister in an atmosphere free from violence.

-

c. In the event that the firman dismissing Mossadeq could not be obtained from the Shah, the +

c. In the event that the firman dismissing Mossadeq could not be obtained from the Shah, the opposition would refrain from participation in street conflicts, but opposition deputies would walk out of the Majlis in order to prevent the formation of a quorum.

3. Kashani preferred a - variation of the above plan, by which he, Kashani, would draft a letter to be signed by Majlis - members as well as by himself. Kashani claimed that he could obtain signatures of + variation of the above plan, by which he, Kashani, would draft a letter to be signed by Majlis + members as well as by himself. Kashani claimed that he could obtain signatures of “possibly forty deputies” before the Government could demand a parliamentary showdown of the “Committee of Eight.”

4. Royal Court officials are deeply concerned over the demonstrations @@ -29498,29 +25025,22 @@

a. Bands of “hoodlums” have been directed by Government supporters to attack the Palace, Majlis buildings, and American installations, but the security forces have not been ordered to stop them.

-

b. The Army guard (including tanks) has been reinforced around Mossadeq’s house and Radio Tehran.

+

b. The Army guard (including tanks) has been reinforced around Mossadeq’s house and Radio Tehran.

c. The Government is giving a holiday to all workers on 16 April and the Bazaar is to close on the same day (thus freeing thousands to gather in the streets).

d. All schools have been ordered to be closed on 16 April.

-
+
192. Memorandum From the Chief of the Iran Branch, Near East and Africa Division (Waller) to the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans, - Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 7, TPAJAX Vol. + Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 7, TPAJAX Vol. I. Top Secret; Security Information. Also distributed to the Chiefs of the Political Propaganda and Foreign Intelligence Divisions in NEA. - Washington, April 16, 1953. + Washington, April 16, 1953. SUBJECT Transmittal of Branch 4 Estimate Entitled “Factors Involved in the @@ -29539,8 +25059,7 @@ Africa Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, undated.

-

FACTORS INVOLVED IN THE OVERTHROW OF MOSSADEQ

+

FACTORS INVOLVED IN THE OVERTHROW OF MOSSADEQ

Summary

I. Basic Assumptions

II. Evaluation of Principal Elements Concerned in @@ -29566,8 +25085,7 @@

B. The Shah

1. Personality

2. Negotiations with the Shah

-

C. Forces which will play a role in any effort to replace Mossadeq and to establish a stable +

C. Forces which will play a role in any effort to replace Mossadeq and to establish a stable government, and evaluation of their attitudes.

1. The Iranian Army

2. Tehran police

@@ -29594,8 +25112,7 @@

c. Landowners

d. The general public

III. Assets which may be directed toward the - replacement of Mossadeq

+ replacement of Mossadeq

A. [1 line not declassified]

1. General factors

2. Political assets

@@ -29621,18 +25138,15 @@

Fazlullah Zahedi

Summary

This study is based upon the premises that U.S. interest and policy - requires the replacement of Mossadeq and that appropriate Agency assets should be - committed to the support of General Zahedi, the contender for the Premiership who is + requires the replacement of Mossadeq and that appropriate Agency assets should be + committed to the support of General Zahedi, the contender for the Premiership who is currently most active and appears to have the widest local support.

Agency assets in Iran are not by themselves capable of overthrowing Mossadeq’s Government, but should Zahedi be supported by these assets and by financial backing his chance of success would be greatly enhanced.

-

Considerations bearing upon the replacement of Mossadeq and the firm establishment of +

Considerations bearing upon the replacement of Mossadeq and the firm establishment of a government headed by Zahedi are presented in the opening section of this study as a series of basic assumptions. Other sections of the study supply the background material @@ -29653,13 +25167,10 @@ assets would be compromised and possibly destroyed. In addition, such a failure would fan National Front and public antipathy to such an extent that the Point IV and Military Missions might be expelled from Iran. The - reaction might include a swing to closer relations with the USSR on the part of the Mossadeq Government.

+ reaction might include a swing to closer relations with the USSR on the part of the Mossadeq Government.

Should developments cause active Agency support [to] be withheld from Zahedi, a detailed plan of - operations should be prepared for such a time as Mossadeq falls from power as the result + operations should be prepared for such a time as Mossadeq falls from power as the result of other pressures. Mossadeq’s prestige and power is definitely on the decline and should this trend continue a successor, favored by the U.S., would find the task of taking @@ -29673,8 +25184,7 @@

2. Appropriate U.S. covert assets will be directed toward his overthrow and U.S. policy action and financial aid will support his successor.

3. General Zahedi is the only - currently active candidate to succeed Mossadeq who has a real chance of success.

+ currently active candidate to succeed Mossadeq who has a real chance of success.

4. For success Zahedi requires the energetic backing of the Shah which insures adequate support by the armed forces.

@@ -29685,13 +25195,11 @@

7. Zahedi can last only if he manages the immediate removal of all dissident leaders.

8. Zahedi is allegedly anxious to - settle the oil issue. A new proposal agreement must at least appear to be more generous than any previous one: + settle the oil issue. A new proposal agreement must at least appear to be more generous than any previous one: it must not insist upon compensation for years in which concession would have covered.

9. Timing of oil agreement is of great importance as it should not be - announced immediately after Zahedi takes office.

+ announced immediately after Zahedi takes office.

10. Zahedi’s cabinet must include the strongest possible individuals, including a U.S. approved choice of his successor.

@@ -29699,8 +25207,7 @@ the Zahedi government must be restricted or neutralized.

-

12. Items 7 through 11 must be agreed upon in advance by Zahedi and the U.S.

+

12. Items 7 through 11 must be agreed upon in advance by Zahedi and the U.S.

13. [2 lines not declassified]

14. Should Zahedi himself fall from power the U.S. must act to replace him by the chosen member of his @@ -29741,8 +25248,7 @@

Amayoun Party (Group which consists largely of “old guard” anti-National Front Senators. This group has Free Mason overtones.)

Large segment of the bazaar, including leading merchant Nikpur

-

Former supporters of Ahmad Qavam

+

Former supporters of Ahmad Qavam

Majority of the people (sic)

An evaluation of the position of some of these elements is given in a @@ -29766,11 +25272,8 @@ pro-Shah cabinet headed by Ala, present Minister of Court. Throughout 1952 there seems to have been little direct contact between the Shah and Zahedi. Then on 11 April the - Shah is said to have favored Zahedi as successor to Mossadeq, but believed that the decision was up to the - Majlis and must wait until Mossadeq’s popularity had declined even lower.

+ Shah is said to have favored Zahedi as successor to Mossadeq, but believed that the decision was up to the + Majlis and must wait until Mossadeq’s popularity had declined even lower.

f. Relations with Ayatollah Kashani

Kashani undoubtedly plans to @@ -29785,27 +25288,23 @@ was reaching an understanding with Borujerdi and Behbehani—influential religious leaders—on the necessity of encouraging the Shah to stand up to Mossadeq.

-

Certainly Zahedi and Kashani do not trust each other: +

Certainly Zahedi and Kashani do not trust each other: Zahedi says he will get rid of Kashani in due course, while Kashani must feel that he could control Zahedi.

2. Negotiations with Zahedi

-

Within the first two weeks of April 1953 Zahedi appeared ready to insist that the Shah appoint +

Within the first two weeks of April 1953 Zahedi appeared ready to insist that the Shah appoint him Prime Minister, but he has failed to press this point. It is believed that Zahedi will not act precipitously and will not attempt to carry out a coup or any more - legalistic maneuver without assurances of U.S. support. [3 lines not declassified]

+ legalistic maneuver without assurances of U.S. support. [3 lines not declassified]

[2 paragraphs (11 lines) not declassified]

(3) Oil Issue

Zahedi will be presented with the draft of an oil agreement which is to be implemented after his government is firmly established. He will be assured that implementation - of the agreement will be followed by a very substantial sum from the U.S., either as a + of the agreement will be followed by a very substantial sum from the U.S., either as a cash advance on oil sales or as a grant.

[2 paragraphs (12 lines) not declassified]

B. The Shah

@@ -29834,8 +25333,7 @@ able to overcome his handicaps of vacillation and indecision. However, in his one great test—that of the recovery of Azerbaijan from the pro-Soviet regime—he displayed real leadership. Again in March 1953 the - public demonstrations in his favor caused him to refuse Mossadeq’s demand to leave Iran. The + public demonstrations in his favor caused him to refuse Mossadeq’s demand to leave Iran. The Shah has stated that he is prepared to sacrifice his life or his throne for the good of his country.

2. Negotiations with the Shah

@@ -29845,15 +25343,12 @@ support this assumption there is the example of the short-lived premiership of Ahmad Qavam in July 1952 where such support was lacking. With control of the armed - forces now more firmly in the hands of Mossadeq, only the Shah has the capacity of appealing to - the basic loyalties of the staff officers to a point where they might follow the orders of the Shah and of + forces now more firmly in the hands of Mossadeq, only the Shah has the capacity of appealing to + the basic loyalties of the staff officers to a point where they might follow the orders of the Shah and of Zahedi rather than of Mossadeq.

-

Before definite negotiations are completed with Zahedi it is vital that a U.S. +

Before definite negotiations are completed with Zahedi it is vital that a U.S. representative be placed in contact with the Shah. This representative should present the point of view that if the Shah will supply the moral leadership the U.S. will support, by every means, the most logical @@ -29862,14 +25357,12 @@ of Iran. The point should be stressed that this is the Shah’s final time for decision and, that failing this time, he will have betrayed his country. Discussions should cover the steps to be taken by the Shah in - replacing Mossadeq by Zahedi, worked out in all pertinent + replacing Mossadeq by Zahedi, worked out in all pertinent details. Should the Shah give the required assurances, negotiations would be concluded with Zahedi. If the U.S. representative felt that the Shah would not rise to the occasion, the projected operation should be discarded.

-

The choice of a suitable representative is of great importance. George Allen, largely responsible for +

The choice of a suitable representative is of great importance. George Allen, largely responsible for the Shah’s decisive action at the time of the recovery of Azerbaijan, would be the ideal choice. A military man, such as one of the former heads of the U.S. Military Mission to Iran, is another possibility. It @@ -29878,8 +25371,7 @@ of that of a special representative and because of the risk that his efforts might be disclosed and his usefulness in Iran ended.

C. Forces which will play a role in - any effort to replace Mossadeq and to establish a stable government, + any effort to replace Mossadeq and to establish a stable government, and evaluation of their attitude

1. The Iranian Army

The bulk of the security forces have a strong sense of traditional @@ -29893,8 +25385,7 @@ legalistic maneuver to put him in power would fail unless supported by the armed forces at Tehran. Until about a year ago the First Division at Tehran, the so-called Guards Division, was in a position to control the - course of events and this force was loyal to the Shah. Mossadeq, realizing the situation, had + course of events and this force was loyal to the Shah. Mossadeq, realizing the situation, had this division split into three separate brigades with officers of his own choosing in command. There are also two armored brigades and the central MP Brigade at Tehran. Headquarters has no information as to the @@ -29906,10 +25397,8 @@ some of them would execute orders of the Shah acting in support of Zahedi.

Should the commanders of the brigades at Tehran incline to neither side - the outcome of any coup or legalistic maneuver to replace Mossadeq would depend upon whether - Mossadeq or Zahedi could muster the largest + the outcome of any coup or legalistic maneuver to replace Mossadeq would depend upon whether + Mossadeq or Zahedi could muster the largest civilian mobs.

There is no indication that Zahedi has control over armed forces in the provinces which he could move @@ -29917,8 +25406,7 @@

2. Tehran Police

The Tehran Police have demonstrated—in July 1952—their inability to maintain order in face of mob violence. Hence they are not an element of - importance, although headed by an officer appointed by Mossadeq.

+ importance, although headed by an officer appointed by Mossadeq.

3. The Majlis

The Majlis is not aThe words “not a” have been crossed out by hand and replaced with the word @@ -29930,8 +25418,7 @@

The Majlis numbers 79 deputies but this total number has never been present at recent sessions. Of this number 30 are allegedly loyal to Mossadeq. Four deputies are - on the fence and the balance of 46 members is potentially anti-Mossadeq. This potential opposition is + on the fence and the balance of 46 members is potentially anti-Mossadeq. This potential opposition is as follows:

@@ -29958,8 +25445,7 @@ 46
-

However, in spite of this potential opposition Mossadeq has won overwhelming votes of +

However, in spite of this potential opposition Mossadeq has won overwhelming votes of confidence in the past. These votes have been on his handling of the oil issue and on his retention of special powers. In recent weeks the opposition has increased in strength and should a test come on some such @@ -29971,14 +25457,11 @@

4. Political groups

a. Dissident elements of the National Front

-

Within the last year the National Front of Mossadeq—a very loose association of individuals of +

Within the last year the National Front of Mossadeq—a very loose association of individuals of varying stature and power to influence the public—has tended to break - up. These dissident elements are active within the Majlis—Haerizadeh, Baghai, and Makki—and + up. These dissident elements are active within the Majlis—Haerizadeh, Baghai, and Makki—and without it. There seems little chance that these elements will coalese - in positive support of such a figure as Zahedi and it also seems unlikely that they can assemble + in positive support of such a figure as Zahedi and it also seems unlikely that they can assemble sizeable groups of anti-Mossadeq demonstrators.

b. Tudeh Party

@@ -29987,10 +25470,8 @@ since one of its basic aims is to disrupt internal security it has rushed to support of Mossadeq in his attacks against the Shah. By 4 April 1953 Tudeh members had been - alerted to the possibility of a coup against Mossadeq and had been ordered to be ready to “protect” - Mossadeq.See Document + alerted to the possibility of a coup against Mossadeq and had been ordered to be ready to “protect” + Mossadeq.See Document 185.

The Tudeh Party may be able to assemble up to 10,000 demonstrators at Tehran from its Party members and the several pro-Soviet front groups @@ -30010,39 +25491,30 @@

d. Third Force

This political group is headed by Khalil Maleki, once a leader of the Tudeh Party and more - recently party organizer and theoretician for Baghai. Maleki claims 10,000 members, certainly + recently party organizer and theoretician for Baghai. Maleki claims 10,000 members, certainly an exaggeration as the party publications appeal to intellectual - socialists. The Third Force has been pro-Mossadeq and is not expected to lend its support to the + socialists. The Third Force has been pro-Mossadeq and is not expected to lend its support to the Shah. It has no record of mustering demonstrators.

e. Baghai’s Toilers Party

Earlier a lieutenant of Mossadeq, Baghai has openly opposed him over the allegedly undemocratic and - unconstitutional methods of Mossadeq. Should a show down between Mossadeq and the Shah be diverted to a vote on the continuation of + unconstitutional methods of Mossadeq. Should a show down between Mossadeq and the Shah be diverted to a vote on the continuation of Mossadeq’s plenary powers, - Baghai would probably oppose Mossadeq. Baghai has not more than three faithful + Baghai would probably oppose Mossadeq. Baghai has not more than three faithful followers among the Majlis deputies. The Party claims 10,000 members - but—given the defection of Maleki, probably has less than 2,000 active members. The + but—given the defection of Maleki, probably has less than 2,000 active members. The Party has not been mustered for street demonstrations.

f. Pan-Iranist

This group is violently anti-Soviet and anti-foreign in general. Small in total numbers, it does have branches in many provincial towns and its importance resides in the fact that it can call out small groups of - street fighters. The group has been consistently pro-Mossadeq, but has a strong inherent + street fighters. The group has been consistently pro-Mossadeq, but has a strong inherent loyalty to the Shah and might split on the issue of which of these individuals it should support.

g. Sumka

This National Socialist Party is small in size but capable of producing - fanatical street fighters. Repressed from time to time by Mossadeq, it might side with the Shah + fanatical street fighters. Repressed from time to time by Mossadeq, it might side with the Shah in a show down. It is very anti-Soviet. In October 1952 its leader tried to interest Zahedi in supporting his party.

@@ -30050,41 +25522,31 @@

Zahedi claims the support of this group. It is believed to be an association of individuals of conservative leanings who have formerly held high posts in the - government and have more recently been members of the Senate. Ala, Minister of Court, is a member. + government and have more recently been members of the Senate. Ala, Minister of Court, is a member. The group has British and Masonic overtones.

5. Religious Elements

a. Ayatollah Kashani

-

On the occasion of recent show-downs with Mossadeq Kashani has always lost out. For this reason he +

On the occasion of recent show-downs with Mossadeq Kashani has always lost out. For this reason he has turned to support of the Shah in an effort to build up a coalition—directed by himself—which would be capable of replacing Mossadeq. As president of the Majlis Kashani has considered it beneath his dignity to actually preside at the sessions and from this and other indications it seems certain that he is not interested in becoming Prime Minister himself, but in - directing a successor to Mossadeq.

+ directing a successor to Mossadeq.

Kashani’s power is not that of a spiritual leader, but of a schemer who can obtain the funds necessary to call out mobs from the bazaar section of Tehran. To date these mobs - have not been as effective as the groups mustered by either Mossadeq or the Tudeh Party.

+ have not been as effective as the groups mustered by either Mossadeq or the Tudeh Party.

b. Respected religious leaders.

This element is headed by Ayatollah Borujerdi, resident at Qum, the supreme spiritual leader of the Moslems. It includes such figures as the - influential Behbehani at Tehran. These individuals have tended to avoid entanglement in the - political arena, but on 11 April 1953 Zahedi reported that Kashani, Borujerdi and Behbehani were reaching an - understanding on the need to bolster the Shah in resistance to Mossadeq.See Document 193. About this same + influential Behbehani at Tehran. These individuals have tended to avoid entanglement in the + political arena, but on 11 April 1953 Zahedi reported that Kashani, Borujerdi and Behbehani were reaching an + understanding on the need to bolster the Shah in resistance to Mossadeq.See Document 193. About this same time two clerics who are also deputies in the Majlis from Tabriz informed Borujerdi that the people of Azerbaijan were demanding that - they leave the National Front because of Mossadeq’s attitude toward the Shah. Borujerdi is + they leave the National Front because of Mossadeq’s attitude toward the Shah. Borujerdi is alleged to have instructed them to form a religious faction within the Majlis.

While it is extremely unlikely that he could be persuaded to take such a @@ -30095,11 +25557,9 @@

This group of fanatics, with a record of political assassinations, is unfavorably disposed to Mossadeq and bitterly opposed to certain members of his government. This small - group is currently cool toward Kashani, who is allegedly trying to establish good + group is currently cool toward Kashani, who is allegedly trying to establish good relations with them. Quiet at present, this group may break out at any - time. However, it is not known how its leader, Navvab Safavi, may be influenced in any + time. However, it is not known how its leader, Navvab Safavi, may be influenced in any specific direction.

6. Tribes

a. Qashqai

@@ -30110,14 +25570,11 @@ repression of the tribe by Reza Shah. At the same time these leaders are reported to be on good terms with Zahedi. If - offered substantial political and economic benefits by Zahedi they might remain passive in the - event of the replacement of Mossadeq. Otherwise they might resort to armed action—as + offered substantial political and economic benefits by Zahedi they might remain passive in the + event of the replacement of Mossadeq. Otherwise they might resort to armed action—as in 1946—and so disrupt the internal security of southwestern Iran.

b. Other tribes

-

The Bakhtiari leaders would probably support Zahedi, as would the Lur, Shahsevan, Khamseh and +

The Bakhtiari leaders would probably support Zahedi, as would the Lur, Shahsevan, Khamseh and Zolfaghari tribal elements. The Kurds would probably not take sides. It is unlikely that any of these groups would take up arms, either in support of Mossadeq or of the @@ -30130,34 +25587,28 @@ internal stability.

a. Government officials

With the exception of members of the Iran Party, the higher officials - would tend to remain neutral with respect to Mossadeq. The lower levels, subject to increasing + would tend to remain neutral with respect to Mossadeq. The lower levels, subject to increasing economic uncertainty, would be glad to see him go.

b. Merchants

Kashani can muster the support of a large segment of the leading merchants in the bazaar. The top level, engaged in foreign trade, might well furnish funds for activity - against Mossadeq and Zahedi claims to have the financial + against Mossadeq and Zahedi claims to have the financial backing of one member of this group. The mass of small shopkeepers, - without influence, support Mossadeq.

+ without influence, support Mossadeq.

c. Landowners

-

The majority of the landowners are opposed to Mossadeq and would employ their influence to attempt to +

The majority of the landowners are opposed to Mossadeq and would employ their influence to attempt to keep order in the provinces in the event of his overthrow.

d. The General Public

Zahedi claims the support of the “majority of the people”, but it is far more likely that the man in the - street continues to admire Mossadeq for his strong stand against the British and as + street continues to admire Mossadeq for his strong stand against the British and as a symbol of resurgent nationalism. However, this element is of no practical value to either side unless effectively organized and led. Action by this element will come only from the groups already listed in earlier headings.

III. Assets which may be - directed toward the replacement of Mossadeq

+ directed toward the replacement of Mossadeq

These assets should be mobilized only in relation to a detailed plan of operations and such a plan would be the primary responsibility of the field station. Should all these assets be engaged in an all-out effort, @@ -30177,26 +25628,19 @@

5. Press Assets

[less than 1 line not declassified] have extremely wide connections with the Tehran press. These contacts could be used to - create an atmosphere favorable to Zahedi once he had taken over power. At the present time - the great bulk of the press is already anti-Mossadeq. Once Zahedi was in power it should be possible to use the - very severe press law put into effect by Mossadeq to suppress all pro-Mossadeq organs. [less than 1 line not + create an atmosphere favorable to Zahedi once he had taken over power. At the present time + the great bulk of the press is already anti-Mossadeq. Once Zahedi was in power it should be possible to use the + very severe press law put into effect by Mossadeq to suppress all pro-Mossadeq organs. [less than 1 line not declassified] should also make a major effort to win over the two most important Tehran papers, Ettelaat and - Keyhan, to the support of Zahedi. Keyhan + Keyhan, to the support of Zahedi. Keyhan would probably be more receptive to such an effort.

[less than 1 line not declassified] also have the capability of producing and distributing posters, pamphlets and throw-aways.

6. Activist Assets

[less than 1 line not declassified] have the - capabilities of bringing out gangs of street fighters. Through [less than 1 line not declassified] contacts with + capabilities of bringing out gangs of street fighters. Through [less than 1 line not declassified] contacts with leaders of various segments of the Pan-Iranists they have encouraged this group to engage in street fights with the Tudeh Party. It is questionable whether [less than 1 line not @@ -30216,19 +25660,16 @@ Qashqai tribe. This contact has been in preparation for Qashqai resistance of the Soviet invasion of Iran and the station has not attempted to influence these leaders with respect to current political - situations. With regard to the replacement of Mossadeq, it is not possible that the + situations. With regard to the replacement of Mossadeq, it is not possible that the station would persuade these leaders to support the Shah. The most the - station could do would be, as an intermediary between Zahedi and these leaders, to pass on + station could do would be, as an intermediary between Zahedi and these leaders, to pass on assurances of political and economic benefits if they would refrain from open hostility toward Zahedi.

3. Former ranking officers of the army and the police

The station has [1 line not declassified] and who could be directed to attempt to win the support of present army - commanders for an operation against Mossadeq.

+ commanders for an operation against Mossadeq.

4. [1 line not declassified]

[1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

5. [1 line not declassified]

@@ -30237,9 +25678,7 @@ declassified]

[5 paragraphs (24 lines) not declassified]

IV. Estimate of the - possibility of overthrowing Mossadeq by a Shah–Zahedi combination, supported by U.S. assets and + possibility of overthrowing Mossadeq by a Shah–Zahedi combination, supported by U.S. assets and policy

The act of overthrow would be either a coup d’état or a rapid legalistic maneuver with Zahedi put into @@ -30249,8 +25688,7 @@ Tehran mobs.

Neither Zahedi nor any other military figure would be able to persuade the commanders of the Tehran - garrison to follow his orders rather than those of Mossadeq as delivered through the Chief + garrison to follow his orders rather than those of Mossadeq as delivered through the Chief of Staff. However, should Zahedi be able to approach these commanders in the name of the Shah he should at least be able to neutralize the opposition of a large part of the @@ -30265,22 +25703,17 @@ been more spontaneous than planned and directed. In fact, information as to how pro-Mossadeq crowds are summoned and directed is completely lacking. All available assets in - Iran engaged in the operation of overthrowing Mossadeq should concentrate on the - tasks of weakening the ability of Tudeh and Mossadeq to call out mobs and of building up the size + Iran engaged in the operation of overthrowing Mossadeq should concentrate on the + tasks of weakening the ability of Tudeh and Mossadeq to call out mobs and of building up the size and leadership of pro-Shah mobs.

Should the Shah–Zahedi combination be able to get the largest mobs in the streets and should a sizeable - portion of the Tehran garrison refuse to carry out Mossadeq’s orders, the overthrow of + portion of the Tehran garrison refuse to carry out Mossadeq’s orders, the overthrow of Mossadeq would be certain.

-
+
193. Information Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job @@ -30292,13 +25725,10 @@ CS DB–3966 - Washington, April 17, 1953. + Washington, April 17, 1953. SUBJECT - 1. Attitude of Shah toward General Zahedi’s Plans for Ousting Mossadeq + 1. Attitude of Shah toward General Zahedi’s Plans for Ousting Mossadeq 2. Attitude of Shah and Opposition Leaders toward Present Crisis @@ -30306,18 +25736,14 @@ SOURCE [4 lines not declassified] -

1. As of 10 April the Shah’s attitude toward General Fazullah Zahedi’s plans for ousting +

1. As of 10 April the Shah’s attitude toward General Fazullah Zahedi’s plans for ousting Mossadeq was reported to be as follows:

-

a. The Shah is sympathetic to Zahedi’s candidacy but he prefers a “parliamentary” +

a. The Shah is sympathetic to Zahedi’s candidacy but he prefers a “parliamentary” solution to the present crisis rather than forceful action to remove Mossadeq.

-

b. The Shah does not want to appoint Zahedi by firman at this time and - thus incur personal responsibility for the overthrow of Mossadeq. The reason for this attitude +

b. The Shah does not want to appoint Zahedi by firman at this time and + thus incur personal responsibility for the overthrow of Mossadeq. The reason for this attitude of the Shah is his lingering fear of the British who he believes do not want to see Mossadeq out of power just now. The Shah is convinced that the British have two policies in @@ -30332,83 +25758,65 @@ past have been considered as spokesmen for British interests, are now approaching him and urging that he accept the recommendations contained in the report of the Majlis “Committee of Eight” which, if accepted, - would drastically curtail the powers of the Shah.Source Comment: + would drastically curtail the powers of the Shah.Source Comment: Mossadeq is fully cognizant of the Shah’s character and superstitiousness and he intentionally selects such men as Moazami to advise and influence the Shah. [Footnote is in the - original.],Washington Comment: According to an Iranian Home Service + original.],Washington Comment: According to an Iranian Home Service dispatch, dated 12 March, this Committee, which was constituted on 5 March 1953 to define and clarify the relationship between the Shah’s powers and the Government, is composed of the following: Hoseyn - Makki, Javad Ganjei, Haerizadeh, Braham Majzadeh, Abdullah Moazami, Mozzafar Baghai, + Makki, Javad Ganjei, Haerizadeh, Braham Majzadeh, Abdullah Moazami, Mozzafar Baghai, Reza Rafi, Kavim Sanjabi. [Footnote is in the original.]

c. The Shah fears that a Zahedi - “experiment” might bring about a repetition of the Qavam fiasco.

+ “experiment” might bring about a repetition of the Qavam fiasco.

d. The Shah is inclined to postpone a change of government until such time as Mossadeq’s popularity will have further ebbed. The Shah feels that there is a strong - undercurrent sapping away Mossadeq’s power and that this should be allowed to take + undercurrent sapping away Mossadeq’s power and that this should be allowed to take its course.

2. As of 11 April:

-

a. the Shah would definitely not fight against the Mossadeq Government to protect his +

a. the Shah would definitely not fight against the Mossadeq Government to protect his prerogatives but would continue his completely passive position and let events take their course;

-

b. the political opposition to Mossadeq had dropped, at least temporarily, all plans to +

b. the political opposition to Mossadeq had dropped, at least temporarily, all plans to overthrow the Prime Minister. However, the opposition was still working secretly to stir up public opinion against the recommendations contained in the report of the “Majlis Committee of Eight.” The opposition asked its friends and supporters not to attempt or encourage street demonstrations against Mossadeq - or in favor of the Shah. Furthermore, the opposition urged Zahedi not to run the risk at this time + or in favor of the Shah. Furthermore, the opposition urged Zahedi not to run the risk at this time of further compromising his political future by attempting a test of strength with Mossadeq. The opposition decided to conserve its assets by making a strategic withdrawal;

c. Mossadeq was beginning to doubt his ability to command a Majlis majority in support of the report of the - “Committee of Eight” or even for a vote of confidence. Mossadeq, therefore, was reluctant to + “Committee of Eight” or even for a vote of confidence. Mossadeq, therefore, was reluctant to force a decision on the report in the Majlis although he was still hopeful that he could persuade the Shah to endorse the “report” without Majlis action. The Prime Minister was, in fact, making conciliatory gestures toward the opposition, and, in particular, toward the Shah.

-

3. On 11 April, Mullah Borujerdi, Kashani, and Behbehani, leading clerical figures from +

3. On 11 April, Mullah Borujerdi, Kashani, and Behbehani, leading clerical figures from the spiritual and/or political point of view, were reaching mutual understanding on the need to bolster the Shah in his resistance to Mossadeq.

4. On 12 April:

-

a. Majlis opposition leader Seyyed Abul Haerizadeh indicated to Zahedi and other colleagues in the group opposing +

a. Majlis opposition leader Seyyed Abul Haerizadeh indicated to Zahedi and other colleagues in the group opposing Mossadeq that this was not - the time to attempt to force Mossadeq’s resignation;

+ the time to attempt to force Mossadeq’s resignation;

c. Moscow’s recent overtures of conciliation toward the West also were having their effect on the opposition by lessening the fear of the Tudeh Party.

-
+
194. Briefing Notes Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for - Director of Central Intelligence DullesSource: + Director of Central Intelligence DullesSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI - Files, Job 80R01443R, Box 1, Folder 14, NSC Briefing 22 Apr 53. Secret; Security Information. + Files, Job 80R01443R, Box 1, Folder 14, NSC Briefing 22 Apr 53. Secret; Security Information. Prepared for DCI Dulles for his briefing of the NSC on April 22. The official @@ -30423,54 +25831,37 @@ Security Council, Official Minutes 1947–1961, Box 26, 140th Meeting) The Progress Report is Document 180. The memorandum of discussion at the NSC - meeting of April 22, drafted by Gleason, notes that “Mr. Dulles spoke briefly about the + meeting of April 22, drafted by Gleason, notes that “Mr. Dulles spoke briefly about the situation in Iran. He noted a further decline in both the prestige of the Shah and the power of Mossadegh. He described the situation as one of perpetual crisis, but predicted no dramatic turn of events - within the next several weeks.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 4, 140th Meeting of + within the next several weeks.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 4, 140th Meeting of the National Security Council) - Washington, April 21, 1953. + Washington, April 21, 1953.

THE IRANIAN SITUATION

The failure of the Iranian Parliament to meet during the past week again - underscores Prime Minister Mossadeq’s current political weakness.This sentence is underlined by Dulles. A report sponsored + underscores Prime Minister Mossadeq’s current political weakness.This sentence is underlined by Dulles. A report sponsored by the Prime Minister, aimed at further reducing the Shah’s powers, has - been before parliament for the last month. Mossadeq’s supporters, however, have been unable to + been before parliament for the last month. Mossadeq’s supporters, however, have been unable to secure the necessary quorum to act on it.

Eight opposition deputies have left Tehran and thus have blocked all - efforts to convene a quorum. Mossadeq reportedly asked the Shah to dismiss + efforts to convene a quorum. Mossadeq reportedly asked the Shah to dismiss parliament, but the latter refused.This - paragraph is underlined by Dulles.

+ paragraph is underlined by Dulles.

Mossadeq’s extensive but disunited opposition is also in a weak position, mainly because of the Shah’s - unwillingness to take any initiative. General Zahedi and other leading political - figures who have been plotting against Mossadeq have, according to late reports, postponed - plans for a coup, awaiting a more propitious time.Most of this sentence is underlined by Dulles. + unwillingness to take any initiative. General Zahedi and other leading political + figures who have been plotting against Mossadeq have, according to late reports, postponed + plans for a coup, awaiting a more propitious time.Most of this sentence is underlined by Dulles. Mullah Kashani, president of - parliament, a long-time critic of Mossadeq, has moved cautiously in the present situation. + parliament, a long-time critic of Mossadeq, has moved cautiously in the present situation. Opposition elements to Mossadeq in the army are apparently not well coordinated with his political opponents.

Mossadeq controls the Army Chief of Staff and he has a large popular following which the Communist Tudeh party has temporarily joined.Most of this - sentence is underlined by Dulles. While he has not been able to secure + sentence is underlined by Dulles. While he has not been able to secure parliament’s cooperation in recent days, Mossadeq has a compact bloc of parliamentary votes, which can, in turn, prevent @@ -30484,17 +25875,13 @@ factions.

Current Tehran cables reflect high tension and suggest that the situation is building up to a climax which could result in a breakdown of public - order as antagonistic groups struggle for power.Most of the last two paragraphs are underlined by - Dulles. Henderson reported on the attacks + order as antagonistic groups struggle for power.Most of the last two paragraphs are underlined by + Dulles. Henderson reported on the attacks on the Point IV office in Shiraz in telegram 4085 from Tehran, April 18. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/4–1853)

-
+
195. Information Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job @@ -30506,8 +25893,7 @@ CS–8550 - Washington, April 24, 1953. + Washington, April 24, 1953. SUBJECT Activities of Anti-Mossadeq @@ -30519,8 +25905,7 @@

1. The opposition to Mossadeq was “greatly discouraged” by the American Embassy’s statement regarding the - Shiraz incident,Washington Comment. On 20 April the American Embassy in + Shiraz incident,Washington Comment. On 20 April the American Embassy in Tehran issued a press statement to the effect that United States policy toward Iran has not changed as a result of the Shiraz incident. [Footnote is in the original.] but is continuing @@ -30528,14 +25913,10 @@

2. The Shah promised “two weeks ago” to give financial aid to General Fazullah Zahedi but to date no aid has been received.

-

3. Dr. Mossafar Baghai has joined Zahedi against Mossadeq.

+

3. Dr. Mossafar Baghai has joined Zahedi against Mossadeq.

-
+
196. Information Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job @@ -30547,13 +25928,11 @@ CS–8642 - Washington, April 27, 1953. + Washington, April 27, 1953. SUBJECT Zahedi Campaign to Replace - Prime Minister Mossadeq + Prime Minister Mossadeq SOURCE @@ -30570,53 +25949,41 @@ until the Shah felt that the time was opportune. The Shah stated that he would give Zahedi a more definite answer on 24 or 25 April.

-

3. On 22 April 1953 the Shah received Mustafa Kashani, the son of Mullah Kashani, who urged the Shah +

3. On 22 April 1953 the Shah received Mustafa Kashani, the son of Mullah Kashani, who urged the Shah to take action “now,” thereby capitalizing on public concern over the - disappearance of Chief of Police General Mahmud Afshartus.Washington Comment. General Afshartus disappeared on the + disappearance of Chief of Police General Mahmud Afshartus.Washington Comment. General Afshartus disappeared on the evening of 20 April 1953 while on duty in Tehran. According to the New York Times of 22 April 1953, a reward of about $6,000 was being offered for information leading to his - whereabouts. According to the 27 April 1953 issue of the New York Times, the mauled and garroted body + whereabouts. According to the 27 April 1953 issue of the New York Times, the mauled and garroted body of Afshartus was found about twenty miles from Tehran on 26 April. [Footnote is in the original.] Washington Comment. According to the same source, Ardeshir - Zahedi, son of General Zahedi, and the following three members of the + Zahedi, son of General Zahedi, and the following three members of the Iranian Retired Officers Association were arrested on 23 April 1953 by order of the Military

Governor:

General Ali Ashgar Mozayeni

General Ali Monnazeh

Colonel Davalou (FNU)

The - arresting party also went to the home of General Zahedi, but he was absent. After a + arresting party also went to the home of General Zahedi, but he was absent. After a short interrogation concerning the whereabouts of his father, Ardeshir Zahedi was released. According to an Associated Press dispatch dated 23 April 1953, it was “assumed” that the arrests were connected with the - disappearance of General Afshartus. [Footnote is in the original.]

+ disappearance of General Afshartus. [Footnote is in the original.]

4. The Shah told Mustafa Kashani to wait “two days—not two weeks or two months, but only two days.”

5. Meanwhile, Prince Ali Reza, the Shah’s brother, told the Shah that he was tired of the present - situation and that, if the Shah refused to act against Mossadeq, Ali Reza would act on his + situation and that, if the Shah refused to act against Mossadeq, Ali Reza would act on his own.

6. Ali Reza was “very busy” among young Army officers, agitating against Mossadeq.

-
+
197. Information Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job @@ -30628,8 +25995,7 @@ CS–8818 - Washington, April 28, 1953. + Washington, April 28, 1953. SUBJECT Current Iranian Situation @@ -30638,8 +26004,7 @@ REFERENCES CS–8817CS–8817, April 28, reported that the Shah had “appointed Abol - Ghassem Amini, a Mossadeq supporter, as ‘Chief of Court’ in order + Ghassem Amini, a Mossadeq supporter, as ‘Chief of Court’ in order to ‘balance’ the appointment of pro-Shah Ali Reza Gharagazlu as Minister of Court replacing Hoseyn Ala.” (Ibid.) @@ -30653,35 +26018,28 @@ will toward Mossadeq and to calm Mossadeq’s suspicions of the Royal Court.” Amini is a - relative and supporter of Mossadeq.

+ relative and supporter of Mossadeq.

2. Ali Reza Gharagazlu, the Shah appointee to replace Minister of Court Hoseyn Ala, has declined the - appointment. The post will remain vacant and Amini will assume Ala’s former duties and + appointment. The post will remain vacant and Amini will assume Ala’s former duties and responsibilities.

-

3. By these actions the Shah is attempting to “placate” Mossadeq in an effort to prevent the +

3. By these actions the Shah is attempting to “placate” Mossadeq in an effort to prevent the latter from making public “documents” which are alleged to implicate the Shah and the Royal Court with:

a. the kidnapping of Police Chief Mahmud - Afshartus;Washington Comment. According to press dispatches, + Afshartus;Washington Comment. According to press dispatches, Afshartus was found strangled to death about 20 miles outside of Tehran on 26 April. [Footnote is in the original.] and

b. the tribal rebellion led by Abol Ghassem Bakhtiari, a kinsman of the Queen.Washington - Comment. According to a 20 April 1953 AFP Radioteletype from Paris, France, + Comment. According to a 20 April 1953 AFP Radioteletype from Paris, France, Abol Ghassem has surrendered to military authorities. [Footnote is in the original.]

4. Seyyed Abul Hasan Haerizadeh, leader of the Mossadeq opposition - in the Majlis, stated on 23 April that he (Haerizadeh):

+ in the Majlis, stated on 23 April that he (Haerizadeh):

a. favors the support of Ali Reza Gharagazlu, “an old and greatly respected man,” as Prime Minister;

b. fears General Fazullah Zahedi @@ -30690,30 +26048,23 @@ named Minister of the Interior in a government headed by Gharagazlu.Field Comment. The information in CS–8808 and CS–8817 may - indicate the Shah’s capitulation to Mossadeq and may signal the end of Zahedi as an immediate threat to + indicate the Shah’s capitulation to Mossadeq and may signal the end of Zahedi as an immediate threat to the Prime Minister. [Footnote is in the original. CS–8808 is in Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 80–00810A, Box 11, Folder 52, CS Information Reports 8800–8809.]

-
- 198. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 198. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/4–3053. Secret. Received at 9:50 a.m. - Tehran, April 30, + Tehran, April 30, 1953, 2 p.m.

4252. 1. Regret delay reply Deptel 2549, April 2.In telegram 2549 to Tehran, April 2, the Department asked the Embassy for “comments regarding probable political consequences of proceeding with implementation - TCA support Mosadeq’s agrarian development and + TCA support Mosadeq’s agrarian development and urban housing program.” (Ibid., 788.00/4–253) Been hoping clarification Iranian internal situation would render possible give affirmative reply re both programs mentioned. Still difficult with @@ -30730,8 +26081,7 @@ is with Mosadeq’s political fortunes and requiring multiple contacts with explosive elements in town and village has sufficient chance success to warrant adoption. Recent - trends cause me believe chances success not (repeat not) good and I see no (repeat no) immediate + trends cause me believe chances success not (repeat not) good and I see no (repeat no) immediate prospect just now (repeat now) reversal these trends.

2. I recommend adoption housing program which might with advantage be strengthened to absorb some of funds not (repeat not) used in village @@ -30748,9 +26098,7 @@ neighborhood 10 million dollars for 1954 without adding at least twice as much for supporting economic aid, chances in Embassy’s opinion success such technical aid so slight consideration should be given - withdrawal TCI entirely.In despatch 895 from Tehran, May 1, Henderson wrote that the + withdrawal TCI entirely.In despatch 895 from Tehran, May 1, Henderson wrote that the continuation of technical assistance was construed by Iranians as an indication of U.S. support in their oil dispute with the British. Hence, “the time may come in the not too distant future when @@ -30762,42 +26110,31 @@ do not believe that that time has as yet come. . . The Department should know however that the possibility exists that it may come.” (Ibid., 788.00/5–153)

-

4. I am showing this telegram Warne, Director TCI for +

4. I am showing this telegram Warne, Director TCI for whose judgment and courageous fighting spirit I have respect and have - invited him comment on it either by telegram or despatch.In telegram 4253 from Tehran, April 30, Warne defended the Village Council + invited him comment on it either by telegram or despatch.In telegram 4253 from Tehran, April 30, Warne defended the Village Council Project and advised against “any decision pull back piecemeal from our acknowledged objectives, as decision not (repeat not) go forward on Village Council Project this late date would seem start do.” (Ibid., 788.00/4–3053) The Department responded in telegram 2816, - May 4, in which it instructed, “in view worldwide objectives TCA, Congressional interest land - reform, and probable adverse reaction by Mosadeq should TCI + May 4, in which it instructed, “in view worldwide objectives TCA, Congressional interest land + reform, and probable adverse reaction by Mosadeq should TCI withdraw this time from Project, go ahead with Village Council Project.” (Ibid.)

- Henderson + Henderson
-
- 199. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 199. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 888.2553/5–453. Secret; Noforn. Received at 2:23 p.m. - Tehran, May 4, 1953, 4 + Tehran, May 4, 1953, 4 p.m.

4304. 1. During my talk Mosadeq - May 3 he said he contemplating new approach oil problem. NIOC or government bring suit against + May 3 he said he contemplating new approach oil problem. NIOC or government bring suit against AIOC in Iranian courts to recover on claims during period AIOC operated concession and on new claims arising from damages inflicted since @@ -30806,13 +26143,10 @@ fairness apparent to all impartial observers. What would I think such approach?

2. I said it might afford considerable international entertainment but - not (repeat not) likely solve oil problem. Public UK and various other countries could not - (repeat not) be convinced trial such circumstance would be fair. AIOC almost certain not (repeat not) + not (repeat not) likely solve oil problem. Public UK and various other countries could not + (repeat not) be convinced trial such circumstance would be fair. AIOC almost certain not (repeat not) answer summons. Trial absentia would have little weight. Prime Minister - insisted Iranian courts proper tribunal; AIOC might not (repeat not) be interested pressing its + insisted Iranian courts proper tribunal; AIOC might not (repeat not) be interested pressing its claims against Iran but Iranian claims active and could not (repeat not) languish. I said I thought free world would consider international tribunal more appropriate than Iranian courts for settlement claims. I @@ -30826,8 +26160,7 @@ contemplated approach would serve any useful purposes so far as settlement oil dispute was concerned. Prime Minister apparently on impulse said “I am willing have this dispute settled by someone whom - Britain and I can trust. I agreeable President Eisenhower act as arbiter. I ready + Britain and I can trust. I agreeable President Eisenhower act as arbiter. I ready give him full power to decide issue. Will you be good enough to ask President Eisenhower if he would undertake settle this matter for us?” I replied I had no (repeat no) @@ -30836,13 +26169,11 @@ contact with British or through Swiss who represented British interests. Prime Minister said he wished make no (repeat no) formal suggestions unless he had some reason hope they might be acceptable. Would I not - (repeat not) be willing at least report our conversations US Government? I agreed provided it be + (repeat not) be willing at least report our conversations US Government? I agreed provided it be clearly understood he was not (repeat not) making any proposals to me; that we were not (repeat not) reviving discussions re settlement oil problem. Was I to understand he - prepared give President Eisenhower full powers with no (repeat no) strings + prepared give President Eisenhower full powers with no (repeat no) strings attached settle oil dispute and accept without reserve whatever decision President might make? Prime Minister hesitated. He said only decision President Eisenhower would be @@ -30852,8 +26183,7 @@ return Iran. British could never return regardless of Iranian Government in power. After further thought Prime Minister said if British indicate willingness abide by decision US - President, he would ask Majlis gave him full power go to US to lay case before President. After + President, he would ask Majlis gave him full power go to US to lay case before President. After arrival in US he would send message requesting Majlis to permit him transfer his full powers to President. He must obtain Majlis approval for each step in explosive problem matter @@ -30868,9 +26198,7 @@ willingness this regard indicates British sure decision will be their favor. Prime Minister said he sure he could manage situation Iran if UK Government could manage in - London. I would report our conversation to US Government but not (repeat not) in form of offer. US President faced with staggering burden + London. I would report our conversation to US Government but not (repeat not) in form of offer. US President faced with staggering burden duties. It would not (repeat not) be easy for him act as arbiter in case this kind. Furthermore, task of thankless character sure to create resentment in both countries. Nevertheless if President had reason @@ -30883,28 +26211,21 @@ consulting his advisers had attached so many conditions approaches proved blind alleys. Nevertheless I would report his remarks to State Department.

-

4. I also told Prime Minister that even if US Government should be willing again to become involved in - this dispute it would not (repeat not) be easy induce UK endeavor find solution oil dispute so +

4. I also told Prime Minister that even if US Government should be willing again to become involved in + this dispute it would not (repeat not) be easy induce UK endeavor find solution oil dispute so long as Mosadeq remained Prime Minister. UK Government seemed believe - as it made concession after concession Mosadeq continued to retreat apparently in expectation + as it made concession after concession Mosadeq continued to retreat apparently in expectation that British would make fresh concessions. My impression was British had - lost practically all hope any settlement while Mosadeq remained Prime Minister. Prime Minister + lost practically all hope any settlement while Mosadeq remained Prime Minister. Prime Minister maintained he desired dispute settled; he had never moved backwards; in fact on occasions he had been willing make concessions which would have rendered him vulnerable sharp criticism by Iran public and by political leaders opposed to him including even stooges of British.

-

5. In view my previous experience with Mosadeq I not (repeat not) inclined place hope in +

5. In view my previous experience with Mosadeq I not (repeat not) inclined place hope in settlement oil problem through channels which he now suggests. Even if British Government would find it possible entrust President decide - dispute it would in my opinion be very difficult for Mosadeq obtain full powers from Majlis + dispute it would in my opinion be very difficult for Mosadeq obtain full powers from Majlis or transfer those powers to President. In any event Majlis likely insist decision be in framework nine-point national law and in right pass on President’s decision. Furthermore I doubt British would be happy at idea @@ -30912,13 +26233,11 @@ disposition Iran oil.

6. Even though Mosadeq’s latest suggestion likely collapse before making appreciable headway I do not - (repeat not) think it in interest free world for US take completely negative attitude at time we stressing + (repeat not) think it in interest free world for US take completely negative attitude at time we stressing settlement question compensation may be key future fate Iran. I venture suggest therefore unless it decided President in no (repeat no) event should become involved in this troublesome problem matter be discussed - with British and they be informed unless they strenuously object US answer be that President did not (repeat + with British and they be informed unless they strenuously object US answer be that President did not (repeat not) believe he could be useful in this matter unless he should be informed jointly by Iran and UK their desire submit to him such differences as they unable to settle between @@ -30926,41 +26245,31 @@ utmost persuade their respective legislatures to approve any decision President might make. US Government therefore suggests if after careful consideration Prime Minister desires - make such approach he might directly contact UK or contact through Swiss. If it believed unwise for - President become involved I might be authorized inform Mosadeq that although this expression + make such approach he might directly contact UK or contact through Swiss. If it believed unwise for + President become involved I might be authorized inform Mosadeq that although this expression confidence in President deeply appreciated, President believes he could be more useful to both Iran and UK in future if he should refrain from making decisions on merits their - respective claims; that he hoped Iran and UK would be able find solution as result direct contact or + respective claims; that he hoped Iran and UK would be able find solution as result direct contact or by agreement on some arbiter other than President in whom both would have confidence.

7. Have marked this telegram Noforn merely because Department and London might desire decide between themselves what if anything tell British.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
- 200. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 200. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/5–453. Top Secret; Security Information; Priority. Received at 9:39 p.m. At the top of the page is a handwritten note that - reads: “Tehran given instructions Deptel 2823 5/5. Brit - Emb informed. Emb London informed by airgram.” + reads: “Tehran given instructions Deptel 2823 5/5. Brit + Emb informed. Emb London informed by airgram.” Telegram 2823 to Tehran is ibid., 788.00/5–553. - Tehran, May 4, 1953, 6 + Tehran, May 4, 1953, 6 p.m.

4311. 1. I have met Amini, new Acting Minister Court twice briefly since his appointment. First April @@ -30968,8 +26277,7 @@ latter occasion I congratulated him on and wished him success in new difficult position. He replied task exceedingly difficult. He found himself in most awkward situation. I said I could understand. I - personally had highest regard for Ala, his predecessor, who had been my friend for many + personally had highest regard for Ala, his predecessor, who had been my friend for many years. I had deep respect and affection for Shah and I exceedingly fond Mosadeq whom I considered one of great men Middle East. Amini @@ -30981,31 +26289,20 @@ afternoon with wife and self. He indicated that would be preferable but I did not (repeat not) set date.

2. May 3, Chief CAS informed me Khosro Qashqai had told him he understood - Chief would like have chat with Amini and he had arranged for him see Amini discreetly same evening. Chief - had replied he had not (repeat not) indicated desire see Amini but would be glad meet him. I + Chief would like have chat with Amini and he had arranged for him see Amini discreetly same evening. Chief + had replied he had not (repeat not) indicated desire see Amini but would be glad meet him. I approved meeting.

-

3. Chief informs me during discussion in presence Qashqai Amini stated differences between Shah +

3. Chief informs me during discussion in presence Qashqai Amini stated differences between Shah and Mosadeq should be settled soonest. Present situation of suspense weakens court, excites opposition and benefits only Tudeh. Basis of settlement of differences will have important bearing on future Iran. If this settlement is to benefit Iran - and be permanent it should be in harmony with US policies. It impossible Iran remain neutral. Iran must - be committed to West and only logical association is with US. Said before advising Shah regarding terms settlement he + and be permanent it should be in harmony with US policies. It impossible Iran remain neutral. Iran must + be committed to West and only logical association is with US. Said before advising Shah regarding terms settlement he must know (question A) what US policy is - regarding Iran particularly regarding Mosadeq? Amini - continued that as soon as differences between Shah and Mosadeq settled Amini will suggest Shah visit Caspian. - Afterwards he wishes arrange Shah go abroad. He would like suggestions regarding country which + regarding Iran particularly regarding Mosadeq? Amini + continued that as soon as differences between Shah and Mosadeq settled Amini will suggest Shah visit Caspian. + Afterwards he wishes arrange Shah go abroad. He would like suggestions regarding country which Shah might visit, preferably one with monarchical government. (Question B)

5. [sic] Re question B, chief said choice country @@ -31013,8 +26310,7 @@ however, that important factor to be taken into consideration was what reaction Iranian public opinion would be. He would ask Ambassador whether Embassy might be able assist in arranging invitation.

-

6. In reply question C, chief stated in his opinion US would not (repeat not) favor attempt +

6. In reply question C, chief stated in his opinion US would not (repeat not) favor attempt effect change in regime. In view geographical position Iran and internal political pressures change of regime would be hazardous venture which might seriously jeopardize Iranian independence and social stability. @@ -31038,81 +26334,63 @@

9. Amini has raised some delicate questions which in my opinion should be carefully considered before reply given. Several days ago Shah through trusted source sent message - to me he did not (repeat not) have full trust in Amini and Embassy should not (repeat - not) fully credit Shah certain views which Amini might express on Shah’s behalf. Understand + to me he did not (repeat not) have full trust in Amini and Embassy should not (repeat + not) fully credit Shah certain views which Amini might express on Shah’s behalf. Understand Amini has made progress of - late in obtaining Shah’s confidence. Fact that Amini carried on this conversation in - presence Khosro who although Amini’s close friend one of most vindictive enemies of + late in obtaining Shah’s confidence. Fact that Amini carried on this conversation in + presence Khosro who although Amini’s close friend one of most vindictive enemies of Shah might indicate Amini playing some kind of game, Khosro undergoing change attitude or Amini naive.

10. After discussion appropriate members staff and some thought, I shall make recommendations re type answers to be given. My present thinking is Amini’s position so unclear - it might be preferable in answering question A state US refraining from intervening in Iranian + it might be preferable in answering question A state US refraining from intervening in Iranian internal affairs and, therefore, not (repeat not) supporting any - particular person. It has great respect for Mosadeq and wishes cooperate with him in correct manner + particular person. It has great respect for Mosadeq and wishes cooperate with him in correct manner during time he Prime Minister. It also regards Shah as factor for stability in country which should not (repeat not) be weakened. Re - economic aid we might point out extremely difficult so long as situation re oil remains + economic aid we might point out extremely difficult so long as situation re oil remains unchanged obtain support US public opinion for substantial economic aid to Iran. Re question B, we might say in case Shah should desire US assistance in arranging for some friendly country invite him for visit, US Government willing do what it can although it not (repeat not) convinced it in interests Iran for Shah - leave country in present circumstances. Re question C, US Government of opinion any attempt effect + leave country in present circumstances. Re question C, US Government of opinion any attempt effect change in head of state or form Iranian Government might produce situation instability dangerous to Iranian independence.

11. Leave to discretion Department extent to which this conversation should be brought to attention UK.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
- 201. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 201. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/5–553. Top Secret; NIACT; Security Information. Received at 8 a.m. Printed from a sanitized version; the original was not found. - Tehran, May 5, 1953, 2 + Tehran, May 5, 1953, 2 p.m. -

4324. 1. Key members Embassy staff in agreement with me Amini Acting Minister Court has not +

4324. 1. Key members Embassy staff in agreement with me Amini Acting Minister Court has not (repeat not) as yet proved trustworthiness to extent warranting our giving him specific reply question A [less than 1 line - not declassified] (Embassy telegram 4311, May 4).Document 200. + not declassified] (Embassy telegram 4311, May 4).Document 200. Amini member influential family Kajar blood and not (repeat not) likely sincerely support present Shah whose father ousted Kajars. Family considered ambitious and opportunistic prepared form temporary alliances to its advantage. Its - friendship with equally opportunistic Qashqai Khans and MFA + friendship with equally opportunistic Qashqai Khans and MFA Fatemi strengthens our doubt regarding its motivations.

2. Various unconfirmed rumors afloat regarding present objectives this family. One is it hopes brigadier brother Minister Court now chief gendarmérie will be made chief staff and be in position with alliance Qashqais and other prominent political and military figures effect coup - which would eliminate both Shah and Mosadeq and make brigadier dictator. Another rumor is - that Minister Court working with Mosadeq get Shah out of country and in absence make + which would eliminate both Shah and Mosadeq and make brigadier dictator. Another rumor is + that Minister Court working with Mosadeq get Shah out of country and in absence make Prince Abdor Reza successor. Mother Abdor Reza Kajar and wife sister of wife Minister Court. These rumors should not (repeat not) be taken too seriously. Nevertheless they @@ -31120,8 +26398,7 @@

3. If Department approves I would like authorize [less than 1 line not declassified] reply somewhat as follows Amini’s questions:

-

Answer question A Ambassador states fixed policy US Government not (repeat not) intervene Iranian internal +

Answer question A Ambassador states fixed policy US Government not (repeat not) intervene Iranian internal affairs by giving political support any particular Iranian political leader or groups. US Government would like maintain friendly relations and cooperate loyally with Iranian @@ -31139,8 +26416,7 @@ and unifying factor and that any substantial weakening of institution Shah in present circumstances might result in series of events which would undermine Iranian independence.

-

Answer to question B Ambassador understands US Government believes it might endanger Iran independence +

Answer to question B Ambassador understands US Government believes it might endanger Iran independence for Shah to leave country in immediate future. He doubts therefore willingness US Government become involved in facilitating Shah’s departure.

@@ -31148,13 +26424,11 @@

4. In case Amini should inform [less than 1 line not declassified] that if US unable extend financial - substantial economic aid to Iran Mosadeq may have no (repeat no) choice other than to + substantial economic aid to Iran Mosadeq may have no (repeat no) choice other than to ally himself with Tudeh and continue cooperate with extremists of Iran party, [less than 1 line not declassified] might reply US Government not (repeat not) - convinced it necessary for Mosadeq make such alliance or continue such cooperation + convinced it necessary for Mosadeq make such alliance or continue such cooperation merely because US cannot (repeat not) give assurance in present circumstances financial or economic assistance. If however Mosadeq @@ -31162,39 +26436,30 @@ direction responsibility for what might happen to Iran will fall upon him, Majlis and Court.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
+
202. Monthly Report Prepared in the Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence AgencySource: - Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 81–01061R, Box 1, Folder 4, Monthly + Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 81–01061R, Box 1, Folder 4, Monthly Report—April 1953, Country Summaries and Analyses. Top Secret; Security Information. - Washington, May 6, 1953. + Washington, May 6, 1953.

IRAN

April 1953

A. General Developments

-

1. The opposition to Premier Mossadeq appears discouraged and has shelved its +

1. The opposition to Premier Mossadeq appears discouraged and has shelved its immediate plans for the overthrow of the present government in favor of biding its time and conserving its assets. This discouragement is in large measure owing to the Shah’s ineffectuality and his unwillingness to resist Mossadeq’s demands (as - exemplified by his recent replacement of Minister of Court Ala by a man more acceptable to + exemplified by his recent replacement of Minister of Court Ala by a man more acceptable to Mossadeq). The opposition was - further discouraged by Ambassador Henderson’s statement to the effect that U.S.–Iran + further discouraged by Ambassador Henderson’s statement to the effect that U.S.–Iran relations had not been disturbed by the mob attack on the Point IV - office in Shiraz,See footnote 2, Document 195. a statement which was + office in Shiraz,See footnote 2, Document 195. a statement which was generally interpreted to mean that the U.S. government still favored Mossadeq as Prime Minister.[text not @@ -31208,49 +26473,37 @@ Operations

[2 paragraphs (7 lines) not declassified]

- John H. - Waller + John H. + Waller Chief, NE–4
-
- 203. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 203. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/5–853. Secret; Security Information; Priority. Repeated to London. Received at 6:11 p.m. The telegram is printed with - redactions in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, + redactions in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 726–727 (Document 325). - Tehran, May 8, 1953, 2 + Tehran, May 8, 1953, 2 p.m.

4356. 1. In considering various policy problems re Iran Department may be - interested brief evaluation by Embassy present position Mosadeq. Although at present Court - appears to be weakening in struggle with Mosadeq and opposition in Majlis unable mobilize its - resources effectively against him Mosadeq’s position is certainly weaker than it was + interested brief evaluation by Embassy present position Mosadeq. Although at present Court + appears to be weakening in struggle with Mosadeq and opposition in Majlis unable mobilize its + resources effectively against him Mosadeq’s position is certainly weaker than it was before he undertook struggle against Shah last February.

2. Appointment Amini Acting Minister Court as successor Ala - generally regarded here as victory for Mosadeq. Since his appointment Amini has been intermediating between + generally regarded here as victory for Mosadeq. Since his appointment Amini has been intermediating between Mosadeq and Shah and has been issuing number conciliatory and optimistical though at times conflicting - statements re progress in achieving understanding between Mosadeq and Court. Doubt exists however + statements re progress in achieving understanding between Mosadeq and Court. Doubt exists however that Amini really working in interest either Mosadeq or Shah. Objectives powerful Kajar–Amini - family not (repeat not) entirely clear but activities Amini may eventually serve further to + family not (repeat not) entirely clear but activities Amini may eventually serve further to weaken position Mosadeq without strengthening Shah.

3. Although opposition in Majlis has not (repeat not) been able take @@ -31259,13 +26512,11 @@ government from engaging in constructive activities. Even if, as is being optimistically predicted in pro-government circles, Majlis may be able meet within next few days there is justified doubt that it can take - action of character which will appreciably strengthen Mosadeq’s position. For instance unless + action of character which will appreciably strengthen Mosadeq’s position. For instance unless some surprise event should take place government may encounter extreme difficulty in depriving Baqai of Parliamentary immunity. Government failure in this respect will reflect - on its strength following official announcement charging Baqai with complicity murder police + on its strength following official announcement charging Baqai with complicity murder police chief Afshartus. Government will also face stubborn opposition in attempting obtain unqualified Majlis approval Committee of Eight report substitute measure limiting Shah’s @@ -31274,8 +26525,7 @@ his present period of asylum there indicates decline in prestige and authority Mosadeq in Majlis.

-

4. During last six months there has been sharp shift in basis Mosadeq support among political +

4. During last six months there has been sharp shift in basis Mosadeq support among political leaders. Most elements original National movement now (repeat now) in open or tacit opposition. Indications friction appearing between him and Iran Party one of last National movement elements which still supports @@ -31301,12 +26551,10 @@ threaten him. Most dangerous threat which we can see at present moment is that coming from Amini group working from within. This group would require exceptional skill however, - if it to succeed overthrow Mosadeq either by peaceful methods or by force. + if it to succeed overthrow Mosadeq either by peaceful methods or by force. Zahedi has to [some?] extent retrieved position taking refuge in Majlis and by presenting his case - individually to Majlis leaders and press. Zahedi thus far however, has not (repeat not) been able + individually to Majlis leaders and press. Zahedi thus far however, has not (repeat not) been able obtain support Shah which he has considered essential his success. Moazami only deputy who in past has frequently contrived make himself middle of road compromise @@ -31314,40 +26562,31 @@ successor Mosadeq who would be acceptable to National movement as well as various opponents that movement. He may eventually become real threat. Shah fears and respects - him allegedly because Shah considers him underground agent for Brit.

+ him allegedly because Shah considers him underground agent for Brit.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
- 204. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 204. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/5–1553. Top Secret; Security Information. Received May 22. A - copy was pouched to London. Drafted by Henderson; the attached memorandum of conversation - was drafted by Melbourne. + copy was pouched to London. Drafted by Henderson; the attached memorandum of conversation + was drafted by Melbourne. No. 953 - Tehran, May 15, + Tehran, May 15, 1953. SUBJECT Embassy Conversation with Source Close to Shah

There is attached for the Department’s information a memorandum of a - conversation which I recently had with a sourceAt the bottom of the page is a handwritten note by + conversation which I recently had with a sourceAt the bottom of the page is a handwritten note by Richards that reads: “In a personal letter LWH identifies source as Ernest @@ -31355,12 +26594,10 @@ members of the Embassy. In this instance it is believed that the memorandum is self-explanatory. It should be noted that this emissary of the Shah expresses on behalf of the Shah views which differ from those - expressed by Acting Minister of the Court Amini. The Acting Minister has taken the position that + expressed by Acting Minister of the Court Amini. The Acting Minister has taken the position that it would be advantageous to Iran and to the Western world for the British to try to come to an oil settlement regardless of whether the - Government of Iran is headed by Dr. Mosadeq or some other prime minister.

+ Government of Iran is headed by Dr. Mosadeq or some other prime minister.

Loy W. Henderson

Ambassador

@@ -31368,54 +26605,41 @@

Memorandum of Conversation

Tehran, May 14, 1953.

On the evening of May 13, the Ambassador had a conversation with a person - extremely close to the Shah. Commander Pollard, Embassy Naval Attaché, and Mr. Melbourne, First Secretary of Embassy, + extremely close to the Shah. Commander Pollard, Embassy Naval Attaché, and Mr. Melbourne, First Secretary of Embassy, were present.

The emissary of the Shah stated he had a message from the Sovereign expressing strong appreciation for the efforts that the Ambassador had made during the period when pressure was being applied to oblige the Shah to leave the country. The Shah wished the Ambassador to know that he believed if it had not been for the actions of the Ambassador at that - time the institution of monarchy in Iran would have been overthrown and the country would have + time the institution of monarchy in Iran would have been overthrown and the country would have been partitioned. Further, the emissary wished the Ambassador to know that the Shah deeply appreciated the continuing support for him which was being given by the American Government.

The emissary wished to make clear to the Ambassador certain fundamental - features of the Shah’s policy toward Dr. Mosadeq. The latter had come to power as the result of + features of the Shah’s policy toward Dr. Mosadeq. The latter had come to power as the result of careful planning over a period of several years before actually assuming power. He had stirred the emotions of the Iranian people when he took office, and he had had public and Majlis support. The Shah had not willingly agreed to make Mosadeq Prime Minister, but he had bowed to the forces behind him and now - believed that the only way to obtain Mosadeq’s eventual dismissal from office was through the + believed that the only way to obtain Mosadeq’s eventual dismissal from office was through the same parliamentary means which had granted him the premiership. The Shah - believed that time was discrediting Mosadeq and that the Soviet menace to Iran had receded - since the death of Stalin so that Mosadeq’s removal in a legal way would be achieved in + believed that time was discrediting Mosadeq and that the Soviet menace to Iran had receded + since the death of Stalin so that Mosadeq’s removal in a legal way would be achieved in the not too distant future. The Shah preferred this method to others, such as a military coup, an arbitrary move of the Shah removing Mosadeq and appointing - another prime minister, the imprisonment of Mosadeq, his exile, or even his death at the hands of a - Tehran mob. In all of these alternatives Mosadeq would be made a martyr or a source of serious - future trouble. It was the Shah’s policy toward Dr. Mosadeq to bow slowly to Mosadeq’s pressure, but at the same + another prime minister, the imprisonment of Mosadeq, his exile, or even his death at the hands of a + Tehran mob. In all of these alternatives Mosadeq would be made a martyr or a source of serious + future trouble. It was the Shah’s policy toward Dr. Mosadeq to bow slowly to Mosadeq’s pressure, but at the same time to regain as much ground as possible through taking advantage of - shifting conditions. If the Shah had rigidly opposed Mosadeq, the Shah would have been + shifting conditions. If the Shah had rigidly opposed Mosadeq, the Shah would have been completely eliminated, like a tree which would have crashed through the force of a violent wind. Such explanations were made by the emissary to depict the Shah’s policy, which he understood had caused a certain dissatisfaction on the part of American officials who wished the Shah to - take a much stronger stand toward Mosadeq.

+ take a much stronger stand toward Mosadeq.

In discussing various personalities, the emissary said that the Shah did not extend confidence to the newly appointed Acting Minister of Court, Mr. Abol Qasem Amini. However, @@ -31423,8 +26647,7 @@ present circumstances and the Shah did not therefore wish to antagonize him. The emissary hoped that the Ambassador would keep the Shah’s attitude toward Mr. Amini in - mind in determining his own relations with Amini.

+ mind in determining his own relations with Amini.

Turning to a discussion of the oil situation, the emissary said that the Shah believed that it was in the real interest of Iran and of free world unity for the Ambassador in the course of official meetings with Dr. @@ -31433,14 +26656,12 @@ settling it. Dr. Mosadeq was not serious in such talk. It would be possible to discuss oil matters, such as the question of - compensation, only with a government other than that of Dr. Mosadeq. The emissary said the Shah was + compensation, only with a government other than that of Dr. Mosadeq. The emissary said the Shah was gratified that the Ambassador was following the practice of telling Dr. Mosadeq, when the question of oil was raised in the course of their official visits, that the United States was not in a position to make further efforts to help solve the - oil problem and that if Dr. Mosadeq had any ideas in this regard it would be wise to + oil problem and that if Dr. Mosadeq had any ideas in this regard it would be wise to bring them, by other means than the United States Government, to the attention of the British Government. The emissary concluded that although it would serve no useful purpose for oil discussions to be @@ -31451,28 +26672,22 @@ that the problem of Iran should not be aggravated by Great Britain and the United States pursuing conflicting policies with respect to it.

-
- 205. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 205. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/5–1953. Top Secret; Security Information. Received May 27. A copy was pouched to London. Both the despatch and the attached - memorandum of conversation were drafted by Cunningham. + memorandum of conversation were drafted by Cunningham. No. 975 - Tehran, May 19, + Tehran, May 19, 1953. REF - Embassy Despatch 953, May 15, 1953Document 204. + Embassy Despatch 953, May 15, 1953Document 204. SUBJECT @@ -31503,8 +26718,7 @@

At approximately 9 p.m. on the evening of May 17, an emissary of the Shah met the Ambassador and the other officers listed above in order to deliver a message from the Shah. He stated that the same message would - probably be repeated to the Ambassador the next day by Mr. Amini, but that he, the source, was, + probably be repeated to the Ambassador the next day by Mr. Amini, but that he, the source, was, in addition, bringing private comments from the Shah which would not be entrusted to Amini. The message was to the effect that:

@@ -31521,11 +26735,8 @@

c) The Shah had agreed to the condition of cooperation contained in a) above.

The Shah’s private comments upon this message were that he would cease - giving apparent support to the Mosadeq Government if Mosadeq undertook to undermine him, particularly his - position with regard to the Army. In fact, if Mosadeq insisted on relieving the Shah + giving apparent support to the Mosadeq Government if Mosadeq undertook to undermine him, particularly his + position with regard to the Army. In fact, if Mosadeq insisted on relieving the Shah of the latter’s responsibilities with regard to the Army, the Shah would leave Iran.

The Shah expressed concern over the announcement appearing currently in @@ -31533,25 +26744,20 @@ Tudeh Party (communist-front party) was not in any way acting contrary to the Constitution and laws of Iran and that, therefore, there was no case against Iranian subjects who were being prosecuted as leaders of - that party. The Shah said that if this announcement was true, it would seem to him that + that party. The Shah said that if this announcement was true, it would seem to him that Mosadeq had already forfeited any claim he might have had to the Shah’s support.

The Sovereign felt that the United States should use its present - bargaining position, arising from Dr. Mosadeq’s great eagerness to obtain United States - support, to force a change in Mosadeq’s attitude towards indigenous communist groups. + bargaining position, arising from Dr. Mosadeq’s great eagerness to obtain United States + support, to force a change in Mosadeq’s attitude towards indigenous communist groups. Such a change could take the form of strong measures against the Tudeh Party and would involve the dismissal of the fellow-traveler Minister of Justice on the pretext that he acted without authority in liberating - communist leaders. The Shah believed that Mosadeq was desperate enough to accept these terms as + communist leaders. The Shah believed that Mosadeq was desperate enough to accept these terms as the price of United States support.

The Ambassador pointed out to the source that such an approach on the part of the United States would tend to under-emphasize the importance - of obtaining a settlement of the compensation problem. Mosadeq might, therefore, gain the + of obtaining a settlement of the compensation problem. Mosadeq might, therefore, gain the impression that, by making certain concessions to the West, in the matter of dealing more firmly with Iranian communists, he could obtain substantial economic aid from the United States regardless of the fact @@ -31568,18 +26774,15 @@ Iran and to the world that there could be no further American aid until at least definite willingness to achieve a solution of the oil problem had been demonstrated. It was pointed out that, were such a declaration - to be issued at this time, Mosadeq could reply that he had offered to initiate + to be issued at this time, Mosadeq could reply that he had offered to initiate conversations with the British regarding compensation for oil and had been turned down. The source then suggested that attempts be made to - induce the British to begin conversations with Mosadeq, so that when such + induce the British to begin conversations with Mosadeq, so that when such conversations broke down, as they surely would, the United States could issue the declaration in question without leaving itself open to the Mosadeq rejoinder.

In the Shah’s opinion, said his emissary, no settlement of the oil - question was possible so long as Mosadeq remained Prime Minister. The Shah was convinced + question was possible so long as Mosadeq remained Prime Minister. The Shah was convinced that Mosadeq should be overthrown by action of the Majlis, but felt that covert means must be employed to prevail upon the Majlis to act. Specifically, such underground means @@ -31588,33 +26791,24 @@ Dr. Mozaffar Baqai. The Shah was sure that both of these men were upright, loyal, and sincere, and that the best chance for Iran - to find a way out of its difficulties was for General Zahedi to become Prime Minister.

-

Although the Shah had given no outward sign of his advocacy of Zahedi, it was merely because he - realized that any such sign would only serve to intensify the Mosadeq Government’s persecution of the + to find a way out of its difficulties was for General Zahedi to become Prime Minister.

+

Although the Shah had given no outward sign of his advocacy of Zahedi, it was merely because he + realized that any such sign would only serve to intensify the Mosadeq Government’s persecution of the General. The emissary conceded that a few months ago the Shah might not - have been so favorably disposed toward Zahedi, but said that recent developments had convinced + have been so favorably disposed toward Zahedi, but said that recent developments had convinced him that Zahedi represented Iran’s only chance out of its current dilemma.

One factor which retarded the Shah’s change of heart with regard to Zahedi was the fact that Hosein Ala, when Minister of - Court, was quite suspicious of Zahedi and regarded him as just another ambitious - military man. The mention of Ala’s name introduced a digression concerning his part in + Court, was quite suspicious of Zahedi and regarded him as just another ambitious + military man. The mention of Ala’s name introduced a digression concerning his part in the crisis over the Shah’s intended departure and subsequent decision to - remain in Iran. The source maintained Ala was initially in favor of the Shah’s leaving Iran, - but that, after Ambassador Henderson’s discussions with him, he changed his mind + remain in Iran. The source maintained Ala was initially in favor of the Shah’s leaving Iran, + but that, after Ambassador Henderson’s discussions with him, he changed his mind and exerted all his influence to persuade the Shah to remain. (The Ambassador is convinced that Ala - was opposed to the Shah’s departure from the very beginning.) Ala was dismissed as Minister of Court + was opposed to the Shah’s departure from the very beginning.) Ala was dismissed as Minister of Court only because of Mosadeq’s pressure, not because Ala had offended the Shah; Mosadeq held @@ -31626,43 +26820,33 @@ intelligent enemies. When Ala was Minister of Court, the Shah tended to open his heart to him, but found that sometimes Ala innocently - passed along the Shah’s confidential remarks to Dr. Mosadeq. As matters now stood, the Shah + passed along the Shah’s confidential remarks to Dr. Mosadeq. As matters now stood, the Shah had no confidence in Mr. Amini, - told him nothing he did not want Dr. Mosadeq to hear, and so could not be betrayed.

-

Returning to the question of support for General Zahedi, the source outlined the Shah’s + told him nothing he did not want Dr. Mosadeq to hear, and so could not be betrayed.

+

Returning to the question of support for General Zahedi, the source outlined the Shah’s views regarding the present political alignment in Iran. On the one - hand, there was a clique consisting of Moazami, Fatemi, + hand, there was a clique consisting of Moazami, Fatemi, and the Amini family, with Maki on the fringe as opposed to Mosadeq’s policies, which was attempting to gain control of the key positions in the Government. These - men contemplated keeping Dr. Mosadeq ostensibly in power, realizing that his day was + men contemplated keeping Dr. Mosadeq ostensibly in power, realizing that his day was done and using him as a front for their own activities and as an ever-present threat against the Shah. They realized that no one except, - as the emissary put it, a man as insane as Mosadeq would dare to flout the Shah’s prestige as the + as the emissary put it, a man as insane as Mosadeq would dare to flout the Shah’s prestige as the present Prime Minister has done. On the other side, there was a group led by General Zahedi and - Dr. Baqai, who wished to overthrow Mosadeq and bring a semblance of sanity + Dr. Baqai, who wished to overthrow Mosadeq and bring a semblance of sanity and purpose to the Iranian Government. The Ganjei faction and other independents would throw in their lot with the stronger of these two parties when a showdown occurred.

-

The Shah’s representative emphasized that Baqai was in no way involved in the murder of General +

The Shah’s representative emphasized that Baqai was in no way involved in the murder of General Afshartus. In fact, it was Baqai who asked the generals now under arrest for the murder to involve his name in their confessions in order that he might be able to reply to these accusations and use the opportunity to lay many accusations of his own at the door of Dr. - Mosadeq. Baqai, being a courageous man and being + Mosadeq. Baqai, being a courageous man and being endowed with parliamentary immunity, was in a better position than most to attack Mosadeq.

The source affirmed as a personal comment that the United States @@ -31670,12 +26854,9 @@ weak. The Shah was merely being extremely cautious, having been betrayed so often in the past that he wished to take no chances now. However, the Shah recognized these most worthy of trust and had made the obvious - choice between the Moazami–Fatemi–Amini + choice between the Moazami–Fatemi–Amini faction, which he believed would be disloyal to him and would ruin Iran, - and the Zahedi–Baqai group, which would respect him + and the Zahedi–Baqai group, which would respect him and try to save the country.

The Shah believes that financial aid from the United States to the Zahedi faction could be @@ -31683,31 +26864,22 @@ Zahedi, the General’s son, who was absolutely honest, and suggested that it could be intimated to those who received it from Ardeshir that the money came from the Shah. Since the Shah’s accounts - were closely controlled and supervised by Mosadeq partisans, he could give Zahedi no economic support of any kind. - In order to bring about the final collapse of the Mosadeq Government, he suggested that - the United States might induce Mosadeq to turn against the Tudeh Party, as outlined - earlier. Once he had done this, Mosadeq would be forced to lean on the Court and the + were closely controlled and supervised by Mosadeq partisans, he could give Zahedi no economic support of any kind. + In order to bring about the final collapse of the Mosadeq Government, he suggested that + the United States might induce Mosadeq to turn against the Tudeh Party, as outlined + earlier. Once he had done this, Mosadeq would be forced to lean on the Court and the Majlis for support. If his power in the Majlis had been undermined by covert support to Zahedi and Baqai and if the Court - refused to assist him in any way, Mosadeq would be doomed. The Shah wished to initiate no - domestic action himself against Mosadeq; he felt that, having achieved power by + refused to assist him in any way, Mosadeq would be doomed. The Shah wished to initiate no + domestic action himself against Mosadeq; he felt that, having achieved power by parliamentary means, Mosadeq should fall by similar means, without apparent royal intervention.

It was brought out that the Shah had been greatly distressed by what he - believed to be evidence of United States support of Mosadeq and his partisans and of + believed to be evidence of United States support of Mosadeq and his partisans and of Maleki, a confirmed opponent of the Shah. The emissary was assured that this was an erroneous - impression; the United States had not actively supported the Mosadeq faction in any way, and had + impression; the United States had not actively supported the Mosadeq faction in any way, and had suspended assistance to Maleki as soon as it was realized that he worked against the Shah. The source reaffirmed that the Shah was @@ -31724,21 +26896,13 @@ although the British might feel that the Shah had not been as firm as he should have been, they were in no way opposed to him. In fact, their stand in the February 28 crisis gave ample evidence of their favorable - attitude toward the Shah.See Document 210.

-

As an afterthought, the Shah’s representative stated that Mr. Amini, in his May 18 interview with - the Ambassador, might suggest that the Ambassador induce Dr. Mosadeq to replace General Riahi as Chief of Staff with General Mahmoud Amini. The Minister of - Court would suggest that the Ambassador tell Dr. Mosadeq that, as proof of his good - faith, he should remove General Riahi, whose alleged connection with the Iran Party + attitude toward the Shah.See Document 210.

+

As an afterthought, the Shah’s representative stated that Mr. Amini, in his May 18 interview with + the Ambassador, might suggest that the Ambassador induce Dr. Mosadeq to replace General Riahi as Chief of Staff with General Mahmoud Amini. The Minister of + Court would suggest that the Ambassador tell Dr. Mosadeq that, as proof of his good + faith, he should remove General Riahi, whose alleged connection with the Iran Party rendered him antagonistic to the United States, and replace him with - General Amini. Amini was in no way acceptable to the + General Amini. Amini was in no way acceptable to the Shah as Chief of Staff and the Shah, although initially doubtful of Riahi’s suitability, was gaining increasing confidence in him.

@@ -31747,18 +26911,11 @@ and the meeting ended at about 12:30 [a.m.].

-
- 206. Memorandum From the Counselor of Embassy (Mattison) to the Ambassador to Iran - (Henderson)Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, +
+ 206. Memorandum From the Counselor of Embassy (Mattison) to the Ambassador to Iran + (Henderson)Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/5–2153. Top Secret; Security Information. The memorandum is - attached to a May 21 letter from Mattison to Richards which reads: “Before the Ambassador left I + attached to a May 21 letter from Mattison to Richards which reads: “Before the Ambassador left I tried to jot down a few things with regard to ‘our’ problem of Iran. The Ambassador, before leaving for Karachi, suggested that we send this to you for your information. Needless to say, I don’t claim @@ -31768,23 +26925,17 @@ primarily because we are not at all sure of what the best course is. We hope that the Ambassador’s conversations with the Secretary may help to firm up our ideas.” - Tehran, May 19, 1953. + Tehran, May 19, 1953. SUBJECT - Your Conversations with the SecretaryDulles and + Your Conversations with the SecretaryDulles and Stassen visited the - Near and Middle East May 9–29. Henderson and Warne flew to Karachi on May 22 to brief + Near and Middle East May 9–29. Henderson and Warne flew to Karachi on May 22 to brief Dulles on the current situation in Iran. In telegram 4472 from Tehran, May 20, Henderson summarized the points that Mosadeq - wanted him to convey to Secretary Dulles. See Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, + wanted him to convey to Secretary Dulles. See Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 727–728 (Document 326). @@ -31810,10 +26961,8 @@ the dollar). The inflationary effect of this is only just beginning to be felt.

On the political side we find that there has been a similar - deterioration. The National Movement upon whom Mosadeq depends for support has split - up into numerous factions. The Majlis has been unable to conduct normal business for over a + deterioration. The National Movement upon whom Mosadeq depends for support has split + up into numerous factions. The Majlis has been unable to conduct normal business for over a month. Mosadeq and the Shah have come into conflict which has weakened both. This conflict has also had the effect of increasing the Prime Minister’s reliance upon the Tudeh @@ -31822,8 +26971,7 @@ had to tolerate further Tudeh penetration of the Government. Intrigue and counter intrigue continue but there has yet not appeared on the scene any political or military figure who has the ability to carry the - Shah with him in a decisive move against Mosadeq.

+ Shah with him in a decisive move against Mosadeq.

2. Problem created by the situation

This set of circumstances has produced problems which render the @@ -31837,11 +26985,9 @@ Minister appears almost out of question. Other factors sharpen the desirability that Mosadeq be replaced by a more reasonable person. However, no opponent who had a - reasonable chance of succeeding in overthrowing Mosadeq has yet presented himself.

+ reasonable chance of succeeding in overthrowing Mosadeq has yet presented himself.

c. A greater degree of economic or financial assistance than we are - presently giving would strengthen the position of Mosadeq in his determination not to + presently giving would strengthen the position of Mosadeq in his determination not to reach a settlement. Withholding of such assistance on the other hand strengthens the determination of the British for a “tough” settlement.

@@ -31977,12 +27123,9 @@ that we would be open to the accusations of not taking sufficiently positive action.Telegram 4524 from Tehran, May 25, Henderson - transmitted the text of an oral message Dulles authorized him to convey to Mosadeq upon the Ambassador’s + transmitted the text of an oral message Dulles authorized him to convey to Mosadeq upon the Ambassador’s return from meeting with the Secretary in Karachi. The Secretary - wished to communicate to Mosadeq that his trip to the Near East and Middle + wished to communicate to Mosadeq that his trip to the Near East and Middle East had been a fact-finding trip and that he was disappointed at not having been able to visit Iran. He nevertheless wished to express his regret “hear you apparently coming opinion it would @@ -31991,28 +27134,19 @@ problem in making plans restoration Iranian economy.” The Secretary urged Mosadeq to continue to work with the British to find a solution to the oil dispute. - Telegram 4524 is printed in full in Foreign + Telegram 4524 is printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 728–729 (Document 327).

-
+
207. Memorandum From the Director of the U.S. Technical Cooperation - Administration Mission in Iran (Warne) to the Ambassador to Iran (Henderson)Source: National Archives, RG 469, Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies + Administration Mission in Iran (Warne) to the Ambassador to Iran (Henderson)Source: National Archives, RG 469, Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies 1948–1961, Mission to Iran, Executive Office Subject Files (Central Files) 1951–1961, Box 7, Folder 6, 350. Secret; Security Information. - Tehran, May 20, 1953. -

DISCUSSION WITH MINISTER AKHAVI

+ Tehran, May 20, 1953. +

DISCUSSION WITH MINISTER AKHAVI

Dr. Ali Akbar Akhavi, Minister of National Economy, asked me to call on him today. He had heard that I was to go with you to Karachi, though I have not spread it around.

@@ -32032,8 +27166,7 @@

3. If the Prime Minister were given the resources he would and could easily take in hand both groups of opposition, the pro-British and the Tudeh.

-

4. The anti-American activities come from what Dr. Akhavi describes as the extreme right +

4. The anti-American activities come from what Dr. Akhavi describes as the extreme right and the extreme left. He says there are very few leading this movement and we should not be alarmed by it.

5. Dr. Akhavi believes that the @@ -32051,39 +27184,31 @@ East because she is not involved in the Israel-Arab fight and is not conjoined with any neighboring country or its problems.

- William E. - WarnePrinted from a copy + William E. + WarnePrinted from a copy that indicates the original was signed.
-
- 208. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 208. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/5–2053. Top Secret; Security Information. Received May 27. - Drafted by Melbourne. + Drafted by Melbourne. No. 982 - Tehran, May 20, 1953. + Tehran, May 20, 1953. SUBJECT - Informal Outline of General Zahedi’s Proposed Program for Iran + Informal Outline of General Zahedi’s Proposed Program for Iran

I have the honor to transmit a copy of a communication received May 19 - from a responsible Iranian who had seen General Zahedi and who, after talking with him, + from a responsible Iranian who had seen General Zahedi and who, after talking with him, outlined at the request of the General a tentative program which he would try to follow in the event he became Prime Minister.

-

It may be noted that General Zahedi proposes to take a strong stand toward the +

It may be noted that General Zahedi proposes to take a strong stand toward the communists and to restore order in the country, after which he would turn to economic and social reforms that presumably would require substantial economic and financial aid from abroad.

@@ -32136,8 +27261,7 @@ that deputies are prepared to sign a non-confidence motion bearing signatures of half plus one of the deputies; this may be done at any moment now. Deputies are afraid Shah will not act on this motion without - strong pressure by U.S. and British. He feels that sooner or later America will have to take action + strong pressure by U.S. and British. He feels that sooner or later America will have to take action with Shah because Iranians cannot save themselves. As the present position has arisen as a result of foreign interference, it is impossible for Iranians to oust the present Government by @@ -32150,31 +27274,23 @@ with success these reforms and abandon his efforts to become Prime Minister in favor of the former.

-
+
209. Briefing Notes Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for - Director of Central Intelligence DullesSource: + Director of Central Intelligence DullesSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI - Files, Job 80R01443R, Box 1, Folder 19, NSC Briefing 20 May 53. Secret. Prepared for DCI + Files, Job 80R01443R, Box 1, Folder 19, NSC Briefing 20 May 53. Secret. Prepared for DCI Dulles for his briefing of the NSC on May 20. The official minutes of the NSC meeting of May 20 record that DCI Dulles briefed the National Security Council on Iran, and included a “reference to the - legalizing of the Tudeh Party in Iran. This development,” Dulles said, “indicated further + legalizing of the Tudeh Party in Iran. This development,” Dulles said, “indicated further deterioration for the interests of the free world in Iran.” (National Archives, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Minutes 1947–1961, Box 27, 145th Meeting) - Washington, undated. + Washington, undated.

IRANIAN TUDEH PARTY IS NO LONGER ILLEGAL

1. The Communist Tudeh party is no longer illegal, and can now engage in overt activity, following an Iranian court ruling of 16 May.

@@ -32188,16 +27304,11 @@ government would or would not do.

-
- 210. Memorandum for the RecordSource: National Archives, RG 59, GTI Files, Lot +
+ 210. Memorandum for the RecordSource: National Archives, RG 59, GTI Files, Lot 57 D 529, Alleged British Intrigues. Top Secret. Drafted by Richards. - Washington, May 21, 1953. + Washington, May 21, 1953.

Ambassador Henderson has recently been informed on a number of occasions by close associates of the Shah that he is disturbed regarding British attitude toward himself. He has @@ -32210,21 +27321,14 @@ British wish to substitute another Shah for me or to abolish the monarchy? Are the British back of present efforts to take away my powers and deprive me of my prestige in Iran and abroad?”

-

On May 17, the Shah sent an emissary to Ambassador Henderson to say that much would be - done to clarify the situation if Ambassador Henderson could ascertain secretly and unequivocally the +

On May 17, the Shah sent an emissary to Ambassador Henderson to say that much would be + done to clarify the situation if Ambassador Henderson could ascertain secretly and unequivocally the British attitude toward the Shah.

Ambassador Henderson plans to leave Iran on June 3 to return to the United States on leave and will see the Shah prior to his departure.

Attachment

-

Message From British Prime Minister ChurchillA handwritten note by Richards below this message reads: “Note Message for Shah from Sir Winston Churchill handed to me by +

Message From British Prime Minister ChurchillA handwritten note by Richards below this message reads: “Note Message for Shah from Sir Winston Churchill handed to me by Beeley on 5/28/53.”

“You may certainly inform the State Department that while we do not @@ -32234,18 +27338,11 @@ assurance to the Shah and say that it comes personally from me.”

-
- 211. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Smith to President EisenhowerSource: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Box 32, Iran +
+ 211. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Smith to President EisenhowerSource: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Box 32, Iran 1953–59(9). Secret; Security Information. There is no drafting information on the memorandum. - Washington, May 23, 1953. + Washington, May 23, 1953.

Ambassador Henderson has personally written several despatches giving his own analysis of trends in Iran and of recent conversations with the Iranian Foreign Minister @@ -32283,16 +27380,14 @@ by individual American nationals in Iran for the benefit of Iran. There are historical and psychological reasons for this phenomenon which I shall not attempt to set forth in this despatch. Nevertheless those in - the United States who are inclined to believe that a mere increase in publicity of + the United States who are inclined to believe that a mere increase in publicity of efforts of Americans in Iran to assist Iran will contribute to a solution of some of the problems which we are facing here at the present time should not overlook the fact that there are extremely important psychological differences between the public mind of Iran and that of the United States.

“The frustrations of practically all sections of the Iranian public, - including those supporting as well as those opposing Dr. Mosadeq, as they note the deteriorating + including those supporting as well as those opposing Dr. Mosadeq, as they note the deteriorating conditions of the country fan the embers of xenophobia. Only those sympathetic to the Soviet Union and to international communism have reason to be pleased at what is taking place in Iran.”

@@ -32302,26 +27397,18 @@ initials.
-
- 212. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/5–3053. Top - Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Henderson, who provided a summary +
+ 212. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/5–3053. Top + Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Henderson, who provided a summary of this conversation in telegram 4573 from Tehran, May 30, which is - printed with redactions in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, + printed with redactions in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 730–732 (Document 329). The - memorandum is attached to a covering letter to Byroade, May 30, in which + memorandum is attached to a covering letter to Byroade, May 30, in which Henderson wrote that “the character of my conversation was so confidential that I do not wish to describe it either in a telegram or a despatch.” - Tehran, May 30, + Tehran, May 30, 1953. PARTICIPANTS @@ -32335,12 +27422,9 @@

After the exchange of a few introductory remarks I told him that it was my understanding that he was not certain regarding the British attitude towards himself. I therefore had taken the liberty of making an inquiry - in this respect and was in a position to inform him that Mr. Churchill had authorized me to say - that the British would be very sorry to see him lose his powers or leave his post or be - driven out.See the attachment to Document 210. The Shah seemed to be + in this respect and was in a position to inform him that Mr. Churchill had authorized me to say + that the British would be very sorry to see him lose his powers or leave his post or be + driven out.See the attachment to Document 210. The Shah seemed to be gratified at this statement. He said that his concern regarding the British attitude had been due primarily to the fact that certain members of the Majlis who were known to maintain close contacts with the British @@ -32348,8 +27432,7 @@ In the past General Frazer had endeavored to persuade him that he should become merely a Constitutional Monarch in the European sense. Ambassador Bullard had taken that position shortly after the Shah had ascended the - Throne and successive British Chiefs of Mission including even Middleton had intimated on various + Throne and successive British Chiefs of Mission including even Middleton had intimated on various occasions that the Shah should keep himself “up in the clouds and avoid taking any part in Iranian political life.” He said that judging from the message from Mr. Churchill @@ -32363,8 +27446,7 @@ openly flouted by the present Government for over a year. Unfortunately he was not in a position to interfere.

I told the Shah that I would like to have a frank statement from him - regarding his attitude towards the candidacy of General Zahedi for the Prime Ministership. Was + regarding his attitude towards the candidacy of General Zahedi for the Prime Ministership. Was or was not General Zahedi acceptable to the Shah? The Shah replied that he did not consider General Zahedi an intellectual @@ -32383,8 +27465,7 @@ not too distant future it would be preferable that there would be no change of government. Razmara had come into power in the belief that he would obtain aid from the - United States. This had not materialized, and Razmara was headed for disaster at the + United States. This had not materialized, and Razmara was headed for disaster at the time of his assassination. Similarly, any change of government at the present time which was not followed by substantial foreign financial and economic aid would merely @@ -32395,8 +27476,7 @@ confident that the United States Government would welcome such a government provided it was sure that His Majesty would give it his full and sustained support. It would be disastrous for Iran if the United - States and British Governments would endeavor to help General Zahedi and then at the last moment + States and British Governments would endeavor to help General Zahedi and then at the last moment would find that the Shah had changed his mind with regard to the General and did not want him to form a government.

The Shah said that he would not change his mind. It was important, @@ -32406,17 +27486,13 @@ the General support unless he could become convinced that the General had behind him a strong array of political leaders as well as a considerable popular support.

-

The Shah said that he did not in any event believe that General Zahedi could come in through a coup. +

The Shah said that he did not in any event believe that General Zahedi could come in through a coup. The key positions in the Army were gradually being taken over by friends of Brigadier General Amini, the brother of the Acting Minister of Court. Several months ago the present Acting Minister of Court had endeavored to persuade the Shah to come out - openly in support of General Zahedi. Since Amini had become Acting Minister of Court, however, his - attitude had changed. He was not maintaining that General Zahedi did not have the qualifications + openly in support of General Zahedi. Since Amini had become Acting Minister of Court, however, his + attitude had changed. He was not maintaining that General Zahedi did not have the qualifications and experience to serve as Prime Minister and was suggesting that it might be better in case the Prime Minister should resign to appoint a “stop-gap rather weak National Front Government” which could later be @@ -32430,44 +27506,36 @@ alternative weaker candidate to act as a “stop-gap.” The Shah said that he thought there was some truth in my remark nevertheless in view of their strength the Amini group - might be able to block General Zahedi.

+ might be able to block General Zahedi.

I told the Shah that I would like for him to repeat for my benefit the - statement of his attitude toward General Zahedi since such a statement was needed by the U.S. + statement of his attitude toward General Zahedi since such a statement was needed by the U.S. Government in connection with certain decisions which it would have to make. His Majesty said I could tell the U.S. Government that he would welcome General Zahedi as Prime Minister subject to the conditions which he had already outlined to me.

-

I said that it might be extremely difficult for General Zahedi to be brought into power by +

I said that it might be extremely difficult for General Zahedi to be brought into power by ordinary Parliamentary methods. For instance if it should become apparent that a majority of the Majlis was opposed to the retention of the present Government, the National Movement Fraction might boycott the Majlis so that it would be impossible to obtain a quorum. The Majlis might therefore be unable to function for an indefinite period and could - not vote lack of confidence in Dr. Mosadeq or register inclination for General Zahedi. If, in such an event, a + not vote lack of confidence in Dr. Mosadeq or register inclination for General Zahedi. If, in such an event, a majority of members of the Majlis should send a petition requesting the Majlis to appoint General Zahedi as Prime Minister what would his Majesty do? The Shah replied that he could not answer this question without ascertaining what his powers were under the Constitution. Even if he should find that he had powers in - such circumstances to appoint General Zahedi, he would not wish to commit himself in advance + such circumstances to appoint General Zahedi, he would not wish to commit himself in advance since he must make his final decision in the light of the situation of the moment.

-

The Shah asked me about my recent trip to Karachi to meet Mr. Dulles and also inquired regarding my +

The Shah asked me about my recent trip to Karachi to meet Mr. Dulles and also inquired regarding my latest conversations with the Prime Minister. Were there any serious conversations now going on with regard to the oil dispute? Did I believe that the U.S. would purchase any quantity of oil from Iran? Did I think that there was any possibility that the U.S. would extend substantial - economic assistance to Iran under a Mosadeq Government? I informed the Shah that the U.S. + economic assistance to Iran under a Mosadeq Government? I informed the Shah that the U.S. was no longer acting as intermediary between the U.K. and Iran in the matter of the oil dispute. So far as I knew no effort was being made at the present time to effect a settlement of the oil problem. I did not @@ -32478,14 +27546,11 @@ Mosadeq Government in the absence of a solution of the compensation problem.

I asked the Shah whether in his opinion: (a) Further efforts should be - made to find a solution for the compensation problem while Dr. Mosadeq remained as Prime Minister and + made to find a solution for the compensation problem while Dr. Mosadeq remained as Prime Minister and (b) whether in the absence of such a solution the U.S. should extend - financial and economic assistance to a Mosadeq Government?

+ financial and economic assistance to a Mosadeq Government?

The Shah replied that he was still of the opinion that it would be easier - to effect a settlement of the oil problem with Dr. Mosadeq than with any successor to Dr. + to effect a settlement of the oil problem with Dr. Mosadeq than with any successor to Dr. Mosadeq. He also thought that Dr. Mosadeq could make a settlement more advantageous to the British than that which any @@ -32494,30 +27559,24 @@ Nevertheless any avenue which might lead towards a settlement of the oil dispute with Dr. Mosadeq should not be ignored. Even if an attempt at such a settlement might result in - Dr. Mosadeq’s remaining in power somewhat + Dr. Mosadeq’s remaining in power somewhat longer, it should be made if there was any possibility whatsoever for success.

The Shah also said that the present economic position of Iran is so dangerous that he would like to see the U.S. give financial and economic - assistance to the country even though Dr. Mosadeq was still in power and even though the extension + assistance to the country even though Dr. Mosadeq was still in power and even though the extension of that assistance might make it appear that the U.S. was supporting Dr. Mosadeq.

The Shah asked me if I did not agree that it would be advantageous to - settle the oil dispute, if possible, with Dr. Mosadeq. I said that I had always + settle the oil dispute, if possible, with Dr. Mosadeq. I said that I had always believed this to be true. I was beginning to feel, however, that there - was no chance of any oil settlement so long as Dr. Mosadeq was Prime Minister. The British + was no chance of any oil settlement so long as Dr. Mosadeq was Prime Minister. The British had come to the conclusion that it was useless to deal with Dr. Mosadeq. If, therefore, the - oil problem was to be settled while Dr. Mosadeq was Prime Minister it seemed to me that he must + oil problem was to be settled while Dr. Mosadeq was Prime Minister it seemed to me that he must take the initiative in making concrete proposals of a character which would cause the British to believe that he was serious. After the - experiences of the last two years it would not be easy for Dr. Mosadeq to convince the British that he + experiences of the last two years it would not be easy for Dr. Mosadeq to convince the British that he really wished to be a party to a fair and reasonable settlement of the oil dispute.

The Shah said that he wished to be frank with me and with the U.S. @@ -32544,8 +27603,7 @@ definitely decided to get out.

The Shah said that Mr. Amini, the Acting Minister of Court, would be certain to question him regarding our - conversation. It was probable also that Mosadeq would try to obtain certain information from me + conversation. It was probable also that Mosadeq would try to obtain certain information from me in this regard. His suggestion was that he inform Amini in the utmost confidence that I had told him about my visit to Karachi and my @@ -32554,36 +27612,29 @@ present circumstances of a settlement of the compensation problem. He would go on to tell Amini that he had said that, in his opinion, it would be much easier for a - settlement of the oil dispute to be effected with Dr. Mosadeq than with some subsequent Prime + settlement of the oil dispute to be effected with Dr. Mosadeq than with some subsequent Prime Minister and that he had expressed to me the hope that if it should prove impossible to achieve an oil settlement, the Government of the United States would nevertheless give sufficient economic and financial assistance to Iran to enable it to pass through its present economic crisis.

- Loy W. - Henderson + Loy W. + Henderson
-
+
213. Monthly Report Prepared in the Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence AgencySource: - Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 81–01061R, Box 1, Folder 5, Monthly + Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 81–01061R, Box 1, Folder 5, Monthly Report—May 1953—Country Summaries and Analyses. Top Secret. - Washington, undated. + Washington, undated.

IRAN

May 1953

A. General Developments

1. May was marked by relatively minor parliamentary skirmishes between - supporters and opponents of Mossadeq. The government’s base of support in the Majlis + supporters and opponents of Mossadeq. The government’s base of support in the Majlis is narrowing, but the opposition still lacks the unity of leadership and design to challenge Mossadeq’s authority effectively. While the Tudeh’s popular strength remains about @@ -32610,11 +27661,9 @@

2. There has been considerable speculation over the reasons for Secretary Dulles’ failure to visit - Iran on his recent Middle Eastern tour and for Ambassador Henderson’s return to the U.S. + Iran on his recent Middle Eastern tour and for Ambassador Henderson’s return to the U.S. Opposition attempts to describe these developments as manifestations of - U.S. dissatisfaction with Mossadeq are being vitiated by reports of a probable + U.S. dissatisfaction with Mossadeq are being vitiated by reports of a probable increase of Point IV aid in the near future.

3. [1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

B. Station Synopsis

@@ -32625,33 +27674,24 @@

Paramilitary Operations

[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

- John H. - Waller + John H. + Waller Chief, NE–4 (Iran)
-
+
214. Summary of Operational Plan - Nicosia, June 1, 1953. + Nicosia, June 1, 1953. [Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files, CSHP 208. Secret. 8 pages not declassified.]
-
- 215. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, general classified - records, Box 14. Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Stutesman. - Washington, June 2, +
+ 215. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, general classified + records, Box 14. Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Stutesman. + Washington, June 2, 1953. SUBJECT @@ -32659,10 +27699,8 @@ PARTICIPANTS - Mr. Norman Paul, DMS - Mr. Robert Black, DMS + Mr. Norman Paul, DMS + Mr. Robert Black, DMS Mr. Arthur L. Richards, GTI Mr. R. Bernard Crowl, @@ -32671,8 +27709,7 @@ Jr., GTI

At their request, Mr. Paul and Mr. - Black called on Mr. Richards following instructions from + Black called on Mr. Richards following instructions from Mr. Stassen to open conversations with the Department regarding increased economic aid to Iran.

@@ -32683,13 +27720,11 @@ was not practical to press for a solution of the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute at this time. They were of the opinion, however, that Iran’s agrarian economy should be kept afloat and that perhaps $15 or $20 - million should be added to the presently-proposed TCA and economic aid programs for Iran in + million should be added to the presently-proposed TCA and economic aid programs for Iran in FY 1954. The thought was that Iran’s essential foreign exchange requirements might be met in some degree in ways such as purchasing vehicles, spare parts, and similar commodity - items for Iran. The conversations between DMS and State should determine (1) a general level of the + items for Iran. The conversations between DMS and State should determine (1) a general level of the FY 1954 program, and (2) the kind of items necessary to include in the program.

Mr. Richards stated that he @@ -32697,8 +27732,7 @@ arrival on consultation this week to give rise to high-level policy discussions regarding Iran. He pointed out that it was still somewhat unclear whether our government policy was to endeavor to keep Iran’s - economy afloat even though Dr. Mosadeq’s government might thereby be strengthened. He + economy afloat even though Dr. Mosadeq’s government might thereby be strengthened. He pointed out that there was an influential body of opinion that any assistance to Iran beyond the present level could only serve to keep Mosadeq in power and remove @@ -32710,25 +27744,16 @@ presently-proposed levels of economic aid for Iran.

-
- 216. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, +
+ 216. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 7, TPAJAX Vol. I. Top Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Waller on June 8. - Washington, June 6, + Washington, June 6, 1953, 10:30–noon. PARTICIPANTS - General Cabell (DDCI); Ambassador Loy Henderson; Mr. Frank Wisner (DD/P); Mr. Kermit Roosevelt (CNEA); Mr. + General Cabell (DDCI); Ambassador Loy Henderson; Mr. Frank Wisner (DD/P); Mr. Kermit Roosevelt (CNEA); Mr. John Waller (CNEA/4) @@ -32739,23 +27764,13 @@ PURPOSE OF CONVERSATION - Briefing of Ambassador Henderson With Regard to Subject in Order to Solicit - His Views Prior to Mr. Roosevelt’s Forthcoming Discussions [less than 1 line not declassified] in + Briefing of Ambassador Henderson With Regard to Subject in Order to Solicit + His Views Prior to Mr. Roosevelt’s Forthcoming Discussions [less than 1 line not declassified] in London

Mr. Roosevelt reviewed the - preliminary operational plan which had been prepared by [cryptonym not declassified] officials and KUBARK representative [less than 1 line not declassified]. A summary of - the plan as presented by Mr. Roosevelt is hereto attached.Not found attached, but see Document 214. Ambassador Henderson interjected his views and + preliminary operational plan which had been prepared by [cryptonym not declassified] officials and KUBARK representative [less than 1 line not declassified]. A summary of + the plan as presented by Mr. Roosevelt is hereto attached.Not found attached, but see Document 214. Ambassador Henderson interjected his views and comments as Mr. Roosevelt described specific aspects of the plan. Significant remarks made by Ambassador Henderson during the @@ -32763,56 +27778,43 @@

1. With regard to the Plan’s basic premise that [cryptonym not declassified] will cooperate actively:

Ambassador Henderson stated - categorically that this premise was fallacious; that [cryptonym not declassified] could not be relied upon to give + categorically that this premise was fallacious; that [cryptonym not declassified] could not be relied upon to give the required backing to [cryptonym not declassified] when the time for action comes unless extreme pressure were exerted on [cryptonym not declassified]. The Ambassador suggested that such pressure might even have to take the form of an actual or implied threat that - ODYOKE and [cryptonym not declassified] would consider replacing [cryptonym not declassified] by one of his + ODYOKE and [cryptonym not declassified] would consider replacing [cryptonym not declassified] by one of his brothers if [cryptonym not declassified] did not take the leadership in removing [cryptonym not - declassified]. Ambassador Henderson added that we had ample evidence of [cryptonym not declassified] inherent weakness and + declassified]. Ambassador Henderson added that we had ample evidence of [cryptonym not declassified] inherent weakness and reluctance to play a strong role in Iran; and the time may have arrived when we should give serious consideration to his replacement. In this connection, Prince Abdul Reza, as possible successor to the throne, was discussed. The advisability of feeling out [cryptonym - not declassified] regarding the replacement of [cryptonym not + not declassified] regarding the replacement of [cryptonym not declassified] with the best available successor, was also discussed.

-

2. The Ambassador expressed concern that without [cryptonym not declassified] active and energetic cooperation +

2. The Ambassador expressed concern that without [cryptonym not declassified] active and energetic cooperation or possibly even with it the Iranian Army could not be relied upon to play the major role assigned it by the preliminary plan. The Ambassador repeatedly and forcefully made the point that it would be highly - advisable to enlist in some way the participation of the Amini brothers—(Brigadier General + advisable to enlist in some way the participation of the Amini brothers—(Brigadier General Mahmud Amini, Gendarmérie - Chief and possible future Chief of Staff; and Abul Ghassem Amini, Minister of Court) + Chief and possible future Chief of Staff; and Abul Ghassem Amini, Minister of Court) since the latter has a firm hold on the Army. In this connection, the Ambassador recalled his own reports from Tehran in which he described - approaches made to him by Minister of Court Amini [less than 1 line not + approaches made to him by Minister of Court Amini [less than 1 line not declassified].An apparent reference to Henderson’s meeting with Amini and Khosro Qashqai reported in Document 200. From this and from available intelligence reports, - the Ambassador felt that the Aminis [less than 1 line not - declassified] would be susceptible to an ODYOKE approach despite their alleged + the Ambassador felt that the Aminis [less than 1 line not + declassified] would be susceptible to an ODYOKE approach despite their alleged loyalty to [cryptonym not declassified]. Ambassador Henderson felt that - both the Aminis [cryptonym not declassified] were wavering in + both the Aminis [cryptonym not declassified] were wavering in their support of [cryptonym not declassified] and would break completely if it were politically advantageous for them to do so.

@@ -32821,19 +27823,14 @@

Ambassador Henderson stated that in a conversation with [cryptonym not declassified] just prior to departing from his post he had told - [cryptonym not declassified] that ODYOKE and [cryptonym - not declassified] were in agreement that [cryptonym not declassified] should not remain in office and - that both ODYOKE and [cryptonym not declassified] were supporting [cryptonym not declassified] solidly.

+ [cryptonym not declassified] that ODYOKE and [cryptonym + not declassified] were in agreement that [cryptonym not declassified] should not remain in office and + that both ODYOKE and [cryptonym not declassified] were supporting [cryptonym not declassified] solidly.

4. With regard to Stage 2 in acquiring [cryptonym not declassified] cooperation: Special U.S. representative to [cryptonym not declassified] (I–B–2):

A. Ambassador Henderson commented - that it would be extremely difficult for the special ODYOKE representative—whoever he may + that it would be extremely difficult for the special ODYOKE representative—whoever he may be—to gain an audience with [cryptonym not declassified] as required by the plan without others present.

@@ -32844,9 +27841,7 @@ head of the U.S. Military Mission to the Iranian Gendarmérie; Ambassador George Allen; Mr. George McGhee, former Assistant - Secretary of State; [name not declassified] and Mr. Kermit Roosevelt. No decisions were + Secretary of State; [name not declassified] and Mr. Kermit Roosevelt. No decisions were reached although General Schwartzkopf’s name was given most favorable consideration. Appropriate cover for General Schwartzkopf was also discussed and the suggestion was made that he might visit other Middle @@ -32861,15 +27856,13 @@ declassified]. He recalled specifically that he had advised against TCI’s $3,400,000 Village Council program but he added that it was too late now to stop this program - without risking possible serious retaliatory moves by [cryptonym not declassified].

+ without risking possible serious retaliatory moves by [cryptonym not declassified].

6. Stage 2: Statement to [cryptonym not declassified] that ODYOKE [cryptonym not declassified] financial aid would be forthcoming to a successor government (I/B/2–(f)):

Ambassador Henderson stated that - this was an extremely important point and that ODYOKE must be fully prepared to render + this was an extremely important point and that ODYOKE must be fully prepared to render such aid. He stated that ODACID should prepare itself immediately to make specific financial commitments although he pointed out that such commitments are difficult to make @@ -32879,18 +27872,13 @@ (d)):

Rather than request [cryptonym not declassified] to suggest the head of a successor government as called for in the - preliminary plan, Ambassador Henderson urged that the special ODYOKE representative to [cryptonym not declassified] should take the + preliminary plan, Ambassador Henderson urged that the special ODYOKE representative to [cryptonym not declassified] should take the initiative in stating that [cryptonym not declassified] ODYOKE desires [cryptonym not declassified]. Ambassador Henderson pointed out that otherwise [cryptonym not declassified] who - basically fears a strong Prime Minister such as [cryptonym not declassified] would name an individual like [cryptonym not declassified].

+ basically fears a strong Prime Minister such as [cryptonym not declassified] would name an individual like [cryptonym not declassified].

8. With regard to Stage 2: Statement to [cryptonym not declassified] that an acceptable oil settlement must ultimately be offered by a successor government (I–B–2(g)):

@@ -32899,16 +27887,14 @@ [cryptonym not declassified] prior to the advent of a new government and such terms must be at least as favorable as those heretofore presented by [cryptonym not - declassified]. Ambassador Henderson stated that [cryptonym not + declassified]. Ambassador Henderson stated that [cryptonym not declassified] is mainly motivated by financial considerations and might well seize the opportunity presented by [cryptonym not declassified] fall to present an oil settlement unfavorable to Iran.

9. With regard to Stage 2: Warning to [cryptonym not - declassified] not to discuss the approach by the special ODYOKE representative with + declassified] not to discuss the approach by the special ODYOKE representative with anyone.

Ambassador Henderson pointed out that [cryptonym not declassified] security is @@ -32924,8 +27910,7 @@ cooperated at all, would insist that [cryptonym not declassified] replace [cryptonym not declassified] by legal procedures. Specifically, not only would - the Majlis have to give a vote of censure or non-confidence to [cryptonym not declassified] but would have to + the Majlis have to give a vote of censure or non-confidence to [cryptonym not declassified] but would have to grant a vote of inclination to [cryptonym not declassified] before [cryptonym not declassified] would issue the royal firman naming him Prime @@ -32946,29 +27931,24 @@ that such statements should not be made by [cryptonym not declassified] or ODYOKE too quickly after the successor government takes over lest it reveal - ODYOKE/ [cryptonym not declassified] implication in the plot.

+ ODYOKE/ [cryptonym not declassified] implication in the plot.

13. With regard to relations with Tribes: Major problem is neutralization of [less than 1 line not declassified] (VIII–B).

Ambassador Henderson felt that [less than 1 line not declassified] who currently support [cryptonym not declassified] - would present a serious problem. He stated that the [less than 1 line not declassified] leaders, who are closely + would present a serious problem. He stated that the [less than 1 line not declassified] leaders, who are closely allied with the Amini brothers (Brigadier Amini, possible new - Chief of Staff and Minister of Court Amini) should be included somehow in the plan or + Chief of Staff and Minister of Court Amini) should be included somehow in the plan or otherwise bought off, so that they would contribute to the undermining of [cryptonym not declassified] rather than the - support of the latter. Ambassador Henderson pointed out that the [less + support of the latter. Ambassador Henderson pointed out that the [less than 1 line not declassified] were already wavering in their support of [cryptonym not declassified] and could probably be manoeuvered into the opposition ranks providing they felt - [cryptonym not declassified] cause was a lost one, and + [cryptonym not declassified] cause was a lost one, and if they stood to benefit politically by cooperation with the opposition.

14. With regard to Mechanics of Quasi-legal overthrow: @@ -32979,47 +27959,35 @@ that it would be inadvisable to attack [cryptonym not declassified] on the grounds of illegally printing money and to publicize the decreased backing of the Iranian currency caused thereby, - unless [cryptonym not declassified] ODYOKE were prepared to grant + unless [cryptonym not declassified] ODYOKE were prepared to grant considerable aid to the successor government.

- John H. - Waller + John H. + Waller Chief, NE–4 (Iran)
-
- 217. Memorandum Prepared by the Naval Attaché in Iran (Pollard)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, +
+ 217. Memorandum Prepared by the Naval Attaché in Iran (Pollard)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 7, TPAJAX. Top Secret; Security Information. On the covering sheet to this memorandum is a handwritten note, apparently from - Waller to [name not declassified], which reads: “A cable - went out to Station complaining that Pollard is crossing wires with us.” + Waller to [name not declassified], which reads: “A cable + went out to Station complaining that Pollard is crossing wires with us.” EN3–11/EF55 - Tehran, June 11, 1953. + Tehran, June 11, 1953.

I met Ardeshir at his request at 9:00 p.m. last night as arranged, and cleared through you yesterday. He had just left a meeting of the - opposition deputies which included Makki, Baghai, Mir Ashrafi, Mostafa Kashani and others.

+ opposition deputies which included Makki, Baghai, Mir Ashrafi, Mostafa Kashani and others.

The opposition is now concentrating on organizing the deputies in order that Kashani be re-elected as “Speaker” of the Majlis. He then stated that at this moment the - opposition is guaranteed of 42 votes for Kashani in these elections. I expressed surprise and + opposition is guaranteed of 42 votes for Kashani in these elections. I expressed surprise and Ardeshir explained that by law this election must be secret, and that by extensive campaign “methods” the opposition group, now openly led by Zahedi, had persuaded enough @@ -33027,8 +27995,7 @@ to make up a total of 42. These he said would be identified by distinguishing marks on their ballots so that it could be determined which deputy, if any, had failed to keep his bargain. This he said must - be kept strictly secret in order to avoid counter-action by Mossadegh, and by covert + be kept strictly secret in order to avoid counter-action by Mossadegh, and by covert methods available to the Soviet Embassy.

He requested that because of the extreme sensitivity of this that I retain it for my own information and not transmit it to the Embassy. I @@ -33042,15 +28009,12 @@ explained this by saying that until the election the opposition will conduct a concentrated campaign of propaganda through their new newspapers, and the present opposition newspapers, but would conduct - their campaign for votes for Kashani covertly. The deputies, in addition to the - opposition’s original 25, are only willing to vote for Kashani in a secret ballot, and if + their campaign for votes for Kashani covertly. The deputies, in addition to the + opposition’s original 25, are only willing to vote for Kashani in a secret ballot, and if not identified. This, at present, seems assured. The result, however, if Kashani is re-elected over the express opposition of Mossadegh, is close to a vote of no - confidence. The opposition feels that if Kashani’s reelection is followed by intense campaigning + confidence. The opposition feels that if Kashani’s reelection is followed by intense campaigning that many more deputies will be encouraged to come out openly for Zahedi, in a sort of “get on the band-wagon” movement. Indeed 42 votes for a candidate not favored by @@ -33060,10 +28024,8 @@

In addition, the opposition is attempting to change the political orientation of Ghashghai and Abol Amini. Previously both - of these characters were firmly behind Zahedi and it is felt that with the proper persuasion - that they can again become supporters of an opposition government. Ardeshir stated that one of the secret ballots in + of these characters were firmly behind Zahedi and it is felt that with the proper persuasion + that they can again become supporters of an opposition government. Ardeshir stated that one of the secret ballots in favor of Kashani would be that of Khosrow Ghashghai.

General Zahedi, in addition, feels @@ -33077,8 +28039,7 @@

Ardeshir is certain that most of the police officers in police headquarters will be replaced by Army officers. However, he stated that this would not be more than a nuisance as most of the Army officers - involved are great admirers of General Zahedi. That the present police leadership is at least + involved are great admirers of General Zahedi. That the present police leadership is at least secretly behind Zahedi can easily be proven. There are many examples of this—one of interest refers to the fact that Ardeshir is a @@ -33122,119 +28083,79 @@ in the Majlis which was practically handpicked by Mossadegh there were men who realized that his course led only to Communism and who had the courage in the face of serious intimidation to oppose him and that among - these men were the organizers of Mossadegh’s strength—Kashani, Makki, Baghai, etc.

+ these men were the organizers of Mossadegh’s strength—Kashani, Makki, Baghai, etc.

-

This is an objective report of the statements of Ardeshir Zahedi and there are no +

This is an objective report of the statements of Ardeshir Zahedi and there are no reflections of the opinions of the author contained in any of the various points enumerated above.

- Eric W. PollardPrinted from a copy with Pollard’s typed + Eric W. PollardPrinted from a copy with Pollard’s typed signature. Commander, U.S. Navy
-
+
218. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near - Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State - (Matthews)Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, - 888.2553/6–1553. Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Stutesman and Richards. Copies of the memorandum - were sent to Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Merchant, Assistant Secretary for + Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State + (Matthews)Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, + 888.2553/6–1553. Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Stutesman and Richards. Copies of the memorandum + were sent to Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Merchant, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs Waugh, and Robert Bowie, Chairman of the Policy Planning Staff. - Washington, June 15, 1953. + Washington, June 15, 1953. SUBJECT Need for Certain Policy Decisions on the Iranian Problem

There is some urgency that the Department’s position be clarified on several matters concerning Iran. Advantage may be taken of the presence - in the Department of Ambassador Loy Henderson from June 18 to about June 28 to obtain his + in the Department of Ambassador Loy Henderson from June 18 to about June 28 to obtain his views. Meetings will be set up of all interested persons after Ambassador Henderson arrives in Washington, but it is suggested that some preliminary thinking be done on the subjects listed below prior to his arrival:

-

(A) What reply, if any, is to be given Dr. Mosadeq’s request that President Eisenhower act as an arbitrator in the - oil dispute?See Document 199.

+

(A) What reply, if any, is to be given Dr. Mosadeq’s request that President Eisenhower act as an arbitrator in the + oil dispute?See Document 199.

It is GTI’s recommendation that no reply be given Dr. Mosadeq on this - matter, unless he raises the question again.To the left of this recommendation in the margin is the handwritten + matter, unless he raises the question again.To the left of this recommendation in the margin is the handwritten word “no.”

(B) What guidance should be given the prominent oil consultant, Mr. Walter Levy, who has - suggested that he send, as a private citizen, a suggestion to Dr. Mosadeq of a figure which would be a basis for a lump - sum settlement of the compensation question in the oil dispute?Walter + suggested that he send, as a private citizen, a suggestion to Dr. Mosadeq of a figure which would be a basis for a lump + sum settlement of the compensation question in the oil dispute?Walter Levy made the proposal in early May. (Memorandum from - Richards to Byroade, June 9, which is tab B to - another copy of the memorandum in National Archives, RG 59, GTI Files, Lot 57 D 155, Box 41)

+ Richards to Byroade, June 9, which is tab B to + another copy of the memorandum in National Archives, RG 59, GTI Files, Lot 57 D 155, Box 41)

It is GTI’s recommendation that the U.S. Government avoid any unwanted interference in the oil dispute, while at - the same time permitting Mr. Levy, as a private citizen, to request by letter Dr. + the same time permitting Mr. Levy, as a private citizen, to request by letter Dr. Mosadeq’s reaction to his - suggestion for an equitable lump sum settlement.To the left of paragraph B in the margin is the + suggestion for an equitable lump sum settlement.To the left of paragraph B in the margin is the handwritten word, “delay.”

(C) What reply should TCA make to the National Iranian Oil Company’s request to have 100 employees trained in the United States?According to a memorandum - from Richards to Byroade, June 8, TCI had been requested by the NIOC to accept 100 NIOC employees into the United States + from Richards to Byroade, June 8, TCI had been requested by the NIOC to accept 100 NIOC employees into the United States for “advance training in mechanical, electrical, and chemical - engineering, and in petroleum technology and accountancy.” Henderson recommended that the + engineering, and in petroleum technology and accountancy.” Henderson recommended that the request be met because it accorded with the overall objectives of - technical assistance to Iran. Ambassador Aldrich in London, on the other + technical assistance to Iran. Ambassador Aldrich in London, on the other hand, warned that “any move by the United States to facilitate - training of individuals on behalf of the NIOC would be interpreted in London as United States + training of individuals on behalf of the NIOC would be interpreted in London as United States Government approval of, or at least acquiescence in, Iran’s oil policy.” (National Archives, RG 59, GTI Files, Lot 57 D 155, Box 41)

-

It is GTI’s recommendation that TCA be informed that there is no policy - objection to acceptance of the Iranian request.To the left of this sentence in the margin is the +

It is GTI’s recommendation that TCA be informed that there is no policy + objection to acceptance of the Iranian request.To the left of this sentence in the margin is the handwritten word “Delay.”

-

(D) What reply should President Eisenhower make to Dr. Mosadeq’s letter of May 28 requesting increased U.S. aid - to Iran?The text of Mosadeq’s letter, May 28, is in +

(D) What reply should President Eisenhower make to Dr. Mosadeq’s letter of May 28 requesting increased U.S. aid + to Iran?The text of Mosadeq’s letter, May 28, is in Eisenhower Library, Ann - Whitman File, Box 32, Iran 1953–59(9). In a memorandum to Dulles on June 5, Byroade described the three + Whitman File, Box 32, Iran 1953–59(9). In a memorandum to Dulles on June 5, Byroade described the three principal points of the letter as: “(1) A recitation of the difficulties experienced by Iran, allegedly as a result of British attitudes and activities. (2) An expression of grave concern over @@ -33244,28 +28165,20 @@ (b) increased economic aid from the United States. (3) An urgent appeal to the U.S. for increased aid ‘if the American Government is not able to effect a removal’ of the obstacles to the sale of - Iranian oil.” The full text of Byroade’s memorandum is in Foreign + Iranian oil.” The full text of Byroade’s memorandum is in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, p. 732 (Document 330).

It is GTI’s recommendation that the President inform Dr. Mosadeq that - the present level of economic aid to Iran will be increased in FY 1954.To the + the present level of economic aid to Iran will be increased in FY 1954.To the left of this sentence in the margin is the handwritten word “no.”

-

(E) What reply will be made to Mr. Stassen who has instructed DMS to open conversations with the Department on the basis +

(E) What reply will be made to Mr. Stassen who has instructed DMS to open conversations with the Department on the basis of his understanding that U.S. economic aid to Iran is to be increased by approximately $15,000,000 in FY 1954?

-

It is GTI’s recommendation that DMS be informed that we consider U.S. - policy objectives would be furthered through an increase in economic aid to Iran in FY 1954 and that we will welcome an +

It is GTI’s recommendation that DMS be informed that we consider U.S. + policy objectives would be furthered through an increase in economic aid to Iran in FY 1954 and that we will welcome an opportunity to discuss the level and nature of such a program.

In addition to the foregoing problems which require urgent decision, there are the following questions which might also receive attention @@ -33285,17 +28198,14 @@ extending the loan to Iran. “The policy considerations mentioned above have been essentially that the aid proposed would strengthen the Mosadeq Government and - would reduce some pressure upon Mosadeq to come to a settlement of the oil dispute. + would reduce some pressure upon Mosadeq to come to a settlement of the oil dispute. On the other hand, the aid will restore some Iranian confidence in American promises and will materially assist in preventing the - collapse of Iran’s agricultural economy.” Richards therefore recommended + collapse of Iran’s agricultural economy.” Richards therefore recommended “that the Export-Import Bank be informed that there is no policy objection to their loaning $25,000,000 to Iran for road building and agricultural machinery if the Bank desires to go ahead with it.” - (National Archives, RG 59, GTI Files, Lot 57 D 155, Box + (National Archives, RG 59, GTI Files, Lot 57 D 155, Box 41)

It is GTI’s recommendation that the Export-Import Bank be informed that we consider U.S. policy objectives @@ -33306,43 +28216,29 @@

(G) What funds can the U.S. Government use to subsidize an American airline in affiliation with Iranian Airways, which is at present bankrupt and in great danger of falling under the control of persons - favorably inclined toward the Soviet Union?In a memorandum to Byroade, June 11, Richards discussed assisting Transocean Airlines to + favorably inclined toward the Soviet Union?In a memorandum to Byroade, June 11, Richards discussed assisting Transocean Airlines to reach an “affiliation agreement” with Iranian Airways in order to keep Iranian Airways from “falling under control of persons - favorably inclined toward the USSR.” According to Richards, the President of Transocean Airlines - expected “some financial support from the US Government in order to carry out his proposal.” + favorably inclined toward the USSR.” According to Richards, the President of Transocean Airlines + expected “some financial support from the US Government in order to carry out his proposal.” Richards recommended - that the U.S. Government provide assistance through the TCI program. (National Archives, - RG 59, GTI Files, Lot 57 D 155, Box 41)

+ that the U.S. Government provide assistance through the TCI program. (National Archives, + RG 59, GTI Files, Lot 57 D 155, Box 41)

It is GTI’s recommendation that a policy decision be taken that it is in the U.S. national interest to subsidize a U.S. airline in affiliation with Iranian Airways (Transocean Airlines has already made the agreement but will need assurances of financial support this month) in order to prevent communist entry into Middle East airlines and to support the Iranian economy without directly - strengthening Dr. Mosadeq.To the left of this paragraph in the margin + strengthening Dr. Mosadeq.To the left of this paragraph in the margin is the handwritten word “Yes.”

(H) What action, if any, should the U.S. Government take to increase - Iran’s diplomatic and commercial relations with West Germany?In a memorandum to Byroade, June 11, Richards explained that Iran–West + Iran’s diplomatic and commercial relations with West Germany?In a memorandum to Byroade, June 11, Richards explained that Iran–West German trade had increased in the last year despite the oil dispute with Great Britain. “This trade not only strengthens Iran’s ties with non-communist areas but siphons off trade which might otherwise - go towards the communist bloc.” (National Archives, RG 59, GTI Files, Lot 57 D 155, Box 41)

+ go towards the communist bloc.” (National Archives, RG 59, GTI Files, Lot 57 D 155, Box 41)

It is GTI’s recommendation that the Bonn Government be encouraged to establish diplomatic and commercial offices in Iran?To the left of this paragraph in @@ -33362,11 +28258,9 @@ of military aid presently being given. These and other ideas for broadening the objectives of US military aid to Iran can be studied in Washington, if the policy - decision is made that it is in the US interest to work towards a restoration of the + decision is made that it is in the US interest to work towards a restoration of the Iranian Army’s political position in Iran.” (National Archives, - RG 59, GTI Files, Lot 57 D 155, Box 41)

+ RG 59, GTI Files, Lot 57 D 155, Box 41)

It is GTI’s recommendation that the present objectives of our military aid program in Iran, aiming at technical standards of equipment and training for the Iranian army, @@ -33374,39 +28268,29 @@ political importance of Iran’s armed forces and their position in the national economy.To the left of this paragraph in the margin is the handwritten word “Yes.” In a - memorandum to Acting Near East and Africa Division Chief [name not declassified] of the Directorate of + memorandum to Acting Near East and Africa Division Chief [name not declassified] of the Directorate of Plans, June 12, Waller - commented on the above questions and recommendations made by GTI. He grouped questions A through E + commented on the above questions and recommendations made by GTI. He grouped questions A through E as “part A,” and questions F through I as “part B.” After reviewing GTI’s recommendations in part A, recommen-dations, he wrote, that “if accepted, would reverse - American policy toward Mossadeq as stated by Under Secretary of State - Smith,” Waller also warned that the - recommendations “would prolong Mossadeq’s tenure of office. Furthermore, latter + American policy toward Mossadeq as stated by Under Secretary of State + Smith,” Waller also warned that the + recommendations “would prolong Mossadeq’s tenure of office. Furthermore, latter recommendations would make Project TPAJAX inoperable but also inconsistent with national policy.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 7, TPAJAX Vol. I)

-
- 219. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 219. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/6–1953. Confidential; Security Information; Priority. Also sent to London. Received at 8:53 a.m. - Tehran, June 19, 1953, + Tehran, June 19, 1953, noon. -

4684. Last night Dr. Gholam Mosadeq, son Prime Minister, told First Secretary +

4684. Last night Dr. Gholam Mosadeq, son Prime Minister, told First Secretary Melbourne that week ago his father had received confirmatory evidence that large sum of money, some 400,000 rials, was being expended by opposition elements led by @@ -33414,8 +28298,7 @@ used to establish group new opposition newspapers and for other activities. Government had traced source of funds to Shah and court circles thus giving Prime Minister impression Shah’s duplicity. Shah - while asserting his full support for Mosadeq and non-involvement in politics by prolonging + while asserting his full support for Mosadeq and non-involvement in politics by prolonging his stay in Rmamsar, was in actuality subsidizing opposition.

Government taking steps counter such opposition moves and had already arrested one Abdol Eqbal (otherwise unidentifiable, no (repeat no) @@ -33424,10 +28307,8 @@ was accumulating concerning others. Likewise in Isfahan area Askar Masud, son Sarem-E-Dowleh, who considered by government as British agent, had been arrested for alleged complicity in Bakhtiari tribal - agitation sponsored by Abol Qasom Bakhtiar. Mosadeq - claimed to have seen numerous letters between them. Mosadeq asserted that + agitation sponsored by Abol Qasom Bakhtiar. Mosadeq + claimed to have seen numerous letters between them. Mosadeq asserted that government-sponsored demonstration today, June 19, was designed counteract opposition propaganda typified by “unrepresentative” activity in Majlis and press and to give public, which was ardent supporter Prime @@ -33436,24 +28317,15 @@ (repeat no) intention permit Tudeh adherents organize separate demonstrations or to allow any acts violence.

- Mattison + Mattison
-
- 220. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 888.2553/6–1953. - Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Stutesman on June 20 and approved - by Jernegan and Richards. - Washington, June 19, 1953, 4 p.m. +
+ 220. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 888.2553/6–1953. + Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Stutesman on June 20 and approved + by Jernegan and Richards. + Washington, June 19, 1953, 4 p.m. SUBJECT Certain Decisions on the Iranian Problem @@ -33461,57 +28333,40 @@ PARTICIPANTS G—Mr. Matthews - S/P—Mr. Bowie + S/P—Mr. Bowie E—Messrs. Waugh and Schaetzel - BNA—Mr. Raynor - NEA—Mr. Jernegan - Ambassador Henderson - GTI—Messrs. Richards and Stutesman + BNA—Mr. Raynor + NEA—Mr. Jernegan + Ambassador Henderson + GTI—Messrs. Richards and Stutesman -

At 4:00 p.m. June 19, the above noted persons gathered in Mr. Matthews’ office to discuss a +

At 4:00 p.m. June 19, the above noted persons gathered in Mr. Matthews’ office to discuss a memorandum from Mr. Jernegan to - Mr. Matthews dated June 15,Document + Mr. Matthews dated June 15,Document 218. listing nine problems related to Iran which required consideration in order to clarify the Department’s position.

Mr. Jernegan opened the discussion by stating that these problems should be viewed in the light - of three alternative approaches: 1) an assumption that Mosadeq is going to stay in power; 2) + of three alternative approaches: 1) an assumption that Mosadeq is going to stay in power; 2) an assumption that it is not to the advantage of the U.S. to take any - measures which would assist Mosadeq to remain in power; 3) an assumption that the + measures which would assist Mosadeq to remain in power; 3) an assumption that the situation in Iran has changed drastically and a non-communist successor to Mosadeq has arisen. The - problems raised in Mr. Jernegan’s memorandum of June 15 were then studied in + problems raised in Mr. Jernegan’s memorandum of June 15 were then studied in order.

-

A) What reply, if any, is to be given Dr. Mosadeq’s request that President Eisenhower act as an arbitrator in the +

A) What reply, if any, is to be given Dr. Mosadeq’s request that President Eisenhower act as an arbitrator in the oil dispute?

-

It was agreed that no reply should be given Dr. Mosadeq on this matter, unless he +

It was agreed that no reply should be given Dr. Mosadeq on this matter, unless he raises the question again.

B) What guidance should be given Walter Levy who has suggested that he send, as a private - citizen, a suggestion to Dr. Mosadeq of a figure which would be a basis for a lump + citizen, a suggestion to Dr. Mosadeq of a figure which would be a basis for a lump sum settlement of the compensation question in the oil dispute?

It was agreed that the U.S. Government would avoid any unwanted - interference in the oil dispute and would urge Mr. Levy, at least for the present, to - postpone any trip to Iran or communication with Dr. Mosadeq on the subject of a lump sum + interference in the oil dispute and would urge Mr. Levy, at least for the present, to + postpone any trip to Iran or communication with Dr. Mosadeq on the subject of a lump sum settlement.

C) What reply should TCA make to the @@ -33520,9 +28375,7 @@

It was agreed that no reply should be given the Iranians on this matter for the present. If they press us for a reply, however, they may be informed that we have the matter under study.

-

D) What reply should President Eisenhower make to Dr. Mosadeq’s letter of May 28 requesting increased U.S. aid +

D) What reply should President Eisenhower make to Dr. Mosadeq’s letter of May 28 requesting increased U.S. aid to Iran?

It was agreed that a reply should be drafted for the President to send Dr. Mosadeq politely refusing his @@ -33530,32 +28383,24 @@ in case at some later date we might wish to make budgetary and economic aid available to an Iranian Government.

In the discussion of this matter it was agreed that it would be - unfortunate at this time to give Mosadeq any ammunition which would strengthen his - political position. In view of the unlikelihood that Mosadeq will ever come to a reasonable + unfortunate at this time to give Mosadeq any ammunition which would strengthen his + political position. In view of the unlikelihood that Mosadeq will ever come to a reasonable settlement of the oil dispute with the British, it seems that keeping Mosadeq afloat will serve only to perpetuate the present frustrating situation. Ambassador Henderson stated that the - chances of getting a successor better than Mosadeq are better now than the chances of getting + chances of getting a successor better than Mosadeq are better now than the chances of getting someone worse. However he emphasized most firmly that we must be - prepared to give any non-communist successor to Mosadeq immediate budgetary and + prepared to give any non-communist successor to Mosadeq immediate budgetary and economic support in substantial quantities. Without that, we would surely lose Iran.

-

E) What reply will be made to Mr. Stassen who has instructed DMS to open conversations with the Department on the basis +

E) What reply will be made to Mr. Stassen who has instructed DMS to open conversations with the Department on the basis of his understanding that U.S. economic aid to Iran is to be increased by approximately $15,000,000 in FY ’54?

-

It was agreed that confidential conversations could be held with DMS to prepare a position, on a +

It was agreed that confidential conversations could be held with DMS to prepare a position, on a contingency basis, to give budgetary and economic support to a - non-communist successor to Mosadeq if one should arise.

+ non-communist successor to Mosadeq if one should arise.

F) Should the Department remove policy objections to the Export-Import Bank’s consideration of a $25,000,000 loan to Iran for agricultural and road-building machinery?

@@ -33566,27 +28411,23 @@

It was agreed that it is in our national interest to support the affiliation of an American airline with Iranian Airways and that we may so inform Mr. Nelson, President - of Transocean Airlines who is interested in making such an arrangement. However, it was + of Transocean Airlines who is interested in making such an arrangement. However, it was agreed that he should be asked not to consummate any agreement for the moment.

As to the source of funds to subsidize Transocean Airlines affiliation - with Iranian Airways, Mr. Matthews stated that efforts to find such funds could be + with Iranian Airways, Mr. Matthews stated that efforts to find such funds could be made on the basis that it is the Department’s position that it is in our national interest to make such a subsidization and other agencies of the Government can be so informed.

H) What action, if any, should the U.S. Government take to increase Iran’s diplomatic and commercial relations with West Germany?

-

It was agreed, barring some objection by GER, that the Bonn Government should be encouraged to +

It was agreed, barring some objection by GER, that the Bonn Government should be encouraged to establish diplomatic and commercial offices in Iran.

I) Should efforts be made to strengthen Iran’s military establishment with the objective of increasing its political importance and position in the national economy?

It was agreed that, so long as there would be no substantial increase in - the cost of military aid to Iran, we could request the views of DMS, Defense, and the Embassy and Military + the cost of military aid to Iran, we could request the views of DMS, Defense, and the Embassy and Military Missions in Iran upon measures which might be taken to broaden present objectives for our military aid program in Iran, probably involving some increased flexibility in the types of aid and expenditures presently @@ -33596,52 +28437,36 @@ memorandum of June 15.

Should MSA purchase asphalt from Iran at a 50% discount from prevailing market prices for use in Indo-China?

-

It was agreed that under present circumstances MSA should not make such purchases.

+

It was agreed that under present circumstances MSA should not make such purchases.

-
+
221. Draft Operational Plan - undated. + undated. [Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files, CSHP 208. Secret. 29 pages not declassified.]
-
+
222. Memorandum From the Chief of the Iran Branch, Near East and Africa Division (Waller) to the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans, - Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt) - Washington, June 24, 1953. + Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt) + Washington, June 24, 1953. [Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 7, TPAJAX Vol. I. Top Secret. 3 pages not declassified.]
-
+
223. Memorandum Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African AffairsSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 7, TPAJAX Vol. I. Top Secret; - Security Information. Drafted by Richards on June 25. Printed from an uninitialed + Security Information. Drafted by Richards on June 25. Printed from an uninitialed copy. - Washington, undated. -

Preliminary to any joint US–UK move to inspire the Iranians to replace + Washington, undated. +

Preliminary to any joint US–UK move to inspire the Iranians to replace Mosadeq, there should be prior understanding with the British that:

1. Our common primary objective is to encourage the establishment of a @@ -33674,43 +28499,34 @@ sales of oil and oil products.

(e) Dispose of the problem of compensation within the framework of the Nine-Point Law and on a basis which would show that Iran is not being - saddled with excessive indebtedness to the AIOC.

+ saddled with excessive indebtedness to the AIOC.

5. No commercial concessions or special political privileges should be asked of Iran.

-

6. While the US agrees with the UK that it would be desirable for the +

6. While the US agrees with the UK that it would be desirable for the amount of compensation to be determined by impartial international arbitration or adjudication, other methods of determination (or possibly even a moratorium) should not be excluded on principle.

7. Recognizing that the economic and political stability of Iran is to a large degree dependent on the revival of its chief industry, both the - US and the UK will take appropriate steps to encourage and facilitate + US and the UK will take appropriate steps to encourage and facilitate the resumption of large-scale exports of Iranian oil.

-
- 224. Notes on the Remarks of the Ambassador to Iran (Henderson) to the National Security +
+ 224. Notes on the Remarks of the Ambassador to Iran (Henderson) to the National Security Council Planning BoardSource: Eisenhower Library, Special Staff File, Box 4. Top Secret; Security Information. There is no drafting information on the notes. - Washington, June 25, 1953. + Washington, June 25, 1953.

In March 1952 we didn’t see how the Mossadegh Government could last out the summer. It had great financial problems. It apparently could not expand its currency and it was without the heavy revenues from oil. As a - matter of fact, the government did fall in July and Qavam became Prime Minister. But the + matter of fact, the government did fall in July and Qavam became Prime Minister. But the Shah did not back Qavam and the mobs forced him out in two days. The Shah apparently withheld his support because he hoped for a leader better from his point of view than either Mossadegh or Qavam. - Mossadegh came back to power and was very much stronger than before. He was granted full powers for + Mossadegh came back to power and was very much stronger than before. He was granted full powers for six months by the Majlis, the legislative assembly. Mossadegh, in order to finance the government, started issuing currency. We estimate that so far he has issued about 3,500,000 rials.

@@ -33718,9 +28534,7 @@ the Planning Board last November, I was hopeful that an oil agreement would be achieved which would preserve the basic existing principles of international commercial intercourse.An - apparent reference to Henderson’s participation in the NSC Senior Staff meeting of December + apparent reference to Henderson’s participation in the NSC Senior Staff meeting of December 6, 1952. See Document 150. The U.S. favored a lump-sum settlement which would not detail reasons, to avoid the argument of whether compensation should be made for loss of future @@ -33728,8 +28542,7 @@ hope, but then he and his three advisers, all of whom are unfriendly to the West and very nationalistic, considered the plan and rejected it. They offered counter-proposals. On February 20 we presented the most - liberal proposal so far. On March 20 it was rejected.In telegram 3296 from Tehran, February 20, + liberal proposal so far. On March 20 it was rejected.In telegram 3296 from Tehran, February 20, Henderson reported on Mosadeq’s reaction to the Anglo-American joint proposals for settlement of the oil dispute @@ -33737,16 +28550,14 @@ proposals in general he said he was afraid he would have to reject them primarily because of terms reference; nevertheless he did not (rpt not) wish do so without - discussion with his advisers.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, + discussion with his advisers.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 888.2553/2–2053) Despatch 780 from Tehran, March 24, contains the text of Mosadeq’s radio address of March 20 discussing the oil dispute and the reasons for his rejection of the February 20 proposals. (Ibid, 888.2553/3–2453) See also Document 157.

Mossadegh did not listen to the other political leaders in Iran, and this - alienated them, including Kashani. Mossadegh came to believe that the Shah was + alienated them, including Kashani. Mossadegh came to believe that the Shah was backing these oppositional elements. In January, therefore, he began making demands on the Shah. First, he demanded that the Shah give up his role as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Secondly, he attacked @@ -33759,8 +28570,7 @@ the name of the nation rather than in the name of the Crown. Thirdly, he demanded that certain religious shrines in the custody of the Shah, from which considerable funds are derived, be turned over to an appointee of - the Prime Minister. A man named Ala is one of our best friends in Iran. He was at one + the Prime Minister. A man named Ala is one of our best friends in Iran. He was at one time the Iranian Ambassador to the U.S. and for many years Court Minister (adviser to the Shah), but has now been forced out of power. This man advised the Shah not to give way to Mossadegh’s demands. The @@ -33784,8 +28594,7 @@ transferring the powers of the Shah to him. It still has not been acted upon.

An important time for Iran is near. Next month a new president of the - Majlis is due to be elected. The incumbent president, Kashani, is opposed by Mossadegh. + Majlis is due to be elected. The incumbent president, Kashani, is opposed by Mossadegh. Having only 30 votes out of 80 in the Majlis, Mossadegh’s National Front is going to prevent a quorum by absenting themselves.

I saw Premier Mossadegh the day I left and was asked for U.S. aid. This @@ -33804,40 +28613,29 @@ pressure from the Tudeh Party.

It is my opinion that there is no hope of settling the oil problem so long as Mossadegh is in power.

-

[This concluded the statement by Mr. Henderson.]Brackets in the +

[This concluded the statement by Mr. Henderson.]Brackets in the original.

-
+
225. Editorial Note

Kermit Roosevelt’s memoir of Operation TPAJAX, Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran, opens with an account of a high-level meeting - at the State Department on June 25, 1953. At this meeting, Roosevelt wrote that he gave a - presentation based on the “London Draft” plan of June 19 (see Document 221) to Secretary of State Dulles, Secretary of Defense Wilson, Director of Central + at the State Department on June 25, 1953. At this meeting, Roosevelt wrote that he gave a + presentation based on the “London Draft” plan of June 19 (see Document 221) to Secretary of State Dulles, Secretary of Defense Wilson, Director of Central Intelligence Dulles, Under Secretary Smith, Deputy Under - Secretaries Murphy and Matthews, Director of the Policy + Secretaries Murphy and Matthews, Director of the Policy Planning Staff Bowie, Assistant Secretary Byroade, and Ambassador Henderson. It was at - this meeting, according to Roosevelt, that he obtained high-level approval for the + this meeting, according to Roosevelt, that he obtained high-level approval for the operation. No official record of this meeting has been found. Neither the classified study of TPAJAX by Donald - Wilber, Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran (CSHP 208), + Wilber, Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran (CSHP 208), nor the Claude H. Corrigan study, The Battle for - Iran (MISC–16), mentions such a meeting, although the Wilber study does mention that the + Iran (MISC–16), mentions such a meeting, although the Wilber study does mention that the above-named individuals were aware that an operational plan was in progress. A chronology entitled “Significant Dates in Implementation TPAJAX Project,” signed by Waller @@ -33851,38 +28649,28 @@ Waller, indicates that the “DCI also obtained approval of President” on July 11. No written authorization from the President has - been found. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 12, Misc. + been found. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 12, Misc. Correspondence—TPAJAX) See also Document 232.

-
+
226. Editorial Note

In a letter to Sir James Bowker - of the British Foreign Office, June 26, 1953, Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador to - the United States, described his conversation with Ambassador Henderson on June 25 in Washington. + of the British Foreign Office, June 26, 1953, Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador to + the United States, described his conversation with Ambassador Henderson on June 25 in Washington. Henderson said that he had - concluded that one could not deal with Mosadeq and added that only the emergency powers + concluded that one could not deal with Mosadeq and added that only the emergency powers accorded Mossadeq after the July - 1952 political crisis had enabled him to survive. Makins and Henderson then discussed alternatives + 1952 political crisis had enabled him to survive. Makins and Henderson then discussed alternatives to Mosadeq. This section of Makins’ letter reads as follows:

-

“An alternative solution might be found through the Amini brothers who, he said, were +

“An alternative solution might be found through the Amini brothers who, he said, were growing rapidly in authority and ambition. He personally did not trust the brother who was Minister of Court. The brothers were trying to work in both with the Shah and Mussadeq. They were in touch through Qashquais - [sic] with Kazemi. Henderson thought they would not + [sic] with Kazemi. Henderson thought they would not hesitate to doublecross both the Shah and Mussadeq.

“Asked what the Aminis might do, Henderson tentatively @@ -33890,34 +28678,25 @@ place the young son of the Shah’s third brother who, I understand, is the only member of the family with Kajar blood in him. They would then set up a regency and hope to enjoy power for many years until the boy - grew up, when they could decide what to do with him. Henderson repeated that he did not - like this solution very much owing to his distrust of the Amini. While the brothers were at + grew up, when they could decide what to do with him. Henderson repeated that he did not + like this solution very much owing to his distrust of the Amini. While the brothers were at present pretending to be on the Western side, he thought the family were just as likely to doublecross us as the Shah and Mussadeq.” The full text of this letter is in the British National Archives, Files of the Ministry of Fuel and Power, POWE 33/2087.

-
- 227. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, +
+ 227. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 7, TPAJAX Vol. I. Top Secret; Security Information. - Washington, June 26, + Washington, June 26, 1953.

Memorandum of Conversation BetweenBrigadier General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Administrative Director, Department of Law and Public Safety for the State of New Jersey, and Mr. John H. Waller, CNEA/4

-

I. Without revealing any specifics of TPAJAX, Mr. Waller outlined to General Schwarzkopf latter’s proposed role +

I. Without revealing any specifics of TPAJAX, Mr. Waller outlined to General Schwarzkopf latter’s proposed role with [cryptonym not declassified].

II. General Schwarzkopf indicated complete willingness to cooperate in any way with the U.S. Government. @@ -33927,8 +28706,7 @@

A. That he be fully briefed on the political situation and the specific plan of which he is a part.

-

B. That he be allowed to represent himself notionally to [cryptonym not declassified] as Major General +

B. That he be allowed to represent himself notionally to [cryptonym not declassified] as Major General instead of his actual rank of Brigadier General. He explained that this request was motivated by prestige reasons and explained that the Iranians, including [cryptonym not declassified], @@ -33936,8 +28714,7 @@ degree of importance to this point.

C. That he be allowed to offer some explanation of his trip to Governor Driscoll of New Jersey and the Attorney General for the State of New - Jersey for whom he presently works. At Mr. Waller’s request, he promised to say nothing at this + Jersey for whom he presently works. At Mr. Waller’s request, he promised to say nothing at this time to either of the above officials but wanted to give them as much advance notice as possible before his departure.

III. [1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]

@@ -33949,59 +28726,43 @@

IV. General Schwarzkopf was amenable to either of the above suggestions or a combination of both. He had no alternative suggestions to make at this time.

-

Drafting Officer’s Note: Since General Schwarzkopf must make some explanation +

Drafting Officer’s Note: Since General Schwarzkopf must make some explanation to Governor Driscoll and the Attorney General for New Jersey, suggestion (A) above would appear preferable because sales representative cover, which ostensibly represents private enterprise, would make it more - difficult for General Schwarzkopf to justify an absence from work.

+ difficult for General Schwarzkopf to justify an absence from work.

V. General Schwarzkopf wanted KUBARK to know the following as it might have a bearing on his mission:

A. Prior to General Schwarzkopf’s - departure, then Chief of Staff Razmara, who was jealous of General Schwarzkopf’s command power over the + departure, then Chief of Staff Razmara, who was jealous of General Schwarzkopf’s command power over the Persian Gendarmérie and who desired that the Gendarmérie be largely - absorbed by the Army, to some degree poisoned [cryptonym not declassified] mind against General Schwarzkopf. The result of this was + absorbed by the Army, to some degree poisoned [cryptonym not declassified] mind against General Schwarzkopf. The result of this was that General Schwarzkopf’s relations with [cryptonym not declassified] were slightly strained at the time of former’s departure. Furthermore, while [cryptonym not declassified] was visiting the - U.S. in 1949, General Schwarzkopf attempted to see him but was unsuccessful. - This could be attributed to the tight schedule which [cryptonym not declassified] was maintaining, but could also possibly represent - coolness toward General Schwarzkopf.

+ U.S. in 1949, General Schwarzkopf attempted to see him but was unsuccessful. + This could be attributed to the tight schedule which [cryptonym not declassified] was maintaining, but could also possibly represent + coolness toward General Schwarzkopf.

- John H. - Waller + John H. + Waller
-
+
228. Letter From the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, - Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt) to the Chief of Station in - Iran ([name not declassified])Source: Central Intelligence Agency, + Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt) to the Chief of Station in + Iran ([name not declassified])Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box - 3, Folder 7, TPAJAX Vol. I. Secret. Sent by air as [text not declassified] on June + 3, Folder 7, TPAJAX Vol. I. Secret. Sent by air as [text not declassified] on June 29. [text not declassified] 804 - Washington, June 29, 1953. + Washington, June 29, 1953. Dear [name not declassified], @@ -34012,8 +28773,7 @@ declassified] will agree to this.

It seems to me that I should arrive at about the same time that RoachIn the margin next to the word - “Roach” is handwritten: “Schwarzkopf.” does, since the course of his + “Roach” is handwritten: “Schwarzkopf.” does, since the course of his conversation with [cryptonym not declassified] is likely to present us with the necessity for making most crucial decisions. There should be time to consult headquarters about such @@ -34025,21 +28785,17 @@ on this.)

I have been giving considerable thought to the ways in which my visit might be handled and I would very much appreciate any views that you and - others would care to offer. Perhaps you could send me a note [less than 1 line not declassified] giving any + others would care to offer. Perhaps you could send me a note [less than 1 line not declassified] giving any suggestions that you have. I will of course keep you fully informed on the timing of my movements.

It seems to me that we must decide at the beginning whether we are going to try to keep the visit more or less secret or, if that is considered to be a hopeless undertaking, whether we should not aim for the casual - note from the very beginning. If the latter course is to be followed, I do not think that I - should start out by staying with KUCLUB personnel in the Compound. I should think it might + note from the very beginning. If the latter course is to be followed, I do not think that I + should start out by staying with KUCLUB personnel in the Compound. I should think it might be more logical for me to spend a little while visiting someone in Shimran and then perhaps move down to the Compound as a matter of - convenience. I quite agree that I should not stay [less than 1 line not declassified]. I think it would be better + convenience. I quite agree that I should not stay [less than 1 line not declassified]. I think it would be better if I did not stay in any one place too long and as long as I have only casual infrequent meetings with other than station personnel, there would be no reason for any one person to realize the length of my stay. @@ -34051,8 +28807,7 @@ work out something that can make my stay relatively inconspicuous.

I believe that there is a slight and so far unacknowledged difference of opinion as to whether or not I am to be in direct contact with any - principals during my visit. The request from [cryptonym not declassified] that I be made available for this + principals during my visit. The request from [cryptonym not declassified] that I be made available for this assignment mentioned the desirability of having someone on the spot who could stiffen any characters who begin to waiver at the last minute. My own feeling and that of Ascham is that I should not see any of the @@ -34071,43 +28826,31 @@ that if we could arrange for [less than 1 line not declassified] to be away during the days of decision, it would be most helpful. During our discussions [less than 1 - line not declassified] we had not anticipated that [less than 1 line not declassified] would be + line not declassified] we had not anticipated that [less than 1 line not declassified] would be present and I must admit that [less than 1 line not declassified] return came as an unexpected blow to me. We - should also be giving some advance thought to [cryptonym not declassified] further travels. [2½ lines not declassified]

+ should also be giving some advance thought to [cryptonym not declassified] further travels. [2½ lines not declassified]

With best regards,

- Kermit - RooseveltPrinted from a + Kermit + RooseveltPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
-
- 229. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to the Administrative Director - of the Department of Law and Public Safety in New Jersey (Schwarzkopf)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, +
+ 229. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to the Administrative Director + of the Department of Law and Public Safety in New Jersey (Schwarzkopf)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 12, Misc. Correspondence—TPAJAX. Personal and - Confidential. Drafted by Waller. - Washington, June 30, 1953. + Confidential. Drafted by Waller. + Washington, June 30, 1953. - Dear General Schwarzkopf: + Dear General Schwarzkopf:

Mr. Waller has filled me in fully on his meeting with you. I wish to express my sincere gratitude for your - willingness to cooperate.See Document 227. Individuals such as + willingness to cooperate.See Document 227. Individuals such as yourself who have long records of achievement and devotion to the national service are those to whom we thankfully turn in time of need.

@@ -34120,25 +28863,19 @@ security.

Sincerely yours, - Allen W. DullesPrinted from a copy - that bears this typed signature. + Allen W. DullesPrinted from a copy + that bears this typed signature.
-
- 230. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in IranSource: National Archives, +
+ 230. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in IranSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, - 888.2553/6–3053. Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Richards; cleared in draft in E, + 888.2553/6–3053. Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Richards; cleared in draft in E, BNA, G, and S; and approved by the President. - Washington, June 30, 1953, + Washington, June 30, 1953, 1:20 p.m. -

3295. Following is message from President to Mosadeq:

+

3295. Following is message from President to Mosadeq:

“Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have received your letter of May 28See @@ -34185,8 +28922,7 @@

There is also considerable sentiment in the United States to the effect that a settlement based on the payment of compensation merely for losses of the physical assets of a firm which has been nationalized would not - be what might be called a reasonable settlement and that an agreement to such a settlement might + be what might be called a reasonable settlement and that an agreement to such a settlement might tend to weaken mutual trust between free nations engaged in friendly economic intercourse. Furthermore, many of my countrymen who have kept themselves informed regarding developments in this unfortunate dispute @@ -34221,23 +28957,18 @@

Unless released by Prime Minister existence and substance this message should be held secret.

- Dulles + Dulles
-
+
231. Monthly Report Prepared in the Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence AgencySource: - Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 81–001061R, Box 2, Folder 1, Monthly + Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 81–001061R, Box 2, Folder 1, Monthly Report—June 1953—Country Summaries and Analyses. Top Secret; Security Information. - Washington, undated. + Washington, undated.

IRAN

June 1953

A. General Developments

@@ -34247,15 +28978,10 @@ opposition elements were able to exert control, both elements concerned themselves largely with the imminent election of a Majlis President. Kashani, who is seeking - re-election, Qanatabadi, a leading Kashani supporter, made violent attacks on the Mossadeq government.

-

2. While the relative strengths of the Mossadeq supporters and the opposition showed no - positive change, new cracks in Mossadeq’s political armor were, however, indicated. The - Qashqai Khans, staunch backers of Mossadeq, intimated a willingness to throw their support + re-election, Qanatabadi, a leading Kashani supporter, made violent attacks on the Mossadeq government.

+

2. While the relative strengths of the Mossadeq supporters and the opposition showed no + positive change, new cracks in Mossadeq’s political armor were, however, indicated. The + Qashqai Khans, staunch backers of Mossadeq, intimated a willingness to throw their support against the Prime Minister under certain conditions.

3. The Tudeh Party, whose immediate Iranian target is the Shah, continued to throw its support to Mossadeq. @@ -34272,21 +28998,18 @@ Mossadeq and Soviet Ambassador Sadchikov. It has been suggested that these talks concern revision of the 1921 - Irano-Soviet agreement, the return of Iranian gold held in the USSR, regulation of disputed boundaries, + Irano-Soviet agreement, the return of Iranian gold held in the USSR, regulation of disputed boundaries, further increasing of Soviet-Iranian trade, and a general rapprochement between the two countries.

5. No serious internal disturbances occurred during the month, indicating - continued effective control by the government security forces, although a generally good + continued effective control by the government security forces, although a generally good harvest probably contributed to the prevailing quiet in the provinces.

6. The government is confronted by mounting economic problems. Faced with continued inflationary tendencies—the rial dropped to 100 to the dollar—the government has placed new restrictions on foreign trade. Mossadeq is reportedly - anxiously awaiting the return of Ambassador Henderson, hoping that he will bring some assurances of + anxiously awaiting the return of Ambassador Henderson, hoping that he will bring some assurances of increased U.S. economic assistance.

B. Station Synopsis

[4 paragraphs (10 lines) not declassified]

@@ -34296,12 +29019,10 @@

Paramilitary Operations

[2 paragraphs (4 lines) not declassified]

- [name not declassified] + [name not declassified]
-
+
232. Editorial Note

On July 1, 1953, Kermit Roosevelt received a communication that stated that the British Prime Minister @@ -34309,31 +29030,24 @@ Office who will also give the Ambassador their views on an ‘acceptable oil settlement’.” The communication then inquired into the status of the detailed plans yet to be completed by officials of the Central - Intelligence Agency. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 7, + Intelligence Agency. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 7, TPAJAX Vol. 1)

-
- 233. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 233. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, - 788.13/7–153. Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Cuomo. A copy was pouched to + 788.13/7–153. Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Cuomo. A copy was pouched to London. Received July 10. No. 337 - Tehran, July 1, 1953. + Tehran, July 1, 1953. SUBJECT - Popularity and Prestige of Prime Minister Mohammed Mosadeq + Popularity and Prestige of Prime Minister Mohammed Mosadeq

Introduction

The Embassy has lately been receiving reports tending to indicate that @@ -34347,8 +29061,7 @@ Dr. Mosadeq at the time he first took office as Prime Minister. As leader of the struggle against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in a country where resentment and even hatred - of the British is deep-rooted, Mosadeq could count upon the support of people from all + of the British is deep-rooted, Mosadeq could count upon the support of people from all levels of society with but few exceptions. For many months after oil nationalization, the Prime Minister’s popularity continually mounted. To the common people, Mosadeq was @@ -34366,8 +29079,7 @@ contradictions in his public statements and promises continued to become more glaringly apparent. While speaking of an “oilless economy” on the one hand the Prime Minister excused his failure to initiate promised - reforms on the ground that he could not “fight on two fronts”. The much promised “oil + reforms on the ground that he could not “fight on two fronts”. The much promised “oil solution”, which was constantly dangled before the people, failed to materialize. More and more demands for dictatorial powers were made, and more and more the Prime Minister was compelled to employ arbitrary and @@ -34389,16 +29101,14 @@ deputies could simply hold up proceedings by merely walking out of the parliamentary assembly. He has now gone a step further and threatened the dissolution of the Majlis.

-

The Shah and Mosadeq

+

The Shah and Mosadeq

To divert public attention from his failure to solve the oil problem or to consolidate his hold on office or for these, as well as other reasons, Mosadeq precipitated a crisis over the position of the Shah. There seems to be no doubt that the Prime Minister did in fact “suggest” that the Shah leave Iran. There seems to be little doubt also that he had underestimated the Shah’s - popularity. Whereas the person of Mohammed Reza Shah has relatively little significance in Iran, + popularity. Whereas the person of Mohammed Reza Shah has relatively little significance in Iran, the monarchic concept is deeply impressed on the minds of the Iranian people. Without here going into details, it is sufficient to note that his failure to rid himself of the Shah represented a major defeat for @@ -34409,18 +29119,15 @@ caused Mosadeq and his entourage to reappraise the position of the Shah, and their efforts to find a modus vivendi resulted in the now well known “Majlis eight-man committee - report” limiting the Shah’s powers. The Shah’s attitude toward Mosadeq has been interpreted by the + report” limiting the Shah’s powers. The Shah’s attitude toward Mosadeq has been interpreted by the latter’s opponents as “weakness”, and the Shah does appear to have discredited himself with some of those who wished him well. However, the opposition now appears to fear the consequences to it of a Shah - completely subservient to and a weapon in the hands of + completely subservient to and a weapon in the hands of Mosadeq. It is noteworthy that Mosadeq’s opponents have not based their attacks against the principle of limiting the Shah’s powers, - but on the quid pro quo of also limiting those of Mosadeq, i.e., cancellation of the + but on the quid pro quo of also limiting those of Mosadeq, i.e., cancellation of the Majlis grant of plenary powers. The Government in turn was careful not to put before the public any such clear-cut issue as a choice between Mosadeq or the Shah.

@@ -34437,8 +29144,7 @@

In a letter dated April 1, 1953, the Consul at Isfahan made the following comment:

“I think I should report that for many weeks now people with whom I have - talked have spoken with growing dissatisfaction about Dr. Mosadeq and the ‘government’ in + talked have spoken with growing dissatisfaction about Dr. Mosadeq and the ‘government’ in general. Articulate persons are dissatisfied with lack of accomplishment, non-progress toward settlement of the oil controversy, new taxes and regulations governing foreign commerce. They talk @@ -34454,8 +29160,7 @@ supporting Mosadeq”, although opposition to him was increasing among the middle and upper classes. He noted, however, that “feeling generally is apathetic”. At Meshed the - Consul remarked a “swinging back to Mosadeq” on the part of “hedging opportunists”, but that + Consul remarked a “swinging back to Mosadeq” on the part of “hedging opportunists”, but that “only the Shah is popular with all”. The Consul there also stated that Mosadeq’s main strength lies in the belief that all other politicians are worse.

@@ -34468,23 +29173,18 @@ same popularity he commanded a year ago . . .”

The tribes, not unusually, are divided in their attitude. The Bakhtiari - leaders seem to be strongly opposed to Mosadeq and have been intriguing against him, for which + leaders seem to be strongly opposed to Mosadeq and have been intriguing against him, for which activities several of their leaders are in prison. The Kurdish leaders are resentful over Mosadeq’s attempt to impose an agrarian reform measure totally at the expense of the landholders. Violence has broken out on several occasions and it is safe to assume that the Kurds, independent in any event, are not favorably disposed toward the Prime Minister. The Qashqais, notoriously - opposed to the Pahlavi dynasty, may be counted upon to support Mosadeq in any move which will weaken + opposed to the Pahlavi dynasty, may be counted upon to support Mosadeq in any move which will weaken the position of the present Shah.

In Tehran the Prime Minister seems to have lost much of his support, although he continues to enjoy a degree of popularity in certain - quarters. The bazaar is now divided between allegiance to Mosadeq and allegiance to Kashani and Baqai. Among businessmen generally + quarters. The bazaar is now divided between allegiance to Mosadeq and allegiance to Kashani and Baqai. Among businessmen generally Mosadeq is heartily disliked, although in this category as well there appear to be important exceptions. For example, exporters are inclined to be more favorably @@ -34501,8 +29201,7 @@ five thousand participants, excluding the twelve or more thousand in Tudeh front groups who came for reasons of their own.

The Consul at Tabriz reports that on the same day a rally was also held - there, with only an estimated four hundred Mosadeq supporters participating. The demonstrators were + there, with only an estimated four hundred Mosadeq supporters participating. The demonstrators were forced to disperse by the police when pro-Shah spectators began to hurl stones. The Consul’s report concluded: “Rally’s small size indicative of the Prime Minister’s lack of support in Azerbaijan.”

@@ -34515,8 +29214,7 @@ media, the job, contract and license giving power. Formerly, his strength sprang from a wide and deep base of popular support, and despite the opposition of key figures within the Government apparatus. - As is true in any country, the prestige and popularity of the man in power is closely + As is true in any country, the prestige and popularity of the man in power is closely related to the issues of the moment. In a struggle directly involving the British, Mosadeq could count upon a tremendous following. There could be a temporary rise in @@ -34524,43 +29222,33 @@ might in the future come about as a result of some particular issue. However, excepting the remote possibility that he solve some basic problem with which the country is faced, it currently appears unlikely - that the downward trend of Mosadeq’s popularity—as distinct from his hold over the + that the downward trend of Mosadeq’s popularity—as distinct from his hold over the organs of Government—may be reversed.

For the Chargé d’Affaires ad interim: - Roy M. - Melbourne + Roy M. + Melbourne First Secretary of Embassy
-
+
234. Memorandum Prepared by the Chief of the Near East and Africa - Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt) - Washington, July 2, 1953. + Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt) + Washington, July 2, 1953. [Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 12, Misc. Correspondence—TPAJAX. Secret. 1 page not declassified.]
-
- 235. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 235. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/7–753. Secret; Security Information. Received at 11:15 a.m. - Tehran, July 7, 1953, + Tehran, July 7, 1953, 2 p.m. -

42. Had hour’s conversation with Amini, Acting Minister Court, this morning covering wide +

42. Had hour’s conversation with Amini, Acting Minister Court, this morning covering wide range subjects. He talked very frankly. Following are highlights:

1. With postponement Emir Saud’s visit, Shah again anxious take trip @@ -34570,8 +29258,7 @@ Minister of Court Amini’s attempt to enlist U.S. financial and economic support should he persuade Mosadeq to (a) - settle his differences with the Shah, (b) allow Amini and his friends to gain + settle his differences with the Shah, (b) allow Amini and his friends to gain control of the security forces, and (c) distance himself from the Iran Party. Henderson commented that Amini’s @@ -34580,21 +29267,16 @@ (Ibid., 788.00/5–753) Amini is attempting dissuade. Stated that Shah suspicious by nature was apt to see changes which did - not (repeat not) exist and needed reassurance. Could he, Amini, tell Shah that Embassy still + not (repeat not) exist and needed reassurance. Could he, Amini, tell Shah that Embassy still felt trip at this juncture a mistake? I told him that my personal opinion was that trip at present juncture would be misconstrued both in Iran and abroad.

-

2. Time was approaching when he felt that his brother, Mahmud Amini, should be made chief of +

2. Time was approaching when he felt that his brother, Mahmud Amini, should be made chief of staff. Present incumbent, Riahi, was too close to Iran party and its leftish sympathies. I observed that this seemed purely internal Iranian affair. Without passing on relative - merits of officers wished state that ARMISH had reported increased cooperation since Riahi made chief of staff. Similarly - GENMISH had found Brigadier Amini most cooperative. Minister Court then stated + merits of officers wished state that ARMISH had reported increased cooperation since Riahi made chief of staff. Similarly + GENMISH had found Brigadier Amini most cooperative. Minister Court then stated perhaps change not (repeat not) necessary.

3. Amini then stated he thought that US promise of say 100 million @@ -34602,14 +29284,11 @@ move Mosadeq to get rid of extremist advisers and to save country from plight which faced it. I explained in some detail why, in absence of oil settlement, substantial - US aid impracticable. Said that while not (repeat not) - familiar with details Ambassador Henderson’s consultations Washington, I had no (repeat + US aid impracticable. Said that while not (repeat not) + familiar with details Ambassador Henderson’s consultations Washington, I had no (repeat no) reason be optimistic anything more than present scale aid envisaged. Amini said that in these - circumstances perhaps time had come to overthrow Mosadeq. I replied this again internal + circumstances perhaps time had come to overthrow Mosadeq. I replied this again internal matter but my understanding was that Shah insistent that any change be by constitutional methods and that recent parliamentary elections seemed to have strengthened Mosadeq’s @@ -34629,17 +29308,14 @@ all telegrams on subject and assured him no (repeat no) decisions would be made without full consultation with Shah. Although vague on specific nature discussions, Amini said - he did not (repeat not) see that there was much to discuss with USSR. Nothing particularly wrong with + he did not (repeat not) see that there was much to discuss with USSR. Nothing particularly wrong with 1921 treaty since it had helped keep British out. Border adjustments of little use since USSR could always - move back when it felt like it. Gold held by USSR belonged to Iran in any case. Therefore he felt best + move back when it felt like it. Gold held by USSR belonged to Iran in any case. Therefore he felt best policy for Iran was to string along Soviets without making any commitments.

6. Sadchikov insisting on having - farewell audience with Shah. Since Sadchikov has worked against Shah for seven years, + farewell audience with Shah. Since Sadchikov has worked against Shah for seven years, neither he nor Amini inclined to grant request although realizing that protocol requires request be granted. Shah has sent word he will come to Tehran to discuss problem @@ -34650,26 +29326,19 @@ substantial delay, it might be better for Ambassador to have audience upon his return.

- Mattison + Mattison
-
+
236. Memorandum From the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, - Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt) to MitchellSource: Central Intelligence Agency, + Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt) to MitchellSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 12, Misc. Correspondence—TPAJAX. Secret. The recipient is referred to as “Mr. Mitchell” in the original and is not further identified. - Washington, July 8, 1953. + Washington, July 8, 1953.

1. In response to [cryptonym not declassified] - query regarding our ability to neutralize Qashqai support of Mossadeq, we have on this date received + query regarding our ability to neutralize Qashqai support of Mossadeq, we have on this date received the following assessment from Tehran. This assessment was arrived at after conversations with Qashqai leaders. Although the Qashqai position as described below may be subject to change in the future it is believed @@ -34677,28 +29346,22 @@

A. The Qashqai principal political assets at this time are represented by:

-

(1) The confidence that their past support has inspired in Mossadeq.

+

(1) The confidence that their past support has inspired in Mossadeq.

(2) Their influence over General Mahmud Amini.

(3) Their “control” of key military figures in Fars and Khuzistan.

(4) Their influence in the National Movement fraction.

B. Qashqai current intentions:

-

(1) The Qashqai principal Khans including Nasser Khan intend to continue to back Mossadeq against all opposition. At +

(1) The Qashqai principal Khans including Nasser Khan intend to continue to back Mossadeq against all opposition. At this time even strong U.S. pressure on the Qashqai Khans would not cause latter to alter this position.

(2) The Qashqai Khans who are working closely with General Mahmud - Amini intend to use their proximity to Mossadeq to build their own political + Amini intend to use their proximity to Mossadeq to build their own political fences in preparation for an eventual but not imminent bid for power.

-

(3) The Qashqai Khans do not take seriously Zahedi’s opposition and feel that latter has little or - no chance of winning out in a test of strength with Mossadeq.

+

(3) The Qashqai Khans do not take seriously Zahedi’s opposition and feel that latter has little or + no chance of winning out in a test of strength with Mossadeq.

C. Qashqai estimate of Mossadeq’s strength:

(1) Mossadeq is the only strong @@ -34709,120 +29372,91 @@ this time.

2. Conclusion:

In our opinion the Qashqai Khans - find it expedient to support Mossadeq and cannot be expected to withdraw this support + find it expedient to support Mossadeq and cannot be expected to withdraw this support until Mossadeq’s position becomes materially weaker and some other political figure emerges to pose a strong threat to Mossadeq’s position; or until the Qashqais themselves feel strong enough to make a bid for power.

-
- 237. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 237. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.11/7–1353. Secret; Security Information. Received at 7:45 a.m. - Tehran, July 13, 1953, + Tehran, July 13, 1953, 11 a.m.

74. Belgian Minister who had audience with Shah yesterday tells me in - strict confidence that Shah still very strongly desires to take trip (re my 42, July 7)Document 235. and + strict confidence that Shah still very strongly desires to take trip (re my 42, July 7)Document 235. and is endeavoring arrange with Italian Government for invitation.

However, CAS source close to Shah states that Shah much heartened by - Eisenhower–Mosadeq exchange and feels that British + Eisenhower–Mosadeq exchange and feels that British and US positions now clearly together.

It is possible Shah either telling different stories to different people in order keep situation confused or that this represents but further evidence Shah’s vacillation.

- Mattison + Mattison
-
+
238. Memorandum From the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, - Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt) to MitchellSource: Central Intelligence Agency, + Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt) to MitchellSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 12, Misc. Correspondence—TPAJAX. Secret. The recipient is referred to as “Mr. Mitchell” in the original and is not further identified. - Washington, July 14, 1953. + Washington, July 14, 1953.

1. Following received 13 July:

Source: Individual with good political contacts but heavily biased against Mossadeq. B–2.

“A. National Movement Fraction held stormy two hour session 12 July with following results:

(1) Mossadeq wants Fraction to - boycott future meetings Parliament and Mossadeq proposes call referendum to determine whether + boycott future meetings Parliament and Mossadeq proposes call referendum to determine whether ‘people’ desire him continue in office.

-

(2) Razavi opposed this procedure declaring he supported Mossadeq ‘up to now’ but he not willing +

(2) Razavi opposed this procedure declaring he supported Mossadeq ‘up to now’ but he not willing close Majlis.

(3) Argument over issue grew so intense that meeting was adjourned to 10 a.m. 13 July.

-

B. Following session reported A above Makki met privately with Moazami and Razavi, the three agreed +

B. Following session reported A above Makki met privately with Moazami and Razavi, the three agreed that Pres. Eisenhower’s letterDocument - 230. had seriously weakened Mossadeq’s position. Moazami and Razavi said ‘if situation so bad’ they + 230. had seriously weakened Mossadeq’s position. Moazami and Razavi said ‘if situation so bad’ they willing ‘get rid’ of Mossadeq but they would insist Mossadeq be replaced by some member Natl. Front. Makki urged that decision be - delayed until after 30 Tir (21 July) anniversary Qavams effort overthrow Mossadeq.

-

C. At private interview with Mossadeq 12 July, latter told Massoudi, the publisher of + delayed until after 30 Tir (21 July) anniversary Qavams effort overthrow Mossadeq.

+

C. At private interview with Mossadeq 12 July, latter told Massoudi, the publisher of Ettelaat:

-

(1) ‘very angrily’ that Eisenhower letter ‘did not hurt Iran, but it did hurt +

(1) ‘very angrily’ that Eisenhower letter ‘did not hurt Iran, but it did hurt American prestige in Iran, very much.’

(2) The govt. ‘is prepared’ for mass demonstrations expected 30 Tir (July 21).

(3) That Mossadeq has no intentions of going to Majlis 14 July for scheduled interpellation - because ‘they (the opposition) want to kill me.’ Instead Mossadeq plans close Majlis and call + because ‘they (the opposition) want to kill me.’ Instead Mossadeq plans close Majlis and call for public referendum.

Source commented: Eisenhower letter has had tremendous impact and Parliament press people and foreign - policy now turning against Mossadeq. His position is most critical of career. Only + policy now turning against Mossadeq. His position is most critical of career. Only weapon left to him is power of arrest. I expect mass arrests of - opposition to begin from 14 July. Any attempt by Mossadeq to close Majlis ‘sure’ to + opposition to begin from 14 July. Any attempt by Mossadeq to close Majlis ‘sure’ to alien-ate deputies; ‘They don’t want to lose their jobs and positions of influence.’

2. Following received from station 13 July:

“Current developments possibly affecting plan:

1. Mossadeq threatening dissolve Majlis and hold referendum.

-

2. National Movement Fraction reported believe govt. must answer interpellation but to avoid joining +

2. National Movement Fraction reported believe govt. must answer interpellation but to avoid joining opposition on this issue are rumored preparing resign or absent selves from Majlis.

3. Mossadeq possibly to ‘permit’ demonstrations which would be anti-American in character.

4. Within 48 hours Mossadeq will go on radio and take case to people.

-

5. Press calling for expulsion Point Four Director Warne and Embassy Press Attaché Bruce, +

5. Press calling for expulsion Point Four Director Warne and Embassy Press Attaché Bruce, closing U.S. Embassy and other U.S. installations and charging U.S. has joined British against Iran.

6. Tudeh sponsored Youth Festival of several thousand which convened July @@ -34831,8 +29465,7 @@ common demonstration.”

3. On night of 11 July [less than 1 line not declassified] stated following to station:

-

“A. Opposition greatly encouraged by Eisenhower letter.

+

“A. Opposition greatly encouraged by Eisenhower letter.

B. Independent Deputy Fakhr attempting establish contact Za-hedi’s son who expected meet Fakhr night of 13 or 14 July.

@@ -34842,14 +29475,12 @@

D. Mossadeq 11 July sent ‘urgent secret instructions’ to Minister Finance to pay Ministry Interior rials two hundred thousand (Dollars two thousand) ‘for printing the papers.’ - Opposition believes this refers to forms for referendum which Mossadeq believed planning to hold in + Opposition believes this refers to forms for referendum which Mossadeq believed planning to hold in effort gain expression popular backing.”

4. Following report received, dated 12 July, from source believed reliable:

“1. Station representative asked whether any basis to rumor Shah intends - go abroad. Source stated Shah very much encouraged by Eisenhower letter, believes his + go abroad. Source stated Shah very much encouraged by Eisenhower letter, believes his absence from Iran at this time not advisable and is even supported in this view by Queen who now recognizes her own recent trip Spain grave mistake. If Mossadeq renews @@ -34865,44 +29496,33 @@ office department destroying all copies opposition newspapers mailed to provinces.

2. Opposition in Majlis now consists 20 deputies firmly committed to and - 11 deputies cooperating with Zahedi.

-

3. Independent Deputy Fakhr and National Movement Deputy Khosrow Qashqai now ‘wavering’ toward + 11 deputies cooperating with Zahedi.

+

3. Independent Deputy Fakhr and National Movement Deputy Khosrow Qashqai now ‘wavering’ toward opposition.”

-
+
239. Memorandum From the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, - Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt) to MitchellSource: Central Intelligence Agency, + Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt) to MitchellSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 12, Misc. Correspondence—TPAJAX. Secret. The recipient is referred to as “Mr. Mitchell” in the original and is not further identified. - Washington, July 15, 1953. + Washington, July 15, 1953.

1. Mossadeq’s reason for - resignation of National Movement fraction from Majlis:The National Front deputies in the Majlis resigned - on July 15. See Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, + resignation of National Movement fraction from Majlis:The National Front deputies in the Majlis resigned + on July 15. See Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 735–736 (Document 333).

Felt he could not control Majlis much longer and felt it focal point mounting criticism his government.

2. Opposition reaction must be:

Stress every way point that what is left of Majlis is legal government of - country, its democratic center as opposed Mossadeq’s illegal dictatorship.

+ country, its democratic center as opposed Mossadeq’s illegal dictatorship.

3. All points which follow should have some bearing on Item 2 above.

4. What is present status of Majlis?

We think a fairly good case can be made out for considering remaining members to be a Majlis in fact, or at least in legal theory.

-

The Majlis should have 136 members. This time Mossadeq stopped the elections when only 80 had been +

The Majlis should have 136 members. This time Mossadeq stopped the elections when only 80 had been elected. When ⅔ of 80 assembled in Tehran had session opened by Shah, named temporary officers and started approving credentials of each other. When ¾ of deputies credentials approved then @@ -34919,8 +29539,7 @@ enough members for a quorum.

6. Mossadeq may want to legally dissolve the Majlis to support Item 5 above. According to Article 48 (as - amended) only the Shah has authority to dissolve the Majlis. Mossadeq may claim that his full powers + amended) only the Shah has authority to dissolve the Majlis. Mossadeq may claim that his full powers bill gives him this authority, but if he does so he is sure to lose many supporters.

@@ -34969,19 +29588,14 @@ Box 3, Folder 12, Misc. Correspondence—TPAJAX)

-
+
240. Memorandum From the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, - Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt) to MitchellSource: Central Intelligence Agency, + Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt) to MitchellSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 12, Misc. Correspondence—TPAJAX. Secret. The recipient is referred to as “Mr. Mitchell” in the original and is not further identified. - Washington, July 16, 1953. + Washington, July 16, 1953.

The following was received 15 July:

1. Zahedi claims to have following military assets, and has following plan of action:

@@ -35007,24 +29621,21 @@ Minister on grounds that Mossadeq forfeited office by “unconstitutional acts”.

(2) Shah to dismiss Mossadeq - without appointing successor; Zahedi temporary Military Governor “pending selection of + without appointing successor; Zahedi temporary Military Governor “pending selection of Prime Minister by Majlis”.

(3) Shah appointment Zahedi to replace Riahi as Chief Staff; immediate arrest Riahi by Zahedi.

(4) Shah’s appointment Zahedi - Minister Court; immediate isolation Amini, present Min + Minister Court; immediate isolation Amini, present Min Court.

B. Implementation of one of above would trigger following series operations:

(1) Two gordons (battalions) Shah’s Imperial Guard (ie apparently the entire Guard) under Col. Nasiri, secure area around Royal - Court and Prime Minister’s home, arrest Mossadeq and entourage.

+ Court and Prime Minister’s home, arrest Mossadeq and entourage.

(2) Transportation units under Col. Akhavi take over radio Tehran and Army radio.

@@ -35036,17 +29647,13 @@ support new govt.

C. To prevent possibility Shah might weaken during “take over” and order - troops out of action (as during Qavam incident year ago) Zahedi proposes remain constantly at Shah’s side until + troops out of action (as during Qavam incident year ago) Zahedi proposes remain constantly at Shah’s side until crisis past.

4. Zahedi claims success in gaining any one of four legal acts (para 3A) would assure him immediate - backing Army and Tehran Mil Gov Ashrafi. Without one of legal acts he unwilling make any + backing Army and Tehran Mil Gov Ashrafi. Without one of legal acts he unwilling make any move.

-

5. [less than 1 line not declassified] Zahedi has selected key figures and +

5. [less than 1 line not declassified] Zahedi has selected key figures and deputies proposed govt with exception Chief Staff who probably one of following:

A. Gen. Batmanqlich (favored by @@ -35054,65 +29661,49 @@

B. Gen. Vosak, former Chief Gendarmérie.

C. Gen. - Hedayatl, former Min Defense.

+ Hedayatl, former Min Defense.

D. Gen. Ali Reza Jahanbani, former Chief Sports Clubs.

[2 paragraphs (9 lines) not declassified]

-
+
241. Memorandum From the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, - Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt) to MitchellSource: Central Intelligence Agency, + Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt) to MitchellSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 12, Misc. Correspondence—TPAJAX. Secret. The recipient is referred to as “Mr. Mitchell” in the original and is not further identified. - Washington, July 16, 1953. + Washington, July 16, 1953.

Following was received 15 July:

1. Tehran Station proposes holding off until after 21 July active campaign build up Zahedi as logical Mossadeq successor. This decision based on possibility that show of hands before scheduled demonstrations inspire Mossadeq - use street mobs to destroy or intimidate Zahedi followers.

+ use street mobs to destroy or intimidate Zahedi followers.

2. In attempt limit size demonstration Station intends:

A. Instruct opposition forces [less than 1 line not declassified] remain in homes 21 July in protest Tudeh - participation in mourning for Nationalist martyrs of Qavam incident year ago.

+ participation in mourning for Nationalist martyrs of Qavam incident year ago.

B. Plant in controlled press of 19 and 20 July announcements that observance ceremony to be at martyrs gravesides in Rey—not in downtown - Tehran. This should appeal Iranian sense of dramatic and Station hopes it result in lessening - attendance at downtown demonstration thus reflecting on Mossadeq drawing power.

-
-
+ Tehran. This should appeal Iranian sense of dramatic and Station hopes it result in lessening + attendance at downtown demonstration thus reflecting on Mossadeq drawing power.

+
+
242. Memorandum From the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, - Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt) to MitchellSource: Central Intelligence Agency, + Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt) to MitchellSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 12, Misc. Correspondence—TPAJAX. Secret. The recipient is referred to as “Mr. Mitchell” in the original and is not further identified. - Washington, July 17, 1953. + Washington, July 17, 1953.

Following received from station 16 July:

1. According one Opposition deputy “resignation” of independent and Opposition deputies 15 July—following similar action by members pro-Mossadeq National Movement Fraction—was “considered” act of strategy aimed at heading off - public referendum by Mossadeq.

+ public referendum by Mossadeq.

2. Opposition deputy explained thinking behind maneuver in this manner:

A. Objective of National Front “resignation” was to close Majlis and thus @@ -35131,8 +29722,7 @@ needed—for example: to take Parliamentary action to name new Prime Minister.

3. Opposition deputy explained that Opposition “hard core” of 15 deputies - agreed enter Majlis that hour to take bast “until Mossadeq is replaced”. He said + agreed enter Majlis that hour to take bast “until Mossadeq is replaced”. He said Opposition agreed this strategy earlier in evening at meeting with Kashani. This is plan:

A. Deputies will remain in Parliament building.

@@ -35155,18 +29745,14 @@

B. Opposition agreed stay off streets and in home during 21 July demonstrations.

-
+
243. Memorandum From the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans (Roosevelt) - to Director of Central Intelligence DullesSource: + to Director of Central Intelligence DullesSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 8, TPAJAX Vol. II. Eyes Only. - Washington, July 17, 1953. + Washington, July 17, 1953. SUBJECT [Omission in the original] @@ -35176,60 +29762,38 @@ presence in Iran and his numerous contacts with high ranking Iranian Government officials are being successfully exploited by Prime Minister Mossadeq in such a way as to - dishearten the opposition and strengthen the Mossadeq administration. It has been reported that Prime Minister Mossadeq is interpreting Ambassador + dishearten the opposition and strengthen the Mossadeq administration. It has been reported that Prime Minister Mossadeq is interpreting Ambassador Henderson’s absence as lack of U.S. support for his policies and is concerned by the fact that Henderson’s absence detracts - from the strength of his (Mossadeq’s) government. This is the desirable effect - from our point of view. To overcome this Mossadeq is attempting with some success to minimize the + from the strength of his (Mossadeq’s) government. This is the desirable effect + from our point of view. To overcome this Mossadeq is attempting with some success to minimize the effects of Henderson’s absence - by exploiting to the utmost Mr. Warne’s continuing contacts and cordiality with + by exploiting to the utmost Mr. Warne’s continuing contacts and cordiality with important government leaders.

2. The opposition leaders with whom we are dealing have expressed concern - since they feel the favorable effects of President Eisenhower’s letter and Ambassador + since they feel the favorable effects of President Eisenhower’s letter and Ambassador Henderson’s absence have to - some degree been counteracted by Mr. Warne’s activities.

+ some degree been counteracted by Mr. Warne’s activities.

3. As you know most Iranians have interpreted continuing Point Four aid - as a tangible sign of U.S. support of Mossadeq. To the degree that Mr. Warne is synonymous with Point Four + as a tangible sign of U.S. support of Mossadeq. To the degree that Mr. Warne is synonymous with Point Four his temporary absence from the country would help to disabuse the Iranians of this misconception, even if it is undesirable to reduce Point Four aid at this time.

-

4. It would not be advisable for Mr. Warne to be recalled to the United States for - consultation as this could be exploited by Mossadeq to mean Warne was negotiating increased U.S. aid to Iran. It has - been suggested by our Station that Mr. Warne leave Iran temporarily on the excuse he was +

4. It would not be advisable for Mr. Warne to be recalled to the United States for + consultation as this could be exploited by Mossadeq to mean Warne was negotiating increased U.S. aid to Iran. It has + been suggested by our Station that Mr. Warne leave Iran temporarily on the excuse he was vacationing in Europe.

5. Recommendation: It is recommended that you - discuss this matter with Under Secretary of State Bedell Smith and with him attempt to arrive - at some solution which would keep Minister Warne away from his post (but not in the U.S.) for + discuss this matter with Under Secretary of State Bedell Smith and with him attempt to arrive + at some solution which would keep Minister Warne away from his post (but not in the U.S.) for approximately one month without revealing to latter the existence of TPAJAX and without provoking too great a storm of protest from Point Four and Minister Warne. I am sorry not to be able to make specific suggestions at this time, though I would express the pious hope that a suitable conference requiring his - presence in Europe might be found. I have requested John Waller and Donald Wilber to explore possibilities - with Jernegan and Richards of State Department.Dulles had discussed the Warne matter with Under Secretary + presence in Europe might be found. I have requested John Waller and Donald Wilber to explore possibilities + with Jernegan and Richards of State Department.Dulles had discussed the Warne matter with Under Secretary Smith at a Psychological Strategy Board meeting on July 15. In a memorandum for the record, Dulles wrote that he @@ -35237,25 +29801,20 @@ of Mr. Warne in Iran who seemed to be swimming against the general current in his Point IV activities. I said I thought it might be desirable for him to take a - vacation somewhere outside of Iran for the next month or so. WBS did not know about this and asked + vacation somewhere outside of Iran for the next month or so. WBS did not know about this and asked for a specific recommendation. (NE - should prepare a short memo for me to send to WBS).” (Ibid., Office of the Director + should prepare a short memo for me to send to WBS).” (Ibid., Office of the Director of Intelligence, Job 80R01731R, Box 33, Folder 1095, DCI/PSB)

- Kermit - RooseveltPrinted from a + Kermit + RooseveltPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
-
- 244. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 244. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/7–1753. Secret; Security Information. Repeated to London and to Geneva for Henderson. @@ -35263,8 +29822,7 @@ Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 736–737 (Document 334). - Tehran, July 17, 1953, + Tehran, July 17, 1953, 2 p.m.

116. Estimate Embassy and CAS present political trends follows.

Immediate reason Mosadeq’s @@ -35274,19 +29832,13 @@ as controller BMI. Opposition was also successfully gaining control key Majlis committees. Serving accelerate these events and impel Mosadeq - consolidate his position urgently was Eisenhower letter clarifying US policy toward Mosadeq Government.See Document 230. Letter served belie + consolidate his position urgently was Eisenhower letter clarifying US policy toward Mosadeq Government.See Document 230. Letter served belie carefully nursed “myth” US supporting - Mosadeq at same time USSR “friendship” overtures appear to be + Mosadeq at same time USSR “friendship” overtures appear to be for moment at least nothing more than willingness adjust frontier problems. With bankruptcy foreign policy thus exposed Prime Minister faced Majlis interpellation this subject and exposure government’s - unauthorized increase note issue by Maki. Unable or disinclined resort to Shah’s power + unauthorized increase note issue by Maki. Unable or disinclined resort to Shah’s power dissolve Majlis Mosadeq struck upon expedient of mass resignation NMF [NF] deputies @@ -35312,40 +29864,26 @@ position destroy remaining opposition leaving him in unchallenged and absolute control.

- Mattison + Mattison
-
+
245. Memorandum From the Acting Chief of the Near East and Africa - Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency ([name not declassified]) to MitchellSource: Central Intelligence Agency, + Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency ([name not declassified]) to MitchellSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 12, Misc. Correspondence—TPAJAX. Secret. The recipient is referred to as “Mr. Mitchell” in the original and is not further identified. - Washington, July 22, 1953. + Washington, July 22, 1953.

Following received 22 July:

-

1. In agreement with Speaker Moazami and to avoid incident during 21 July +

1. In agreement with Speaker Moazami and to avoid incident during 21 July demonstration Zahedi left Majlis - 20 July. Was to return there 22 July. Moazami gave assurance govt. would not attempt arrest.

-

2. While out of Majlis Zahedi [less than 1 line not declassified] gave following + 20 July. Was to return there 22 July. Moazami gave assurance govt. would not attempt arrest.

+

2. While out of Majlis Zahedi [less than 1 line not declassified] gave following information:

A. Arrest list

-

(1) To be arrested night of coup: Mossadeq, Riahi, - Ashrafi, Modaber Rasavi, Hassibi, Shayegan, Zirakzadeh, Sanjabi, Khalil Maleki, Forouar of Pan Iran, +

(1) To be arrested night of coup: Mossadeq, Riahi, + Ashrafi, Modaber Rasavi, Hassibi, Shayegan, Zirakzadeh, Sanjabi, Khalil Maleki, Forouar of Pan Iran, Amini of Gendarmérie, Sareshteh of M.P.

(2) Sixty members Tudeh

@@ -35355,47 +29893,36 @@ Modaber in contact with Zahedi and may switch over to him at decisive moment they still uncertain elements and as precaution included arrest list.

-

B. Re arrest Mossadeq: Zahedi plan as follows:

+

B. Re arrest Mossadeq: Zahedi plan as follows:

(1) Block where his house located to be surrounded by Palace Guard.

(2) Col Daftari and Capt. Davar Panah who in charge Mossadeq person guard are “in hand” Zahedi - and at his bidding will apprehend Mossadeq and deliver him to Zahedi.

+ and at his bidding will apprehend Mossadeq and deliver him to Zahedi.

(3) Mossadeq will then be taken custody in village outside Tehe,

-

(4) Rumor will be circulated Mossadeq dead. This for purpose causing followers lose - hope and rally other banner presumably Zahedi.

+

(4) Rumor will be circulated Mossadeq dead. This for purpose causing followers lose + hope and rally other banner presumably Zahedi.

C. Installations to be seized night of coup:

(1) Source electric power telephone system.

(2) Radio Tehe and army wireless.

(3) Police and general staff Hq office.

(4) Note: all premises used by political groups to be closed.

-

D. In addition to troops previously mentioned Zahedi counts on one battalion from Military +

D. In addition to troops previously mentioned Zahedi counts on one battalion from Military Academy.

E. Zahedi has contacts in Air Force but does not plan call on their participation time coup.

-
- 246. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 246. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 84, London Embassy Files, Lot 59 F 59, classified general records, Box 34. Confidential. Repeated to London. Received at 6:30 pm. The telegram is the Embassy’s copy as approved and has no time of transmission. - Tehran, July 22, 1953. + Tehran, July 22, 1953.

142. As yet too early draw conclusion regarding significance yesterday’s - demonstrations or determine what likely be Mosadeq’s next moves in consequence.

+ demonstrations or determine what likely be Mosadeq’s next moves in consequence.

Embassy and CAS however believe Tudeh afternoon gathering their largest and best organized since being declared illegal and perhaps in party’s history. Crowd displayed high degree discipline. While slogans attacking @@ -35406,22 +29933,17 @@ Central Committee in which legalization Tudeh party appeared primary immediate objective.

- Mattison + Mattison
-
- 247. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, +
+ 247. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 80R01443R, Box 1, Folder 27, NSC Briefing 23 July 53. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. - Washington, July 22, 1953. + Washington, July 22, 1953.

SOVIET UNION OFFERS TO SETTLE IRANIANFINANCIAL CLAIMS

[1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]

@@ -35432,21 +29954,17 @@ refusal to discuss this issue has been a major cause of friction between the two countries.

Late last month the Soviet Union proposed that some of the outstanding - border disputes between Iran and the USSR should be settled. Iran, [less than + border disputes between Iran and the USSR should be settled. Iran, [less than 1 line not declassified] insisted that all disputes be settled, particularly the question of the gold.

The Soviet Union’s apparent concession to Iran’s urgent request for return of the gold, the conclusion of the 10 June barter trade agreement,A handwritten phrase inserted at this point reads: “involving 100 million on both sides”. - and the appointment of a top-level Soviet diplomat, LavrentievIn the right margin at this point, is a handwritten note that + and the appointment of a top-level Soviet diplomat, LavrentievIn the right margin at this point, is a handwritten note that reads: “Yugoslavia Russian”. as ambassador to Iran, all suggest that the Soviet Union may be inaugurating a new policy toward - Iran. These moves may be designed to show Prime Minister Mossadeq that an alternative exists to + Iran. These moves may be designed to show Prime Minister Mossadeq that an alternative exists to economic and political ties with the West.

If Mossadeq succeeds in obtaining the gold, he will be able to exploit it as a considerable victory in his @@ -35461,8 +29979,7 @@ Majlis and holding new elections.

While the delivery of the gold would be a tremendous psychological boost, actually the $21,000,000 dollars under discussion would cover at best - three or four months of current expenses for Iran’s oil-less economy. It is accordingly not a + three or four months of current expenses for Iran’s oil-less economy. It is accordingly not a solution to Iran’s economic and financial problems.

The Soviet Union and the Tudeh would benefit by the return of the gold. Soviet action in making about $21,000,000 available lends itself as a @@ -35483,8 +30000,7 @@ support has also helped make the party a force with which to reckon. It may even be in a position to elect deputies to the next Majlis. The Tudeh’s disciplined public appearance suggests that it may become a - direct threat to public order at any time.The minutes of the July 23 NSC + direct threat to public order at any time.The minutes of the July 23 NSC meeting record that the DCI, reporting on “Significant Developments Affecting U.S. Security,” referred to “the reported Soviet-Iranian negotiations.” (National @@ -35492,13 +30008,9 @@ National Security Council, Official Minutes 1947–1961, Box 29, 156th Meeting)

-
+
248. Memorandum From the Acting Chief of the Near East and Africa - Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency ([name not declassified]) to MitchellSource: Central Intelligence Agency, + Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency ([name not declassified]) to MitchellSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 12, Misc. Correspondence—TPAJAX. Secret. The recipient is referred to as “Mr. Mitchell” in the original and is not further @@ -35518,8 +30030,7 @@

(1) Limit his freedom of contact with [less than 1 line not declassified] his potential and actual followers.

(2) Possibly make it more difficult to reach the palace at D hour.

-

B. Decision on above deferred pending Zahedi–Moazami +

B. Decision on above deferred pending Zahedi–Moazami meeting.

C. Zahedi agreed to designate on 22 July a trustworthy [less than 1 line not @@ -35529,35 +30040,24 @@ opinion:

A. Zahedi appears to lack forceful leadership quality and plans may have to be perfected through his - followers. Despite apparent “vagueness” of Zahedi’s thinking he apparently only effective “rallying + followers. Despite apparent “vagueness” of Zahedi’s thinking he apparently only effective “rallying point” for opposition and for that reason he must be supported and - encouraged to maximum against Mossadeq.

+ encouraged to maximum against Mossadeq.

B. Zahedi does have sufficient stature and “guts” to continue along path he entered.

-

C. Every effort should be made to stimulate Zahedi’s ambition and maintain his morale.

+

C. Every effort should be made to stimulate Zahedi’s ambition and maintain his morale.

-
+
249. Memorandum From the Acting Chief of the Near East and Africa - Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency ([name not declassified]) to MitchellSource: Central Intelligence Agency, + Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency ([name not declassified]) to MitchellSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 12, Misc. Correspondence—TPAJAX. Secret. The recipient is referred to as “Mr. Mitchell” in the original and is not further identified. - Washington, undated. -

Relative of Min Court Amini told source 22 July that Shah’s + Washington, undated. +

Relative of Min Court Amini told source 22 July that Shah’s morale “greatly improved” during past week; that Shah confident, as - result Eisenhower letter,See Document + result Eisenhower letter,See Document 230. that Shah now has American backing and lacks only assurance British support to inspire him to decisive move against Mossadeq.

@@ -35579,23 +30079,16 @@

Gen Zahedi has become very active since leaving Majlis 20 July and probably will not return to bast.

-
- 250. Paper Given by the British Ambassador (Makins) to the Under Secretary of - State (Smith)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, +
+ 250. Paper Given by the British Ambassador (Makins) to the Under Secretary of + State (Smith)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files, CSHP 208. Secret; Security Information. The paper is Appendix C to CSHP, Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, from which the date is taken. - Washington, July 23, 1953. + Washington, July 23, 1953.

“Her Majesty’s Government have noted the State Department’s views as got - out in a report on the conversation between Mr. Byroade and Mr. Beeley on 7 July, and have much + out in a report on the conversation between Mr. Byroade and Mr. Beeley on 7 July, and have much sympathy for them.Not found.

“The overriding consideration is that the whole question of compensation must be left to the impartial arbitration of an international tribunal. @@ -35611,8 +30104,7 @@ from Washington Embassy are as follows:

“(a) The United Kingdom can do without this oil, although it would be an - advantage to have it flowing into its traditional markets [the UK]Brackets in + advantage to have it flowing into its traditional markets [the UK]Brackets in the original. once more. Her Majesty’s Government are, however, anxious to dispose of the dispute which poisons their relations with the country concerned and is a disturbing element in the area as a @@ -35623,23 +30115,17 @@ the initiative would be left to the future Prime Minister both as to the priority of an oil agreement in relation to his general programme and as to the nature of it. They hope he would agree to look at the February - proposals,For Henderson’s account of the - February 20 proposals, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, - Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 670–674 (Document 300). See also Document 157. and they would of + proposals,For Henderson’s account of the + February 20 proposals, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, + Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 670–674 (Document 300). See also Document 157. and they would of course ‘help him in regard to the presentation of the agreement.’ If he had any alternative proposals, Her Majesty’s Government would consider them with equal sympathy, subject always to the principles mentioned above being safeguarded.”

-
+
251. Editorial Note -

On July 24, 1953, Secretary of State Dulles spoke to Director of Central Intelligence +

On July 24, 1953, Secretary of State Dulles spoke to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles over the telephone. The transcript of their conversation reads: “The Secy called and said in your talk about Iran yesterday at the meeting you did not mention the @@ -35664,22 +30150,14 @@ Relations, 1952–1954, volume X, Iran, 1951–1954, pages 737–738 (Document 335).

-
+
252. Memorandum From the Chief of the Iran Branch, Near East and - Africa Division, Directorate of Plans (Waller) to Director of Central Intelligence DullesSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, + Africa Division, Directorate of Plans (Waller) to Director of Central Intelligence DullesSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 8, TPAJAX Vol. II. Top Secret. - Washington, July 27, 1953. + Washington, July 27, 1953. SUBJECT - Results of conversation with Mr. Jernegan re statement to be made by The Secretary of + Results of conversation with Mr. Jernegan re statement to be made by The Secretary of State at latter’s Press Conference July 28

1. Mr. Jernegan stated that the @@ -35693,42 +30171,33 @@ assistance to Iran.The phrase “consider any increase in assistance to Iran” in the quote has been edited by hand to read: “give further consideration of aid to a government which - tolerates such activity.” Dulles made substantially this statement at his + tolerates such activity.” Dulles made substantially this statement at his press conference on July 28. The text of the statement is printed in Department of State Bulletin, August 10, 1953, p. 178.

2. Mr. Jernegan stated that he - and/or Assistant Secretary Byroade would discuss the above proposed statement with + and/or Assistant Secretary Byroade would discuss the above proposed statement with the Secretary of State. They would also discuss the mechanics by which the proposed newsman’s query can best be planted prior to the Secretary’s news conference.

3. I stated that final planting of the query should await word from me - since we were momentarily expecting Teheran’s reaction to the proposed statement by the + since we were momentarily expecting Teheran’s reaction to the proposed statement by the Secretary of State and do not want to go ahead without benefit of this reaction.

J.H.W.Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. At the end of the memorandum is a - handwritten note, apparently by Dulles, that reads: “further consideration of + handwritten note, apparently by Dulles, that reads: “further consideration of aid to a Govt tolerating such activity.”
-
- 253. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans (Wisner) to the Chief of the Near East +
+ 253. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans (Wisner) to the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency - (Roosevelt)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, + (Roosevelt)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 8, TPAJAX Vol. II. Top Secret. - Washington, July 28, 1953. + Washington, July 28, 1953. SUBJECT Draft of proposed message to Teheran station @@ -35742,43 +30211,30 @@ with the State Department.

2. The following is the outline of the proposed cable which I should appreciate your getting off as soon as possible:

-

“In further discussions with high level officials of ODACID concerning the difficulties and - complications arising from the (Warne) situation, the opinion has been expressed that it +

“In further discussions with high level officials of ODACID concerning the difficulties and + complications arising from the (Warne) situation, the opinion has been expressed that it would be most difficult for ODACID to propose to (Warne) that he depart from Iran for a period of time in such a way as to satisfactorily mask the intent of the instruction. In other words no device or pretext - has yet been hit upon which would satisfy (Warne) and guarantee against his asking questions which + has yet been hit upon which would satisfy (Warne) and guarantee against his asking questions which might provide further complications and prove a source of additional embarrassment.

“Accordingly will you please advise whether in light of all present - circumstances you still feel it desirable for (Warne) to be absent from the country for a time. For your - information it is the present disposition ODACID to pursue this subject further only if you feel that - there are compelling reasons dictating the absence.”In a memorandum to Roosevelt, July 30, Waller recommended that “if you concur, I shall + circumstances you still feel it desirable for (Warne) to be absent from the country for a time. For your + information it is the present disposition ODACID to pursue this subject further only if you feel that + there are compelling reasons dictating the absence.”In a memorandum to Roosevelt, July 30, Waller recommended that “if you concur, I shall advise Jernegan to take no - action to arrange for Mr. Warne to be called away from Iran.” + action to arrange for Mr. Warne to be called away from Iran.” (Ibid.)

- Frank G. - WisnerPrinted from a + Frank G. + WisnerPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
-
- 254. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, +
+ 254. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 80R01443R, Box 1, Folder 28, NSC Briefing 30 July 53. Secret; Security Information. This paper was apparently prepared @@ -35786,17 +30242,13 @@ Dulles’ briefing of the NSC on July 30. In the top right-hand corner of the paper is a handwritten note that reads: - “used.” The minutes of the July 30 NSC meeting record that the DCI briefed the NSC on + “used.” The minutes of the July 30 NSC meeting record that the DCI briefed the NSC on significant world developments, including “developments in Iran.” (National Archives, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Minutes 1947–1961, Box 29, 157th Meeting—Section 1) The memorandum of discussion at the July 30 NSC meeting, prepared by - Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason, notes that “Mr. Dulles stated that in Iran another + Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason, notes that “Mr. Dulles stated that in Iran another crisis was approaching. A plebiscite was due to be held on August 5 to give Mossadegh the right to get rid of Parliament. The Shah had locked himself in his palace, and the Tudeh Party was supporting @@ -35805,8 +30257,7 @@ (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 4, 157th Meeting of the National Security Council) - Washington, July 29, 1953. + Washington, July 29, 1953.

POLITICAL PROSPECTS IN IRAN

Prime Minister Mossadeq’s cabinet decree of 25 July provides for a popular vote on whether or not the @@ -35822,13 +30273,11 @@ accuses it of being a tool of the imperialistic West. Thus, the prime minister is assured of its support on this issue.

-

By conducting the nonsecret ballot provided for in Mossadeq’s decree, his henchmen, +

By conducting the nonsecret ballot provided for in Mossadeq’s decree, his henchmen, supported by the security forces, will be in a position to exert direct influence on the voters. Accordingly, there is little doubt that such a referendum will approve the dissolution of the present Majlis.

-

What may be expected thereafter? Since Mossadeq is currently operating under virtual +

What may be expected thereafter? Since Mossadeq is currently operating under virtual dictatorial powers voted him by the Majlis last spring—powers which will not expire until January 1954—he is in a position to rule alone. He has, however, so far apparently been sufficiently unsure of himself to desire @@ -35836,19 +30285,16 @@ elections can accordingly be anticipated.

Rigged elections are traditionally standard practice in Iran, and normally several months are needed to conduct the actual ballot-ing. - During the last elections for Majlis seats, the Mossadeq govern-ment used both legal + During the last elections for Majlis seats, the Mossadeq govern-ment used both legal and illegal means to ensure the election of its candidates.

-

The present situation offers unique angles, however, and Mossadeq may not be able to secure a +

The present situation offers unique angles, however, and Mossadeq may not be able to secure a new Majlis which will be more amenable than the present one. While the Communists will support him in the referendum, in a Majlis election it will probably put up its own candidates. In view of the overwhelming Tudeh demonstration in Tehran on 21 July, some of its candidates would be successful there. In other cities, such as Isfahan, it might also be successful. Tudeh candidates would probably represent Communist-front - groups; they might even be disguised and run under Mossadeq’s banner. In districts where + groups; they might even be disguised and run under Mossadeq’s banner. In districts where Tudeh strength is weak, its support would be thrown directly to Mossadeq in order to defeat his opposition.

@@ -35856,8 +30302,7 @@ opposition grouped loosely around the shah and the royal court. Tribal chiefs, army officers, the landed gentry, and religious fanatics under the control of Mullah Kashani - might, if they were united, defeat Mossadeq. In the rural districts they can hardly be + might, if they were united, defeat Mossadeq. In the rural districts they can hardly be denied, and their candidates can only be defeated through wholesale terrorism.

Under any circumstances, several months will elapse before a Majlis can @@ -35875,40 +30320,29 @@

Mossadeq has been recently reported as undecided and extremely nervous, but, on another occasion, - as convinced that the people will support him fully. Mossadeq’s personal appeal and his + as convinced that the people will support him fully. Mossadeq’s personal appeal and his almost miraculous ability to recoup should not be overlooked; on the other hand, Tudeh is the only political party in Iran which has a sense of purpose and a clear doctrine to offer.

-

An ominous note is sounded by Mossadeq’s off-the-record statement to New York Times correspondent Richard [Kennett] Love. In commenting on the 21 July Tudeh +

An ominous note is sounded by Mossadeq’s off-the-record statement to New York Times correspondent Richard [Kennett] Love. In commenting on the 21 July Tudeh demonstrations, the prime minister stated: “You cannot crush the will of the people—look at what happened in China.”

-
+
255. Memorandum From the Chief of the Iran Branch, Near East and - Africa Division, Directorate of Plans (Waller) to the Deputy Director for Plans, Central - Intelligence Agency (Wisner)Source: Central Intelligence + Africa Division, Directorate of Plans (Waller) to the Deputy Director for Plans, Central + Intelligence Agency (Wisner)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 10, TPAJAX. Top Secret; Security Information; Eyes Only. - Washington, July 30, 1953. + Washington, July 30, 1953. SUBJECT - Problem of Neutralizing Qashqai/Amini Threat to TPAJAX + Problem of Neutralizing Qashqai/Amini Threat to TPAJAX

I. Problem

The Qashqais, particularly Khosrow - Qashqai, and their allies, the Aminis, represent a serious potential + Qashqai, and their allies, the Aminis, represent a serious potential menace to TPAJAX. Ideally they should be brought to the point of cooperating with TPAJAX. Failing this, they should be neutralized.

II. Background

@@ -35919,8 +30353,7 @@ of Mossadeq to build their own political power for the purpose of eventually taking over the government from Mossadeq.

-

B. Station has been in contact with both Qashqais and Aminis since the inception of TPAJAX, +

B. Station has been in contact with both Qashqais and Aminis since the inception of TPAJAX, realizing they represented a powerful political/military/tribal force which must be won over or neutralized.

@@ -35928,33 +30361,24 @@ their refusal to be associated in any way with a plot involving the British. No mention of TPAJAX has ever been made or inferred but recent developments show the Qashqais suspect U.S. implication in what they - believe is a British sponsored plot to oust Mossadeq.

-

III. Qashqai/Amini Position as Stated by Khosrow Qashqai—27 July

+ believe is a British sponsored plot to oust Mossadeq.

+

III. Qashqai/Amini Position as Stated by Khosrow Qashqai—27 July

A. Khosrow Qashqai is suspicious - of possible Anglo-American cooperation in plan to oust Mossadeq.

+ of possible Anglo-American cooperation in plan to oust Mossadeq.

B. Qashqai/Amini clique fully - agreed to “take orders from U.S. in any American backed plan”Omitted here is a footnote in the original that + agreed to “take orders from U.S. in any American backed plan”Omitted here is a footnote in the original that contains detailed operational material. but would “fight to finish” any plot in which British or British agents involved.

C. Qashqais and Aminis willing to - produce blueprint for action and discuss with KUBARK. Their cost estimates are high + produce blueprint for action and discuss with KUBARK. Their cost estimates are high ($5,000,000 plus $250,000,000 economic aid by loan or grant upon completion of successful action).

-

IV. Station/Roosevelt Estimate of Qashqai/Amini Position and Proposal

+

IV. Station/Roosevelt Estimate of Qashqai/Amini Position and Proposal

A. Genuineness:

Offer made with Qashqais retaining in their own mind initiative to follow through if we agree—or later betray if it to their advantage.

B. Validity their claims

-

1. Political support based on their alliance Mossadeq and would materially be reduced if they broke +

1. Political support based on their alliance Mossadeq and would materially be reduced if they broke with him. Major political asset their current freedom from British taint.

2. Military support largely valid, although some exaggeration should be @@ -35974,16 +30398,13 @@ to Solve Qashqai/Amini Problem

Proceed with TPAJAX and attempt to enlist under most favorable - circumstances cooperation of certain elements of Qashqais/Aminis. If cooperation cannot be gained they should be + circumstances cooperation of certain elements of Qashqais/Aminis. If cooperation cannot be gained they should be neutralized. This should be done in such a way as to eliminate danger premature exposure of TPAJAX.

[2 paragraphs (16 lines) not declassified]

VIII. NE/4 Estimate

-

With reference to heading IV, Station/Roosevelt Estimate of +

With reference to heading IV, Station/Roosevelt Estimate of Qashqai/Amini Position and Proposal, NE–4 is in general agreement, with the following comments:

@@ -35996,15 +30417,12 @@

D [sic]. The Qashqais have cooperated with the British in the past. At the present time, however, it is political suicide to appear to be anything but anti-British and this attitude will - continue until such time as Mossadeq falls.

+ continue until such time as Mossadeq falls.

E. We should stick firmly with TPAJAX through period of discussions with Shah.

F. Only if we discard TPAJAX or it fails in execution should we swing to - concrete planning with Qashqai/Amini.In the margin next to - paragraphs D, E, and F is a handwritten note by Wisner that reads: + concrete planning with Qashqai/Amini.In the margin next to + paragraphs D, E, and F is a handwritten note by Wisner that reads: “Okay.”

IX. NE/4 Recommended Action

@@ -36012,47 +30430,36 @@

C. Discussions in the U.S. with the Qashqais should achieve the following:

1. Remove them from Iran and hence a part of the danger to TPAJAX.

-

2. Inform them that U.S. finally resolved to save Iran from Mossadeq and Communism. However, no +

2. Inform them that U.S. finally resolved to save Iran from Mossadeq and Communism. However, no mention will be made to them regarding our present implication in a plot to overthrow Mossadeq.

3. If their stay should overlap the abandonment of TPAJAX then negotiations could be switched to a discussion of their own blueprint.

- John H. - Waller + John H. + Waller
-
+
256. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs, Office - of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Stutesman) to the Director of the Office of Greek, + of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Stutesman) to the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and - African Affairs (Richards)Source: Central Intelligence + African Affairs (Richards)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 8, TPAJAX Vol. II. Top Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Stutesman. Printed from an uninitialed copy. A handwritten note in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum reads: “late July?” - Washington, undated. + Washington, undated. SUBJECT Measures which the United States Government Might Take in Support - of a Successor Government to Mosadeq + of a Successor Government to Mosadeq -

Assumption—a coup against Mosadeq has firmly established a +

Assumption—a coup against Mosadeq has firmly established a successor government we wish to support.

Problem—What measures might the United States Government take to support the successor government?

@@ -36066,11 +30473,9 @@ Iran to a repetition of our traditional unwillingness to interfere in the internal affairs of a free country and our willingness to work with the government in power. The U.K. Government should give no indication - that it considers a successor to Mosadeq to be ready to serve U.K. interests or that the + that it considers a successor to Mosadeq to be ready to serve U.K. interests or that the British had a hand in bringing him to power. Naturally, there should be - no expression of regret that Mosadeq has departed from the political scene.

+ no expression of regret that Mosadeq has departed from the political scene.

2. The U.S. Government should avoid any statement that the oil question is involved in a change of government in Iran. It is important that neither the U.S. nor U.K. Governments should rejoice publicly over @@ -36121,12 +30526,10 @@ presently representing a financial burden to the Iranian Government.

Private

1. Privately the new government could be assured of U.S. willingness to - provide military aid to any reasonable extent desired. A particular point might be made of + provide military aid to any reasonable extent desired. A particular point might be made of providing military items such as trucks and communication equipment which have civilian uses.

-

2. Since it is quite likely that a coup against the Mosadeq Government will result in +

2. Since it is quite likely that a coup against the Mosadeq Government will result in serious urban disturbances and possibly outbreaks resembling civil war in the provinces, the new government will probably face an initial problem of restoring order. Riot-quelling weapons, small arms, and money @@ -36134,8 +30537,7 @@ equipment clandestinely to any Iranian forces.

III. Economic Measures

1. Budgetary support will be an important and - immediate need of any successor to Mosadeq. At first, foreign budgetary aid should be given + immediate need of any successor to Mosadeq. At first, foreign budgetary aid should be given as privately as possible without requiring public agreements or commitments on the part of a new Iranian Government. A covert operation might meet this problem for the first month particularly in payment of @@ -36147,8 +30549,7 @@

Appendix I describes in detail Iran’s yearly budgetary deficit ($45 million if the NIOC sells enough oil to cover its own expenses). A basic assumption to this estimate is that - a new government will not be in a position to continue Mosadeq’s clandestine printing of new + a new government will not be in a position to continue Mosadeq’s clandestine printing of new currency.

2. Note cover is an explosive political problem in Iran. Mosadeq has officially @@ -36178,8 +30579,7 @@ currency to be used at some appropriate later date for economic development in Iran, since 100 percent backing of Iran’s currency is not a fiscal necessity.In the left margin by - paragraph 2 is a handwritten note by Waller that reads: “Interesting + paragraph 2 is a handwritten note by Waller that reads: “Interesting angle—JW.”

3. Lend-lease and Surplus Property deliveries to Iran created a debt of nearly $30 million. It is obvious that the @@ -36219,12 +30619,9 @@

6. TCA. Present plans call for reducing the TCA Program in Iran to $10 million. The present level of expenditures, which - involves both FY ’52 and FY ’53 appropriations, is about $3 million + involves both FY ’52 and FY ’53 appropriations, is about $3 million a month or $35 million a year. TCA - hopes that its reduced program will be supplemented by an [illegible—TCA?] request for material aid in an + hopes that its reduced program will be supplemented by an [illegible—TCA?] request for material aid in an amount sufficient to bring the ’54 program up to the current level of expenditures. If the Point Four Program were reduced without additional material aid at a time when a new government is struggling for position @@ -36232,16 +30629,14 @@ not only weaken the new government but could quite possibly lead to the cancellation of the Point Four Agreement and expulsion of that source of U.S. influence.To the left of this - paragraph is a handwritten note in the margin by Waller that reads: “This appears to + paragraph is a handwritten note in the margin by Waller that reads: “This appears to be extremely important aspect—JW.”

7. Economic Development. Any new government of Iran must lay claim to a program to develop the country economically. To support such a program the U.S. should be in a position to offer immediately at least $15 million to help the Iranians complete dams or other projects of a long list of worthy subjects developed by American - and other advisers since the War. Appendix IINot found attached. describes three separate + and other advisers since the War. Appendix IINot found attached. describes three separate irrigation projects, each of which could be developed with $45 million over a three-year period.

The Export-Import Bank has long had earmarked a $25 million loan for @@ -36255,13 +30650,11 @@ dominated by a known Soviet agent could be restored to effective operation by a U.S. private concern supported unobtrusively by the U.S. Government.To the left of this - paragraph is a handwritten note in the margin by Waller that reads: “Doubt if this + paragraph is a handwritten note in the margin by Waller that reads: “Doubt if this contributes greatly to economy—JW.”

IV. Relations With the United Kingdom

-

1. Any British statements welcoming a successor to Mosadeq or otherwise indicating that +

1. Any British statements welcoming a successor to Mosadeq or otherwise indicating that the successor will serve U.K. interests, will probably serve as death warrants for the new premier.

2. If the U.K. restricts U.S. action vis-à-vis a new Iranian Government @@ -36283,8 +30676,7 @@ to its members why Mosadeq should be supported in his feud with the Shah, obviously fearing severe restrictive measures against it should a new Prime Minister appear.

-

2. Once he was out of office, Mosadeq would automatically become a Tudeh martyr and +

2. Once he was out of office, Mosadeq would automatically become a Tudeh martyr and the party would throw its full weight behind those elements seeking his restoration. Should Mosadeq himself disappear from the scene, the Tudeh could conceivably seize @@ -36309,14 +30701,12 @@

APPENDIX I

Iran’s gross budget is estimated to be running a deficit at the rate of about 6 billion rials ($120 million) per year. On the optimistic - assumption that the National Iranian Oil Co. (NIOC) will export sufficient oil to be self-supporting from + assumption that the National Iranian Oil Co. (NIOC) will export sufficient oil to be self-supporting from oil revenues, and assuming further budgetary economies, this deficit could be reduced to some 4.0 billion rials. At 50 rials per dollar this is the equivalent of $20 million. After allowing for the increased rial revenues from customs receipts because of the greater volume of imports - resulting from an aid program, this would be reduced to some $65 million. In a background where + resulting from an aid program, this would be reduced to some $65 million. In a background where the United States was taking positive action to prevent the loss of Iran, it is estimated that the Government could finance by loans from the Central Bank, the sum of 1 billion rials ($20 million). We are then @@ -36354,20 +30744,13 @@ security forces amounts to 3,271,250,000 rials ($67 million).

-
+
257. Monthly Report Prepared in the Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence AgencySource: - Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 81–01061R, Box 2, Folder 2, Monthly + Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 81–01061R, Box 2, Folder 2, Monthly Report—July 1953—Country Summaries and Analyses. Top Secret; Security Information. - Washington, undated. + Washington, undated.

IRAN

July 1953

A. General Developments

@@ -36375,8 +30758,7 @@ Iran. The opposition’s success in preventing action in the Majlis on Mossadeq’s requests resulted in the surprise resignation from the Majlis of all government - supporters, leaving that body without a quorum. Mossadeq now proposes holding a + supporters, leaving that body without a quorum. Mossadeq now proposes holding a national referendum, on 3 August in Tehran and 10 August in the rest of the country. The referendum will seek national approval for the dissolution of the present Majlis and also revocation of the Shah’s @@ -36388,20 +30770,13 @@ staunchest supporters, most notably the Qashqai brothers and the powerful Amini family. This alarm was heightened by the fact that the Tudeh demonstration in - celebration of the first anniversary of the overthrow of Qavam on 21 July so completely - overshadowed the demonstration staged by Mossadeq’s National Movement.

+ celebration of the first anniversary of the overthrow of Qavam on 21 July so completely + overshadowed the demonstration staged by Mossadeq’s National Movement.

3. Mossadeq and his supporters were given a clear indication of the U.S. government’s concern over the - mounting communist strength in Iran by Secretary Dulles’ recent statement to the - press.See footnote 2, Document 252. They also were served - notice, through President Eisenhower’s letter to Mossadeq,See Document 230. that the Iranian + mounting communist strength in Iran by Secretary Dulles’ recent statement to the + press.See footnote 2, Document 252. They also were served + notice, through President Eisenhower’s letter to Mossadeq,See Document 230. that the Iranian government would not be bailed out of its economic difficulties by the U.S. so long as it demonstrated no sincere interest in achieving an oil settlement with the British.

@@ -36414,37 +30789,27 @@

Paramilitary Operations

[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

- John H. - Waller + John H. + Waller CNE-4
-
+
258. Memorandum From the Director of the U.S. Technical Cooperation - Administration Mission in Iran (Warne) to the Chargé d’Affaires in Iran (Mattison)Source: National Archives, RG 469, Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies + Administration Mission in Iran (Warne) to the Chargé d’Affaires in Iran (Mattison)Source: National Archives, RG 469, Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies 1948–1961, Mission to Iran, Executive Office Subject Files (Central Files) 1951–1961, Box 7, Folder 8, 350 Political: 1953. Confidential; Security Information. - Tehran, August 6, 1953. -

Conference With Dr. Akhavi and Mr. ZanganehRegarding Tudeh Party

+ Tehran, August 6, 1953. +

Conference With Dr. Akhavi and Mr. ZanganehRegarding Tudeh Party

At a meeting called this morning for the purpose of discussing the location of the wool scouring plant of one of our project agreements, the Minister of National Economy, A.A. Akhavi, and Eng. Ahmad Zanganeh of Plan Organization, in grave mien, discussed with me for 40 minutes the problem Iran faces as a - result of the statements issued in Washington by Secretary Dulles and President Eisenhower regarding communist + result of the statements issued in Washington by Secretary Dulles and President Eisenhower regarding communist influence here. Others present were Eng. Radjy who took little part in the conversation and, for a few minutes near the end of this part of the discussion, Mr. Stanley Drake of the Point 4 staff, the expert on the @@ -36474,8 +30839,7 @@ Tudeh had endeavored to organize the laborers at Masjid-i-Suliman and the Government resisted and in the fracas several were killed. He said that the Government endeavored to ship 10,000 tons of rice from - Khorramshahr and that Tudeh elements, definitely traced to AIOC support, had blocked the shipment + Khorramshahr and that Tudeh elements, definitely traced to AIOC support, had blocked the shipment through raising trouble on the docks with porters and longshoremen and, in the town, with the people to the point that the shipment was delayed until the letter of credit expired. He said the propaganda was “why @@ -36503,11 +30867,9 @@ by reason of the fact that the United States and most of the free world would not buy its products. He cited a public adjudication for the sale of their surplus wool which, he said, resulted just this week in not a - single bid. He said the sugar situation was extremely difficult and in the end they might have to send + single bid. He said the sugar situation was extremely difficult and in the end they might have to send produce to Russia in exchange for sugar.

-

“What are we to do?” both Dr. Akhavi and Mr. Zanganeh repeatedly asked. I made no +

“What are we to do?” both Dr. Akhavi and Mr. Zanganeh repeatedly asked. I made no effort to respond.

“Where are the reports coming from that are misleading the officials in the United States?” they repeatedly asked. I made no effort to @@ -36538,31 +30900,23 @@ earnestly, that is “what they want you to do” and that is why they cry “Yankee Go Home.”

- William E. - WarnePrinted from a copy + William E. + WarnePrinted from a copy with this typed signature and an indication that the original was signed.
-
- 259. Draft National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79R01012A, Box 32, +
+ 259. Draft National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79R01012A, Box 32, Folder 3, (NIE 102) Probable Developments in Iran. Top Secret; Security Information. The draft estimate was prepared in the Office of National Estimates. A summary - of the estimate was sent to Dulles by Kent on August 13. (Ibid., Job 79R00904A, Box 1, + of the estimate was sent to Dulles by Kent on August 13. (Ibid., Job 79R00904A, Box 1, Folder 4, Memo for DCI (1953) - (Substantive)) For the final text of the NIE, see Document + (Substantive)) For the final text of the NIE, see Document 347. - Washington, August 12, 1953. + Washington, August 12, 1953. SUBJECT The Current Outlook in Iran (Staff Draft for Board @@ -36571,13 +30925,11 @@

The Problem

To re-assess the outlook in Iran in the light of developments since publication of NIE–75/1, “Probable - Future Developments in Iran through 1953.”Document 152.

+ Future Developments in Iran through 1953.”Document 152.

Estimate

Introduction

1. The elements of instability and uncertainty in the Iranian situation - have become more pronounced since the beginning of 1953. While Mossadeq has managed to retain control + have become more pronounced since the beginning of 1953. While Mossadeq has managed to retain control of the government and the political initiative in Iran, he has made no discernable progress toward solution of the serious problems confronting the country and has suffered a long series of political setbacks. These @@ -36589,11 +30941,8 @@ colleagues in the National Front, including such leading figures as Kashani, Baghai, and Makki, now oppose him, leaving only a small group of faithful - supporters. A group of ex-Army officers headed by General Zahedi is openly committed to his - downfall, and such nominal Mossadeq collaborators as Minister of Court Amini (whose brother heads the + supporters. A group of ex-Army officers headed by General Zahedi is openly committed to his + downfall, and such nominal Mossadeq collaborators as Minister of Court Amini (whose brother heads the gendarmérie) appear to be secretly plotting against him. Following Mossadeq’s unsuccessful effort to drive the Shah into exile in February, the Majlis opposition @@ -36608,44 +30957,32 @@ also have involved a fraudulent count. The opposition abstained.

2. Another unsettling development has been the emergence of the Communist Tudeh Party as the leading manipulator of mob pressure, at least in - Tehran, and as an important source of support for Mossadeq vis-à-vis his non-Communist + Tehran, and as an important source of support for Mossadeq vis-à-vis his non-Communist opposition. While Mossadeq and Tudeh still appear to be operating at arm’s length, he clearly accepted Tudeh collaboration in the recent referendum and in preliminary demonstrations. In the two most recent of these demonstrations, Tudeh - made a far more impressive showing than Mossadeq’s own followers.

-

3. Finally, there has been a change in the attitudes of the US and the USSR which has almost certainly necessitated a review of + made a far more impressive showing than Mossadeq’s own followers.

+

3. Finally, there has been a change in the attitudes of the US and the USSR which has almost certainly necessitated a review of Iranian foreign policy. The US attitude toward Mossadeq has gradually - hardened, culminating in President Eisenhower’s warning of 30 June that Iran can expect no + hardened, culminating in President Eisenhower’s warning of 30 June that Iran can expect no emergency assistance from the US so long - as it refuses a reasonable oil settlement with the British.See Document 230. - This development has not only helped weaken Mossadeq’s internal position, by undercutting the + as it refuses a reasonable oil settlement with the British.See Document 230. + This development has not only helped weaken Mossadeq’s internal position, by undercutting the widespread belief that the US was - backing him, but has also struck at one of Mossadeq’s own fundamental convictions—namely, that if + backing him, but has also struck at one of Mossadeq’s own fundamental convictions—namely, that if he holds on to power long enough and thus proves that he is the man to - deal with, fear of Communism will eventually compel the US to provide him with oil markets or + deal with, fear of Communism will eventually compel the US to provide him with oil markets or financial assistance without requiring concessions to the British or other limitations on his freedom of action. Meanwhile, the new Soviet regime has not only agreed to a doubling of Soviet-Iranian trade but has also joined in negotiations for a general settlement of outstanding issues between the two countries. These developments have raised the possibility that Mossadeq might - bolster his popular prestige by obtaining concessions from the USSR and have indirectly lessened the - pressure on him to curry favor with the US.

-

The Outlook for Mossadeq and the non-Communist Opposition

+ bolster his popular prestige by obtaining concessions from the USSR and have indirectly lessened the + pressure on him to curry favor with the US.

+

The Outlook for Mossadeq and the non-Communist Opposition

4. As a general proposition, we believe that the odds still favor Mossadeq’s retention of power at least through the end of 1953. He is convinced that Iran needs his @@ -36656,25 +30993,21 @@ including the security forces; and still has a large, undefined residue of popularity and prestige on which to fall back. His financial problems are unlikely to produce an early crisis despite his probable continued - resort to the printing press to meet current expenses; crops are good, the general level of + resort to the printing press to meet current expenses; crops are good, the general level of economic activity is fairly normal, and such inflation as has developed shows no signs of soon getting out of control. Finally, it is uncertain whether any serious challenge to his leadership will soon emerge. The Shah’s past unwillingness to give strong backing to an effort to oust Mossadeq is likely to be reinforced by the current absence of a Majlis which might give legal - sanction to such a move, and it remains unclear whether Mossadeq’s other opponents are capable + sanction to such a move, and it remains unclear whether Mossadeq’s other opponents are capable of banding together and following through with a unified and vigorous effort to overthrow him by force unless they get the Shah’s cooperation. Although Tudeh’s capabilities are manifestly increasing, we believe that it is not yet prepared to make a direct bid for power itself and—except - to take advantage of a sudden crisis—will not turn against Mossadeq until it has further exploited + to take advantage of a sudden crisis—will not turn against Mossadeq until it has further exploited its current tacit alliance with him.

-

5. Despite these favorable factors, Mossadeq will still face considerable difficulty in +

5. Despite these favorable factors, Mossadeq will still face considerable difficulty in maintaining his present position. So long as the present unsettled situation continues, he will be constantly exposed to the danger that an effective movement to unseat him may in fact emerge, even though a @@ -36703,14 +31036,10 @@

a. A settlement with the British providing for resumption of large-scale Iranian oil operations remains extremely unlikely. The British have no present need for Iranian oil and appear resolved to hold out for what - they consider a fair basis for determining compensation. Mossadeq will almost certainly continue + they consider a fair basis for determining compensation. Mossadeq will almost certainly continue to reject these terms. Even if the British were induced to offer - settlement terms more favorable to Iran (as, for example, along the lines of the lump sum - compensation proposal advanced by Mossadeq this spring), Mossadeq’s innate belief in British perfidy and his + settlement terms more favorable to Iran (as, for example, along the lines of the lump sum + compensation proposal advanced by Mossadeq this spring), Mossadeq’s innate belief in British perfidy and his predilection for haggling would probably prevent any satisfactory arrangement from being reached.

b. There is little chance that Iran can find customers for significant @@ -36719,13 +31048,11 @@ easing of the world tanker supply, Iran’s sales thus far have been held to extremely small proportions, mainly because the major companies which share with AIOC the domination of the - world oil market are reluctant to clash with AIOC on this issue, have ample supplies of their own, and + world oil market are reluctant to clash with AIOC on this issue, have ample supplies of their own, and would probably react sharply against any attempts by independents to bring in large quantities of cut-rate Iranian oil. These considerations are unlikely to change in the near future.

-

c. Finally, little help is likely to come from the USSR. While the Soviet bloc might agree +

c. Finally, little help is likely to come from the USSR. While the Soviet bloc might agree to purchase small quantities of Iranian oil, it would probably be deterred from absorbing significant amounts by (1) its lack of any need for such amounts and (2) its probable reluctance to make possible any @@ -36735,12 +31062,10 @@ temporary alleviation of Iran’s financial woes, particularly since Iran is already using at least half of that amount as note cover.

7. Under these circumstances, and with the appeal to nationalist fervor - less potent than it has been in the past, Mossadeq will probably have to place increased reliance + less potent than it has been in the past, Mossadeq will probably have to place increased reliance on chicanery, intimidation, and military force to maintain himself. Nevertheless, this trend toward increasing authoritarianism will - probably be checked at least to some extent by Mossadeq’s desire to maintain his legal + probably be checked at least to some extent by Mossadeq’s desire to maintain his legal status as representative of the people’s will and by his probable inability to build a strong and reliable dictatorial apparatus. While Mossadeq may attempt to use @@ -36753,10 +31078,8 @@ point for opposition elements. However, except as an act of desperation or opportunism, Mossadeq is unlikely to risk another full-scale onslaught on the Shah, since it - would probably serve to unite the opposition as did Mossadeq’s attempt last spring and - might conceivably result in Mossadeq’s own downfall.

+ would probably serve to unite the opposition as did Mossadeq’s attempt last spring and + might conceivably result in Mossadeq’s own downfall.

8. While Mossadeq might succeed in securing a nominal majority in new Majlis elections, mainly through reliance on the open ballot @@ -36766,24 +31089,19 @@ over a period of weeks or months would facilitate government rigging of the balloting and enable Mossadeq once again to cancel elections in doubtful districts once he had seated - a minimum number of supporters. However, Mossadeq would probably still have difficulty in + a minimum number of supporters. However, Mossadeq would probably still have difficulty in invading the feudal strongholds of the old conservative landlord class, which held on to a considerable number of seats in the 1952 elections, when Mossadeq’s popular appeal and ability to secure local supporters were far greater than they are - now, and which would probably have fared even better if Mossadeq had not stopped the balloting - when it was little more than half-finished. This time, Mossadeq would lack the support of + now, and which would probably have fared even better if Mossadeq had not stopped the balloting + when it was little more than half-finished. This time, Mossadeq would lack the support of Kashani, whose local - workers were extremely effective in 1952. Moreover, Mossadeq would probably lose some seats + workers were extremely effective in 1952. Moreover, Mossadeq would probably lose some seats in Tehran and possibly other urban centers to Tudeh nominees.

9. In any event, Mossadeq is unlikely to be any more successful than in the past in finding men he - can trust to stand by him after they are elected. Although Mossadeq is likely to go through with + can trust to stand by him after they are elected. Although Mossadeq is likely to go through with new elections so long as they show any promise of reinforcing his position, they are at best likely to provide him with only a short breathing spell.

@@ -36792,20 +31110,17 @@ retain power, he is likely to take steps which will weaken the prestige and influence of the US in Iran and which will increase the danger of an ultimate Communist takeover.

-

11. In the foreign relations field, Mossadeq is likely to give Tudeh free rein in attacking +

11. In the foreign relations field, Mossadeq is likely to give Tudeh free rein in attacking the US and to become more critical of the US in his own public statements. He - can be expected to accept any genuine concessions the USSR may offer him and might go so far as + can be expected to accept any genuine concessions the USSR may offer him and might go so far as to eject the US military missions and to pledge Iran to refrain from entering into any defense arrangement with the West if offered sufficient Soviet inducement. Such moves are likely to result in a decline in US prestige, an improvement in the popular standing of the pro-Soviet element, and possibly widened opportunities for Soviet propaganda and subversion.

-

12. In the domestic field, Mossadeq will probably continue to rely on Tudeh support +

12. In the domestic field, Mossadeq will probably continue to rely on Tudeh support in his efforts to dominate his non-Communist opponents. As a result, he will probably feel compelled to wink at the continuation of Tudeh demonstrations and the re-emergence of Tudeh as an acknowledged @@ -36818,29 +31133,25 @@ believe they will go so far within the next few months as to result in Iran’s coming directly or indirectly under Communist domination.

14. With respect to the USSR, it is - extremely unlikely that an ardent nationalist of Mossadeq’s stripe would grant the + extremely unlikely that an ardent nationalist of Mossadeq’s stripe would grant the USSR oil concessions, permit Soviet technicians to move in at Abadan, or otherwise open the way for large-scale Soviet penetration of Iran. Moreover, it is almost equally unlikely that Mossadeq will sever all ties with the US. Despite some signs that he may be changing his mind, he will probably be extremely - reluctant to abandon completely the belief that the US will eventually have to come to his and + reluctant to abandon completely the belief that the US will eventually have to come to his and Iran’s assistance, and he probably hopes that his current dealings with the USSR, together with the rise of Tudeh, will serve to impress the US with - the danger of losing Iran to the Communists. In any event, Mossadeq is unquestionably convinced, + the danger of losing Iran to the Communists. In any event, Mossadeq is unquestionably convinced, as are most Iranians, that national salvation depends on balancing off the great powers and thus preventing any single one of them from achieving a dominant influence over Iran. He will therefore continue to desire US support as a counterweight to possible Soviet pressure.

15. We also consider it unlikely that Tudeh’s position will improve so - rapidly under a policy of collaboration with Mossadeq as to enable it to gain power on its own + rapidly under a policy of collaboration with Mossadeq as to enable it to gain power on its own initiative before the end of 1953. Despite its growth in experience, boldness, and ability to exert mob pressure, Tudeh is still a numerically small party (with an estimated card-carrying membership of @@ -36871,9 +31182,7 @@ to intervene militarily on its behalf, Tudeh might succeed in gaining the upper hand if no definite winner, willing and able to use the security forces to suppress Tudeh outbreaks, were to emerge. A similar - situation might arise if, in the event of Mossadeq’s death, the Shah and Mossadeq’s non-Communist opponents + situation might arise if, in the event of Mossadeq’s death, the Shah and Mossadeq’s non-Communist opponents failed to work out a rapid solution to the succession problem.

18. Barring such an unpredictable eventuality, however, a Tudeh assumption of power is most likely to come about as a result of one or @@ -36890,28 +31199,22 @@ Tudeh infiltration of the bureaucracy to a point where Tudeh could readily seize power on its own initiative.

-
+
260. Telegram From the Station in Iran to the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central - Intelligence Agency. Secret. Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in + Intelligence Agency. Secret. Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in the Central Intelligence Agency that no longer exists. See “Sources” chapter. - Tehran, August 14, + Tehran, August 14, 1953, 1303Z.

TEHE 686. 1. Al Homdulillah.

2. Late last night, accompanied by kisses (literally) from Iranian source, we informed papers brought by [name not declassified]. They now in possession Zahedi. Evidently - pressure finally effective and we feel much credit must go to [name not declassified]. Action scheduled midnight + pressure finally effective and we feel much credit must go to [name not declassified]. Action scheduled midnight tonight.

3. Earlier meeting with Zahedi showed him firm of purpose but inhabiting - dream world so far as his subsequent program concerned. Spoke of free medical care for the + dream world so far as his subsequent program concerned. Spoke of free medical care for the third class citizens, mechanizing agriculture and growing vast crops of cotton on Moghan Steppes, equalizing wealth by income taxes, etc. Time not right for us to argue issue but we warning strongly against making @@ -36919,26 +31222,19 @@ realistic guidance.

End of message.

-
- 261. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: Central Intelligence +
+ 261. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, Iran 1951–1953. Restricted; Security Information; NIACT. Repeated to London - NIACT and to Beirut NIACT for Ambassador Henderson. Received at 4:28 + NIACT and to Beirut NIACT for Ambassador Henderson. Received at 4:28 a.m. - Tehran, August 16, + Tehran, August 16, 1953, 10 a.m.

333. Embassy received unconfirmed report from good source Shah in dismissing Mosadeq issued royal decree appointing General Zahedi - Prime Minister. Reports also received Acting Minister Court Amini and other court officials + Prime Minister. Reports also received Acting Minister Court Amini and other court officials arrested this morning.

Up to 9:30 a.m. city appears calm, extra police on duty, with tanks and truck loads security forces around royal palaces and Prime Minister’s @@ -36948,41 +31244,31 @@ Point IV close as trouble expected. Appropriate instructions issued.

Rumors now prevalent and received by varied Embassy sources to effect alleged coup inspired by government. Reasoning behind this general - impression is this action necessary give Mosadeq excuse move against Shah.

+ impression is this action necessary give Mosadeq excuse move against Shah.

- Mattison + Mattison
-
- 262. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: Central Intelligence +
+ 262. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, Iran 1951–1953. Restricted. Repeated to London - and to Beirut for Ambassador Henderson. Received at 7:55 a.m. - Tehran, August 16, + and to Beirut for Ambassador Henderson. Received at 7:55 a.m. + Tehran, August 16, 1953, 1 p.m.

337. Significance placed here upon fact Shojat, principal Tudeh newspaper, only one to have account alleged coup d’état this morning and that same paper had proclaimed imminence coup since August 13.

-

Aside minor hint in Mard Asia, anti-Mosadeq paper, August 16, that +

Aside minor hint in Mard Asia, anti-Mosadeq paper, August 16, that government apprehensive about coup, apparently only Communists had idea of purported coup.

Shojat on August 13 called upon government to forestall coup, naming many alleged plotters in armed forces. On August 14 same paper said certain army commanders in league with Shah and - arrangements coup all set. Claimed Kashani also in plot.

-

August 16 Shojat said Mosadeq tipped off to plot Friday afternoon and + arrangements coup all set. Claimed Kashani also in plot.

+

August 16 Shojat said Mosadeq tipped off to plot Friday afternoon and plotters, learning this, later sent white flare into sky to notify conspirators delay action. “Coup was to come off last night. Following meeting General Schwarzkopf and @@ -36995,37 +31281,26 @@ occupy government centers, radio station, arrest Prime Minister, ministers. Execute some at once. Plot discovered, tipped off. White flare sent up.

-

“American imperialists sent Schwarzkopf as spy to court after Dulles and Eisenhower statements with +

“American imperialists sent Schwarzkopf as spy to court after Dulles and Eisenhower statements with instructions present government must be ousted by military action and - replaced by government headed by men like Alayar Saleh, General + replaced by government headed by men like Alayar Saleh, General Zahedi, Hakimi, Dr. Amini.”

- Mattison + Mattison
-
+
263. Telegram From the Station in Iran to the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central - Intelligence Agency. Secret. Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in + Intelligence Agency. Secret. Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in the Central Intelligence Agency that no longer exists. See “Sources” chapter. - Tehran, August 16, 1953. -

TEHE 704. A. From Mattison.

+ Tehran, August 16, 1953. +

TEHE 704. A. From Mattison.

Both Melbourne and I, only - Embassy officers having knowledge plan, believe non-success CIA efforts not due to any lack dedicated + Embassy officers having knowledge plan, believe non-success CIA efforts not due to any lack dedicated effort nor through any failure to attempt to provide for various contingencies. All CIA personnel under K. Roosevelt leadership @@ -37039,43 +31314,32 @@ grateful for above which is fully reciprocated. Both officers have given every possible [illegible] operation. We still think there [illegible] remaining chance success if Baghdad radio strongly presses point that - Shah tricked out of country by Mossadeq determination overthrow constitution and Zahedi + Shah tricked out of country by Mossadeq determination overthrow constitution and Zahedi willing and able take aggressive stand.

End of message.

-
+
264. Telegram From the Station in Iran to the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central - Intelligence Agency. Secret. Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in + Intelligence Agency. Secret. Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in the Central Intelligence Agency that no longer exists. See “Sources” chapter. [text not declassified] - Tehran, August 16, 1953. -

TEHE 707. Suggest pass [less than 1 line not declassified] soonest:

-

1. Request you inform Shah that U.S. Govt has taken following steps to support him:

+ Tehran, August 16, 1953. +

TEHE 707. Suggest pass [less than 1 line not declassified] soonest:

+

1. Request you inform Shah that U.S. Govt has taken following steps to support him:

A. Arranged world press interview to establish fact Shah has acted legally in interest his country.

B. Supported his new Prime Minister by bringing his credentials (firmans) to attention of Iran and whole world.

-

C. Brought heavy pressure upon Chief of Staff Gen Riahi to arrest Mossadeq.

+

C. Brought heavy pressure upon Chief of Staff Gen Riahi to arrest Mossadeq.

D. Protected safety of Gen Zahedi.

E. Arranged to bring Shah’s case to country. Army is still his and looking for his orders.

F. Religious leaders go to country tomorrow in Shah’s behalf.

-

G. Make it clear to country Shah forced by Mossadeq temporarily to leave.

-

2. If Shah has not already done so desire he reaffirm Zahedi’s position as acting +

G. Make it clear to country Shah forced by Mossadeq temporarily to leave.

+

2. If Shah has not already done so desire he reaffirm Zahedi’s position as acting constitutionally. Must save lives and inspire those who now know first time what their King wants. Situation bad but may improve.

3. Zahedi plans to issue appeal to country. He has not given up and will @@ -37083,51 +31347,35 @@ Zahedi now plans utilize.

End of message.

-
- 265. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency [text not declassified]Source: Central Intelligence Agency. Secret; - Operational Immediate. Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in +
+ 265. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency [text not declassified]Source: Central Intelligence Agency. Secret; + Operational Immediate. Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in the Central Intelligence Agency that no longer exists. See “Sources” chapter. - Washington, August 16, 1953. + Washington, August 16, 1953.

DIR 16044. Re: [less than 1 line not declassified] (CIA officer).

1. Request you report immediately info re: whereabouts Shah, feasibility establishing covert contact; surveillance and protection by Iraq Govt.

2. Send info copies all messages to STEHE and [less - than 1 line not declassified] (CIA officer) and use indicator.

+ than 1 line not declassified] (CIA officer) and use indicator.

-

3. Above info should be acquired in such a way as not reveal our intention contact Shah. Security of paramount - importance as Iran situation most explosive. Do not make any effort to contact Shah.

+

3. Above info should be acquired in such a way as not reveal our intention contact Shah. Security of paramount + importance as Iran situation most explosive. Do not make any effort to contact Shah.

End of message.

-
- 266. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: Central Intelligence +
+ 266. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, - Box 11, Folder 14, Iran 1951–1953. Restricted; NIACT. Repeated to London NIACT and to Beirut for Ambassador + Box 11, Folder 14, Iran 1951–1953. Restricted; NIACT. Repeated to London NIACT and to Beirut for Ambassador Henderson. Received at 10 a.m. - Tehran, August 16, + Tehran, August 16, 1953, 3 p.m.

342. Late morning August 16, correspondents Donald Schwind, Associated Press, and Kennett Love, New York Times, went to - hills north of Tehran at request son of General Zahedi for conference. Zahedi not + hills north of Tehran at request son of General Zahedi for conference. Zahedi not present, but son showed signed decree from Shah and gave photostats of it to newsmen.

Decree, signed by Shah, dated Thursday, August 13, 1953, said:

@@ -37146,16 +31394,12 @@ with Shah’s signature because previous employment, saw photostat and declared belief Shah’s signature genuine.

- Mattison + Mattison
-
- 267. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: Central Intelligence +
+ 267. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, Iran 1951–1953. Secret; Security Information; NIACT. Repeated to London @@ -37163,12 +31407,10 @@ Ambassador Henderson. Sent with an instruction to pass to the Defense Department. Received at 12:10 p.m. - Tehran, August 16, + Tehran, August 16, 1953, 5 p.m.

345. At 11:15 General McClure on - Embassy advice had conference with Chief of Staff Riahi lasting forty minutes.

+ Embassy advice had conference with Chief of Staff Riahi lasting forty minutes.

McClure stated he gravely concerned at reports he received and radio news broadcast re coup d’état. Stated had information from Embassy and other sources that Shah @@ -37191,10 +31433,8 @@ came before Shah or any particular government and that army was of people. Army would support people. He said Iran had adopted policy of long range benefit to its people; that Iran wanted and needed - sympathetic help of free world particularly US but that she would not deviate from that policy even - though it meant loss of aid and even friendship of US. He repeated his desire for continued + sympathetic help of free world particularly US but that she would not deviate from that policy even + though it meant loss of aid and even friendship of US. He repeated his desire for continued help.

McClure replied he did not know what our government’s policy would be in support an illegal government @@ -37203,39 +31443,28 @@

Riahi stated cordial personal and official relationship between them had been based on frank and honest expression of views and that he hoped that relationship would continue. - He added footnote that it unfortunate that US had been taken in by British propaganda and poor - reporting; while blood ties of Britain and US caused close collaboration, + He added footnote that it unfortunate that US had been taken in by British propaganda and poor + reporting; while blood ties of Britain and US caused close collaboration, US was the one country who could help peoples achieve their “four freedoms.”

Embassy believes McClure handling of conversation most helpful and in US interest under present difficult circumstances.

- Mattison + Mattison
-
- 268. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 268. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, - 788.00/8–1653. Secret. Repeated NIACT to London and to Beirut for Ambassador Henderson. Received at 1:09 + 788.00/8–1653. Secret. Repeated NIACT to London and to Beirut for Ambassador Henderson. Received at 1:09 p.m. - Tehran, August 16, + Tehran, August 16, 1953, 8 p.m.

348. Flight by Shah and uncertainty Zahedi actions presumably leave Mosadeq victor in protracted and Persian-mannered campaign eliminate Shah as political force in - country. Embassy considers quite possible Mosadeq may establish regency to provide needed interim + country. Embassy considers quite possible Mosadeq may establish regency to provide needed interim before eventual proclamation Iranian republic.

Believe under circumstances and pending Department decisions upon varied policy matters apparent as result new situation that Ambassador’s @@ -37245,38 +31474,30 @@ actions Mosadeq government in next few days likewise will assist Department in determining lines to be followed.Telegram 370 from Tehran, - August 17, reported that Henderson arrived in Tehran that day at 6 p.m. + August 17, reported that Henderson arrived in Tehran that day at 6 p.m. (Ibid.)

- Mattison + Mattison
-
+
269. Telegram From the Station in Iran [text not declassified]Source: Central Intelligence Agency. Secret. Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in the Central Intelligence Agency that no longer exists. See “Sources” chapter. - Tehran, August 16, 1953. + Tehran, August 16, 1953.

TEHE 705. Foll is message Shah should broadcast ad infinitum, by voice and recording. Suggest he be urged - quickest do so in name Churchill, Eden and + quickest do so in name Churchill, Eden and Salisbury:

-

“Beloved people: In past 28 months Dr Mossadeq has been given by me greatest support and +

“Beloved people: In past 28 months Dr Mossadeq has been given by me greatest support and encouragement in hope he would serve nation but in all this time he has created nothing but greatest poverty, disunity and chaos. Has also spent best part time libeling patriots and statesmen who tried help Iran.

-

“Have sworn upon God and holy Koran preserve constitution but Mossadeq’s impertinence reached point +

“Have sworn upon God and holy Koran preserve constitution but Mossadeq’s impertinence reached point where he tramps on all our sacred ideals. He’s now endangered country in name welfare country and is skillfully driving country to communism. Finding it impossible endure his treacherous deeds I dismissed him and @@ -37294,35 +31515,26 @@ the Shah to broadcast such a message. (Ibid.)

-
+
270. Telegram From the Station in Iran to the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central - Intelligence Agency. Secret. Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in + Intelligence Agency. Secret. Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in the Central Intelligence Agency that no longer exists. See “Sources” chapter. - Tehran, August 17, 1953. + Tehran, August 17, 1953.

TEHE 710. 1. MilSitRep 15–16 August 53.

-

A. As of night 13 Aug 52 [53] (as recd) CIA cut out of military preparation by Batmangeliche and +

A. As of night 13 Aug 52 [53] (as recd) CIA cut out of military preparation by Batmangeliche and Zahedi.

B. Farzanegan was told night 14 August he was not Deputy Chief Staff. Once Batmangeliche took over control of situation lost.

C. On 14 Aug 53 Zahedi (as recd) made decision to cut in Gen Daftari on - final plan to act. This may have been fatal. Riahi was informed 1700 hours 15 Aug that Shah would act + final plan to act. This may have been fatal. Riahi was informed 1700 hours 15 Aug that Shah would act that night at 2400 hours.

D. Riahi used 7 hours warning to - advantage. By 2300 hours his commanding officers Parsa, Momtaz, Ashrafi, Sharokh, and Novanry were all on spot and + advantage. By 2300 hours his commanding officers Parsa, Momtaz, Ashrafi, Sharokh, and Novanry were all on spot and waiting arrival Zahedi emissaries.

E. Despite that fact Momtaz, Sharokh, Kiani were arrested when Col Nassiri went into action.

@@ -37331,25 +31543,19 @@ Nassiri was correct in going directly to Prime Minister with firman for that is normal channel. But Nassiri walked into superior force and was arrested after notifying Mossadeq - servant he had personal message for Mossadeq. Firman dismissing Mossadeq now probably in Mossadeq’s hands.

+ servant he had personal message for Mossadeq. Firman dismissing Mossadeq now probably in Mossadeq’s hands.

G. Meantime Batmangeliche refused to attempt Chief of Staff’s office when he saw tanks and troops waiting for him at door. Without his presence in Chief of Staff’s office command radio net could not be used.

H. Zahedi waited for 2 jeeps of troops to escort him to officers club but - of course troops firmly under Riahi’s commanders. Zahedi look for escort then returned + of course troops firmly under Riahi’s commanders. Zahedi look for escort then returned Farzanegan brothers house in Shimran at 0035 August.

I. Troops moving down at 0120 hours from Shimran to Teheran sounded to - Zahedi like Nassiri’s. Troops sent to arrest the alerted Riahi. This sounded like plan being + Zahedi like Nassiri’s. Troops sent to arrest the alerted Riahi. This sounded like plan being attempted despite now overwhelming odds.

J. At that time Zahedi sent Navabi to reconnoitre. Navabi returned 0210 - hours. Police and troops stopping all vehicles. Mossadeq’s house protected from 1130 + hours. Police and troops stopping all vehicles. Mossadeq’s house protected from 1130 hours by infantry and tanks.

K. At 0230 hours Gen General @@ -37360,36 +31566,26 @@

L. Consensus was that Daftari had given game away.

M. Debate followed. Should Zahedi - hide, run, or come out in open. Decided to hide and send Farzanegan to ask CIA advice.

-

N. At 0410 hours Station officer reconnoitered city. Mossadeq house surrounded for blocks. + hide, run, or come out in open. Decided to hide and send Farzanegan to ask CIA advice.

+

N. At 0410 hours Station officer reconnoitered city. Mossadeq house surrounded for blocks. Ministry of War protected by sleeping soldiers. 2 tanks being brought up to reinforce Mossadeq’s house. All police boxes reinforced. City quiet. No fighting.

O. Advice to Zahedi to make firman known and to declare openly his legal rights reported elsewhere.

P. Riahi called meeting all high - ranking officers 0900 hours and laid down law. Gen McClure estimates that had Zahedi then walked in with firman he + ranking officers 0900 hours and laid down law. Gen McClure estimates that had Zahedi then walked in with firman he would have won.

End of message.

-
- 271. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 271. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/8–1753. Top Secret; Security Information; Priority. Repeated to Tehran. Received at 7:14 a.m. This telegram is printed with - redactions in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, + redactions in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 746–748 (Document 345). - Baghdad, August 17, + Baghdad, August 17, 1953, 7 a.m.

92. For Under Secretary—No (repeat no) Distribution. Shah of Iran expressed to Iraqi Government desire to meet me. In order to provide @@ -37402,30 +31598,23 @@ suggested for his prestige in Iran he never indicate that any foreigner had had a part in recent events. He agreed.

Shah stated that in recent weeks he had felt increasingly that he would - have to take action against Mosadeq as the latter became bolder in flouting Iranian - Constitution. Therefore, when a fortnight ago it was suggested that he sponsor a military + have to take action against Mosadeq as the latter became bolder in flouting Iranian + Constitution. Therefore, when a fortnight ago it was suggested that he sponsor a military coup he accepted the idea. However, in giving it more thought he decided that such action as he took must be within the framework of his constitutional power, hence, not (repeat not) a coup. Thus, after consultation with an American, not (repeat not) an official of the State Department, decided to appoint General - Zahedi as Prime Minister in place of Mosadeq. After being assured that + Zahedi as Prime Minister in place of Mosadeq. After being assured that everything was arranged and that there was no (repeat no) possibility of - failure, he left Tehran for his Caspian Palace in order to put Mosadeq off guard and from there three - days ago sent letter of appointment of General Zahedi to Tehran with a trusted - Iranian Colonel. The letter was delivered to General Zahedi and he was to choose the timing + failure, he left Tehran for his Caspian Palace in order to put Mosadeq off guard and from there three + days ago sent letter of appointment of General Zahedi to Tehran with a trusted + Iranian Colonel. The letter was delivered to General Zahedi and he was to choose the timing and method for informing Mosadeq. The Shah expected action would take place that very day. But no (repeat no) action took place, apparently because message arrived too late in day, and no (repeat no) action took place the following day, apparently - because it was a holiday. On the third day Mosadeq by some means had been alerted and had had the + because it was a holiday. On the third day Mosadeq by some means had been alerted and had had the time to take successful countermeasures so that when the Colonel arrived at Mosadeq’s house he was himself arrested.

@@ -37440,9 +31629,7 @@ Tehran and to have advice from his American friend. He will try to hold off giving out a statement until he gets advice, but the pressure to issue is great and mounting. He is thinking of saying in his statement - that three days ago he dismissed Prime Minister Mosadeq and appointed General Zahedi as Prime Minister, taking his + that three days ago he dismissed Prime Minister Mosadeq and appointed General Zahedi as Prime Minister, taking his action because Mosadeq had continually violated the constitution. As he himself had sworn, upon ascending the throne, to respect and uphold the constitution, he had no @@ -37456,9 +31643,7 @@

The Shah said that he is utterly at loss to understand why the plan failed. Trusted Palace officials were completely sure of its succeeding. The American friend was absolutely confident of its success. When he had - said to the American if it should fail what should he do, the American scouted the possibility of failure adding when + said to the American if it should fail what should he do, the American scouted the possibility of failure adding when pressed, that the Shah should go to Baghdad. The Shah said that is why he came to Baghdad when the plan miscarried. Now he needs information and advice upon his next move. He said that he thought that he should @@ -37469,53 +31654,39 @@ would return to reign over his people for whom he has done so much, but he replied that Mosadeq is absolutely mad and insanely jealous, like a tiger who springs upon any - living thing that it sees moving above him. Shah believes Mosadeq thinks he can form a + living thing that it sees moving above him. Shah believes Mosadeq thinks he can form a partnership with the Tudeh Party and then outwit it, but in so doing Mosadeq will become the Dr. BenesCzechoslovak President, 1935–1938 and 1945–1948. of Iran.In a - memorandum dated August 18, Under Secretary Smith summarized this telegram for + memorandum dated August 18, Under Secretary Smith summarized this telegram for the President and forwarded it to him as an attachment. He commented that “the attached message is self-explanatory and will give you the Iranian situation in a nutshell. The move failed because of three days of delay and vacillation by the Iranian generals concerned, during which time Mosadeq - apparently found out all that was happening. Actually it was a counter-coup, as the Shah acted within his - constitutional power in signing the firman replacing Mosadeq. The old boy wouldn’t + apparently found out all that was happening. Actually it was a counter-coup, as the Shah acted within his + constitutional power in signing the firman replacing Mosadeq. The old boy wouldn’t accept this and arrested the messenger and everybody else involved that he could get his hands on. We now have to take a whole new look at the Iranian situation and probably have to snuggle up to Mosadeq if we’re going to save anything there. I daresay this means a little added difficulty - with the British.” (Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, + with the British.” (Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, p. 748; Document 346)

- Berry + Berry
-
- 272. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency [text not declassified]Source: Central Intelligence Agency. Secret. +
+ 272. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency [text not declassified]Source: Central Intelligence Agency. Secret. Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in the Central Intelligence Agency that no longer exists. See “Sources” chapter. Omissions are in the transcribed text. - Washington, August 17, 1953. -

DIR 16090. 1. Reference your priority message of 17 August.The reference is presumably to [text not declassified]. In view extra sensitivity - this matter we have been requested by State to convey [1½ lines not declassified].

+ Washington, August 17, 1953. +

DIR 16090. 1. Reference your priority message of 17 August.The reference is presumably to [text not declassified]. In view extra sensitivity + this matter we have been requested by State to convey [1½ lines not declassified].

2. State considers your handling of situation exemplary under circumstances and requests that if in your judgment the situation @@ -37523,22 +31694,17 @@ suggest to him that he issue clear and definitive statement explaining his actions and ______ the ______ along lines of his statement to you yesterday, viz: “In recent weeks Shah had felt increasingly that he - would have to take action against Mossadeq as the latter became bolder in flouting the + would have to take action against Mossadeq as the latter became bolder in flouting the constitution. Therefore he decided to take action within the framework of his constitutional power ______ taken not in any sense a coup d’état. He decided to appoint Zahedi in place of Mossadeq. Three days ago - he sent letter of appointment to Zahedi to capital city with a trusted emissary. The + he sent letter of appointment to Zahedi to capital city with a trusted emissary. The letter was delivered to Zahedi which empowered him to take office. When the messenger arrived at Mossadeq’s house to deliver Shah’s communication he was arrested while trying to carry out Shah’s - order. Shah took this action dismissing Mossadeq and appointing Zahedi in his place because Mossadeq had continually violated the constitution and + order. Shah took this action dismissing Mossadeq and appointing Zahedi in his place because Mossadeq had continually violated the constitution and because Shah himself had sworn upon ascending the throne to respect and uphold the constitution. Shah had no choice but to remove the head of a government acting unconstitutionally. When it became apparent that @@ -37565,23 +31731,19 @@

5. For guidance [less than 1 line not declassified] you are not to take any action with respect to Shah without specific authorization HQS. - Please lend all possible support and assistance to Berry particularly with respect to + Please lend all possible support and assistance to Berry particularly with respect to prompt servicing his communications.

6. [less than 1 line not declassified] pass paras 1 thru 4 above to MI–6.

-

7. Explanation genesis of above follows immediately.In telegram TEHE +

7. Explanation genesis of above follows immediately.In telegram TEHE 712, August 17, the Station in Tehran urged that the following - request be sent to Ambassador Berry in Baghdad: “I urge you to send strongly + request be sent to Ambassador Berry in Baghdad: “I urge you to send strongly worded message encouragement to the Shah of Iran who is now in Baghdad. According my information he has latent support majority of Iranian population including its most eminent clerics, including, of course, Borujerdi. However his presence needed Iran to successfully - rally populace against tyranny of Mossadeq. In exercising his constitutional + rally populace against tyranny of Mossadeq. In exercising his constitutional prerogatives of dismissing one Prime Minister and appointing another he has placed himself in position having fight to finish. Please have my personal assurances that he issued firman for dismissal of @@ -37595,22 +31757,17 @@ “Sources” chapter.)

End of message.

-
+
273. Telegram From the Station in Iran to the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central - Intelligence Agency. Secret. Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in + Intelligence Agency. Secret. Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in the Central Intelligence Agency that no longer exists. See “Sources” chapter. All brackets are in the transcribed text. - Tehran, August 17, 1953. + Tehran, August 17, 1953.

TEHE 717. 1. While initial attempt failed several significant facts remain:

A. Firmans established new govt and - dismissed old. They are in effect. Mossadeq has actually conducted a revolution. Legally + dismissed old. They are in effect. Mossadeq has actually conducted a revolution. Legally Ambassador is not accredited to him but to Shah who has dismissed him.

B. Economic situation will continue to worsen.

@@ -37626,18 +31783,15 @@ constant reshuffling which now greatly intensified.

H. Religious leaders now desperate. Will attempt anything. Will try save Islam and Shah of Iran.

-

I. People apathetic toward Mossadeq call for mob reaction. Fear loss of Shah and +

I. People apathetic toward Mossadeq call for mob reaction. Fear loss of Shah and Tudeh takeover.

J. Shah waiting to see if U.S. supports his first courageous action.

-

K. Amny [Many], many yyes [eyes] now look to U.S. to save them.

+

K. Amny [Many], many yyes [eyes] now look to U.S. to save them.

L. Past Dept. of State policy can only end in loss of Iran.

2. Situation will worsen, while dictatorship strengthens.

3. Dept. of State seems willing to pull - démarche and throw arms around Mossadeq who cannot be veered.

+ démarche and throw arms around Mossadeq who cannot be veered.

4. U.S. long range Middle East interests require firm continuation Eisenhower policy.

5. Nothing can be gained by selling the Shah, constitution, army, Islam, @@ -37645,32 +31799,25 @@

6. Recommend in strongest terms CIA express firm belief in constitution policy of opposition. In long run that policy will be vindicated or all lost.

-

7. Will discuss above with Ambassador Henderson this evening.

+

7. Will discuss above with Ambassador Henderson this evening.

8. Ref para one DIR 16046In telegram DIR 16046 to Tehran, August 16, the DCI informed Roosevelt that the Department of State was firmly opposed to any American attempt to - contact the Shah. (Ibid.) and 16048:See footnote 2, Document - 269. Particularly in view [Berry’s] conversation with Shah do not + contact the Shah. (Ibid.) and 16048:See footnote 2, Document + 269. Particularly in view [Berry’s] conversation with Shah do not see how we can in good conscience refuse Shah advice and - encouragement.See Document 271.

+ encouragement.See Document 271.

End of message.

-
+
274. Memorandum Prepared in the Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 10, TPAJAX. Secret; Eyes Only. - Washington, August 17, 1953. + Washington, August 17, 1953.

Messages need to be sent to the following places and persons containing in each case the various points indicated:

a. A message via [less than 1 line not @@ -37683,89 +31830,68 @@ and in absence of any satisfactory indications of possible success, the U.S. wishes to avoid assuming responsibility for urging statements upon the Shah beyond what he himself has indicated his disposition to be. - This message might be from Whiting to Berry. We should indicate that State has seen the Arab + This message might be from Whiting to Berry. We should indicate that State has seen the Arab News Agency report on the Shah’s statement which is considered helpful but deficient in many respects—e.g., it is not nearly as good or as full as his oral statements to Berry. Also, his statement of intention to take off for Europe in the near future is regarded as unfortunate.

b. [2 lines not declassified] The message to - Berry will be [1½ lines not declassified] that Berry will handle any contact with the - Shah.The message to Berry has not been + Berry will be [1½ lines not declassified] that Berry will handle any contact with the + Shah.The message to Berry has not been found.

-

c. The substance of the message to Berry, including the text of the statement (to be drawn +

c. The substance of the message to Berry, including the text of the statement (to be drawn from Berry’s cable as indicated - by underscoring), should be repeated to Roosevelt together with the additional explanation that + by underscoring), should be repeated to Roosevelt together with the additional explanation that State has gone part of the way in the direction apparently desired by Roosevelt but has been unwilling to authorize Berry to press the Shah to make an appeal to the armed services of Iran to arise in support of him—as a matter of U.S. initiative. In this regard, the Department feels that, lacking more satisfactory indications than it has - been able to draw from Roosevelt’s messages, that there is a real and significant possibility of + been able to draw from Roosevelt’s messages, that there is a real and significant possibility of decisive action in Iran, the Department does not wish to become associated with a reckless backing of a hopeless cause. The possibility of a more affirmative State Department position in this regard would depend upon Roosevelt’s ability to provide more satisfactory evidence of the possibility of significant - resistance. (State is not sure whether Roosevelt’s language intended to buck up Shah or whether - all of it is really meant at full strength.) Reference should also be made to IN 10764,Not found. and Roosevelt should be advised that State + resistance. (State is not sure whether Roosevelt’s language intended to buck up Shah or whether + all of it is really meant at full strength.) Reference should also be made to IN 10764,Not found. and Roosevelt should be advised that State has passed the word to VOA and instructed its own press relations people to avoid any such terminology as “coup d’état,” “plot,” etc., and that while playing the story “straight” they should play up the fact that there is another version of - the story supported by both Zahedi and now the Shah which indicates that if there + the story supported by both Zahedi and now the Shah which indicates that if there was any coup d’état it was that of Mossadegh and not of Zahedi.

d. We have also to consider adding as part of one of the foregoing - messages or making it the subject of a new message—[less than 1 line not declassified]—a reference to our OUT - 81878 of 16 AugustSee footnote 2, Document 269. which + messages or making it the subject of a new message—[less than 1 line not declassified]—a reference to our OUT + 81878 of 16 AugustSee footnote 2, Document 269. which indicated that, while State had no policy objection to the British - urging the Shah to make the statement suggested by Roosevelt, we were under admonitions to + urging the Shah to make the statement suggested by Roosevelt, we were under admonitions to avoid any approach of our own to the Shah for this purpose. The point should be made that Mr. Berry’s action has at least partially overtaken that position of State and that Berry is being authorized to speak with the Shah in the sense of subparagraph a. above.

-
+
275. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 79T00937A, Box 2, Folder 2, Staff Memoranda—1953 Substantive. Secret; Security Information. - Washington, August 17, 1953. + Washington, August 17, 1953. SUBJECT The Iranian Situation -

1. The unsuccessful attempt to remove Mossadeq from power this weekend, culminating in the +

1. The unsuccessful attempt to remove Mossadeq from power this weekend, culminating in the flight of the Shah to Iraq, greatly advances the progressive deterioration of political stability in Iran.

2. On the one hand, Mossadeq’s numerous non-Communist opponents have been dealt an almost crippling blow and may never again be in a position to make a serious attempt to - overthrow him. The chief figures in the attempt to oust Mossadeq are already in jail or in + overthrow him. The chief figures in the attempt to oust Mossadeq are already in jail or in hiding, thus at least temporarily eliminating or neutralizing the most vigorous of these opponents. Even more important, the Shah’s flight—a move which may well be followed @@ -37777,8 +31903,7 @@ which it could rally but also eliminates virtually all hope that the considerable prestige and authority of the monarchy could be used to secure the necessary cooperation of the security forces and reassure the - public in any future effort to oust Mossadeq. Except in the unlikely event that a strong and + public in any future effort to oust Mossadeq. Except in the unlikely event that a strong and resolute opposition majority develops in some future Majlis, any future attempt to unseat Mossadeq will necessarily be an out-and-out coup, without legal sanction.

@@ -37787,44 +31912,35 @@ advantages which he will obtain from the failure of the attempt to unseat him and from the repressive measures he is likely to undertake to consolidate his victory. The events of the weekend are unlikely to - provoke any great revival of enthusiasm for Mossadeq himself, and in any event his probable + provoke any great revival of enthusiasm for Mossadeq himself, and in any event his probable continued failure to solve the basic economic and social problems facing Iran will result in a slow but steady drain on his popular support. While Mossadeq will probably make greater use of authoritarian methods, he shows little promise of being - able to eliminate all opposition. If Mossadeq goes through with new Majlis elections, as + able to eliminate all opposition. If Mossadeq goes through with new Majlis elections, as appears likely, his prestige plus his ability to rig the balloting will probably enable him to obtain a majority. However, he is likely to be little more successful than in the past in finding men who will stand by him once they are elected.

-

4. Thus the ultimate beneficiary of the failure to unseat Mossadeq is most likely to be the Tudeh +

4. Thus the ultimate beneficiary of the failure to unseat Mossadeq is most likely to be the Tudeh Party which has regarded the neutralization of the “counterrevolutionary” forces around the Shah as a primary objective and which has also capitalized on the widening popular unrest and insecurity - which has been developing under Mossadeq. Although Mossadeq’s reassertion of his authority makes it less + which has been developing under Mossadeq. Although Mossadeq’s reassertion of his authority makes it less likely that he will have to make important concessions to Tudeh to stay in office, Tudeh is not yet ready to seize control and will probably feel compelled to confine itself to pressure group tactics for the next few months. Nevertheless, Tudeh is at present the only remaining major contender for Mossadeq’s power, and as the deterioration of the political and economic situation in Iran - progresses its capabilities for an eventual showdown with Mossadeq will continue to grow. In the + progresses its capabilities for an eventual showdown with Mossadeq will continue to grow. In the event of Mossadeq’s death, Tudeh might well be able to capitalize on the confusion which would probably result and to gain control at least in Tehran.

5. Mossadeq’s innate suspiciousness, which has probably been reinforced by the events of the - weekend, may lead him to link the attempt to unseat him with the recent hardening of US policy toward him and to represent the - attempt as an “imperialist” plot engineered by the US and UK. + weekend, may lead him to link the attempt to unseat him with the recent hardening of US policy toward him and to represent the + attempt as an “imperialist” plot engineered by the US and UK. Even if Mossadeq convinces himself that the US is involved, however, we believe that he is likely to stop short of provoking an open @@ -37839,23 +31955,17 @@ Mossadeq probably believes that this concept is more valid than ever. Although he will probably criticize and seek to embarrass the US, - his main object will probably be that of forcing the US to assist him on his terms.

+ his main object will probably be that of forcing the US to assist him on his terms.

-
+
276. Telegram From the Station in Iran to the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central - Intelligence Agency. Secret. Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in + Intelligence Agency. Secret. Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in the Central Intelligence Agency that no longer exists. See “Sources” chapter. - Tehran, August 18, + Tehran, August 18, 1953, 1149Z. -

TEHE 724. Source [less than 1 line not declassified].

+

TEHE 724. Source [less than 1 line not declassified].

1. At extraordinary party contact evening 16 August Tudeh issued foll instruction:

A. Members possessing firearms must inform party. Also anyone knowing @@ -37874,18 +31984,13 @@ declassified].

End of message.

-
- 277. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency [text not declassified]Source: Central Intelligence Agency. Secret. Repeated +
+ 277. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency [text not declassified]Source: Central Intelligence Agency. Secret. Repeated to Tehran [text not declassified]. Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in the Central Intelligence Agency that no longer exists. See “Sources” chapter. - Washington, August 18, 1953. + Washington, August 18, 1953.

DIR 16225. 1. The following represents instructions from State with which we concur.

2. [less than 1 line not declassified] officer @@ -37908,20 +32013,15 @@ Zahedi (Identity C) in place of Mossadeq three days ago he sent letter of appointment to Zahedi to capital city with a trusted - emissary. The letter was delivered to Zahedi which empowered him to take office. When the + emissary. The letter was delivered to Zahedi which empowered him to take office. When the messenger arrived at Mossadeq’s house to deliver Shah’s communication he was arrested while trying to - carry out Shah’s order. Shah took this action dismissing Mossadeq and appointing Zahedi in his place because Mossadeq had continually violated the + carry out Shah’s order. Shah took this action dismissing Mossadeq and appointing Zahedi in his place because Mossadeq had continually violated the constitution and because Shah himself had sworn upon ascending the throne to respect and uphold the constitution. Shah had no choice but to remove the head of a government acting unconstitutionally. When it became apparent that Shah’s orders were not being followed he left the - country but stands ready to return when he can to serve the people and in the meantime + country but stands ready to return when he can to serve the people and in the meantime prays for the independence and safety of the country and that all true patriots will never allow their country to fall under the control of the illegal identity D.” Finally Shah might usefully give public expression @@ -37929,40 +32029,30 @@ that he can form a partnership with Tudeh Party and then outwit it, but in so doing Mossadeq will become the Doctor Benes of the country.

-

4. All cables this subject should be sent by Ambassador [less than 1 line not declassified] bearing above +

4. All cables this subject should be sent by Ambassador [less than 1 line not declassified] bearing above indicator. This matter of utmost sensitivity and should be handled by [less than 1 line not declassified] Ambassador accordingly.

End of message.

-
+
278. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Station in IranSource: Central - Intelligence Agency. Secret. Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in + Intelligence Agency. Secret. Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in the Central Intelligence Agency that no longer exists. See “Sources” chapter. - Washington, August 18, 1953. -

DIR 16224. Ref TEHE 717.Document 273.

+ Washington, August 18, 1953. +

DIR 16224. Ref TEHE 717.Document 273.

1. In view Ambassador Henderson’s - return and in light of indications contained in ref, State Dept and ourselves most anxious receive + return and in light of indications contained in ref, State Dept and ourselves most anxious receive benefit your views after full discussion which we assume already taking - place between you and Ambassador Henderson.

+ place between you and Ambassador Henderson.

2. State Dept has indicated following tentative stand:

This view on basis evidence available to it is that operation has been tried and failed and we should not participate in any operation against - Mossadegh which could be traced back to US and further compromise future relations with him which - may become only course of action left open to US.In a telegram from + Mossadegh which could be traced back to US and further compromise future relations with him which + may become only course of action left open to US.In a telegram from Washington to the Foreign Office, August 17, British Ambassador Sir Roger Makins wrote that “Bedell Smith told me today @@ -37981,8 +32071,7 @@ stated by US official (“operation not quite dead”)Apparently a paraphrase of the opening sentence of telegram TEHE - 715, August 17: “Project is not yet quite dead in that Zahedi Gilanshah (Iranian sources) + 715, August 17: “Project is not yet quite dead in that Zahedi Gilanshah (Iranian sources) and Farzanegen determined to press action.” (Central Intelligence Agency. Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in the Central Intelligence @@ -38000,17 +32089,14 @@ future use.

End of message.

-
+
279. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.11/8–1853. Confidential; Security Information; Priority. Repeated Priority to Tehran and Baghdad. Received at 6:27 p.m. - Rome, August 18, + Rome, August 18, 1953, 8 p.m.

571. Shah arrived Rome early this afternoon (reference Baghdad’s 97 and Tehran’s 374 to Department).Not @@ -38020,12 +32106,10 @@ “I am not (repeat not) going to abdicate now”; asked if he had fled, he said “It is not (repeat not) true—I have not (repeat not) fled from my country”; asked if he would return, he said “Probably, but not (repeat - not) in immediate future”; Shah added he and Queen had not (repeat not) yet made up their minds, + not) in immediate future”; Shah added he and Queen had not (repeat not) yet made up their minds, but would not (repeat not) remain in Rome, indicating that they might stay on elsewhere in Italy as this is “nothing else but a vacation”. - Asked if he had any comment on Mossadeq’s policy, he said “I cannot answer that now, + Asked if he had any comment on Mossadeq’s policy, he said “I cannot answer that now, but I will have a statement regarding that in a few days. You can say, however, that I am watching very carefully every development in my country”.

@@ -38039,23 +32123,16 @@

Would appreciate instructions on manner in which Department desires Embassy deal with Shah.

- Luce + Luce
-
- 280. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 280. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, - 788.00/8–1853. Secret; Security Information; NIACT. Repeated to London. Received - at 6:57 p.m. Also printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, + 788.00/8–1853. Secret; Security Information; NIACT. Repeated to London. Received + at 6:57 p.m. Also printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 752–755 (Document 347). - Tehran, August 18, + Tehran, August 18, 1953, 10 p.m.

384. 1. My talk with Mosadeq this evening lasted one hour. He received me fully dressed (not pajama clad) @@ -38069,8 +32146,7 @@ American citizens. After Shiraz incident he had issued instructions to law enforcement agencies which had afforded high degree protection to American nationals. Unfortunately law enforcement agencies appeared - again to be becoming lax. Every hour or two I receiving additional reports attacks on American + again to be becoming lax. Every hour or two I receiving additional reports attacks on American citizens not only in Tehran but also other localities.

3. He said these attacks almost inevitable. Iranian people thought Americans were disagreeing with them and, therefore, were attacking @@ -38078,13 +32154,11 @@ in throes revolution and in revolutionary stress and strain it would require three times as many police as exist to afford full protection to American citizens. I should remember that in American Revolutionary - times when Americans wanted British out, many Britishers in US were attacked. I said if Iranians wanted + times when Americans wanted British out, many Britishers in US were attacked. I said if Iranians wanted Americans out individual attacks not necessary. We would go en masse. He said Iranian Government did not want Americans leave but some individual Iranians did and, therefore, were attacking them. I replied Chiefs of - American military mission, American gendarmérie mission, and TCI had informed me today that Iranian + American military mission, American gendarmérie mission, and TCI had informed me today that Iranian officials with whom they dealt had assured them they were anxious that these missions continue to function in Iran. These missions could be assured of maximum cooperation from Iranian authorities. These chiefs @@ -38107,12 +32181,10 @@ confidentially for use my government, just what had happened during recent days. US Government interested with respect both events and legal situation. He chose interpret my - remarks as reference to President’s letter to him last July.See Document 230. + remarks as reference to President’s letter to him last July.See Document 230. He reminded me that we had had agreement to effect existence these letters would be confidential and exchange would not be published unless - US reply would be favorable. He maintained American + US reply would be favorable. He maintained American officials either in Washington or in Tehran had directly or indirectly deliberately leaked information to pro-British Iranian press re this exchange and against his will US had @@ -38123,24 +32195,20 @@ publish, he had finally insisted previous messages exchanged last January between him and President-elect be also published. I told him it had been my understanding leak had occurred in his office and in view - distorted public version of President’s letter unfavorable to US, US + distorted public version of President’s letter unfavorable to US, US Government had thereupon insisted exchange be published. He denied heatedly Iranians had been guilty of leaks. No Iranian except himself - and Saleh, US Embassy Iranian assistant and + and Saleh, US Embassy Iranian assistant and interpretor, had been aware of existence these letters. He had kept them among his own private papers, not in office files. I intimated I not sure his private papers were kept in manner which would prevent clever agents having access to them. I also pointed out there were certain modern hearing devices which might result in knowledge this kind falling - into possession of agents parties hostile both to Iran and US. He continued insist certain Americans + into possession of agents parties hostile both to Iran and US. He continued insist certain Americans had deliberately leaked in order that public knowledge of contents of President’s letter might weaken his government. I told him that I knew that exchange had been handled in US and - Tehran in most discreet manner by trusted officials and I sure no US leak.

+ Tehran in most discreet manner by trusted officials and I sure no US leak.

6. Mosadeq then outlined events which led to dissolution Majlis. His narrative in general in line with information already furnished Department by Embassy. He maintained @@ -38163,8 +32231,7 @@ with at least certain degree of harmony.

8. I told him I particularly interested in events recent days. I would - like to know more about effort replace him by General Zahedi. He said on evening of 15th + like to know more about effort replace him by General Zahedi. He said on evening of 15th Col. Nasiri had approached his house apparently to arrest him. Col. @@ -38176,9 +32243,7 @@ British.

9. I asked Mosadeq if he had reason believe it true Shah had issued firman (decree) removing him as - Prime Minister and appointing Zahedi in his place. Mosadeq said he had never seen such decree and if he had + Prime Minister and appointing Zahedi in his place. Mosadeq said he had never seen such decree and if he had it would have made no (repeat no) difference. His position for some time had been that Shah’s powers were only of ceremonial character; that Shah had no (repeat no) right on his personal responsibility issue firman @@ -38189,8 +32254,7 @@ and (b) even if he should find that Shah had issued such firman in present circumstances he would consider it to be invalid? He replied “precisely”.

-

10. Before departing I told Mosadeq that during 24 hours since my return Tehran, +

10. Before departing I told Mosadeq that during 24 hours since my return Tehran, members American official family here had received intimations from various Iranian authorities which caused me believe some Iranian officials suspected Embassy harboring Iranian political refugees. I @@ -38209,24 +32273,17 @@ this to come out of Point IV funds. He said Iranian Government would be glad, despite limited budget, pay expenses those refugees.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
- 281. Memorandum for the RecordSource: British National Archives, FO 371/104570. +
+ 281. Memorandum for the RecordSource: British National Archives, FO 371/104570. Secret; Security Information. The memorandum is attached to a - covering note from R.J. Bowker, a Foreign Office official, indicating that - the memorandum was handed to him by Joseph Palmer of the U.S. Embassy in + covering note from R.J. Bowker, a Foreign Office official, indicating that + the memorandum was handed to him by Joseph Palmer of the U.S. Embassy in London. - Tehran, August 19, 1953. + Tehran, August 19, 1953.

Ambassador Henderson saw Prime Minister Mossedeq by appointment for an hour yesterday evening. He reported that Mossedeq was as usual courteous but the Ambassador @@ -38254,16 +32311,12 @@ purchasing operation, he decided that a British-purchased Majlis was unworthy of the Iranian people and should be eliminated. Mossedeq then asked for Henderson’s comments - concerning the dissolution of the Majlis. Henderson replied that although he was reluctant as a + concerning the dissolution of the Majlis. Henderson replied that although he was reluctant as a foreign diplomat to comment on Iranian internal affaires, it did seem to - him unfortunate for Iran and no [comfort(?)]Brackets are in the original. The word in telegram 384 (Document 280) reporting the conversation is + him unfortunate for Iran and no [comfort(?)]Brackets are in the original. The word in telegram 384 (Document 280) reporting the conversation is “compliment.” to the Iranian people that the Government of Iran apparently could not be based on a Parliament. Iran was in a most - dangerous international position and Ambassador Henderson thought that it would be + dangerous international position and Ambassador Henderson thought that it would be much more secure if all organs provided for in the Iranian constitution functions with at least a certain degree of harmony.

@@ -38274,19 +32327,16 @@ had been arrested and a number of other arrests followed. The Prime Minister said he had sworn not to try to oust the Shah and that he would have honored this oath had the Shah not engaged in a venture of this - kind. It was clear that Colonel Nasiri had been sent by the Shah to arrest him and that + kind. It was clear that Colonel Nasiri had been sent by the Shah to arrest him and that the Shah had been prompted by the British.

-

In reply to a question by Ambassador Henderson as to whether he had reason to believe that it +

In reply to a question by Ambassador Henderson as to whether he had reason to believe that it is true that the Shah had expected a firman removing Mossedeq and appointing General Zahedi as Prime Minister, Dr. Mossedeq said that he had never seen such a firman and that if he had, it would have made no difference. His position for some time had been that the Shah’s powers were of a ceremonial nature and that the Shah had no right on his personal responsibility to issue a - firman calling for a change in government. When Ambassador Henderson pointed out that he was + firman calling for a change in government. When Ambassador Henderson pointed out that he was particularly interested in this point and that he would like to report it carefully to the United States Government, Mossedeq affirmed that: (a) he had no official knowledge that the Shah had issued a firman @@ -38307,39 +32357,25 @@ that the above be treated as highly classified information.

-
+
282. Memorandum for the Record by the Deputy Director for Plans, - Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, Iran + Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, Iran 1951–1953. Secret; Security Information. - Washington, August 19, 1953. + Washington, August 19, 1953. SUBJECT - Conversation with Governor Stassen August 19, 1953, concerning FOA support for Zahedi regime + Conversation with Governor Stassen August 19, 1953, concerning FOA support for Zahedi regime -

1. Colonel White and the undersigned called upon Governor Stassen at his office this afternoon +

1. Colonel White and the undersigned called upon Governor Stassen at his office this afternoon in order to follow up on earlier conversations between Governor Stassen and the Director in which Governor Stassen had indicated that his agency would be in a position to move promptly to the support of the new regime with new or stepped-up programs of economic - assistance. (I had learned from General Smith just prior to the meeting with Governor Stassen that the two of them had - discussed this matter at some length and were in agreement that FOA should move in with substantial + assistance. (I had learned from General Smith just prior to the meeting with Governor Stassen that the two of them had + discussed this matter at some length and were in agreement that FOA should move in with substantial economic assistance at the right moment.)

-

2. I explained the current situation to Governor Stassen, who appeared to be fully +

2. I explained the current situation to Governor Stassen, who appeared to be fully aware and appreciative of the significance of the entire matter. He approved of our sending to the Embassy by our communications a statement confirming the readiness of FOA to give @@ -38350,8 +32386,7 @@ found. However, in telegram 633 to Tehran, August 27, the Department expressed its concern over obtaining the best psychological effect in Iran from any announced aid figure. Therefore, it suggested to - the Embassy that it seek a specific request from the Zahedi government, in order that + the Embassy that it seek a specific request from the Zahedi government, in order that the U.S. Government might then be able to offer a specific amount that would correspond to Iranian expectations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, @@ -38387,23 +32422,18 @@ appropriate programs of support.

3. Governor Stassen thought that we should get off this additional guidance to the field in very short - order, but he wished to have us check it with General Smith before doing so. He was - particularly anxious to be sure that General Smith would approve of this approach, + order, but he wished to have us check it with General Smith before doing so. He was + particularly anxious to be sure that General Smith would approve of this approach, as being the right one.

4. Governor Stassen also recommended that the Ambassador take up this matter at the earliest feasible moment with Mr. Warne - and obtain his assistance and guidance. He explained that Mr. Warne is a very able and energetic + and obtain his assistance and guidance. He explained that Mr. Warne is a very able and energetic representative of FOA who should be brought into the act and who should be able to make a substantial - contribution—and also since Mr. Warne will have to assume responsibility for the + contribution—and also since Mr. Warne will have to assume responsibility for the administration of any new programs that may be developed.

-

5. I pointed out to Governor Stassen the fact that our representatives had put us on +

5. I pointed out to Governor Stassen the fact that our representatives had put us on notice of the fact that Zahedi’s appreciation of the financial situation was unrealistic and that he had some very fanciful notions concerning the feasibility of certain @@ -38412,75 +32442,58 @@ require some very firm and realistic guidance, and that he had been warned against making impossible promises in his early speeches. (I showed Governor Stassen the - reports of the early speeches which indicate that Zahedi has not been too mindful of this + reports of the early speeches which indicate that Zahedi has not been too mindful of this advice to date.)

-

6. Concerning the possibility of our receiving help from FOA on the $5 million immediate +

6. Concerning the possibility of our receiving help from FOA on the $5 million immediate requirement, Governor Stassen said that he did not think that FOA could very easily do this. He did not believe that it was appropriate for him to provide cash to us for secret payments, and he said that he - thought this was “exactly the kind of thing we (CIA) have our reserves for—and that we (CIA) should draw upon our reserve for this kind of money.” He went + thought this was “exactly the kind of thing we (CIA) have our reserves for—and that we (CIA) should draw upon our reserve for this kind of money.” He went on to say that just as soon as FOA programs are launched in Iran they will begin to generate counterpart funds in Iranian currency. He promised to do his best to make substantial amounts of such counterpart funds available to us in partial “repayment” for our outlay and also to provide us with funds which will probably become necessary for further operations to shore up the new - regime. I pointed out to Governor Stassen the continuing necessity for maintaining + regime. I pointed out to Governor Stassen the continuing necessity for maintaining security with respect to this entire affair. I said that there had been already a great deal of speculation in the press of the free world and direct accusations of US intervention in - the Communist press and radio broadcasts. Governor Stassen fully acknowledged the + the Communist press and radio broadcasts. Governor Stassen fully acknowledged the importance of maintaining security and said that he would be very mindful of this factor in his own dealings. He also agreed that for the present our communications facilities should continue to be employed for all sensitive aspects of this affair and, moreover, he stated that he would clear with us any communications which he might wish to send at a slightly later date to the Embassy or to Mr. - Warne.At the bottom of the page is a typewritten note - that reads: “8/21/53. Colonel White—Acting DD/A stopped and left the following message in response + Warne.At the bottom of the page is a typewritten note + that reads: “8/21/53. Colonel White—Acting DD/A stopped and left the following message in response to FGW’s inquiry: ‘The memorandum - of conversation with Governor Stassen is in my opinion entirely accurate and I + of conversation with Governor Stassen is in my opinion entirely accurate and I have no changes to suggest.’ BJM”

- Frank G. - WisnerPrinted from a + Frank G. + WisnerPrinted from a copy with a stamped indication that the original was signed.
-
- 283. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 283. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, - 788.00/8–2053. Confidential; Security Information; NIACT. Repeated to London, Rome, - Dhahran, and Baghdad. Received at 8:01 a.m. Also printed in Foreign + 788.00/8–2053. Confidential; Security Information; NIACT. Repeated to London, Rome, + Dhahran, and Baghdad. Received at 8:01 a.m. Also printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 752–755 (Document 348). - Tehran, August 20, 1953, noon. + Tehran, August 20, 1953, noon.

419. 1. Too early as yet to furnish precise detailed report of events last 36 hours. Nevertheless we shall attempt herein give preliminary outline assessing flow of events in light such knowledge at present available to us.

2. Evening August 18 break appeared to take place between - Communist-controlled Tudeh and Mosadeq regime. Apparently Tudeh partisans began + Communist-controlled Tudeh and Mosadeq regime. Apparently Tudeh partisans began demonstrating on streets without having obtained usual appropriate clearance from Mosadeq and engaged in acts violence. Mosadeq @@ -38529,8 +32542,7 @@ commanders of military units in suburbs Tehran might take. Some fear lest under orders General Riahi Mosadeq’s Chief of Staff they - would descend on city during night and retake it on behalf Mosadeq. Also rumors afloat that Tudeh + would descend on city during night and retake it on behalf Mosadeq. Also rumors afloat that Tudeh was preparing “show its hand” after public enthusiasm pro-Shah crowds had worn itself out and they had dispersed. When, however, Batmanqilich assumed duties Chief of Staff it would, seem all army units in vicinity @@ -38552,17 +32564,14 @@ easy initial victory which was achieved with high degree spontaneity. Among factors believed responsible for this are following:

A. Iranian people of all classes were disgusted at bad taste exhibited by - anti-Shah elements supporting Mosadeq. For instance, they were outraged when gangs of + anti-Shah elements supporting Mosadeq. For instance, they were outraged when gangs of hooligans bearing red flags and chanting Commie songs began tearing down statues of Shah and father, breaking into houses and shops for purpose destroying Shah’s pictures, etc. They were repelled by vituperative - language employed by Foreign Minister Fatemi and by Iranian newspaper editors in attacking + language employed by Foreign Minister Fatemi and by Iranian newspaper editors in attacking Shah.

B. Iranian people of all classes in general also worried by what seemed - to be at least temporary alliance between Mosadeq and Tudeh. They were alarmed at seeing thousands + to be at least temporary alliance between Mosadeq and Tudeh. They were alarmed at seeing thousands of Tudeh demonstrators whom they regard as agents Soviet Union marching openly arm-in-arm through streets denouncing Shah and Western countries particularly US. Tudeh clearly @@ -38572,28 +32581,21 @@

C. Iranian people had become thoroughly tired of stresses and strains of last two years. They yearned for period of quietness which would give them chance to improve their economic and social status. Many had lost - hope of improving their conditions under Mosadeq.

+ hope of improving their conditions under Mosadeq.

-

D. Rupture which had taken place between Mosadeq regime and Tudeh on evening August 18 prevented +

D. Rupture which had taken place between Mosadeq regime and Tudeh on evening August 18 prevented effective cooperation on morning August 19 between these two anti-Shah forces in facing pro-Shah demonstrators. Tudeh was conspicuously absent all day. It possible that Tudeh leaders were sure that during course of - day they would be called upon by Mosadeq regime come to its assistance. However, once - demonstrations got underway Mosadeq regime not in position ask for such help.

+ day they would be called upon by Mosadeq regime come to its assistance. However, once + demonstrations got underway Mosadeq regime not in position ask for such help.

E. Most armed forces and great numbers Iranian civilians inherently loyal to Shah whom they have been taught to believe is symbol of national unity as well as of stability of country. Army in particular extremely friendly US partly as result fear of - strong northern neighbor and partly because of appreciation of US military aid during recent years. TCI aid also has made many friends for + strong northern neighbor and partly because of appreciation of US military aid during recent years. TCI aid also has made many friends for US among Iranian civilians. Many - military persons and civilians had become convinced that Mosadeq’s policies prevented close + military persons and civilians had become convinced that Mosadeq’s policies prevented close American-Iranian cooperation and that only under Shah’s leadership could that cooperation be maintained.

8. As already pointed out crowds although intensely savage at times were @@ -38612,30 +32614,22 @@ picture crowds applauded and laughed.In telegram 606 to Rome, August 20, the Department authorized the Embassy in Rome to share the contents of telegram 419 from Tehran - with the Shah. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1950–1954, + with the Shah. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1950–1954, 788.00/8–2053)

- Henderson + Henderson
-
- 284. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency [text not declassified]Source: Central Intelligence Agency. Secret. [text not declassified] Transcribed +
+ 284. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency [text not declassified]Source: Central Intelligence Agency. Secret. [text not declassified] Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in the Central Intelligence Agency that no longer exists. See “Sources” chapter. The transcript of this telegram lists the date as “18 or 19 AUG 1953.” All blank underscores that indicate omissions and question marks are in the transcribed text. - Washington, August 19, 1953. + Washington, August 19, 1953.

DIR 16330. 1. New State instruction follows. (These instructions should be carried out by Ambassador Baghdad in event Shah leaves Rome for Baghdad.)

@@ -38660,8 +32654,7 @@ (?);

A. That what _____ did was entirely compatible (?) and legal with Iranian law and moreover in keeping with Iranian practice and tradition.

-

B. Had Shah remained in place and not run away—and backed up Zahedi with his own presence and his +

B. Had Shah remained in place and not run away—and backed up Zahedi with his own presence and his affirmation of sincerity—the change of government would have been effective in the first instant. The failure is in very large part attributed to the fact that Shah departed suddenly leaving behind only @@ -38670,26 +32663,19 @@ validity.

3. VOA beginning about 10:00 a.m. today received authorization to play as straight news President’s statements - made to Rome in Persian to Teheran. Has been doing so, [less than 1 line not declassified] now being told query [less than 1 line not declassified] London re + made to Rome in Persian to Teheran. Has been doing so, [less than 1 line not declassified] now being told query [less than 1 line not declassified] London re similar action BBC.

4. For State only: Above is result of Shah policy changes from position previously given you, aimed of course at new situation.

End of message.

-
+
285. Telegram From the Station in Iran to the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central - Intelligence Agency. Secret. Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in + Intelligence Agency. Secret. Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in the Central Intelligence Agency that no longer exists. See “Sources” chapter. - Tehran, August 19, 1953. + Tehran, August 19, 1953.

TEHE 737. 1. We frankly horrified at lack support and guidance given Shah of Iran. Must point out also that Embassy no [not] been given text Shah statement, @@ -38702,20 +32688,17 @@

B. MAAG announce soonest cutback in military aid Iran.

C. Eisenhower at weekly news - conference raise question as to constitutionality of Mossadeq’s claim to premiership after + conference raise question as to constitutionality of Mossadeq’s claim to premiership after being dismissed by Shah.

D. CIA and British Bagh urge Iraq - mollahs cable Borujerdi requesting that he call jihab [jihad] against communism.

+ mollahs cable Borujerdi requesting that he call jihab [jihad] against communism.

3. FYI:

A. Troops in Tehe broke up Tudeh demonstration night 18 August bashing heads and shouting “long live Shah.”

B. Genl Gilanshah restrained by (Iranian sources) from making 15 plane air raid on capital.

C. Aminis angered by anti Shah - demonstrations and Qashqais willing drop Mossadeq but adamant in opposition to Shah.

+ demonstrations and Qashqais willing drop Mossadeq but adamant in opposition to Shah.

D. Unconfirmed reports received 19 August that army garrison Sanadej in revolt against govt.

@@ -38723,19 +32706,15 @@ secret police sources that they and we still “completely clean.”

End of message.

-
+
286. Telegram From the Station in Iran to the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency. Secret; Operational Immediate. Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in the Central Intelligence Agency that no longer exists. See “Sources” chapter. - Tehran, August 19, 1953. -

TEHE 742. 1. Overthrow of Mossadeq appears on verge of success. + Tehran, August 19, 1953. +

TEHE 742. 1. Overthrow of Mossadeq appears on verge of success. Zahedi now at radio station.

2. Ambassador Henderson and I @@ -38745,23 +32724,18 @@ how money should be deposited but see no need ship money out here.

End of message.

-
+
287. Telegram From the Station in Iran to the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency. Secret; Operational Immediate. Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in the Central Intelligence Agency that no longer exists. See “Sources” chapter. - Tehran, August 19, + Tehran, August 19, 1953, 1923Z. -

TEHE 744. Ambassador Henderson believes moment has come +

TEHE 744. Ambassador Henderson believes moment has come when the Shah should issue appeal to all members armed forces and all - Iranian civilian officials to obey orders of Gen Zahedi and those appointed by him. Shah + Iranian civilian officials to obey orders of Gen Zahedi and those appointed by him. Shah also hopes all loyal Iranians will give full support to this genuine national govt. Shah plans to return Tehe in near future. In addition to making this statement suggest Shah @@ -38770,27 +32744,19 @@ Dept agrees it is hoped that immediate contact be made in Rome.Telegram TEHE 745 from Tehran, August - 19, noted that Ambassador Henderson cautioned “that Shah of Iran must not now + 19, noted that Ambassador Henderson cautioned “that Shah of Iran must not now be permitted return. Let public sentiment develop into demand for his return then let Shah of Iran return when Tehe reports moment.” (Ibid.)

End of message.

-
- 288. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 288. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, Lot - 60 F 86, general records, 1953–1955, Box 7. Restricted; NIACT. Drafted by Cuomo and repeated NIACT to London. The telegram is the + 60 F 86, general records, 1953–1955, Box 7. Restricted; NIACT. Drafted by Cuomo and repeated NIACT to London. The telegram is the Embassy copy as approved and has no time of transmission. - Tehran, August 19, 1953. + Tehran, August 19, 1953.

400. PTT and Press and Propaganda offices occupied. Telegrams reportedly being sent provinces urging pro-Shah action similar that of Tehran.

Embassy officers report truckloads soldiers, civilians and six tanks seen @@ -38800,26 +32766,20 @@

General Daftari reportedly appointed Tehran Military Governor and Police Chief. He apparently attempting use, according Embassy radio intercepts, Customs Guards - organization he previously commanded in behalf Mosadeq regime.

+ organization he previously commanded in behalf Mosadeq regime.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
+
289. Telegram From the Station in Iran to the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency. Secret; Priority. [text not - declassified] Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in + declassified] Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in the Central Intelligence Agency that no longer exists. See “Sources” chapter. - Tehran, August 20, + Tehran, August 20, 1953, 0010Z.

TEHE 747. 1. MilSitRep last few days:

@@ -38829,89 +32789,65 @@ were provided.

C. [less than 1 line not declassified] held Zahedi up and he proved to be - most courageous, work with military paid off. Farzanegan risked life and got + most courageous, work with military paid off. Farzanegan risked life and got Bakhtiar to agree ride on Tehe with Kermanshah brigade.

-

D. Batmangelich proved himself a man. Farzanegan now at his side with full [less than 1 line not declassified] orders to secure situation +

D. Batmangelich proved himself a man. Farzanegan now at his side with full [less than 1 line not declassified] orders to secure situation from possible Tudeh takeover. All key points heavily guarded.

-

E. Zahedi and Guilanshah got in tanks [less than 1 line not declassified] and bravely +

E. Zahedi and Guilanshah got in tanks [less than 1 line not declassified] and bravely won the day.

F. Farzanegan made a speech on Radio Tehran and defied them to come get them.

G. MilAtts very helpful today. [less than 1 line not declassified] should acknowledge their great work, particularly - Major William Kaiser, Assistant Air Attaché. McClure was of no assistance.

+ Major William Kaiser, Assistant Air Attaché. McClure was of no assistance.

H. Every fifteen minutes through crucial night [less than 1 line not declassified] receives reports from Chief of Staff’s and Prime Minister’s office.

I. Army is getting ready for Tudeh.

-

J. Complete (new government) lineup now appointed. Momtaz had to be killed. Will keep you +

J. Complete (new government) lineup now appointed. Momtaz had to be killed. Will keep you advised.

K. City quiet 10 hundred hours local.

End of message.

-
+
290. Telegram From the Station in Iran to the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central - Intelligence Agency. Secret; Operational Immediate. [text not declassified] Transcribed + Intelligence Agency. Secret; Operational Immediate. [text not declassified] Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in the Central Intelligence Agency that no longer exists. See “Sources” chapter. - Tehran, August 20, + Tehran, August 20, 1953, 1853Z. -

TEHE 756. Re: DIR 16355.Not found. Some difference of opinion exists +

TEHE 756. Re: DIR 16355.Not found. Some difference of opinion exists among Iranian officials on best timing for Shah’s return and we think this question best resolved without our involvement particularly since direct communications between Shah and his people now easy. Therefore - tell Shah all news most encouraging and we understand his govt in touch with him directly.In telegram TEHE 749, sent earlier on August 20, the Station + tell Shah all news most encouraging and we understand his govt in touch with him directly.In telegram TEHE 749, sent earlier on August 20, the Station requested to “have the Shah start Tehe immediately.” (Central - Intelligence Agency. Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in + Intelligence Agency. Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in the Central Intelligence Agency that no longer exists. See “Sources” chapter.)

End of message.

-
+
291. Memorandum Prepared by the Chief of the Iran Branch, Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency - (Waller)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, + (Waller)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, Iran 1951–1953. Secret. At the end of the memorandum - is a handwritten note that reads: “above written by John Waller for DD/I [name not declassified] to be incorporated in + is a handwritten note that reads: “above written by John Waller for DD/I [name not declassified] to be incorporated in CIB.” - Washington, August 20, 1953. + Washington, August 20, 1953.

General Fazlollah Zahedi is in definite control of Tehran and has restored public order in the capital. No word has been received concerning continuing significant pro-Mossadeq activity in the provinces. From the outset the important Northwest Province of Azerbaijan, long considered a stronghold of pro-Shah sentiment, was - behind the Shah and his newly designated Prime Minister Zahedi. The Military units stationed - in Senandaj and Kermanshah contributed armed forces to General Zahedi’s successful attempt to assume + behind the Shah and his newly designated Prime Minister Zahedi. The Military units stationed + in Senandaj and Kermanshah contributed armed forces to General Zahedi’s successful attempt to assume the Premiership on August 19th.

The Royalist, pro-Zahedi, movement of August 19th contained a large @@ -38923,38 +32859,29 @@ the early stages of the events on August 19th in an effort to rally the people and army to the Shah’s cause.

The Shah intends to leave Rome shortly and proceed to Tehran. Depending - upon events, and instructions from the Zahedi government, the Shah may stop off in Baghdad + upon events, and instructions from the Zahedi government, the Shah may stop off in Baghdad enroute to Tehran so that a more appropriate and impressive entrance can be arranged.

-

The opportunistic but at least outwardly loyal Mossadeq supporter, Abol Ghassem Amini, acting Minister of - Court, who was arrested by Mossadeq during the events of August 14th, is believed +

The opportunistic but at least outwardly loyal Mossadeq supporter, Abol Ghassem Amini, acting Minister of + Court, who was arrested by Mossadeq during the events of August 14th, is believed to have thrown some support to the Royalist cause from the strong Amini family who controlled certain key points of command in the Iranian army. The strong and influential Qashqai tribe, led by four paramount chieftains, who have remained loyal to Mossadeq and - who have been closely allied with the above-mentioned Amini family, can still be considered + who have been closely allied with the above-mentioned Amini family, can still be considered in opposition to the Shah, but indications are they will take no paramilitary action to endanger Iran’s security for the time being.

-
+
292. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Station in IranSource: Central Intelligence Agency. Secret; Priority. [text not - declassified] Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in + declassified] Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in the Central Intelligence Agency that no longer exists. See “Sources” chapter. No time of transmission appears on the source text. - Washington, August 20, 1953. + Washington, August 20, 1953.

DIR 16474. 1. CIA officials are joined by the appropriate divisional and branch officers in extending commendation and congratulations to all Tehran Station personnel. @@ -38964,11 +32891,9 @@ and CIA well. We respect the Tehran group for their great stauchness in the face of difficulties and temporary discouragement. We are proud of the Tehran Station personnel - who have all to varying degrees contributed greatly to the success of overthrow. Commendation + who have all to varying degrees contributed greatly to the success of overthrow. Commendation is also extended to CIA official who - has done an excellent job backstopping the operation [less than 1 line not declassified] and has handled with credit + has done an excellent job backstopping the operation [less than 1 line not declassified] and has handled with credit the sensitive task of conducting liaison [less than 1 line not declassified].

2. The DCI wished to extend his warmest @@ -38976,36 +32901,24 @@ Roosevelt for a superbly and successfully executed mission. Roosevelt’s persistence, extreme competence and courage should be commended most highly.

-

3. Commendation also being prepared for CIA official upon latter’s return.

+

3. Commendation also being prepared for CIA official upon latter’s return.

End of message.

-
- 293. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency [text not declassified]Source: Central Intelligence Agency. Secret; Routine. +
+ 293. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency [text not declassified]Source: Central Intelligence Agency. Secret; Routine. [text not declassified] Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in the Central Intelligence Agency that no longer exists. See “Sources” chapter. - Washington, August 20, + Washington, August 20, 1953, 1853Z -

DIR 16556. 1. State has received Eisenhower approval that message essentially same as one +

DIR 16556. 1. State has received Eisenhower approval that message essentially same as one proposed originally by Kermit Roosevelt can be delivered personally, orally, and confidentially to Shah. Decision as to when this message can be released and sent [less than 1 line not declassified] to - Teheran for delivery will be made by DCI.

-

2. Eisenhower and State do not want this message joint with Churchill nor does Eisenhower want Churchill to affiliate himself with + Teheran for delivery will be made by DCI.

+

2. Eisenhower and State do not want this message joint with Churchill nor does Eisenhower want Churchill to affiliate himself with message. Also Churchill should not make any reference this message in one of his own.

@@ -39017,21 +32930,16 @@

End of message.

-
+
294. Memorandum Prepared by the Deputy Director for Plans, Central - Intelligence Agency (Wisner)Source: Central Intelligence + Intelligence Agency (Wisner)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 10, TPAJAX. Eyes Only. A typed note on the memorandum - reads: “The following was dictated by FGW in presence of [name not + reads: “The following was dictated by FGW in presence of [name not declassified] and [name not declassified] took the original with him. 9/20/53.” - Washington, August 20, 1953. + Washington, August 20, 1953.

The following are additional points and thoughts which should be considered in connection with the idea that the company might be in the position to play a most useful and constructive role in connection with @@ -39065,10 +32973,7 @@ to arrange for appropriate introductions and the presentation of the most favorable and impressive credentials.

Even though it is understood that there will presumably be continuing - governmental programs under the administration of Mr. Stassen’s new organization (FOA), there will of course be a limit to both the size and + governmental programs under the administration of Mr. Stassen’s new organization (FOA), there will of course be a limit to both the size and kind of such programs with the probable result that there will be a substantial area left open for consideration by a private company engaged in this particular line of business. Moreover, the contribution @@ -39079,24 +32984,13 @@ strengthening of the present regime which is understood to be rather favorably regarded by our government.

-
- 295. Memorandum From Acting Director of Central Intelligence Cabell to President EisenhowerSource: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Iran, 1953–58(8), +
+ 295. Memorandum From Acting Director of Central Intelligence Cabell to President EisenhowerSource: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Iran, 1953–58(8), Box 32. Secret. At the end of the memorandum is a handwritten note that reads: “DDE has seen - 8/21/53—ACW.” Also printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, + 8/21/53—ACW.” Also printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 755–756 (Document 349). - Washington, undated. + Washington, undated.

Comment on the Iranian situation:

An unexpected strong upsurge of popular and military reaction to Prime Minister Mossadeq’s government @@ -39116,36 +33010,29 @@

The strategic province of Azerbaijan according to radio dispatches originating from Tabriz is held by royalists but Isfahan radio some two hundred miles south of Tehran has in a single brief announcement - proclaimed itself loyal to Mossadeq.

+ proclaimed itself loyal to Mossadeq.

In this confused situation it appears that the tone and content of the - communiqués is definitely anti-communist. Tudeh overt activity has been almost non-existing + communiqués is definitely anti-communist. Tudeh overt activity has been almost non-existing during the past critical hours. Should the royalists manage to take over, Tudeh will be their strongest and most violent opponent.

Our sources have confirmed press and radio reports that pro-royalist - forces appear in control of city of Teheran and that Zahedi has returned to city where he + forces appear in control of city of Teheran and that Zahedi has returned to city where he broadcast proclamations to the people promising a program of economic and social reforms. Our sources report huge crowds in streets of Teheran calling return of the Shah.

- C.P. - Cabell + C.P. + Cabell
-
+
296. Telegram From the Station in Iran to the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central - Intelligence Agency. Secret. Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in + Intelligence Agency. Secret. Transcribed specifically for the Foreign Relations series from microfilm in the Central Intelligence Agency that no longer exists. See “Sources” chapter. A typed notation indicates that this telegram was transmitted at 0033Z, August 22. - Tehran, August 21, 1953. + Tehran, August 21, 1953.

TEHE 765. 1. Tudeh discipline appears to have been broken. This particularly noticeable between hard-core, rigidly disciplined element composed of leaders, functionaries, and @@ -39176,9 +33063,7 @@ declassified].

End of message.

-
+
297. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to MitchellSource: Central @@ -39186,16 +33071,14 @@ 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 10, TPAJAX. Top Secret; Eyes Only. The recipient is referred to as “Mr. Mitchell” in the original and is not further identified. - Washington, August 21, 1953. + Washington, August 21, 1953. SUBJECT Proposed Message to “C”

I should appreciate it if you would be kind enough to convey a message along the following lines to your chief, in acknowledgement of his - informal message to me of August 20.Attached but not printed.

+ informal message to me of August 20.Attached but not printed.

[1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]

“Regarding significance this matter, we regard it as substantial victory for the West as matters now appear, but are very concerned over numerous @@ -39210,49 +33093,35 @@ certain encouraging assurances.”

-
+
298. Memorandum From the Chief of the Iran Branch, Near East and - Africa Division, Directorate of Plans (Waller) to the Deputy Director for Plans, Central - Intelligence Agency (Wisner)Source: Central Intelligence + Africa Division, Directorate of Plans (Waller) to the Deputy Director for Plans, Central + Intelligence Agency (Wisner)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, Iran 1951–1953. Secret. - Washington, August 24, 1953. -

1. Attached hereto is the draft of a cable prepared by Mr. Jernegan of State on the basis of + Washington, August 24, 1953. +

1. Attached hereto is the draft of a cable prepared by Mr. Jernegan of State on the basis of suggestions made by you.

-

2. It has not been sent, however, since Messrs. Byroade, Matthews and Berry of State were in agreement that such an approach +

2. It has not been sent, however, since Messrs. Byroade, Matthews and Berry of State were in agreement that such an approach to Zahedi at this time would be unwise. Specifically, their reasoning was as follows:

-

A. State would possibly find itself in a difficult position if Zahedi actually concluded economic +

A. State would possibly find itself in a difficult position if Zahedi actually concluded economic agreements with the USSR. Such - agreements might, amongst other things, prejudice U.S. aid. If Zahedi were to construe U.S. remarks + agreements might, amongst other things, prejudice U.S. aid. If Zahedi were to construe U.S. remarks per attached cable draft as encouragement to continue negotiations, it - would be difficult later to bring pressure to bear causing Zahedi to abandon undesirable economic + would be difficult later to bring pressure to bear causing Zahedi to abandon undesirable economic ties with the USSR.

B. The Department of State would risk adverse U.S. criticism if the attached cable draft should leak from Persian government sources and be quoted out of context. Zahedi - could, in fact, use it as an excuse for later démarches with the USSR which would be unacceptable to the + could, in fact, use it as an excuse for later démarches with the USSR which would be unacceptable to the U.S.

C. Inexperienced as he is, Zahedi may find himself out-manoeuvered and out-foxed by the Soviets in ensuing negotiations. This could be to the detriment of U.S. interests.

3. If you still feel that the attached cable draft or a communication similar to it should be sent, it is suggested that you discuss the - matter with Mr. Matthews.At the end of the memorandum is a handwritten + matter with Mr. Matthews.At the end of the memorandum is a handwritten note that reads: “While I originally shared reason #A, the possibilities of the Russians rising to the bait was remote; and even if they did we could avoid the fish (barracude, that is), @@ -39267,37 +33136,27 @@ Zahedi that it might be advisable for him to continue negotiations with Soviets or at least not make first move to break them off. Such an attitude would be in line - nationalist policies expected of Zahedi and would, if Soviets refuse pay gold or make + nationalist policies expected of Zahedi and would, if Soviets refuse pay gold or make concessions, be another black mark against Russians in Iran. However, Zahedi should not obtain - impression American public would be unconcerned if his Govt made any considerable concessions to + impression American public would be unconcerned if his Govt made any considerable concessions to Soviets.

-
+
299. Draft Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for - International Security Affairs (Nash) to the Chairman of the Planning Board of the - National Security Council (Cutler)Source: National Archives, RG 330, + International Security Affairs (Nash) to the Chairman of the Planning Board of the + National Security Council (Cutler)Source: National Archives, RG 330, Records of the Department of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Office of Military Assistance, Project Decimal Files, 1953, Box 35, 091.452.1 Iran. Secret; Security Information. Attached is a handwritten note from Black to General Stewart, August 24, that reads: “This was prepared as a - matter of urgency in accordance with Mr. Nash’s instructions to draft a + matter of urgency in accordance with Mr. Nash’s instructions to draft a letter which would take advantage of the recent Iranian developments. Col. Bonesteel would like your views on the attached before the Planning Board meeting at 2:30 PM today.” - Washington, undated. + Washington, undated. SUBJECT Course of Action with Respect to Iran @@ -39310,8 +33169,7 @@ increasing trouble from the Tudeh party which, you will recall, recently assembled over 100,000 supporters for a public demonstration in Tehran alone.

-

2. Doubtless Ambassador Henderson, based on his intimate knowledge of the situation, +

2. Doubtless Ambassador Henderson, based on his intimate knowledge of the situation, will submit proposals for U.S. action. Without wishing to anticipate or prejudge his recommendations, the following suggestions are forwarded as a possible course of action @@ -39329,12 +33187,10 @@

d. This Presidential message would also state that if the Shah wishes, we are prepared to dispatch to Iran a high Cabinet official, such as Mr. Stassen, to demonstrate our - active interest in the success of the Zahedi Government’s program and to initiate a new U.S. + active interest in the success of the Zahedi Government’s program and to initiate a new U.S. program of economic and technical assistance.

e. Follow up this visit by expediting funds, equipment and technical - assistance to Iran, in order that Zahedi can start implementing his eight-point program + assistance to Iran, in order that Zahedi can start implementing his eight-point program immediately. In particular, the U.S. could help his Government with its programs for the mechanization of agriculture, free medical treatment and the roadbuilding program.A final @@ -39346,88 +33202,65 @@ part to exploit the current fortunate turn of events.

-
+
300. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 84, London Embassy Files, classified general records, Box 34. Secret; Security - Information. Drafted by Palmer and cleared by Penfield. Repeated to Tehran and to Moscow by + Information. Drafted by Palmer and cleared by Penfield. Repeated to Tehran and to Moscow by pouch. - London, August 24, + London, August 24, 1953, 6 p.m.

771. Altho Fonoff highly gratified at - improvement Shah’s position and downfall of Mossadeq, its attitude towards Zahedi, as revealed in + improvement Shah’s position and downfall of Mossadeq, its attitude towards Zahedi, as revealed in recent conversations with us, reflects considerable reserve.

-

Fonoff attributes Mossadeq’s fall from power primarily to +

Fonoff attributes Mossadeq’s fall from power primarily to reaction against his steady march towards dictatorship (much of it at Shah’s expense) and to his inability deliver promised benefits under extreme nationalist program (particularly profitable exploitation oil industry).

-

Cautious British attitude towards Zahedi seems derive partly from distrust as result their +

Cautious British attitude towards Zahedi seems derive partly from distrust as result their war-time experience with him, but more importantly from fact that they regard him as opportunist. They are, for example, concerned about association Zahedi appears have - formed with extreme nationalist elements such as Kashani, even though they recognize + formed with extreme nationalist elements such as Kashani, even though they recognize former has been forced take his support where he could find it.

British foresee period of grave difficulty ahead. As they see situation, Zahedi faces three main immediate problems: (1) Extreme nationalism; (2) disorganized administration; and (3) empty coffers. Combination these three factors creates situation capable Communist exploitation. Re first, British see - no reason believe that events which led up to Mossadeq’s downfall portend any + no reason believe that events which led up to Mossadeq’s downfall portend any lessening of nationalist fervor in Iran and therefore look for little change in immediate future. However, second and third factors amenable to Govt action and British will be - carefully watching see what corrective measures Zahedi takes.

-

Altho, for foregoing reasons, British still uncertain how Zahedi’s accession to power will affect + carefully watching see what corrective measures Zahedi takes.

+

Altho, for foregoing reasons, British still uncertain how Zahedi’s accession to power will affect their interests, they recognize that it may be better at this juncture that Prime Minister’s office be filled by someone with an anti-British reputation than by a Said.

We have impression that despite foregoing, British would like and hope be - able improve their relations with new Govt. They have been encouraged, for example, by press + able improve their relations with new Govt. They have been encouraged, for example, by press reports of statements by Zahedi - which are inferentially critical of Mossadeq’s anti-British policy. For present, however, + which are inferentially critical of Mossadeq’s anti-British policy. For present, however, British seem likely maintain attitude of friendly reserve and watchful waiting. We see little prospect British taking initiative renewal - diplomatic relations or oil question until Zahedi’s position and policies become clearer.

+ diplomatic relations or oil question until Zahedi’s position and policies become clearer.

-

Similarities in foregoing to reserved British attitude towards Naguib upon his accession to power +

Similarities in foregoing to reserved British attitude towards Naguib upon his accession to power should not be overlooked.

- Aldrich + Aldrich
-
+
301. Letter From Iranian Prime Minister - Zahedi to President EisenhowerSource: Eisenhower Library, + Zahedi to President EisenhowerSource: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Iran, 1953–58(8), Box 32. The text of the letter is printed from a White House press release of September 1. The letter - is also printed in Public Papers: Eisenhower, 1953, pp. + is also printed in Public Papers: Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 580–581. - Tehran, August 26, 1953. + Tehran, August 26, 1953. Dear Mr. President: @@ -39454,8 +33287,7 @@ to work hard in order to obtain these objectives, but the realization of their aspirations may be delayed for sometime unless they receive technical, financial, and economic aid from abroad. I hope that the - United States will find it possible at this critical moment in Iranian history to come to my + United States will find it possible at this critical moment in Iranian history to come to my country’s assistance as it has done on occasions in the past.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that it is the intention of the new Government of Iran not only to strengthen the country internally but @@ -39471,27 +33303,17 @@

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurance of my highest consideration.

- General F. ZahediPrinted from a copy that indicates + General F. ZahediPrinted from a copy that indicates Zahedi signed the original.
-
- 302. Letter From President Eisenhower to Iranian Prime Minister ZahediSource: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Iran, 1953–58(8), +
+ 302. Letter From President Eisenhower to Iranian Prime Minister ZahediSource: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Iran, 1953–58(8), Box 32. The text of the letter is printed from a White House press - release of September 1. The letter is also printed in Public Papers: Eisenhower, 1953, pp. + release of September 1. The letter is also printed in Public Papers: Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 579–580. - Washington, August 26, 1953. + Washington, August 26, 1953. Dear Mr. Prime Minister: @@ -39504,8 +33326,7 @@ horizons in knowledge and opportunity. I am gratified that the aid which we have extended has contributed to the security of Iran and to the raising of the technical efficiency of the Iranian people. I am also - pleased to have your assurance that your Government desires to maintain friendly relations + pleased to have your assurance that your Government desires to maintain friendly relations with other members of the family of nations and that it will pursue a policy of eliminating such differences as may exist or which may develop with other countries in a spirit of friendliness and in accordance with @@ -39515,30 +33336,25 @@ development of our aid programs there. I recognize that your needs are pressing. Your request will receive our sympathetic consideration and I can assure you that we stand ready to assist you in achieving the - aspirations for your country which you have outlined.The White House announced on September 5 that $45 + aspirations for your country which you have outlined.The White House announced on September 5 that $45 million would be made available for immediate economic assistance to Iran, in addition to the existing military and technical assistance programs. (Ibid., p. 581)

Please accept, Mr. Prime Minister, the assurances of my highest consideration.

- Dwight D. - EisenhowerPrinted from a + Dwight D. + EisenhowerPrinted from a copy with this typed signature and an indication that the President signed the original.
-
- 303. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 303. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/8–2653. Top Secret; Security Information. Received at 11:22 a.m. - Tehran, August 26, + Tehran, August 26, 1953, 3 p.m.

489. 1. I saw Shah again last evening at my request in order discuss various matters, particularly exchange of letters re financial, economic @@ -39549,25 +33365,19 @@

2. Shah again said he not happy re Cabinet. He thought it had not made very good impression. Changes might be necessary very soon. I said Cabinet not yet completed, if selections to fill vacancies should be - wise it could be materially strengthened. Shah would be deluged with visits disgruntled politicians + wise it could be materially strengthened. Shah would be deluged with visits disgruntled politicians who will criticize new government’s policies. I hoped he would neither by word or gesture indicate to any of them lack of full confidence in his Prime Minister. All country, including Zahedi, must be given to feel - latter has Shah’s complete support. Zahedi might be kind of man who could move with decision + latter has Shah’s complete support. Zahedi might be kind of man who could move with decision if he sure Shah back of him but who would become ineffectual if he not - sure Shah’s support. Even if Zahedi should do certain things which Shah considered to + sure Shah’s support. Even if Zahedi should do certain things which Shah considered to be unwise, Shah should not be unduly critical. No two persons do things in exactly same way. Zahedi must not feel he must consult Shah re every detail. Shah agreed, said he would try to build up Zahedi. During course of day he had given him - active army status, promoted him to Lt. Gen. and given him highest Iranian decoration. Zahedi had conducted himself during - this crisis with courage and wisdom. As result his estimate Zahedi had risen. Nevertheless it must + active army status, promoted him to Lt. Gen. and given him highest Iranian decoration. Zahedi had conducted himself during + this crisis with courage and wisdom. As result his estimate Zahedi had risen. Nevertheless it must be clear to Zahedi and every one that no person or organization can come between Shah and Army. Energetic steps must be taken to strengthen solidarity Army and to display @@ -39594,19 +33404,16 @@ poor and needy Government looking after their interests. He hoped re-launch his campaign for distribution of crownlands on wide scale. He was wondering if Bank for Reconstruction which he had organized might - not have been attempting to obtain loan immediately from EXIM Bank in order start building workers + not have been attempting to obtain loan immediately from EXIM Bank in order start building workers houses in Tehran and other large urban centers. If they could begin at once building cheap but healthy living quarters—say for 10,000 homeless families in Tehran, and a thousand or more in each of the other large - Iranian cities—effect would be most salutary. Perhaps EXIM + Iranian cities—effect would be most salutary. Perhaps EXIM Bank could make loan to Reconstruction Bank without necessity approval Majlis. I said I not qualified discuss this problem. It might be Majlis would require some kind of government guarantee. Shah said such guarantee would probably require Majlis approval. He still thought - Majlis should dissolve itself although Zahedi was of opinion it would be politically wise + Majlis should dissolve itself although Zahedi was of opinion it would be politically wise permit rump Majlis to function while he held elections to fill vacancies. He afraid any kind Majlis would be great handicap to Zahedi. I said it seemed to me some kind loans for Iran would be necessary if it @@ -39615,24 +33422,19 @@ discuss this matter in some detail with Zahedi.

4. Said he understood I had seen Meftah acting Minister of Foreign Affairs during course of day. I - replied in affirmative stating I had discussed with Meftah US position in UN re problem and under instructions from Washington had + replied in affirmative stating I had discussed with Meftah US position in UN re problem and under instructions from Washington had expressed hope US could have Iranian support. At Shah’s request I outlined US position (Depcirctel 102, August 20).Not found. Shah asked if US could not get enough votes to support its position without Iran taking sides. He did not wish do - anything which might offend Nehru. I said US would + anything which might offend Nehru. I said US would particularly like support Asian power like Iran. Shah asked if any other Asian countries would take sides against India. I said I certain number would.

-

Shah said he anxious have friendship Nehru. He therefore contemplated calling in Indian - Ambassador and suggesting latter send message to Nehru to effect that Shah was not +

Shah said he anxious have friendship Nehru. He therefore contemplated calling in Indian + Ambassador and suggesting latter send message to Nehru to effect that Shah was not espousing socialism against capitalism or capitalism against socialism. Shah favored mixed economy in Iran. I asked Shah if it his intention give Nehru impression Iran would @@ -39643,8 +33445,7 @@ guilty and “third force” was not taking sides but was merely supporting whichever world happened to be right re some particular point. Shah said he considered “third force” idea as unsound and did not intend giving - support to it. His purpose in message to Nehru would relate merely to Iranian internal problems. + support to it. His purpose in message to Nehru would relate merely to Iranian internal problems. Iran would like an economy similar to that of Scandinavian countries. I told Shah I hoped Iran would play more clear cut role on side free world in UN. No desire that Iran should @@ -39657,56 +33458,44 @@ from becoming such victim. If as result vacillation and hesitation Korea should be lost to free world international communism would be encouraged to strike elsewhere. Shah did not reply.

-

5. Shah said he had difficulty knowing what be done with Mosadeq. Latter should really be tried +

5. Shah said he had difficulty knowing what be done with Mosadeq. Latter should really be tried for treason. Yet he feared trial might merely result in making former Prime Minister martyr. How could Government justify trial Army officers acting under Mosadeq’s orders without trying Mosadeq himself? - Impression might be created Government afraid to try Mosadeq. He had been toying with idea + Impression might be created Government afraid to try Mosadeq. He had been toying with idea permit Mosadeq go abroad for medical treatment. Europe however too close to Iran. Might be preferable - let Mosadeq go to US if he would give undertaking to refrain + let Mosadeq go to US if he would give undertaking to refrain in future from engaging in Iranian political activities. He asked my opinion. I said matter too complicated for me to venture off-hand - advice. I thought however, that if Mosadeq should be brought to public trial he might be + advice. I thought however, that if Mosadeq should be brought to public trial he might be able with his histrionic ability to make it appear that his accusers rather than he were being tried.

-

6. Shah said he had received letter from Qavam asking that latter be permitted leave country for +

6. Shah said he had received letter from Qavam asking that latter be permitted leave country for medical treatment. He in quandary because Parliament had passed bill of attainder against Qavam and he - might be condemned for permitting Qavam leave country in such circumstances. I asked - whether it might not be possible to permit Qavam go to Europe for medical treatment provided latter + might be condemned for permitting Qavam leave country in such circumstances. I asked + whether it might not be possible to permit Qavam go to Europe for medical treatment provided latter would give signed statement he would return to Iran on Shah’s request if he should subsequently be needed in connection with legal proceedings. Shah said he would look into this possibility.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
+
304. Memorandum of Discussion at the 160th Meeting of the National Security CouncilSource: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 4, 160th Meeting of National Security Council. Top Secret; Security - Information; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on August 28. Printed with redactions in + Information; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on August 28. Printed with redactions in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 771–775 (Document 358). - Washington, August 27, 1953. + Washington, August 27, 1953. SUBJECT Discussion at the 160th Meeting of the National Security Council, @@ -39722,28 +33511,22 @@ Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; Frank C. - Nash, Department of Defense; General Gerhart, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Robert + Nash, Department of Defense; General Gerhart, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Robert Amory, Jr., Central Intelligence Agency; the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C.D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; the Acting - White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, + White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

[Omitted here is discussion of Items 1 and 2.]

3. - The Situation in Iran (NSC 136/1; NSC Actions - Nos. 875–b and 766–a)For NSC + The Situation in Iran (NSC 136/1; NSC Actions + Nos. 875–b and 766–a)For NSC 136/1, see Document 147. For texts of - NSC Action Nos. 875–b, and 766–a, see - ibid., footnote 2, p. 772 (Document 358).

+ NSC Action Nos. 875–b, and 766–a, see + ibid., footnote 2, p. 772 (Document 358).

General Cabell briefed the Council on the most recent developments in Iran. He said that General Zahedi appeared to be @@ -39753,8 +33536,7 @@ as one could anticipate in Iran, although the Shah had expressed disappointment at the small number of new faces in the Cabinet. Indications are that General - Zahedi will oppose the indiscriminate imposition of martial law, and when his + Zahedi will oppose the indiscriminate imposition of martial law, and when his control is firmly established he is expected to recall the Majlis. Elections for a new Majlis are to be anticipated thereafter. The army will doubtless manipulate these elections to ensure a conservative @@ -39764,8 +33546,7 @@ probably go underground. Its leadership is still intact, and it may be expected to work with the pro-Mossadegh factions to discredit the Shah and the new regime.

-

The allegiance of the tribes, said General Cabell, is not yet completely clear, but the fact that +

The allegiance of the tribes, said General Cabell, is not yet completely clear, but the fact that they have never been able to work in concert with one another minimizes the dangers which Zahedi must anticipate from the tribes.

@@ -39785,31 +33566,21 @@

Secretary Dulles commented that while what happened in Iran was spontaneous, he did feel obliged to say that a number of people in Iran had kept their heads and maintained - their courage when the situation looked very tough. He felt that CIA in particular was entitled to great + their courage when the situation looked very tough. He felt that CIA in particular was entitled to great praise. He also expressed himself as pleased with the cooperation - between CIA, State and FOA.

-

As a result of what had happened, Secretary Dulles informed the Council, the United States now had a + between CIA, State and FOA.

+

As a result of what had happened, Secretary Dulles informed the Council, the United States now had a “second chance” in Iran when all hope of avoiding a Communist Iran - appeared to have vanished. Secretary Dulles said that there had been an exchange of letters + appeared to have vanished. Secretary Dulles said that there had been an exchange of letters between the President and General - Zahedi.See Documents 301 and 302. Secretary Dulles summarized General + Zahedi.See Documents 301 and 302. Secretary Dulles summarized General Zahedi’s letter, pointing out the latter’s statement that he desired to reconsider the problem of the oil settlement and that he - needed assistance. The President had replied that General Zahedi’s request would receive - sympathetic consideration. Secretary Dulles went on to point out that in order to assist the + needed assistance. The President had replied that General Zahedi’s request would receive + sympathetic consideration. Secretary Dulles went on to point out that in order to assist the new regime, the Administration would require funds beyond those programmed in the Mutual Security Act. The additional funds would - probably be in the neighborhood of $35 million. The most difficult problem confronting us was + probably be in the neighborhood of $35 million. The most difficult problem confronting us was how to develop revenues for Iran out of her oil. We can’t very well subsidize Iranian oil when we can’t make full use of present resources available to us. Since we must not, however, miss this second chance, @@ -39834,24 +33605,17 @@ appeared useful.

Mr. Cutler then reminded the members of the Council of the task which it had asked the Attorney - General to perform, noted that Judge Barnes had been appointed by the Attorney General to - carry out this task, and that Judge Barnes was planning a committee of three individuals to + General to perform, noted that Judge Barnes had been appointed by the Attorney General to + carry out this task, and that Judge Barnes was planning a committee of three individuals to perform the task. Mr. Cutler stated that Judge Barnes had already produced a tentative statement of the problem to which his - committee should address itself. Mr. Cutler further pointed out the relationship between + committee should address itself. Mr. Cutler further pointed out the relationship between Judge Barnes’ assignment and the - committee which had been contemplated in NSC 138/1, which, of course, had never materialized.See Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, + committee which had been contemplated in NSC 138/1, which, of course, had never materialized.See Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, Part 1, p. 637 (Document 279). Mr. Cutler - assured the members of the Council that Judge Barnes would consult with the heads of + assured the members of the Council that Judge Barnes would consult with the heads of appropriate departments and agencies before completing his report, which he hoped to have ready by December.

Secretary Dulles inquired whether @@ -39866,28 +33630,22 @@ possibly be settled out of court.

Secretary Humphrey expressed - emphatic agreement with Secretary Dulles, and inquired whether this assignment should be + emphatic agreement with Secretary Dulles, and inquired whether this assignment should be added to that contemplated by the special representative.

Secretary Dulles expressed doubts - as to the feasibility of Secretary Humphrey’s proposal, but again insisted that the civil + as to the feasibility of Secretary Humphrey’s proposal, but again insisted that the civil proceedings should be postponed if it was humanly possible.

Mr. Cutler suggested that the Council invite the Attorney General to come to the next meeting of the Council to hear the arguments and to discuss possible postponement of the suit. It developed that the Attorney General would be out of town - except for one day this week, and Mr. Cutler therefore suggested that the Secretary of State + except for one day this week, and Mr. Cutler therefore suggested that the Secretary of State get in touch with the Attorney General and explain to him the Council’s unanimous feeling that, for reasons of national security, it favored postponement of the civil suit.

-

The National Security Council:Paragraphs a–d and the Note constitute NSC Action No. 891. (National +

The National Security Council:Paragraphs a–d and the Note constitute NSC Action No. 891. (National Archives, RG 273, Records of the - National Security Council, Box 95, NSC Actions 697–1001)

+ National Security Council, Box 95, NSC Actions 697–1001)

a. Discussed the situation in Iran in the light of an oral briefing by the Acting Director of Central Intelligence on developments, and in the light of an oral report by the Secretary of @@ -39899,46 +33657,35 @@ nominate, for the President’s consideration, an individual to act as a special representative of the United States to deal with problems related to an Anglo-Iranian oil settlement.

-

c. Noted an oral report by Mr. Cutler regarding the status of the +

c. Noted an oral report by Mr. Cutler regarding the status of the Attorney General’s study of the Near East oil situation pursuant to - NSC Action No. 875–b.

+ NSC Action No. 875–b.

d. Agreed, with the concurrence of the Attorney General, to recommend to the President that in the interests of national security, in view of the Iranian situation, the Attorney General be requested to conduct proceedings in the so-called oil cartel civil suit, - now being carried on as indicated in NSC Action No. 766–a, with due + now being carried on as indicated in NSC Action No. 766–a, with due regard for their effect upon United States foreign relations.

Note: The action in b above subsequently referred to the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, and Defense, the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, and the Director of Central - Intelligence, for implementation. The recommendation in d above subsequently approved by the President + Intelligence, for implementation. The recommendation in d above subsequently approved by the President and transmitted to the Attorney General for appropriate action.

[Omitted here is discussion of items 4–8.]

- S. Everett - Gleason + S. Everett + Gleason
-
- 305. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans (Wisner) to Director of Central - Intelligence DullesSource: Central Intelligence Agency, +
+ 305. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans (Wisner) to Director of Central + Intelligence DullesSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 10, TPAJAX. Secret; Security Information; Eyes Only. At the bottom of the page is a handwritten note that reads: “No other - copies made—Orig shown to DDCI by FGW.” - Washington, August 27, 1953. + copies made—Orig shown to DDCI by FGW.” + Washington, August 27, 1953. SUBJECT The first stages of negotiations for the settlement of the oil @@ -39962,38 +33709,30 @@ affected and will be further affected if something is not got under way quickly to produce revenues for the Iranian Government.

2. We have discussed various aspects of these related matters with - General Smith, Henry Byroade, Governor Stassen and others, making it clear to + General Smith, Henry Byroade, Governor Stassen and others, making it clear to all concerned at all times that we were most anxious to avoid creating the impression that we are concerning ourselves with matters not within our range of interest. One development which has occurred and which you - should know about is that (with General Cabell’s authorization) I supported Henry Byroade’s appeal for assistance + should know about is that (with General Cabell’s authorization) I supported Henry Byroade’s appeal for assistance in the form of getting Paul Nitze in on the State Department thinking and planning—if only on an arms’ length, no title, no pay, basis. This was overruled for reasons deemed sufficient by higher echelons—a decision which I personally regard as regrettable in view of - the vast amount of knowledge, background and experience which Paul has had throughout the entire + the vast amount of knowledge, background and experience which Paul has had throughout the entire history of the Iranian negotiations. (It will be recalled that he headed the US negotiation team which went to London about a year ago.)

3. Because of your own interest and familiarity with some of the past history of these negotiations, it has seemed to me that you might be - interested in the first two suggestions which were offered by Paul + interested in the first two suggestions which were offered by Paul Nitze, following which I presume - he would have fallen out of play. Paul proposed, very tentatively of course, that

+ he would have fallen out of play. Paul proposed, very tentatively of course, that

a. Consideration be given to the possible applicability in the Iranian situation of the Mexican arbitration formula (as distinguished from the settlement which was ultimately arrived at between the Mexican and - British Governments). According to Paul, the Mexican arbitration formula was a new + British Governments). According to Paul, the Mexican arbitration formula was a new invention at the time it was brought forth. It consisted basically of having each party pick his own “arbitrator” with the understanding, in advance, that if those two “arbitrators” could arrive at an agreement as @@ -40019,28 +33758,23 @@ two-fold, viz.: (1) Their position concerning ownership of the oil in the tanks would thus be recognized; and (2) since the money would not be paid for the oil but rather in settlement of certain collateral - counter-claims, there would be an avoidance of any inference of pricing. The advantage from the Iranian point of + counter-claims, there would be an avoidance of any inference of pricing. The advantage from the Iranian point of view would be that their position concerning the counter-claims would be recognized and, last but not least, they would get some much-needed cash.

- Frank G. - WisnerPrinted from a + Frank G. + WisnerPrinted from a copy with this typed signature and a note that indicates Wisner signed the memorandum on August 28.
-
- 306. Memorandum From the Chief of Station in Iran [text not declassified] to the Chief of the Near East and +
+ 306. Memorandum From the Chief of Station in Iran [text not declassified] to the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency - (Roosevelt)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, + (Roosevelt)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 8, TPAJAX Vol. II. Secret; Security Information. Sent by air pouch and for the attention of the Deputy Chief of Psychological @@ -40050,14 +33784,12 @@ [number not declassified] - Tehran, August 28, 1953. + Tehran, August 28, 1953.

[less than 1 line not declassified] Contribution to TPAJAX

1. In Station opinion we cannot be too complimentary concerning the contributions of our [less than 1 line not - declassified] agents to the success of TPAJAX. [less than 1 line not declassified] did remarkably + declassified] agents to the success of TPAJAX. [less than 1 line not declassified] did remarkably good job while maintaining security at all times. They are to be highly commended for laying the groundwork for action and providing the spark which set off the demonstrations on 19 August. Their contribution can @@ -40069,19 +33801,12 @@ retrospect, our only hope to get popular and active backing in a movement to unseat Mossadeq was to point up an issue which would instill greater fear in the average - Iranian than his fear of Mossadeq. For the first three weeks in August, [4½ lines not declassified] were able to lay the - groundwork for future action. They were assisted in this campaign [less than 1 line not declassified] who also - emphasized the collaboration of Mossadeq and the Tudeh. Secretary Dulles’ and President Eisenhower’s comments concerning the + Iranian than his fear of Mossadeq. For the first three weeks in August, [4½ lines not declassified] were able to lay the + groundwork for future action. They were assisted in this campaign [less than 1 line not declassified] who also + emphasized the collaboration of Mossadeq and the Tudeh. Secretary Dulles’ and President Eisenhower’s comments concerning the Tudeh were of great help and gradually the people of Tehran began to feel a greater fear than the one which previously pervaded their lives. - They began to feel that Mossadeq’s retention of power could only lead to a Communist + They began to feel that Mossadeq’s retention of power could only lead to a Communist state. They believed this strongly and it was reflected in the conversations of most to whom we talked during this period. There was still a deep fear of Mossadeq, @@ -40091,10 +33816,8 @@

3. On Sunday, August 16, news of [cryptonym not declassified] press interview began to leak out. The fact that he possessed a Firman began to spread, but still there was no proof - since few had actually seen facsimiles of the Firman. [2½ lines not declassified] On Tuesday, reports of the Firman - were printed in several papers and Foreign Minister Fatemi + since few had actually seen facsimiles of the Firman. [2½ lines not declassified] On Tuesday, reports of the Firman + were printed in several papers and Foreign Minister Fatemi denied its existence. Nevertheless, the word continued to spread and the number who saw a facsimile increased. [2 lines not @@ -40103,18 +33826,15 @@ cause by having the Statues of both Shahs torn down throughout the city. His violent speeches attacking the Shah offended most Iranians and strengthened their resolve to act. Their fear of the Communist menace, - plus their indignation over Fatemi’s actions combined in an emotional desire to do + plus their indignation over Fatemi’s actions combined in an emotional desire to do something. Only the spark was needed to set off the conflagration.

-

4. Wednesday was the day set by the Station for action. [1½ lines not declassified] We were hoping for a +

4. Wednesday was the day set by the Station for action. [1½ lines not declassified] We were hoping for a strong religious showing and felt that something might happen if we could only get it started. It must be said, however, that there were many persons out Wednesday morning who had no connection with us. Nevertheless, they were disorganized and milling about aimlessly until several people discovered a press shop in process of printing - broadsheets containing a facsimile of the Firman appointing [cryptonym not declassified] Prime Minister. There + broadsheets containing a facsimile of the Firman appointing [cryptonym not declassified] Prime Minister. There were several shops doing this and there were several different items. [less than 1 line not declassified] a statement of [cryptonym not declassified] along @@ -40130,8 +33850,7 @@

5. Armed with the knowledge that [cryptonym not declassified] was the legal Prime Minister, that the Shah had actually made his move, and conditioned for action by the past three - weeks, the people of Tehran acted. Trucks, provided by the Army, [less than 1 line not declassified] were filled to + weeks, the people of Tehran acted. Trucks, provided by the Army, [less than 1 line not declassified] were filled to overflow capacity and headed for Radio Tehran. Buses were stopped and commandeered by the mobs and all means of public transportation were forced to mob use. Private automobiles were ordered to allow Shah @@ -40148,17 +33867,13 @@

[name not declassified]

-
- 307. Record of Meeting in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, +
+ 307. Record of Meeting in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 9, TPAJAX (Iran). Top Secret; Security Information; Eyes Only. Drafted by [name not declassified]. - Washington, August 28, 1953. + Washington, August 28, 1953.

TPAJAX

PRESENT @@ -40186,13 +33901,11 @@ [name not declassified] Reporter -

Mr. Wisner: Mr. Roosevelt reported that in his +

Mr. Wisner: Mr. Roosevelt reported that in his conversations with the British going up to the highest levels they had expressed complete understanding of and agreement with the reasons which he gave for his failure to report adequately during the period from - Sunday morning until Wednesday afternoon.August 16–19. These reasons were that he was faced with the + Sunday morning until Wednesday afternoon.August 16–19. These reasons were that he was faced with the choice of spending his time reporting fully and factually or getting out and acting—he could not do both—and he chose to do the latter. General Cabell responded that we, of @@ -40216,59 +33929,46 @@ not declassified] who was a tower of strength in this whole business, showed up in pretty much of a stew, and he said Nasseri had been arrested.

-

At that time I got hold of General McClure and asked him to go and call on General +

At that time I got hold of General McClure and asked him to go and call on General Riahi and try to find out - what the situation was. I didn’t get McClure’s report until a lot later, but I believe it was + what the situation was. I didn’t get McClure’s report until a lot later, but I believe it was then that Riahi told him that there had been an attempted coup by the Shah’s bodyguard under Colonel Nasseri and it had been defeated, but that there was American - implication in the thing, specifically that Commander Eric Pollard had been implicated and + implication in the thing, specifically that Commander Eric Pollard had been implicated and that later on he told McClure that he had information that we were hiding out certain people in the Embassy including General - Zahedi. I told McClure there was nothing in that, that Pollard had not been plotting, that we + Zahedi. I told McClure there was nothing in that, that Pollard had not been plotting, that we were not hiding out anyone in the Embassy.

Riahi was the Chief of Staff under - Mossadeq. Mossadeq had an announcement put on the + Mossadeq. Mossadeq had an announcement put on the air at 7:00 o’clock to much the same effect that there was no American implication . . . that simply a coup had been attempted by the Shah’s bodyguard and had been defeated. There was no mention of any firman by - the Shah, no mention of any attempt to replace Mossadeq officially or appoint Zahedi. + the Shah, no mention of any attempt to replace Mossadeq officially or appoint Zahedi. Zahedi’s name never appeared in the first broadcast. [4½ lines not - declassified] The Zahedis, father and son, showed tremendous courage + declassified] The Zahedis, father and son, showed tremendous courage through this whole business, so we then decided that the main thing to concentrate on was to prove to the Army and the people that this was not an attempted coup, that this was a legitimate change of government which Mossadeq had foiled by a coup. Accordingly our first step was to arrange for a secret interview - with the foreign correspondents. There were only two—one from the New York Times and one from the AP—and we set that up for 11:00 o’clock. We + with the foreign correspondents. There were only two—one from the New York Times and one from the AP—and we set that up for 11:00 o’clock. We wanted to have General Zahedi there, but he wasn’t able to be there, and, incidentally, we weren’t - there. We set the thing up. Young Zahedi was there with, first of all, the original order + there. We set the thing up. Young Zahedi was there with, first of all, the original order of the Shah appointing Zahedi Prime Minister and, secondly, with a number of photostatic copies of it, - which we gave to the correspondents, and also a statement from his father which came out, as a matter + which we gave to the correspondents, and also a statement from his father which came out, as a matter of fact, which we sent out in the plane that went to Beirut to pick up Ambassador Henderson. We took over the firman then and kept it in our safe in the Embassy after photostating. There were two photostats made, one by Persians and one in the Embassy. The one by Persians was actually better, but ours was the one that got the most distribution and appeared in most of the papers. - Now we then started immediately to prepare a statement for Zahedi to the press and public of Iran. + Now we then started immediately to prepare a statement for Zahedi to the press and public of Iran. He had seen the foreign correspondents. Now he was to speak to his own people, and we were worked up. We dictated in the course of that afternoon [3½ lines not declassified]. We did not @@ -40277,21 +33977,16 @@ reluctant to bring in an indigenous typesetter into the Embassy compound, so we compromised. We had [less than 1 line not declassified] type the thing out in Persian on a - typewriter. He did 10 copies. We whipped them off to Zahedi who signed them and sent them + typewriter. He did 10 copies. We whipped them off to Zahedi who signed them and sent them back to us, and then we distributed them to the foreign correspondents, and to such of the local press as we could get, and also to a couple of key army officers. By the time we finally succeeded in getting this it was too late to catch the morning papers, [5½ lines not declassified]. This came out Monday morning.

-

Mr. Wisner: [less than 1 line not declassified].

-

Mr. Roosevelt: [1 line not declassified].

-

Mr. Wisner: [less than 1 line not declassified].

-

Mr. Roosevelt: [less than 1 line not declassified]. Now there was one other +

Mr. Wisner: [less than 1 line not declassified].

+

Mr. Roosevelt: [1 line not declassified].

+

Mr. Wisner: [less than 1 line not declassified].

+

Mr. Roosevelt: [less than 1 line not declassified]. Now there was one other very encouraging sign Sunday evening, and that was that Tudeh began some demonstrations in which they shouted, “Death to the Shah,” and acting without orders, the Army started to beat the hell out of them, and they @@ -40300,8 +33995,7 @@ thing, and that gave us tremendous encouragement, so Sunday evening didn’t look nearly as black as Sunday morning. Now, of course, the thing that was bothering us was the security of our principal agents or allies - in this business. You can’t call Zahedi an agent, but he was an ally, and he was someone + in this business. You can’t call Zahedi an agent, but he was an ally, and he was someone to whom we had responsibility. We were desperately afraid that if he were captured the whole damn thing would collapse, and, therefore, we took the risk of hiding the principal people out in American houses. We @@ -40338,33 +34032,25 @@ trying to arrange for follow throughs from Zahedi. We got additional statements. We tried to place them. We tried to get the previous evening’s statement placed, and we tried to get the firman printed in as - many papers or even just single sheet emergency papers as possible. [1 line not declassified] It was really an amazing + many papers or even just single sheet emergency papers as possible. [1 line not declassified] It was really an amazing thing, and I don’t know how they did it, but they carried the firman; they carried the fake interview with Zahedi; they carried the next day the real interview with Zahedi; they carried more copies of the firman - photostats; and they kept attacking Mossadeq; and they still continued publishing. I just + photostats; and they kept attacking Mossadeq; and they still continued publishing. I just don’t know how they managed. Now we haven’t had a bill for it, but that was the general tenor of Monday’s events, and there were more talks - between McClure and Riahi, and McClure himself was arguing at the time that the best - thing to do was to make a deal with Riahi and hope that in due course he would overthrow + between McClure and Riahi, and McClure himself was arguing at the time that the best + thing to do was to make a deal with Riahi and hope that in due course he would overthrow Mossadeq.

The Ambassador arrived back Monday afternoon, and Monday was a day in - which there was still a certain amount of pro-Mossadeq rioting in town and no + which there was still a certain amount of pro-Mossadeq rioting in town and no particular indication of pro-Shah feeling except that these firmans were obviously having an effect. Everyone was asking about them. Was it true - that the Shah had issued a firman? If so, why was Mossadeq lying about it? And wasn’t + that the Shah had issued a firman? If so, why was Mossadeq lying about it? And wasn’t that a most reprehensible thing to do? Monday evening was a curious evening for me. We had a big Council of War in one of the houses in the compound and consisting of - General Zahedi, [1½ lines not declassified] and myself. We + General Zahedi, [1½ lines not declassified] and myself. We smuggled these people in and out in the bottom of cars and in closed jeeps, and strangely enough never at any time was there any attempt to stop cars going in or out of the American Embassy, which was just as @@ -40373,10 +34059,8 @@ going on, and I would have to leave it occasionally and go over and see Ambassador Henderson, and General McClure was sitting out - in front of his house in the compound worrying over Ambassador Henderson’s forthcoming interview with - Mossadeq and McClure’s previous interviews with + in front of his house in the compound worrying over Ambassador Henderson’s forthcoming interview with + Mossadeq and McClure’s previous interviews with Riahi, and they would say to me, “Now we must be able to assure the Prime Minister that we are not hiding out any Persians in the compound,” and I would say, “Please give @@ -40385,12 +34069,10 @@ this meeting. Henderson knew perfectly well what was going on. He told me afterwards. He said, “You did the only thing you could do. You had to tell them, but you also had - to do your business.” I don’t think McClure knew. The decision was eventually reached that + to do your business.” I don’t think McClure knew. The decision was eventually reached that night. It was a typical Persian discussion. It went all around the God damn map for about four hours. I felt no compunction coming in, and - going out, and reassuring Henderson from time to time, and then eventually + going out, and reassuring Henderson from time to time, and then eventually obviously someone had to make some decisions, and so we decided that we were going to make our play on Wednesday, and that we were going to send off three messages outside of Teheran, and that we were going to @@ -40402,10 +34084,7 @@ of their religion and the throne.

Then we wanted some outside military support from outside of Teheran, and it looked to us as if the two best bets within reach were the troops at - Kermanshah under Colonel Bakhtiar and the troops at Isfahan under Brigadier General Mahmud Davalu. [6½ lines not declassified]

+ Kermanshah under Colonel Bakhtiar and the troops at Isfahan under Brigadier General Mahmud Davalu. [6½ lines not declassified]

[1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]

Of course, the build-up that had gone on over the previous months, and particularly, I think, the material produced by the headquarters here, @@ -40421,19 +34100,15 @@ they can’t act until Friday, and that is too bad, but we have got to have some kind of a demonstration on Wednesday. We can’t let this thing just drift because if it drifts it is going to drift away from us.”

-

The Shah’s statementSee Document 269.—incidentally it was from Baghdad—was +

The Shah’s statementSee Document 269.—incidentally it was from Baghdad—was by that time receiving a good deal of circulation by word of mouth, and that was having a good effect, so although there were discouraging - signs, it didn’t look too desperate, so we sent out. [8½ lines not declassified]

-

Mr. Waller: [less than 1 line not declassified].

+ signs, it didn’t look too desperate, so we sent out. [8½ lines not declassified]

+

Mr. Waller: [less than 1 line not declassified].

Mr. Roosevelt: Well, they did. Incidentally, those troops didn’t get to Teheran until after the thing was pretty well over, but they served a very useful purpose on the way - because the one place in which there were serious pro-Mossadeq demonstrations on Wednesday + because the one place in which there were serious pro-Mossadeq demonstrations on Wednesday was Hamadan, and these boys hit Hamadan just as the Iran Party and the Tudeh was out on the streets, and they shot them up a bit and sent them scurrying back to their hiding holes and came rolling on to Teheran. No @@ -40451,16 +34126,12 @@ Headquarters to pieces, that they tore down “Bakhtar Emruz”, and I think this was [less than 1 line not declassified].

Mr. Wilber: I wondered because one - of the statements we got was that that mob was headed by people from Zuhrkhaneh exercise clubs, sport clubs, and [less than 1 line not declassified].

+ of the statements we got was that that mob was headed by people from Zuhrkhaneh exercise clubs, sport clubs, and [less than 1 line not declassified].

Mr. Roosevelt: We don’t know. We will find out in due course, but we don’t know yet, but when their targets appeared we felt fairly confident that [less than 1 line not declassified] and they went after “Bakhtar - Emruz” which was the most virulent, and pro-Mossadeq, and anti-American paper, and they really wrecked that place, + Emruz” which was the most virulent, and pro-Mossadeq, and anti-American paper, and they really wrecked that place, and the Security Forces wouldn’t fire on them. So things started developing, and by, I think, about 10 o’clock there was a mob headed toward Mossadeq’s house. That was @@ -40470,8 +34141,7 @@ orders, and they fired on the mob, and I think that was where most of the casualties were. The casualties so far as we could make out were greatly exaggerated in newspaper reports and Radio Teheran reports, as - also was the account of fighting around Mossadeq’s house. I read Time + also was the account of fighting around Mossadeq’s house. I read Time this morning, and it said that tanks were shooting 75 millimeter shells at each other, and they were bouncing off World War II armament for four hours. Well, dammit all, that just isn’t true because one of the girls @@ -40479,8 +34149,7 @@ Mossadeq’s house about 2:30 the fighting was all over, and the house was being ransacked, and there wasn’t anything like that. Later on there was mortar firing, and I think - that some of the troops just lobbed mortars into Mossadeq’s house for fun.

+ that some of the troops just lobbed mortars into Mossadeq’s house for fun.

Mr. Wisner: Weren’t there ransackers in there?

Mr. Roosevelt: They probably broke @@ -40489,8 +34158,7 @@ that time.

Well, beginning about 10:00 o’clock we began to have really great hopes of the situation, [26 lines not declassified] and - we brought him to the place where Zahedi was hidden, which was quite close to the Embassy + we brought him to the place where Zahedi was hidden, which was quite close to the Embassy compound in the house of one of our people. He was in the basement there, and we put the two of them together and we said, “Now, gentlemen, it is very likely that you are going to have to take action soon, and @@ -40509,15 +34177,13 @@ at about 1:30, although there appeared to be a slight lull, we decided that things were pretty good, and I went off to get a bite to eat around 2:00 and started listening to Radio Teheran which had been discussing - cotton prices all through this business but which switched to music at about 2:00 o’clock, and at + cotton prices all through this business but which switched to music at about 2:00 o’clock, and at about 2:15 there appeared to be something wrong with the record. It would halt or would sound slurred, and at about 2:30 the thing just went off the air, and we had no way of getting to the radio station, but it looked pretty good. The one real worry I had was that they might have wrecked the radio station so badly that they couldn’t get it on the air - again, and while that would hurt Mossadeq, it would also hurt us if we were going to be + again, and while that would hurt Mossadeq, it would also hurt us if we were going to be able to make the play, so I went back to the Embassy, and at about 3:30 Radio Teheran came on the air again deliriously pro-Zahedi. As a matter of fact, it was an irresponsible and silly performance, but anyhow they @@ -40526,19 +34192,15 @@ but . . . so as soon as I knew Radio Teheran was on the air, we sent out a scouting party to determine whether there were still tanks and trucks of troops waving the Shah’s picture and the word, so about 10 minutes of - four I went over to the house where Zahedi was hidden in the basement, and I found Zahedi in his underwear and khaki pants + four I went over to the house where Zahedi was hidden in the basement, and I found Zahedi in his underwear and khaki pants eating lunch with [name not declassified] who was - clad in a dirty old sport shirt and some torn up pants. Zahedi had his uniform there, and I + clad in a dirty old sport shirt and some torn up pants. Zahedi had his uniform there, and I said, “Gentlemen, the time has come now. You are going to have to get out on the streets and take command of the situation, and we have Radio Teheran.” Unfortunately the radio we had given to them the batteries went dead, so they didn’t know we had Radio Teheran, but they both responded immediately, and they said, “Certainly, how do we do this?” - and I said, “Well, what we are going to do is we are going to send [name not declassified] out in one of our cars + and I said, “Well, what we are going to do is we are going to send [name not declassified] out in one of our cars with white tags—non-diplomatic tags—and we are going to hunt around until we find a tank or truckload of soldiers which are pro-Shah, and then [name not declassified] will get out, and he @@ -40547,21 +34209,17 @@ Zahedi at a given street corner at 4:30 sharp, and we will deliver Zahedi in a closed jeep with again white tags on it to this street corner. He will get in; - he will ride up to Radio Teheran, and General Zahedi will go on the air, and he will + he will ride up to Radio Teheran, and General Zahedi will go on the air, and he will make a statement, and after that you are in,” and they said, “Fine”.

There was some argument. [name not declassified] had the idea maybe they should go directly to the Chief of Staff’s - office. I vetoed that. I thought it was too dangerous, so anyhow [name not declassified]—

+ office. I vetoed that. I thought it was too dangerous, so anyhow [name not declassified]—

Mr. Helms: Excuse me just a - second. At this point had Mossadeq already fled? I mean are you aware he had + second. At this point had Mossadeq already fled? I mean are you aware he had disappeared?

Mr. Roosevelt: We weren’t sure where he was. He had left his house by then, yes, but we didn’t know. - The rumor was he had gone to the Chief of Staff’s office, and so [name not declassified] went out on the street, + The rumor was he had gone to the Chief of Staff’s office, and so [name not declassified] went out on the street, but this, like every other part of the plan, didn’t go quite according to schedule.

@@ -40584,8 +34242,7 @@

[name not declassified] said to me afterwards, he said, “What can I do?” So he took them to him, and this tank came sailing right into the compound of this house, and Iranian Army officers - poured out of it, and they went in and they got Zahedi out of the basement, and they + poured out of it, and they went in and they got Zahedi out of the basement, and they put him on their shoulders, and they put him in the tank, and they marched up to Radio Teheran.

Fortunately there were so many wild stories going around that night that @@ -40614,8 +34271,7 @@

Mr. Waller: What happened to Mumtaz?

Mr. Roosevelt: He wasn’t killed. - Mumtaz was in charge of the guard in front of Mossadeq’s house. They apparently did + Mumtaz was in charge of the guard in front of Mossadeq’s house. They apparently did fight for a while. The first story we got was that Mumtaz had been killed in front of the house by a machine gun from a tank.

@@ -40634,11 +34290,9 @@ in on it?

Mr. Roosevelt: No, he was not anyone we counted on, but we hoped at the last minute he would come on - our side, but he apparently directed the defense of Mossadeq’s house and then fled at the + our side, but he apparently directed the defense of Mossadeq’s house and then fled at the appropriate moment, but the story was he had been shot and then - committed suicide in front of Mossadeq’s house, but two days later he turned up + committed suicide in front of Mossadeq’s house, but two days later he turned up without a scratch on him under arrest.

I think really when you come right down to it there were about three casualties among the military which is, considering all the shooting @@ -40678,8 +34332,7 @@ particular the Qashqai, look like doing now?

Mr. Roosevelt: Well, I can tell you the first thing that happened when this government came in was all - the tribes except the Qashqai sent telegrams to Zahedi saying, “If these Qashqai make + the tribes except the Qashqai sent telegrams to Zahedi saying, “If these Qashqai make any trouble, don’t send the Army after them. Let us go and take care of them.” A whole batch of telegrams came in, so that is one indication.

@@ -40695,12 +34348,10 @@

Mr. Helms: When this fellow Roosevelt says somebody has got to go, you sort of go like this, don’t you, or they have had it?

-

Mr. Roosevelt: [1½ lines not declassified].

+

Mr. Roosevelt: [1½ lines not declassified].

Mr. Waller: [1 line not declassified].

-

Mr. Roosevelt: [1 line not declassified].

+

Mr. Roosevelt: [1 line not declassified].

Mr. Wilber: I wonder if it wouldn’t be the time instead of having us go for us to move in on them as we plan to do over the years and haven’t been able to quite pull off @@ -40746,8 +34397,7 @@

Mr. Roosevelt: Yes, well, it is probably in worse shape than that. Furthermore, the parties with which it has been allied recently, or with which it might have allied, are - also in bad shape—the Iran Party. Has it been confirmed that Zirakzadeh’s brother cut his + also in bad shape—the Iran Party. Has it been confirmed that Zirakzadeh’s brother cut his throat?

Mr. Wilber: We heard his older brother actually committed suicide, but we haven’t any additional @@ -40762,8 +34412,7 @@

Mr. Roosevelt: Well, both the Shah and Zahedi promised me that very vigorous measures would be taken. What slowed them up was the defection - of this Police Chief of whom we had been hoping a great deal. [3 lines not declassified] But what happened, on + of this Police Chief of whom we had been hoping a great deal. [3 lines not declassified] But what happened, on Wednesday morning the guy took to the hills, and finally a day or so later we managed to arrest him. So the machinery that had been set up to take care of that just never functioned. Now when I last spoke to the @@ -40779,26 +34428,21 @@ least I saw that in the London Press.

Mr. Wisner: Were any of the - suggestions that we sent through to you in one rather long cableNot found. just about the day before + suggestions that we sent through to you in one rather long cableNot found. just about the day before you left—we hoped that you would receive it before your last conference there with the Shah and Zahedi—accepted, or was it simply fortuitous that some of these things were done anyway? These had to do with various - measures such as the disposition of Mossadeq.

+ measures such as the disposition of Mossadeq.

Mr. Roosevelt: Oh, yes. Well, those, as you probably recognized when you sent them, were already things that we were trying to do.

Mr. Wisner: Yes.

Mr. Roosevelt: The disposition of Mossadeq was a debated - subject when I left. The Shah discussed it with Henderson.Telegram 489 from Tehran, August 26, records a conversation between + subject when I left. The Shah discussed it with Henderson.Telegram 489 from Tehran, August 26, records a conversation between the Shah and Henderson in which the fate of Mosadeq was - discussed. The Shah gave expression to his concern that Mosadeq not be made a martyr. + discussed. The Shah gave expression to his concern that Mosadeq not be made a martyr. Henderson’s reply was to say “that if Mosadeq should be brought to public trial he might be able with his histrionic @@ -40813,88 +34457,68 @@

Mr. Wisner: We appreciated that when we said it.

Mr. Roosevelt: I did say that I - thought it was wise not to make a martyr out of Mossadeq, and the Shah agreed, but I + thought it was wise not to make a martyr out of Mossadeq, and the Shah agreed, but I think the Shah still at that time had the intention of having the public trial. Now I felt that Henderson could talk him out of that if it is the opinion of the United States Government that he should be talked out of it, but I would tell you one - thing: I would be more inclined to trust his judgment and Zahedi’s about it than I would ours. I + thing: I would be more inclined to trust his judgment and Zahedi’s about it than I would ours. I mean they know the psychology of the situation, and certainly from here - we can’t tell it. Maybe Henderson [less than 1 line not + we can’t tell it. Maybe Henderson [less than 1 line not declassified] out there can tell it, but I will tell you back here you certainly can’t, and the one thing that I did say to the Shah - on the subject of trials was that I thought Riahi should be executed, and the Shah said, “Well, why + on the subject of trials was that I thought Riahi should be executed, and the Shah said, “Well, why particularly?” He said, “he may not have known he was acting against a firman of mine.” I said that he certainly damn well did know and that he had said to General McClure that - even if he did know that it was your firman, Mossadeq was on the side of the people, and his loyalty + even if he did know that it was your firman, Mossadeq was on the side of the people, and his loyalty was to the people, and I said, “He seems to have made a slight miscalculation, but I don’t think that excuses him for having committed treason,” and the Shah said that he didn’t either. In fact, the Shah got - rather a nasty glint in his eye at that stage of the game. Riahi, you know, was the guy who + rather a nasty glint in his eye at that stage of the game. Riahi, you know, was the guy who wrecked us in the first attempt. If it hadn’t of been for him there wouldn’t be any trouble at all. So he and I think it is important for the morale of the Army that an example be made of the senior officer who disobeyed the orders of his - Commander in Chief, so even though General McClure thinks Riahi is a fine man, I am afraid that I think he should + Commander in Chief, so even though General McClure thinks Riahi is a fine man, I am afraid that I think he should suffer.

Mr. Wisner: I have a number of other questions to ask, but I think that probably they could wait. I am - sure, however, that General Cabell and the rest of us would like to hear something + sure, however, that General Cabell and the rest of us would like to hear something about what happened in London.

Mr. Roosevelt: Oh, yes. Well, I don’t know whether you want all of this taken down or not.

Mr. Wisner: No, I don’t think this is necessary.

-
+
308. Monthly Report Prepared in the Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence AgencySource: - Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 81–01061R, Box 2, Folder 3, Monthly + Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 81–01061R, Box 2, Folder 3, Monthly Report—August 1953—Country Summaries and Analyses. Top Secret. - Washington, undated. + Washington, undated.

IRAN

August 1953

A. General Developments

1. The fall of the Mossadeq government overshadowed all other activities and operations in Iran. The - successful outcome of the efforts of General Zahedi and his supporters to gain control of the + successful outcome of the efforts of General Zahedi and his supporters to gain control of the government and the return of the Shah to Iran have undoubtedly paved the way for increased internal stability and closer relations with the U.S., - and have created a favorable atmosphere for CIA operations in the country. As a result of the change of + and have created a favorable atmosphere for CIA operations in the country. As a result of the change of government CIA contacts in key government and military circles have been greatly increased; few losses were sustained.

2. Experience has proven, however, that the Iranian internal political - situation is given to rapid and drastic change. While CIA should capitalize to the fullest + situation is given to rapid and drastic change. While CIA should capitalize to the fullest extent on the present favorable situation it should at the same time prepare itself to cope with problems arising under new and possibly unfavorable conditions.

3. The greatest assurance for the maintenance of the present government in power and internal stability lies in a rapid improvement of the country’s finances and economy. Prompt initiation of new labor giving - projects under the long-range developmental program, known as the Seven Year Plan, would create + projects under the long-range developmental program, known as the Seven Year Plan, would create popular confidence. This action, if properly propagandized, could be developed into a nation-wide popular appeal, having the effect of reducing the appeal of extreme nationalism and communism.

@@ -40905,8 +34529,7 @@ by raiding cells and publications and making arrests. It has established its control over the country generally through the Army and civilian appointments. There is no information on the residual strength of the - now latent, extreme nationalist and other pro-Mossadeq elements.

+ now latent, extreme nationalist and other pro-Mossadeq elements.

6. The Qashqai who appeared to be on the point of rebelling against the new government at the time of its accession to power, are quiescent at least momentarily, and with a consolidation of the new government it is @@ -40919,8 +34542,7 @@

[Omitted here are paragraphs 7–12.]

C. Operational Summary

Political and Psychological Warfare

-

13. Although the anti-Tudeh activities continued, PP operations were largely directed in support of bringing +

13. Although the anti-Tudeh activities continued, PP operations were largely directed in support of bringing about a change in government.

[4 paragraphs (11 lines) not declassified]

Paramilitary Operations

@@ -40930,11 +34552,8 @@ activities.

[1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]

- John H. - Waller[name not declassified] signed for Waller above Waller’s typed + John H. + Waller[name not declassified] signed for Waller above Waller’s typed signature. CNE-4 @@ -40942,45 +34561,32 @@
-
+
The Aftermath of Operation TPAJAX, September 1953–December 1954 -
+
309. Memorandum From the Acting Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans ([name not - declassified]) to Director of Central Intelligence DullesSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 7901228A, Box 11, + declassified]) to Director of Central Intelligence DullesSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 7901228A, Box 11, Folder 14, Iran 1951–1953. Secret. - Washington, September 2, 1953. + Washington, September 2, 1953. SUBJECT - Memorandum of Conversation Between Mr. Henry Byroade, Assistant Secretary - of State for NEA, and John Waller, CNEA–4, Concerning + Memorandum of Conversation Between Mr. Henry Byroade, Assistant Secretary + of State for NEA, and John Waller, CNEA–4, Concerning Allayar Saleh, Iranian Ambassador to the United States

The conversation reported herein took place at the request of the Deputy Director, Plans:

-

1. Mr. Waller called Mr. Byroade’s attention to the fact that +

1. Mr. Waller called Mr. Byroade’s attention to the fact that Ambassador Saleh had tendered his resignation and presumably planned to return to Iran in the near future. Information had reached us to the effect that the Iranian government had urged Saleh to remain at his post and withdraw his resignation. However, it appeared that Ambassador Saleh definitely - intended to relinquish his post. Mr. Waller stated that CIA - was concerned by the prospect of Saleh’s return to Iran at this time in view of his Iran + intended to relinquish his post. Mr. Waller stated that CIA + was concerned by the prospect of Saleh’s return to Iran at this time in view of his Iran Party ties and his very considerable personal prestige which might be exploited by pro-Mossadeq or even pro-Tudeh political factions which are in current opposition to the Shah @@ -40991,51 +34597,35 @@ opposition to the return of the Shah, which role had brought the Iran Party dangerously close to outright alliance with the Tudeh Party.

2. Mr. Waller observed that this - was essentially a Department of State problem but that CIA felt that it was appropriate for its + was essentially a Department of State problem but that CIA felt that it was appropriate for its views to be brought to the attention of the Department of State. - Furthermore, it would be perhaps possible for CIA to take covert action designed to neutralize any + Furthermore, it would be perhaps possible for CIA to take covert action designed to neutralize any adverse effect which Mr. Saleh’s return might occasion.

3. Mr. Byroade acknowledged the - fact that the possible problems presented by Ambassador Saleh’s return to Iran were of concern + fact that the possible problems presented by Ambassador Saleh’s return to Iran were of concern to the Department of State. He stated that he also had received - information to the effect that the Zahedi government had urged Saleh to remain at his post in Washington and that Ambassador Saleh had refused to do so. Mr. + information to the effect that the Zahedi government had urged Saleh to remain at his post in Washington and that Ambassador Saleh had refused to do so. Mr. Byroade added that in his opinion Saleh now regretted - having announced in such strong terms his allegiance to Mossadeq and opposition to General - Zahedi. In Mr. Byroade’s opinion, Ambassador + having announced in such strong terms his allegiance to Mossadeq and opposition to General + Zahedi. In Mr. Byroade’s opinion, Ambassador Saleh’s press release on the subject was hastily made and made on the basis of inadequate information - from Iran which had caused Mr. Saleh to under-estimate the degree of popular support + from Iran which had caused Mr. Saleh to under-estimate the degree of popular support for the Shah. Mr. Byroade stated - that the Department probably should have gotten to Ambassador Saleh before he made his unfortunate + that the Department probably should have gotten to Ambassador Saleh before he made his unfortunate remarks to the press, but that since these remarks were made it would appear that Ambassador Saleh had - burned his bridges behind him. Mr. Byroade believed that there was absolutely no chance + burned his bridges behind him. Mr. Byroade believed that there was absolutely no chance that Saleh would at this point consider remaining as Ambassador to the U.S.

4. With regard to possible black campaigns intended to discredit Saleh or otherwise - neutralize him in Iran, Mr. Byroade felt that we should proceed with caution since + neutralize him in Iran, Mr. Byroade felt that we should proceed with caution since Saleh, given favorable - circumstances, might later prove helpful to the U.S. Mr. Byroade stated that the Department had - an informal channel of contact with Saleh through Mr. Engert, former Ambassador to Iran and Ambassador to + circumstances, might later prove helpful to the U.S. Mr. Byroade stated that the Department had + an informal channel of contact with Saleh through Mr. Engert, former Ambassador to Iran and Ambassador to Afghanistan. Through this contact it might be possible to encourage Saleh to delay his return to Iran. However, Engert had @@ -41043,59 +34633,43 @@ intended to return straightway to Iran despite real fear and apprehension as to his reception there.

5. Mr. Byroade stated that he was - not sure we need worry about future opposition activities by Saleh in Iran. Nevertheless, he shared + not sure we need worry about future opposition activities by Saleh in Iran. Nevertheless, he shared to some extent CIA’s concern in this regard. Mr. Byroade said he - would like to think about the problem further and he would let CIA know of any action which the - Department felt it should or could take either to delay Saleh’s return to Iran, or to + would like to think about the problem further and he would let CIA know of any action which the + Department felt it should or could take either to delay Saleh’s return to Iran, or to neutralize him once in Iran.

- [name not declassified] + [name not declassified]
-
+
310. Despatch From the Station in Iran to the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt) - Tehran, September 4, 1953. + Tehran, September 4, 1953. [Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 8, TPAJAX. Secret; Security Information. 5 pages not declassified.]
-
- 311. Despatch From the Chief of Station in Iran ([name not declassified]) to the Chief of the Near East and +
+ 311. Despatch From the Chief of Station in Iran ([name not declassified]) to the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt) - Tehran, September 4, 1953. + Tehran, September 4, 1953. [Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 8, TPAJAX. Secret; Security Information; Eyes Only. 5 pages not declassified.]
-
+
312. Telegram From the Chief of the U.S. Military Mission in Iran (McClure) to the Chief of - Staff, United States Army (Ridgway)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, Iran + Staff, United States Army (Ridgway)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, Iran 1951–1953. Confidential; Security Information. - Tehran, September 6, + Tehran, September 6, 1953, 0815Z.

S 748A. Had a conference with His Majesty lasting 1 hour and 15 mins. Conf was entirely in English with @@ -41103,8 +34677,7 @@ and most important problem was the morale of the armed forces. Something must be done immediately to provide min housing rqmts for jr officers and noncommissioned officers many of whom at present living in squalor. - He accepted as an interim organization the one which our mil had programmed and is now prepared to + He accepted as an interim organization the one which our mil had programmed and is now prepared to support—12 Inf Brigades and 3 Armored Brigades and appropriate supporting trps. He desires a highly proficient and tech trained small army with considerable mobility which could be backed, in time of war, @@ -41112,15 +34685,12 @@ defensively until over run and then resort to guerilla tactics. To this end he required strategically located bases to support a retirement from his northern frontier to a final defensive line. While accepting the - reorganization plan as an interim measure, he is not rpt not satisfied with the equip we are + reorganization plan as an interim measure, he is not rpt not satisfied with the equip we are providing. He stated that the tank battalions are equipped with tank destroyers instead of tanks. These tank destroyers should ultimately be transferred to Inf Brigades. He believes the heaviest tank which the Russians would attempt to use on this country is the modified T–34 and - that his 3 Armored Brigades must be equipped with US tanks which will compete on favorable terms with this Russian + that his 3 Armored Brigades must be equipped with US tanks which will compete on favorable terms with this Russian tank. To this end he asked for consideration of furn 3 battalions of Patton tanks. He stated that each of the 5 corps required an Anti-Acft Battalion to protect ground trps from straffing and bombing attacks, as @@ -41133,26 +34703,21 @@ mountains. Recognizing the lack of adequate airfields in the southern part of the country he rqsts consideration of steel matting for air strips. He visualizes the mission of the Air Force as being one of close - support to ground trps only. He does not rpt not feel the F–47 is effective enough to justify its + support to ground trps only. He does not rpt not feel the F–47 is effective enough to justify its continuance. He accepted the T–6 as an interim vehicle and recognizes that it is much too early to ask for jet acft. However he believes that - specially selected Iran officers should be sent to the US for a period of 2 years to become + specially selected Iran officers should be sent to the US for a period of 2 years to become proficient in jet acft and form the nucleus of an instructor group in Iran. He was very disappointed to learn that the 155 Howitzers had been - removed from the program. He recognized that he had no rpt no authority over Gen Staff at the + removed from the program. He recognized that he had no rpt no authority over Gen Staff at the time that was agreed upon. He was emphatic that the minimum rqmt for the type force which Iran must have would require 5 battalions—1 for each corps. He said an opponent having 155’s would put his ground forces with - 105’s at such disadvantage they would not rpt not stand even in mountain passes. He also commented on + 105’s at such disadvantage they would not rpt not stand even in mountain passes. He also commented on the fact that there was no rpt no bridge equip other than for tng purposes prov in the program. While admitting there were apparently few rivers of any size in this country - he said that in certain seasons of the year his Armored Div should have aval 200 meters of Bailey + he said that in certain seasons of the year his Armored Div should have aval 200 meters of Bailey Bridge. He stated that he would direct the Gen Staff to proceed at once with the reorganization. In his parting remarks said he hoped we would have frequent meetings to discuss mil @@ -41162,24 +34727,17 @@ Battalions capable of stopping the improved T–34 (C) The addition of 3 Anti-Acft Battalions (D) The provision of 5 Battalions of 155 Howitzers (E) Provision of bridge equip (F) Early tng of jet pilots. The Shah was - confident positive and intense during the conference and left no rpt no doubt in my mind that he expects to + confident positive and intense during the conference and left no rpt no doubt in my mind that he expects to assume leadership over the Armed Forces.

-
- 313. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans (Wisner) to Director of Central - Intelligence DullesSource: Central Intelligence Agency, +
+ 313. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans (Wisner) to Director of Central + Intelligence DullesSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, Iran 1951–1953. Secret; Security Information. A note - on the memorandum indicates it was noted by DCI on September 10. - Washington, September 8, 1953. + on the memorandum indicates it was noted by DCI on September 10. + Washington, September 8, 1953. SUBJECT Financial and economic assistance to Iran; the views and position @@ -41188,12 +34746,10 @@

1. Reference is made to the various memoranda held in reserve for the Director concerning the efforts of this Agency to stimulate (by all - appropriate means) the interest and action of various US governmental and other officials to the + appropriate means) the interest and action of various US governmental and other officials to the end that sufficient and timely economic and financial assistance may be provided to the new Iranian Government.Two - such memoranda are Documents 282 and 305. After some days of unsuccessful + such memoranda are Documents 282 and 305. After some days of unsuccessful effort to reach Mr. Eugene Black, he finally called me on September 4 and we had a very carefully guarded conversation of which the following is the substance (although not the @@ -41213,20 +34769,17 @@ case of Iran obviously such a loan could not be repaid unless and until that country’s problems with the British were satisfactorily resolved.

-

3. Under the circumstances Mr. Black did not propose to send [less +

3. Under the circumstances Mr. Black did not propose to send [less than 1 line not declassified] representative of the Bank to Iran, as this would undoubtedly give rise to speculation that the Bank was about to entertain a loan application, which might cause further embarrassment. However, with realization of how much assistance the Bank could render Iran, Mr. Black consulted the head of the Monetary Fund with respect to the willingness - of the Fund to send a mission to Iran, if and when asked, to aid in + of the Fund to send a mission to Iran, if and when asked, to aid in solving the exchange problems which are sure to arise—and in fact have already come up—[2 lines not declassified]. The - head of the Fund readily agreed, and Mr. Black is hopeful that this plan may go forward soon. + head of the Fund readily agreed, and Mr. Black is hopeful that this plan may go forward soon. [2 lines not declassified]

4. Mr. Black regards most favorably the man who has been named as the new head of the Central Bank @@ -41236,22 +34789,17 @@ discussed with Mr. Nasr the desirability of the visit to Iran of a mission from the Monetary Fund and understands that Mr. Nasr will, in his new capacity as head of the Central Bank, request such a mission. - While Mr. Nasr was on duty in Washington, Mr. Black personally took care to see that + While Mr. Nasr was on duty in Washington, Mr. Black personally took care to see that he met quite a number of key US - officials such as Assistant Secretary of State Byroade, and persons of considerable + officials such as Assistant Secretary of State Byroade, and persons of considerable importance in both the Treasury and the Federal Reserve System.

- Frank G. - Wisner + Frank G. + Wisner
-
- 314. Central Intelligence Agency Information CableSource: Central Intelligence Agency, +
+ 314. Central Intelligence Agency Information CableSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 89–00176R, Box 1, Folder 19, Political Activities—Iran. Secret; Security Information. Sent to the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air @@ -41263,8 +34811,7 @@ CS PD 916 - Washington, September 8, 1953. + Washington, September 8, 1953. SUBJECT Qashqai–Zahedi Relations @@ -41279,49 +34826,35 @@ found.

1. The Qashqai Khans are - attempting to obtain from the Zahedi government some “face saving” concessions + attempting to obtain from the Zahedi government some “face saving” concessions (possibly a public announcement that the government has no intention of - arresting “loyal Iranians” Khosro and Mohammad Hoseyn Qashqai, and that it has released fellow members of the former + arresting “loyal Iranians” Khosro and Mohammad Hoseyn Qashqai, and that it has released fellow members of the former national movement fractions who were formerly arrested before burying the hatchet with Zahedi.

-

2. At the request of the Qashqai, Zahedi is sending Hoseyn Makki to Shiraz on 3 September +

2. At the request of the Qashqai, Zahedi is sending Hoseyn Makki to Shiraz on 3 September to confer with Nasr Qashqai. (Washington comment: For further information concerning Makki’s activities, see PD–903.)Not found.

3. The Qashqai have absolutely no intention of rebelling or “seceding” and will fight only in self-defense if attacked by the army.

-

Field distribution: State, Army, SUBCOMNELM formal dissem follows. (End of message)

-

The above info based on Tehe 868 (IN 16169).Not found.

+

Field distribution: State, Army, SUBCOMNELM formal dissem follows. (End of message)

+

The above info based on Tehe 868 (IN 16169).Not found.

- [name not declassified] + [name not declassified]
-
+
315. Memorandum From the U.S. Technical Cooperation Administration - Regional Director in Shiraz (Bryant) to the Director of the U.S. Technical - Cooperation Administration Mission in Iran (Warne)Source: + Regional Director in Shiraz (Bryant) to the Director of the U.S. Technical + Cooperation Administration Mission in Iran (Warne)Source: National Archives, RG 469, Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies 1948–1961, Mission to Iran, Executive Office Subject Files (Central Files) 1951–1961, Box 7, Folder 6, 350. Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy, which is - attached to a covering memorandum from Warne to Henderson dated September 12. - Shiraz, Iran, September 9, 1953. -

Third Memorandum Report Pertaining to the Ghashghaie Situation

+ attached to a covering memorandum from Warne to Henderson dated September 12. + Shiraz, Iran, September 9, 1953. +

Third Memorandum Report Pertaining to the Ghashghaie Situation

The Governor General, Mr. Haiat, and the General of the Sixth Division, Mirjahangiri, met the Ghashghaie brothers in an area near Abadeh, at which time every effort was made to @@ -41337,13 +34870,11 @@

In later discussions with the brothers they indicated that they did not expect the government to concede to all of their requests. The proposals made by them to gain their support or to remain quiet were purposely - difficult for the government as the Ghashghaies at this time were not in a position to make + difficult for the government as the Ghashghaies at this time were not in a position to make a decision as to their future course of action. This final decision will not be made until they meet with all of the sub-tribal chiefs, consisting of approximately 100, in about two weeks time.

-

The meeting was conducted in a friendly atmosphere and the Ghashghaie high personal regard for Mr. +

The meeting was conducted in a friendly atmosphere and the Ghashghaie high personal regard for Mr. Haiat and General Mirjahangiri was further enhanced; however no real satisfaction was realized by the government (as intended by the chiefs), but a promise was made to submit the Ghashghaie proposals to Tehran for @@ -41375,15 +34906,13 @@ this time, but should make an effort to reconcile their position. These two powerful sub-chiefs would undoubtedly remain loyal to the majority view of the brothers, but, without question, Khosrow’s attitude was - softened as a result of pressure exerted by them. Khosrow’s position would be greatly weakened if + softened as a result of pressure exerted by them. Khosrow’s position would be greatly weakened if he failed to take their views into consideration.

Bahmanbegui contacted Nasser Khan on my instructions for the purpose of making arrangements for me to meet with him. Realizing that Nasser was in sympathy with giving support to the present government, I left it - for him to decide with whom I should meet. Nasser, recognizing Khosrow’s popular following, + for him to decide with whom I should meet. Nasser, recognizing Khosrow’s popular following, suggested that I first meet with Khosrow and Malek Mansour and, if this meeting was not successful, he would make arrangements to see me at a very early date.

@@ -41412,23 +34941,17 @@ was not his desire in any way to make their position difficult, that he had always enjoyed their friendship and confidence, and that he desired to continue to maintain a close and satisfactory working relationship - and understanding with them. I also explained that General Zahedi would welcome a visit by any of + and understanding with them. I also explained that General Zahedi would welcome a visit by any of the brothers and that he would further assure them of safe travel to and from Tehran if they wished to meet with him.

-

Khosrow deeply appreciated the fact that Ambassador Henderson recognized that assurances +

Khosrow deeply appreciated the fact that Ambassador Henderson recognized that assurances from the Prime Minister would not be sufficient to safeguard their future security and had, therefore, discussed their situation with the - Shah. In discussing the conversation that Ambassador Henderson and the Shah had, I pointed - out to them that I was of the opinion that Mr. Henderson had presented their + Shah. In discussing the conversation that Ambassador Henderson and the Shah had, I pointed + out to them that I was of the opinion that Mr. Henderson had presented their situation in the most favorable manner. They were informed that the Ambassador had spoken to the Shah of the good working relationship we - had always maintained with the Ghashghaies and that they had always extended to the Americans the finest + had always maintained with the Ghashghaies and that they had always extended to the Americans the finest hospitality and, in addition, had been of substantial service to the Americans.

I explained that the Shah did not understand why they disliked him since @@ -41446,12 +34969,10 @@ guarantee on matters which pertain to the internal affairs of any nation. I am certain that these statements and assurances extracted by Ambassador Henderson immediately - greatly impressed the other Ghashghaies and that as Khosrow had an opportunity to + greatly impressed the other Ghashghaies and that as Khosrow had an opportunity to think about it he was deeply appreciative for the effort that was made by Mr. Henderson.

-

In my discussion with the Ghashghaies I covered in some detail the opinions of +

In my discussion with the Ghashghaies I covered in some detail the opinions of Ambassador Henderson as to the consequences they could expect if they took action counter to the interest of the government. I told them that the Ambassador was of the @@ -41468,8 +34989,7 @@ representatives of the Communists and that he had informed them that regardless of the present situation that some day in the future they would undoubtedly be shooting at each other.

-

Throughout all the discussion the Ghashghaies indicated that they had faith and believed +

Throughout all the discussion the Ghashghaies indicated that they had faith and believed in General Zahedi, but that they did not feel that his government would remain in office for any prolonged period of time. However, at no time did they indicate that @@ -41483,8 +35003,7 @@

They hold in the highest regard the Governor General Haiat and General Mirjahangiri, but possess a fear that they will be replaced by someone who will not give them the consideration which they feel they deserve. - As indicated they deeply appreciate the efforts made by Mr. Henderson, but fear also that at some + As indicated they deeply appreciate the efforts made by Mr. Henderson, but fear also that at some date he may leave Iran and that his influence will be forgotten. I pointed out to them that the conversations which took place had been reported and that certainly Washington would be informed of our @@ -41522,9 +35041,7 @@ would tie down the military in giving security to that vicinity. They would then take as their first objective the city of Kazeroon. Their choice in making Kazeroon their first objective is based on their belief - that 75 per cent or more of the population of that city would support the Ghashghaies, and secondly, because most + that 75 per cent or more of the population of that city would support the Ghashghaies, and secondly, because most of the military ammunition dumps are in that vicinity.

Throughout Khosrow’s private discussion with me he continuously kept coming back to the realization that regardless of what they might @@ -41536,8 +35053,7 @@ stated that the tolerance of Communism by the past government was the great mistake, and that although he recognized this, he did not feel that he could desert Dr. Mossadegh. He pointed out that regardless of - what might happen to Iran in the future that he and the Ghashghaies could never accept Communism + what might happen to Iran in the future that he and the Ghashghaies could never accept Communism and that as long as they were a force they would fight it.

There is no doubt but what Khosrow still holds Dr. Mossadegh in the highest esteem and sincerely believes that he has been one of Iran’s @@ -41590,8 +35106,7 @@ a message had been sent to one of the sub-tribal chiefs by Khosrow that they were going to make peace with the government.

In evaluating the present situation I believe that much progress has been - made as a result of Mr. Henderson’s contacts and relationships which have been + made as a result of Mr. Henderson’s contacts and relationships which have been maintained with Khosrow by Embassy officials in the past as well as the efforts which have been undertaken by representatives of the Iranian government. I do not believe that the Ghashghaies will undertake any @@ -41622,56 +35137,45 @@ And secondly, some feel that he would put personal interest over that of serving the tribes.

- E.C. - Bryant + E.C. + Bryant
-
- 316. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 316. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, - 788.00/9–1153. Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Gannett. Received September 18. + 788.00/9–1153. Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Gannett. Received September 18. Sent by pouch to Isfahan and London. No. 154 - Tehran, September 11, 1953. + Tehran, September 11, 1953. SUBJECT - Attitude of Qashqai Tribes Toward the Zahedi Government + Attitude of Qashqai Tribes Toward the Zahedi Government

There are transmitted herewith several items reflecting upon the attitude - of the Qashqai tribes toward the Zahedi Government (see list on page 3).The list of enclosures on page 3 is not printed. + of the Qashqai tribes toward the Zahedi Government (see list on page 3).The list of enclosures on page 3 is not printed. None of the enclosures is printed.

As was to be expected, the Qashqai tribes were greatly alarmed by the change in administration occurring on August 19, fearing that it portended activity against them by the Central Government and by the Shah in particular. Principally through the leadership of Khosro Qashqai, a member of the National Movement Faction in the 17th Majlis, - the tribes thoroughly allied themselves with the Mosadeq Government and on repeated + the tribes thoroughly allied themselves with the Mosadeq Government and on repeated occasions indicated to American officials in Iran that they would resist with force any change in administration unless they were assured in advance of a benevolent attitude on the part of the successor government.

In keeping with previous events, on August 19 tribesmen disarmed the Gendarmérie garrison of some 20 men at Semiron, summer seat of the - tribes, but restored them to their former duties several days later when it appeared no + tribes, but restored them to their former duties several days later when it appeared no untoward actions against the tribes were forthcoming from Tehran. Khosro Khan, who had personally led an anti-Shah mob through the streets of Shiraz on August 16, was back in Tehran by August 19 but beat a hasty - retreat that day to Fars Ostand when it became apparent the Mosadeq Government was falling. + retreat that day to Fars Ostand when it became apparent the Mosadeq Government was falling. Meanwhile, Nasr Khan who had already sought to impose the role of intermediary between the tribes and the American Government upon Mr. Elmer C. Bryant, Regional @@ -41684,18 +35188,15 @@ began immediately preparations for the southward migration, some 30 days earlier than customary, in order to place as much distance between them and Tehran as possible and to take up secure winter positions in the - shortest period of time. Mr. Bryant relates his several conversations with Dr. Bahman + shortest period of time. Mr. Bryant relates his several conversations with Dr. Bahman Bege in a memorandum of August 24, 1953 (see enclosure no. 1).

As a consequence of these conversations and of the local situation, Mr. Bryant decided to come to Tehran, making the trip by car on August 23. The Embassy’s telegram to - the Department (no. 484 of August 26, repeated London as no. 140)See footnote 4, + the Department (no. 484 of August 26, repeated London as no. 140)See footnote 4, Document 321. relates the oral message he brought from the Qashqai chieftains, the Ambassador’s conversation with the Shah - and the oral messages given to Mr. Bryant to be conveyed to the chieftains from the Shah + and the oral messages given to Mr. Bryant to be conveyed to the chieftains from the Shah and the Ambassador. As yet no report has been received from Mr. Bryant concerning any further conversations he may have had with the Qashqais. Under date of @@ -41713,13 +35214,10 @@ fall of the Mosadeq Government. Moreover, Ali Hayat, who became Governor General at Shiraz following August 19, but recently resigned that post in order to accept - appointment as President of the Supreme Court, has been in direct touch with the tribes and + appointment as President of the Supreme Court, has been in direct touch with the tribes and states that “since there is still some unfinished work to be done (he is going back to Fars temporarily) as the Government’s special - representative” (see enclosure no. 4).Enclosure no. 4 is a report from the newspaper Kayhan, September 9, on the appointment of Ali Hayat, + representative” (see enclosure no. 4).Enclosure no. 4 is a report from the newspaper Kayhan, September 9, on the appointment of Ali Hayat, former Governor-General of Fars Province, to the Presidency of the Supreme Court. In his former capacity as Governor-General, Hayat commented on the tense, although improving, relationship between the @@ -41740,21 +35238,17 @@ present at least, to relax tensions between them and the Qashqais, and to restore amicable relations.Enclosures no. 3 and 5 are not commented upon in the despatch. Enclosure no. 3 - reproduces a warning issued on August 21, in which Brigadier Davalu referred to rumors + reproduces a warning issued on August 21, in which Brigadier Davalu referred to rumors that Mohamed Nasr Qashqai - wished to incite a rebellion in the Semiron area. Davalu warned: “If these - publications were really signed by Mr. Mohamed Nasr Qashqai, he, as well as Messrs. Mohamed + wished to incite a rebellion in the Semiron area. Davalu warned: “If these + publications were really signed by Mr. Mohamed Nasr Qashqai, he, as well as Messrs. Mohamed Hosein and Khosro, is hereby notified to confess that he has been wrong, come immediately to Isfahan, and ask to be forgiven and be sure that he will definitely be secure. Failing to do so, they and the small number of people who, contrary to their religious and national duties, should make troubles for the people or the guards at the Gendarmérie outposts, etc., will promptly and mercilessly be - wiped out by air and land.” Enclosure no. 5 is a report from Asia Javan, September 9, that listed four + wiped out by air and land.” Enclosure no. 5 is a report from Asia Javan, September 9, that listed four conditions rumored to have been put to Hayat by the Qashqai, but which Hayat denied. The conditions read: “1. Release of Dr. Mosadeq and the leaders @@ -41763,16 +35257,14 @@ relations with Britain.”

For the Ambassador: - Roy M. - Melbourne + Roy M. + Melbourne First Secretary of Embassy
-
+
317. Information Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job @@ -41783,20 +35275,17 @@ CS–20045 - Washington, September 14, 1953. + Washington, September 14, 1953. SUBJECT - Relations between the Shah and Prime Minister Zahedi + Relations between the Shah and Prime Minister Zahedi SOURCE [1 line not declassified]

1. On 3 September 1953 the Shah stated that he “is a new man” since his - return to Iran. “Before 19 August 1953, I was the son of Reza Shah. Now I am the Shah in my own + return to Iran. “Before 19 August 1953, I was the son of Reza Shah. Now I am the Shah in my own right.”

2. The Shah stated also that he will not make the mistakes he made with Ali Razmara and Mohammed @@ -41808,13 +35297,11 @@ him. The Shah added that Prime Minister Zahedi could receive information copies but that all action on Army matters would proceed from himself.

-

4. The first disagreement between the Shah and Zahedi occurred concerning Major +

4. The first disagreement between the Shah and Zahedi occurred concerning Major General Ahmad Vosuq, Deputy Minister of National Defense. Vosuq is a “Shah man” and Zahedi is resisting Vosuq’s appointment as Minister of National Defense and states - that he does not trust Vosuq. The Shah has announced that Zahedi must refrain from interfering in + that he does not trust Vosuq. The Shah has announced that Zahedi must refrain from interfering in Army affairs.

5. The Shah has included Ardeshir Zahedi, the son of the Prime Minister, within his private @@ -41830,23 +35317,15 @@ all state occasions, saying, “This is an order that you must obey.”

-
+
318. Memorandum From the Chief of the Iran Branch, Near East and - Africa Division, Directorate of Plans (Waller) to Director of Central Intelligence DullesSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 80R01443R, Box 1, + Africa Division, Directorate of Plans (Waller) to Director of Central Intelligence DullesSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 80R01443R, Box 1, Folder 33, NSC Briefing 17 Sept 53. Top Secret; Security Information. - Washington, September 16, 1953. + Washington, September 16, 1953. SUBJECT - Transmittal of Texts of Messages Sent By Prime Minister Zahedi and Prime Minister + Transmittal of Texts of Messages Sent By Prime Minister Zahedi and Prime Minister Churchill

At your request, made during the NSC @@ -41881,43 +35360,32 @@ centuries old friendship. We ought to be able to find ways of helping each other and we are certainly willing to play our part. I shall always be very glad to hear from you.”

-

The above messages were transmitted via CIA channels.

+

The above messages were transmitted via CIA channels.

- John H. - Waller + John H. + Waller
-
+
319. Briefing Notes Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for - Director of Central Intelligence DullesSource: + Director of Central Intelligence DullesSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI - Files, Job 80R01443R, Box 1, Folder 33, NSC Briefing 17 Sept 53. Top Secret; Security + Files, Job 80R01443R, Box 1, Folder 33, NSC Briefing 17 Sept 53. Top Secret; Security Information. Prepared for DCI Dulles for his briefing to - the NSC on September 17; see Document 320. - Washington, undated. + the NSC on September 17; see Document 320. + Washington, undated.

THE SITUATION IN IRAN

I. - Zahedi disappointed over US aid:

+ Zahedi disappointed over US aid:

A. Prime Minister Zahedi considers $45,000,000 too small to undertake necessary development and job-creating projects.

B. He allegedly considered resignation, but stated he was reassured after talking to Ambassador Henderson - on 11 September.For Henderson’s account of his meeting - with Zahedi, see telegram 639 from Tehran, September 11, in Foreign + on 11 September.For Henderson’s account of his meeting + with Zahedi, see telegram 639 from Tehran, September 11, in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 791–794 (Document 366).

C. Zahedi is planning to send a @@ -41929,34 +35397,25 @@ development.

E. The American grant enables Iran to meet immediate obligations, but Zahedi must settle with - Britain and sell Iran’s oil in order to carry out program after US aid ends.

+ Britain and sell Iran’s oil in order to carry out program after US aid ends.

II. Zahedi has not yet proposed - reopening oil negotiations with British:There is a handwritten note at this point that reads: “Open + + reopening oil negotiations with British:There is a handwritten note at this point that reads: “Open + [illegible].”

A. He has sent a message to London via the Swiss asking British to “take the initiative in creating a more favorable climate in Tehran.”

B. The British have asked the US to find out informally what Zahedi means by “taking the initiative.”At this point - there is the handwritten insertion “Churchill exchange,” an apparent reference to the - communications between Churchill and Zahedi in Document + there is the handwritten insertion “Churchill exchange,” an apparent reference to the + communications between Churchill and Zahedi in Document 318.

III. The Foreign Office - feels that negotiations with Zahedi should be based on the February 1953 proposals - made to Mossadeq:For the proposals of February 20, see telegram 3304 - from Tehran, February 20, Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, + feels that negotiations with Zahedi should be based on the February 1953 proposals + made to Mossadeq:For the proposals of February 20, see telegram 3304 + from Tehran, February 20, Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 670–674 (Document 300).

-

A. Any agreement must provide “fair compensation” to AIOC for loss of its enterprise in +

A. Any agreement must provide “fair compensation” to AIOC for loss of its enterprise in Iran.

B. Iran must not profit more from its oil than the neighboring countries.

@@ -42012,15 +35471,12 @@ threatened by political forces:

A. Political forces are regrouping and opposition will probably soon appear.

-

B. Status of the Majlis is unclear since the shah and Zahedi favor its dissolution and new +

B. Status of the Majlis is unclear since the shah and Zahedi favor its dissolution and new elections, but the remaining deputies refuse to resign.

C. Zahedi’s government offers Iran a chance for stability.

-
+
320. Editorial Note

The 162nd meeting of the National Security Council, September 17, 1953, included a discussion of Iran. While delivering his briefing on @@ -42032,59 +35488,43 @@ Staff to report directly to the Shah rather than to the Prime Minister. In the long run Mr. Dulles felt this would be a favorable and stabilizing change. In explanation of the - Shah’s change of behavior, Mr. Dulles suggested that it was only now that the Shah had - become convinced of his personal hold over the people.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, - NSC Series, Box 4a, 162nd NSC Meeting) (For the text of that portion + Shah’s change of behavior, Mr. Dulles suggested that it was only now that the Shah had + become convinced of his personal hold over the people.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, + NSC Series, Box 4a, 162nd NSC Meeting) (For the text of that portion of the memorandum of discussion at the National Security Council meeting - devoted exclusively to Iran, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, volume X, Iran, + devoted exclusively to Iran, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, volume X, Iran, 1951–1954, pages 794–796 (Document 367).

-
- 321. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 321. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, - 788.00/9–1853. Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Gannett. Received September 19. + 788.00/9–1853. Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Gannett. Received September 19. Sent by pouch and copied to Isfahan and London. No. 172 - Tehran, September 18, 1953. + Tehran, September 18, 1953. REF - Embassy Despatch 154, September 11, 1953Document + Embassy Despatch 154, September 11, 1953Document 316. SUBJECT - Attitude of Qashqai Tribes Toward the Zahedi Government + Attitude of Qashqai Tribes Toward the Zahedi Government

There is transmitted herewith an additional memorandum concerning the Qashqai tribes by Mr. Elmer C. Bryant, Regional Director at Shiraz of the U.S. - Operations Mission for Iran.Printed as Document 315. Mr. Bryant describes the interview he had + Operations Mission for Iran.Printed as Document 315. Mr. Bryant describes the interview he had with Khosro Khan and Malek Mansur Khan to deliver oral messages to the - Qashqais from the Shah and from Ambassador Henderson (Embassy Telegram no. 484, August 26, repeated + Qashqais from the Shah and from Ambassador Henderson (Embassy Telegram no. 484, August 26, repeated London as no. 140)Telegram 484 from Tehran, - August 26, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/8–2653. - as regards the tribes’ relationship with the Zahedi Government.

+ August 26, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/8–2653. + as regards the tribes’ relationship with the Zahedi Government.

In summary, it would appear the Qashqais continue to consider the Shah as an anathema and Prime Minister Zahedi, while personally an honorable man, as the Shah’s @@ -42092,15 +35532,13 @@ future; hence they will continue to remain aloof and will wait until the anticipated formation of another government before coming to terms with the Tehran authorities. Nevertheless, the chieftains appeared impressed - by the word conveyed by Mr. Bryant that the Shah wished to let bygones be bygones + by the word conveyed by Mr. Bryant that the Shah wished to let bygones be bygones and that Ambassador Henderson accepted this assurance as given in good faith. Finally, the chieftains appeared to have reached a decision to disassociate themselves completely from the Tudeh. In this latter connection there have appeared in the last few days a number of press stories that Nasr and Khosro have - publicly reaffirmed their devotion to Mohamed Mosadeq and their desire to see the + publicly reaffirmed their devotion to Mohamed Mosadeq and their desire to see the former Prime Minister returned to power. It seems probable this unlikely and unconfirmed report was in fact originated by the Tudeh, who have carried it as one item in a clandestinely circulated printed leaflet of @@ -42114,10 +35552,8 @@

Mr. Bryant, who has been in Tehran the last few days for a conference of Regional Directors, states the only item of interest coming to his attention with regard to the - Qashqais since the date of his most recent memorandumPresumably a reference to the August 30 memorandum - sent as enclosure no. 2 to despatch 154, September 11, Document 316. was concerned with an + Qashqais since the date of his most recent memorandumPresumably a reference to the August 30 memorandum + sent as enclosure no. 2 to despatch 154, September 11, Document 316. was concerned with an incident at Firuzabad, to the southeast of Shiraz, on about September 10. Apparently a sizable number of Qashqai tribesmen straddled the road from Shiraz in that vicinity, but did not attempt to interrupt traffic; @@ -42128,32 +35564,25 @@ the possibilities for more serious troubles. The tribesmen in question appeared to be part of a group which remained in the Shiraz vicinity at the time of the northward migration last spring, to oversee Qashqai - interests in view of the incident of April 16–17. As Mr. Bryant indicates, the tribes intend to + interests in view of the incident of April 16–17. As Mr. Bryant indicates, the tribes intend to group for the next few months at least in the general vicinity of Fahlian, to the northwest of Shiraz, where this year grazing is more advantageous than in more traditional but drought-stricken areas further south.

For the Ambassador: - Roy M. - Melbourne + Roy M. + Melbourne First Secretary of Embassy
-
+
322. Memorandum by the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, - Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, + Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 12, Misc. Correspondence—TPAJAX. Secret. - Washington, September 21, 1953. + Washington, September 21, 1953.

The following information from Tehran, Iran dated 19 September, 1953 is evaluated at 3. Sources of this information were competent American observers (B). Subject of the information is “Survey of Current Iranian @@ -42161,24 +35590,16 @@

1. Political:

A. Energetic action against Tudeh Party is gaining increased public respect for new government. However, this partially offset by slowness - in bringing former Prime Minister Mossadeq and his advisors to trial.

-

B. Because of “soft” government treatment of Mossadeq, Mossadeq’s followers and the Tudeh Party are exploiting - the situation to set up opposition to Prime Minister Zahedi; the suggestion that Mossadeq “is down but not out” is heard + in bringing former Prime Minister Mossadeq and his advisors to trial.

+

B. Because of “soft” government treatment of Mossadeq, Mossadeq’s followers and the Tudeh Party are exploiting + the situation to set up opposition to Prime Minister Zahedi; the suggestion that Mossadeq “is down but not out” is heard more and more frequently.

-

C. There is much public criticism of Zahedi’s appointments but few constructive suggestions +

C. There is much public criticism of Zahedi’s appointments but few constructive suggestions on possible replacements. It is obvious, however, that part of this criticism stems from disgruntled politicos who have not received jobs.

-

D. Among factors threatening stability of the Zahedi government, the most serious are signs of - friction between the Shah and Zahedi over Army appointments and talk in court circles +

D. Among factors threatening stability of the Zahedi government, the most serious are signs of + friction between the Shah and Zahedi over Army appointments and talk in court circles that Dr. Baghai might be a good man to replace Zahedi.

2. Military:

A. Chief of Staff Batmangelich “is throwing his weight around”, bypassing @@ -42187,10 +35608,7 @@ problem directly to the Shah (who insists that the Army is his).

B. As a result of paragraph 2A above, Batmangelich is the object of Zahedi’s ire.

-

C. Intriguing jointly with Batmangelich against Zahedi are Generals Deihimi and Akhavi, Deputy Chiefs of Staff, who +

C. Intriguing jointly with Batmangelich against Zahedi are Generals Deihimi and Akhavi, Deputy Chiefs of Staff, who are also attempting secretly to oust Batmangelich in favor of pro-British General Arfa.

3. Religious: The Shah is courting the favor of the leading Moslem @@ -42199,33 +35617,23 @@ appointments to government jobs.

-
+
323. Memorandum by the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, - Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, + Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 12, Misc. Correspondence—TPAJAX. Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy. - Washington, September 22, 1953. + Washington, September 22, 1953.

The following information from Tehran, Iran, dated 5–17 September, 1953 is evaluated at 3. Source of this information is [less than 1 line not declassified] well-placed to obtain this information (C). Subject of the information is “Rivalry Between Shah and Prime Minister Zahedi Over the Control of the Army”.

-

1. A power tug-of-war between the Shah and Prime Minister Zahedi over the control of the Army +

1. A power tug-of-war between the Shah and Prime Minister Zahedi over the control of the Army continues to be a serious threat to Iranian stability.

-

2. Zahedi and General Hedayat, Minister of National Defense, +

2. Zahedi and General Hedayat, Minister of National Defense, pull against the Shah, Chief of Staff General Batmangelich and the - latter’s two deputies, Generals Akhavi and Deihimi.

+ latter’s two deputies, Generals Akhavi and Deihimi.

3. The Shah has replaced Colonel Moini (first name unknown) of Military Police and Brigadier General Timur Bakhtiar, Commander of Kermanshah Brigade, without @@ -42236,31 +35644,19 @@

5. Zahedi now hopes to have General Garzan installed as new Chief of Staff.

-

6. Rumors persist that General Arfa is behind Generals Deihimi and Akhavi. Akhavi +

6. Rumors persist that General Arfa is behind Generals Deihimi and Akhavi. Akhavi asked “a colonel” to see General - Guilanshah and have latter urge Zahedi to make Arfa Chief of Staff.

+ Guilanshah and have latter urge Zahedi to make Arfa Chief of Staff.

7. General Vosuk, soon leaving for Iranian Embassy, Washington, was the victim of the Shah–Zahedi power struggle.A note at the end of the memorandum reads: “Not transmitted.”

-
- 324. Memorandum From the Chief of Station in Iran ([name not declassified]) to the Ambassador to Iran (Henderson)Source: National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1953–1955, classified +
+ 324. Memorandum From the Chief of Station in Iran ([name not declassified]) to the Ambassador to Iran (Henderson)Source: National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1953–1955, classified general records, Box 9. Secret; Security Information. - Tehran, September 25, 1953. + Tehran, September 25, 1953.

1. Qashqai Khans and all Kalantars pledged their word to the writer 22–23 September that they:

@@ -42275,29 +35671,24 @@ Zahedi and the Shah.

E. Will not join any Tudeh plan, nor tolerate Tudeh activity in their area.

-

2. Qashqais’ requested that above be passed on to Gen. +

2. Qashqais’ requested that above be passed on to Gen. Zahedi, and the following proposal be discussed with both Gen. Zahedi and the Shah:

-

A. In order to save Qashqai face and free them from word given Mosadeq to support him to “end” the +

A. In order to save Qashqai face and free them from word given Mosadeq to support him to “end” the Shah might pardon Mosadeq, on Qashqai petition, allowing him retire to village or leave country.

B. On promise such action, Qashqais would bow before the Shah and give guarantee they would:

(1) support him and government “100 percent.”

-

(2) have no further dealings with Mosadeq or followers.

+

(2) have no further dealings with Mosadeq or followers.

(3) themselves (Qashqai Khans) leave Iran if the Shah felt their absence would benefit Iran.

3. Advised by the writer that he felt above proposal would not be accepted, Qashqais said they view it as simple face-saving device, but would welcome any other acceptable proposal under which they could bow - before the Shah without violating word to Mosadeq, whom they hold in greatest respect. Once they - considered their pledge to Mosadeq fulfilled, Qashqais’ said, they ready assure + before the Shah without violating word to Mosadeq, whom they hold in greatest respect. Once they + considered their pledge to Mosadeq fulfilled, Qashqais’ said, they ready assure same degree loyalty to Zahedi–Shah.

4. In “parliamentary” discussion of 2 and 3 above Qashqai group (chieftains and gray beards of all 18 Qashqai units and one Boir Ahmad @@ -42310,14 +35701,11 @@

B. Under Mosadeq, their welfare “considered” and there was no trouble in their area.

C. In past, their enemies saddled them with unwarranted reputation double - dealing. They “gave their word” to Americans years ago and to Mosadeq 28 months ago and considered + dealing. They “gave their word” to Americans years ago and to Mosadeq 28 months ago and considered themselves bound in both cases.

-

D. They had not caused trouble since Mosadeq fall only out of respect their cooperation to +

D. They had not caused trouble since Mosadeq fall only out of respect their cooperation to Americans. They intend to continue to follow American advice but in - present instance feel bolt to Zahedi bandwagon would cheapen them and tend to confirm + present instance feel bolt to Zahedi bandwagon would cheapen them and tend to confirm enemy accusations (C above).

5. During the powwow at Qashqai headquarters Nasr Khan Qashqai expressed confidence in the Commanding General, Shiraz Garrison, and, in order to @@ -42334,37 +35722,28 @@ moving southward toward winter quarters.

-
- 325. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 325. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/9–2653. Confidential; Security Information. Received October 2. Drafted by John Howison, Second Secretary of Embassy. A handwritten note on the despatch - indicates it was read and approved by Henderson. + indicates it was read and approved by Henderson. No. 187 - Tehran, September 26, 1953. + Tehran, September 26, 1953. SUBJECT - Aspects of the Political Environment of the Zahedi Government + Aspects of the Political Environment of the Zahedi Government

Summary

-

There has been a tendency to regard the Mosadeq Government in retrospect as a noble but - unsuccessful experiment, and to credit Mosadeq himself with high motives which were thwarted by +

There has been a tendency to regard the Mosadeq Government in retrospect as a noble but + unsuccessful experiment, and to credit Mosadeq himself with high motives which were thwarted by unworthy advisers and the former Prime Minister’s own faults of - character. It is necessary to convict Mosadeq and his advisers of their crimes as soon as + character. It is necessary to convict Mosadeq and his advisers of their crimes as soon as possible; delay makes this already thorny problem increasingly difficult. The Zahedi Government has not succeeded in posing as the inheritor of the nationalist @@ -42383,13 +35762,11 @@ question; however, there will be an opportunity for unscrupulous demagoguery to complicate matters before the problem is finally resolved. Political courage and skill will be required to reconstitute a - full-fledged Majlis following Mosadeq’s attempt to destroy this institution. Continued + full-fledged Majlis following Mosadeq’s attempt to destroy this institution. Continued good relations between the Government and the Court are vital to the stability of Iran; the relationship will continue to be subject to disruptive influences.

-

The Mosadeq Era in Retrospect

+

The Mosadeq Era in Retrospect

The Iranian people’s retrospective assessment of the historical significance of the Mosadeq era is one of the major factors defining the freedom of action of the @@ -42398,8 +35775,7 @@

One of the seeming paradoxes so frequent in Iranian politics has been the public’s inclination to begin weaving a favorable myth around the Mosadeq Government only a few - days after demonstrating an overwhelming desire that Mosadeq be ousted. Even among those who + days after demonstrating an overwhelming desire that Mosadeq be ousted. Even among those who had opposed Mosadeq most bitterly during the final months of his incumbency there are partisans of the belief that the old National Front movement had been a noble if @@ -42407,23 +35783,18 @@ campaign seeking to nullify this impression with limited success to date.

Some Iranians offer the unilateral explanation that the lingering favor - for the former Government represents the hold on the public of Mosadeq’s personality. Representatives - of all shades of opinion stubbornly cling to the belief that Mosadeq was a patriot sincere in + for the former Government represents the hold on the public of Mosadeq’s personality. Representatives + of all shades of opinion stubbornly cling to the belief that Mosadeq was a patriot sincere in purpose. Most of his strongest critics grant him this much, but condemn him for disqualifying traits of character such as stubborness, inflexibility, and hunger for power. His defenders attempt to blame all - the former Government’s shortcomings on Mosadeq’s advisers. This analysis serves to exalt + the former Government’s shortcomings on Mosadeq’s advisers. This analysis serves to exalt Mosadeq even further: he becomes a sort of demi-god who is too good to live among ordinary Iranians, who frequently seem to take a perverse pride in themselves as a nation of unprincipled Haji Babas.

-

A somewhat broader explanation of Mosadeq’s continuing reputation proceeds from the nature - of the “national movement” which he epitomized. Some anti-Mosadeq observers now admit that the +

A somewhat broader explanation of Mosadeq’s continuing reputation proceeds from the nature + of the “national movement” which he epitomized. Some anti-Mosadeq observers now admit that the National Front initially had the sympathies, at least in principle, of as many as ninety percent of politically conscious Iranians. It seems evident that nationalism, defined to mean freedom from foreign political @@ -42433,8 +35804,7 @@ at a time when many Iranians feel obliged to compromise on the matter of foreign influences, Mosadeq to some extent symbolizes the nationalist ideal. However, most Iranian - observers are inclined to think that Mosadeq’s term as the active leader of the forces of + observers are inclined to think that Mosadeq’s term as the active leader of the forces of nationalism has ended.

Mosadeq’s Advisers

@@ -42443,45 +35813,33 @@ Prime Minister. Ex-Foreign Minister Hosein Fatemi is probably the best-hated man in modern Iranian history. Anti-Mosadeq elements - are hardly less bitter toward Fatemi than are Mosadeq’s most devoted partisans, who put Fatemi in first place among the - “unworthy” advisers whom they blame for Mosadeq’s failures. When Fatemi was reported to have been torn to pieces by the + are hardly less bitter toward Fatemi than are Mosadeq’s most devoted partisans, who put Fatemi in first place among the + “unworthy” advisers whom they blame for Mosadeq’s failures. When Fatemi was reported to have been torn to pieces by the mob on August 19, the Iranian public, usually repelled by the idea of physical violence, seemed to welcome the report without a qualm. Efforts to capture him still hold a high place in public interest.

Next in order of degree of guilt, as judged by the Iranian public, come Deputies Shayegan, Zirakzadeh, - Sanjabi and Hasibi. The first three are blamed along with Fatemi for Mosadeq’s cooperation with the Tudeh Party. Hasibi is - blamed for contributing to the Mosadeq Government’s failure to achieve a favorable + Sanjabi and Hasibi. The first three are blamed along with Fatemi for Mosadeq’s cooperation with the Tudeh Party. Hasibi is + blamed for contributing to the Mosadeq Government’s failure to achieve a favorable settlement of the oil question; a stronger reason for blame may be, however, that he, like Fatemi, jumped from comparative obscurity to a position of influence without undergoing the requisite political apprenticeship which is normally - expected of top-ranking government figures. As in the case of Fatemi, these four advisers are now + expected of top-ranking government figures. As in the case of Fatemi, these four advisers are now unpopular with Mosadeq supporters and opponents alike.

-

Particularly distasteful to anti-Mosadeq Iranians are individuals such as former +

Particularly distasteful to anti-Mosadeq Iranians are individuals such as former Ministers Alemi and Sadeqi, who after Mosadeq’s fall professed to - have been completely fooled by Mosadeq and to have been entirely unaware of his more + have been completely fooled by Mosadeq and to have been entirely unaware of his more flagrantly anti-constitutional intentions. Several prominent Iranians intimated to Embassy officers that the disclaimers of responsibility by Alemi and Sadeqi were in their eyes prime examples of the moral degradation which had accompanied Mosadeq’s destruction of - constitutionalism. Referring to these ministers, Dad on September 14 editorialized:

+ constitutionalism. Referring to these ministers, Dad on September 14 editorialized:

“They allowed themselves to be used for the annihilation of our country, and now that the government has fallen, they are making sorrowful statements to acquit themselves.

@@ -42489,34 +35847,26 @@ wretchedness of our fatherland. It is deplorable that a minister who admits that he used to read government decisions in the papers continued in office and drew his salary until the last day of the government.”

-

Prosecution of Mosadeq and His Advisers

+

Prosecution of Mosadeq and His Advisers

One of the thorniest political problems besetting the new Government is - the disposition of the person of Prime Minister Mosadeq and of those of his advisers + the disposition of the person of Prime Minister Mosadeq and of those of his advisers and supporters who are also accused of treason or deliberate breaches of - the constitution. More than a month after Zahedi’s accession, no indictments against them have + the constitution. More than a month after Zahedi’s accession, no indictments against them have been rendered. Although the Government maintains that cases are being prepared as fast as possible and occasionally makes general statements of the progress being made, the problem becomes progressively more acute as time goes on. The public generally interprets the Government’s failure to take prompt action as a sign of weakness, and anxiously - awaits actual trials; delay has already given time for the pro-Mosadeq legend to grow, and for the + awaits actual trials; delay has already given time for the pro-Mosadeq legend to grow, and for the feelings of righteous indignation earlier held by part of the public to wane.

Qualified Iranian observers who have discussed this problem with Embassy - officers have varying opinions as to the preferable jurisdiction for these trials, but most + officers have varying opinions as to the preferable jurisdiction for these trials, but most agree that the choice of a court is of secondary importance. They have been virtually unanimous on three points: 1) the sooner the trials are - held and sentences passed, the better for the Zahedi Government; 2) Mosadeq should not be allowed to put + held and sentences passed, the better for the Zahedi Government; 2) Mosadeq should not be allowed to put his histrionic abilities to work in a public trial if it can possibly be - avoided; 3) no harm should come to Mosadeq personally. The most popular formula provides + avoided; 3) no harm should come to Mosadeq personally. The most popular formula provides that Mosadeq be tried promptly on charges of treason, in a closed or carefully managed court, and condemned to death, sentence to be commuted by the Shah to permanent @@ -42527,63 +35877,50 @@ ostensible reason for the delay in proceeding with the trials is that considerable time is required for formal interrogations and the preparation of indictments. Other possible reasons for the delay have - been suggested, most of them purely speculatively: Zahedi may be uneasy, looking backward + been suggested, most of them purely speculatively: Zahedi may be uneasy, looking backward at the Qavam affair, about establishing a fresh precedent for the punishment of ex-premiers; bribes or blackmail may be at work inside the military judicial machinery which - is preparing for the trials; hidden sentiment for Mosadeq the individual may be + is preparing for the trials; hidden sentiment for Mosadeq the individual may be motivating members of government. Embassy observers find it difficult to credit the popular belief that the Government’s lethargy represents simple “fear” of pro-Mosadeq elements. The simplest and perhaps best explanation of the Government’s - slowness in proceeding against Mosadeq is that such processes are always slow-moving in + slowness in proceeding against Mosadeq is that such processes are always slow-moving in the hands of Iranians.

Neither Government nor public seems very concerned about the chastisement of Mosadeq’s advisers and - lieutenants such as former Chief of Staff Riahi; should Fatemi be captured, this situation might well be + lieutenants such as former Chief of Staff Riahi; should Fatemi be captured, this situation might well be altered.

-

Attitudes Toward the Zahedi Government—General Zahedi acceded to the Premiership, not +

Attitudes Toward the Zahedi Government—General Zahedi acceded to the Premiership, not on the basis of what he stood for as a personality, but as the chosen instrument of forces opposed to the destruction of the monarchy and of constitutional government in Iran. He was accepted as the man of the - hour capable of assuming “field leadership” of pro-Shah, anti-Mosadeq and anti-Tudeh elements. He + hour capable of assuming “field leadership” of pro-Shah, anti-Mosadeq and anti-Tudeh elements. He gained added prestige as a result of the belief that he was the individual most acceptable to the Western powers, particularly the United States. According to their point of view, various political groups hoped that Zahedi could best draw American support to Iran, or that he could best come to a “realistic” agreement with the British. Armed with the Shah’s firman - appointing him Prime Minister, Zahedi was almost unanimously accepted by the popular + appointing him Prime Minister, Zahedi was almost unanimously accepted by the popular forces which rose up on August 19 against the Government which had given - Iran two years of frustration culminating in the final moves to upset the institutional + Iran two years of frustration culminating in the final moves to upset the institutional framework of constitutional government.

Zahedi was widely credited with having saved Iran from “a change of regime”, which many believed would have resulted in a Communist take-over in short order. Almost immediately, however, some possibly - disgruntled individuals began to wonder whether Zahedi had not “fulfilled his historic + disgruntled individuals began to wonder whether Zahedi had not “fulfilled his historic mission”, or whether, at least, he would not have done so after a fairly brief period in which he would devote himself entirely to reestablishing orderly government. On the whole, however, it came to be accepted that Zahedi and his backers expected him to play a larger role. Particularly after the prompt grant - of American aid, it was realized that Zahedi could not be expected to step down before his own + of American aid, it was realized that Zahedi could not be expected to step down before his own hand had been tried at the task of reconstruction and reform.

It soon became apparent that Zahedi, despite his personal history as an early partisan of the nationalist movement, and despite the - protestations of his supporters that Zahedi was returning the nationalist movement to its + protestations of his supporters that Zahedi was returning the nationalist movement to its proper course, was not being successful in representing himself as the inheritor of the nationalist mantle. The population took it for granted that Zahedi would again accept @@ -42591,20 +35928,16 @@ Most of those who regarded foreign influence as undesirable seemed to accept the United States as a less objectionable patron than either Britain or the USSR.

-

Given this background, it is not surprising that Zahedi’s personal prestige is related +

Given this background, it is not surprising that Zahedi’s personal prestige is related to his continued close association with the monarchy and the United States, both of whom carry more prestige with the public under current circumstances.

-

Despite this tertiary position, Zahedi has maintained his personal predominance over +

Despite this tertiary position, Zahedi has maintained his personal predominance over other politicians now “on-stage.” His personal dignity and skill in handling himself publicly have earned him respect; criticism of his - government has generally not been directed at Zahedi personally.

+ government has generally not been directed at Zahedi personally.

Criticism of Zahedi’s subordinates - began almost immediately after his rise to power.Embassy Despatch 185 of September 25, 1953, “The + began almost immediately after his rise to power.Embassy Despatch 185 of September 25, 1953, “The Zahedi Cabinet”, gives a more detailed analysis of Iranian attitudes toward the members of the Zahedi Government. @@ -42623,8 +35956,7 @@ convinced, however illogically, that the United States was somehow responsible for Zahedi’s success. The United States’ prompt grant of aid, although smaller than many had - hoped, served notice to the public that Zahedi’s Government had our full support. America thus + hoped, served notice to the public that Zahedi’s Government had our full support. America thus gained part of the credit for saving constitutional government in Iran, and her prestige accordingly soared. The consensus was that the United States had at last begun to fulfill her moral “responsibilities” to the @@ -42662,23 +35994,20 @@ position in Iran.

General Attitudes on Foreign Relations—Overt manifestations of Iranians’ innate xenophobia have declined markedly - since Zahedi came to power. Simultaneously, there has + since Zahedi came to power. Simultaneously, there has appeared some evidence that the increasingly isolated position in which Mosadeq’s policies had placed Iran during the past two years had not been to the taste of most educated Iranians. Xenophobic though they may be, on occasion, Iranians are as anxious as any other nationalistically inclined people that their nation be a fully accepted member of the family of nations. The press - has recently made repeated criticisms of the Mosadeq regime for having “alienated” Iran’s neighbors + has recently made repeated criticisms of the Mosadeq regime for having “alienated” Iran’s neighbors and other countries.

Relations with Great Britain—Although it would still be suicidal for an Iranian to espouse friendship with the British openly, a desire to “normalize” relations with the United Kingdom, at least at the diplomatic level, has been frankly expressed in the - pro-Government press. Iranians now feel free to declare that Mosadeq’s anti-British policy was too + pro-Government press. Iranians now feel free to declare that Mosadeq’s anti-British policy was too radical, and even to question the reasonableness of having broken diplomatic relations. The sense of insecurity developed during the past two years will not be entirely erased until Iran’s long-run relationship @@ -42709,12 +36038,10 @@ interest appears to rest primarily on the belief that major oil revenues would of themselves offer promise of general economic betterment, although more sophisticated Iranians recognize that the problem has far - wider implications. The belief that Mosadeq mishandled the oil question is widespread, and + wider implications. The belief that Mosadeq mishandled the oil question is widespread, and there is considerable appreciation of the fact that the oil question might long since have - been resolved in a manner satisfactory to Iran had not Mosadeq preferred to exploit the + been resolved in a manner satisfactory to Iran had not Mosadeq preferred to exploit the problem for internal political purposes.

Although the Iranian public is eager for an oil settlement, the problem remains an extremely sensitive one. The degree of difficulty to be @@ -42724,8 +36051,7 @@ with the public’s essential willingness to make this or that concession to the British. The consensus of Iranian opinion consulted is that “if all goes well” the Iranian public would accept a settlement little more - favorable than that offered Mosadeq in February of 1953.

+ favorable than that offered Mosadeq in February of 1953.

Most Iranians, even in high government circles, are as yet insufficiently aware of the factors impeding a prompt settlement of the oil question. For example, the importance to the West of ratification of any such @@ -42737,16 +36063,13 @@ question, it is impossible to predict the extent to which public opinion may be influenced by unscrupulous demogoguery during the next few months.

-

The Parliamentary SituationOmitted from this discussion is the question of the - revival of the Senate. There is virtually no politically valent [sic] sentiment for the reestablishment of the +

The Parliamentary SituationOmitted from this discussion is the question of the + revival of the Senate. There is virtually no politically valent [sic] sentiment for the reestablishment of the Senate, and the absence of a Senate produces no serious difficulties of legislative procedure under the Iranian constitution. [Footnote is in the original.]—Another of the major problems facing the Zahedi Government is the - disposition of the 21-member rump Majlis which survived Mosadeq’s efforts to destroy it. Its + disposition of the 21-member rump Majlis which survived Mosadeq’s efforts to destroy it. Its members show little inclination to disband voluntarily, and the Seventeenth Majlis might well continue to exist in its present anomalous form until the end of its normal term in May, 1954. Although the Majlis @@ -42763,10 +36086,8 @@

Under the above circumstances, and given the importance of finalizing such international agreements as might grow out of negotiations for an - oil agreement as soon as possible, the Zahedi Government may be obliged to dissolve the - Seventeenth Majlis and proceed to the election of the Eighteenth.See Embassy Despatch 135, of August 16, 1952, + oil agreement as soon as possible, the Zahedi Government may be obliged to dissolve the + Seventeenth Majlis and proceed to the election of the Eighteenth.See Embassy Despatch 135, of August 16, 1952, for a discussion of electoral procedures. [Footnote is in the original. Despatch 135 was not found.] This procedure entails difficulties. First, the present rump Majlis must be forced by political @@ -42777,17 +36098,13 @@ take several months. Holding elections in Iran usually absorbs a major portion of the Government’s energies, and produces tensions which not infrequently result in public disturbances. The resurrection of a - full-fledged Majlis following Mosadeq’s efforts to destroy it thus poses a problem - which will require both courage and political skill for the Zahedi Government to solve.

-

The Government and the Shah—The Zahedi Government received from the + full-fledged Majlis following Mosadeq’s efforts to destroy it thus poses a problem + which will require both courage and political skill for the Zahedi Government to solve.

+

The Government and the Shah—The Zahedi Government received from the public on August 19 a mandate to safeguard constitutionalism; the obligation to protect the position of the monarchy was implicit in this mandate. As the public has given little attention thus far to the - possibility of friction between Zahedi and the Shah, the subject of their relationship + possibility of friction between Zahedi and the Shah, the subject of their relationship lies beyond the scope of this despatch. It may be observed here, however, that the perennial problem of defining the respective spheres of influence of the Court and the Government has by no means been @@ -42798,29 +36115,22 @@ other can be expected to threaten their relationship increasingly.

For the Ambassador:

- Roy M. - Melbourne + Roy M. + Melbourne First Secretary of Embassy
-
+
326. Monthly Report Prepared in Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence AgencySource: - Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 81–01061R, Box 2, Folder 4, Monthly + Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 81–01061R, Box 2, Folder 4, Monthly Report—September 1953—Country Summaries and Analyses. Top Secret; Security Information. The report is attached to a covering memorandum from Roosevelt to Dulles, October 8. - Washington, undated. + Washington, undated.

IRAN

September 1953

A. General Developments

@@ -42837,8 +36147,7 @@ Majlis affirmation is required to settle the oil question, while the Shah feels that the Majlis should not be brought into session because a strong authoritarian government is necessary to provide the country’s - internal stability. Ex-Premier Mossadeq has been brought to trial under closed military + internal stability. Ex-Premier Mossadeq has been brought to trial under closed military court, whose verdict will quite certainly be guilty of treason. Zahedi desires immediate execution of Mossadeq while the @@ -42851,40 +36160,29 @@ Posts and Telegraphs, to the U.S. as a secret envoy to thank President Eisenhower for U.S. aid and to feel out the attitude of the U.S. Government regarding substantial - increases in emergency aid. Zahedi appeared grateful for the U.S. grants given to - Iran about ten days after Zahedi’s take-over, but was disappointed that the amount was + increases in emergency aid. Zahedi appeared grateful for the U.S. grants given to + Iran about ten days after Zahedi’s take-over, but was disappointed that the amount was not greater. Farzanegan saw various high U.S. Government officials by whom he was given a cordial welcome but from whom he was given no encouragement regarding increased aid at this time. He was, however, given assurance by the Department of State that the U.S. Government would do all possible to encourage the British to reach an equitable oil - settlement.General Abbas Farzanegan had a series of + settlement.General Abbas Farzanegan had a series of meetings in Washington September 21–23 with Acting Secretary - Smith, General Lemnitzer, Harold Stassen, and Herbert Hoover, Jr. In these + Smith, General Lemnitzer, Harold Stassen, and Herbert Hoover, Jr. In these meetings, Farzanegan thanked - U.S. officials for their support of General Zahedi and the $45 million + U.S. officials for their support of General Zahedi and the $45 million emergency aid package. He informed these officials that the Iranian Government believed it would require additional aid. U.S. officials impressed upon Farzanegan that it would be very difficult for them to assemble an aid package for Iran over and above the emergency aid package already extended. - A report of the meeting with Smith is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.5 + A report of the meeting with Smith is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.5 MSP/9–2153. Farzanegan’s - meeting with General Lemnitzer is ibid., 788.5 MSP/9–2353. The meetings + meeting with General Lemnitzer is ibid., 788.5 MSP/9–2353. The meetings with Stassen are ibid., - 788.5 MSP/9–2353, and with Hoover, ibid., 888.2553/9–2353.

+ 788.5 MSP/9–2353, and with Hoover, ibid., 888.2553/9–2353.

3. The oil question still holds paramount position in the immediate welfare of Iran. The Zahedi government has begun a propaganda program to soften the Iranian public @@ -42894,8 +36192,7 @@ Washington.

4. Persistent reports in the latter half of the month indicated that the Qashqai tribes were preparing for open conflict with the government - forces provoked by the issuance of an ultimatum for Mossadeq’s release. However, Qashqai + forces provoked by the issuance of an ultimatum for Mossadeq’s release. However, Qashqai leaders have assured U.S. officials that while winter migrations had started earlier than usual, the Qashqai’s have every intention of remaining at peace with the present government. There were rumors also @@ -42905,19 +36202,15 @@ cent of the Iranian Air Force planes were put out of action for several weeks by direct sabotage committed by Tudeh members of the Air Force personnel. The Qashqai leaders subsequently admitted Tudeh overtures to - them, but denied that they had agreed to any Tudeh alliance.See Document + them, but denied that they had agreed to any Tudeh alliance.See Document 324.

-

5. Throughout the month, the Zahedi government has continued vigorous anti-Tudeh +

5. Throughout the month, the Zahedi government has continued vigorous anti-Tudeh repressions by weeding out known members on government payrolls, by strenuous efforts of the security forces against known Tudeh members and their facilities, and by strong propaganda measures.

6. As reported last month, the change of government has resulted in greatly improved CIA contacts in - government and military circles.See Document 308. Consequently, CIA capabilities have become greatly + government and military circles.See Document 308. Consequently, CIA capabilities have become greatly enhanced both in terms of short-term political action programs designed to support the existing government and in terms of long-range programs designed to promote the @@ -42925,32 +36218,21 @@ the country.

[Omitted here is operational detail.]

-
+
327. Memorandum by the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, - Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, + Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 12, Misc. Correspondence—TPAJAX. Secret. - Washington, October 2, 1953. + Washington, October 2, 1953.

The following information from Tehran, Iran dated 30 September 1953, is evaluated at 1 (referring to reportorial accuracy). Subject of this - information is “Shah’s Decision Concerning Disposal of Mossadeq”. [less than + information is “Shah’s Decision Concerning Disposal of Mossadeq”. [less than 1 line not declassified]

-

1. The Shah has decided that former Prime Minister Mossadeq must be tried and condemned to - death, but he has not decided whether Mossadeq should then be pardoned by royal decree and +

1. The Shah has decided that former Prime Minister Mossadeq must be tried and condemned to + death, but he has not decided whether Mossadeq should then be pardoned by royal decree and immediately banished from Iran or immediately executed.

-

2. The Shah believes that any delay in disposing of Mossadeq, following the trial, would +

2. The Shah believes that any delay in disposing of Mossadeq, following the trial, would invite Tudeh (and pro-Mossadeq) - counterattack under a slogan such as “Save Mossadeq’s Life”.

+ counterattack under a slogan such as “Save Mossadeq’s Life”.

3. In the event of a Tudeh move (see paragraph 2 above) prior to the sentencing of Mossadeq, the Shah has ordered that Mossadeq be @@ -42958,14 +36240,10 @@

4. The Shah is greatly disturbed by a report which he received that the Tudeh will attack within thirty days.

-
+
328. Editorial Note -

In his diary entry for October 8, 1953, President Eisenhower referred to the United - States role in the overthrow of the Mosadeq government, and noted his admiration for the +

In his diary entry for October 8, 1953, President Eisenhower referred to the United + States role in the overthrow of the Mosadeq government, and noted his admiration for the efforts of Kermit Roosevelt in helping to bring that about. His diary entry reads, in part, as follows: “Another recent @@ -42986,17 +36264,11 @@ Library, Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 1)

-
+
329. Memorandum by the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, - Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, + Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 12, Misc. Correspondence—TPAJAX. Secret. - Washington, October 9, 1953. + Washington, October 9, 1953.

The following information from Tehran, Iran, dated 1–4 October, is evaluated at 3. Source of this information is [1 line not declassified]. Subject of the information is “Activities of @@ -43012,16 +36284,11 @@ again.

2. Kashani organized a meeting for the night of 4 October at the home of former deputy, Yusef Moshar. - The meeting was attended by Kashani, Moshar, Hoseyn Makki and Haerizadeh, who agreed to reform the + The meeting was attended by Kashani, Moshar, Hoseyn Makki and Haerizadeh, who agreed to reform the National Front movement.

-

3. Source does not believe that Kashani is being paid by the Soviets. However, Kashani told source on the day after - the overthrow of former Prime Minister Mossadeq that Iran must get along with the Soviets and +

3. Source does not believe that Kashani is being paid by the Soviets. However, Kashani told source on the day after + the overthrow of former Prime Minister Mossadeq that Iran must get along with the Soviets and must not provoke them to act against Iran.

4. Kashani hoped to enlist one hundred Mullahs in Iran to preach for him.

@@ -43030,9 +36297,7 @@ government and will lead the National Movement against Zahedi, thus representing dangerous threat in the oil settlement.

-
+
330. Information Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job @@ -43044,8 +36309,7 @@ CS–22194 - Washington, October 14, 1953. + Washington, October 14, 1953. SUBJECT Opposition to the Zahedi @@ -43063,9 +36327,7 @@ declassified]

Right-Wing Political Activity

-

1. On 8 October 1953, twelve former supporters of Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq, including Shamshiri (fnu), a cafe owner and important bazaar +

1. On 8 October 1953, twelve former supporters of Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq, including Shamshiri (fnu), a cafe owner and important bazaar merchant, were arrested for participation in an anti-Government conspiracy which had succeeded in closing the Tehran bazaar for several hours. The closing of the bazaar was inspired entirely by right-wing @@ -43076,8 +36338,7 @@ interrogated “scores” of bazaar merchants. On the basis of the information obtained from these investigations, Source concludes that the following are leaders of - the right-wing opposition to the Zahedi Government:

+ the right-wing opposition to the Zahedi Government:

Hoseyn MakkiWashington Comment. According to a report from a member of the former National Movement faction, date of information June 1953, Makki was @@ -43089,35 +36350,27 @@ ibid., Box 15, Folder 89, CS Information Reports 12830–12839. CS–22075 is ibid., Box 26, Folder 8, CS Information Reports 22070–22079.]

-

Dr. Mozaffar BaghaiWashington Comment. According to a report from an - informant with close contacts in Zahedi’s family, date of information 23 April 1953, - Baghai had joined forces with Zahedi in opposition to Mossadeq. See CS–9550. [Footnote is in the original. +

Dr. Mozaffar BaghaiWashington Comment. According to a report from an + informant with close contacts in Zahedi’s family, date of information 23 April 1953, + Baghai had joined forces with Zahedi in opposition to Mossadeq. See CS–9550. [Footnote is in the original. CS–9550 was not found.]

Mullah Kashani

Mullah BehbehaniWashington Comment. According to a report from a source close to Prime Minister Zahedi, date of - information 26 September 1953, Zahedi gave Mullah Behbehani 10,000 tomans + information 26 September 1953, Zahedi gave Mullah Behbehani 10,000 tomans (approximately $1,000.00) and again on 3 October 5,000 tomans (approximately $500.00) designed to maintain the goodwill of - Behbehani and to keep him politically aligned with the Zahedi Government. See CS–22075. + Behbehani and to keep him politically aligned with the Zahedi Government. See CS–22075. [Footnote is in the original.]

-

Pro-British Political ActivityWashington Comment. For +

Pro-British Political ActivityWashington Comment. For further information concerning recent activities of pro-British political forces, see CS’s–20968, –20713, and –21530. [Footnote is in the original. Information on CS–20968, September 25, is summarized in part in footnotes 6 and 9 below. CS–20968 is in Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 80–00810A, Box 25, Folder 7, CS Information Reports - 20960–20969. CS–20713, September 22, reported on Zahedi’s views a number of + 20960–20969. CS–20713, September 22, reported on Zahedi’s views a number of personnel matters in the Iranian Government, particularly his growing disagreement with the Ayatollah Behbehani over the latter’s desire to see his son @@ -43126,8 +36379,7 @@ footnote 8 below. CS–21530 is ibid., CS Information Reports 21530–21539.]

3. The investigations also indicated that the right-wing opposition is - bidding for the support of Mossadeq’s followers and is rallying behind pro-British + bidding for the support of Mossadeq’s followers and is rallying behind pro-British Ali Soheli,Washington Comment. According to a report from a well-placed source, date of information 19 September 1953, Kazem Sayah, acting on @@ -43140,21 +36392,18 @@ the Shah. See CS–20968. [Footnote is in the original.] who aspires to succeed Zahedi as Prime Minister. The interrogations revealed that the bazaar merchants - are particularly impressed by the right-wing opposition to Zahedi because they consider the + are particularly impressed by the right-wing opposition to Zahedi because they consider the leaders as “British agents” and the merchants therefore assume that the British Government must desire to replace Zahedi.

4. The British have financed Dr. Baghai in the past and they are paying - him at present through Hassan Arab,Washington Comment. According to a report + him at present through Hassan Arab,Washington Comment. According to a report from a qualified American observer, date of information 12 January 1953, Hassan Arab is a “low grade mobster” who is supported financially by the British, and is the leader of a small, inconsequential group. [Footnote is in original.] who is very close to Dr. Baghai.

-

5. Dr. Farokh FaroudWashington Comment. According to a report from an Iranian +

5. Dr. Farokh FaroudWashington Comment. According to a report from an Iranian with good contacts in pro-British circles, date of information 26 September 1953, Dr. Faroud is a member of a political faction reportedly sponsored by Seyfollah Rashidian and led by Kazem Sayah, @@ -43172,18 +36421,15 @@ Iranian Airways, is a member.”] The new party’s directing committee is composed of the following members:

a. Hoseyn Pirnia, Undersecretary of Finance.

-

b. Dr. Ahmed Houman,Washington Comment. +

b. Dr. Ahmed Houman,Washington Comment. Houman was Assistant Minister of Court in 1951. See SO’s–73845 and - –75198. [Footnote is in the original. SO–73845 and SO–75198 + –75198. [Footnote is in the original. SO–73845 and SO–75198 were not found.] who is considered by Source to be the most important member of the committee.

c. Adeshir Zahedi, son of Prime Minister Zahedi.

-

d. Major Houshang Afshar.Washington Comment. Hooshang Afshar is Technical Manager +

d. Major Houshang Afshar.Washington Comment. Hooshang Afshar is Technical Manager of the Iranian Airways. [Footnote is in the original.]

e. Dr. Farokh Faroud.

6. The committee intends to organize sub-committees throughout Iran, @@ -43193,8 +36439,7 @@ according to Source, Ardeshir Zahedi may be unable to control the overwhelming British influence within the group.

-

8. Ali Mansur,Washington Comment. +

8. Ali Mansur,Washington Comment. Ali Mansur, who has served as Prime Minister, Governor General of Khorassan and of Azerbaijan, and as Ambassador to Italy, had dropped out of political activities @@ -43208,56 +36453,42 @@

9. Dr. Hasan Ayatollah Imami (Imam Jumeh), pro-British religious leader,Washington - Comment. For further information on the Imam Jumeh, former Speaker of the + Comment. For further information on the Imam Jumeh, former Speaker of the Majlis, see SO’s–91325, –87695, and - –91774. [Footnote is in the original. SO–91325, SO–87695, and + –91774. [Footnote is in the original. SO–91325, SO–87695, and SO–91774 were not found.] - plans to organize a religious party to support Zahedi and to fight Kashani and Mullah Behbehani. The + plans to organize a religious party to support Zahedi and to fight Kashani and Mullah Behbehani. The Imam Jumeh believes that the British should support the Zahedi Government and hopes that his new party will prove to be helpful. He criticized the Zahedi Government, - however, for failing to execute former Prime Minister Mossadeq, General Riahi, and the high-ranking Tudeh Party + however, for failing to execute former Prime Minister Mossadeq, General Riahi, and the high-ranking Tudeh Party leaders who have been captured.

-

Activities of Kashani

+

Activities of Kashani

10. Prime Minister Zahedi plans to visit Mullah Kashani - privately at 1200 hours on 10 October 1953 in Kashani’s house.Washington Comment. + privately at 1200 hours on 10 October 1953 in Kashani’s house.Washington Comment. According to a report from an Iranian who has close contacts with Kashani’s group, Kashani organized a meeting for the night of 4 October at the home of Yusef Moshar. Those attending the meeting agreed to re-organize the National Front Movement. See CS–21962. [Footnote is in the original. CS–21962, - October 8, is in Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 80–00810A, Box 25, + October 8, is in Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 80–00810A, Box 25, Folder 107, CS Information Reports 21960–21969.] Zahedi will be driven to Kashani’s residence by Major General Guilanshah in a closed jeep, without a bodyguard.

-
+
331. Editorial Note

Herbert Hoover, Jr., Consultant to the Secretary of State on the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute, who was appointed on October 14, 1953, visited Iran from October 17 to November 4 to ascertain Iranian views on resuming diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom and finding a solution to the Anglo-Iranian oil - controversy. On November 1, Iranian Foreign Minister Entezam told Hoover that a solution to the oil + controversy. On November 1, Iranian Foreign Minister Entezam told Hoover that a solution to the oil dispute would have to precede any resumption of diplomatic relations between Iran and the United Kingdom. To resolve the oil dispute Entezam suggested creation of @@ -43267,9 +36498,7 @@ Regarding compensation, the other companies in the consortium would “compensate” the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The proposal delivered by Entezam was transmitted to - the Department of State in telegram 1022, November 2. For text, see Foreign + the Department of State in telegram 1022, November 2. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, volume X, Iran, 1951–1954, pages 819–821 (Document 378).

Hoover then traveled to London @@ -43287,28 +36516,20 @@ their country and which, on the basis of justice and equity, will safeguard the honour and interest of both parties.” For the text of the joint communiqué transmitted in telegram 2228 from London, November 24, - and subsequently issued on December 5, see ibid., pages 843–844 (Document 391).

+ and subsequently issued on December 5, see ibid., pages 843–844 (Document 391).

For extensive documentation on Herbert Hoover, Jr.’s efforts to conclude an oil settlement in - Iran, see ibid., pages 814–1044 (Documents 376–488).

-
-
- 332. Letter From the Ambassador to Iran (Henderson) to the Director of the Office of Greek, + Iran, see ibid., pages 814–1044 (Documents 376–488).

+
+
+ 332. Letter From the Ambassador to Iran (Henderson) to the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and - African Affairs (Richards)Source: National Archives, + African Affairs (Richards)Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/10–1753. Secret; Security Information; Official–Informal. Attachments 3–5 are attached but not printed. See footnotes below. - Tehran, October 17, 1953. + Tehran, October 17, 1953. Dear Art: @@ -43325,8 +36546,7 @@ active CAS source. During the turn-over last August he made close contacts with certain military circles, including the Prime Minister and the son of the Prime Minister, and has assiduously exploited those - contacts. The Prime Minister’s son arranges frequently for [name not declassified] to join himself and the + contacts. The Prime Minister’s son arranges frequently for [name not declassified] to join himself and the Prime Minister at dinner. During these dinner parties many matters are discussed. Usually [name not declassified] advises me regarding at least certain passages of these conversations. @@ -43334,30 +36554,22 @@ up his prestige and causes many Iranian officials to approach him rather than our Armed Forces Attachés and other appropriate members of the Embassy staff.

-

You will note that Colonel Pakravan, Chief of G–2, who formerly maintained close relations with CAS, has +

You will note that Colonel Pakravan, Chief of G–2, who formerly maintained close relations with CAS, has avoided CAS contacts since August 19. It is clear that Colonel Pakravan is hostile to General Zahedi and - is unhappy at the shift which brought Zahedi into power. It would appear from the comments + is unhappy at the shift which brought Zahedi into power. It would appear from the comments which he made to Colonel McNulty that he, like a number of other Army - officers who do not feel that they are profiting from [name not declassified] close relationship with the Prime - Minister, is not pleased at this relationship. I assume that [name not declassified] is carrying on his + officers who do not feel that they are profiting from [name not declassified] close relationship with the Prime + Minister, is not pleased at this relationship. I assume that [name not declassified] is carrying on his activities under instructions from his superiors in Washington. I am trying so far as is possible to cut down too much free-wheeling. This is not too easy, however.At the end of this - paragraph is a handwritten note by Henderson that reads: “Please take no action with - regard to this matter which I prefer to handle here. [name not declassified] is [illegible] and has - done much useful work.” Henderson marked the letter to indicate that the + paragraph is a handwritten note by Henderson that reads: “Please take no action with + regard to this matter which I prefer to handle here. [name not declassified] is [illegible] and has + done much useful work.” Henderson marked the letter to indicate that the note applied to the concluding sentences of the third paragraph.

-

I have discussed with the Shah the growing strength of Baqai in the Army, but His Majesty does +

I have discussed with the Shah the growing strength of Baqai in the Army, but His Majesty does not seem to be particularly concerned. He intimates that he is sure that Baqai and the Army are loyal to him, and so long as they are there is no need to worry regarding @@ -43370,42 +36582,32 @@ a rather smug attitude about the matter.

I thought you might be interested in Imam - Jumeh’s conversation with Howison.In a conversation - of October 14 with Dr. Sayid Hasan Emami, the Imam Jumeh, Second Secretary of + Jumeh’s conversation with Howison.In a conversation + of October 14 with Dr. Sayid Hasan Emami, the Imam Jumeh, Second Secretary of Embassy John M. Howison discussed Jumeh’s intention to form a political party which “the Shah approved” but “was not sponsoring.” In another conversation that Howison had on the same day with the Imam Jumeh and - Mostafa Fateh, formerly of the AIOC, Jumeh commented “that he did not believe + Mostafa Fateh, formerly of the AIOC, Jumeh commented “that he did not believe Zahedi would ever come to - grips with the oil problem. Zahedi was reinforcing rather than destroying + grips with the oil problem. Zahedi was reinforcing rather than destroying nationalistic propaganda in order to cater to public opinion.” Both memoranda of conversation are attached. There is no doubt in - my mind that the so-called “pro-Shah” party which the Imam is organizing is not particularly + my mind that the so-called “pro-Shah” party which the Imam is organizing is not particularly friendly to the Prime Minister. We are not particularly disturbed regarding the warning which Ahmad - Aramesh gave to Mr. Howison. There is always a possibility, of course, that + Aramesh gave to Mr. Howison. There is always a possibility, of course, that some of us might be made victims of terroristic tactics. I believe, however, that Aramesh has talked about this with Howison - primarily to establish a closer personal relationship with him.Howison reported in an attached memorandum to + primarily to establish a closer personal relationship with him.Howison reported in an attached memorandum to Melbourne, October 15, that Minister of Labor Ahmad - Aramesh had told him that “pro-Mosadeq and Tudeh elements were + Aramesh had told him that “pro-Mosadeq and Tudeh elements were planning a putsch which was tentatively scheduled for October 22. As a build up for this effort they would resort to terrorist methods of - which Americans would be primary targets. He had learned that I ‘might be one of the people’ to be assassinated as + which Americans would be primary targets. He had learned that I ‘might be one of the people’ to be assassinated as a preface to the uprising. . . . My assumption is that Aramesh was trying either (a) to impress me with his usefulness to me personally in a manner @@ -43431,60 +36633,40 @@

1. At the request of Chief of Staff Batmangelich, the undersigned visited Batmangelich at his office on 9 October 1953. Deputy Chiefs of Staff - Akhavi and Deihimi were also present.

+ Akhavi and Deihimi were also present.

2. In the course of the meeting, the following observations were made:

A. Batmangelich stated that the Chief of Staff should have full control over martial law in Tehran. Failing that, he should at least have final - authority over the right of release of incarcerated persons. The COS said that Military Governor Dadsetan was a junior officer and owed + authority over the right of release of incarcerated persons. The COS said that Military Governor Dadsetan was a junior officer and owed him, Batmangelich, more respect.

-

B. Batmangelich stated that his relations with Gen. +

B. Batmangelich stated that his relations with Gen. Zahedi are now good but the - latter has asked him to relieve Deputy COS + latter has asked him to relieve Deputy COS Deihimi, who, according to - Batmangelich, is a very good officer. The COS said he would not relieve Deihimi until forced to do so.

+ Batmangelich, is a very good officer. The COS said he would not relieve Deihimi until forced to do so.

C. Batmangelich said that the plight of the junior officers and the men is terrible. He said that the Army must not be undermined by the Tudeh Party, and that the U.S. is taking an unnecessary gamble by refusing to use money from the Military Aid program to increase the pay and improve - the living conditions of military personnel. He said that Gen. + the living conditions of military personnel. He said that Gen. McClure had tried and failed and that Ambassador Henderson should step in to help.

-

D. Akhavi and Deihimi agreed with the above and said +

D. Akhavi and Deihimi agreed with the above and said that fighting the Tudeh in the Army is not enough; the U.S. should - insist on a united political front between Zahedi and the National Front leaders. Both Akhavi and Deihimi told of former close associations with Baqai. After a discussion between - Akhavi and Deihimi, they both said that it was + insist on a united political front between Zahedi and the National Front leaders. Both Akhavi and Deihimi told of former close associations with Baqai. After a discussion between + Akhavi and Deihimi, they both said that it was impossible to unite Zahedi with the National Front; therefore, the latter should be split by joining - Zahedi with Baqai.

+ Zahedi with Baqai.

E. Deihimi stated that the only - hope for Iran was for a Zahedi–Baqai coalition.

+ hope for Iran was for a Zahedi–Baqai coalition.

3. As a result of the above statements, the undersigned reached the conclusion that: Baqai’s strength - in the Army is obviously becoming a serious matter. Deihimi and Akhavi fully control Batmangelich, who - seems to feel that his position is strengthened vis-à-vis Zahedi by Baqai support.

+ in the Army is obviously becoming a serious matter. Deihimi and Akhavi fully control Batmangelich, who + seems to feel that his position is strengthened vis-à-vis Zahedi by Baqai support.

[name not declassified]

Attachment 2

Tehran, October 14, 1953.

@@ -43494,11 +36676,7 @@ General Staff, Iranian Army

1. Chief of Staff Nader - Batmangelich and his two deputies, Brig.Gens. Akhavi and Deihimi, have engaged in power struggles against Prime Minister Zahedi, Commanding General of the + Batmangelich and his two deputies, Brig.Gens. Akhavi and Deihimi, have engaged in power struggles against Prime Minister Zahedi, Commanding General of the Gendarmérie Golpyra, and Military Governor Farhat Dadsetan.

2. Maj.Gen. Batmangelich has a @@ -43508,98 +36686,67 @@ to what extent they control him.

3. It will be recalled that Maj.Gen. Batmangelich displayed cowardice during the night 15–16 August. During - that same night and for several days before, Brig.Gen. (then Col.) Akhavi was + that same night and for several days before, Brig.Gen. (then Col.) Akhavi was sick in bed and did not participate in the events of 15–19 August, 1953. Brig.Gen. - Deihimi (then Col.) was Chief of Staff of the Kerman + Deihimi (then Col.) was Chief of Staff of the Kerman Division and did not participate in the events of 15–19 August, 1953.

-

4. Batmangelich was accepted as Chief of Staff by HIM the Shah upon the nomination of +

4. Batmangelich was accepted as Chief of Staff by HIM the Shah upon the nomination of Brig.Gen. Akhavi, who has for years seconded Batmangelich during Batmangelich’s Army assignments.

5. Brig.Gen. - Akhavi and Maj.Gen. Batmangelich are known to be close + Akhavi and Maj.Gen. Batmangelich are known to be close friends of Maj.Gen. - Arfa; in fact, Akhavi suggested, through two cut-outs, + Arfa; in fact, Akhavi suggested, through two cut-outs, to Gen. - Zahedi that Gen. + Zahedi that Gen. Arfa replace Batmangelich. - Batmangelich stated on October 2nd that he considers Maj.Gen. + Batmangelich stated on October 2nd that he considers Maj.Gen. Arfa one of his oldest and - dearest friends, but Batmangelich does not know of Gen. - Akhavi’s attempts to make Gen. + dearest friends, but Batmangelich does not know of Gen. + Akhavi’s attempts to make Gen. Arfa Chief of Staff. The fact that Maj.Gen. Arfa has for years been close to British officials is well known, but it is not believed until further evidence is gathered that either Gen. - Akhavi or Gen. Batmangelich are particularly - pro-British. However, the influence of Maj.Gen. + Akhavi or Gen. Batmangelich are particularly + pro-British. However, the influence of Maj.Gen. Arfa upon those two officers seems to be quite strong.

6. Brig.Gen. Deihimi stated to the undersigned on October 2nd that he acted for five years as an official in the Shah’s - personal intelligence organization. Gen. + personal intelligence organization. Gen. Deihimi stated that he was a foe of Gen. Razmara’s and later, an enemy of the National Front. Gen. Deihimi related that when the - National Front, led by Dr. Mossadeq, threatened to become strong enough to oust the + National Front, led by Dr. Mossadeq, threatened to become strong enough to oust the Shah, he went to the Shah and asked for imperial authority to split the - National Front by weaning Dr. Baqai away from Dr. Mossadeq. Gen. + National Front by weaning Dr. Baqai away from Dr. Mossadeq. Gen. Deihimi stated that the Shah gave - him that authority and that subsequently Dr. Baqai did break away from Mossadeq.

-

7. American sources have reported that Dr. Baqai for years has considered Deihimi one of his closest lieutenants. - It is not known to what extent Akhavi was involved in the Baqai group, but on October 2nd Gen. + him that authority and that subsequently Dr. Baqai did break away from Mossadeq.

+

7. American sources have reported that Dr. Baqai for years has considered Deihimi one of his closest lieutenants. + It is not known to what extent Akhavi was involved in the Baqai group, but on October 2nd Gen. Akhavi stated that he joined privately with Dr. Baqai - approximately one year ago in an effort to oppose Dr. Mossadeq and that he has been in touch + approximately one year ago in an effort to oppose Dr. Mossadeq and that he has been in touch with Dr. Baqai ever since. The relationship between Gen. - Deihimi and Dr. Baqai appears to be much closer than - the Akhavi–Baqai relationship. Gen. + Deihimi and Dr. Baqai appears to be much closer than + the Akhavi–Baqai relationship. Gen. Akhavi has stated that he respects Gen. Deihimi as much as any other - officer in the Iranian Army and that he heavily relies upon Gen. + officer in the Iranian Army and that he heavily relies upon Gen. Deihimi’s judgment.

8. After August 19, 1953, when Gen. - Zahedi displaced Dr. Mossadeq, Gen. - Akhavi sent Gen. Batmangelich’s personal Army plane to + Zahedi displaced Dr. Mossadeq, Gen. + Akhavi sent Gen. Batmangelich’s personal Army plane to Kerman to fly Gen. Deihimi to Tehran. In Tehran Gen. Batmangelich and Gen. @@ -43613,28 +36760,23 @@ Vossuk, Deputy Minister of National Defense, a Shah man, was ousted by Prime Minister Zahedi from his cabinet. Maj.Gen. - Hedayat, whom Gen. + Hedayat, whom Gen. Zahedi believes to be his man, was made Minister of National Defense. In the meantime, the Shah ordered Gen. Batmangelich to refer all papers concerning the Army directly to him, rather than going through Gens. - Zahedi and Hedayat. This decision by the Shah + Zahedi and Hedayat. This decision by the Shah greatly strengthened the position of the Chief of Staff, who thereby was able to promote officers friendly to him in such a way that Gen. Zahedi was unable to prevent - it. It is known that Gens. Batmangelich, Akhavi and Deihimi have ignored Army regulations in promoting their + it. It is known that Gens. Batmangelich, Akhavi and Deihimi have ignored Army regulations in promoting their personal friends, with the Shah’s approval.

10. The prosecution of the Army officers apparently guilty of treason and of Dr. Mossadeq and his closest advisers has proceeded at what Gen. Zahedi considers to be a snail’s - pace. Upon five different occasions Gen. + pace. Upon five different occasions Gen. Zahedi has sent his son to protest against this slow-down. Gen. Zahedi became convinced that the @@ -43646,45 +36788,30 @@ Zahedi threatened to resign. On 13 October he sent his son to the Shah with a demand that the Shah dismiss the Chief of Staff or accept Zahedi’s resignation; - however, his son did not tell the Shah that Gen. + however, his son did not tell the Shah that Gen. Zahedi desired to resign, in an effort to smooth over this crisis in his father’s political career. There now can be no doubt that the failure by the Chief of Staff to execute, or at least to prosecute, those traitors now in his hands - continues gravely to embarrass the Zahedi administration.

+ continues gravely to embarrass the Zahedi administration.

11. Efforts by the U.S. to keep the Shah and the Prime Minister together have been successful except over the issue of the armed forces. This - problem is greatly complicated by the fact that Gen. Batmangelich and his deputies now seem to feel strong - enough in the Shah’s graces to move out and to attack Zahedi stalwarts. Recently Gen. Batmangelich attempted to replace + problem is greatly complicated by the fact that Gen. Batmangelich and his deputies now seem to feel strong + enough in the Shah’s graces to move out and to attack Zahedi stalwarts. Recently Gen. Batmangelich attempted to replace Col. Malek, Chief of Staff to Maj.Gen. - Golpyra, with Brig.Gen. Mirfanderski, Gen. Batmangelich’s brother-in-law. For + Golpyra, with Brig.Gen. Mirfanderski, Gen. Batmangelich’s brother-in-law. For professional reasons, the American Mission to the Iranian Gendarmérie has strongly opposed that - move and has sought CAS intervention. On October 9th Gen. Batmangelich promised CAS that Col. Malek would not be removed from his - post. On October 11th CAS learned that Gen. Batmangelich was still attempting to assign his + move and has sought CAS intervention. On October 9th Gen. Batmangelich promised CAS that Col. Malek would not be removed from his + post. On October 11th CAS learned that Gen. Batmangelich was still attempting to assign his brother-in-law to the Gendarmérie where, as a Brigadier-General, Mirfanderski would greatly strengthen Batmangelich’s ability to - intervene politically on behalf of Baqai or other Zahedi opponents in the forthcoming elections. This - situation is further complicated by the fact that Maj.Gen. - Golpyra and Brig.Gen. Mirfanderski are old enemies; in + intervene politically on behalf of Baqai or other Zahedi opponents in the forthcoming elections. This + situation is further complicated by the fact that Maj.Gen. + Golpyra and Brig.Gen. Mirfanderski are old enemies; in fact, Gen. - Zahedi’s right hand, Maj.Gen. + Zahedi’s right hand, Maj.Gen. Hedayat Guilanshah, stated on October 13th that Maj.Gen. Golpyra might be forced to resign @@ -43692,41 +36819,33 @@ Zahedi be able to block the Mirfanderski assignment.

12. Gen. Batmangelich has also attacked - another important official. During interviews with Maj.Gen. + another important official. During interviews with Maj.Gen. Dadsetan, Military Governor of Tehran, Gen. Batmangelich has attempted to gain complete control of the Office of Military Governor, an office - of great importance in the forthcoming elections. When Gen. + of great importance in the forthcoming elections. When Gen. Dadsetan refused to buckle under, Gen. Batmangelich asked for - Dadsetan’s resignation. Gen. - Dadsetan refused. Gen. Batmangelich then carried his fight + Dadsetan’s resignation. Gen. + Dadsetan refused. Gen. Batmangelich then carried his fight against Dadsetan to the Shah. On October 2nd and 9th, Gen. Batmangelich - also solicited CAS assistance in attacking Gen. + also solicited CAS assistance in attacking Gen. Dadsetan. With the Gendarmérie and the Office of the Military Governor of Tehran in his hands, the political position of Gen. Batmangelich - would be very strong indeed. Of course, the position of Gen. + would be very strong indeed. Of course, the position of Gen. Zahedi might seriously be weakened.

13. From numerous sources and from direct personal observation, CAS is convinced that Gen. Batmangelich is only the creature of Gens. - Akhavi and Deihimi. This certainly means that the + Akhavi and Deihimi. This certainly means that the influence of Dr. Baqai is far greater at the moment than is overtly realized.

14. The ability of the U.S. to do something about this matter is further complicated by the fact that there is a distinct possibility that the - Shah is a party to the Baqai–Deihimi + Shah is a party to the Baqai–Deihimi scheme. Gen. Deihimi has himself stated that when he was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff, he was told by the Shah to @@ -43741,23 +36860,17 @@ met only a noncommittal answer by the Shah, and the entire problem remains unsolved.

- [name not declassified] + [name not declassified]
-
+
333. Memorandum From the Second Secretary of Embassy in Iran (Cuomo) to the First - Secretary of Embassy in Iran (Melbourne)Source: National Archives, RG 59, + Secretary of Embassy in Iran (Melbourne)Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/10–2153. Secret; Security - Information. Drafted by Cuomo. The memorandum is an enclosure to a letter from - Henderson to Richards, October 21, which reads + Information. Drafted by Cuomo. The memorandum is an enclosure to a letter from + Henderson to Richards, October 21, which reads in part: “In the past few weeks it seemed advisable to us here to attempt to put down on paper for our private use, and not for general distribution, an outline program for combating Communism in @@ -43768,8 +36881,7 @@ of Communism being his field of reporting, that he evolve an outline draft. After some amendment and rewriting, the attached memorandum of October 19 is the result.” - Tehran, October 19, 1953. + Tehran, October 19, 1953. SUBJECT Suggested Program for Combatting Communism in Iran @@ -43787,8 +36899,7 @@ there is a constant danger in a country such as Iran that its governments sooner or later come to the conclusion that a little communism is a good thing in international affairs to help pry - concessions from the Western powers. Mosadeq played this game and failed, and perhaps the + concessions from the Western powers. Mosadeq played this game and failed, and perhaps the policy is sufficiently discredited for it to remain so for some time to come.

On the assumption that there is a sincere desire at this time to @@ -43844,8 +36955,7 @@

“Any program designed to eliminate communism in Iran might well be one based on long-range methods, on the frank assumption that there is probably no panacea to cause its disappearance in the immediate future. - The middle-class intellectuals who provide the leadership could be the first target and + The middle-class intellectuals who provide the leadership could be the first target and consideration might be given to the necessity of suppression for some time to come on the same principle that a broken leg is placed in a cast to prevent harmful movement until the fracture has been healthily @@ -43974,8 +37084,7 @@ frequently obtains results in Iran, care should be taken in using it not to arouse the strong Iranian tendency to sympathize with the underdog. Pro-communists, as contrasted with known communist activists and - leaders, who are removed from the state bureaucracy, for example, could be given whatever may + leaders, who are removed from the state bureaucracy, for example, could be given whatever may be their due on the basis of existing regulations with regard to pension and terminal pay. Persons proved to be leaders of the communist conspiracy, however, should be recognized as dangerous, virtually @@ -43986,14 +37095,11 @@ or creating street disturbances, would act as a very strong deterrent to any spread of the Tudeh organization.

-
+
334. Memorandum From the Deputy Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans ([name not declassified]) to the Deputy Director for Plans, Central - Intelligence Agency (Wisner)Source: Central Intelligence + Intelligence Agency (Wisner)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 10, TPAJAX. Secret; Security Information. @@ -44005,8 +37111,7 @@ Termination of the [less than 1 line not declassified] phase of TPAJAX -

I have discussed this matter with Mr. Roosevelt. He feels it should be discussed as casually +

I have discussed this matter with Mr. Roosevelt. He feels it should be discussed as casually as possible and at the operating level. He suggests I be designated to take it up with [name not declassified] here and does not believe it advisable to call in either RS of the British @@ -44024,49 +37129,39 @@ revert to the type of relationship which existed prior to the initiation of TPAJAX with this one change however; to wit that so long as the British have no official representation in Tehran we will continue to - pass on to [name not declassified] operational information which in our - opinion appears to have a bearing on the future of TPAJAX.In the left margin next to this sentence is a typed + pass on to [name not declassified] operational information which in our + opinion appears to have a bearing on the future of TPAJAX.In the left margin next to this sentence is a typed note by Wisner that reads: “‘Okay’ FGW.”

- [name not declassified]Printed from + [name not declassified]Printed from a copy that bears [name not declassified] typed signature and an indication that he signed the original. At the end of the memorandum is a typed note that reads: “This moderate–medium level initial approach - was discussed with and approved by the DCI—and [name not - declassified] should proceed. FGW 21 October 1953.” Another note reads: “Original + was discussed with and approved by the DCI—and [name not + declassified] should proceed. FGW 21 October 1953.” Another note reads: “Original returned to [name not declassified] on 21 October 1953 with FGW’s notes in his own handwriting instructing [name not - declassified] to proceed with above.” + declassified] to proceed with above.”
-
- 335. Letter From the Ambassador to Iran (Henderson) to the Director of the Office of Greek, +
+ 335. Letter From the Ambassador to Iran (Henderson) to the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and - African Affairs (Richards)Source: National Archives, + African Affairs (Richards)Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/11–5053. Secret; Security Information; Official–Informal. - Tehran, October 20, 1953. + Tehran, October 20, 1953. Dear Art:

Attached hereto is a memorandum prepared by [name not declassified] which is almost self-explanatory. General Batmanqilich seems to be dominated by his two deputies, Generals - Deihimi and Akhavi, who owe allegiance to Dr. + Deihimi and Akhavi, who owe allegiance to Dr. Baqai and who owe their present positions to the support of the Shah. General Batmanqilich, in my opinion, means well but he is politically an infant and fears what @@ -44075,16 +37170,11 @@ against him.

I met Batmanqilich on the evening of October 17 at a reception and had a frank talk with him. I told him that [name not - declassified] had described to me the conversation which [name not declassified] had had with Baqai, as arranged by Batmanqilich. + declassified] had described to me the conversation which [name not declassified] had had with Baqai, as arranged by Batmanqilich. Batmanqilich said that he was glad that [name not - declassified] had seen Baqai. Baqai was + declassified] had seen Baqai. Baqai was probably the greatest man in Iran and it was important that the American - Embassy should work with him. I said that Baqai had been arguing publicly for an oilless economy and had advocated + Embassy should work with him. I said that Baqai had been arguing publicly for an oilless economy and had advocated such an economy in his conversation with [name not declassified]. If Baqai intended to oppose a solution to the oil problem and the exploitation by @@ -44097,8 +37187,7 @@

Batmanqilich was somewhat taken aback. He asked if I could not arrange to meet him, General Deihimi and Baqai secretly. I said the - American Ambassador met no one surreptitiously. If Baqai would care to call on me I would + American Ambassador met no one surreptitiously. If Baqai would care to call on me I would be glad to meet him. If Baqai would like to invite me to his house I would go there. There would, however, be nothing secret about such a meeting. The General asked if I @@ -44110,8 +37199,7 @@ about the situation in General Staff. I have already touched on the matter during previous conversations with the Shah, who on each occasion changed the subject. During my last talk with the Shah on October 14, I - mentioned the danger to the country from the direction of Baqai. The Shah minimized this danger. + mentioned the danger to the country from the direction of Baqai. The Shah minimized this danger. He said that an opposition was a good thing and in his opinion it was better for Baqai, who was loyal to the regime, to be leader of an opposition than someone who was @@ -44122,23 +37210,18 @@ Zahedi.

The Shah did make the concession in talking with me that it might be a good thing to send Baqai out of - the country for a time. He thought Baqai might be a good man to serve as a contact with - Iranian students in Europe and America. Baqai was a learned man and could probably be useful in + the country for a time. He thought Baqai might be a good man to serve as a contact with + Iranian students in Europe and America. Baqai was a learned man and could probably be useful in convincing Iranian youth abroad that the Iranian Government was after - all progressive. When I suggested to the Shah that Baqai’s particular type of “socialism” + all progressive. When I suggested to the Shah that Baqai’s particular type of “socialism” might not be a good thing with which to infect the students, the Shah reminded me that he personally thought that socialism might be good for Iran. He repeated that he was rather sympathetic to socialism and in his opinion the future of Iran lay in a marriage between socialism and capitalism.

I have been so busy during the last week with the Congressmen and am at - present so much occupied with Mr. Hoover that I fear that I am unable to keep the - Department currently informed to the extent that I would like of political developments + present so much occupied with Mr. Hoover that I fear that I am unable to keep the + Department currently informed to the extent that I would like of political developments here.See Document 331. I may say that I am not happy with the situation, which seems to be gradually deteriorating. I hope that the @@ -44158,44 +37241,31 @@ the request of Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Batmangelich. While talking with the undersigned between 1600 and 1800 hours on October 16th, Gen. - Batmangelich insisted that the undersigned meet with Dr. Baqai. Gen. Batmangelich repeated several times that Iran should + Batmangelich insisted that the undersigned meet with Dr. Baqai. Gen. Batmangelich repeated several times that Iran should have two top men: Zahedi and Baqai. Undersigned accepted Gen. Batmangelich’s invitation to meet Dr. Baqai.

-

2. At 2100 hours undersigned met with Dr. Baqai and Brig. Gen. +

2. At 2100 hours undersigned met with Dr. Baqai and Brig. Gen. Deihimi in the latter’s home; Dr. F. Taylor Gurney of the Embassy interpreted.

3. The undersigned asked Dr. Baqai - what he thought of the present situation. Dr. Baqai replied that in his opinion the - situation is not good. He severely criticized the Zahedi Cabinet, saying that Gen. + what he thought of the present situation. Dr. Baqai replied that in his opinion the + situation is not good. He severely criticized the Zahedi Cabinet, saying that Gen. Zahedi had retained several members of the old Razmara - Cabinet: Dr. Jehan Shah Saleh, Maj. Gen. - Hedayat, Hekmat, and Eng. Sharif Emami. Dr. + Cabinet: Dr. Jehan Shah Saleh, Maj. Gen. + Hedayat, Hekmat, and Eng. Sharif Emami. Dr. Baqai also severely criticized the appointment of Dolatabadi and Amidi-Nuri as assistants to the Prime Minister.

4. Dr. Baqai charged that only “poor” members of the Tudeh Party were being arrested, while those with - influence and money were not. Dr. Baqai said that no real effort was being made to arrest + influence and money were not. Dr. Baqai said that no real effort was being made to arrest the real leaders of the Tudeh Party and that among those arrested who - were important Tudeh members, Lankarani, Noruzi, and Hormoz had immediately been released. Dr. + were important Tudeh members, Lankarani, Noruzi, and Hormoz had immediately been released. Dr. Baqai said that the same - thing occurred under Dr. Mossadeq. He said, “When we saw that and also the way + thing occurred under Dr. Mossadeq. He said, “When we saw that and also the way Mossadeq was helping the Tudehs secretly, we worked for his overthrow—to get him out and to get Zahedi in.”

@@ -44208,11 +37278,9 @@ oilless economy. He said that Iran had never really enjoyed any oil profits. He said that those profits which were intended for use by the Seven Year Plan Organization had been dissipated by quarreling between - the British and Americans. Undersigned asked Dr. Baqai to expatiate upon that statement + the British and Americans. Undersigned asked Dr. Baqai to expatiate upon that statement but Dr. Baqai changed the - subject. Dr. Baqai expressed the opinion that Dr. Mossadeq had always used the oil + subject. Dr. Baqai expressed the opinion that Dr. Mossadeq had always used the oil question as a means of silencing his opponents, who were constantly told that they must remain silent because a settlement was imminent. He said that he did not propose to remain silent any longer, although it was @@ -44223,12 +37291,10 @@ and Dr. Baqai replied that he did not necessarily believe it was. He then praised the economic assistance that the United States had given Iran, and said that because of that - policy, the prestige of the U.S. had been very high. Dr. Baqai was asked if he realized that the + policy, the prestige of the U.S. had been very high. Dr. Baqai was asked if he realized that the present administration in the U.S. had been elected on a platform of balancing the budget, reducing the national debt, and cutting costs - wherever possible. In the same line of questioning, Dr. Baqai was asked if he believed an + wherever possible. In the same line of questioning, Dr. Baqai was asked if he believed an oilless economy were possible if the American government found it necessary to reduce in FY 1954 economic assistance to Iran. Dr. Baqai @@ -44246,22 +37312,17 @@ government whether he liked it or not, but that he would criticize that government whenever he felt it necessary. When asked if he were a supporter of the Zahedi - administration or an opponent of it, Dr. Baqai replied that he found himself in a dilemma: he had + administration or an opponent of it, Dr. Baqai replied that he found himself in a dilemma: he had helped bring the Zahedi government to power and was politically identified with it, but he felt Zahedi’s gang would ruin the government if it continued in the way that it has started. He made it - clear that he was neither identifying himself with the Zahedi government nor with the opponents of that + clear that he was neither identifying himself with the Zahedi government nor with the opponents of that government. He was then asked if he would accept a proposal to join the - Hassibi, Sangabi, Zirakzadeh group now working against + Hassibi, Sangabi, Zirakzadeh group now working against Zahedi. Dr. Baqai replied that those men were traitors and that he would never join them. He was then - asked if he would join Makki against Zahedi and he skirted that question.

+ asked if he would join Makki against Zahedi and he skirted that question.

8. Dr. Baqai made it clear that he did not identify his political future with the present group surrounding Gen. @@ -44271,70 +37332,48 @@ Minister.

9. Conclusions by Undersigned

A. Dr. Baqai’s political future - can quickly be ended by the prosecution of the Afshartus affair.On the Afshartus affair, see footnotes 2 and 3, Document - 196. The Military Governor of Tehran, Maj. Gen. + can quickly be ended by the prosecution of the Afshartus affair.On the Afshartus affair, see footnotes 2 and 3, Document + 196. The Military Governor of Tehran, Maj. Gen. Dadsetan, stated on October 18th - that he had proof certain that Dr. Baqai was directly implicated in the murder of the + that he had proof certain that Dr. Baqai was directly implicated in the murder of the former Police Chief. That fact means that in order to be safe, Dr. Baqai and his men must control the General Staff, the Police Department, and the Office of the - Military Governor. During the last two weeks Dr. Baqai’s men have been attempting to - capture those positions or to neutralize them. Gen. + Military Governor. During the last two weeks Dr. Baqai’s men have been attempting to + capture those positions or to neutralize them. Gen. Zahedi’s hands are momentarily tied in this matter because he has decided to free all of the military - officers who plotted against the life of Afshartus and who executed him. At the moment, + officers who plotted against the life of Afshartus and who executed him. At the moment, therefore, Dr. Baqai may with impunity criticize the Zahedi administration. As an insurance measure, however, his men continue to attempt to capture the posts mentioned above.

-

B. Involved also in this whole business is the fact that Gens. - Deihimi and Akhavi meet Maj. Gen. +

B. Involved also in this whole business is the fact that Gens. + Deihimi and Akhavi meet Maj. Gen. Arfa every Thursday night in Gen. - Arfa’s home. Maj. Gen. Guilanshah is of the opinion that + Arfa’s home. Maj. Gen. Guilanshah is of the opinion that Gens. - Akhavi and Deihimi are closer to Gen. - Arfa than to Dr. Baqai. CAS did not necessarily agree + Akhavi and Deihimi are closer to Gen. + Arfa than to Dr. Baqai. CAS did not necessarily agree with that estimate but, nevertheless, the hand of the British may very well be a part of this particular problem.

C. Dr. Baqai’s friends in the - General Staff continue to insist that the U.S. urge Gen. - Zahedi to make Dr. Baqai his right-hand.

+ General Staff continue to insist that the U.S. urge Gen. + Zahedi to make Dr. Baqai his right-hand.

D. There can be little doubt that HIM - the Shah is perfectly aware of Dr. Baqai’s influence with the Army. Whether or not the Shah + the Shah is perfectly aware of Dr. Baqai’s influence with the Army. Whether or not the Shah desires that Dr. Baqai become the leader of Zahedi’s political opposition is not clear at the moment.

-

E. CAS will know on Wednesday, October 21st, whether or not Dr. Baqai accepts Makki’s offer to join him +

E. CAS will know on Wednesday, October 21st, whether or not Dr. Baqai accepts Makki’s offer to join him against Zahedi.

- *17 [name not declassified] + *17 [name not declassified]
-
+
336. Information Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job @@ -44346,12 +37385,10 @@ CS–22878 - Washington, October 20, 1953. + Washington, October 20, 1953. SUBJECT - 1. Pledges made by Qashqai Khans to Zahedi Government + 1. Pledges made by Qashqai Khans to Zahedi Government 2. Intention of Government to Demand Capitulation of Qashqai Khans @@ -44360,10 +37397,8 @@ [3 lines not declassified]

1. The Qashqai Khans and the chiefs of all the individual Qashqai - sub-tribes met with Ali Hayat, Zahedi Government representative and the Governor of - Fars, and with General Mir-Jahangir (fnu), Commander of the Shiraz Garrison, at Shiraz on the + sub-tribes met with Ali Hayat, Zahedi Government representative and the Governor of + Fars, and with General Mir-Jahangir (fnu), Commander of the Shiraz Garrison, at Shiraz on the evening of 14 October 1953.

2. At the meeting, the Tribal Council members pledged unanimously that their tribes would not attack Shiraz, and stated that the Qashqais had @@ -44388,13 +37423,11 @@ 21340–21349.]

5. The reported refusal of Nasr Khan Qashqai to come to Tehran to see the Shah and Prime Minister Zahedi - has precipitated a decision by the Zahedi Government, as of 15 October 1953, to force the + has precipitated a decision by the Zahedi Government, as of 15 October 1953, to force the Qashqai leaders to capitulate or flee.

6. Major General Seyfollah - Hemat,Washington Comment: According to a report from a + Hemat,Washington Comment: According to a report from a well-qualified but prejudiced source (F–3) date of information February 1952, influential individuals were collaborating under the direction of General Seyfollah @@ -44402,13 +37435,10 @@ to 1947 and later attached to this Division as its tribal expert, to weaken the political influence of the Qashqais and to strengthen the position of the Shah. See SO–82200. - According to a report to another Government agency, Hemat retired from the Army in - April 1953, at his own request. For further information on Hemat’s tribal activities, see + According to a report to another Government agency, Hemat retired from the Army in + April 1953, at his own request. For further information on Hemat’s tribal activities, see SO’s–90925, –92656, –92783, and - –94689. [Footnote is in the original. SOs–82200, –90925, –92656, –92783, and –94689 were not + –94689. [Footnote is in the original. SOs–82200, –90925, –92656, –92783, and –94689 were not found.] an old enemy of the Qashqais, has been designated Commanding General of the Shiraz military forces. He is to confer with Zahedi on 17 October.

@@ -44423,27 +37453,19 @@ orders to the Hawker Company in England for 13 propellers and asked the United States Embassy in Tehran to help expedite their shipment.

9. Zahedi led a discussion on the - evening of 14 October 1953 among Generals Abdullah Hedayat, Nadr Batmangelich, Hedayatollah - Guilanshah, Dadsetan (fnu), Bakhtiar (fnu),Washington Comment: + evening of 14 October 1953 among Generals Abdullah Hedayat, Nadr Batmangelich, Hedayatollah + Guilanshah, Dadsetan (fnu), Bakhtiar (fnu),Washington Comment: Probably Brigadier Bakhtiar (fnu), who was named Commander of the Tehran Armored Division by the Shah on 29 September 1953. - [Footnote is in the original.] Reza Azimi, Morteza Akhavi, and Deihimi (fnu). + [Footnote is in the original.] Reza Azimi, Morteza Akhavi, and Deihimi (fnu). Zahedi “laid down” the - strategy while the Generals listened. Zahedi plans to take heights surrounding the Qashqais’ + strategy while the Generals listened. Zahedi plans to take heights surrounding the Qashqais’ southern location and to demand their capitulation. He does not expect the Qashqais to fight.

10. Two important Qashqai sub-tribal leaders who are now in Tehran told Zahedi that they will lead - opposition within the Qashqais against Nasr Khan Qashqai if Zahedi will promise to furnish the + opposition within the Qashqais against Nasr Khan Qashqai if Zahedi will promise to furnish the Shiraz Garrison with forces capable of overwhelming the Qashqais. On 14 October Zahedi gave his promise to furnish the forces.

@@ -44452,32 +37474,21 @@ conflict.

-
+
337. Memorandum by the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, - Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, + Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 12, Misc. Correspondence—TPAJAX. Secret. - Washington, October 22, 1953. + Washington, October 22, 1953.

The following information from Tehran, Iran dated 16 October 1953, is evaluated at 2 (referring to reportorial accuracy). Source of this information is an Iranian with wide political contacts (C). Subject of - the information is “Baghai’s Dissatisfaction with Zahedi Government”.

+ the information is “Baghai’s Dissatisfaction with Zahedi Government”.

1. Dr. Mozaffar Baghai, head of the Toilers Party, stated on 16 October - that he was very dissatisfied with the Zahedi government because of:

+ that he was very dissatisfied with the Zahedi government because of:

A. Razmara Cabinet hangovers—Dr. Jehanshah Salah, Ali Asghar Hekmat, Abdollah Hedayat, Sharif Emami (now out).

-

B. Release by government of high Tudeh leaders like Ahmad Lankarani, Daud Noruzi, and Mahmud Hormuz, and arrest of many +

B. Release by government of high Tudeh leaders like Ahmad Lankarani, Daud Noruzi, and Mahmud Hormuz, and arrest of many innocent “little people”.

C. Opening of the Senate.

2. Baghai charged that Military Government officers were accepting bribes @@ -44487,32 +37498,23 @@ could live on “oilless economy”. He said that he would support “an honorable settlement based on nine points of nationalization law”. Baghai said that he had appointed a commission to study the oil question - and plans to print their report in his newspaper Shahed.

+ and plans to print their report in his newspaper Shahed.

4. Baghai said that Mossadeq used - the oil question to silence his opponents and hopes that Zahedi would not do the same. He said + the oil question to silence his opponents and hopes that Zahedi would not do the same. He said that Zahedi could force an oil - settlement on the people but that, if Zahedi did so, the people would repudiate the + settlement on the people but that, if Zahedi did so, the people would repudiate the agreement.

-

5. Baghai is seriously thinking of an open break with Zahedi and said that, if the government +

5. Baghai is seriously thinking of an open break with Zahedi and said that, if the government continued its mistakes, the country would be ruined.

-
- 338. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans (Wisner) to Director of Central - Intelligence DullesSource: Central Intelligence Agency, +
+ 338. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans (Wisner) to Director of Central + Intelligence DullesSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, Iran 1951–1953. Secret; Security Information. - Washington, October 27, 1953. + Washington, October 27, 1953. SUBJECT Iran; the present situation and the significance of an increased @@ -44522,20 +37524,15 @@ prepared by the NE Division as the result of your request, made orally at a recent morning staff meeting,An apparent reference to the - Deputies’ meeting of October 23. At this meeting, DCI + Deputies’ meeting of October 23. At this meeting, DCI Dulles “indicated he had - discussed the Iranian Army question with Admiral Radford and that the latter had - agreed that we should encourage such a program. General Cabell suggested that the U.S. - Army should be brought in on this and Mr. Wisner undertook to follow up.” + discussed the Iranian Army question with Admiral Radford and that the latter had + agreed that we should encourage such a program. General Cabell suggested that the U.S. + Army should be brought in on this and Mr. Wisner undertook to follow up.” (Ibid., Office of the Director of Intelligence, Job 80B01676R, Box 23, Folder 14, Minutes of Deputies’ Meetings) for a draft paper which would be suitable for circulation to the Department of - State, the Department of Defense and possibly the JCS. It was your thought in requesting the + State, the Department of Defense and possibly the JCS. It was your thought in requesting the preparation of this paper that at some risk of having it appear that CIA is involving itself in matters beyond the scope of its responsibilities as an intelligence agency, you @@ -44566,13 +37563,10 @@

1. It is the view of this Division that United States military assistance to Iran on a scale designed to build the Iranian Armed Forces into an effective defense force would have decisive influence in consolidating - Iran’s position on the side of the free nations. The Zahedi Government appears fairly well + Iran’s position on the side of the free nations. The Zahedi Government appears fairly well entrenched at this time, but already it is beginning to be faced with - problems similar to those which undermined the Razmara regime three years ago and - which led to the advent to power of Mossadeq and the extreme nationalists and to the + problems similar to those which undermined the Razmara regime three years ago and + which led to the advent to power of Mossadeq and the extreme nationalists and to the concomitant upsurge of Tudeh influence.

2. We believe that an expanded military aid program would be likely to have the following effects:

@@ -44582,8 +37576,7 @@ the West. The principal source of the Shah’s power is the Army. We believe, therefore, that any strengthening of the Army will directly contribute to the strengthening of Iran’s Western orientation.

-

b. Immediately strengthen the prestige of the Zahedi Government, thus allowing it more opportunity to +

b. Immediately strengthen the prestige of the Zahedi Government, thus allowing it more opportunity to concentrate on basic social reforms and economic programs. Present leaders in the government are now prepared to commit themselves to a pro-Western alignment and to undertake a positive program of social @@ -44608,30 +37601,17 @@ of the strengthened Army, as well as the loyalty of the nation as a whole, to the one element in Iran (namely the Shah) that we feel is unequivocally committed to the West.

- - Kermit - Roosevelt[name not declassified] signed for - Roosevelt above - Roosevelt’s typed - signature. - Chief - Division of Near East and Africa - +
-
+
339. Memorandum From the Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of - Plans to Director of Central Intelligence DullesSource: + Plans to Director of Central Intelligence DullesSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, Iran 1951–1953. Secret; Security Information. There is no drafting information on the memorandum, only the indication that it came from the Near East and Africa Division. - Washington, October 29, 1953. + Washington, October 29, 1953. SUBJECT Certain Aspects of the Present Situation in Iran Which Appear to @@ -44642,12 +37622,9 @@

1. While the coup of 16/19 August which restored the Shah to effective power may now definitely be considered as a success, there are indications nevertheless that the position of the Shah and of his - government is by no means secure. The Zahedi cabinet which was riding high at the time of the + government is by no means secure. The Zahedi cabinet which was riding high at the time of the announcement of American economic aid is currently hitting a squall of - opposition engendered by disgruntled power seekers (such as Mullah Kashani), Mossadeq supporters including the Tudeh + opposition engendered by disgruntled power seekers (such as Mullah Kashani), Mossadeq supporters including the Tudeh (who are making a desperate and possibly successful effort to maintain their organization in being), and an increasingly larger segment of Bazaar merchants (whose business prospects seem to be threatened by @@ -44671,8 +37648,7 @@ printing of additional rial currency backed by American dollars.

c. Finally, a well-conducted and subtle propaganda campaign is underway preparing the ground for an attempted settlement of the oil controversy; - while at the same time the Hoover mission appears to be making steady headway.

+ while at the same time the Hoover mission appears to be making steady headway.

4. These same observers, however, stress that, despite the seriousness of Iran’s economic condition, Iran’s problems today as yesterday are primarily political and psychological. No solution of Iran’s economic or @@ -44687,8 +37663,7 @@ to enter into any formal alliance with the West, the fact remains that the Pahlavis have everything to gain by a close understanding with the West, and everything to lose by going toward Russia, or even by - attempting to remain neutral. These observers point out that Reza Shah came to power with the Army + attempting to remain neutral. These observers point out that Reza Shah came to power with the Army and the support of the West, and that the present Shah regained power last August with the aid of Army and with the support of the West. They concluded that in order to consolidate the present regime and render @@ -44700,8 +37675,7 @@ policy in the area.

5. We understand that a new U.S. military assistance program to Iran is under consideration. It is our view that to be effective such a program - should have as its objective the development of the Iranian Army into a force which, under the + should have as its objective the development of the Iranian Army into a force which, under the leadership of the Shah, can unquestionably dominate the internal situation so as to leave no doubt as to its ability to prevent civil disorder and preserve order and security; and at the same time act as a @@ -44722,39 +37696,29 @@ the one element in Iran (namely the Shah) that we feel is unequivocally committed to the West.

-
- 340. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 340. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/10–3053. Secret; Security Information. Repeated to London. Received at 9:34 a.m. - Tehran, October 30, 1953, 1 p.m. + Tehran, October 30, 1953, 1 p.m.

1004. During talk which I had with Shah October 27, he told me he would be grateful if I would request members Embassy staff Tehran refrain from political discussions with officers Iranian armed forces. He anxious these officers not become accustomed discuss political matters. I told him I would make request but would not be frank if I did not point out Iranian Army officers frequently approached not only members Embassy - staff but myself to discuss political matters. For instance, Batmangilich, Chief Staff, few days ago + staff but myself to discuss political matters. For instance, Batmangilich, Chief Staff, few days ago had urged me have talk with Baqai, for whom he expressed greatest admiration, and even offered make appointment for me with Baqai. I said Chief Staff and his two deputies on various occasions had tried persuade members - American representation Iran that Baqai one of great men of country who should have American support. It was + American representation Iran that Baqai one of great men of country who should have American support. It was being stated in army circles that Shah himself had given orders for - these officers to maintain contact with Baqai.

+ these officers to maintain contact with Baqai.

2. Shah seemed somewhat embarrassed. He said true several years ago he had used General Deihimi, one of - Deputy Chiefs Staff, as contact man with Baqai but was not doing so now. Deihimi seemed to have become infected + Deputy Chiefs Staff, as contact man with Baqai but was not doing so now. Deihimi seemed to have become infected with urge engage in political intrigues. It might be necessary transfer him other duties. He had on preceding day given strict instructions officers Iranian Security Forces to cease engaging in political @@ -44767,12 +37731,8 @@ Curtain countries. I again promised convey his request to American officials in Iran and expressed hope his officers would carry out his instructions.

-

3. Last evening at Turkish reception, Generals Batmangilich and Deihimi approached me. They referred to - conversation which at suggestion Batmangilich I had had with Baqai on October 24 and asked if it had been +

3. Last evening at Turkish reception, Generals Batmangilich and Deihimi approached me. They referred to + conversation which at suggestion Batmangilich I had had with Baqai on October 24 and asked if it had been helpful.An apparent reference to the conversation between Baqai and Henderson on October 23. @@ -44782,16 +37742,11 @@ could not arrange another conversation. I replied it might be preferable for Baqai and me arrange our meetings direct. Deihimi said “we - are afraid that unless we help in this matter you will not see Baqai again and that you will drift + are afraid that unless we help in this matter you will not see Baqai again and that you will drift apart”. I made vague reply and changed conversation to generalities.

-

4. At same reception General Farzanegan, Acting Minister Posts and Telegraphs, told - me that earlier in evening at request Batmangilich he had discussed Iranian political - situation with latter and his two deputies Deihimi and Akhavi. Three had tried enlist his support in prevailing +

4. At same reception General Farzanegan, Acting Minister Posts and Telegraphs, told + me that earlier in evening at request Batmangilich he had discussed Iranian political + situation with latter and his two deputies Deihimi and Akhavi. Three had tried enlist his support in prevailing on Zahedi agree to appointment Deihimi as military governor Tehran in place of Dadsetan. They @@ -44811,19 +37766,14 @@ my experiences of last evening indicate they not too deeply impressed.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
- 341. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 341. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 788.00/10–3053. Secret; Security Information. Received November 15. - The despatch was drafted by Melbourne. The attached memorandum of conversation + The despatch was drafted by Melbourne. The attached memorandum of conversation was drafted by Cunningham. A copy was sent to London. @@ -44831,8 +37781,7 @@ No. 245 - Tehran, October 30, + Tehran, October 30, 1953. SUBJECT @@ -44840,21 +37789,19 @@ Mozaffar Baqai

There is enclosed for the Department’s information a memorandum of - conversation which I had recently with Dr. Mozaffar Baqai who has been the leading open + conversation which I had recently with Dr. Mozaffar Baqai who has been the leading open critic of the Zahedi Government. While the memorandum of conversation is self-explanatory, my purposes in - the course of the meeting were to ascertain Dr. Baqai’s point of view toward the + the course of the meeting were to ascertain Dr. Baqai’s point of view toward the Zahedi Government and toward the United States and Great Britain, on the one hand, and to make clear to him the policies and view of the United States, on the other.

- - Loy W. + + Loy W. Henderson - - Ambassador - + + Ambassador + @@ -44862,8 +37809,7 @@ Memorandum of Conversation - Tehran, October 23, 1953. + Tehran, October 23, 1953. PARTICIPANTS Loy W. Henderson, @@ -44877,19 +37823,14 @@

Dr. Baqai came to tea at the Residence at the invitation of the Ambassador about 6 p.m. on - October 23. After the Ambassador and Baqai had exchanged assurances that they would speak + October 23. After the Ambassador and Baqai had exchanged assurances that they would speak with complete candor regarding their views on Iran’s problems, the Ambassador asked Baqai to - outline his estimate of and attitude toward the Zahedi Government and its + outline his estimate of and attitude toward the Zahedi Government and its performance to date.

-

As a preface to his remarks, Dr. Baqai observed that his political fate was +

As a preface to his remarks, Dr. Baqai observed that his political fate was inevitably closely allied to that of the new Government. He had a - long record of opposition to Mosadeq, had supported Zahedi for some time, had defended him publicly at + long record of opposition to Mosadeq, had supported Zahedi for some time, had defended him publicly at the time of his arrest in 1952, and had helped bring the General to power. Thus, regardless of the fact that he had not sought or been offered influence or position in the new Government, its success @@ -44897,14 +37838,12 @@ be considered in some measure his failure.

Dr. Baqai said that he was frankly disturbed and disappointed by the General’s record so far. - He explained that whereas Zahedi could have picked for his Cabinet trustworthy + He explained that whereas Zahedi could have picked for his Cabinet trustworthy though politically unknown officials or military men in whom he had confidence, he had instead appointed a group of politicians of long standing, whose inefficiency and corruption and whose records as tools of Great Britain or Soviet Russia were known to all. As a - result, the people who brought Zahedi to power in a violent reaction against the + result, the people who brought Zahedi to power in a violent reaction against the Mosadeq Government and who had hoped for a new and more honest regime were disturbed and indignant at the General’s choice of ministers.

@@ -44921,8 +37860,7 @@ are inevitably trying to frustrate and discredit the man who overthrew their leader; and the elements who oppose in principle any Government headed by a military - man.Richards highlighted this sentence.

+ man.Richards highlighted this sentence.

Dr. Baqai commented in passing that in normal times he would oppose the selection of a military man as premier. In view of the present crisis, however, and in view of @@ -44930,20 +37868,17 @@ Government and could see at present no alternative to Zahedi, he had supported the General in his bid for power. Now, however, he found himself in a very embarrassing situation, as he could neither - support, oppose, nor remain indifferent to the Zahedi regime. He could not grant + support, oppose, nor remain indifferent to the Zahedi regime. He could not grant it support because it was acting contrary to his expressed principles, was returning to power long-discredited politicians and - was committing all over again the mistakes of the Mosadeq Government. He could not + was committing all over again the mistakes of the Mosadeq Government. He could not oppose it, because he had helped bring it to power and could only turn against it at the cost of admitting he had made a mistake in preferring Zahedi to Mosadeq; furthermore, opposition to Zahedi would merely play into Communist hands. Finally, he could not remain - silent and profess indifference to the Zahedi Government because his followers would ask + silent and profess indifference to the Zahedi Government because his followers would ask him why he failed to criticize the new Government when it repeated the mistakes of the old.

Dr. Baqai went on to say that @@ -44956,8 +37891,7 @@ innocent. Furthermore, the remainder who are either Tudeh party members or Communist sympathizers include only rank and file members and insignificant minor functionaries; not a single member of the - Central Committee of the Party,Richards underlined + Central Committee of the Party,Richards underlined the phrase “not a single member of the Central Committee of the Party.” not a single important Communist writer or pamphleteer, not a single leading party organizer has been @@ -44971,8 +37905,7 @@

Baqai emphasized that Communism, being an ideology, could not be overcome by force alone, and pointed out that the Government was even using force, its only - weapon, incorrectly. While innocent men are arrested at the whim of a police officer or + weapon, incorrectly. While innocent men are arrested at the whim of a police officer or Government functionary or in the hope that they might pay a ransom for their release, the guilty are all too often securing release or immunity from arrest by bribery or by influence. In some cases @@ -44988,34 +37921,27 @@ the Zahedi Government Cabinet, who has a long record of service to the British cause and who in recent years has become increasingly involved in Iran’s - Soviet cultural activities. Hekmat’s brother, a professor at Tehran University + Soviet cultural activities. Hekmat’s brother, a professor at Tehran University and an active Tudeh party member, is and will remain immune from arrest because of his brother’s position. There have been, in fact, only three important party functionaries arrested since the inauguration of the Zahedi regime and all three of them were released within 48 hours of their - arrest.According to Baqai the three men in question + arrest.According to Baqai the three men in question were Engineer Ansari, a former functionary in the Ministry of Finance and a candidate member of the Central Committee of the Party; Davoud Noruzi, major Communist writer, and one Hormoz, a lawyer. Ansari secured his release through the influence of a relative of his, whose - name and governmental position Baqai had forgotten for the moment but could + name and governmental position Baqai had forgotten for the moment but could find out if necessary; the other two, he thought, had probably bribed some officials to obtain their freedom. [Footnote is in the original.]

-

At this point Ambassador Henderson asked Dr. Baqai if his dissatisfaction with the Zahedi Government resulted from +

At this point Ambassador Henderson asked Dr. Baqai if his dissatisfaction with the Zahedi Government resulted from fundamental disagreement on policy grounds or merely from disappointment in Zahedi’s implementation of his policies. He went on to point out that in - order to correct abuses and errors which Baqai had detailed, the Government would need an + order to correct abuses and errors which Baqai had detailed, the Government would need an honest and efficient police force, which it did not at present have and which would be difficult and time-consuming to develop. The Ambassador asked Baqai just @@ -45028,11 +37954,9 @@ policies but stated that what really counted was the way these policies were being carried out and that it was in this connection that he differed with General - Zahedi. He conceded that Zahedi’s personal aims were undoubtedly commendable + Zahedi. He conceded that Zahedi’s personal aims were undoubtedly commendable and that he was attempting to pursue an effective anti-Communist - campaign, but contended that such attempts were largely vitiated by the corrupt + campaign, but contended that such attempts were largely vitiated by the corrupt and venal politicians who surround him. He felt that, since his own Workers’ Party had extensive information regarding the Communist organization leadership and activities in Iran, the Security Forces @@ -45042,8 +37966,7 @@ Communism, Baqai stated that this experience made him one of the best qualified men in Iran to discuss Communist activities and the best ways of combating them. - Several times in this presentation, Baqai affirmed that he had made his position clear + Several times in this presentation, Baqai affirmed that he had made his position clear to General Zahedi and that the General agreed with his estimate of the situation but was prevented by his entourage from acting effectively.

@@ -45053,18 +37976,13 @@ statement by Foreign Minister Anthony Eden of Great Britain regarding the necessity for free intercourse between Iran and Britain and the desirability of - re-establishing diplomatic relations.See Document 331. The + re-establishing diplomatic relations.See Document 331. The Ambassador pointed out that General Zahedi had emphasized Iran’s desire to be on friendly - terms with all countries, and asked Dr. Baqai’s reaction to this statement. Baqai said that he certainly agreed - in principleRichards underlined the phrase + terms with all countries, and asked Dr. Baqai’s reaction to this statement. Baqai said that he certainly agreed + in principleRichards underlined the phrase “Baqai said that he - certainly agreed in principle.” with Zahedi’s stand and felt that + certainly agreed in principle.” with Zahedi’s stand and felt that diplomatic relations with Great Britain should by all means be re-established. However such recognition must be proceeded by at least the beginnings of an oil settlement in order to prevent the @@ -45083,16 +38001,13 @@

When the 16th Majlis was elected some four years ago and the national movement first came into prominence, one of the movement’s major objectives as listed in Shahed was the - settlement of the oil question. By this, Baqai explained, he meant the reaching of an + settlement of the oil question. By this, Baqai explained, he meant the reaching of an understanding with the AIOC if that company were willing to grant Iran a fair share of the proceeds from its oil; otherwise, he advocated eviction of the British and nationalization of the oil industry. British intransigence - unfortunately aroused public anger in Iran to such a pitch that many people came to feel - that they wanted no part either of the AIOC or of the oil industry; in other words, they + unfortunately aroused public anger in Iran to such a pitch that many people came to feel + that they wanted no part either of the AIOC or of the oil industry; in other words, they wanted to be rid of the oil question completely. In line with this public feeling, Baqai had advocated and still defended the oilless economy as an alternative @@ -45103,12 +38018,10 @@ division of profits, which would be completely unacceptable to the Iranian people. Rather than accept such a shameful settlement, he believed Iran should forget her oil and turn to other sources of - revenue.Richards highlighted and + revenue.Richards highlighted and placed his initials in the margin next to this sentence.

-

The Ambassador thanked Dr. Baqai for his frank and detailed presentation of his +

The Ambassador thanked Dr. Baqai for his frank and detailed presentation of his views and said that his comments had been most helpful and revealing. He then stated his intention to explain with equal frankness and in some detail his own estimate, and what he believed @@ -45147,8 +38060,7 @@ years, the Ambassador suggested that such a most-favored-nation clause would permit Iran to increase her revenue from oil at the same pace as her sister nations. Were such a provision to go into - effect, it was likely that both the AIOC and Iran itself might lose much of their interest + effect, it was likely that both the AIOC and Iran itself might lose much of their interest in the question of compensation.

Underlining the extreme urgency of the situation, the Ambassador stated that either foreign economic aid such as now proffered by the @@ -45156,8 +38068,7 @@ the Iranian economy if it was to avoid complete bankruptcy. The emergency aid program now under way had five more months to run; at the end of that time Iran must find some other source of - revenue.Richards underlined the phrase + revenue.Richards underlined the phrase “at the end of that time Iran must find some other source of revenue.” Although personally willing if necessary to ask his Government for additional aid for Iran, the Ambassador felt very @@ -45165,12 +38076,10 @@ an oil settlement, the United States Congress would refuse to extend further assistance. Rightly or wrongly, the American people would feel that a country which apparently did nothing to utilize its own - resources did not deserve support from abroad.The preceding four paragraphs are highlighted + resources did not deserve support from abroad.The preceding four paragraphs are highlighted and the comment “Lovely” was written in an unidentified hand in the margin.

-

At the close of the Ambassador’s presentation, Dr. Baqai said that he thanked the +

At the close of the Ambassador’s presentation, Dr. Baqai said that he thanked the Ambassador for his frankness and agreed in substance with his estimate of the situation. However, he felt it necessary to point out that the people of Iran must be psychologically prepared for an @@ -45185,8 +38094,7 @@ reasons behind an oil settlement.The last sentence in this paragraph was highlighted with a comment in the margin: “What an S.O.B.”

-

The Ambassador took sharp issue with Baqai’s comments regarding the Korean intervention +

The Ambassador took sharp issue with Baqai’s comments regarding the Korean intervention and emphasized that the United States had acted solely in order to resist Communist aggression and to keep its word to the free world. Baqai then modified his @@ -45196,8 +38104,7 @@ reiterated his contention that in his country and particularly in the case of the oil question considerable psychological preparation of the people was necessary.

-

Further detailing his position, Baqai stated that his party served as a screen +

Further detailing his position, Baqai stated that his party served as a screen between the Communist Party and Iranians dissatisfied with their country’s present situation. This was because the Worker’s Party advocates many of the reforms demanded by the Tudeh without @@ -45207,8 +38114,7 @@ attract these individuals towards him and away from the Tudeh, Baqai had found it necessary to profess on occasions a neutralism which he did not - feel.Richards underlined the phrase “a neutralism + feel.Richards underlined the phrase “a neutralism which he did not feel.” In the margin is the handwritten word “Nuts!” Pointing out that these intellectuals, if forced to chose between Britain and Russia, would invariably turn toward @@ -45224,31 +38130,25 @@ conviction would criticize the United States or United States policies. He thought, however, it would be unworthy of a statesman to criticize a country trying to help Iran merely for the purpose of - trying to strengthen his political party.Richards underlined the phrase “unworthy of a + trying to strengthen his political party.Richards underlined the phrase “unworthy of a statesman to criticize a country trying to help Iran merely for the purpose of trying to strengthen his political party” and - wrote in the margin “a thrust that hurt Baqai!” At this critical + wrote in the margin “a thrust that hurt Baqai!” At this critical period of Iran’s history, it behooved such leaders of public opinion as Dr. Baqai to assert their leadership to the fullest on behalf of Iran’s interests and to explain the situation fully and frankly to their supporters and constituents. By professing for reasons of political convenience - opinions which he did not hold, Dr. Baqai made it impossible for the members of his + opinions which he did not hold, Dr. Baqai made it impossible for the members of his party and their sympathizers to know precisely where he stood; furthermore, he deprived them of the benefit of his informed judgment and leadership.

To these remarks Baqai merely reiterated his opinion that the Iranian people could not be dragooned into supporting an oil settlement and must be prepared - psychologically over a period of time for any agreement. He pointed out that + psychologically over a period of time for any agreement. He pointed out that General Zahedi, an honest - but idealistic and therefore dangerousRichards underlined + but idealistic and therefore dangerousRichards underlined the phrase “therefore dangerous” and wrote a question mark in the margin. military man, seemed to believe it possible to obtain by means of rigged elections a Majlis which would approve @@ -45258,33 +38158,21 @@ manner a truly representative Majlis once the country had been properly prepared for this move. To the Ambassador’s observation that regardless of the feeling of the Iranian people there were only - five months left in which to act, Baqai had no rejoinder.

-

The interview terminated with the Ambassador and Dr. Baqai exchanging thanks for each + five months left in which to act, Baqai had no rejoinder.

+

The interview terminated with the Ambassador and Dr. Baqai exchanging thanks for each party’s frank and complete presentation. Before leaving at - approximately 9 p.m., Dr. Baqai professed his readiness to discuss the oil + approximately 9 p.m., Dr. Baqai professed his readiness to discuss the oil question further with the Ambassador at the latter’s convenience.

-
+
342. Monthly Project Status Report Prepared in the Directorate of - Plans, Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 59–00133R, Box 5, + Plans, Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 59–00133R, Box 5, Folder 13, [cryptonym not declassified]. - Secret; Security Information. The report covers Operation [cryptonym not declassified] for October + Secret; Security Information. The report covers Operation [cryptonym not declassified] for October 1953. - Washington, undated. + Washington, undated.

Summary

A. Mission: The mission of the project is to establish an effective instrument in Iran with which to work toward our @@ -45302,29 +38190,20 @@

[6 paragraphs (34 lines) not declassified]

D. Effectiveness of Project: The Station continues - to prepare and distribute anti-Tudeh articles and cartoons [less than 1 line not declassified]. In this way - it is attempting to keep the Zahedi government aware of the dangers of the Tudeh.

+ to prepare and distribute anti-Tudeh articles and cartoons [less than 1 line not declassified]. In this way + it is attempting to keep the Zahedi government aware of the dangers of the Tudeh.

E. Methods and Standards: [8 lines not declassified].

F. PP Assets Acquired: none.

-
+
343. Monthly Report Prepared in the Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence AgencySource: - Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 81–01061R, Box 2, Folder 5, Monthly + Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 81–01061R, Box 2, Folder 5, Monthly Report—October 1953—Country Summaries and Analyses. Top Secret; Security Information. - Washington, undated. + Washington, undated.

IRAN

October 1953

A. General Developments

@@ -45334,32 +38213,26 @@ Mossadeq supporters including the Tudeh, and several hundred bazaar merchants. These opposition factors have found rallying points around the tardiness of the - government in the prosecution of Mossadeq and Tudeh leaders, delays in using impact + government in the prosecution of Mossadeq and Tudeh leaders, delays in using impact portion of U.S. emergency aid, and public uncertainty over the oil problem.

2. The Shah and General Zahedi have proposed that U.S. military aid be increased to permit the development of the Iranian Army as a frontier screen of defense rather than only as an internal police force. The U.S. Ambassador has endorsed - the idea and our Station has urged strong support by CIA as a potent factor in solidifying + the idea and our Station has urged strong support by CIA as a potent factor in solidifying public opinion behind the Zahedi government and scattering the opposition.

-

3. The major elements of opposition to the Zahedi government have so far failed to present any +

3. The major elements of opposition to the Zahedi government have so far failed to present any insurmountable problem to the government since they have lacked any cohesive effort and no one element is believed to have financial support - capable of amounting to a positive threat. Furthermore the Zahedi government is taking significant + capable of amounting to a positive threat. Furthermore the Zahedi government is taking significant steps to eliminate the problems which constitute the grounds for opposition.

4. Intra-government discord continues chiefly on the dissatisfaction of General Zahedi with Chief of Staff General Batmangelich and his top aide, and the latter’s overtures - to the Shah derogatory to General Dadsetan’s effectiveness in prosecuting the Tudeh + to the Shah derogatory to General Dadsetan’s effectiveness in prosecuting the Tudeh leaders.

5. The Mossadeq trials were scheduled to begin the 22nd of October but were subsequently postponed @@ -45369,8 +38242,7 @@

6. There have been no significant developments on the oil question, though the visit of Herbert Hoover, Jr. to Tehran as a U.S. State Department - consultant has been well noted in the Iranian Press.See Document 331. + consultant has been well noted in the Iranian Press.See Document 331. The Zahedi government is still endeavoring to reveal the facts of the situation to the Iranian public and it is believed that some headway has been made in the government’s @@ -45385,11 +38257,8 @@

[Omitted here is operational detail.]

-
- 344. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 344. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/11–553. Confidential; Security Information. Drafted by G.D. King. Pouched to London and Moscow. Received on November @@ -45399,12 +38268,10 @@ No. 263 - Tehran, November 5, 1953. + Tehran, November 5, 1953. REF - Embassy Despatch No. 235, October 24, 1953Despatch 235 from Tehran, October 24, reported + Embassy Despatch No. 235, October 24, 1953Despatch 235 from Tehran, October 24, reported that the Tudeh had retained the ability to conduct a “limited anti-Government campaign.” Even so, “Government security measures . . . have risen to a new level of effectiveness in @@ -45428,22 +38295,18 @@ the possibility of further Tudeh mob actions. Nevertheless, the Tudeh continues to attempt a minimal anti-Government campaign. The content of Party propaganda has changed little during the past month except to - stress the contention that Mosadeq is the legal Prime Minister and to enlist public + stress the contention that Mosadeq is the legal Prime Minister and to enlist public support in the campaign to gain his release.

Government Measures

Information based on Embassy, CAS and Armed Services Attaché sources indicates that the Government’s security forces are continuing their - clean-up operations against the Party. General Dadsetan, Military Governor of Tehran, + clean-up operations against the Party. General Dadsetan, Military Governor of Tehran, in a press interview on November 3, announced that, since August 19, 208 “Communist and anti-National” centers have been uncovered and 842 arrests have been made in Tehran alone. During the same period over - 200,000 Tudeh leaflets were seized and caches of arms and explosives were uncovered and + 200,000 Tudeh leaflets were seized and caches of arms and explosives were uncovered and confiscated. According to a communiqué from the Ministry of Interior, - released on the day before General Dadsetan’s interview, a total of 1375 Tudeh Party + released on the day before General Dadsetan’s interview, a total of 1375 Tudeh Party members were arrested in all of Iran during the Iranian month of Mehr (September 23–October 22). On November 4, the pro-Government newspaper, Etela’at, took cognizance of the Military @@ -45453,15 +38316,11 @@ insure employment for those elements in the population most susceptible to Tudeh propaganda.

General Dadsetan indicated that the - Government is aware of the cooperation between the various pro-Mosadeq and Tudeh elements, although he + Government is aware of the cooperation between the various pro-Mosadeq and Tudeh elements, although he did not specifically mention the new Tudeh-inspired National Resistance - Movement. He did make the statement, however, that Hosein Fatemi, ex-Minister of Foreign - Affairs, Dr. Sanjabi, and Engineers Hasibi and Zirakzadeh were using the funds which - they had accumulated illegally while serving under Dr. Mosadeq to further the cause of the + Movement. He did make the statement, however, that Hosein Fatemi, ex-Minister of Foreign + Affairs, Dr. Sanjabi, and Engineers Hasibi and Zirakzadeh were using the funds which + they had accumulated illegally while serving under Dr. Mosadeq to further the cause of the Tudeh and allied pro-Mosadeq organizations.

The Military Governor’s office further demonstrated its efficiency during @@ -45490,12 +38349,10 @@

Situation in the Ministries and in the Provinces

The situation within the various Ministries of Government appears to be - quiet. The Ministry of Finance announced on October 25 that it was about to expel 150 + quiet. The Ministry of Finance announced on October 25 that it was about to expel 150 employees who have been convicted of working with the Tudeh Party and that an equal number of questionable Ministry employees outside of - Tehran would be placed on indefinite leave. The Iranian Army G–2, according to a reliable source, + Tehran would be placed on indefinite leave. The Iranian Army G–2, according to a reliable source, claimed on October 22 to have arrested a total of 60 officers and 250 non-commissioned officers to date. The non-commissioned officers have been summarily separated from the service, but the Army is in a quandary @@ -45535,8 +38392,7 @@ falange or fascist type of group, even to their black-shirted uniforms. The Sumka demonstrated its strength and discipline on the occasion of the recent Sports Festival, when approximately 500 of its members - impressed the crowds at the Stadium with a show of swastika-bedecked banners carried in + impressed the crowds at the Stadium with a show of swastika-bedecked banners carried in perfect marching order. These organizations enlist their members almost solely on the basis of intense anti-Tudeh feelings, and almost certainly receive their excellent financial backing from the Shah and the @@ -45551,22 +38407,18 @@ making constant efforts to achieve at least limited objectives.

It would appear that the most important event during October was the formation of the so-called National Resistance Movement. The Tudeh has - been working since before the fall of Mosadeq for the creation of a united front among + been working since before the fall of Mosadeq for the creation of a united front among pro-Mosadeq elements. In mid-October they were successful in organizing the National Resistance Movement from elements of the Iran Party, the Pan-Iranists, and the Third Force, as well as remnants of the National Movement. Cooperation among these diverse political units has been achieved by agreement on - the single objective of obtaining the release of Dr. Mosadeq. Tudeh leaders are apparently + the single objective of obtaining the release of Dr. Mosadeq. Tudeh leaders are apparently satisfied with this degree of cooperation, but have urged the other parties participating in the Movement to review the possibility of - further cooperation after the limited objective concerning Dr. Mosadeq has been realized.

+ further cooperation after the limited objective concerning Dr. Mosadeq has been realized.

Reportedly, the Movement has recently been strengthened by the receipt of - a surreptitious message from Dr. Mosadeq in which the ex-Prime Minister gave his blessing + a surreptitious message from Dr. Mosadeq in which the ex-Prime Minister gave his blessing to the joint effort. The leaders of the Movement, in conjunction with members of a pro-Mosadeq Bazaar Committee, are making plans for a one-day strike in the bazaar and @@ -45604,13 +38456,11 @@ at strategic points in the city (one set of tracts was scattered on the street a block from the Embassy). Two weeks ago the anniversary edition of the Party newspaper Mardom appeared in Tehran - and, at about the same time, a new magazine called Mosavar with a violently anti-American, pro-Soviet slant + and, at about the same time, a new magazine called Mosavar with a violently anti-American, pro-Soviet slant commenced publication. It would appear also that the Tudeh is responsible for a current rumor and whispering campaign against the United States in general and the Embassy in particular. One rumor - insists, for example, that Ambassador Henderson is putting pressure on the Government to + insists, for example, that Ambassador Henderson is putting pressure on the Government to execute Dr. Mosadeq forthwith. Other rumors spread by the Tudeh and by its compatriots in the National Resistance Movement attempt to foster the belief that the British and @@ -45619,8 +38469,7 @@ administration has reflected the Party’s new status in the country. During recent weeks the persistent central theme has been a demand that Dr. Mosadeq be released, coupled - with a constantly reiterated insistence that Mosadeq is the legal Prime Minister. In conjunction with + with a constantly reiterated insistence that Mosadeq is the legal Prime Minister. In conjunction with this theme, the Party contends the present administration has usurped the power of government by means of an illegal and treasonable coup d’état. Tudeh propaganda also reflects the extent to which its @@ -45631,10 +38480,8 @@

In the few Party newspapers and magazines which have appeared recently, the favorite topic continues to be a series of accusations against the United States. Tudeh publications warned the local populace that the - United States plans to make Iran a colony, that Iran is to be used by the United States and - Great Britain as a base against the USSR, and the Americans have appointed themselves + United States plans to make Iran a colony, that Iran is to be used by the United States and + Great Britain as a base against the USSR, and the Americans have appointed themselves successors in Iran to the British, with whom they continue to work hand-in-glove.

For the Ambassador:

@@ -45642,31 +38489,22 @@ Melbourne

First Secretary of Embassy

-
+
345. Letter From the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South - Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State (Stutesman) to the First Secretary of - Embassy in Iran (Melbourne)Source: National Archives, - RG 59, GTI Files, Lot 57 D 529, Box 40, CIA. Top Secret; Security Information; + Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State (Stutesman) to the First Secretary of + Embassy in Iran (Melbourne)Source: National Archives, + RG 59, GTI Files, Lot 57 D 529, Box 40, CIA. Top Secret; Security Information; Official–Informal. - Washington, November 6, 1953. + Washington, November 6, 1953. Dear Roy:

I consider myself an unusually fortunate Desk Officer in having such close personal relationships with my more or less opposite numbers in - CIA. John Waller and [name not + CIA. John Waller and [name not declassified] are men upon whose judgment we can all rely - without qualification and Arthur Richards and I have been happy to observe that they go + without qualification and Arthur Richards and I have been happy to observe that they go out of their way to maintain friendly and close relations with us, asking our advice often upon subjects which their organization might not normally discuss with working levels in the Department.

@@ -45688,8 +38526,7 @@ these major segments of the total Iranian problem. The first involves, in Washington, the NSC and constant in-fighting with FOA and Defense. The - banner of the second is being carried at this moment by Mr. Hoover. My efforts in regard to + banner of the second is being carried at this moment by Mr. Hoover. My efforts in regard to meeting the 4th (propaganda) problem will be dealt with in another letter and involves close coordination with Clary Thompson of USIA and a host of propaganda experts in other crannies of Washington.

@@ -45699,12 +38536,10 @@ discussions and our difficulties. The rest of this letter will be devoted to raising problems with you on this specific subject.

First of all, as I know you already realize, we have such great - admiration for Ambassador Henderson and you that we have not sought to give you + admiration for Ambassador Henderson and you that we have not sought to give you more than general indications of our attitude on political aspects of the Iranian situation. For instance, you will note that we have hardly - expressed an opinion upon the question of whether to urge Zahedi to fill up his rump Majlis or + expressed an opinion upon the question of whether to urge Zahedi to fill up his rump Majlis or elect a new Majlis. We have such confidence in the Ambassador that we feel it best to leave to his discretion final judgment upon such tactical problems. Therefore we are inclined more to backing you up than @@ -45729,8 +38564,7 @@ involved in Iranian internal affairs. The grave risk we will run is that we will become known as an intriguing power and lose our important moral position as a nation dealing with other independent members of the free - world as equals. On the other hand, I fear that refusal to interfere in Iran would not + world as equals. On the other hand, I fear that refusal to interfere in Iran would not only be disbelieved but could be as dangerous as refusing to stretch forth a hand to help an unstable man walk along a precipice.

1. Army—It would seem essential that there be an @@ -45768,13 +38602,11 @@ serious danger of encouraging intrigue and antagonisms, and, in Iran, a land of intrigue, I doubt that we could long keep any support of an opposition group secret. However, and this I consider a most important - point upon which I need your advice, it seems to me that Zahedi must not become our only arrow + point upon which I need your advice, it seems to me that Zahedi must not become our only arrow in the political quiver. Although we have never raised the question on a high level here it is my frank belief that in any show-down between the Shah and Zahedi, we can only side with the Shah. We have gone already - very far in the direction of becoming identified with Zahedi and I dread the day when his + very far in the direction of becoming identified with Zahedi and I dread the day when his increasingly unpopular government will either fall of its own failures or he destroyed by the Shah or opposition forces.

@@ -45790,8 +38622,7 @@ romantic feelings about the nomads of Iran or their political or military dependability in any time of crisis. I believe the actions of the Qashqai during recent months have shaken many illusions here, but - there is still that undercurrent of affection which Joe Wagner once described as the + there is still that undercurrent of affection which Joe Wagner once described as the American characteristic of being interested in people who wear funny hats. There has always seemed to me a contradiction in our policy of seeking on the one hand to develop a strong central government, while @@ -45801,8 +38632,7 @@ we would be foolish not to maintain relations with the tribes, particularly as they can sometimes affect political developments.

There are, of course, other resources which we can use to influence - internal Iranian affairs, paramount among which is the TCA program. Arthur and I have shivers + internal Iranian affairs, paramount among which is the TCA program. Arthur and I have shivers whenever the question of TCA participation in political affairs comes up, but it would be foolish to disregard the many contacts which they have and their entry into levels @@ -45815,19 +38645,16 @@ from the great opportunity offered us in mid-August.

Sincerely,

- John H. - StutesmanPrinted from a + John H. + StutesmanPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
-
+
346. Despatch From the Station in Iran to the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency - (Roosevelt)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, + (Roosevelt)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 89–00176R, Box 1, Folder 20, Political Activities—Iran. Secret; Security Information. Sent for the attention of the Deputy for Psych/Intel. @@ -45837,8 +38664,7 @@ [text not declassified]–1472 - Tehran, November 13, 1953. + Tehran, November 13, 1953. SUBJECT General—Operational @@ -45847,8 +38673,7 @@

1. Introduction

Elections, as we know them in the West, have never been held in Iran. In fact, one might almost call the process whereby a private citizen - becomes a Majlis deputy selection rather than election. And, unfortunately, the voter is the + becomes a Majlis deputy selection rather than election. And, unfortunately, the voter is the least important person in the process. There are a number of reasons for this state of affairs: a) Political parties, as we know them, do not exist in Iran, b) 90% of the population is illiterate, c) the majority @@ -45864,8 +38689,7 @@ propaganda. At the same time, due to lack of serious attention regarding improvement of the country, on the part of previous governments, as well as the influence and intervention in public affairs by the central - government, the British government and the AIOC, an atmosphere of despair and negligence has been + government, the British government and the AIOC, an atmosphere of despair and negligence has been created, even among the more intelligent and educated class of the Iranian Society, with the result that even they refrain from constructive participation in public affairs and are satisfied to pursue @@ -45875,13 +38699,9 @@ organized party activity, but the foundation of these various organizations has always been a particular aim or motive, which, once having been attained eliminates the reason for existence of the - organization. The best example of this is Qavam’s Democratic Party of Iran which was formed for the specific purpose of - having a Majlis favorable to Qavam. After the elections to the 15th Majlis, in which - there were many members of Qavam’s party, the organization disintegrated, and + organization. The best example of this is Qavam’s Democratic Party of Iran which was formed for the specific purpose of + having a Majlis favorable to Qavam. After the elections to the 15th Majlis, in which + there were many members of Qavam’s party, the organization disintegrated, and members like Makki bolted. They had joined merely to gain a Majlis seat. Their objective reached, they no longer had need of membership in the organization. Regardless of how this sounds to the Western mind, Persian @@ -45908,8 +38728,7 @@ subject to its jurisdiction by means of cooperation from the local landlords. An example of this type of “selectoral process” is as follows:

-

1) In the elections to the 17th Majlis, Mossadeq was extremely concerned about the military +

1) In the elections to the 17th Majlis, Mossadeq was extremely concerned about the military moving in and changing the ballot boxes. Since, in Tehran, the Electoral Commission must at least go through the motions of counting votes, etc., it was important that the proper votes be in the boxes when the time @@ -45920,8 +38739,7 @@ the boxes, Mossadeq’s sentinels sounded the call to prayer. The crowd was then led by professional agitators in a movement which would cause the Army to lose face. Just - before the close of balloting, Mossadeq leaked the rumor that the Tudeh Party was going + before the close of balloting, Mossadeq leaked the rumor that the Tudeh Party was going to attack and burn the ballot boxes. Orders were issued for assembling all ballot boxes at the Ministry of Education for safe keeping. While one truck picked up the legal ballot boxes, another was loaded with @@ -45929,15 +38747,12 @@ Education. The former disappeared. Makki was elected first Deputy of Tehran with 120,000 votes, Kashani was second with - 100,000. The reason for this is that, Mossadeq, although he had no objection to Kashani’s election, did not want him + 100,000. The reason for this is that, Mossadeq, although he had no objection to Kashani’s election, did not want him to be first deputy. Electioneering agents of the National Front were instructed to repeat Makki’s name on the ballots 20,000 times more than Kashani’s. (Every source utilized for this report maintains that Makki could not have gotten - 5,000 votes fairly, while Kashani is generally conceded to have 15,000 votes in + 5,000 votes fairly, while Kashani is generally conceded to have 15,000 votes in the Bazaar.)

2) For a case study in changing ballot boxes, see Attachment A. Although the Shah attempted to elect his candidate from Karaj, the area was under @@ -45946,10 +38761,8 @@ they may play safe and just stuff them. Government employees of various factories and the railroad are granted paid leave for one or more days and ordered to form queues in front of polling places. They are - instructed not to allow “outsiders” to join them. Qavam did this in the election for - the 15th Majlis. He did not want Kashani to be re-elected and so he stuffed the ballot + instructed not to allow “outsiders” to join them. Qavam did this in the election for + the 15th Majlis. He did not want Kashani to be re-elected and so he stuffed the ballot boxes. In addition, the electoral boards were instructed not to stamp the identity cards of voters who voted for the government list. The result was that the 12 deputies of Tehran each got more than 40,000 @@ -45964,23 +38777,18 @@ exercised mostly in frontier regions where the military holds sway, and in regions where the influence of religion is strong—such as in areas inhabited by Sunnites. Examples of the Shah’s influence are:

-

1) In the elections to the 17th Majlis the Shah wanted Mir Ashrafi to be deputy from Meshgin +

1) In the elections to the 17th Majlis the Shah wanted Mir Ashrafi to be deputy from Meshgin Shahi. Mir Ashrafi is a former - Army officer who was expelled from the Army for being too corrupt. During the war he acquired for himself the + Army officer who was expelled from the Army for being too corrupt. During the war he acquired for himself the reputation of being one of the worst crooks in the country. However, Meshgin Shahi is a region inhabited by simple peasants who certainly had - never heard anything of or about Mir Ashrafi. Since the Army controlled the area, the + never heard anything of or about Mir Ashrafi. Since the Army controlled the area, the Intelligence Bureau of the General Staff communicated the royal desire to the Commanding officer at Meshgin Shahi. A few men were instructed to - fill thousands of ballots with the name of Mir Ashrafi and the peasants were ordered + fill thousands of ballots with the name of Mir Ashrafi and the peasants were ordered to cast the ballots into the ballot boxes. It is probable that the majority of “voters” never learned whose name was on the ballots they - cast. The whole thing was done so smoothly that even Mossadeq did not know what was afoot + cast. The whole thing was done so smoothly that even Mossadeq did not know what was afoot until the results were published.

2) In the elections for the 17th Majlis at Mahabad the Shah had the @@ -45989,10 +38797,8 @@ inhabited by Sunnites and the Imam Jomeh is a Shia high priest. Nevertheless, since the Sunni believes that the Sovereign is the supreme spiritual and secular - authority, the Shah’s decision was accepted by the Sunni Imam Jomeh of Kurdistan and - successfully carried out. Mossadeq attempted to stop this operation, but without + authority, the Shah’s decision was accepted by the Sunni Imam Jomeh of Kurdistan and + successfully carried out. Mossadeq attempted to stop this operation, but without success. Thus, from the capital of Kurdistan a non-Kurd, who is a Shia, was elected.

3) For a detailed case study of the elections at Mahabad for the 15th @@ -46002,12 +38808,9 @@

Within this category, the element of foreign intervention often crops up. Examples of this are:

(1) Hossein Farhoodi was elected to the 15th Majlis from Dashti-Meshon in - the Bani Toref region, then controlled by the AIOC. The Shah did not want Farhoodi, Qavam didn’t want him, the military + the Bani Toref region, then controlled by the AIOC. The Shah did not want Farhoodi, Qavam didn’t want him, the military didn’t back him, he had no money with which to bribe anyone, yet all - other candidates withdrew in deference to the AIOC.

+ other candidates withdrew in deference to the AIOC.

(2) When Soviet troops were stationed in Iran during the war, the Russians succeeded in sending eight Tudeh deputies to the Majlis. They were supposed to represent the areas occupied by the Soviets. In order @@ -46032,8 +38835,7 @@ some cases, the government allows the various candidates in a constituency to fight out their battle. This happens when they find themselves confronted with several equally non-objectionable candidates. - Officials of the government accept bribes from all of them and promise each not to interfere with + Officials of the government accept bribes from all of them and promise each not to interfere with his election. In such cases the candidate who spends the most money wins the election. Influence of the land owners is also needed to make certain of victory in these areas. In many cases, the large land owners, @@ -46044,9 +38846,7 @@ never been in the area before his campaign and he was totally unknown in Iran. However, when Kashani joined the National Front, he announced that he wanted Qanatabadi to be - elected to the Majlis. The request was communicated to Mossadeq who was working with Kashani at that time and the + elected to the Majlis. The request was communicated to Mossadeq who was working with Kashani at that time and the necessary instructions were given to the governor, the Chief of Gendarmérie and the Chief of Police of that area. It was the first that the people of Shahrud had ever heard of Qanatabadi.

@@ -46059,8 +38859,7 @@ the Shah for the election of a Majlis favorable to our purposes in Iran. We are initiating election talks with the government on 14 November. We already have a list of declared candidates for the 18th Majlis - (Attachment C), and we are ready to do what we can to assist the [name not declassified] in this matter.

+ (Attachment C), and we are ready to do what we can to assist the [name not declassified] in this matter.

It is imperative, from our point of view, that the Prime Minister and the Shah agree on a list of candidates, thus eliminating harmful conflict between these two elements. [name not @@ -46070,33 +38869,27 @@ avoid recommending but maintaining a role of concurrence. Details of our approach to this will be the subject of a separate dispatch.

- [name not declassified] + [name not declassified] - [name not declassified] + [name not declassified] - [name not declassified] + [name not declassified]
-
- 347. National Intelligence Estimate

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79R01012A, Box 32, +

+ 347. National Intelligence Estimate

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79R01012A, Box 32, Folder 3, (NIE 102) Probable Developments in Iran. Secret. The Intelligence Advisory - Committee concurred in this estimate on November 10. The FBI abstained, the subject being + Committee concurred in this estimate on November 10. The FBI abstained, the subject being outside of its jurisdiction. The following member organizations of the Intelligence Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff. -

-

Paragraphs 1–6 of the estimate are printed in Foreign +

Paragraphs 1–6 of the estimate are printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 836–837 (Document 387).

 @@ -46104,8 +38897,7 @@ NIE–102 - Washington, November 16, 1953. + Washington, November 16, 1953.

PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN THROUGH 1954

The Problem

To estimate probable developments in Iran through 1954.

@@ -46133,8 +38925,7 @@ disorders and recurrent rioting if provided timely political leadership. This capability will continue if, during the period of this estimate: (a) security forces receive adequate financial support; (b) differences - between the Shah and top level leaders over control of the security forces are not seriously + between the Shah and top level leaders over control of the security forces are not seriously aggravated; and (c) strong public opposition to the regime does not develop.

4. Tudeh’s capabilities do not constitute a serious present threat to the @@ -46142,12 +38933,10 @@ control of the country during 1954, even if it combines with other extremist groups. It will retain a capability for acts of sabotage and terrorism.

-

5. Iran will attempt to maintain friendly relations with the USSR, but will almost certainly resist +

5. Iran will attempt to maintain friendly relations with the USSR, but will almost certainly resist any Soviet efforts to increase its influence in Iran’s internal affairs.

-

6. Failure to receive continued financial aid from the US or an acceptable oil settlement will +

6. Failure to receive continued financial aid from the US or an acceptable oil settlement will probably result in a government coming to power which will be less friendly to the US than the present one.

@@ -46157,8 +38946,7 @@

7. The overthrow of the Mossadeq government on 19 August 1953 checked the drift in Iran toward Communism and isolation from the West. The authority of the Shah has been - reasserted, and a moderate government under General Zahedi is in power. This government is + reasserted, and a moderate government under General Zahedi is in power. This government is committed to maintaining the constitutional position of the monarchy and the parliament, suppressing the Communist Tudeh Party, and launching an economic development program predicated on settlement of the oil @@ -46172,8 +38960,7 @@ to respond promptly in support of the government if given timely political leadership.

9. Increasing friction and uncertainty are developing within the Imperial - General Staff because of the Shah’s tendency to by-pass Zahedi on military matters and because + General Staff because of the Shah’s tendency to by-pass Zahedi on military matters and because of mutual efforts of Zahedi and Chief of Staff Batmangelich to undermine each other and place their own men in key positions. Although political maneuvering to this degree is @@ -46190,10 +38977,8 @@ cooperation of die-hard nationalist and extremist groups are successful. Tudeh retains, however, a capability for acts of sabotage and terrorism.

-

11. Outside the security field, the Zahedi government has made little progress. The Majlis - has lacked a quorum since the withdrawal of pro-Mossadeq members in the summer of 1953. +

11. Outside the security field, the Zahedi government has made little progress. The Majlis + has lacked a quorum since the withdrawal of pro-Mossadeq members in the summer of 1953. Hence the government is presently unable to obtain legislation needed to carry out its announced program. Moreover, the regime has reached no firm decision on how and when to reconstitute a functioning legislature. @@ -46203,29 +38988,22 @@ uncertain how to insure the election of a manageable Majlis, and have not yet definitely scheduled the holding of elections.

12. Meanwhile, the government has done little to strengthen its political - position in preparation for new elections. Zahedi has enlisted few if any real allies among the - politicians formerly associated in opposition to Mossadeq. The present cabinet is + position in preparation for new elections. Zahedi has enlisted few if any real allies among the + politicians formerly associated in opposition to Mossadeq. The present cabinet is dominated by members of the old ruling class, many of whom have little genuine sympathy for reform, command little political support, or are - suspect because of former identification with the British. Zahedi himself has had little success + suspect because of former identification with the British. Zahedi himself has had little success in convincing the public that he will not compromise the basic objectives of the National Front, especially with respect to oil - nationalization. Finally, the strength and standing of the Zahedi government is being impaired by + nationalization. Finally, the strength and standing of the Zahedi government is being impaired by friction between Zahedi and the Shah.

13. These developments have hastened the breakup of the loose array of - politicians aligned against Mossadeq and have encouraged an early revival of + politicians aligned against Mossadeq and have encouraged an early revival of factionalism and intrigue. Public criticism of the government and - preliminary maneuvering to undermine Zahedi are already beginning to emerge. Nationalist and + preliminary maneuvering to undermine Zahedi are already beginning to emerge. Nationalist and extremist elements are most active in these respects. However, National - Front leaders who supported Mossadeq until the end are still publicly discredited, + Front leaders who supported Mossadeq until the end are still publicly discredited, and open opposition to the government in other quarters is not united. The government’s strained relations with the Qashqai tribes, which have been traditionally hostile to the present dynasty and were closely @@ -46233,17 +39011,14 @@ under present circumstances an irritant rather than a major threat.

Economic

14. The Zahedi government faces - serious budgetary and monetary problems. Mossadeq’s oil policy resulted in reduction of public + serious budgetary and monetary problems. Mossadeq’s oil policy resulted in reduction of public revenues by about a third, and he was able to meet government operating expenses and keep the oil workers paid only by curtailing the development program, reducing the level of imports, depleting the government’s financial reserves, and - illegally expanding the currency. Zahedi has thus been left with a depleted treasury and a + illegally expanding the currency. Zahedi has thus been left with a depleted treasury and a sizeable operating deficit. The emergency grant of $45 million extended - by the US soon after Zahedi took office will enable him to + by the US soon after Zahedi took office will enable him to meet current operating expenses until about February or March of 1954, provided that the government takes effective steps to cope with its conversion problem.

@@ -46269,8 +39044,7 @@ considers Mossadeq’s attitude toward oil negotiations to have been arbitrary and unrealistic, and has already made some halting efforts to prepare Iranian public opinion for - a settlement which might involve some retreat from Mossadeq’s demands. The obstacles to + a settlement which might involve some retreat from Mossadeq’s demands. The obstacles to solution of the oil problem nevertheless remain great, mainly because the Iranians hope for greater control over oil operations and higher financial returns than are likely to be acceptable to the international @@ -46278,30 +39052,23 @@

Foreign Affairs

17. The Shah and Zahedi are cooperating with the US and have - indicated their desire to improve relations with the UK. Although the new government has signed + indicated their desire to improve relations with the UK. Although the new government has signed the barter agreement with the USSR - which was under negotiation at the time of Mossadeq’s downfall, it has at least for the present + which was under negotiation at the time of Mossadeq’s downfall, it has at least for the present discontinued Mossadeq’s policy of attempting to play the USSR off against the West.

-

18. The government’s interest in cooperating with the US and its receptiveness to US advice are due in large measure to its - current dependence on US financial aid, and probably also to a +

18. The government’s interest in cooperating with the US and its receptiveness to US advice are due in large measure to its + current dependence on US financial aid, and probably also to a belief that Communism is the overriding threat to Iran’s independence. - The government’s good standing with the US, as demonstrated by its receipt of emergency budgetary + The government’s good standing with the US, as demonstrated by its receipt of emergency budgetary aid, is at present one of its main political assets within Iran. Anti-US agitation has died down except for spasmodic efforts on the part of Tudeh.

19. The new government is conscious of the need for British agreement in the revival of Iran’s oil industry. However, basic suspicions of British intentions remain widespread. The government is still reluctant to - resume formal diplomatic relations with the UK before there is tangible progress toward an oil + resume formal diplomatic relations with the UK before there is tangible progress toward an oil settlement.

II. Probable Developments

@@ -46323,18 +39090,15 @@ Party collaboration, to gain power.

Economic

22. The Shah and the Zahedi regime - are likely to be more reasonable than Mossadeq in their approach to the oil problem, but an + are likely to be more reasonable than Mossadeq in their approach to the oil problem, but an early and satisfactory solution is not likely. The following generalizations can be made:

a. The oil issue is still politically explosive in - Iran and will be an issue in the electoral campaign. The Zahedi regime will probably not wish to + Iran and will be an issue in the electoral campaign. The Zahedi regime will probably not wish to reach a formal oil agreement with the British before the completion of the elections, which usually take several months. In any case no Iranian regime could survive if it appeared to be compromising the provisions of - the oil nationalization law or retreating far from Mossadeq’s basic demands. Once a Majlis + the oil nationalization law or retreating far from Mossadeq’s basic demands. Once a Majlis is reconstituted, it can probably be brought to ratify an agreement which does not appreciably violate these conditions, but only after vigorous political pressure and public propaganda by the government.

@@ -46348,12 +39112,10 @@ will not reap sizeable financial benefits at once, unless through some form of advance against future oil deliveries.

23. It therefore appears that sometime during 1954 Iran will encounter - difficulties in meeting its budgetary expenses. After the present US emergency grant is exhausted, the + difficulties in meeting its budgetary expenses. After the present US emergency grant is exhausted, the Iranian Government will either require additional outside financial assistance or will be forced to seek Majlis authorization for a - resumption of deficit financing of the sort that Mossadeq engaged in illegally. The + resumption of deficit financing of the sort that Mossadeq engaged in illegally. The Majlis would probably grant such authorization, but with great reluctance, and only if there appeared to be no hope of timely outside aid. Moreover, this course would in the long run probably result in a @@ -46371,8 +39133,7 @@ immediate challenge, the chances that his government will survive through 1954 are not good. Basic conflicts continue within and between the traditional governing groups, who are eager to regain the position - of privilege they held before Mossadeq, and the urban middle and lower classes, who + of privilege they held before Mossadeq, and the urban middle and lower classes, who are demanding economic and social reforms and greater participation in government. These conflicts could flare out into the open at any time, particularly during proposed elections or over such issues as the @@ -46380,16 +39141,14 @@ oil dispute.

25. Mossadeq remains a problem for the regime. So long as he remains alive, he will be a potential leader - for extremist opposition to the regime. On the other hand, if Mossadeq were executed in the near + for extremist opposition to the regime. On the other hand, if Mossadeq were executed in the near future the resultant disturbances would be serious but could probably be suppressed.

26. The necessity of reconstituting the Majlis poses a serious problem for the Zahedi government. The new regime is firmly committed to a return to parliamentary government and appears unwilling to face the consequences of deliberately - postponing elections. It is likely that elections will be held within the period of + postponing elections. It is likely that elections will be held within the period of this estimate. However, political instability is likely to be increased by the electoral campaign and by the nature of the Majlis likely to be elected. Once the electoral campaign begins, political groups now @@ -46399,8 +39158,7 @@

27. The new Majlis will almost certainly be a heterogeneous body including representatives of the traditional governing groups, tribal leaders, former Mossadeq - supporters, and ardent nationalists like Mullah Kashani and Mozafar Baghai. Many members will be + supporters, and ardent nationalists like Mullah Kashani and Mozafar Baghai. Many members will be little interested in stable government or will be basically unsympathetic to the government’s reform program. Others will suspect Zahedi of too close @@ -46423,14 +39181,11 @@ key government posts, and his by-passing of Zahedi in exercising his command of the armed forces might at any time lead to a situation in which Zahedi would become - ineffective. If strong opposition to Zahedi develops in the Majlis, the Shah will probably + ineffective. If strong opposition to Zahedi develops in the Majlis, the Shah will probably jettison Zahedi and appoint a new cabinet, thus in effect returning to the chronic governmental - ineffectiveness and instability of the pre-Mossadeq era.

-

29. The Shah would probably be successful in replacing the Zahedi government with another + ineffectiveness and instability of the pre-Mossadeq era.

+

29. The Shah would probably be successful in replacing the Zahedi government with another relatively moderate one. However, if foreign aid is substantially reduced and there is no oil settlement or reasonable prospect of one, moderate governments would encounter greater popular opposition. The @@ -46453,24 +39208,19 @@ major deterrent to Tudeh assumption of power, will be weakened if there is a marked increase in popular support for Tudeh.

Foreign Affairs

-

31. The hope of obtaining continued and increasing US aid, both in restoring oil revenues and +

31. The hope of obtaining continued and increasing US aid, both in restoring oil revenues and in providing funds in their absence, makes it almost certain that the - Shah and his governments will continue to cooperate with the US. A sharp curtailment in US aid to Iran would not only make Iran + Shah and his governments will continue to cooperate with the US. A sharp curtailment in US aid to Iran would not only make Iran less receptive to US advice and influence, but would significantly reduce public confidence in the government’s ability to improve social and economic conditions and maintain internal security. There will also be increasing pressure, - particularly from the Shah, for an expansion of US military aid. Even if the Shah should be offered + particularly from the Shah, for an expansion of US military aid. Even if the Shah should be offered considerable inducement in the form of military aid, he would not agree to join with the US in formal arrangements for defense of the Middle East, since such a commitment would be strongly opposed by many Iranians, would not obtain Majlis - approval, and might, in his mind, provoke the USSR into invoking the 1921 Treaty.

+ approval, and might, in his mind, provoke the USSR into invoking the 1921 Treaty.

32. Iranian relations with the UK will largely depend on progress in settling the oil dispute. Settlement of the dispute would almost certainly result in some gradual revival of @@ -46481,20 +39231,15 @@ efforts to increase its influence in Iran’s internal affairs.

-
- 348. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 348. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/11–1953. Secret; Security Information. Repeated to London and pouched to Meshed, Tabriz, and Isfahan. Received at 1:17 p.m. The - telegram is printed with redactions in Foreign + telegram is printed with redactions in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 840–842 (Document 389). - Tehran, November 19, 1953, 1 p.m. + Tehran, November 19, 1953, 1 p.m.

1141. Embassy has sought below to give its general appraisal of Iranian situation at present and to project this estimate into 1954. This survey has been concurred in by CAS and Armed Services attachés.

@@ -46504,18 +39249,14 @@ undermined and if he at same time allows government to proceed with effective measures designed to quell that opposition. Nationalist political forces remain disrupted and no popularly recognized - Nationalist political leader other than Mosadeq seems available, and he in jail. Armed Services + Nationalist political leader other than Mosadeq seems available, and he in jail. Armed Services have for many years been decisive political instrument in country - although this fact obscured under Mosadeq regime because of Shah’s unwillingness employ + although this fact obscured under Mosadeq regime because of Shah’s unwillingness employ them contrary to Mosadeq’s - wishes. Constitutional issue which divided Mosadeq and Shah resolved in favor latter, because + wishes. Constitutional issue which divided Mosadeq and Shah resolved in favor latter, because former was not able maintain control over armed forces.

2. Zahedi attempting abide by - constitution without full powers Dr. Mosadeq possessed although confronted with serious + constitution without full powers Dr. Mosadeq possessed although confronted with serious conditions as aftermath Mosadeq rule. In view of his constitutional and legal shackles from which he apparently not willing free himself by extra legal actions, his regime @@ -46526,12 +39267,10 @@ getting its share which will be related to its future effectiveness.

3. Prime internal political problem clearly continued good relations between Shah and Prime Minister. Shah may be expected, in traditional - Persian manner, not to place complete trust in Zahedi or to back him unqualifiedly. + Persian manner, not to place complete trust in Zahedi or to back him unqualifiedly. Current Mosadeq trial having some adverse public effect upon government and being handled under authority - Shah. On other hand, Shah and Zahedi agree that because disruptions parliamentary + Shah. On other hand, Shah and Zahedi agree that because disruptions parliamentary development under Mosadeq next Majlis elections should be fully controlled and slate candidates mutually agreed upon. Both affirm new deputies should come from areas @@ -46543,8 +39282,7 @@ aside from possible intrigues of Qashqais, may not be considered as of decisive significance. Worker agitation for better wages and problem unemployment may have to be met partially by government. Activities of - merchant class, particularly those benefiting from Mosadeq’s previous inflationary + merchant class, particularly those benefiting from Mosadeq’s previous inflationary policies, will have to be channeled in direction of recognition benefits to be derived from improved economic conditions flowing from an oil agreement. Familiar problem will remain of educated Iranians frustrated @@ -46558,8 +39296,7 @@ regime, no matter how authoritarian, can survive. Public sentiment may be mobilized in behalf oil agreement or at least neutralized if it considers such arrangement protects Iranian rights. Although this broad - concept, it will be necessary for Zahedi regime to publicize fully it has safeguarded + concept, it will be necessary for Zahedi regime to publicize fully it has safeguarded Iran’s interests in making settlement. Tudeh Party has been seriously scotched by strong government actions taken but its essential leadership and organization intact. In event no oil settlement or foreign financial @@ -46573,32 +39310,25 @@ offers best available means to achieve an oil settlement which under present volatile Iranian conditions could have likeliest prospect of durability.

-

As well, it believed that Shah recognizes Zahedi in better position to reach oil agreement than - any potential Prime Minister now that Mosadeq can no longer be considered. However, Shah might +

As well, it believed that Shah recognizes Zahedi in better position to reach oil agreement than + any potential Prime Minister now that Mosadeq can no longer be considered. However, Shah might at some stage wish replace Zahedi by another also opposed to extreme Nationalists. Abrupt dismissal of Zahedi would be likely strengthen forces opposed to an oil settlement as could undermine any - oil arrangement already made. Questions whether Zahedi is to remain in power and + oil arrangement already made. Questions whether Zahedi is to remain in power and whether Shah permits him sufficient leeway for constructive action may be answered in part by ability United States and United Kingdom fully to cooperate in Iran.

- Henderson + Henderson
-
+
349. Memorandum From the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans (Roosevelt) - to Director of Central Intelligence DullesSource: + to Director of Central Intelligence DullesSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, Iran 1951–1953. Secret; Security Information. The memorandum is attached to a covering @@ -46611,32 +39341,26 @@ establishment (particularly the Army), the fact that not all is serene in Iran and that further significant action is required to solidify and exploit the advantages which were gained in August. - (Actually, the recommendations of the Embassy and the US Military Mission in Teheran go well + (Actually, the recommendations of the Embassy and the US Military Mission in Teheran go well beyond what we were inclined to recommend at the end of last month.)” Wisner then requested Dulles to allow - him to communicate the views expressed in Roosevelt’s memorandum to the + him to communicate the views expressed in Roosevelt’s memorandum to the NSC Planning Board. To the left of this request, Dulles wrote “OK” by hand. - Washington, November 20, 1953. + Washington, November 20, 1953. SUBJECT Position Paper/Re: Recommendation Submitted by Ambassador - Henderson that NSC 136/1Document 147. be Amended + Henderson that NSC 136/1Document 147. be Amended With Regard to U.S. Policy Toward the Iranian Armed Forces REFERENCES (1) American Embassy Tehran Cables No. 1102 and 1103 of 14 November 1953In telegram 1102 from - Tehran, November 14, Henderson reported on several recent + Tehran, November 14, Henderson reported on several recent conversations he had with the Shah on the future of the Iranian army. The Shah had made clear his view that the Iranian army should do more than just maintain internal security. Rather, it @@ -46651,31 +39375,25 @@ have to consider entering into defense agreements with other countries. The Shah responded positively to the suggestion that the MAAG program be expanded, - but he expressed reservations regarding Henderson’s suggestion that + but he expressed reservations regarding Henderson’s suggestion that Iran consider defense agreements with neighboring countries on the grounds that such arrangements might give the Soviet Union reason to invoke the 1921 Soviet-Iranian treaty. For the text of - telegram 1102, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, + telegram 1102, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 831–834 (Document 385). Telegram 1103 was not found. - (2) Memorandum to the Director from NEA Division dated 29 October, entitled “Certain + (2) Memorandum to the Director from NEA Division dated 29 October, entitled “Certain Aspects of the Present Situation in Iran Which Appear to Require Further Attention By the U.S. Government; The Significance and Value - of an Appropriate Program of Military Assistance”Document + of an Appropriate Program of Military Assistance”Document 339.

1. Policy Recommendation Under Consideration:

-

In paragraph 1 of Embassy cable No. 1103 Ambassador Henderson made the following policy +

In paragraph 1 of Embassy cable No. 1103 Ambassador Henderson made the following policy recommendations:

-

a) That the following sentence be added to paragraph 4 (E) (of NSC 136/1):

+

a) That the following sentence be added to paragraph 4 (E) (of NSC 136/1):

“In this connection in order to strengthen the will and ability of the government and people of Iran to suppress internal Communist activities and to resist external Communist pressure, the U.S. will accede to the @@ -46704,16 +39422,14 @@ well as the ability and financial wherewithal to do so. U.S. policy, tactical decisions, and operations in Iran should be formulated to insure this state of affairs.

-

Compatible with these immediate and longer range U.S. aims, the NEA Division believes that an expanded and +

Compatible with these immediate and longer range U.S. aims, the NEA Division believes that an expanded and re-oriented military aid and advisory program would:

a) Immediately and on a long term basis increase the prestige, influence and actual power of the Shah, who we consider to be the most effective instrument for maintaining and strengthening Iran’s orientation toward the West, and resisting pressures from within or without by international Communism.

-

b) Immediately increase the strength and confidence of the Zahedi government which would further +

b) Immediately increase the strength and confidence of the Zahedi government which would further encourage this government to reach an oil settlement in the face of opposition influences within Iran.

c) Contribute to building the Iranian Army into a force under the @@ -46749,43 +39465,31 @@ who reject alliance with either East or West, and tribal elements which traditionally oppose central authority and the Army. Such opposition is not, however, considered of serious proportion.

-

3. Recommended CIA Position:

+

3. Recommended CIA Position:

When Ambassador Henderson’s - proposals per paragraph 1 above come before the NSC, it is recommended that you support them and that you - concur in the reasoning put forth by Ambassador Henderson in reference Embassy cables + proposals per paragraph 1 above come before the NSC, it is recommended that you support them and that you + concur in the reasoning put forth by Ambassador Henderson in reference Embassy cables No. 1102 and 1103.

- Kermit - Roosevelt[name not declassified] signed for + Kermit + Roosevelt[name not declassified] signed for Roosevelt above Roosevelt’s typed signature.
-
- 350. Letter From the First Secretary of Embassy in Iran (Melbourne) to the Officer in Charge of +
+ 350. Letter From the First Secretary of Embassy in Iran (Melbourne) to the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau - of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (Stutesman)Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, + of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (Stutesman)Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/11–3053. Top Secret; Security Information. - Tehran, November 30, 1953. + Tehran, November 30, 1953. Dear John:

The ideas that you clearly expressed in your letter of November 6 have, - as you may imagine, been upon our minds as well.Document 345. It + as you may imagine, been upon our minds as well.Document 345. It is indeed a knotty question as to how far our responsibility goes in Iranian internal affairs and the extent to which we should interfere in them. While it is true we have become involved in Iranian internal @@ -46802,8 +39506,7 @@ could not expect to understand the full ramifications of such appointments and the pressures upon a Prime Minister inducing him to make them. However, if we felt required to do so, we could point out to - a Prime Minister (and that only so long as our Military, FOA and other aid are being received) that + a Prime Minister (and that only so long as our Military, FOA and other aid are being received) that he needed some men of stature and experience to give tone and capacity to his Cabinet, which under particular circumstances it might not have. The important thing seems to us to be that with the leverage we have @@ -46813,13 +39516,11 @@ indirect the direction, within state institutions and outside, is bound to be discovered and consequently suspected. Roger, for example, can give you the details as to the difficulties we ran into with the Shah - through our support of the Workers’ Party and then of Maleki’s Third Force because they were + through our support of the Workers’ Party and then of Maleki’s Third Force because they were publicly anti-communist. It became known to the Shah that we were giving the support, even at a time when these organizations were critical of him. This served to encourage - his suspicions that the United States was supporting Mosadeq as against him, thus + his suspicions that the United States was supporting Mosadeq as against him, thus reenforcing his innate irresolution. This is an example of how one of our worthy objectives may help stymie another. There is also a potential future complication in that Baqai @@ -46866,8 +39567,7 @@

4. Potential Opposition. Penetration of communist and extremist groups, of course, is extremely important for covert intelligence. At the same time - to sponsor a potential opposition to Zahedi we think would be a serious error. It would + to sponsor a potential opposition to Zahedi we think would be a serious error. It would become eventually known, would encourage the Shah to intrigue against the Prime Minister, and would paralyze the latter’s actions as well through becoming known to him. By keeping on the best of terms with all @@ -46880,65 +39580,51 @@

5. Tribes. We should, of course, maintain relations with the tribes, but we think here those relations should not be at the expense of disrupting our essential objectives in Iran.

-

FOA, through the TCI program for example, is being +

FOA, through the TCI program for example, is being adequately employed now in building up through actual performance a powerful weapon in influencing Iranians simply by continuing to do a good job. The TCI people are well acquainted with people and attitudes in their respective regions, and are making friends for the United States. As sources of information they - can continue to be tapped, but we honestly do not believe TCI can contribute anything in the + can continue to be tapped, but we honestly do not believe TCI can contribute anything in the provinces beyond what it is actually doing in behalf of American - policies. The intelligent use of our TCI programs and of FOA + policies. The intelligent use of our TCI programs and of FOA economic aid can be further integrated into our political objectives, - and I think this can be done through continued Embassy–FOA liaison in operations and + and I think this can be done through continued Embassy–FOA liaison in operations and planning.

Both the Ambassador and Bill Rountree have seen and approve this letter.

All the best.

Sincerely,

- Roy M. - MelbourneMelbourne signed “Roy” above + Roy M. + MelbourneMelbourne signed “Roy” above his typed signature.
-
+
351. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to - Secretary of State DullesSource: National Archives, RG 59, + Secretary of State DullesSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 888.2222/12–153. Top Secret; Security Information. - Washington, December 1, 1953. + Washington, December 1, 1953.

Before Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr., left for London we conferred with regard to the question of “assurances” given by the British prior to the undertaking of the recent operation in Iran which resulted in the change of government. He suggested that this - information might be useful to you as background for Bermuda.A reference to the Bermuda conference of December + information might be useful to you as background for Bermuda.A reference to the Bermuda conference of December 4–8, held among the United States, United Kingdom, and France. For - documentation on the Bermuda conference, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. V, Western European - Security, Part 2, pp. 1710–1848 (Documents 318–364).

+ documentation on the Bermuda conference, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. V, Western European + Security, Part 2, pp. 1710–1848 (Documents 318–364).

Accordingly Mr. Roosevelt has prepared, and I enclose, a brief memorandum giving the information on - this subject including Roosevelt’s talks with high British officials.

+ this subject including Roosevelt’s talks with high British officials.

You will probably have in the State Department further information on this subject since I understand that there were conversations with the British Ambassador and possibly cables with London.

- Allen W. Dulles + Allen W. Dulles @@ -46946,12 +39632,9 @@ Memorandum From the Chief of the Near East and - Africa Division, Directorate of Plans (Roosevelt) to Director of - Central Intelligence Dulles - Washington, November 27, 1953. + Africa Division, Directorate of Plans (Roosevelt) to Director of + Central Intelligence Dulles + Washington, November 27, 1953. SUBJECT Information Bearing on Current Discussions with the British @@ -46960,8 +39643,7 @@

1. On 26 November, Herbert Hoover, Jr., telephoned me to discuss the various aspects of the talks he is holding with the British on a proposed - oil settlement with Iran.See Document 331. As a result of our + oil settlement with Iran.See Document 331. As a result of our conversation he asked that I pass on to you his strong recommendation that a report on my own meetings with Prime Minister Churchill and Acting @@ -46976,8 +39658,7 @@ oil settlement with the new Persian Government, and that H.M.G. understood well that such a settlement would have to be very carefully drawn up with an eye to giving as much support as possible - to the prestige of any Persian Government agreeing to it.Reference is to the paper British Ambassador + to the prestige of any Persian Government agreeing to it.Reference is to the paper British Ambassador Sir Roger Makins gave to Under Secretary Smith, dated July 23; see Document @@ -47005,8 +39686,7 @@ Government should be done. There was some discussion as to whether it would be more convenient if diplomatic relations should be restored between Iran and Great Britain prior to discussion of an - oil settlement, but Sir Winston indicated that he did not think this was an + oil settlement, but Sir Winston indicated that he did not think this was an important issue. He said further that he would be perfectly prepared to give a certain amount of economic aid to the new Iranian Government even before the reestablishment of diplomatic relations. @@ -47022,16 +39702,13 @@ feeling that it would be useful at this time to remind the Secretary and the President of these British expressions and commitments.

- Kermit - Roosevelt + Kermit + Roosevelt
-
- 352. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 352. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/12–1553. Secret; Security Information. The despatch was drafted by Melbourne. There @@ -47042,13 +39719,11 @@ No. 331 - Tehran, December + Tehran, December 15, 1953. REF - Embassy Despatch 245 of October 30, 1953Document + Embassy Despatch 245 of October 30, 1953Document 341. @@ -47057,23 +39732,21 @@ Baqai

There is enclosed for the Department’s information a memorandum of - conversation of another conversation which I had recently with Dr. Mozafar Baqai who has been the + conversation of another conversation which I had recently with Dr. Mozafar Baqai who has been the leading open critic of the Zahedi Government. While, as in the previous instance, the memorandum of conversation is self-explanatory, my purposes in attending this recent meeting were to learn Dr. Baqai’s - current points of view towards the Zahedi Government, the United States, the Iranian + current points of view towards the Zahedi Government, the United States, the Iranian resumption of relations with Great Britain, and upon the oil question. Similarly, I wished to express to him clearly the policies and points of view of the United States.

- - Loy W. + + Loy W. Henderson - - Ambassador - + + Ambassador + @@ -47082,12 +39755,10 @@ Memorandum of Conversation - Tehran, December 4, 1953. + Tehran, December 4, 1953. PARTICIPANTS - Ambassador Henderson + Ambassador Henderson Mr. Roy M. Melbourne, First Secretary of Embassy Dr. Baqai, Leader of @@ -47099,8 +39770,7 @@ Third Secretary of Embassy

At the request of Dr. Baqai, - leader of the Workers’ Party, Ambassador Henderson received him on the + leader of the Workers’ Party, Ambassador Henderson received him on the evening of December 4, 1953. The conversation was carried on in French, which the Doctor speaks quite fluently, and lasted three hours.

@@ -47112,35 +39782,28 @@ However, the more he and his collaborators studied the problem, the more they became convinced that the real problem lay in the psychology of despair which grips the people. Iranians have lost - hope for the future. This, according to Dr. Baqai, is the real issue and it is + hope for the future. This, according to Dr. Baqai, is the real issue and it is to combat this mentality and attitude that he organized his party. He feels he has been partially successful in accomplishing this end. While previously all those who were actively discontented with things as they were joined the Tudeh party, more and more have come to join his. Thus, his party has acted as a screen against the Tudeh.

-

His position towards Communism and towards Dr. Mosadeq, he continued, is well +

His position towards Communism and towards Dr. Mosadeq, he continued, is well enough known, so that he need not amplify on the subject. However, - he considers that the manner in which the trial of Mosadeq has been handled by the + he considers that the manner in which the trial of Mosadeq has been handled by the military court, the press, and the radio is a grave error. No - difference is made between the two periods of Mosadeq’s regime, between the first + difference is made between the two periods of Mosadeq’s regime, between the first fifteen months which lasted until July 1952 (the event surrounding the abortive Ghavam Government) and the second period, which lasted - until August 19, 1953. In the first period, Dr. Baqai considers that Dr. Mosadeq accurately reflected the + until August 19, 1953. In the first period, Dr. Baqai considers that Dr. Mosadeq accurately reflected the national will or movement; he was a symbol of national resurgence. But after July 1952 he became entangled with the communists and in the last few days of his regime finished by committing treason. His connection with the communists, Dr. Baqai knows for a fact, because, through reliable informants within the Tudeh, - he received, in August 1952, a report of the meeting Mosadeq held with four of the + he received, in August 1952, a report of the meeting Mosadeq held with four of the principal Tudeh leaders. This meeting was alleged to have taken place on July 20, 1952. At this meeting, the Tudeh leaders told Mosadeq that he now had @@ -47156,13 +39819,11 @@ considers that Mosadeq has had an understanding with the communists.

In August 1952, after he had received the report of the meeting, Dr. - Baqai called on Mosadeq and argued with him at + Baqai called on Mosadeq and argued with him at length about the dangers of both the British and the Communists. Both, he told Mosadeq, preyed on the weakness of Iran and therefore sought to perpetuate this - weakness. If the British were to be expelled, he advised Mosadeq, all Britishers should + weakness. If the British were to be expelled, he advised Mosadeq, all Britishers should leave, not just those who carried British passports, but also all their agents, even those who were Iranian nationals. Otherwise, argued Baqai, the breaking of @@ -47176,8 +39837,7 @@ newspaper on this subject, that if relations are reestablished without some previous tangible evidence from the British that they mean to change their attitude towards Iran, then this - reestablishment, taken together with the condemnation of Mosadeq’s whole regime, will be + reestablishment, taken together with the condemnation of Mosadeq’s whole regime, will be interpreted in the popular mind as a condemnation of the national movement. To Iranians, it will simply mean that British colonial policy is reaping its revenge. The consequences of such a @@ -47190,30 +39850,26 @@ previously been paid for, or other similar minor concessions?

The Ambassador answered that the British Government had taken the position that diplomatic relations must be reestablished before any - conversations on the oil problem can be held. That Government believes that only direct + conversations on the oil problem can be held. That Government believes that only direct negotiations can adequately settle the problem and such negotiations can only be undertaken after diplomatic relations are established. Furthermore, the British Government insists on separating the establishment of diplomatic relations from the differences which arise between governments. At the same time, the Ambassador - continued, he was afraid he differed on one point with Dr. Baqai as he understood his + continued, he was afraid he differed on one point with Dr. Baqai as he understood his position. Dr. Baqai, he thought, believed that the Iranian economy could run without oil revenues. The Ambassador, on the contrary, considered that oil was essential to the Iranian economy and that, without the production and sale of oil, he could see no hope for the economy and therefore - the country. He appreciated the difficulties which Dr. Baqai outlined regarding the + the country. He appreciated the difficulties which Dr. Baqai outlined regarding the resumption of diplomatic relations, but he could see no alternative. The British Government had taken a firm position and if the Iranian Government took an equally intransigent position, then he could only foresee the country drifting hopelessly towards bankruptcy. Therefore, for the good of this country, he considered the alternative of resuming relations as the better.

-

To the above argument, Dr. Baqai made two points. First, since he foresaw the +

To the above argument, Dr. Baqai made two points. First, since he foresaw the possibility for Iran of remaining a number of years without oil revenues, he thought that, for morale purposes, it was better to encourage the people to make them believe that doing without oil was @@ -47221,8 +39877,7 @@ solely for reasons of morale. He himself knows very well the importance of oil to Iran and knows that, if the country is to develop as an independent nation, it must obtain the benefits of its - oil resources. Secondly, Baqai did not see why it was not possible for the + oil resources. Secondly, Baqai did not see why it was not possible for the British to separate the question of compensation from that of the sale of oil. He admitted that the problem of compensation would have to be examined by direct negotiations, but he failed to see why, as @@ -47261,15 +39916,12 @@ that it would recognize the Iranian nationalization law on certain conditions. Previously, on two occasions at least—once following the Harriman mission, and - another which he described as the “Middleton letter,”—the British had formally declared + another which he described as the “Middleton letter,”—the British had formally declared that they recognized the nationalization law and placed no - conditions on this recognition. Now, Eden’s statement was a definite reversal of policy + conditions on this recognition. Now, Eden’s statement was a definite reversal of policy and this action inspired serious doubts as to the British professions of good faith.

-

The Ambassador disagreed with Baqai’s interpretation of the former British +

The Ambassador disagreed with Baqai’s interpretation of the former British position and pointed out that the British position was that they had accepted nationalization only “in principle”, that they had always qualified their recognition with certain reservations.

@@ -47284,8 +39936,7 @@ General Zahedi would have to call for new elections to the Majlis and to ensure a strong majority for the Government. He would be impelled to control these elections. - And, Baqai added, Zahedi is already half a mind to do + And, Baqai added, Zahedi is already half a mind to do just this now and is being urged to do so by his advisers. Such a maneuver would increase the general discontent, leading in turn to a strengthening of the Tudeh Party and a dangerous increase in @@ -47308,11 +39959,9 @@

4. His view that Dr. Mosadeq’s first government was truly representative of the popular will and that he only failed the people in his second government by allying - himself with the Tudeh. His conclusion that condemning Mosadeq indiscriminately undermines + himself with the Tudeh. His conclusion that condemning Mosadeq indiscriminately undermines public confidence.

-

5. His flat statement that Dr. Mosadeq had had a meeting with Tudeh leaders on July +

5. His flat statement that Dr. Mosadeq had had a meeting with Tudeh leaders on July 20, 1952 and had reacted favorably to the idea of creating a Republic.

6. His continued opposition to resumption of relations with Great @@ -47321,36 +39970,26 @@ will in the oil sphere.
-
- 353. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/12–2853. Secret. +
+ 353. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/12–2853. Secret. Drafted by Henderson. Transmitted to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 368 from Tehran, December 28. - Tehran, December + Tehran, December 22, 1953.

Memorandum Summarizing Conversation Between the Shah of Iran and Loy W. Henderson, American Ambassador, on the Afternoon of December 22, 1953

-

During a conversation which I had several days ago with Mr. Ala, Minister of Court, I remarked that +

During a conversation which I had several days ago with Mr. Ala, Minister of Court, I remarked that it had been two weeks since I had seen the Shah and it might be useful - for me to have another audience with him. Mr. Ala telephoned the following day + for me to have another audience with him. Mr. Ala telephoned the following day setting an appointment for the evening of December 22.

-

Mosadeq–Riahi +

Mosadeq–Riahi trial

-

The Shah opened our conversation by referring to the trial of Mosadeq which had terminated on the +

The Shah opened our conversation by referring to the trial of Mosadeq which had terminated on the preceding day. His Majesty said he was pleased that the sentence had - been limited to three years in solitary confinement. He thought that if the sentence had + been limited to three years in solitary confinement. He thought that if the sentence had been for a longer term there might have been considerable public sympathy for Mosadeq. On the other hand if the sentence had not called for “solitary” confinement he @@ -47359,12 +39998,10 @@ to receive him and prevent him from engaging in political activities against Iran. In Iran a sentence to simple imprisonment—not solitary confinement—is considered to be just as mild as banishment, and - therefore not subject to commutation to banishment. If Mosadeq should subsequently show the + therefore not subject to commutation to banishment. If Mosadeq should subsequently show the right attitude it was the intention of the Shah to commute the sentence to banishment.

-

The Shah said he was also pleased with the sentence of General Riahi. He thought that General +

The Shah said he was also pleased with the sentence of General Riahi. He thought that General Riahi had behaved in a dignified, manly, and constructive way during the trial and therefore should not be punished too severely. The General was now being expelled @@ -47372,12 +40009,10 @@ reinstated.

The Shah asked me if I had read the statement which he had sent to the trial judge on the eve of the termination of the trial. In this - statement he had indicated that in his opinion Mosadeq had served the interests of + statement he had indicated that in his opinion Mosadeq had served the interests of Iran by nationalizing oil and in fact during the first year of his Prime Ministership had had the support of the Shah himself and that therefore - the Shah held no personal grievance against Mosadeq for what the latter had done during the last + the Shah held no personal grievance against Mosadeq for what the latter had done during the last part of his Prime Ministership. The Shah said that he had sent this message to the President of the Court for two reasons:

a. He wanted to make it clear that he favored and still favored the @@ -47386,26 +40021,21 @@ them. He considered that a certain amount of nationalism was necessary for Iran and that it should develop under his leadership.

b. When it became apparent that the arrival of the British would almost - coincide with the sentencing of Mosadeq it seemed important that he should make it clear - to all Iranians that he was still supporting Mosadeq’s attitude towards the British during the first + coincide with the sentencing of Mosadeq it seemed important that he should make it clear + to all Iranians that he was still supporting Mosadeq’s attitude towards the British during the first year that Mosadeq was Prime Minister. He thought this was necessary in order to weaken propaganda which the enemies of himself and of the Government would be sure to - disseminate to the effect that the sentencing of Mosadeq to prison at the time of the + disseminate to the effect that the sentencing of Mosadeq to prison at the time of the arrival of the British in Iran showed how completely the present regime of Iran was under the British thumb. The Shah said he was well pleased with the results of his intervention in the trial. He had caught Mosadeq off balance and had - for the time being disarmed Mosadeq’s adherents.

+ for the time being disarmed Mosadeq’s adherents.

The Dissolution of the Senate and the Majlis and the Call for New Elections

I told the Shah that I was glad that finally the firman had been issued - dissolving the Majlis and calling for new elections. I was particularly pleased that apparently + dissolving the Majlis and calling for new elections. I was particularly pleased that apparently there had been no important hostile public reaction to this firman. The decision of the Shah and of the Government seemed to have been taken by the public as a matter of course.

@@ -47416,8 +40046,7 @@ the Senate would have a quorum when in due course the vacancies provided by law had been filled there was no reason to dissolve it. He had considered it necessary to dissolve the Senate for two reasons: (a) He - himself had signed a firman under pressure from Mosadeq and the Majlis in 1952 + himself had signed a firman under pressure from Mosadeq and the Majlis in 1952 dissolving the Senate. He did not believe that he could ignore his own firman without injuring the royal prestige. This fact had influenced his decision to dissolve the Senate before it would endeavor to enact any @@ -47434,8 +40063,7 @@ houses in his firman he was showing favoritism to neither. He thought that most of the former members of the Senate would be re-elected or reappointed. Some should be got rid of. He had noted with some - satisfaction that apparently Senator Nasser Khan, one of the leading Qashqai chieftains, had + satisfaction that apparently Senator Nasser Khan, one of the leading Qashqai chieftains, had already expressed concern at his loss of parliamentary immunity as a result of the dissolution of the Senate. The Shah was not unhappy that several of the Senators had lost their parliamentary immunity.

@@ -47449,8 +40077,7 @@ district—not someone imposed upon the district from Tehran.

I inquired whether or not the Prime Minister was keeping him informed regarding his lists of prospective candidates. The Shah again replied in - the affirmative. He said that the Prime Minister would not dare try to deceive him in a matter of + the affirmative. He said that the Prime Minister would not dare try to deceive him in a matter of this kind. I remarked that I was convinced of the complete loyalty of the Prime Minister to the Shah and of the Prime Minister’s desire to keep the Shah fully informed regarding his actions. The Shah said he @@ -47463,11 +40090,9 @@ good reputation and of ability. The Shah thought it was imperative, however, that he should make sure regarding the general high quality of the new Majlis and new Senate.

-

The Visit of Vice President Nixon

+

The Visit of Vice President Nixon

The Shah remarked that the visit of the Vice President had been a - complete success.Vice President Richard M. Nixon was in Iran + complete success.Vice President Richard M. Nixon was in Iran December 9–12 as part of his good will tour of the Far East and South Asia, which began on October 7 and ended upon his return to Washington December 14. Extensive material regarding the Vice @@ -47492,16 +40117,11 @@ position to say an explanatory word sympathetic to Iran from time to time when Iranian problems were discussed in the higher governmental circles. The Shah asked if the Vice President had told me of their last - conversation relating to Iranian military needs.Henderson - reported on the December 11 meeting between Nixon and the Shah in telegram - 1341 from Tehran, December 17, printed in Foreign + conversation relating to Iranian military needs.Henderson + reported on the December 11 meeting between Nixon and the Shah in telegram + 1341 from Tehran, December 17, printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. - 850–852 (Document 396). See also footnote 3, Document 360. He said that he had told the Vice President + 850–852 (Document 396). See also footnote 3, Document 360. He said that he had told the Vice President frankly that he would not be content to be Commander-in-Chief of a police army; an army destined only for police purposes would not give Iran the self-assurance and confidence necessary for the maintenance of @@ -47541,14 +40161,10 @@ moving forward with renewed confidence and was creating public confidence in its ability to do things. I referred illustratively to the establishment of relations with the United Kingdom, to the dissolution - of the Majlis, to the decisive attitude adopted towards Kashani, Baqai, Maki, et - al, and to the outcome of the Mosadeq trial. The trial had come out much better than I + of the Majlis, to the decisive attitude adopted towards Kashani, Baqai, Maki, et + al, and to the outcome of the Mosadeq trial. The trial had come out much better than I had anticipated. At one time I had been much concerned at the way in - which it was being handled. I was relieved that it had now come to an end in a nonsensational + which it was being handled. I was relieved that it had now come to an end in a nonsensational manner. I hoped that Mosadeq’s appeal could be disposed of without too much attendant publicity.

The Shah agreed with my optimism. He said his chief concern at the moment @@ -47566,37 +40182,26 @@ be taken. The Shah on his part thought that the disclosure and prosecution of graft would strengthen the prestige of the Government and obtain for it a wider measure of public support. The Shah said that it - was his understanding that the corruption which Guilanshah thought he had discovered + was his understanding that the corruption which Guilanshah thought he had discovered had been in existence for more than two years. I suggested that it might be a good idea to set up some kind of administration headed by prominent men of of unquestioned integrity whose duty it would be to check and approve every important governmental transaction involving an expenditure of considerable sums. The Shah agreed and said that he - thought a person such as Ebtahaj or Allah-Yar Saleh might be useful at the head of an + thought a person such as Ebtahaj or Allah-Yar Saleh might be useful at the head of an administration of this kind.

-
+
354. Monthly Report Prepared in the Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence AgencySource: - Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 81–01061R, Box 3, Folder 2, The Current + Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 81–01061R, Box 3, Folder 2, The Current Report—December 1953. Top Secret. - Washington, undated. + Washington, undated.

IRAN

December 1953

A. General Developments

-

1. Relations between the Shah and Prime Minister Zahedi appear to have improved during - this month and opposition forces continue to be kept effectively under control. It is reported +

1. Relations between the Shah and Prime Minister Zahedi appear to have improved during + this month and opposition forces continue to be kept effectively under control. It is reported that Chief of Staff Batmangelich has lost out with the Shah in his fight for position vis-à-vis Prime Minister. The Government seems to have achieved enough solidarity and popular support to have confidence in its @@ -47611,11 +40216,8 @@ people. This opened the way for election of a new Majlis which the Government announced would take place in the near future and it also removed the political immunity of the principal leaders of more serious - elements in opposition to the Zahedi government. It was reported that the Prime - Minister is now prepared to arrest such opposition leaders as Kashani and Baqai if they engage in provocative + elements in opposition to the Zahedi government. It was reported that the Prime + Minister is now prepared to arrest such opposition leaders as Kashani and Baqai if they engage in provocative activity.

[Omitted here are unrelated activities.]

5. The main Qashqai leaders, Nasr Khan and Khosrow Khan, traveled to @@ -47635,46 +40237,34 @@ composition of the government slate. [3 lines not declassified] Headquarters has begun a systematic analysis of all election information with the intent of providing the Station with - maximum support and guidance during the electioneering phase. [2 lines not declassified]

+ maximum support and guidance during the electioneering phase. [2 lines not declassified]

[Omitted here are operational details.]

- John H. - Waller + John H. + Waller
-
- 355. Statement of Policy by the National Security CouncilSource: National Archives, RG 273, Records of the National +
+ 355. Statement of Policy by the National Security CouncilSource: National Archives, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Minutes 1947–1961, Box 35 (178th - Meeting). Top Secret. In a covering letter to this paper, Lay informed members of the + Meeting). Top Secret. In a covering letter to this paper, Lay informed members of the NSC that the President had approved NSC 5402 on January 2. - NSC 5402 thus superseded NSC 136/1 (Document 147). NSC 5402 - is printed with redactions in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, + NSC 5402 thus superseded NSC 136/1 (Document 147). NSC 5402 + is printed with redactions in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 865–889 (Document 403). NSC 5402 - Washington, January 2, 1954. + Washington, January 2, 1954.

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAN

General Considerations

1. It is of critical importance to the United States that Iran remain an - independent nation, not dominated by the USSR. Because of its key strategic position, oil resources, - vulnerability to intervention or armed attack by the USSR, and vulnerability to political + independent nation, not dominated by the USSR. Because of its key strategic position, oil resources, + vulnerability to intervention or armed attack by the USSR, and vulnerability to political subversion, Iran must be regarded as a continuing objective of Soviet expansion. The loss of Iran, particularly by subversion, would:

a. Be a major threat to the security of the entire @@ -47706,8 +40296,7 @@ meet emergencies, will do little to create real stability, permit development or avoid future emergencies.

-

3. If the Shah cooperates, the Zahedi Government should be able to stay in power for +

3. If the Shah cooperates, the Zahedi Government should be able to stay in power for some time. However, the government is confronted with many serious problems, springing primarily from the basic changes taking place in Iranian society. Zahedi must cope @@ -47751,8 +40340,7 @@ regime and to initiate essential monetary reforms. This aid is believed sufficient to carry the regime until May or June of 1954.

8. Until the oil revenues become substantial, emergency aid in some form - will have to be continued and may have to be increased. In considering the timing and extent of + will have to be continued and may have to be increased. In considering the timing and extent of such aid, the following factors must be kept in mind:

a. Too long a delay in the institution of economic and social reforms in Iran may make it impossible to seize the @@ -47837,8 +40425,7 @@ with Iran, in order to bring about a resumption of revenues from its oil resources as a stabilizing influence in the Government of Iran tending to obviate the need for U.S. emergency economic assistance.

-

d. In implementing actions under b or c above, seek to avoid +

d. In implementing actions under b or c above, seek to avoid establishing any precedent which would adversely affect United States interests in Middle East resources.

@@ -47861,8 +40448,7 @@

d. Continue efforts to have the United Kingdom and Iran agree to a practical and equitable solution of the oil problem at the earliest possible moment and, at the same time, have the United - Kingdom give full support to the Zahedi Government.

+ Kingdom give full support to the Zahedi Government.

e. Be prepared to avail itself of the authority of the President to approve voluntary agreements and programs under Section 708 (a) and (b) of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended.

@@ -47885,8 +40471,7 @@ which may be developed for the Middle East.

22. Recognize the strength of Iranian nationalist feeling; try to direct it into constructive channels and be ready to exploit any opportunity to - do so, bearing in mind the desirability of strengthening in Iran the ability and desire of the + do so, bearing in mind the desirability of strengthening in Iran the ability and desire of the Iranian people to resist communist pressure.

23. Encourage the adoption by the Iranian Government of necessary financial, judicial and administrative and other reforms, including @@ -47934,14 +40519,12 @@ prompt withdrawal of Soviet forces.

b. If unsuccessful, decide in the light of the - circumstances existing at the time whether to treat the action as a casus belli.

+ circumstances existing at the time whether to treat the action as a casus belli.

c. Place itself in the best possible position to meet the increased threat of global war.

d. Consult with selected allies to perfect coordinated plans.

-

e. Make clear through diplomatic and UN channels the aggressive character of the +

e. Make clear through diplomatic and UN channels the aggressive character of the Soviet action and the United States preference for a peaceful solution, and, if appropriate, the conditions upon which the United States would, in concert with other members of the United Nations, accept such a @@ -48027,8 +40610,7 @@

Preface

1. Review of U.S. policy toward Iran has shown a need for detailed study of certain selected problems. NIE–102 - “Probable Developments in Iran Through 1954”,Document 347. + “Probable Developments in Iran Through 1954”,Document 347. provides a timely study of the present political situation in Iran and the problems which Zahedi or any successor non-communist Premier must face. This staff study is therefore @@ -48097,16 +40679,13 @@ that any one of them could probably meet the total demand for Middle East oil entirely by itself, though perhaps with some difficulty. Certainly any two of these countries could do so without undue strain. - This fact was totally unappreciated by Mosadeq, who clearly expected the world to beg for - Iranian oil on his terms. The Shah and Prime Minister Zahedi have received considerable + This fact was totally unappreciated by Mosadeq, who clearly expected the world to beg for + Iranian oil on his terms. The Shah and Prime Minister Zahedi have received considerable education in this regard and the government’s propaganda ministry is attempting to explain these facts to the Iranian public.

8. Virtually all Middle East crude production on net balance, flows to Eastern Hemisphere markets. About 75 percent is consumed in Europe, - while the rest is divided between Africa, the Far East, South Asia and the South Pacific. There + while the rest is divided between Africa, the Far East, South Asia and the South Pacific. There is very little market in the Western Hemisphere, nor will there be for some years to come in view of the potential surpluses that exist in that region. In fact, if there should be any appreciable flow of Middle East @@ -48149,8 +40728,7 @@

12. If distribution can be obtained through the major companies, however, a volume of from 400,000 to 800,000 barrels per day could be achieved within approximately a two-or three-year period after resuming - operations. This output is comparable to the average off-take of about 650,000 barrels per day + operations. This output is comparable to the average off-take of about 650,000 barrels per day which was reached prior to the shut-down in 1951.

13. The refining situation in Iran presents a parallel condition to that which exists in crude oil production. The trend in recent years has been @@ -48189,8 +40767,7 @@ the industry. This requirement is generally interpreted by the industry to mean that there must be effective foreign management of Iranian oil production. Techniques to accomplish this, within the framework of the - nationalization law, range from suggestions that the IBRD be an intermediate agent to + nationalization law, range from suggestions that the IBRD be an intermediate agent to consideration of the restoration of a foreign oil concession in Iran under some terms of contract with the National Iranian Oil Company.

@@ -48285,10 +40862,7 @@ people.

Economic Factors Affecting British Interests

26. The British have only reluctantly entertained the idea that an - international consortium would replace the AIOC as producer and marketer of Iranian oil. However, Sir William Fraser, Chairman of the + international consortium would replace the AIOC as producer and marketer of Iranian oil. However, Sir William Fraser, Chairman of the AIOC, has invited representatives of five major American oil companies and of Shell to conversations in London regarding the establishment of such a consortium.

@@ -48301,8 +40875,7 @@ consideration by the British and Iranian Governments, while U.S. influence is being exerted primarily through the persons of Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr., Special - Consultant to the Secretary of State on oil affairs, and of Loy Henderson, U.S. Ambassador to + Consultant to the Secretary of State on oil affairs, and of Loy Henderson, U.S. Ambassador to Iran. Although general lines of a settlement have been blocked out, no firm position has been taken on either side.)

Part 2

@@ -48478,8 +41051,7 @@ budgetary and foreign exchange requirements.

12. This type of program would not provide the Government with financing for any economic development program other than that included in the - present U.S. technical and economic aid program. The Zahedi Government has committed itself + present U.S. technical and economic aid program. The Zahedi Government has committed itself to a development program designed to raise the standard of living and reduce unemployment. This program calls for an annual expenditure of 3.9 billion rials ($43 @@ -48502,8 +41074,7 @@ $10 to $15 million may have to be made available in the current U.S. fiscal year.

15. A special contingency fund of $45 million for the whole area of the - Near East and Africa has been included in the FY 1955 budget, some of which might be available for Iran + Near East and Africa has been included in the FY 1955 budget, some of which might be available for Iran in the event that substantial oil revenues are not flowing by that time. These funds would be additional to the technical and economic program which would be continued at approximately the current level of $23 @@ -48513,10 +41084,8 @@

Importance to Defense of Middle East

1. The strategic importance of the Middle East to the United States and its allies has been described in NSC - 155/1.For the text of NSC 155/1, “United States Objectives - and Policies With Respect to the Near East,” July 14, 1953, see Foreign + 155/1.For the text of NSC 155/1, “United States Objectives + and Policies With Respect to the Near East,” July 14, 1953, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, Near and Middle East, pp. 399–406 (Document 145). U.S. and U.K. studies developed to date are in general agreement that the most @@ -48525,8 +41094,7 @@ extend from northern Iraq generally southwestward through Iran to the Pakistan border.

2. Iran constitutes a blocking position from which to oppose any Soviet - operation launched across the Caucasus for the purpose of encircling Turkey, attacking the + operation launched across the Caucasus for the purpose of encircling Turkey, attacking the Suez Canal or seizing the Persian Gulf area. Because of its geographical location on the periphery of the USSR and its key position in relation to the other countries of the Middle @@ -48544,8 +41112,7 @@ been estimated that by 1975 Europe will be dependent upon the Middle East for at least 90% of its peacetime crude oil—requiring imports of 3.7 million B/D. Likewise the United - States, by 1975 will require peacetime imports of 1.2 million B/D of Middle East crude oil (8.8% of total + States, by 1975 will require peacetime imports of 1.2 million B/D of Middle East crude oil (8.8% of total peacetime requirement). Therefore, unless the essential and greater allied wartime requirements, including those of the United States, can be met from other sources, provision must be made to insure the @@ -48577,8 +41144,7 @@ the Iranian plateau. Nazi-Soviet diplomatic conversations resulted in 1940 in a draft agreement “that the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of - aspirations of the Soviet Union.”Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939–1941, Documents from + aspirations of the Soviet Union.”Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939–1941, Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office. [Footnote is in the original.] The USSR is extremely sensitive to developments along its borders. It usually has @@ -48590,10 +41156,8 @@ Iranian frontier has been a series of truculent Soviet notes to recent Iranian Governments protesting the presence of American military missions and oil drillers in Iran. Each note referred, as a basis for - the protest, to Article VI of the 1921 treaty between the USSR and Iran (see Part 6).

-

9. If air bases were to become available to the USSR in Iran, light bombers of the Soviet Air Force would + the protest, to Article VI of the 1921 treaty between the USSR and Iran (see Part 6).

+

9. If air bases were to become available to the USSR in Iran, light bombers of the Soviet Air Force would be able to operate throughout the region of the Persian Gulf. Iranian bases could also support Soviet ground and air attacks against the upper Tigris-Euphrates valley and thence westward toward the Mediterranean. @@ -48601,8 +41165,7 @@ of Iran would also provide an excellent base for political penetration of Pakistan on the east and the Arab states on the west. Communist theoreticians have described the conquest of Iran as the key to the - success of communist designs on Asia, and particularly India.G. Lenczowski, Russia and the + success of communist designs on Asia, and particularly India.G. Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran. [Footnote is in the original.]

10. While the USSR does not require the oil reserves and facilities of Iran for further development of her @@ -48641,8 +41204,7 @@ aggression would not be lessened by this event, but the question of Pakistan’s reaction is not so clear.

13. It would also be a shock to the whole community of free nations - should Iran become a satellite of the USSR. U.S. prestige throughout the world would suffer and + should Iran become a satellite of the USSR. U.S. prestige throughout the world would suffer and the concept of communal security would be weakened.

Part 4

Support of Iranian Armed Forces

@@ -48663,8 +41225,7 @@ capable of delaying the progress of an enemy if Iran should be invaded.

-

Ambassador Henderson’s Recommendations

+

Ambassador Henderson’s Recommendations

3. The Ambassador has recommended that the United States should accede to the request of Iran to assist in reorganizing, rearming and retraining the armed forces of Iran so that:

@@ -48693,9 +41254,7 @@

Iranian Attitudes

5. The Shah has stated that until Iran has an army capable of putting up some kind of defense, it would be useless to discuss multilateral - security arrangements. Ambassador Henderson believes that the Shah and Zahedi would probably be willing to + security arrangements. Ambassador Henderson believes that the Shah and Zahedi would probably be willing to undertake such arrangements if (1) Iran is more on a basis of equality with its neighbors in military capabilities, and (2) if the combined strength of the countries participating in a defense arrangement is @@ -48742,18 +41301,15 @@ any equally potent force on their frontiers willing and able to oppose the Soviet Union successfully. They are not encouraged by the Korean precedent. They will undoubtedly be very cautious toward any policy - which may appear provocative to the USSR. This attitude must be taken into account in any + which may appear provocative to the USSR. This attitude must be taken into account in any planning toward including Iran in regional arrangements with anti-Soviet implications.

Regional Aspects

8. Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan have the capability of contributing significant forces to the defense of the area provided that proper equipment is furnished from outside sources. The situations in Pakistan - and Turkey are substantially different than Iran. Ambassador Henderson believes that it would be - useful at the proper time for the Turks and Pakistanis either to take the lead in discussions + and Turkey are substantially different than Iran. Ambassador Henderson believes that it would be + useful at the proper time for the Turks and Pakistanis either to take the lead in discussions with Iran and Iraq or at least to closely associate themselves with any proposals which might be put forward. He speculates that favorable action by Iran and Iraq would probably be predicated upon firm @@ -48830,8 +41386,7 @@ States. A copy of each such request intended to be within the coverage of this section, and any modification or withdrawal thereof, shall be furnished to the Attorney General and the Chairman of the Federal Trade - Commission when made, and it shall be published in the Federal Register unless publication thereof would, in the + Commission when made, and it shall be published in the Federal Register unless publication thereof would, in the opinion of the President, endanger the national security.”

3. It is of interest to note that on November 26, 1952, President Truman requested the @@ -48841,15 +41396,12 @@ action by (the President) would produce the result desired.” The President, giving this instruction, referred to the authority granted him by Congress in Section - 708(a) and (b) of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended.See Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, + 708(a) and (b) of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended.See Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 538–539 (Document 243).

4. On December 4, 1952 representatives of the major American oil companies assembled at the Department of State for exploratory discussions,Regarding this meeting at - the Department of State, see ibid., pp. 542–543 (Document 245). under + the Department of State, see ibid., pp. 542–543 (Document 245). under the following terms of reference as stated by the Acting Secretary of State:

“In the light of the national defense considerations implicit in finding @@ -48866,8 +41418,7 @@ part of a “package” proposal for settlement of the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute, an assurance that an international oil company, in which several major U.S. oil companies would participate, would purchase - unspecified amounts of Iranian oil. When Mosadeq rejected these proposals in February 1953, the + unspecified amounts of Iranian oil. When Mosadeq rejected these proposals in February 1953, the entire question of the formation of an international purchasing organization was dropped until its recent reconsideration.

Part 6

@@ -48878,14 +41429,11 @@ quoted below:

“If a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of occupation by means of armed intervention in the territory of Persia or to use the - territory of Persia as a base for military operation against the USSR, and if thereby danger should + territory of Persia as a base for military operation against the USSR, and if thereby danger should threaten the frontiers of the USSR or those of Powers allied to it, and if the Persian Government, after - warning on the part of the Government of the USSR, should prove to be itself not strong enough to - prevent this danger, the Government of the USSR + warning on the part of the Government of the USSR, should prove to be itself not strong enough to + prevent this danger, the Government of the USSR shall have the right to advance its troops onto Persian territory in order to take necessary military measures in the interests of self-defense.”

@@ -48906,8 +41454,7 @@ considerable armed attack upon Russia or the Soviet Republics allied to her by the partisans of the regime which has been overthrown (the Czarist regime), or by its supporters among those foreign powers which - are in a position to assist the enemies of the USSR, and at the same time to possess themselves by force + are in a position to assist the enemies of the USSR, and at the same time to possess themselves by force or by underhand methods of part of Iranian territory, thereby establishing a base of operations for any attacks—made either directly or through the counter-revolutionary forces—which they might contemplate @@ -48916,8 +41463,7 @@ USSR made out a case for co-existence of the above four conditions, and at the same time the Government of Iran denied their co-existence and/or resisted the - introduction of Soviet troops into Iran, the USSR would not be entitled under the United Nations Charter + introduction of Soviet troops into Iran, the USSR would not be entitled under the United Nations Charter to introduce armed forces unilaterally into Iran on the basis of the Treaty. It would be a violation of Charter obligations for the Soviet Union to take such action against the will and over the resistance of @@ -48938,9 +41484,7 @@ regarding their right to do so.

-
+
356. Information Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job @@ -48951,8 +41495,7 @@ CS–28662 - Washington, January 6, 1954. + Washington, January 6, 1954. SUBJECT 1. Interview between the Shah and Dr. Baghai @@ -48961,14 +41504,11 @@ REFERENCES CS–27860CS–27860, December 21, - reported that in a meeting with Zahedi held before December 6, Baghai had + reported that in a meeting with Zahedi held before December 6, Baghai had assured him of his “support but stated that he could not come out openly in support of Zahedi. Baghai promised, however, that his newspaper, Shahed, would gradually - lessen its attacks on the Zahedi Government. On 13 December, Zahedi told Source that he was + lessen its attacks on the Zahedi Government. On 13 December, Zahedi told Source that he was through with Baghai because the latter’s newspaper attacks on the Government were increasing rather than diminishing.” (Ibid., Box 32, Folder 7, CS Information Reports @@ -48982,44 +41522,33 @@ declassified]

1. On 16 December 1953, the Shah granted an interview to Dr. Mozaffar - Baghai, leader of the Toilers’ Party.Source Comment. It is not known what + Baghai, leader of the Toilers’ Party.Source Comment. It is not known what transpired during this meeting between the Shah and Baghai. The two - have been on friendly terms since former Prime Minister Mossadeq began to oppose the Shah. + have been on friendly terms since former Prime Minister Mossadeq began to oppose the Shah. [Footnote is in the original.]

2. When Prime Minister Zahedi learned of this interview, he sent a message to the Shah expressing disapproval of such interviews.

3. Zahedi has warned Baghai to “watch his step” since Zahedi - intends to jail Baghai if the latter gets out of line.Washington Comment. + intends to jail Baghai if the latter gets out of line.Washington Comment. According to the New York Times dispatch from Tehran, dated 16 December 1953, orders had been issued for the arrest of Dr. Baghai whose newspaper, Shahed, was shut down by the Police on 15 December after it had exhorted the Tehran populace to defy the security forces and “make blood run in - the streets.” [Footnote is in the original.],Source Comment. The + the streets.” [Footnote is in the original.],Source Comment. The Government is determined to prevent Baghai from seeking reelection to the Majlis. [Footnote is in the original.] Baghai promised to refrain from active opposition to the Government for six months.

4. Informant states that on 17 December Dr. Mozaffar Baghai made the following statements to him:

-

a. Tudeh Party members and supporters of former Prime Minister Mossadeq have been trying to induce - Baghai to cooperate with them. Supporters of Mossadeq proposed that, if Baghai refrained from attacking Mossadeq, they, in turn, would support - Baghai. Baghai did not accept this proposal and told the Mossadeq supporters that Mossadeq is the cause of all Iran’s +

a. Tudeh Party members and supporters of former Prime Minister Mossadeq have been trying to induce + Baghai to cooperate with them. Supporters of Mossadeq proposed that, if Baghai refrained from attacking Mossadeq, they, in turn, would support + Baghai. Baghai did not accept this proposal and told the Mossadeq supporters that Mossadeq is the cause of all Iran’s present misfortunes.

b. Khalil Maleki, leader of the - Third Force, has cooperated with the supporters of Mossadeq and has urged Baghai not to + Third Force, has cooperated with the supporters of Mossadeq and has urged Baghai not to attack Mossadeq.

c. Mullah Kashani has shown himself to be weak.

@@ -49028,28 +41557,18 @@ of the Iranian people to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom must be exploited in every possible way.

-
- 357. Letter From the Ambassador to Iran (Henderson) to the Special Assistant for Intelligence, - Department of State (Armstrong)Source: National Archives, RG 84, +
+ 357. Letter From the Ambassador to Iran (Henderson) to the Special Assistant for Intelligence, + Department of State (Armstrong)Source: National Archives, RG 84, Tehran Embassy Files, 1953–1955, classified general files, Box 10. - Secret. Drafted by Melbourne. - Tehran, January 7, 1954. + Secret. Drafted by Melbourne. + Tehran, January 7, 1954. - Dear Mr. Armstrong: + Dear Mr. Armstrong: -

With reference to your letter of November 27, 1953,Not found. the Embassy, CAS, and the Service +

With reference to your letter of November 27, 1953,Not found. the Embassy, CAS, and the Service Attachés have studied National Intelligence Estimate 102, entitled - “Probable Developments in Iran through 1954,Document 347. and find + “Probable Developments in Iran through 1954,Document 347. and find themselves in general agreement with the approach and conclusions reflected in this document. We might, however, comment on certain points:

@@ -49062,12 +41581,9 @@ very near future. In connection with paragraph 19, diplomatic relations between the UK and Iran have been resumed prior to any tangible progress toward an oil settlement. Also, - with regard to paragraph 25, the first stage of the Mosadeq trial has been completed, with + with regard to paragraph 25, the first stage of the Mosadeq trial has been completed, with his conviction and a three-year sentence which has now been appealed to - a higher court. In this connection, I should point out that the execution of Mosadeq never has been seriously + a higher court. In this connection, I should point out that the execution of Mosadeq never has been seriously considered, due to his age.

The foregoing developments do not, however affect appreciably the conclusions drawn in the Estimate. We believe these conclusions to be @@ -49081,8 +41597,7 @@ Minister until at least several months after the organization of the new 18th Majlis. Furthermore, it should not be ruled out that foreign influence not entirely predictable at this time will have an important - bearing on the durability of the Zahedi regime and the Shah’s attitude toward it. In this + bearing on the durability of the Zahedi regime and the Shah’s attitude toward it. In this connection, it should be noted that the Government is comprised of representatives of the traditional ruling group of Iran who have been amenable to foreign, notably British, influence. Unless there are @@ -49113,24 +41628,19 @@ Iran, will involve psychological as well as economic problems which would reach grave proportions during the period covered by the Estimate. While it might theoretically be possible for the Government to cope with - the immediate fiscal and budgetary problems by resorting to deficit financing and other - unorthodox means, it is not at all certain that the Zahedi Government or any moderate + the immediate fiscal and budgetary problems by resorting to deficit financing and other + unorthodox means, it is not at all certain that the Zahedi Government or any moderate Government could survive the political repercussions of this development. In other words, we believe that the continuation of a moderate Government in Iran throughout 1954 might well depend upon either an oil settlement or continuation of American financial assistance.

There are certain small points which might also be made. With further - reference to paragraph 25, we believe it unlikely that Mosadeq will be a future nationalist + reference to paragraph 25, we believe it unlikely that Mosadeq will be a future nationalist leader in his own right, although he could have potential as a “front man” in a coalition controlled by others. With regard to paragraph 27, we understand that the list of candidates for the Majlis elections, - approved by the Shah and Zahedi, exclude Ayatollah Kashani, Maki and Baqai. + approved by the Shah and Zahedi, exclude Ayatollah Kashani, Maki and Baqai. The chances that they will be elected to the Majlis are, therefore, not strong. We believe that General Zahedi particularly has no idea of working with this @@ -49142,37 +41652,29 @@ general agreement.

Sincerely,

- Loy W. - HendersonPrinted from a - copy that bears Henderson’s typed signature. + Loy W. + HendersonPrinted from a + copy that bears Henderson’s typed signature.
-
- 358. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, +
+ 358. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, - 788.00/1–1154. Secret. Drafted by Henderson. Received January 23. A copy was sent to + 788.00/1–1154. Secret. Drafted by Henderson. Received January 23. A copy was sent to London. No. 410 - Tehran, January 11, 1954. + Tehran, January 11, 1954. SUBJECT Conversation with Prime Minister Zahedi

I have the honor to enclose herewith a memorandum of a conversation - regarding the Qashqai tribes which took place on January 7, 1954, between General Fazlollah Zahedi, Prime Minister of + regarding the Qashqai tribes which took place on January 7, 1954, between General Fazlollah Zahedi, Prime Minister of Iran, and myself.

Respectfully yours,

Loy W. @@ -49186,11 +41688,9 @@ Zahedi on January 7, 1954, regarding present status of the Qashqai Khans -

During a conversation which I had on January 7th with General Fazlollah Zahedi I asked him what was +

During a conversation which I had on January 7th with General Fazlollah Zahedi I asked him what was the latest development with regard to the dissident Qashqai Khans.

-

The Prime Minister said he assumed that I was aware that Nasser Khan, the former Senator who +

The Prime Minister said he assumed that I was aware that Nasser Khan, the former Senator who had been acting as chief spokesman for the four brothers, had been in Tehran for some time. Following his arrival in Tehran Nasser had approached the Prime Minister and informed him that he would be prepared @@ -49215,11 +41715,9 @@ Qashqais were not to be trusted, and that therefore three of the brothers, Nasser, Khosrow, and Mahammed Hosein, should leave the country. The Prime Minister said that - he had imparted this information to Nasser “this very + he had imparted this information to Nasser “this very morning”, and Nasser had taken - the decision without any great display of surprise. Nasser had maintained that he and his + the decision without any great display of surprise. Nasser had maintained that he and his brothers did not have sufficient funds abroad on which to live. He himself had only $17,000 in foreign banks. He had begged, therefore, that they be permitted to sell some of their property and convert the @@ -49242,14 +41740,12 @@ work remained to be done before the problem of the Qashqais could be said to be definitely eliminated.

- Loy W. - Henderson + Loy W. + Henderson
-
+
359. Information Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job @@ -49260,8 +41756,7 @@ CS–28871 - Washington, January 12, 1954. + Washington, January 12, 1954. SUBJECT Situation in the Tudeh Party @@ -49291,17 +41786,11 @@ arms only shortly before the events of 19 August 1953 took place.

-
- 360. Letter From the Ambassador to Iran (Henderson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near - Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade)Source: National Archives, RG 59, +
+ 360. Letter From the Ambassador to Iran (Henderson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near + Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade)Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 888.00–TA/1–1654. Secret. - Tehran, January 16, 1954. + Tehran, January 16, 1954. Dear Hank: @@ -49347,12 +41836,9 @@ elaborate in more detail in this letter regarding my conversation with His Majesty. I believe I have written enough, however, to let you know that His Majesty is not easy to deal with these days. On the other hand - this bad humor might be merely a reflection of internal troubles. During our conversation - reference was made to domestic troubles of Amini whose wife the Shah told me with relish had been - behaving badly in Europe. When I remarked that I thought Amini had been doing extremely well in + this bad humor might be merely a reflection of internal troubles. During our conversation + reference was made to domestic troubles of Amini whose wife the Shah told me with relish had been + behaving badly in Europe. When I remarked that I thought Amini had been doing extremely well in the circumstances the Shah stated with emphasis that “no one could be having more family trouble than I encounter constantly”. I understand that among the members of his family who are causing the Shah worry are @@ -49360,16 +41846,14 @@

I hope that the Shah’s outburst, as set forth in the enclosure, will not cause anyone in the Department who sees it from considering Iran’s need for further aid on any other than an unprejudiced sympathetic basis.

- With warmest regards, I am Sincerely, - + With warmest regards, I am Sincerely, + Loy W. Henderson - Henderson signed “Loy” above his typed signature, + Henderson signed “Loy” above his typed signature, and initialed below the postscript. - + -

P.S. I am sending a copy of this to Evan Wilson in London. It is extremely important that the +

P.S. I am sending a copy of this to Evan Wilson in London. It is extremely important that the contents of this letter, particularly those portions relating to Wright, not be brought to the attention of the British Government.

@@ -49379,8 +41863,7 @@ Enclosure Memorandum of Conversation - Tehran, January 14, 1954. + Tehran, January 14, 1954. PARTICIPANTS His Majesty the Shah of Iran @@ -49388,13 +41871,11 @@ American Ambassador

At my request the Shah granted me an audience yesterday at the - beginning of which I presented him with a copy of Persepolis, as a gift of the Oriental Institute of Chicago + beginning of which I presented him with a copy of Persepolis, as a gift of the Oriental Institute of Chicago University.

During our conversation subsequent to the presentation the Shah asked me again what the U.S. was planning to do for Iran, what kind of - report re economic and military aid had Vice President Nixon made to the National + report re economic and military aid had Vice President Nixon made to the National Security Council, etc.Vice President Nixon met with the Shah on December 11, 1953, in Tehran. Telegram 1341 from Tehran, @@ -49403,21 +41884,18 @@ “whether Iranian Army was to be organized, equipped and trained to defend Iran in case of external attack from any direction, or army was to be used merely for maintaining internal security.” - For telegram 1341, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, + For telegram 1341, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 850–852 (Document 396). The Vice President reported to the NSC on his trip to the Far East, South Asia, and Iran on December - 23, 1953; see ibid., pp. 854–855 (Document 398). The + 23, 1953; see ibid., pp. 854–855 (Document 398). The Shah, who appeared to be in a petulant humor, commenced to complain re the state of the Iranian budget. The available funds even with American emergency aid were not sufficient to meet the urgent economic and security needs of the country. What would happen after several months when emergency aid was exhausted he did not know unless the U.S. could find some way to supplement emergency aid at - least until conclusion of the oil agreement. Eden had expressed in a recent + least until conclusion of the oil agreement. Eden had expressed in a recent speech the hope that the oil agreement would be achieved during the year 1954. That did not indicate expectation on the part of the British for an early agreement. Even if an early agreement could be @@ -49433,8 +41911,7 @@ pay salary, allowances, quarters, etc. There was nothing left for operations. I remarked that perhaps with more expert management the Army could within the framework of the present budget take care of - elementary operational needs. General McClure in describing to me earlier in the day a + elementary operational needs. General McClure in describing to me earlier in the day a recent conversation which he had had with General Batmanqilich, said Batmanqilich had declared solemnly to him that the Army did not even possess personnel to distribute clothing and blankets which the U.S. @@ -49446,8 +41923,7 @@ Batmanqilich had made this statement merely in order to impress General McClure with their military needs. Batmanqilich would, of course, find means of - distributing this material. He had been talking with General Batmanqilich a few + distributing this material. He had been talking with General Batmanqilich a few moments before he received me. General Batmanqilich, known for his administrative and organizational ability, was a loyal, honest, and capable military leader. If he was experiencing difficulties under @@ -49460,14 +41936,10 @@ already in uniform. This required budgetary funds and no such funds were as yet in sight.

Turning to civilian needs the Shah asked if there was not something I - could tell him re U.S. plans. Did Secretary Dulles’ speech on December 12 - indicate a radical change in U.S. policy?Assistant Secretary Byroade, not Secretary + could tell him re U.S. plans. Did Secretary Dulles’ speech on December 12 + indicate a radical change in U.S. policy?Assistant Secretary Byroade, not Secretary Dulles, delivered a - speech on Iran on December 12; see Department of State Bulletin, December 28, 1953, pp. + speech on Iran on December 12; see Department of State Bulletin, December 28, 1953, pp. 894–896. Was the U.S. planning to call home its troops and turn the defense of the world against aggression over to the United Nations? Had the U.S. Government decided to refrain from @@ -49496,8 +41968,7 @@ itself. In fact, the U.S. Government had spent many millions of dollars in order to help Iran out of a predicament in which it had put itself. The Shah asked if he was to understand that the U.S. did - not intend to give Iran any additional financial aid regardless of delays in achieving an + not intend to give Iran any additional financial aid regardless of delays in achieving an oil agreement. I told him that I was not in a position at this time to state what the U.S. might or might not do. The Shah asked if he was to understand also that in the event an oil agreement would be @@ -49515,8 +41986,7 @@ natural resources, needed U.S. aid for its survival. I was not, however, making any promises and I did not believe the U.S. Government was in a position to make any promises at this time.

-

Reverting to Secretary Dulles’ speech I said that if the Shah had read it +

Reverting to Secretary Dulles’ speech I said that if the Shah had read it carefully it should have given him encouragement. It indicated that the U.S. was determined to hold the initiative in its struggle to avert international communist aggression. It further indicated that @@ -49532,27 +42002,17 @@

-
- 361. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/3–554. Secret. +
+ 361. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/3–554. Secret. Drafted by Gannett. This - memorandum is attached to a letter from Gannett to Stutesman, March 5, in which he commented that “I + memorandum is attached to a letter from Gannett to Stutesman, March 5, in which he commented that “I see Perron for tea most every - week in succession to a custom pursued in my time here by Eric Pollard and later Roy Melbourne. These sessions - usually consist of lectures from ‘Professor’ Perron on the Iranian scene as he + week in succession to a custom pursued in my time here by Eric Pollard and later Roy Melbourne. These sessions + usually consist of lectures from ‘Professor’ Perron on the Iranian scene as he sees it and upon the shortcomings of the Shah as a leader of people. As these memoranda indicate, it is usually my tactic to listen and to offer as few comments as possible.” - Tehran, February + Tehran, February 19, 1954. SUBJECT @@ -49568,82 +42028,64 @@

Mr. Perron had the following points to make in a conversation held on February 17, in which he did most of the talking:

-

1. Relations between Shah and Zahedi—Mr. Perron asserted that the possibilities +

1. Relations between Shah and Zahedi—Mr. Perron asserted that the possibilities for differences to arise between the Shah and the Prime Minister following inauguration of the new Parliament will be very great and that steps should be taken now to prevent the two from drifting apart. He - asserted that for some time the Shah has not liked Zahedi but was forced to accept the - General’s leadership of the movement to oust Mosadeq owing to the absence of any other person who + asserted that for some time the Shah has not liked Zahedi but was forced to accept the + General’s leadership of the movement to oust Mosadeq owing to the absence of any other person who could adequately perform this task. He thought it highly possible, given the Shah’s mentality, that intriguers could be successful in persuading the Shah to ditch the Prime Minister, especially after the elapse of a few months when the inevitable cleavages within the Majlis and the - Senate will begin to develop. Mr. Perron hoped that the American Embassy would exert its + Senate will begin to develop. Mr. Perron hoped that the American Embassy would exert its best efforts toward insuring the continuation of an adequate working relationship between the Shah and the Prime Minister. In this regard he - thought it highly important that the Zahedi regime be able to develop a popular following, in + thought it highly important that the Zahedi regime be able to develop a popular following, in particular to secure the support of the non-communist, nationalist - elements which formerly had rallied behind Dr. Mosadeq. He recognized this would be a + elements which formerly had rallied behind Dr. Mosadeq. He recognized this would be a difficult task but felt that unless some measure of progress could be made in this direction, the prospects for the continued life of the Zahedi Government would not be good. I assured Mr. Perron that we also regarded as essential the maintenance of smooth working - relations and mutual confidence between the Shah and Zahedi and that one cannot help being concerned over the gulf + relations and mutual confidence between the Shah and Zahedi and that one cannot help being concerned over the gulf existing between the present Government and many segments of the Iranian people.

2. Perron’s - desire to work with Zahedi—Mr. Perron said that unfortunately he had not been able to - develop a harmonious working relationship with General Zahedi. He was most anxious for the + desire to work with Zahedi—Mr. Perron said that unfortunately he had not been able to + develop a harmonious working relationship with General Zahedi. He was most anxious for the General and his Government to know of his good intentions in this regard but found that he did not have an effective means of communicating them to the General. Unfortunately, he was unable to communicate them through Ardeshir Zahedi with whom he does not have a common language. In view of the close working - relationship between the American Embassy and the Zahedi Government and particularly with + relationship between the American Embassy and the Zahedi Government and particularly with Ardeshir Zahedi, he hoped it would be possible for the Embassy to have it made known to General Zahedi that he was available - to be of every assistance. Mr. Perron proceeded immediately to his next point without + to be of every assistance. Mr. Perron proceeded immediately to his next point without awaiting comment from myself.

3. American efforts to support anti-communist groups—Mr. Perron said he was aware of efforts by the American Embassy to encourage the development of anti-communist groups within Iran. In this connection he - wished merely to call to our attention that Aramesh and Bahbudi are highly dishonest persons and - should not be treated with any confidence.Richards placed a check - mark in the margin next to this sentence and underlined “Aramesh” and “Bahbudi.” I - observed that I also had heard of this reputation. Mr. Perron went on to make a plea for + wished merely to call to our attention that Aramesh and Bahbudi are highly dishonest persons and + should not be treated with any confidence.Richards placed a check + mark in the margin next to this sentence and underlined “Aramesh” and “Bahbudi.” I + observed that I also had heard of this reputation. Mr. Perron went on to make a plea for forthright American intervention in the internal political affairs of Iran, in order to insure success for the anti-communist movement. He asserted that Point Four and the Military Mission engage daily in domestic political matters and obviously only the Embassy was reluctant - to do so.Richards placed a check mark and his initials in the + to do so.Richards placed a check mark and his initials in the margin next to this sentence. He thought this reluctance was most unfortunate, as it would be in the common interest of both the United States and Iran for the Embassy to take forthrightly a more active part in this vital matter. I noted that it was not the intention of OMI or the Military Mission to dable in local politics and that I thought it imprudent for any foreign government to seek to manage the - local affairs of another country. Mr. Perron recalled that to his knowledge in the past the + local affairs of another country. Mr. Perron recalled that to his knowledge in the past the American Government had pursued policies in Iran of which the Ambassador had not always been aware; to which I observed that I could speak only of recent months but that I was sure that during the period I had been @@ -49669,21 +42111,16 @@ inevitably have unfortunate repercussions for the Monarchy. I said I could easily understand this viewpoint and that so far as I was aware the Embassy had not had prior knowledge of Mr. Klein’s intention to - visit Iran.Richards highlighted this paragraph and placed his + visit Iran.Richards highlighted this paragraph and placed his initials in the margin.

-
+
362. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC - Files, Job 79R00904A, Box 1, Folder 5, Memos for DCI (1954) (Substantive). + Files, Job 79R00904A, Box 1, Folder 5, Memos for DCI (1954) (Substantive). Secret. - Washington, March 5, 1954. + Washington, March 5, 1954.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (Draft for Board Consideration)

@@ -49694,8 +42131,7 @@ analysis contained in NIE–102, “Probable Developments in Iran through 1954,” published on 10 November 1953.Document - 347. Although a revision of NIE–102 at this time would contain some + 347. Although a revision of NIE–102 at this time would contain some changes in emphasis on certain points, we do not believe they would be sufficient to warrant such a revision before the one now scheduled for the fourth quarter of 1954. @@ -49713,19 +42149,14 @@ Zahedi’s chances of holding on through all of 1954 are “not good” does not take account of the restraining influence which has been exercised on the Shah thus far by - his recognition that a man of Zahedi’s caliber would be hard to find and by his fear - of incurring US–UK opposition. So long as the Shah continues to believe + his recognition that a man of Zahedi’s caliber would be hard to find and by his fear + of incurring US–UK opposition. So long as the Shah continues to believe that the situation requires a strong premier and so long as he is - convinced that the US and the UK feel it essential that Zahedi remain, he will probably + convinced that the US and the UK feel it essential that Zahedi remain, he will probably hesitate to go too far toward undermining the prime minister’s position.

4. It also appears that the job of keeping the warring politicians under - control may be somewhat less formidable than was suggested in NIE–102. The government appears to be + control may be somewhat less formidable than was suggested in NIE–102. The government appears to be getting through the critical electoral period with far less difficulty than was anticipated. It has not only been spared the increased political tension and instability which was expected to develop out of @@ -49745,34 +42176,27 @@ the success of the forthcoming oil negotiations, Western preparations for which now appear to be reaching the final stage. One hopeful sign is that the Iranians appear somewhat more amenable to a “realistic” - solution than appeared to be the case when NIE–102 was completed. In their present passive mood, the + solution than appeared to be the case when NIE–102 was completed. In their present passive mood, the Iranian people appear prepared to accept almost any sort of agreement which makes some minimum provision for national pride. However, it is - still unclear whether the oil companies—particularly AIOC—are prepared to offer the Iranians + still unclear whether the oil companies—particularly AIOC—are prepared to offer the Iranians an arrangement which they can accept and live with in peace. A successful solution may thus largely depend on US effectiveness in insisting on political realism in the negotiations and on prompt action to take advantage of the present favorable climate of opinion in Iran.

-
+
363. Memorandum Prepared in the Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 11, Misc. TPAJAX Correspondence. Top Secret. - Washington, March 8, 1954. + Washington, March 8, 1954.

CAMPAIGN TO INSTALL PRO-WESTERN GOVERNMENTIN IRAN

AUTHORITY: Approved by the President, Secretary of State, - and DCI on 11 July 1953. NSC 136/1.See - Document 225. NSC 136/1 is Document + and DCI on 11 July 1953. NSC 136/1.See + Document 225. NSC 136/1 is Document 147.

Target

Prime Minister Mossadeq and his @@ -49785,48 +42209,36 @@ Minister

CIA Action

Plan of action was implemented in four phases:

-

1. Through direct pressure, applied by CIA’s representatives in Iran, to strengthen the Shah’s +

1. Through direct pressure, applied by CIA’s representatives in Iran, to strengthen the Shah’s will to exercise his constitutional power and to sign those decrees - necessary to effect the legal removal of Mossadeq as Prime Minister;

+ necessary to effect the legal removal of Mossadeq as Prime Minister;

2. Welded together and coordinated the efforts of those political - factions in Iran who were antagonistic toward Mossadeq, including the powerfully + factions in Iran who were antagonistic toward Mossadeq, including the powerfully influential clergy, to gain their support and backing of any legal - action taken by the Shah to accomplish Mossadeq’s removal;

+ action taken by the Shah to accomplish Mossadeq’s removal;

3. Launched an intensive propaganda campaign intended to disenchant the - Iranian population with the myth of Mossadeq’s patriotism, by exposing his collaboration with the Communists + Iranian population with the myth of Mossadeq’s patriotism, by exposing his collaboration with the Communists and his manipulation of constitutional authority to serve his own personal ambitions for power;

-

Simultaneously, conducted a “war of nerves” against Mossadeq designed to reveal to +

Simultaneously, conducted a “war of nerves” against Mossadeq designed to reveal to Mossadeq and to the general populace that increased economic aid would not be forthcoming and that - the U.S. viewed with alarm Mossadeq’s policies:

+ the U.S. viewed with alarm Mossadeq’s policies:

a. A series of public statements by high U.S. officials implying that - there was little hope that Mossadeq could expect increased U.S. aid;

+ there was little hope that Mossadeq could expect increased U.S. aid;

b. U.S. press and magazine articles which were critical of him and his methods; and

c. The induced absence of the American Ambassador, lending credence to - the impression that the U.S. had lost confidence in Mossadeq and his government.

+ the impression that the U.S. had lost confidence in Mossadeq and his government.

4. Developed covertly and independently a military apparatus within the Iranian Army which could be counted on to back up any legal action taken - by the Shah to remove Mossadeq.

+ by the Shah to remove Mossadeq.

Results

The original D-Day set by CIA misfired when Mossadeq, learning of the plan through a leak in our military covert apparatus, took immediate counteraction to neutralize the plan.

-

An intensive propaganda campaign, engineered and directed by CIA, was launched in the interim period +

An intensive propaganda campaign, engineered and directed by CIA, was launched in the interim period between the original and final D–Days to educate the Iranian population to the fact that, in view of the dissolution of the Majlis (effected by Mossadeq at an earlier stage @@ -49846,9 +42258,7 @@ “touched off” are inserted here by hand at this point. aided and abetted by CIA’s covert contributions. The military and security forces joined the populace, - Radio Tehran was taken over, and Mossadeq was forced to flee on 17 Aug 53.This sentence was revised by hand. It originally + Radio Tehran was taken over, and Mossadeq was forced to flee on 17 Aug 53.This sentence was revised by hand. It originally read: “The military were forced to act in quelling the riots and gained strength on the momentum of the situation in support of the Shah.”

@@ -49889,8 +42299,7 @@ Emergency Phase: - Immediately following Zahedi’s assumption of the Prime Minister-ship + Immediately following Zahedi’s assumption of the Prime Minister-ship and to fill the financial gapuntil official U.S. funds could bemade available to the new Iranian government, CIA made an outright grant @@ -49906,26 +42315,17 @@

Information received from John - Waller, Chief, NE/4 on 5 Mar 54.A handwritten note at the end of the memorandum - indicates it was revised on March 8 and signed by Waller on that same day.

+ Waller, Chief, NE/4 on 5 Mar 54.A handwritten note at the end of the memorandum + indicates it was revised on March 8 and signed by Waller on that same day.

-
+
364. Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency Representative on - the NSC 5402 Working Group (Waller) to the Special Assistant to the - Director of Central Intelligence (Jackson)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of - Intelligence, Job 80R01731R, Box 30, Folder 1010, NSC 5402—Iran. Top + the NSC 5402 Working Group (Waller) to the Special Assistant to the + Director of Central Intelligence (Jackson)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of + Intelligence, Job 80R01731R, Box 30, Folder 1010, NSC 5402—Iran. Top Secret. - Washington, March 19, 1954. + Washington, March 19, 1954. SUBJECT Summary of Action Taken By OCB @@ -49933,24 +42333,18 @@ 18 Meeting

1. The meeting on March 18 was almost exclusively devoted to para. 15 - NSC 5402.Document 355. In + NSC 5402.Document 355. In view of recent reports indicating that negotiations in London between - the major American oil companies and AIOC with regard to compensation had reached a + the major American oil companies and AIOC with regard to compensation had reached a deadlock,An apparent reference to the - deadlock in negotiations surrounding AIOC’s position on financial participation and + deadlock in negotiations surrounding AIOC’s position on financial participation and compensation. In telegram 4773 to London, March 17, the Department criticized AIOC’s position as being unacceptable to both the Iranian Government and the American companies willing to participate in the oil consortium. For telegram - 4773, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, - pp. 949–950 (Document 436). the OCB Working Group drafted recommendations - for action to be presented to the next meeting of the OCB. The draft is worded essentially as + 4773, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, + pp. 949–950 (Document 436). the OCB Working Group drafted recommendations + for action to be presented to the next meeting of the OCB. The draft is worded essentially as follows although minor editing was to be done before it was to be passed to the OCB:

“Bearing in mind para 15 (c) of NSC 5402 @@ -50011,12 +42405,10 @@ judge whether the dangers of such exceptional pressures to the Anglo-American alliance are sufficient to out-weigh the dangers of failing to achieve an early oil settlement in Iran.

-

It is recommended that the Chairman of the OCB consider sending a telegram along the following lines +

It is recommended that the Chairman of the OCB consider sending a telegram along the following lines to Mr. Hoover at London:

“Consideration is being given to psychological pressures on the British - Government. Request your advice regarding ways in which such pressure might be most effective + Government. Request your advice regarding ways in which such pressure might be most effective in encouraging more reasonable approach re Iran oil problem. For example, we are thinking of further indications to the British that the U.S. may be forced to take unilateral action in Iran and the Middle @@ -50024,10 +42416,7 @@ influenced by impression of reasonableness of British position on Iran oil.”

2. It is suggested that the DCI be - advised of the above soonest and prior to the next OCB meeting.At the end of the memorandum, Jackson added a handwritten note that reads: “23 + advised of the above soonest and prior to the next OCB meeting.At the end of the memorandum, Jackson added a handwritten note that reads: “23 March—Waller informed me that Gen. Smith had a talk with the @@ -50035,13 +42424,11 @@ above lines. The negotiations are going along better as of this date.”

- John H. - Waller + John H. + Waller
-
+
365. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence AgencySource: National Archives, RG 273, Records @@ -50050,15 +42437,12 @@ memorandum from Paul Borel, Deputy Assistant Director of ONE, to Lay stating that it was - intended as a contribution to the NSC Planning Board’s meeting on NSC 5402 on March 31. A note on the + intended as a contribution to the NSC Planning Board’s meeting on NSC 5402 on March 31. A note on the memorandum indicates that it originated as an attachment to a memorandum from the Assistant Director of the Office of National Estimates, Kent, to the DCI on March 29. - Washington, March 29, 1954. + Washington, March 29, 1954.

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES IN IRAN OF FAILURE TOACHIEVE AN EARLY OIL SETTLEMENTThis is an estimate prepared by the Board of National Estimates of the Central @@ -50079,8 +42463,7 @@ succeed where Mossadeq failed in deriving adequate benefits from Iran’s oil resources.

2. Thus far the situation has developed favorably for the present - leadership. With the aid of $51 million in US emergency grants, Iran’s treasury has been restored for + leadership. With the aid of $51 million in US emergency grants, Iran’s treasury has been restored for the time being to reasonable order. Ultranationalist and Tudeh elements, the chief opposition to the government and its present policies, remain weak and divided, and the general public is at least passively aligned @@ -50108,12 +42491,10 @@

5. If US emergency aid were allowed to run out before a settlement had been reached or was immediately in prospect, Iran’s present moderate leadership would be in serious - trouble. The budgetary deficit now covered by US aid could be met only by deficit financing techniques + trouble. The budgetary deficit now covered by US aid could be met only by deficit financing techniques which the Majlis would be reluctant to authorize and which if long continued would probably lead to a progressive weakening of Iran’s - financial stability. The withdrawal of US financial support would also seriously damage the + financial stability. The withdrawal of US financial support would also seriously damage the government’s morale and prestige, would lead to widespread popular discouragement about Iran’s future, and would be likely to result in a resurgence of extremist pressures. Indeed, the failure to continue @@ -50132,24 +42513,19 @@ lead to a gradual but progressive narrowing of the government’s freedom of action in dealing with the oil question. Opposition elements would have further opportunities to criticize the settlement terms under - negotiation, attack the UK and US, and ridicule the government’s + negotiation, attack the UK and US, and ridicule the government’s expectation that it could do business with them. Although the government - would at first seek to avoid friction with the UK and US, it would become + would at first seek to avoid friction with the UK and US, it would become increasingly discouraged about the prospect for a settlement and would - tend to become more and more bitter over the failure of AIOC and the other oil companies to - provide a plan satisfactory to Iran and over US failure to compel them to do so. Eventually, the + tend to become more and more bitter over the failure of AIOC and the other oil companies to + provide a plan satisfactory to Iran and over US failure to compel them to do so. Eventually, the declining morale and prestige of the Iranian Government and the rising strength and vigor of the opposition might create a situation in which conclusion of any kind of a settlement would be impossible.

7. If it became apparent, as a result either of a clear-cut breakdown of negotiations or of cumulative delays and disappointments, that there was little or no real hope of a satisfactory settlement, the position of the - moderate elements in Iran would be seriously weakened. If US emergency aid were continued, it would + moderate elements in Iran would be seriously weakened. If US emergency aid were continued, it would most likely enable the moderates to retain control at least initially, but Zahedi himself might have to be dropped as a scapegoat, and the ability of the moderates to retain @@ -50171,12 +42547,9 @@ US assistance in marketing Iranian oil without British participation. Even assuming that such an arrangement could actually be made, its consequences would depend - primarily on the extent to which Iranian oil revenues were actually restored.A US decision to + primarily on the extent to which Iranian oil revenues were actually restored.A US decision to assist Iran in marketing its oil without reference to the British - would also have major repercussions on US–UK relations which + would also have major repercussions on US–UK relations which are not considered in this paper. [Footnote is in the original.] Should this arrangement result in only limited restoration of Iranian oil revenues, the Iranians would probably tend @@ -50184,16 +42557,10 @@ failed to put sufficient pressure on the British to secure a more adequate settlement.

-
- 366. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/4–2954. - Confidential. Drafted by Stutesman. - Washington, April 29, +
+ 366. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/4–2954. + Confidential. Drafted by Stutesman. + Washington, April 29, 1954. PARTICIPANTS @@ -50209,8 +42576,7 @@ tribe and wished to present to officials of the American Government the nature of a very serious problem which was facing the Qashqais.

First he reviewed the history of the tribe, fighting mountain nomads who - were moved, some four hundred years ago, by the Safavi monarch, Shah Abbas, from the + were moved, some four hundred years ago, by the Safavi monarch, Shah Abbas, from the Caucasus mountain area to the mountains of southwest Iran. The tribe has been involved in trouble and fighting its entire history, and, as Mohammed Hosein concluded, “Is now again in trouble”.

@@ -50220,15 +42586,12 @@ from Iran. Mr. Qashqai interjected at this point that Prime Minister Zahedi is not antagonistic to the Qashqais and is in fact responsible for the comparatively calm - relations which have existed during the past eight months between the Government + relations which have existed during the past eight months between the Government authorities and the tribe.On January 7, - Zahedi told Henderson that the Shah felt that + Zahedi told Henderson that the Shah felt that “the Qashqais were not to be trusted, and that therefore three of the brothers, Nasser, - Khosrow, and Mahammed Hosein, should leave the country.” See Document 358.

+ Khosrow, and Mahammed Hosein, should leave the country.” See Document 358.

Mohammed Hosein said that the tribal people have long looked to his family for leadership. He and his brothers were raised in the tribal mountains, love their people and could not be happy even in the finest @@ -50246,8 +42609,7 @@ of the tribal leadership and probably of the tribal pattern of life. He pointed out somewhat wryly that this objective seemed to be similar to that sought by the Shah.

-

In response to a question from Mr. Murphy, he stated that the tribe did not seek a +

In response to a question from Mr. Murphy, he stated that the tribe did not seek a semi-autonomous status but in fact only wanted to live like other citizens of Iran. He pointed out that they presently pay substantial taxes to the Iranian Government.

@@ -50255,8 +42617,7 @@ Government, through the mouth of its Ambassador in Iran, could make some representation to the Shah which would result in amelioration of the Shah’s present antagonistic attitude. This would fit within the American - objectives in Iran of maintaining stability and peace. Mr. Murphy replied that he was most + objectives in Iran of maintaining stability and peace. Mr. Murphy replied that he was most interested in this problem, as described by Mr. Qashqai, and would consult with interested officers in the Department upon the matter. He then asked Mr. Qashqai to show on a map where the tribe lived in Iran, @@ -50265,9 +42626,7 @@ tribal migrations.

-
+
367. Information Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job @@ -50278,8 +42637,7 @@ CS–40139 - Washington, June 14, 1954. + Washington, June 14, 1954. SUBJECT Corruption in the Zahedi @@ -50294,8 +42652,7 @@ Appraisal of Content: [less than 1 line not declassified] -

1. The Shah believes that the popularity and power of the Zahedi Government is at a low ebb as +

1. The Shah believes that the popularity and power of the Zahedi Government is at a low ebb as the result of widespread corruption. This situation is further aggravated by activities of the Tudeh Party, which has exaggerated the extent of the corruption, thus contributing greatly to the growing storm @@ -50303,8 +42660,7 @@ that this situation must be stopped and expressed the opinion that the Government can be held in office only so long as he lends it his strongest support.Field - Comment: It is likely that, unless Zahedi launches his own effective + Comment: It is likely that, unless Zahedi launches his own effective anti-corruption campaign, the chances of survival of his Government following conclusion of the oil negotiations are practically nil. [Footnote is in the original.]

@@ -50314,10 +42670,8 @@ Shah’s own position, the Shah decided to continue giving “strong” support to the present Government. His decision was based on the fear that any show of friction between the Shah and the Government might have - an adverse effect on the oil negotiations.Field Comment: The Shah’s decision to - continue to support the Zahedi Government was confirmed by an Iranian source + an adverse effect on the oil negotiations.Field Comment: The Shah’s decision to + continue to support the Zahedi Government was confirmed by an Iranian source in close personal contact with the Royal Court for the past 21 years. However, unconfirmed reports indicate that the Shah is intriguing within and actively penetrating the civil bureaucracy @@ -50329,8 +42683,7 @@

4. The Shah received Ardeshir Zahedi in audience on 3 June, following the latter’s return from Europe on 2 June. When Ardeshir emerged from the audience, - he was in tears and remarked bitterly, “Why wasn’t I told how bad things are? I could + he was in tears and remarked bitterly, “Why wasn’t I told how bad things are? I could have been here to help. My father is a good man: His Majesty knows that he is a good man.”Source Comment: It is obvious that the Shah delivered a strong @@ -50338,11 +42691,8 @@ Iran at the moment and one in which the Shah is extremely interested. [Footnote is in the original.]

-
- 368. Project Outline Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence +
+ 368. Project Outline Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 78–01521R, Box 5, Folder 14, [cryptonym not declassified]. Secret. The covering sheet indicates that the @@ -50350,8 +42700,7 @@ [name not declassified] on June 28. Waller reviewed the outline as well. - Washington, June 15, 1954. + Washington, June 15, 1954.

1. Objective:

To establish an effective political action/psychological warfare program in Iran with which to oppose Tudeh/Communists, and to build a stable, @@ -50362,31 +42711,19 @@

This is a continuing project which was originated in 1951, receiving approval from DADPC on 11 August 1951.See Document - 41. The project resulted from CIA responsibility under NSC 10/2 (superseded by NSC 5412), NSC 107 (superseded by NSC + 41. The project resulted from CIA responsibility under NSC 10/2 (superseded by NSC 5412), NSC 107 (superseded by NSC 136), and conforms to NSC 5402, approved 2 January 1954 which authorizes covert action to direct Iranian nationalist feeling into constructive channels thereby strengthening the ability and desire of the Iranian people to resist Communist - pressure.For NSC 10/2, June 18, 1948, see Foreign + pressure.For NSC 10/2, June 18, 1948, see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence - Establishment, pp. 713–715 (Document 293). For NSC 5412, see ibid., 1950–1955, The - Intelligence Community, 1950–1955, pp. 475–478 (Document 171). NSC 107/2 is Document 35; NSC 136/1 - is Document 147; NSC 5402 is Document + Establishment, pp. 713–715 (Document 293). For NSC 5412, see ibid., 1950–1955, The + Intelligence Community, 1950–1955, pp. 475–478 (Document 171). NSC 107/2 is Document 35; NSC 136/1 + is Document 147; NSC 5402 is Document 355.

The project also conforms to the Letter of Instructions to the Chief of - Mission, Tehran, Iran, approved 4 April 1954.Not found.

+ Mission, Tehran, Iran, approved 4 April 1954.Not found.

b. The project originated in the field.

3. Situation:

@@ -50416,25 +42753,21 @@ government would greatly strengthen communist capabilities in neighboring countries and threaten the position of the western powers throughout the area.

-

In contrast with the opportunities of 1951, CIA is now in a much better strategic position, has gained +

In contrast with the opportunities of 1951, CIA is now in a much better strategic position, has gained the services of many additional agents and assets, and most important, has established a close relationship with the Shah and the present - government. The fall of the Mossadeq government in August 1953 and the installation + government. The fall of the Mossadeq government in August 1953 and the installation of the Zahedi regime created a situation containing greatly broadened potentialities for effective action against the Tudeh Party and in the interest of political stability. The Shah and the Prime Minister, cognizant of the need for assistance in their effort to capitalize on the present situation, have - become willing collaborators with CIA.

+ become willing collaborators with CIA.

[1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified]

In addition to support for the Department of Press and Propaganda the [5 lines not declassified].

[1 paragraph (13 lines) not declassified]

-

The problem facing the Iranian government and CIA is the suppression of the Tudeh Party and the +

The problem facing the Iranian government and CIA is the suppression of the Tudeh Party and the establishment of a strong, popular, progressive government, one that is in harmony with the throne, which serves as the strongest factor of stability in the political scene.

@@ -50474,9 +42807,7 @@ 1955.

-
+
369. Information Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job @@ -50487,8 +42818,7 @@ CS–40518 - Washington, June 17, 1954. + Washington, June 17, 1954. SUBJECT Government Offer to Khosrow Khan Qashqai @@ -50503,8 +42833,7 @@ Staff General Nadr Batmangelich.” (Ibid., Box 40, Folder 15, CS Information Reports 36200–36209) CS–33633CS–33633, March 17, reported - on the agreement reached between the Qashqai and the Zahedi government. According to + on the agreement reached between the Qashqai and the Zahedi government. According to this report, Nasr Khan agreed to remain in Iran during the summer tribal migration, to be led by Malek Mansur Qashqai, but Mohammad Hoseyn Qashqai and his family would leave Iran for @@ -50528,9 +42857,7 @@ tribal stronghold near Firuzabad.

-
+
370. Information Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job @@ -50541,20 +42868,17 @@ CS–40723 - Washington, June 17, 1954. + Washington, June 17, 1954. SUBJECT - Details of Opposition to Zahedi Government + Details of Opposition to Zahedi Government REFERENCES CS–40354CS–40354, June 17, reported that General Batmangelich was agitating strongly for the replacement of Prime Minister - Zahedi. The report also stated that Zahedi was aware of + Zahedi. The report also stated that Zahedi was aware of Batmangelich’s activities. (Ibid., Folder 75, CS Information Reports 40350–40359) @@ -50564,58 +42888,47 @@

The following is a summary of events which reflect the thinking and agitation of various segments of the political arena in Iran concerning - opposition to the Government of Prime Minister Zahedi:

+ opposition to the Government of Prime Minister Zahedi:

1. On 4 June 1954, Senator Manuchehr Eqbal stated that the Government had received an eleventh hour reprieve through:

-

a. the accidental death of General Mohammed Hoseyn JahanbaniWashington Comment: +

a. the accidental death of General Mohammed Hoseyn JahanbaniWashington Comment: Jahanbani, Minister without Portfolio, died as a result of an automobile accident near Hamadan, Iran. [Footnote is in the original.] on 30 April 1954, which precluded the exposure of a major scandal concerning government corruption, in which Jahanbani was involved, and

-

b. the Shah’s appeal, transmitted by Minister of Court Hoseyn Ala, for strong Majlis support +

b. the Shah’s appeal, transmitted by Minister of Court Hoseyn Ala, for strong Majlis support of the Government in the interest of an oil settlement.

2. On 5 June, Military Governor Timur Bakhtiar stated that he was not sure that the Government would last through the oil negotiations, despite the Shah’s support.

-

3. On 8 June, Manuchehr Eqbal approached Princess Ashraf for her support of a movement to replace +

3. On 8 June, Manuchehr Eqbal approached Princess Ashraf for her support of a movement to replace Prime Minister Zahedi with Minister of Court Hoseyn Ala, to be followed by himself (Eqbal). Princess - Ashraf refused on the basis that Ala was too weak.

+ Ashraf refused on the basis that Ala was too weak.

4. General Hasan Arfa stated on 7 June that Prime Minister Zahedi must go and that, if a non-military figure is desired to replace Zahedi, it should be Hoseyn Ala; if it is - to be a military figure, he, Arfa, should be selected. Arfa feels sure of United States and British support and + to be a military figure, he, Arfa, should be selected. Arfa feels sure of United States and British support and is confident that their preference is for a military figure.

5. On 9 June General Hasan Akhavi - was still in Tehran on two months’ leave.Field Comment: If it is true that + was still in Tehran on two months’ leave.Field Comment: If it is true that General Arfa’s arch stooge, General Akhavi, is slated for Chief of Staff, he (Akhavi) is probably awaiting political developments. [Footnote is in the original.]

-
+
371. Quarterly Report Prepared in the Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 81–01061R, Box 3, Folder 4, Quarterly Report April–June 1954. Top Secret. - Washington, July 8, 1954. + Washington, July 8, 1954.

IRAN

April–June 1954

1. Summary of PP/PM @@ -50624,8 +42937,7 @@ guidance support to an agent highly placed in the Department of Propaganda so as to make more effective the government propaganda program of: 1) preparing public opinion for an oil settlement, 2) - convincing the people that the policy of the Mossadeq government was destructive and dangerous in its + convincing the people that the policy of the Mossadeq government was destructive and dangerous in its communist collaboration and usurpation of power, and 3) increasing public support for the Shah and Zahedi. In addition to continued broadcasting, publishing, and film production, a popular Tudeh song was @@ -50636,8 +42948,7 @@

The considerable amount of propaganda put out over the principal informational media has probably increased the chances of public acceptance of an oil agreement, if one is concluded. Propaganda and - political action has helped Zahedi retain the premiership in the face of strong + political action has helped Zahedi retain the premiership in the face of strong pressure from rival political factions.

[2 paragraphs (6 lines) not declassified]

@@ -50645,8 +42956,7 @@ Results:

While the current program is meeting its general objectives, the grave problems created by Iranian political instability have continued to - mount. Public antagonism to Zahedi is generally constrained due to government + mount. Public antagonism to Zahedi is generally constrained due to government security measures; however, within the Majlis and the cabinet outright opposition to Zahedi is evident. Direct Station pressure upon the Shah has been successful in that the @@ -50659,16 +42969,13 @@ removed at this time, a stepped up program in support of the present government is being prepared.

- [name not declassified] Acting Chief, + [name not declassified] Acting Chief, NEA/4
-
+
372. Editorial Note -

In a memorandum to Secretary of State Dulles, July 30, 1954, Acting Special Assistant for +

In a memorandum to Secretary of State Dulles, July 30, 1954, Acting Special Assistant for Intelligence Fisher Howe discussed the political prospects for Iran. He wrote that political power in Iran was exercised by the Shah and the landowning classes. If @@ -50676,22 +42983,18 @@ army would intervene. Iran’s power structure was maintained by the continuance of martial law, the enforcement of strict press censorship, the work of the security forces, the provision of U.S. emergency aid, - and the expectation of an oil settlement favorable to Iran. Howe wrote that “this balance is likely + and the expectation of an oil settlement favorable to Iran. Howe wrote that “this balance is likely to be broken by the persistence of fundamental political and social trends which neither the Shah nor the landowning groups will be able to alter. The new urban groups, for example—especially intellectuals, professional men, merchants, and workers—will probably grow in importance as the force of traditional social relationships and beliefs diminishes in the continuing encounter with Western modernism.” For the - full text of this memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, volume X, Iran, + full text of this memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, volume X, Iran, 1951–1954, pages 1041–1042 (Document 485).

-
+
373. Editorial Note

In a statement issued in Tehran on August 5, 1954, Dr. Ali Amini, Chairman of the Iranian delegation to the oil talks, and Howard Page, @@ -50699,25 +43002,20 @@ consortium, announced an agreement “which will restore the flow of Iranian oil to world markets in substantial quantities.” Under the agreement, two operating companies would be formed to run the oil fields - and refinery in Iran on behalf of the NIOC (National Iranian Oil Company). The NIOC would in turn sell crude and refined + and refinery in Iran on behalf of the NIOC (National Iranian Oil Company). The NIOC would in turn sell crude and refined oil to an international consortium of oil companies. The agreement would remain in force for 25 years, with the possibility of three 5-year extensions thereafter. For the text of the announcement, see Department of State Bulletin, August 16, 1954, pages 232–233.

-
+
374. Quarterly Report Prepared in the Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 81–01061R, Box 3, Folder 5, CS Quarterly Report, July–September 1954. Top Secret. - Washington, October 12, 1954. + Washington, October 12, 1954.

IRAN

July–September 1954

I. Summary of PP/PM @@ -50726,15 +43024,11 @@

II. Summary of Results

[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

The 28 Mordad celebration was an outstanding success and contributed - materially to enhancing the prestige of the Zahedi Government. It also gave the public further - evidence of harmony between the Shah and Zahedi at a time when rumors that “Zahedi would be + materially to enhancing the prestige of the Zahedi Government. It also gave the public further + evidence of harmony between the Shah and Zahedi at a time when rumors that “Zahedi would be replaced” were impeding the effectiveness of the present government.

Large-scale propaganda exploitation of the Tudeh roundup has resulted in - reducing some of the public’s previous antagonism towards the Zahedi government’s security measures and has heightened + reducing some of the public’s previous antagonism towards the Zahedi government’s security measures and has heightened public recognition of the Tudeh menace.

III. Significance of Results

@@ -50744,8 +43038,7 @@ continue to mount. The Shah has stated that he will continue to support Zahedi if the latter takes steps to raise the general standard-of-living in Iran and pushes through - necessary government reforms. Active “politicking against Zahedi by some cabinet members, certain + necessary government reforms. Active “politicking against Zahedi by some cabinet members, certain high military officials and various Majlis and Senate members is increasingly evident, but it is the consensus that, barring unforeseen circumstances, Zahedi can remain @@ -50764,24 +43057,19 @@ success in coping with these issues will to a large extent determine its fate in the coming months.

- [name not declassified] Chief, + [name not declassified] Chief, NEA–4
-
- 375. National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79R01012A, Box 43, +
+ 375. National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79R01012A, Box 43, Folder 1, (NIE 34–54) Probable Developments in Iran through 1955. Secret. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the - Air Force, and the Joint Staff. All representatives of the IAC concurred with the exception of + Air Force, and the Joint Staff. All representatives of the IAC concurred with the exception of the Atomic Energy Commission Representative and the Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds the subject was outside their jurisdiction. @@ -50790,16 +43078,14 @@ NIE 34–54 - Washington, December 7, 1954. + Washington, December 7, 1954.

PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN THROUGH 1955

The Problem

To estimate probable trends in Iran in the light of the oil settlement, with particular respect to: (a) the prospects for continued control by Zahedi or other moderate leaders; (b) the outlook for economic and political stability; (c) the - probable extent of Iran’s will and ability to contribute to US-backed regional security programs; and + probable extent of Iran’s will and ability to contribute to US-backed regional security programs; and (d) the extent to which continuing US assistance and influence will be important factors in the situation.

Conclusions

@@ -50807,8 +43093,7 @@ political power in Iran has largely reverted to the Shah and the conservative traditional ruling group. The principal new features of the situation are: (a) the extent to which authoritarian means have been - used to curtail opposition; (b) the emergence of the US as an acknowledged major influence in + used to curtail opposition; (b) the emergence of the US as an acknowledged major influence in the situation; and (c) the re-emergence of British political and economic influence. (Paras. 13–14)

2. Zahedi’s chances of survival @@ -50834,15 +43119,13 @@ re-emerge as an active threat unless the government both continues effective suppression and succeeds in allaying popular grievances. (Paras. 15, 21, 35–37)

-

4. The resumption of oil production, together with interim US aid, will provide Iran with substantial +

4. The resumption of oil production, together with interim US aid, will provide Iran with substantial funds for an economic development program which could do much to meet popular aspirations. However, the ultimate effectiveness of any such program will depend not only on the money available but also on the way in which the government tackles the managerial and political problems involved, and on the Shah’s willingness to provide firm support. This, - in turn, is likely to depend on the ability of the US and UK + in turn, is likely to depend on the ability of the US and UK to work together effectively and influence the Shah and other Iranian leaders against allowing the programs to be unduly weakened by corruption, mismanagement, and political maneuvering. (Paras. 29, 38, @@ -50869,10 +43152,8 @@ they are confident that such a move would not encounter serious opposition within Iran. Neither condition is likely to be met within the next year or two. (Paras. 56–57)

-

8. So long as the Iranian Government continues to expect US economic, financial, and military - assistance, it will remain responsive to +

8. So long as the Iranian Government continues to expect US economic, financial, and military + assistance, it will remain responsive to US influence. As oil revenues are restored and US aid is reduced, however, Iranians may become increasingly determined to manage their own affairs @@ -50888,10 +43169,8 @@ drastic improvement in the professional standards of the officer corps, the development of a will to fight on the part of Iran’s conscript forces, and a government resolute to resist aggression. (Para. 52)

-

10. In the short run, the chief effects of an expanded US military aid program would be political. - Such a program would strengthen the self-confidence and pro-US orientation of the Shah, army leaders, +

10. In the short run, the chief effects of an expanded US military aid program would be political. + Such a program would strengthen the self-confidence and pro-US orientation of the Shah, army leaders, and other key elements in Iran. If accompanied by improved pay and living conditions, such a program would also tend to lessen the vulnerability of the armed forces to Tudeh appeals and thereby to @@ -50899,14 +43178,12 @@

11. The USSR would almost certainly regard it as provocative if Iran joined a Western-backed regional defense organization, and would probably respond with strong diplomatic - protests and increased subversive and propaganda efforts. The USSR might also threaten to invoke the + protests and increased subversive and propaganda efforts. The USSR might also threaten to invoke the 1921 Irano-Soviet Treaty, which it interprets as permitting it to introduce troops into Iran in case of threatened invasion from Iranian territory. If establishment of Western bases on Iranian soil appeared to be in prospect, the Soviet reaction would be stronger and would probably - include shows of force along the border. In this case, the USSR might claim comparable base rights + include shows of force along the border. In this case, the USSR might claim comparable base rights in Iran which would result in the movement of Soviet forces into Iran. (Para. 61)

12. Iran, under any foreseeable leadership, will continue to resist @@ -50917,12 +43194,10 @@

Discussion

I. Political

Present Situation

-

13. Since the overthrow of Mossadeq in August 1953, political power in Iran has +

13. Since the overthrow of Mossadeq in August 1953, political power in Iran has largely reverted to those who controlled the country prior to the oil nationalization crisis of 1951. The Shah has been confirmed in his - central role in the governmental power structure; as the most important focus of prestige and + central role in the governmental power structure; as the most important focus of prestige and political influence in the country; and, through his continuing personal control of the armed forces, as a powerful force in political affairs. The mixture of zealots, demagogues, and reformers who rose to prominence @@ -50936,8 +43211,7 @@

14. The principal new features of the present power situation are: (a) the extensive use of authoritarian means—martial law, censorship, and prosecution or repression of opponents—to curtail opposition to the - regime and to the government; (b) the emergence of the US, which many Iranians hold responsible + regime and to the government; (b) the emergence of the US, which many Iranians hold responsible for effecting Mossadeq’s downfall and which has since been the chief financial backer of the government, as an acknowledged major influence in the situation; and (c) the @@ -50946,8 +43220,7 @@ reasonably orderly and stable government has been established in Iran. The Majlis and Senate have been reconstituted, and as yet there has been no resumption of the irresponsible bickering and obstructionism which - has marked the legislative process in the past. Zahedi has sought and successfully + has marked the legislative process in the past. Zahedi has sought and successfully retained the support of the Shah and has thus been able to stave off various emergent political conspiracies to replace him. The government has recognized its probable inability to appease the extremists and has @@ -50971,8 +43244,7 @@

17. Despite these achievements, a real basis for lasting stability is still lacking. The events of the last year have not eliminated the strains and discontents which - accounted for much of the success of Mossadeq’s nationalist appeal (and for much of the + accounted for much of the success of Mossadeq’s nationalist appeal (and for much of the appeal of the Tudeh Party). Extreme nationalism itself has been repressed rather than destroyed as a major political force. The government has failed to achieve widespread support and at best appears @@ -50985,8 +43257,7 @@ importance because of their impact on the potentially politically influential urban middle and lower class elements.

18. Because of the traditional practice of using public office for - private and family gain, many officials, including Zahedi himself, have been accused of + private and family gain, many officials, including Zahedi himself, have been accused of the same graft and corruption which have long encouraged popular cynicism about the government. The use of authoritarian methods has tended to create some adverse reaction of its own: it has probably @@ -50996,12 +43267,9 @@ success to date in retaining the support of the Shah and in obtaining the cooperation of the Majlis and Senate, he has few reliable supporters in either body. His success is largely due to general recognition that - an oil settlement was necessary and that the removal of Zahedi would have jeopardized the - settlement and incurred the disapproval of the US and the UK. Many - legislators probably also reasoned that Zahedi could be made the scapegoat in case the political + an oil settlement was necessary and that the removal of Zahedi would have jeopardized the + settlement and incurred the disapproval of the US and the UK. Many + legislators probably also reasoned that Zahedi could be made the scapegoat in case the political atmosphere changed and opposition to the oil settlement became active and widespread.

20. Now that the oil settlement has been achieved, it is uncertain as to @@ -51049,14 +43317,11 @@ active encouragement from the Palace. The Shah’s continued willingness to provide such backing, however, is uncertain. His underlying distrust of any strong personality, his predilection for political intrigue, and - his tendency to vacillate all militate against his supporting Zahedi on a sustained basis, + his tendency to vacillate all militate against his supporting Zahedi on a sustained basis, particularly now that the oil settlement has been achieved. Moreover, the probable increase in political activity in the months to come is - likely to make it easier for Zahedi’s rivals to persuade the Shah, who is keenly - sensitive to political currents within Iran, that Zahedi no longer is acceptable to the + likely to make it easier for Zahedi’s rivals to persuade the Shah, who is keenly + sensitive to political currents within Iran, that Zahedi no longer is acceptable to the political community and should be replaced. The Shah may be dissuaded from making an early switch by the difficulty of finding a satisfactory replacement, by fear of losing US or @@ -51071,8 +43336,7 @@ may develop during the Shah’s projected three months trip to Europe and the US beginning in December 1954 but would be unlikely to succeed in view of the Shah’s probable desire to - have no change of government during his absence. + have no change of government during his absence. Zahedi’s position will be open to further attack if he goes through with his plans to go to Europe for necessary medical attention following the Shah’s return. Moreover, the @@ -51090,15 +43354,13 @@ necessarily lead to any significant change in the over-all stability and orientation of the government, since the Shah would remain the most influential single figure in the governmental structure and since the - present government’s major policies are as much his as Zahedi’s. However, a successor might + present government’s major policies are as much his as Zahedi’s. However, a successor might not be as willing as Zahedi to use force to maintain order. Furthermore, successful efforts to remove Zahedi would encourage similar attacks on his successor and might accelerate the return of extremist groups to positions of political influence. Such a development - would tend to revive the pre-Mossadeq pattern of political instability. In this + would tend to revive the pre-Mossadeq pattern of political instability. In this situation, each prime minister in turn would secure a temporary majority in parliament by promising a redistribution of spoils. Sooner or later, however, he would no longer be able to meet the continuing demands of @@ -51106,22 +43368,17 @@ willing to promise more. If, in the meantime, the Shah had not taken action in the face of a succession of weak governments, a possibility of a coup by a strong military leader would have been created.

-

26. None of the leading candidates for Zahedi’s position has any solid political support and, +

26. None of the leading candidates for Zahedi’s position has any solid political support and, moreover, none shows any great promise as a national leader. The most prominent current candidate is Senator Manuchehr Eqbal, an experienced government official, believed to be particularly well-disposed toward the British and to have the confidence of the Shah. The Shah might also appoint his Minister of Court, Hosein - Ala, as an interim prime minister.Other aspirants for the prime ministership include: - Senator Javad Bushehri; retired general Hassan Arfa; Senator Dr. Mohammed Sajjadi; Ali - Soheyli, a former prime minister and now ambassador to the UK; and Abol Qasem Najm, a former + Ala, as an interim prime minister.Other aspirants for the prime ministership include: + Senator Javad Bushehri; retired general Hassan Arfa; Senator Dr. Mohammed Sajjadi; Ali + Soheyli, a former prime minister and now ambassador to the UK; and Abol Qasem Najm, a former minister of finance. [Footnote is in the original.] In any - case, the effectiveness of any successor to Zahedi would depend on the willingness and ability of + case, the effectiveness of any successor to Zahedi would depend on the willingness and ability of the Shah and the Prime Minister to cooperate.

Long-Range @@ -51131,8 +43388,7 @@ authoritarian methods now in effect. However, unless they make some progress in satisfying popular grievances and reducing popular distrust of the government, they will remain vulnerable to the sort of flareup, - under Tudeh or nationalist auspices, which was touched off by Razmara’s assassination and the oil + under Tudeh or nationalist auspices, which was touched off by Razmara’s assassination and the oil issue in 1951. In the long run, moreover, unless the traditional landowning group adjusts to a sharing of political power with growing urban middle class elements, there will probably be an increase in the @@ -51171,8 +43427,7 @@ necessity of such support and to keep his attention focused on the problem.

30. In any event, however, Iran is likely to remain a basically unsteady - country for a number of years. Iran’s underlying social and economic problems are of a sort + country for a number of years. Iran’s underlying social and economic problems are of a sort which can be solved only over a relatively long period of time and which, in the process, generate new tensions and stresses. With oil revenues in process of being restored and a beneficial relationship with @@ -51183,8 +43438,7 @@

31. In view of the key role of the Shah in the Iranian political system, the death of the present monarch could be a serious blow to Iranian stability, particularly since he has no male heirs of his own and has - refrained from openly designating a successor.With the recent death of the Shah’s only + refrained from openly designating a successor.With the recent death of the Shah’s only full-brother Ali Reza, the next in line is the Shah’s oldest half-brother, Gholam Reza, 31 years old. After Gholam Reza, the next in line is 30-year old Abdor Reza, former head of the Seven Year @@ -51243,9 +43497,7 @@

The Outlook for the Tudeh Party

35. The Communist Tudeh Party is currently at one of the low points in its history, though it remains the only political opposition group in - Iran that has some organization and discipline.During the last year of Dr. Mossadeq’s regime (1953) Tudeh + Iran that has some organization and discipline.During the last year of Dr. Mossadeq’s regime (1953) Tudeh membership probably reached a peak of about 35,000. Present active membership probably numbers about 7 to 8 thousand. [Footnote is in the original.] Strong popular opposition to Tudeh flared up @@ -51279,8 +43531,7 @@ of the Communists in recruiting Iranian personnel for their covert operations. The fact that the Tudeh ring in the armed forces apparently confined its efforts to espionage and the development of a sabotage - potential suggests that in present circumstances the USSR recognizes that its program must be + potential suggests that in present circumstances the USSR recognizes that its program must be confined to developing assets rather than fostering an early attempt to seize control of the armed forces.

37. At least for the short run, recent stringent measures against the @@ -51303,19 +43554,16 @@ Shah.

II. Economic

Present Situation

-

38. The chief economic accomplishment of the Zahedi government has been the agreement between Iran +

38. The chief economic accomplishment of the Zahedi government has been the agreement between Iran and a consortium of eight - Western firms for restoration of Iran’s oil industry.Major provisions of the settlement are summarized + Western firms for restoration of Iran’s oil industry.Major provisions of the settlement are summarized in an appendix. [Footnote is in the original.] This agreement, which calls for development of Iranian oil production by the end of the third full year of operation to a level yielding the Iranian Government revenues of approximately $175 million a year, will provide Iran with substantial funds for a program of economic rehabilitation and development.Consortium payments to Iran - will be in sterling. Under a secret UK-Iranian convertibility agreement, 40 percent of + will be in sterling. Under a secret UK-Iranian convertibility agreement, 40 percent of these sterling payments will be convertible into dollars. [Footnote is in the original.] Although the oil companies have made no further specific commitments, they have formally indicated that they @@ -51328,9 +43576,7 @@ various indirect economic benefits in the southern oil areas.

39. In other respects, the Iranian economy has done little more than mark time in the period since Zahedi’s - advent to power. The provision of $70 million in US emergency assistance has enabled Zahedi to pay the government’s running + advent to power. The provision of $70 million in US emergency assistance has enabled Zahedi to pay the government’s running expenses, and the oil settlement has bolstered general business confidence and Iran’s foreign credit standing. On the other hand, there has been little development activity other than that undertaken in @@ -51347,14 +43593,12 @@

40. The government has obtained US pledges of an additional $127.3 million in grant aid and loans during fiscal 1955 including $52.8 million for direct budgetary support. In - addition it has taken some steps, in part at US urging, to improve its future financial management. + addition it has taken some steps, in part at US urging, to improve its future financial management. Currency reform legislation was pushed through in July 1954, providing the government with increased flexibility in monetary matters. Following the wave of profligate government buying this summer, an Economic Council, made up of the director of the Plan Organization, the governor - of the Bank Melli, the Ministers of Finance and National Economy, and the Prime Minister, was + of the Bank Melli, the Ministers of Finance and National Economy, and the Prime Minister, was established to plan, coordinate, and control government finances and developmental expenditures. The government’s program also calls for prompt reorganization of the government tobacco monopoly and of the @@ -51377,8 +43621,7 @@ could be devoted to financing a development program. In the first full year of operation, however, Iran will obtain only about $60 million in oil revenues, and much if not all of this may be used up in meeting - current operating expenses. Although projected US aid for 1955 includes $52.8 million for direct budgetary + current operating expenses. Although projected US aid for 1955 includes $52.8 million for direct budgetary support—enough to cover the current rate of deficit—pressures for an increase in salaries of government workers, who have been particularly hard hit by inflation, will almost certainly become stronger. After the @@ -51397,8 +43640,7 @@ economic effects, there is a danger that without programs which have an immediate social or economic impact public confidence in the over-all program may be dissipated. These difficulties will be compounded if - lethargy, corruption, and mismanagement are allowed to delay the program or to divert its + lethargy, corruption, and mismanagement are allowed to delay the program or to divert its funds to private pockets or unproductive ventures. Moreover, the desired political effect will not be obtained unless special care is taken to assure sufficiently broad participation in the benefits of these @@ -51406,8 +43648,7 @@

44. The Shah and Zahedi appear convinced of the need for an effective development program and have some capable men associated with them in this effort. However, the problems - ahead cannot be solved without effective US and UK guidance and + ahead cannot be solved without effective US and UK guidance and support. Given such guidance and support, the Economic Planning Council may be able to commit the government to worthwhile projects which, though unpopular with certain vested interests, would be difficult for @@ -51424,8 +43665,7 @@ progress in improving its economic position. Both public and private foreign trade is likely to increase, particularly in view of the strong and growing desire of Japan, Germany, and Italy to participate in the - Iranian market. Barter trade with the USSR may increase in absolute terms, though its relative + Iranian market. Barter trade with the USSR may increase in absolute terms, though its relative importance is likely to decline in view of Iran’s expanding relations with the Western world.

III. Military

@@ -51452,8 +43692,7 @@ military missions to the Army and the Gendarmérie, and through provision of military equipment. Of the $110 million in such equipment aid allocated thus far, about $76 million had been shipped by mid-1954. The - mission to the Army is to be augmented by five US training teams at brigade or division level in early + mission to the Army is to be augmented by five US training teams at brigade or division level in early 1955.

49. While some improvements have been effected through these programs, the Iranian military establishment is still of generally poor quality. @@ -51518,8 +43757,7 @@ program would also tend to lessen the vulnerability of the armed forces to Tudeh appeals and thereby to improve their long-term reliability.

IV. Foreign Affairs

-

Relations with the US

+

Relations with the US

54. Under the Zahedi government, and with the strong support of the Shah, Iran has moved toward alignment with the West, particularly the US. The @@ -51529,35 +43767,26 @@ appear to welcome this relationship.

55. The Shah and other important leaders have shown themselves generally responsive to US advice over settlement - of the oil issue, resumption of relations with the UK, methods of improving the armed forces, + of the oil issue, resumption of relations with the UK, methods of improving the armed forces, and certain internal matters such as economic planning and - administration. Iran has generally supported the US in issues before the UN + administration. Iran has generally supported the US in issues before the UN and tends to follow US advice in its relations with other Asian states. Morever, since the signing of the - Turk-Pakistani agreement and the start of US military aid to Pakistan and Iraq, Iranian leaders, + Turk-Pakistani agreement and the start of US military aid to Pakistan and Iraq, Iranian leaders, particularly the Shah as Commander-in-Chief, have expressed growing - interest in eventual participation in US-backed regional defense preparations. Iran has maintained a + interest in eventual participation in US-backed regional defense preparations. Iran has maintained a firm position in the face of Soviet protests over the prospects for its - defense cooperation with the West, and the government has risked Soviet displeasure by firm + defense cooperation with the West, and the government has risked Soviet displeasure by firm measures against the Tudeh Party and Communist subversion.

-

56. So long as the Iranian Government continues to expect US economic, financial, and military - assistance, it will remain responsive to US influence. As oil revenues are restored and US aid is reduced Iranians may become +

56. So long as the Iranian Government continues to expect US economic, financial, and military + assistance, it will remain responsive to US influence. As oil revenues are restored and US aid is reduced Iranians may become increasingly determined to manage their own affairs and more resistant to US guidance. We do not believe, however, that developing Iranian self-reliance is likely to alter significantly the conviction of the government, and of the Shah in particular, that Iran requires Western support and friendly relations if it is to avoid isolation and eventual Soviet domination. The Shah is - especially desirous of building up the army and regards the US as the only feasible source of the + especially desirous of building up the army and regards the US as the only feasible source of the military assistance required to do so. He may also believe that obvious US concern about Iran gives him a favorable bargaining position. Even if he is unsuccessful in obtaining @@ -51582,14 +43811,12 @@ opposition within Iran. Neither condition is likely to be met within the next year or two at least. However, Iran might engage in informal staff talks with Iraq and possibly Turkey or Pakistan within this period.

-

Relations with the UK

+

Relations with the UK

58. Iranian-UK diplomatic relations have been resumed and, with the oil settlement, tension between the two governments has subsided. However, widespread suspicions of the British persist. Because of the fact that most Iranian leaders now tend to look - more to the US than to the UK for support and guidance, the expansion + more to the US than to the UK for support and guidance, the expansion of UK diplomatic influence is likely to be slow, and the UK will not, in the foreseeable future, regain its former position as the dominant Western @@ -51605,34 +43832,26 @@ encounter increasing competition from the West Germans in this and other business fields.

59. The UK currently agrees with the - US on the desirability of Zahedi’s remaining in office. However, - various differences are likely to arise between the US and UK. - The most likely source of major US–UK differences concerns - Iran’s role in Middle East defense. The UK not only has a low opinion of Iran’s military potential + US on the desirability of Zahedi’s remaining in office. However, + various differences are likely to arise between the US and UK. + The most likely source of major US–UK differences concerns + Iran’s role in Middle East defense. The UK not only has a low opinion of Iran’s military potential and reliability, and looks with considerable reserve on the Shah’s military aspirations, but also appears to believe that Iranian participation in a defense arrangement would unnecessarily provoke the USSR without adequate compensating benefits to the West. Moreover, the UK - is apparently less convinced than is the US of the urgency of the need to allay widespread social - and economic grievances in Iran. Other US–UK differences will + is apparently less convinced than is the US of the urgency of the need to allay widespread social + and economic grievances in Iran. Other US–UK differences will probably arise over commercial and financial conflicts of interest.

-

Relations with the USSR

+

Relations with the USSR

60. The Zahedi government’s actions and policies with respect to the oil dispute, resumption of relations with the UK, desire for increased US military aid, the uncovering of Tudeh sabotage and espionage rings, and firm action against the Tudeh Party have almost certainly appeared to Soviet leaders - as a setback to their interests in Iran. Nevertheless, the USSR is unlikely to respond with force, + as a setback to their interests in Iran. Nevertheless, the USSR is unlikely to respond with force, estimating that such action would almost certainly provoke a violent Western reaction. The USSR will probably continue its propaganda efforts to discredit the oil consortium @@ -51642,20 +43861,16 @@ so long as commercial and political advantages seem to warrant it, and may make further conciliatory gestures toward Iran. It has, for example, now initiated an agreement with Iran on boundary disputes and on the - restoration of gold and foreign exchange which the USSR has owed Iran.

+ restoration of gold and foreign exchange which the USSR has owed Iran.

61. The USSR would almost certainly regard it as provocative if Iran joined a Western-backed regional defense organization, and would probably respond with strong diplomatice - protests and increased subversive and propaganda efforts. The USSR might also threaten to invoke the - 1921 Irano-Soviet Treaty, which it interprets as permitting it to introduce troops into Iran in + protests and increased subversive and propaganda efforts. The USSR might also threaten to invoke the + 1921 Irano-Soviet Treaty, which it interprets as permitting it to introduce troops into Iran in case of threatened invasion from Iranian territory. If establishment of Western bases on Iranian soil appeared to be in prospect, the Soviet reaction would be stronger and would probably include shows of force - along the border. In this case, the USSR might claim comparable base rights which would result + along the border. In this case, the USSR might claim comparable base rights which would result in the movement of Soviet forces into Iran.

62. Iran, under any foreseeable leadership, will continue to resist Soviet attempts to interfere in Iranian affairs. At the same time it @@ -51741,387 +43956,246 @@ -

+
Index

References are to document numbers

Acheson, Dean: - Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 60 - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 99, 101, - 106, 109, 121, 146 + Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 60 + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 99, 101, + 106, 109, 121, 146 Mossadeq removal proposals, 70, - 77, 103 + 77, 103 Oil nationalization dispute, 27, - 49, 76, 99, 101, 121 + 49, 76, 99, 101, 121 Qavam appointment - crisis (July 1952), 85, 90, - 96, 97 - Tudeh Party takeover contingency plans, 141 + crisis (July 1952), 85, 90, + 96, 97 + Tudeh Party takeover contingency plans, 141 Adhavi, Col. Mohammad, 182 Afshar, Maj. Houshang, 330 - Afshartus, Gen. - Mahmud, 155, 182, 188, 196, 197, 205, 335 + Afshartus, Gen. + Mahmud, 155, 182, 188, 196, 197, 205, 335 Ahmadi, 73 - Akhavi, Ali Akbar, 207, 258 + Akhavi, Ali Akbar, 207, 258 Akhavi, Brig. Gen. - Hassan, 317, 322, 323, 332, 335, 340, 370 - Akhavi, Morteza, 336 + Hassan, 317, 322, 323, 332, 335, 340, 370 + Akhavi, Morteza, 336 Akhavj, Col. H., 240 - Ala, Hossein (see also + Ala, Hossein (see also Ala administration period): - As Mossadeq replacement candidate, 42, 54 - Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 49, 56 - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 113, 157, - 159, 164, 165, 187, 188, + As Mossadeq replacement candidate, 42, 54 + Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 49, 56 + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 113, 157, + 159, 164, 165, 187, 188, 205 Mossadeq removal proposals, 75, - 77, 78, 79 + 77, 78, 79 Oil nationalization dispute, 49, 370 Qavam appointment - crisis (July 1952), 83, 91, + crisis (July 1952), 83, 91, 92 - Resignation of, 20, 22, 65 + Resignation of, 20, 22, 65 U.S. covert activities and, 5, 8 Zahedi government period, 354, - 370, 375 + 370, 375 Ala administration period (Mar.-Apr. 1951): Berry memoranda, 12 CIA Directorate of Plans - memoranda, 4, 5 + memoranda, 4, 5 CIA Office of National Estimates memoranda, 3 Langer memoranda, 16 - NIE–6, 13 + NIE–6, 13 NSC 107, 6, 14 - NSC 107 progress reports, 21 + NSC 107 progress reports, 21 Kermit Roosevelt memoranda, 7, - 10, 17 + 10, 17 Soviet policy in Iran during, 3, 4, 6, 19 - Special Estimate, 7, 9, 28 + Special Estimate, 7, 9, 28 Stutesman report, 65 - U.S. covert activities, 5, 6, 8, 11, 14, - 15, 18 + U.S. covert activities, 5, 6, 8, 11, 14, + 15, 18 - Aldrich, Winthrop W., 218, 300, 331 + Aldrich, Winthrop W., 218, 300, 331 Alemi, 325 - Allen, George, 26, 192 + Allen, George, 26, 192 Allen, Raymond, 116 Amayoun Party, 192 Amidi-Nuri, 335 Amini, Abol Ghassem: - Mossadeq post-crisis administration period, 197, 200, - 203, 204, 235 - Mossadeq removal proposals and, 212, 217, 226 - Operation Ajax, 216, 261, 291 + Mossadeq post-crisis administration period, 197, 200, + 203, 204, 235 + Mossadeq removal proposals and, 212, 217, 226 + Operation Ajax, 216, 261, 291 Amini, Ali, 373 - Amini, Brig. Gen. Mahmoud, 205, 212, 216, 226 + Amini, Brig. Gen. Mahmoud, 205, 212, 216, 226 Amiralai, Chamseddine, 42 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) (see also Oil nationalization dispute), - 12, 13, 16, 17, 19, 20 + 12, 13, 16, 17, 19, 20 Ansari, Engineer, 341 Arab, Hassan, 330 - Aramesh, Ahmad, 332, 361 - Arfa, Gen. Hasan, 73, 322, 323, 332, 335, 370, 375 - Armory, Robert, Jr., 145, 304 + Aramesh, Ahmad, 332, 361 + Arfa, Gen. Hasan, 73, 322, 323, 332, 335, 370, 375 + Armory, Robert, Jr., 145, 304 Armstrong, W. Park, Jr., 357 Ashrafi, Mir, 217 - Azad, Ibol Qader, 5, 65 - Azerbaijani people, 1, 11, 13, 188, 295 + Azad, Ibol Qader, 5, 65 + Azerbaijani people, 1, 11, 13, 188, 295 Azimi, Reza, 336 - Babadori, Gen. Ahmad, 182 + Babadori, Gen. Ahmad, 182 Baghai, Mosafar: - As Mossadeq replacement candidate, 73 + As Mossadeq replacement candidate, 73 Committee of Eight, 193 - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 125, 127, - 135, 177, 193, 195 + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 125, 127, + 135, 177, 193, 195 Mossadeq removal proposals, 192, 217 National Front and, 65 Zahedi government period, 322, - 330, 332, 335, 337, 340, - 341, 352, 356 + 330, 332, 335, 337, 340, + 341, 352, 356 - Baharmast, Gen., 165, 175 + Baharmast, Gen., 165, 175 Bahbudi, 361 - Bahmanbegui, 315, 316 + Bahmanbegui, 315, 316 Bailey, Ronald, 134 Bakhtiar, 336 - Bakhtiar, Col. Timur, 240, 288, 323, 370 + Bakhtiar, Col. Timur, 240, 288, 323, 370 Bakhtiar tribe (see also Iranian tribes), 178, 192, - 197, 219 - Bakhtiari, Abul Ghasem, 178, 197, 219 + 197, 219 + Bakhtiari, Abul Ghasem, 178, 197, 219 Balmer, Brig. Gen. Jesmond D., 109, 110, - 117, 170 + 117, 170 Baqai, Mosafar. See Baghai, Mosafar - Baqi, Abdul, 114, 155, 203, 205 + Baqi, Abdul, 114, 155, 203, 205 Barnes, 304 Barnes, Tracy: Operation Ajax, 307 - Barzani, Gen. Mulla Mustafa, 4 + Barzani, Gen. Mulla Mustafa, 4 Batmangelitch, Gen. Nadr: - Operation Ajax, 270, 283, 288, + Operation Ajax, 270, 283, 288, 291 Zahedi coup plots, 182 Zahedi government period, 322, - 323, 332, 335, 336, 340, - 347, 351, 360, 370 + 323, 332, 335, 336, 340, + 347, 351, 360, 370 Battle, Lucius D., 38 Bayne, Ned, 116 Beale, 134 Bealey, 205 Becker, 104 - Becker, Loftus E., 129, 131, 138 + Becker, Loftus E., 129, 131, 138 Beeley, Harold, 181 - Behbehani, 192, 193, 330 + Behbehani, 192, 193, 330 Berry, Burton Y.: - Mossadeq removal proposals, 26 - Operation Ajax, First attempt, 271, 272, 274 + Mossadeq removal proposals, 26 + Operation Ajax, First attempt, 271, 272, 274 Berry, J. Lampton: Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, U.S.-British discussions, 134 - Zahedi government, Soviet relations with, 298 + Zahedi government, Soviet relations with, 298 Berry: Mossadeq removal proposals, 70, 126 - Tudeh Party takeover contingency plans, 170 + Tudeh Party takeover contingency plans, 170 Berry (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs): - Ala administration period, 8, 12 - Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 60 + Ala administration period, 8, 12 + Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 60 Black, 299 Black, Eugene R., Jr., 313 Black, Lt. Col., 170 Black, Robert, 215 Boghai, Mozafar, 5 - Bohlen, Charles E., 109, 146 + Bohlen, Charles E., 109, 146 Bonbright, James C.H., 133 Bonesteel, Col., 299 Borel, Paul, 365 - Boroujerdi, Ayatollah, 192, 193 - Bowie, Robert, 218, 220, 225, 304 - Bowker, James, 90, 226 + Boroujerdi, Ayatollah, 192, 193 + Bowie, Robert, 218, 220, 225, 304 + Bowker, James, 90, 226 Bowker, R.J., 281 - Bradley, Gen. Omar N., 145 + Bradley, Gen. Omar N., 145 British role in Iran (see also Oil nationalization dispute; Operation Ajax; U.S.-British discussions under other headings): - Ala administration period, 6, 9, 12, 13, 16, + Ala administration period, 6, 9, 12, 13, 16, 21 CIA internal discussions, 53 - Diplomatic relations break, 136 - Iranian tribes and, 30, 32, 168, + Diplomatic relations break, 136 + Iranian tribes and, 30, 32, 168, 175 - Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 47, 50, + Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 47, 50, 51 Mossadeq administration post-crisis period: - Henderson memoranda, 210, 212 - U.S.-Baghai discussions, 135 - U.S.-British emergency planning, 110 + Henderson memoranda, 210, 212 + U.S.-Baghai discussions, 135 + U.S.-British emergency planning, 110 - Mossadeq removal proposals and, 42, 46, 54, 56, - 73, 77, 78 - NIE–6, 13 + Mossadeq removal proposals and, 42, 46, 54, 56, + 73, 77, 78 + NIE–6, 13 NSC 107, 6, - 14, 21, 35 - Razmara assassination and, 2 + 14, 21, 35 + Razmara assassination and, 2 Stutesman report, 65 Wagner memoranda, 1 Zahedi government period, 300, - 318, 325, 330, 341, 347, - 353, 354, 355, 375 + 318, 325, 330, 341, 347, + 353, 354, 355, 375 Brownell, Herbert, Jr., 304 - Bruce, David K., 109, 118 - Bryant, Elmer C., 315, 316, 321 + Bruce, David K., 109, 118 + Bryant, Elmer C., 315, 316, 321 Bundy, William P., 150 Burrows, 134 Bushehri, Javad, 375 Busheri, 73, 80, 127 Byroade, Henry: - Documents not declassified, 148 + Documents not declassified, 148 Mossadeq administration post-crisis period: - British paper, 133 - Henderson recall rumors, 113 - Oil nationalization dispute, 101, 121, 174, 218 - U.S. covert activities, 105, 109 + British paper, 133 + Henderson recall rumors, 113 + Oil nationalization dispute, 101, 121, 174, 218 + U.S. covert activities, 105, 109 U.S. economic aid, 106, - 121, 218 + 121, 218 Mossadeq removal proposals, 101, 181 Operation Ajax, 225 Qavam appointment - crisis (July 1952), 85, 97 - Zahedi government, 298, 305, 309 + crisis (July 1952), 85, 97 + Zahedi government, 298, 305, 309 - Cabell, Gen. Charles P., 216, 295, 304, 305, 307, 338 + Cabell, Gen. Charles P., 216, 295, 304, 305, 307, 338 Carney, Adm. Robert B., 304 Carr, Robert, 72 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (see also @@ -52132,66 +44206,48 @@ Developments,” 20 Directorate of Plans memoranda, 4, 5 - Documents not declassified, 130 + Documents not declassified, 130 Information Cables, CS PD 916, - “Qashqai-Zahedi Relations,” 314 + “Qashqai-Zahedi Relations,” 314 Information Reports: CS–5029a, “Attitude of Shah - Concerning His Present Position,” 178 + Concerning His Present Position,” 178 CS–6360, “Planned Coup - D’État against Mossadeq Government,” 182 + D’État against Mossadeq Government,” 182 CS–6708, “Tudeh Instructions Concerning Activities in Case of - Anti-Mossadeq Coup,” 185 + Anti-Mossadeq Coup,” 185 CS–6963, “Further Details Concerning General Zahedi’s Plans for Supplanting Mossadeq/Counter Measures by Mossadeq Government,” 188 CS–7704, “Opposition Test - of Strength with Mossadeq,” 191 + of Strength with Mossadeq,” 191 CS–8550, “Activities of - Anti-Mossadeq Groups,” 195 + Anti-Mossadeq Groups,” 195 CS–8642, “Zahedi Campaign - to Replace Prime Minister Mossadeq,” 196 + to Replace Prime Minister Mossadeq,” 196 CS–8818, “Current Iranian Situation,” 197 - CS–22194, 330 - CS–22878, 336 - CS–28662, 356 + CS–22194, 330 + CS–22878, 336 + CS–28662, 356 CS–28871, “Situation in the Tudeh Party,” 359 - CS–40139, “Iran,” 367 + CS–40139, “Iran,” 367 CS–40518, “Government Offer - to Khosrow Khan Qashqai,” 369 + to Khosrow Khan Qashqai,” 369 CS–40723, “Details of - Opposition to Zahedi Government,” 370 + Opposition to Zahedi Government,” 370 CS DB–3966, “Attitude of Shah Toward General Zahedi’s Plans for Ousting Mossadeq/Attitude of Shah and Opposition Leaders - Toward Present Crisis,” 193 + Toward Present Crisis,” 193 - Intelligence Memoranda, SIC No. 9750, “Effects of Closing Down the Iranian Oil + Intelligence Memoranda, SIC No. 9750, “Effects of Closing Down the Iranian Oil Industry,” 39 - Office of Intelligence Research memoranda, No. 1378, “Iran:: Potential Character of - a Kashani-Dominated Government,” 181 + Office of Intelligence Research memoranda, No. 1378, “Iran:: Potential Character of + a Kashani-Dominated Government,” 181 Office of National Estimates memoranda: No. 32, “The Situation in Iran,” 3 @@ -52199,249 +44255,137 @@ in US Intelligence,” 58 No. 211, “Effect of Recent - Developments in Iran on Mossadeq’s Regime,” 67 + Developments in Iran on Mossadeq’s Regime,” 67 No. 247, “An Evaluation of the Significance of the National Front Movement in - Iran,” 82, 86 + Iran,” 82, 86 - No. 256, “OIR Comments on Staff - Memorandum No. 247,” 86 + No. 256, “OIR Comments on Staff + Memorandum No. 247,” 86 - Churchill, Winston, 121, 205, 210, 212, 318, 352 - Collins, Gen., 176 + Churchill, Winston, 121, 205, 210, 212, 318, 352 + Collins, Gen., 176 Communism. See Soviet policy in Iran; Tudeh Party Corrigan, Claud H., 225 Crowl, R. Bernard, 215 - Cunningham, Joseph H., 205, 341 - Cuomo, Anthony, 23, 43, 64, 155, 233, 333 - Cutler, Robert, 171, 176, 304 + Cunningham, Joseph H., 205, 341 + Cuomo, Anthony, 23, 43, 64, 155, 233, 333 + Cutler, Robert, 171, 176, 304 - Dadsetan, Maj. Gen. Farhat, 332, 335, 336, 344 - Daftari, Gen., 240, 270, 288 + Dadsetan, Maj. Gen. Farhat, 332, 335, 336, 344 + Daftari, Gen., 240, 270, 288 Davalou, Col., 196 Davis, A.C.: - NSC 107, 6 + NSC 107, 6 - Deihimi, Gen., 322, 323, 332, 335, 336, 340 - Derakshan, Gen., 240 - Documents not declassified, 130, 148, 149, 214, 221, 222, 234, 310, 311 - Dodge, Joseph M., 146, 171, 176 + Deihimi, Gen., 322, 323, 332, 335, 336, 340 + Derakshan, Gen., 240 + Documents not declassified, 130, 148, 149, 214, 221, 222, 234, 310, 311 + Dodge, Joseph M., 146, 171, 176 Dolatabadi, 335 Donovan, William, 366 - Dooher, Gerald F.P., 34, 36, 61, 115 + Dooher, Gerald F.P., 34, 36, 61, 115 Dubois, Arthur, 139 Dulles, Allen: - Ala administration period, 7, 8, 11, + Ala administration period, 7, 8, 11, 18 - Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 53 + Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 53 - Majlis elections, 66 + Majlis elections, 66 Mossadeq administration post-crisis period: Briefing notes, 153, - 194, 254 - Long memoranda, 108 - Mossadeq resignation threat (Feb. 1953), 160 - National Intelligence Estimates, 259 - Oil nationalization dispute, 153, 171, 176 - Shah foreign travel plans, 162 - Thornburg memoranda, 154 - Tudeh Party legalization, 209 - U.S. capabilities analyses, 168 - U.S. covert activities, 183 - U.S. economic aid, 252 + 194, 254 + Long memoranda, 108 + Mossadeq resignation threat (Feb. 1953), 160 + National Intelligence Estimates, 259 + Oil nationalization dispute, 153, 171, 176 + Shah foreign travel plans, 162 + Thornburg memoranda, 154 + Tudeh Party legalization, 209 + U.S. capabilities analyses, 168 + U.S. covert activities, 183 + U.S. economic aid, 252 Mossadeq removal proposals, 25, - 26, 104, 118 + 26, 104, 118 Oil cartel suit, 304 - Oil nationalization dispute, 304, 305, 319, 365 - Operation Ajax, 184, 225, 243, - 251, 292, 363 - Tudeh Party takeover contingency plans, 171, 176 + Oil nationalization dispute, 304, 305, 319, 365 + Operation Ajax, 184, 225, 243, + 251, 292, 363 + Tudeh Party takeover contingency plans, 171, 176 U.S. covert activities: - Ala administration period, 8, 11, 18 - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 183 + Ala administration period, 8, 11, 18 + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 183 - U.S. security interests in Iran, 10 + U.S. security interests in Iran, 10 Zahedi government: - British relations with, 318 - Intra-government conflicts, 319, 320 - Oil nationalization dispute and, 304, 305, 319, 365 - Saleh ambassadorship, 309 + British relations with, 318 + Intra-government conflicts, 319, 320 + Oil nationalization dispute and, 304, 305, 319, 365 + Saleh ambassadorship, 309 U.S. economic aid, 304, - 313, 319, 320 + 313, 319, 320 U.S. military aid, 338, - 339, 349 + 339, 349 Dulles, John Foster: Mossadeq administration post-crisis period: - Eisenhower-Mossadeq correspondence, 230 - Henderson discussions, 206 - Oil nationalization dispute, 171, 172, 174, 176 - Shah foreign travel plans, 163, 166 + Eisenhower-Mossadeq correspondence, 230 + Henderson discussions, 206 + Oil nationalization dispute, 171, 172, 174, 176 + Shah foreign travel plans, 163, 166 U.S. economic aid, 206, 218 Oil cartel suit, 304 - Oil nationalization dispute, 171, 172, 174, 176, - 304, 352 - Operation Ajax, 225, 251, 363 - Tudeh Party takeover contingency plans, 171, 176 - Zahedi government, 304, 352, 372 + Oil nationalization dispute, 171, 172, 174, 176, + 304, 352 + Operation Ajax, 225, 251, 363 + Tudeh Party takeover contingency plans, 171, 176 + Zahedi government, 304, 352, 372 Dunn, James C., 68 - Ebtehaj, Abolhassan, 42, 73 - Eden, Anthony, 171, 172, 176, 179, 181, 331, 341, 353 + Ebtehaj, Abolhassan, 42, 73 + Eden, Anthony, 171, 172, 176, 179, 181, 331, 341, 353 Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D.: Mossadeq administration post-crisis period: - Allen Dulles memoranda, 168 + Allen Dulles memoranda, 168 - Henderson memoranda, 211 - Mossadeq correspondence, 230, 238, 249, 258, 259 - Oil nationalization dispute, NSC discussions, 171, 176 - Truman discussions, 146 + Henderson memoranda, 211 + Mossadeq correspondence, 230, 238, 249, 258, 259 + Oil nationalization dispute, NSC discussions, 171, 176 + Truman discussions, 146 - Operation Ajax, 271, 293, 295, - 328, 363 - Zahedi correspondence, 301, 302 + Operation Ajax, 271, 293, 295, + 328, 363 + Zahedi correspondence, 301, 302 - Emami, Jemal, 65, 78 + Emami, Jemal, 65, 78 Emmerglick: - NSC 136, 147 + NSC 136, 147 - Entezam, Nasrollah, 73, 75, 80, 330, 331 + Entezam, Nasrollah, 73, 75, 80, 330, 331 Eqbal, Abdol, 219 - Eqbal, Manuchehr, 370, 375 + Eqbal, Manuchehr, 370, 375 Faramarzi, Abdul Rahman, 51 Farman-Farmayan, 114 Faroud, Farokh, 330 - Farzanegan, Brig. Gen., 270, 289, 326, 340 + Farzanegan, Brig. Gen., 270, 289, 326, 340 Fateh, Mostafa, 332 - Fatemi, Hossein, 157, 201, 205, 209, 283, 306, 325, 344 + Fatemi, Hossein, 157, 201, 205, 209, 283, 306, 325, 344 Fechteler, Adm. W.M., 141 Fedayan Islam, 192 - Fedi-i-a-Islam, 3, 67 - Ferguson, C. Vaughan, Jr., 34, 70, 73, 85 + Fedi-i-a-Islam, 3, 67 + Ferguson, C. Vaughan, Jr., 34, 70, 73, 85 Firth, 179 Flemming, Arthur, 304 Foster, William C., 74 @@ -52450,952 +44394,529 @@ Friends of Islam, 9 - Ganjei, Jayad, 193, 205 - Gannet, 316, 321 + Ganjei, Jayad, 193, 205 + Gannet, 316, 321 Garner, Robert L., 57 - Garzan, Gen. Abbas, 73, 182, 323 - Gerhart, Gen. John K., 304 - Ghanatabodi, Shams, 91, 115 + Garzan, Gen. Abbas, 73, 182, 323 + Gerhart, Gen. John K., 304 + Ghanatabodi, Shams, 91, 115 Gharagazlu, Ali Reza, 197 Ghasghgai tribe. See Qashqai tribe. - Gifford, Walter S., 12, 49, 90, 95 - Gleason, S. Everett, 35, 171, 176, 194, 254, 304 - Golpyra, Maj. Gen., 332 - Grady, Henry F., 2, 4, 16, 30, 32, 65 - Guilanshah, Gen. Hedayat, 114, 285, 289, 323, 330, 332, 336 + Gifford, Walter S., 12, 49, 90, 95 + Gleason, S. Everett, 35, 171, 176, 194, 254, 304 + Golpyra, Maj. Gen., 332 + Grady, Henry F., 2, 4, 16, 30, 32, 65 + Guilanshah, Gen. Hedayat, 114, 285, 289, 323, 330, 332, 336 Gurney, F. Taylor, 335 - Haerizadeh, Sayyid Sbol Hazan, 5, 65, 182, 193, 197, 329 - Hakimi, Ibrahim, 42, 73, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80 + Haerizadeh, Sayyid Sbol Hazan, 5, 65, 182, 193, 197, 329 + Hakimi, Ibrahim, 42, 73, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80 Harriman, Averell, 146 - Harriman Mission, 43, 44, 49, 65 - Hasibi, 155, 325 - Hayat, Ali, 315, 316, 336 - Hedayat, Maj. Gen. Abdullah, 323, 332, 335, 336, 337 + Harriman Mission, 43, 44, 49, 65 + Hasibi, 155, 325 + Hayat, Ali, 315, 316, 336 + Hedayat, Maj. Gen. Abdullah, 323, 332, 335, 336, 337 Hedden, 104 - Hedjazi, Gen. Abdalhussein, 107 + Hedjazi, Gen. Abdalhussein, 107 Hekmat, 335 - Hekmat, Ali Asghar, 337, 341 - Hekmat, Sardar Fakher, 36, 42, 56 - Helms, Richard M., 59, 117, 307 - Hemat, Gen. Seyfollah, 336 + Hekmat, Ali Asghar, 337, 341 + Hekmat, Sardar Fakher, 36, 42, 56 + Helms, Richard M., 59, 117, 307 + Hemat, Gen. Seyfollah, 336 Henderson, Loy W.: - Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952): + Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952): Debriefing, 150 - Mossadeq discussions, 100 - Recall rumors, 113 - Kermit Roosevelt memoranda, 71 + Mossadeq discussions, 100 + Recall rumors, 113 + Kermit Roosevelt memoranda, 71 Tudeh Party, 64 Tudeh Party role, 114, 124 - U.S.-British discussions, 99 - U.S.-British joint estimates, 72 - U.S. economic aid, 137 - U.S. military aid, 60 + U.S.-British discussions, 99 + U.S.-British joint estimates, 72 + U.S. economic aid, 137 + U.S. military aid, 60 - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 112, 155, - 173, 203, 211, 224 + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 112, 155, + 173, 203, 211, 224 Amini appointment, 200, 203 - Abol Ghassem Amini discussions, 235 - British role in Iran, 210, 212 + Abol Ghassem Amini discussions, 235 + British role in Iran, 210, 212 CIA monthly reports, 202 Dubois visit, 139 - John Foster Dulles discussions, 206 - Allen Dulles memoranda, 168 - Kashani discussions, 115, 140, 142 - Kashani-Tudeh coup plot, 124 - Oil nationalization dispute, 150, 174, 177, 199, 204, 205, 206, 212, 220, 224 - Recall proposals, 171 - Shah foreign travel plans, 159, 161, 164, 165, 212, 235 + John Foster Dulles discussions, 206 + Allen Dulles memoranda, 168 + Kashani discussions, 115, 140, 142 + Kashani-Tudeh coup plot, 124 + Oil nationalization dispute, 150, 174, 177, 199, 204, 205, 206, 212, 220, 224 + Recall proposals, 171 + Shah foreign travel plans, 159, 161, 164, 165, 212, 235 U.S. economic aid, 198, 220 U.S. military aid, 218, 220 - Warne-Akhavi discussions, 207 + Warne-Akhavi discussions, 207 Zahedi coup plots, 156, 187 Mossadeq removal proposals, 52, - 69, 78, 80, 107 + 69, 78, 80, 107 - Ala discussions, 75, 77 - John Foster Dulles discussions, 206 - Henderson-Shah emissary discussions, 204, 205 - Shah discussions, 212 - U.S.-British discussions, 42, 46, 54, 56, 79, 107, 226 - U.S.-Shah discussions, 79 + Ala discussions, 75, 77 + John Foster Dulles discussions, 206 + Henderson-Shah emissary discussions, 204, 205 + Shah discussions, 212 + U.S.-British discussions, 42, 46, 54, 56, 79, 107, 226 + U.S.-Shah discussions, 79 Oil nationalization dispute, 49 - Baghai on, 341, 353 - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 150, 174, 177, 199, 220, 224 - U.S.-Qavam discussions, 78 - Zahedi government period, 335, 341, 348, 353, 354, 357 + Baghai on, 341, 353 + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 150, 174, 177, 199, 220, 224 + U.S.-Qavam discussions, 78 + Zahedi government period, 335, 341, 348, 353, 354, 357 Operation Ajax: - Authorization of, 225 + Authorization of, 225 Briefing, 216 - Execution of, 283, 287, 288 - First attempt, 261, 266, 267, 268, 271, 280, 281 + Execution of, 283, 287, 288 + First attempt, 261, 266, 267, 268, 271, 280, 281 Qavam appointment - crisis (July 1952), 83, 84, - 85, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, - 98, 112 + crisis (July 1952), 83, 84, + 85, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, + 98, 112 Zahedi government: - Baghai on, 335, 341, 352 - British relations with, 354 - Domestic programs, 208 - Intra-government conflicts, 332, 335, 340, 348 - Majlis dissolution/elections, 354, 357 + Baghai on, 335, 341, 352 + British relations with, 354 + Domestic programs, 208 + Intra-government conflicts, 332, 335, 340, 348 + Majlis dissolution/elections, 354, 357 Mossadeq treatment, 353, - 354, 357 + 354, 357 Nixon visit, 354 - Oil nationalization dispute, 335, 341, 348, 353, 354, 357 - Qashqai tribe relations with, 315, 324, 358, 366 - Shah discussions, 303 - U.S. anti-communism policy recommendations, 333 + Oil nationalization dispute, 335, 341, 348, 353, 354, 357 + Qashqai tribe relations with, 315, 324, 358, 366 + Shah discussions, 303 + U.S. anti-communism policy recommendations, 333 U.S. economic aid, 286, 360 U.S. military aid, 332, - 349, 354, 355, 360 + 349, 354, 355, 360 - Hewitt, R.L., 58, 177 + Hewitt, R.L., 58, 177 Holmes, Julius C., 95 - Hoover, Herbert, Jr., 331, 343, 352 + Hoover, Herbert, Jr., 331, 343, 352 Hormoz, 341 - Hormuz, Mahmud, 335, 337 - Horsey, Outerbridge, II, 170 + Hormuz, Mahmud, 335, 337 + Horsey, Outerbridge, II, 170 Houman, Ahmed, 330 Howe, Fisher, 372 - Howison, John, 155, 325 + Howison, John, 155, 325 Howison, John M., 332 Human, 91 - Humphrey, George M., 171, 176, 304 + Humphrey, George M., 171, 176, 304 - Imami, Hasan, 330, 332 - Imami, Sharif, 330, 335, 337 + Imami, Hasan, 330, 332 + Imami, Sharif, 330, 335, 337 India, 303 - International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (World Bank), 57, 67 - International Court of Justice (ICJ), 47, 76 - Iran Party, 192, 205, 235 - Iranian-Soviet Treaty (1921), 1, 6, 19, 145, 355 + International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (World Bank), 57, 67 + International Court of Justice (ICJ), 47, 76 + Iran Party, 192, 205, 235 + Iranian-Soviet Treaty (1921), 1, 6, 19, 145, 355 Iranian tribes (see also Kurds; Qashqai tribe): - British role, 30, 32, 168 - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 136, 139, - 153, 175, 177, 178, 233 - Mossadeq removal proposals and, 192 - U.S.-British joint estimates, 72 + British role, 30, 32, 168 + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 136, 139, + 153, 175, 177, 178, 233 + Mossadeq removal proposals and, 192 + U.S.-British joint estimates, 72 U.S. covert activities, 109 - British paper, 133 + British paper, 133 CIA Directorate of Plans memoranda, 5 - CIA/State/Defense/JCS discussions, 170 - Long memoranda, 108 - U.S. capabilities analyses, 168, 169 - Wisner memoranda, 117 - Zahedi government period, 345, 350 + CIA/State/Defense/JCS discussions, 170 + Long memoranda, 108 + U.S. capabilities analyses, 168, 169 + Wisner memoranda, 117 + Zahedi government period, 345, 350 - Jackson, C.D., 304, 364 + Jackson, C.D., 304, 364 Jackson, William H., 4 Jahanban, Gen. Mohammed Hoseyn, 370 Jernegan, John D.: - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 105, 109, - 133, 134, 166, 218, 220, + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 105, 109, + 133, 134, 166, 218, 220, 252 - Mossadeq removal proposals, 103 + Mossadeq removal proposals, 103 Zahedi government, 298 Johnson, 225 - Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) (see also Davis, A.C.), 141, 145 - Joyce, Robert P., 109, 110, 126, 133 + Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) (see also Davis, A.C.), 141, 145 + Joyce, Robert P., 109, 110, 126, 133 Kaiser, Maj. William, 289 Kashani, Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem: - Ala administration period, 3, 5, 8, 9, 11, 17 - Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 43, 51, - 61, 65 + Ala administration period, 3, 5, 8, 9, 11, 17 + Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 43, 51, + 61, 65 Mossadeq administration post-crisis period: - Byroade memoranda, 121 + Byroade memoranda, 121 CIA Information Reports, 193 CIA monthly reports, 167 CIA Office of - National Estimates memoranda, 177 - Coup plot, 120, 124, 127 - Allen Dulles memoranda, 168 - Henderson discussions, 140, 142 - Henderson memoranda, 112, 114, 124, 155 - Henderson recall rumors, 113 - Mossadeq resignation threat (Feb. 1953), 157 - NIE–75, 143, 152 - Shah foreign travel plans, 165 - Special Estimates, 132 - U.S. covert activities, 170 - U.S. economic aid, 115 + National Estimates memoranda, 177 + Coup plot, 120, 124, 127 + Allen Dulles memoranda, 168 + Henderson discussions, 140, 142 + Henderson memoranda, 112, 114, 124, 155 + Henderson recall rumors, 113 + Mossadeq resignation threat (Feb. 1953), 157 + NIE–75, 143, 152 + Shah foreign travel plans, 165 + Special Estimates, 132 + U.S. covert activities, 170 + U.S. economic aid, 115 Zahedi coup plots, 187, 191 Mossadeq removal proposals, 73, - 181, 192 - National Front and, 5, 43, 65 + 181, 192 + National Front and, 5, 43, 65 Qavam appointment - crisis (July 1952), 91, 94 - Razmara assassination and, 9 + crisis (July 1952), 91, 94 + Razmara assassination and, 9 U.S. covert activities and, 5, 8, 11, 59 Zahedi government period, 329, - 330, 339 + 330, 339 - Kashani, Mostafa, 115, 196, 217 - Kazemi, 127, 155 - Kent, Sherman, 62, 81, 162, 259, 365 - Khalili, Parvis Khan, 68, 70 + Kashani, Mostafa, 115, 196, 217 + Kazemi, 127, 155 + Kent, Sherman, 62, 81, 162, 259, 365 + Khalili, Parvis Khan, 68, 70 Khashanizshad-Kashani, 115 - Khazrai, 68, 70 + Khazrai, 68, 70 King, G.D., 344 Kitchen, J.C., 49 Klein, Harry T., 361 Krentz, 109 - Kurds (see also Iranian tribes), 1, 4, 13, 175, 192 + Kurds (see also Iranian tribes), 1, 4, 13, 175, 192 - Landry, Gen. Robert, 43 - Langer, William L., 16, 33, 37 - Lankarani, Ahmad, 335, 337 + Landry, Gen. Robert, 43 + Langer, William L., 16, 33, 37 + Lankarani, Ahmad, 335, 337 Lay, James S., Jr.: - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 145, 147, - 171, 176 - NSC 107, 6 + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 145, 147, + 171, 176 + NSC 107, 6 Oil nationalization dispute, 27, - 31, 171, 176, 304, 365 - Tudeh Party takeover contingency plans, 128, 138 - Zahedi government, 304, 355 + 31, 171, 176, 304, 365 + Tudeh Party takeover contingency plans, 128, 138 + Zahedi government, 304, 355 - Leavitt, John H., 67, 82, 122, 167 - Levy, Walter, 43, 218, 220 + Leavitt, John H., 67, 82, 122, 167 + Levy, Walter, 43, 218, 220 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 146 - Long, Robert E., 104, 108 + Long, Robert E., 104, 108 Lotfi, Abdol Ali, 114 Love, Kenneth, 266 Love, Richard, 254 - Lovett, Robert A., 141, 145, 146 + Lovett, Robert A., 141, 145, 146 Luce, Clare Booth, 279 - Magruder, Gen., 109, 110, 117 + Magruder, Gen., 109, 110, 117 Majzadeh, Braham, 193 Maki, Seyid Hosein: - As Mossadeq replacement candidate, 73, 75, 80 - Henderson-Shah emissary discussions, 205 - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 114, 155, - 190, 193, 205 + As Mossadeq replacement candidate, 73, 75, 80 + Henderson-Shah emissary discussions, 205 + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 114, 155, + 190, 193, 205 Mossadeq removal proposals, 217, 238 - National Front formation and, 65 - U.S. covert activities and, 5 + National Front formation and, 65 + U.S. covert activities and, 5 Zahedi government period, 314, - 329, 330 + 329, 330 - Makins, Roger, 90, 95, 226, 250, 278, 352 + Makins, Roger, 90, 95, 226, 250, 278, 352 Malek, Col., 332 Maleki, Khalil, 192 Mansur, Hassan Ali: - As Mossadeq replacement candidate, 42, 73, 75, 77, - 78, 79, 80 - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 156, 177 + As Mossadeq replacement candidate, 42, 73, 75, 77, + 78, 79, 80 + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 156, 177 Stutesman report, 65 - Zahedi government period, 330 + Zahedi government period, 330 Martin-Daftari, 73 Masud, Askar, 219 Matthews, H. Freeman: - Ala administration period, 8 - Documents not declassified, 148 + Ala administration period, 8 + Documents not declassified, 148 Iranian tribes, 30 - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 133, 134, - 218, 220 + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 133, 134, + 218, 220 Mossadeq removal proposals, 57, 103 Oil nationalization dispute, 57, - 218, 220 + 218, 220 Operation Ajax, 225 Qavam appointment - crisis (July 1952), 97 + crisis (July 1952), 97 Zahedi government, 298 Mattison, Gordon H.: - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 151, 206, - 235, 237, 244, 246, 258 - Mossadeq removal proposals, 219 - Operation Ajax, 261, 262, 263, - 266, 267, 268 + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 151, 206, + 235, 237, 244, 246, 258 + Mossadeq removal proposals, 219 + Operation Ajax, 261, 262, 263, + 266, 267, 268 McClelland, 168 - McClure, Gen. Robert A., 218, 267, 307, 312, 360 - McGhee, George C., 12, 26, 30, 49, 65 + McClure, Gen. Robert A., 218, 267, 307, 312, 360 + McGhee, George C., 12, 26, 30, 49, 65 Meftah, 303 Mehdiwazar, 114 Melbourne, Roy M.: - Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 55, 64, - 65, 72 - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 112, 113, - 135, 155, 233 + Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 55, 64, + 65, 72 + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 112, 113, + 135, 155, 233 Mossadeq removal proposals, 80, - 204, 205 + 204, 205 Operation Ajax, 263 Qavam appointment - crisis (July 1952), 94 + crisis (July 1952), 94 Zahedi government: Baghai on, 341 - Domestic programs, 208 - Howison memoranda, 332 - Intra-government conflicts, 325 - Qashqai tribe relations with, 316, 321 - Tudeh Party suppression, 344 - U.S. anti-communism policy recommendations, 333 - U.S. covert activities, 345, 350 + Domestic programs, 208 + Howison memoranda, 332 + Intra-government conflicts, 325 + Qashqai tribe relations with, 316, 321 + Tudeh Party suppression, 344 + U.S. anti-communism policy recommendations, 333 + U.S. covert activities, 345, 350 Merchant, Livingston, 218 Meshed, 114 - Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO), 171 + Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO), 171 Middleton, George H.: - Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 42 - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 99, 101 + Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 42 + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 99, 101 Mossadeq removal proposals, 54, - 56, 78, 101, 107 + 56, 78, 101, 107 Qavam appointment - crisis (July 1952), 84, 92, + crisis (July 1952), 84, 92, 95 Millspaugh, Arthur, 65 - Mirfanderski, Brig. Gen., 332 - Mirjahangiri, Gen., 315, 336 - Moazami, Abdullah, 193, 203, 205, 238 + Mirfanderski, Brig. Gen., 332 + Mirjahangiri, Gen., 315, 336 + Moazami, Abdullah, 193, 203, 205, 238 Modabar, 249 Mohammadi, Hadi Nazar, 344 Mohanna, 267 Moini, Col., 323 - Monnazeh, Gen. Ali, 196 + Monnazeh, Gen. Ali, 196 Morgan, George A., 183 Morrison, Herbert, 16 - Moshar, Yusef, 329, 330 + Moshar, Yusef, 329, 330 Mossadeq, Gholam, 219 Mossadeq, Mohammad (see also Mossadeq - administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952); Mossadeq administration post-crisis + administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952); Mossadeq administration post-crisis period; Mossadeq removal proposals): - Ala administration period, 5, 8 + Ala administration period, 5, 8 Eisenhower correspondence, 230, - 238, 249, 258, 259 - Operation Ajax, 280, 281 - Prime Ministership appointment, 20 - Razmara assassination and, 28 - Resignation and reinstatement (July 1952). See + 238, 249, 258, 259 + Operation Ajax, 280, 281 + Prime Ministership appointment, 20 + Razmara assassination and, 28 + Resignation and reinstatement (July 1952). See Qavam appointment crisis (July 1952). Stutesman report, 65 - Zahedi government period treatment, 303, 307, 322, 325, - 327, 343, 344, 347, 353, - 354, 357 + Zahedi government period treatment, 303, 307, 322, 325, + 327, 343, 344, 347, 353, + 354, 357 - Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952) (see + Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952) (see also Mossadeq removal proposals; Oil nationalization dispute; Qavam appointment crisis (July 1952)): - British policy, 47, 50, 51 + British policy, 47, 50, 51 CIA internal discussions, 53 CIA Memoranda of Information, 20 CIA Office of - Intelligence Research memoranda, 44 + Intelligence Research memoranda, 44 CIA Office of National - Estimates memoranda, 67, 82 + Estimates memoranda, 67, 82 CIA Tehran Station - memoranda, 22, 24, 51 - Economic situation, 79, 81 + memoranda, 22, 24, 51 + Economic situation, 79, 81 Kashani role, 43 Langer memoranda, 37 - Majlis elections, 56, 59, 63, - 64, 65, 66, 67 - NIE–46, 58, 62, 63, + Majlis elections, 56, 59, 63, + 64, 65, 66, 67 + NIE–46, 58, 62, 63, 67 - NSC 107 progress reports, 31 + NSC 107 progress reports, 31 NSC background summary, 49 NSC discussions, 50 Qashqai brothers U.S. visit (1951), - 34, 36 - Richards memoranda, 23, 42, 43 - Kermit Roosevelt memoranda, 71 + 34, 36 + Richards memoranda, 23, 42, 43 + Kermit Roosevelt memoranda, 71 Special Estimates, 28 Stutesman report, 65 U.S.-British discussions, 42, - 46, 54, 56, 57 + 46, 54, 56, 57 U.S.-British joint estimates, 55, 72 - U.S. covert activities, 29, 40, 41, - 48, 59, 61, 66 - U.S. military aid to Iran refusal, 60, 63, 65, 67 - U.S. Qashqai tribe consultations, 34, 36, 74 + U.S. covert activities, 29, 40, 41, + 48, 59, 61, 66 + U.S. military aid to Iran refusal, 60, 63, 65, 67 + U.S. Qashqai tribe consultations, 34, 36, 74 Villard memoranda, 29 - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period (July 1952–Aug. 1953) (see also Mossadeq administration post-crisis political + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period (July 1952–Aug. 1953) (see also Mossadeq administration post-crisis political situation; Mossadeq removal proposals; Oil nationalization dispute): Dubois visit, 139 Shah foreign travel plans: - John Foster Dulles memoranda, 163, 166 - Henderson-Ala discussions, 159, 164, 165 - Henderson-Abol Ghassem Amini discussions, 235 - Henderson memoranda, 161, 165, 200, 212 - Henderson-Shah emissary discussions, 205 - Kent memoranda, 162 - Mattison memoranda, 237 - Melbourne memoranda, 233 - Kermit Roosevelt memoranda, 238 + John Foster Dulles memoranda, 163, 166 + Henderson-Ala discussions, 159, 164, 165 + Henderson-Abol Ghassem Amini discussions, 235 + Henderson memoranda, 161, 165, 200, 212 + Henderson-Shah emissary discussions, 205 + Kent memoranda, 162 + Mattison memoranda, 237 + Melbourne memoranda, 233 + Kermit Roosevelt memoranda, 238 - U.S.-British emergency planning, 110 + U.S.-British emergency planning, 110 U.S. covert activities (see also Mossadeq removal proposals): - British paper, 133 + British paper, 133 CIA Director’s - meeting discussions, 102 - Leavitt memoranda, 122 - NSC 136, 147, 180, 183 - Richards memoranda, 105 - State Department guidance, 109 - Tudeh Party takeover contingency plans, 117, 158, 170 - U.S. capabilities analyses, 138, 168, 169 - Wisner memoranda, 117 + meeting discussions, 102 + Leavitt memoranda, 122 + NSC 136, 147, 180, 183 + Richards memoranda, 105 + State Department guidance, 109 + Tudeh Party takeover contingency plans, 117, 158, 170 + U.S. capabilities analyses, 138, 168, 169 + Wisner memoranda, 117 U.S. economic aid: - British paper, 133, 134 - Byroade memoranda, 121 - John Foster Dulles-Henderson discussions, 206 - Henderson-Abol Ghassem Amini discussions, 235 - Henderson memoranda, 198 - Henderson-Mossadeq discussions, 137 - Henderson-Shah emissary discussions, 205 - Jernegan memoranda, 218 - Mutual Security-State Department discussions, 215 - Press conference, 252 - Truman-Acheson discussions, 106 - U.S.-Kashani discussions, 115 + British paper, 133, 134 + Byroade memoranda, 121 + John Foster Dulles-Henderson discussions, 206 + Henderson-Abol Ghassem Amini discussions, 235 + Henderson memoranda, 198 + Henderson-Mossadeq discussions, 137 + Henderson-Shah emissary discussions, 205 + Jernegan memoranda, 218 + Mutual Security-State Department discussions, 215 + Press conference, 252 + Truman-Acheson discussions, 106 + U.S.-Kashani discussions, 115 U.S.-Iranian relations: CIA Information Reports, 195 CIA monthly reports, 202 - Allen Dulles briefing notes, 194 - Eisenhower-Mossadeq correspondence, 230, 238, 249, 258, 259 - Henderson-Mossadeq discussions, 280 - Henderson recall proposals, 171 - Henderson recall rumors, 113 + Allen Dulles briefing notes, 194 + Eisenhower-Mossadeq correspondence, 230, 238, 249, 258, 259 + Henderson-Mossadeq discussions, 280 + Henderson recall proposals, 171 + Henderson recall rumors, 113 Mossadeq administration post-crisis political situation: Acheson memoranda, 99 - Amini appointment, 197, 200, 201, - 203, 204 + Amini appointment, 197, 200, 201, + 203, 204 - British paper, 133, 134 + British paper, 133, 134 Byroade memoranda, 121 CIA Directorate of Plans memoranda, 249 CIA Information Reports, - 178, 185 - CIA memoranda, 175 - CIA monthly reports, 125, 167, - 202, 213, 231, 257 + 178, 185 + CIA memoranda, 175 + CIA monthly reports, 125, 167, + 202, 213, 231, 257 CIA Office of National Estimates memoranda, 177 - Committee of Eight, 187, 191, 193, + Committee of Eight, 187, 191, 193, 233 - Allen Dulles briefing notes, 153, 194, 254 - John Foster Dulles-Henderson discussions, 206 - Allen Dulles memoranda, 168 - Eisenhower-Mossadeq correspondence and, 238, 249 - Henderson-Abol Ghassem Amini discussions, 235 + Allen Dulles briefing notes, 153, 194, 254 + John Foster Dulles-Henderson discussions, 206 + Allen Dulles memoranda, 168 + Eisenhower-Mossadeq correspondence and, 238, 249 + Henderson-Abol Ghassem Amini discussions, 235 Henderson debriefing, 150 - Henderson memoranda, 112, 155, 173, - 203, 211, 224 - Henderson-Mossadeq discussions, 100 - Kashani-Tudeh coup plot (Sept. 1952), 120, 124, 127 + Henderson memoranda, 112, 155, 173, + 203, 211, 224 + Henderson-Mossadeq discussions, 100 + Kashani-Tudeh coup plot (Sept. 1952), 120, 124, 127 Long memoranda, 108 - Mattison memoranda, 151, 244, 246 + Mattison memoranda, 151, 244, 246 Melbourne memoranda, 233 - Mossadeq resignation threat (Feb. 1953), 157, 160 - National Intelligence Estimates, 259 - NIE–75, 143, 150, 151 - NSC 136, 144, 145, 147, 180, + Mossadeq resignation threat (Feb. 1953), 157, 160 + National Intelligence Estimates, 259 + NIE–75, 143, 150, 151 + NSC 136, 144, 145, 147, 180, 183 Kermit Roosevelt memoranda, 238, - 239, 242 + 239, 242 Special Estimates, 132 - Thornburg memoranda, 116, 118, 119, + Thornburg memoranda, 116, 118, 119, 154 - Truman-Eisenhower discussions, 146 - Tudeh Party legalization, 209 - U.S.-Baghai discussions, 135 + Truman-Eisenhower discussions, 146 + Tudeh Party legalization, 209 + U.S.-Baghai discussions, 135 U.S.-British discussions, 99, - 134, 172 + 134, 172 U.S.-Kashani discussions, 115, - 140, 142 + 140, 142 Warne-Akhavi discussions, 207 - Zahedi coup plots, 156, 182, 187, - 188, 191, 193, 195, 196 + Zahedi coup plots, 156, 182, 187, + 188, 191, 193, 195, 196 Mossadeq removal proposals (see also Operation Ajax; Zahedi coup plots under Mossadeq administration post-crisis period): - Acheson memoranda, 70, 103 + Acheson memoranda, 70, 103 British role in Iran and, 42, - 46, 54, 56, 73, 77, 78 + 46, 54, 56, 73, 77, 78 Byroade memoranda, 101 CIA Director’s meeting discussions, 104 @@ -53406,359 +44927,198 @@ CIA Iran Branch estimates, 192 CIA Office of - Intelligence Research memoranda, 181 + Intelligence Research memoranda, 181 CIA-State Department - discussions, 26, 126 + discussions, 26, 126 CIA Tehran Station - memoranda, 189, 190 - John Foster Dulles-Henderson discussions, 206 - Henderson memoranda, 80, 107 - Henderson-Shah discussions, 212 - Henderson-Shah emissary discussions, 204, 205 - Kashani-Tudeh coup plot (Sept. 1952), 120, 124, 127 + memoranda, 189, 190 + John Foster Dulles-Henderson discussions, 206 + Henderson memoranda, 80, 107 + Henderson-Shah discussions, 212 + Henderson-Shah emissary discussions, 204, 205 + Kashani-Tudeh coup plot (Sept. 1952), 120, 124, 127 Leavitt memoranda, 122 - Mossadeq administration responses, 219 + Mossadeq administration responses, 219 Pollard memoranda, 217 Stutesman report, 65 - Thornburg memoranda, 116, 118, 122 - U.S.-Ala consultations, 75, 77, 78 + Thornburg memoranda, 116, 118, 122 + U.S.-Ala consultations, 75, 77, 78 U.S.-British discussions: - Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 42, 46, 54, 56, 73, 78, 79, 80 - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 101, 103, 107, 179, 181, 226 + Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 42, 46, 54, 56, 73, 78, 79, 80 + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 101, 103, 107, 179, 181, 226 U.S.-Qavam - communications, 52, 68, 69, + communications, 52, 68, 69, 78 U.S.-Shah discussions, 79 Wilber memoranda, 123 Movvagar, 5 - Mozayeni, Gen. Hoseyn, 182, 196 - Mumtaz, 289, 307 - Murphy, Robert D., 225, 366 - Mutual Security, Department of (DMS), 215, 218, 220 + Mozayeni, Gen. Hoseyn, 182, 196 + Mumtaz, 289, 307 + Murphy, Robert D., 225, 366 + Mutual Security, Department of (DMS), 215, 218, 220 Naderi, 307 Najm, Abol Qasem, 375 Nariman, Seyid Mahud, 65 - Nash, Frank C., 128, 299, 304 + Nash, Frank C., 128, 299, 304 Nasiri, Col., 240 Nasr, 313 National Front (see also Mossadeq - administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952)): - Ala administration period, 9, 17 + administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952)): + Ala administration period, 9, 17 Kashani role, 43 - Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 23, 24, - 65, 82, 86 - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 112, 121, - 136, 238, 239, 242 - Mossadeq removal proposals and, 79, 80, 192 + Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 23, 24, + 65, 82, 86 + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 112, 121, + 136, 238, 239, 242 + Mossadeq removal proposals and, 79, 80, 192 Qavam appointment - crisis (July 1952), 98 + crisis (July 1952), 98 Zahedi government period, 329, 330 National Intelligence Estimates: - Draft (Aug. 1953), 259 - NIE–6, “Iran’s Position in the East-West Conflict,” - 10, 13 - NIE–34–54, “Probable Developments in Iran Through 1955,” 375 - NIE–46, “Probable Developments in Iran in 1952 in the Absence of an Oil - Settlement,” 58, 62, 63, 67 - NIE–75, “Probable Developments in Iran Through 1953,” 143, - 150, 151, 152 - NIE–102, “Probable Developments in Iran Through 1954,” 347, - 357, 362 + Draft (Aug. 1953), 259 + NIE–6, “Iran’s Position in the East-West Conflict,” + 10, 13 + NIE–34–54, “Probable Developments in Iran Through 1955,” 375 + NIE–46, “Probable Developments in Iran in 1952 in the Absence of an Oil + Settlement,” 58, 62, 63, 67 + NIE–75, “Probable Developments in Iran Through 1953,” 143, + 150, 151, 152 + NIE–102, “Probable Developments in Iran Through 1954,” 347, + 357, 362 National Resistance Movement, 344 National Security Council (NSC): - Directives, No. 10/2, 40, 41, + Directives, No. 10/2, 40, 41, 368 - Meetings, 27, 50, 171, 176, 304, + Meetings, 27, 50, 171, 176, 304, 320 Statements of policy: - NSC 107, “Iran,” 6, 14, 21, 31, 35, 41, 71, 128, 129, 131, 138, 368 + NSC 107, “Iran,” 6, 14, 21, 31, 35, 41, 71, 128, 129, 131, 138, 368 NSC 136, “United States Policy regarding the Present Situation in Iran,” - 144, 145, 147, 180, 368 + 144, 145, 147, 180, 368 NSC 5402, “United States Policy Toward Iran,” 355, 368 Navabi, 270 - Near East oil situation study, 304 + Near East oil situation study, 304 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 303 - Nitze, Paul, 29, 47, 103, 133, 146, 305 + Nitze, Paul, 29, 47, 103, 133, 146, 305 Nixon, Richard M.: - Iran visit, 354, 360 - Oil nationalization dispute, 171, 176, 304 + Iran visit, 354, 360 + Oil nationalization dispute, 171, 176, 304 - Noruzi, Davoud, 335, 337, 341 + Noruzi, Davoud, 335, 337, 341 Oil. See Near East oil situation study; Oil cartel suit; Oil nationalization dispute. Oil cartel suit, 304 Oil nationalization dispute: - British boycott, 37, 99, 121 - Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952): - British armed intervention possibility, 12, 16, 33, 35 + British boycott, 37, 99, 121 + Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952): + British armed intervention possibility, 12, 16, 33, 35 CIA Directorate - of Plans memoranda, 4, 5 + of Plans memoranda, 4, 5 CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 39 CIA Memoranda of Information, 20 CIA Office of - National Estimates memoranda, 3 + National Estimates memoranda, 3 CIA Tehran - Station memoranda, 22, 23, 24 + Station memoranda, 22, 23, 24 Harriman Mission, 43, - 44, 49 + 44, 49 IBRD - negotiations, 57, 67 - International Court of Justice hearings, 47, 76 + negotiations, 57, 67 + International Court of Justice hearings, 47, 76 Kashani and, 43 - Langer memoranda, 37 - NIE–46, 63 - NSC 107, 35, 128 + Langer memoranda, 37 + NIE–46, 63 + NSC 107, 35, 128 NSC 107 progress reports, - 21, 31 - NSC background summary, 49 - NSC discussions, 27, 50 - Soviet imports and, 45 - Special Estimates, 7, 9, 28 - Stokes Mission, 42, 43 - Stutesman report, 65 - UN Security Council discussions, 49, 51, 55 - U.S.-British discussions, 46 - U.S.-British joint estimates, 55, 72 - U.S.-Qavam discussions, 78 + 21, 31 + NSC background summary, 49 + NSC discussions, 27, 50 + Soviet imports and, 45 + Special Estimates, 7, 9, 28 + Stokes Mission, 42, 43 + Stutesman report, 65 + UN Security Council discussions, 49, 51, 55 + U.S.-British discussions, 46 + U.S.-British joint estimates, 55, 72 + U.S.-Qavam discussions, 78 Villard memoranda, 29, 47 Wagner memoranda, 2 - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 99, 101, - 106, 121 + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 99, 101, + 106, 121 - British paper, 133, 134 - Byroade memoranda, 174 + British paper, 133, 134 + Byroade memoranda, 174 CIA Iran Branch estimates, 192 CIA Office of - National Estimates memoranda, 177 - Allen Dulles briefing notes, 153 - John Foster Dulles-Henderson discussions, 206 + National Estimates memoranda, 177 + Allen Dulles briefing notes, 153 + John Foster Dulles-Henderson discussions, 206 - Eisenhower-Mossadeq correspondence, 230, 238, 249, 258, 259 - Henderson debriefing, 150 - Henderson memoranda, 199, 224 - Henderson-Shah discussions, 212 - Henderson-Shah emissary discussions, 204, 205 - Jernegan memoranda, 218 - Leavitt memoranda, 122 + Eisenhower-Mossadeq correspondence, 230, 238, 249, 258, 259 + Henderson debriefing, 150 + Henderson memoranda, 199, 224 + Henderson-Shah discussions, 212 + Henderson-Shah emissary discussions, 204, 205 + Jernegan memoranda, 218 + Leavitt memoranda, 122 Makins paper, 250 - Mossadeq resignation threat (Feb. 1953) and, 157 - National Intelligence Estimates, 259 - NIE–75, 143, 152 + Mossadeq resignation threat (Feb. 1953) and, 157 + National Intelligence Estimates, 259 + NIE–75, 143, 152 NSC discussions, 171, 176 - Special Estimates, 132 - Thornburg memoranda, 118, 154 - Truman-Churchill joint statement, 121 - U.S.-British discussions, 171, 172, 176 + Special Estimates, 132 + Thornburg memoranda, 118, 154 + Truman-Churchill joint statement, 121 + U.S.-British discussions, 171, 172, 176 Operation Ajax and, 216 Qavam appointment - crisis (July 1952) and, 90, 95, + crisis (July 1952) and, 90, 95, 97 - Razmara assassination and, 2, 3, 9 + Razmara assassination and, 2, 3, 9 Zahedi government period: - Baghai on, 337, 341, 353 + Baghai on, 337, 341, 353 CIA Information Reports, 370 CIA monthly reports, 326 CIA Office of - National Estimates memoranda, 365 - Allen Dulles briefing notes, 319 - Henderson-Baqai discussions, 335 - Henderson memoranda, 348 - Henderson-Shah discussions, 354 + National Estimates memoranda, 365 + Allen Dulles briefing notes, 319 + Henderson-Baqai discussions, 335 + Henderson memoranda, 348 + Henderson-Shah discussions, 354 Hoover mission, 331, 343 - Melbourne memoranda, 325 - National Intelligence Estimates, 347, 357, 362 - NSC discussions, 304 - NSC statement of policy, 355 - Kermit Roosevelt memoranda, 352 - Settlement (1954), 373, 374, 375 - Waller memoranda, 364 - Wisner memoranda, 305 + Melbourne memoranda, 325 + National Intelligence Estimates, 347, 357, 362 + NSC discussions, 304 + NSC statement of policy, 355 + Kermit Roosevelt memoranda, 352 + Settlement (1954), 373, 374, 375 + Waller memoranda, 364 + Wisner memoranda, 305 Operation Ajax (see also Mossadeq removal @@ -53766,84 +45126,54 @@ Authorization of, 225 CIA Directorate of Plans memoranda, 363 - Dulles-Dulles discussions, 251 - Eisenhower message to Shah, 293 + Dulles-Dulles discussions, 251 + Eisenhower message to Shah, 293 Execution of: CIA internal discussions, 307 CIA Tehran Station memoranda, 286, - 287, 290, 306 + 287, 290, 306 CIA telegrams, - 284, 285 - Henderson memoranda, 283, 288 - Waller memoranda, 291 + 284, 285 + Henderson memoranda, 283, 288 + Waller memoranda, 291 First attempt: CIA Directorate - of Plans memoranda, 274 + of Plans memoranda, 274 CIA Office of - National Estimates memoranda, 275 + National Estimates memoranda, 275 CIA Tehran Station memoranda, 264, - 270, 273 + 270, 273 CIA telegrams, - 265, 269, 272, 277, 278 - Henderson-Mossadeq discussions, 280, 281 - Henderson-Shah discussions, 271 + 265, 269, 272, 277, 278 + Henderson-Mossadeq discussions, 280, 281 + Henderson-Shah discussions, 271 Mattison memoranda, 261, - 262, 263, 266, 267, 268 - Shah press interview, 279 - Tudeh Party responses, 276 + 262, 263, 266, 267, 268 + Shah press interview, 279 + Tudeh Party responses, 276 Henderson briefing, 216 - Qashqai tribe and, 236, 255, 291, + Qashqai tribe and, 236, 255, 291, 307 Richards memoranda, 223 Kermit Roosevelt memoranda, 184, - 228, 241 - Schwartzkopf role, 216, 227, 228, + 228, 241 + Schwartzkopf role, 216, 227, 228, 229 - Shah return, 284, 287, 290, + Shah return, 284, 287, 290, 293 - Tudeh Party and, 262, 276, 283, - 295, 307 - U.S.-British discussions, 232 + Tudeh Party and, 262, 276, 283, + 295, 307 + U.S.-British discussions, 232 Waller memoranda, 218 - Warne situation, 243, 253 - Zahedi correspondence, 240, 245, 248, + Warne situation, 243, 253 + Zahedi correspondence, 240, 245, 248, 260 - Zahedi government period, 334 + Zahedi government period, 334 Zahedi proposed government, 240, 260 @@ -53857,68 +45187,40 @@ 216 Pahlavi, Ashraf (Princess of Iran), 51, - 65, 69, 370 - Pahlavi, Gholam Reza (prince of Iran), 375 + 65, 69, 370 + Pahlavi, Gholam Reza (prince of Iran), 375 Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza (Shah of Iran): - Ala administration period, 5, 8, 12, 16, 21 + Ala administration period, 5, 8, 12, 16, 21 Health of, 21 - Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 49, 51, + Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 49, 51, 67 - U.S.-British joint estimates, 72 + U.S.-British joint estimates, 72 - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 112 + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 112 - British paper, 133 - British role in Iran, 210, 212 - Byroade memoranda, 121 + British paper, 133 + British role in Iran, 210, 212 + Byroade memoranda, 121 CIA Information Reports, 178 CIA memoranda, 157 CIA Office of - National Estimates memoranda, 177 + National Estimates memoranda, 177 Foreign travel plans: - John Foster Dulles memoranda, 163, 166 - Henderson-Ala discussions, 159, 164, 165 - Henderson memoranda, 161, 165, 200, 212 - Henderson-Shah emissary discussions, 205 - Kent memoranda, 162 - Melbourne memoranda, 233 + John Foster Dulles memoranda, 163, 166 + Henderson-Ala discussions, 159, 164, 165 + Henderson memoranda, 161, 165, 200, 212 + Henderson-Shah emissary discussions, 205 + Kent memoranda, 162 + Melbourne memoranda, 233 - Henderson memoranda, 136 - Melbourne memoranda, 233 - Mossadeq resignation threat (Feb. 1953), 160 + Henderson memoranda, 136 + Melbourne memoranda, 233 + Mossadeq resignation threat (Feb. 1953), 160 Zahedi coup plots, 187, - 193, 195, 196 + 193, 195, 196 Mossadeq administration post-crisis political situation, Allen Dulles briefing notes, 194, @@ -53930,261 +45232,146 @@ CIA Iran Branch estimates, 192 CIA-State - Department discussions, 126 + Department discussions, 126 CIA Tehran - Station memoranda, 189 - Henderson discussions, 212 - Henderson memoranda, 107 - Henderson-Shah emissary discussions, 204, 205 - Thornburg memoranda, 118, 122 - U.S.-Ala consultations, 75, 77 - U.S.-British discussions, 42, 54 - U.S.-Qavam communications, 68, 78 - Wilber memoranda, 123 + Station memoranda, 189 + Henderson discussions, 212 + Henderson memoranda, 107 + Henderson-Shah emissary discussions, 204, 205 + Thornburg memoranda, 118, 122 + U.S.-Ala consultations, 75, 77 + U.S.-British discussions, 42, 54 + U.S.-Qavam communications, 68, 78 + Wilber memoranda, 123 - NIE–46, 67 - NSC 107, 35 - Oil nationalization dispute, 212, 354 + NIE–46, 67 + NSC 107, 35 + Oil nationalization dispute, 212, 354 Operation Ajax: CIA Directorate - of Plans memoranda, 249 - Eisenhower message, 293 - Execution of, 284, 287, 290 - First attempt, 261, 264, 266, 267, 269, 271, 279 - Henderson discussions, 271 + of Plans memoranda, 249 + Eisenhower message, 293 + Execution of, 284, 287, 290 + First attempt, 261, 264, 266, 267, 269, 271, 279 + Henderson discussions, 271 Qavam appointment - crisis (July 1952), 83, 87, - 91, 92, 93, 94, 97 + crisis (July 1952), 83, 87, + 91, 92, 93, 94, 97 Razmara assassination, 2 Stutesman report, 65 - U.S.-British joint estimates, 55 + U.S.-British joint estimates, 55 Zahedi government: - Baghai interview, 356 - British relations with, 354 - Corruption problems, 367 - Domestic programs, Henderson discussions, 303 + Baghai interview, 356 + British relations with, 354 + Corruption problems, 367 + Domestic programs, Henderson discussions, 303 Intra-government conflicts: CIA - Information Reports, 317 + Information Reports, 317 CIA monthly reports, 351 - Allen Dulles briefing notes, 319 - Gannett-Perron discussions, 361 - Henderson discussions, 335, 340, 360 - Henderson memoranda, 348 - National Intelligence Estimates, 347 - NSC discussions, 320 - Kermit Roosevelt memoranda, 322, 323 + Allen Dulles briefing notes, 319 + Gannett-Perron discussions, 361 + Henderson discussions, 335, 340, 360 + Henderson memoranda, 348 + National Intelligence Estimates, 347 + NSC discussions, 320 + Kermit Roosevelt memoranda, 322, 323 - Majlis dissolution/elections, 351, 354 + Majlis dissolution/elections, 351, 354 Mossadeq treatment, 327, 354 - National Intelligence Estimates, 375 - Nixon visit, 354, 360 + National Intelligence Estimates, 375 + Nixon visit, 354, 360 U.S. military aid, 312, - 349, 354, 355, 360 + 349, 354, 355, 360 Pakravan, Col., 332 - Palmer, Joseph, 181, 281 + Palmer, Joseph, 181, 281 Pan-Iranist group, 192 Panahi, Abol Qasem, 52 Paul, Norman, 215 - Perron, Ernest, 204, 205, 360, 361 + Perron, Ernest, 204, 205, 360, 361 Pirnia, Hoseyn, 330 Point IV (see also U.S. economic aid to - Iran), 8, 63, 65, 86, 135, 137, 243, 253 - Pollard, Cmdr. Eric, 156, 204, 205, 217, 307 + Iran), 8, 63, 65, 86, 135, 137, 243, 253 + Pollard, Cmdr. Eric, 156, 204, 205, 217, 307 Polowetzky, 113 Post-coup government. See Zahedi government. - Pyman, Launcelot, 73, 80 + Pyman, Launcelot, 73, 80 Qashqai, Abdullah, 74 Qashqai, Khosro: - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 165, 200 - Mossadeq removal proposals, 217 + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 165, 200 + Mossadeq removal proposals, 217 Operation Ajax, 255 - U.S. visit (1951), 34, 36 + U.S. visit (1951), 34, 36 Zahedi government period, 315, - 316, 321, 351, 369 + 316, 321, 351, 369 - Qashqai, Malek Mansur, 315, 321, 369 - Qashqai, Mohamad, 34, 36 - Qashqai, Mohammed Hosein, 366, 369 - Qashqai, Nasser, 74, 121, 314, 315, 316, 324, 336, 351, 358, 369 + Qashqai, Malek Mansur, 315, 321, 369 + Qashqai, Mohamad, 34, 36 + Qashqai, Mohammed Hosein, 366, 369 + Qashqai, Nasser, 74, 121, 314, 315, 316, 324, 336, 351, 358, 369 Qashqai tribe (see also Iranian tribes): - Amini appointment and, 200, 201 - Mossadeq removal proposals and, 192 - Operation Ajax and, 236, 255, 291, + Amini appointment and, 200, 201 + Mossadeq removal proposals and, 192 + Operation Ajax and, 236, 255, 291, 307 Qashqai brothers U.S. visit (1951), - 34, 36 - U.S. consultations with, 34, 36, 74 + 34, 36 + U.S. consultations with, 34, 36, 74 U.S. covert activities and, 40, - 48, 102, 109, 117, 168 + 48, 102, 109, 117, 168 Wiley memoranda, 38 Zahedi government relations with: - Bryant memoranda, 315 + Bryant memoranda, 315 CIA Information Cables, 314 CIA Information - Reports, 336, 369 + Reports, 336, 369 CIA monthly - reports, 308, 326, 351 + reports, 308, 326, 351 CIA Tehran - Station memoranda, 324 - Henderson-Zahedi discussions, 358 - Melbourne memoranda, 316, 321 - Murphy-Mohammed Hosein Qashqai discussions, 366 + Station memoranda, 324 + Henderson-Zahedi discussions, 358 + Melbourne memoranda, 316, 321 + Murphy-Mohammed Hosein Qashqai discussions, 366 - Qavam, Ahmad (see also + Qavam, Ahmad (see also Qavam appointment crisis (July 1952)): As Ala replacement candidate, 16 As Mossadeq replacement candidate: - Acheson memoranda, 70 - Henderson memoranda, 80 - Stutesman report, 65 - U.S.-Ala consultations, 75, 77, 78 - U.S.-British discussions, 42, 46, 54, 56, 73, 78 - U.S.-Qavam communications, 52, 68, 69, 78 - U.S.-Shah discussions, 79 + Acheson memoranda, 70 + Henderson memoranda, 80 + Stutesman report, 65 + U.S.-Ala consultations, 75, 77, 78 + U.S.-British discussions, 42, 46, 54, 56, 73, 78 + U.S.-Qavam communications, 52, 68, 69, 78 + U.S.-Shah discussions, 79 - Oil nationalization dispute, 78 - Zahedi government period, 303 + Oil nationalization dispute, 78 + Zahedi government period, 303 Qavam appointment crisis (July 1952): Acheson memoranda, 85 - CIA status report, 111 + CIA status report, 111 Editorial note, 87 - Henderson memoranda, 83, 84, 88, - 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 98, 112 - State Department position paper, 97 - Truman-Acheson discussions, 96 + Henderson memoranda, 83, 84, 88, + 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 98, 112 + State Department position paper, 97 + Truman-Acheson discussions, 96 U.S.-British discussions, 84, - 90, 92, 95 + 90, 92, 95 Qavam prime minstership (1952). See @@ -54192,275 +45379,170 @@ (July 1952). - Radford, Adm. Arthur W., 304, 338 + Radford, Adm. Arthur W., 304, 338 Rafi, Haji Agha Reza, 193 Rashidian, Seyfollah, 330 Raynor, 220 - Razavi, 238, 249 + Razavi, 238, 249 Razmara, Haj Ali (see also Razmara - assassination), 65, 115, 118 + assassination), 65, 115, 118 Razmara assassination, 2 Berry memoranda, 12 CIA Directorate of Plans - memoranda, 4, 5 + memoranda, 4, 5 CIA Office of National Estimates memoranda, 3 - NIE–6, 13 - NSC 107 on, 6 - Special Estimate, 7, 9 - U.S. security interests in Iran and, 10 + NIE–6, 13 + NSC 107 on, 6 + Special Estimate, 7, 9 + U.S. security interests in Iran and, 10 - Riahi, Gen. Esmail, 188 - Riahi, Gen. Taghi, 188, 205, 217, 235, 267, 270, 307, 354 + Riahi, Gen. Esmail, 188 + Riahi, Gen. Taghi, 188, 205, 217, 235, 267, 270, 307, 354 Richards, 134 Richards, Arthur L.: - Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 23, 43 + Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 23, 43 - Mossadeq removal proposals, 42, 46, 52 + Mossadeq removal proposals, 42, 46, 52 - Oil nationalization dispute, 218, 220 - Stutesman report, 65 + Oil nationalization dispute, 218, 220 + Stutesman report, 65 Tudeh Party, 64 Mossadeq administration post-crisis period: - John Foster Dulles-Henderson discussions, 206 - Eisenhower-Mossadeq correspondence, 230 - Henderson recall rumors, 113 - Mattison memoranda, 151 - Shah foreign travel plans, 163, 166 - U.S. covert activities, 105 + John Foster Dulles-Henderson discussions, 206 + Eisenhower-Mossadeq correspondence, 230 + Henderson recall rumors, 113 + Mattison memoranda, 151 + Shah foreign travel plans, 163, 166 + U.S. covert activities, 105 U.S. economic aid, 215, - 218, 220 + 218, 220 Mossadeq removal proposals, 118, - 204, 205 + 204, 205 Operation Ajax, 223 - Zahedi government, 256, 332, 333, + Zahedi government, 256, 332, 333, 335 - Ridgway, Gen. Matthew B., 304, 312 - Roach. See Schwartzkopf, Brig. Gen. Norman H. + Ridgway, Gen. Matthew B., 304, 312 + Roach. See Schwartzkopf, Brig. Gen. Norman H. Roosevelt, Kermit: - Ala administration period, 7, 8, 10, 14, 17, + Ala administration period, 7, 8, 10, 14, 17, 18 Documents not declassified, 222, - 234, 310, 311 - Eisenhower-Mossadeq correspondence, 238 - Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 48, 53, + 234, 310, 311 + Eisenhower-Mossadeq correspondence, 238 + Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 48, 53, 71 - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 105, 119, - 133, 134, 238, 239, 242 + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 105, 119, + 133, 134, 238, 239, 242 Mossadeq removal proposals, 26, - 122, 126, 179, 192, 238 - Operation Ajax, 184, 228, 241 + 122, 126, 179, 192, 238 + Operation Ajax, 184, 228, 241 - Authorization of, 225 - Execution of, 292, 306, 307 - First attempt, 263 - Henderson briefing, 216 - Qashqai tribe and, 236 - U.S.-British discussions, 232 + Authorization of, 225 + Execution of, 292, 306, 307 + First attempt, 263 + Henderson briefing, 216 + Qashqai tribe and, 236 + U.S.-British discussions, 232 Warne situation, 243, 253 - Zahedi correspondence, 240 - Zahedi government period, 334 + Zahedi correspondence, 240 + Zahedi government period, 334 - Tudeh Party takeover contingency plans, 71, 129, 131 - U.S. security interests in Iran, 10 + Tudeh Party takeover contingency plans, 71, 129, 131 + U.S. security interests in Iran, 10 Zahedi government, 352 Baghai on, 337 - Intra-government conflicts, 322, 323, 337 - Mossadeq treatment, 327 - Opposition activities, 329 - U.S. covert activities, 346 + Intra-government conflicts, 322, 323, 337 + Mossadeq treatment, 327 + Opposition activities, 329 + U.S. covert activities, 346 U.S. military aid, 338, 349 Ross, A.D.M., 181 - Rothnie, A.K., 181, 187 - Rountree, William M., 26, 43, 49, 73 + Rothnie, A.K., 181, 187 + Rountree, William M., 26, 43, 49, 73 - Sadchikov, Ivan, 19, 231 + Sadchikov, Ivan, 19, 231 Sadeqi, 325 Saed, Mohammed, 65 Sajjadi, Mohammed, 375 Salah, Jehanshah, 337 Saleh, Illahyer: - As Mossadeq replacement candidate, 73, 75, 79, 80 - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 123, 165 - Mossadeq removal proposals, 189 + As Mossadeq replacement candidate, 73, 75, 79, 80 + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 123, 165 + Mossadeq removal proposals, 189 National Front and, 65 - U.S. covert activities and, 5 - Zahedi government period, 309 + U.S. covert activities and, 5 + Zahedi government period, 309 Saleh, Jehan Shah, 335 - Sanjabi, Kavim, 193, 325, 344 + Sanjabi, Kavim, 193, 325, 344 Sayah, Kazem, 330 Schaetzel, 220 Schwartzkopf, Brig. Gen. Norman H., 216, 227, - 228, 229 + 228, 229 Schwind, Donald, 266 Shah of Iran. See Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza. - Shayegan, Seyid Ali, 65, 73, 155, 325 - Shepherd, Gen. Lemuel C., 46, 304 + Shayegan, Seyid Ali, 65, 73, 155, 325 + Shepherd, Gen. Lemuel C., 46, 304 Smith, Gen. Walter B.: Ala administration period, 11, 16 - Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 37, 62, + Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 37, 62, 81 - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 108, 117, - 145, 154, 180, 211 + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 108, 117, + 145, 154, 180, 211 Mossadeq removal proposals, 25, - 104, 118, 181 + 104, 118, 181 Oil nationalization dispute, 33, - 37, 250, 305, 352, 364 - Operation Ajax, 225, 243, 271, + 37, 250, 305, 352, 364 + Operation Ajax, 225, 243, 271, 278 U.S. covert activities, 11 Zahedi government, 298 Snyder, John W., 146 - Soheily, Ali, 73, 80, 330, 375 + Soheily, Ali, 73, 80, 330, 375 Soviet-Iranian relations: - Iranian financial claims, 247 - Iranian-Soviet Treaty (1921), 1, 6, 19, 145, + Iranian financial claims, 247 + Iranian-Soviet Treaty (1921), 1, 6, 19, 145, 355 - Zahedi government, 298, 347 + Zahedi government, 298, 347 Soviet policy in Iran (see also Tudeh Party): British paper, 133 CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 19 - CIA monthly reports, 231 + CIA monthly reports, 231 CIA Office of Research and Reports study, 45 CIA Tehran Station memoranda, 51 - Henderson-Abol Ghassem Amini discussions, 235 + Henderson-Abol Ghassem Amini discussions, 235 Iranian tribes and, 175 Kashani ties, 3 - National Intelligence Estimates, 259, 347, 375 - NIE–46, 63 - NIE–75, 143, 152 - NSC 107, 6 - NSC 136, 145 - NSC statement of policy, 355 + National Intelligence Estimates, 259, 347, 375 + NIE–46, 63 + NIE–75, 143, 152 + NSC 107, 6 + NSC 136, 145 + NSC statement of policy, 355 Oil industry shutdown and, 39, 63 - Razmara assassination and, 3, 4 + Razmara assassination and, 3, 4 Special Estimates, 28 Stutesman report, 65 Wagner memoranda, 1 @@ -54473,72 +45555,44 @@ SE–6, “Current Development in Iran,” 28 SE–33, “Prospects for Survival of - Mossadeq Regime in Iran,” 132 + Mossadeq Regime in Iran,” 132 Special political operations. See U.S. covert activities. - Stassen, Harold E., 171, 176, 215, 282, 304, 305 - Stewart, Gen., 299 - Stokes Mission, 42, 43 + Stassen, Harold E., 171, 176, 215, 282, 304, 305 + Stewart, Gen., 299 + Stokes Mission, 42, 43 Strauss, Lewis, 304 Strong, 170 Stutesman, John H.: - Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 23, 65 - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 105, 133, - 163, 166, 174, 215, 218, + Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 23, 65 + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 105, 133, + 163, 166, 174, 215, 218, 220 - Mossadeq removal proposals, 103 - Zahedi government, 256, 345, 350, - 361, 366 + Mossadeq removal proposals, 103 + Zahedi government, 256, 345, 350, + 361, 366 Sumka party, 192 Tabriz, 114 - Tadj ol-Molouk (queen mother of Iran), 65, 69, 80 + Tadj ol-Molouk (queen mother of Iran), 65, 69, 80 Third Force, 192 - Thornburg, Max, 116, 118, 119, 122, 126, 154 - Toilers Party, 192, 337, 341 + Thornburg, Max, 116, 118, 119, 122, 126, 154 + Toilers Party, 192, 337, 341 TP-AJAX. See Operation Ajax. Tribes. See Iranian tribes; Qashqai tribe. Truman, Harry S.: - Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 30, 49 - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 106, 121, - 146, 171 + Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 30, 49 + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 106, 121, + 146, 171 NSC 107, 6, 14 Qavam appointment - crisis (July 1952), 96 - Tudeh Party takeover contingency plans, 141 + crisis (July 1952), 96 + Tudeh Party takeover contingency plans, 141 Tudeh Party (see also Soviet policy in Iran; Tudeh Party suppression under Zahedi government; Tudeh Party @@ -54549,61 +45603,36 @@ CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 19 CIA Office of - National Estimates memoranda, 3 - Langer memoranda, 16 - NIE–6 on, 13 - Kermit Roosevelt memoranda, 7, 10 - Special Estimates, 7, 9, 28 - Strikes (Apr. 1951), 12 + National Estimates memoranda, 3 + Langer memoranda, 16 + NIE–6 on, 13 + Kermit Roosevelt memoranda, 7, 10 + Special Estimates, 7, 9, 28 + Strikes (Apr. 1951), 12 U.S. covert activities, 5, - 8, 11 + 8, 11 - Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952): + Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952): CIA Memoranda of Information, 20 CIA Office of - Intelligence Research memoranda, 44 + Intelligence Research memoranda, 44 CIA Office of - National Estimates memoranda, 58 + National Estimates memoranda, 58 CIA Tehran - Station memoranda, 51 - Henderson memoranda, 64 - Langer memoranda, 33 + Station memoranda, 51 + Henderson memoranda, 64 + Langer memoranda, 33 Majlis elections, 64, - 66, 67 - NIE–46, 58, 62, 63 - U.S.-British joint estimates, 55 + 66, 67 + NIE–46, 58, 62, 63 + U.S.-British joint estimates, 55 - U.S. covert activities, 41, 48, 59, 66 + U.S. covert activities, 41, 48, 59, 66 - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 124, 132 + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 124, 132 - British paper, 133 + British paper, 133 CIA Information Reports, 185 CIA Iran Branch @@ -54613,263 +45642,154 @@ CIA monthly reports, 231 CIA Office of - National Estimates memoranda, 177 - CIA papers, 247 - Coup plot, 120, 124, 127 - Allen Dulles briefing notes, 194 - John Foster Dulles-Henderson discussions, 206 - Allen Dulles memoranda, 168 - Henderson memoranda, 112, 114, 136 - Henderson-Shah emissary discussions, 205 + National Estimates memoranda, 177 + CIA papers, 247 + Coup plot, 120, 124, 127 + Allen Dulles briefing notes, 194 + John Foster Dulles-Henderson discussions, 206 + Allen Dulles memoranda, 168 + Henderson memoranda, 112, 114, 136 + Henderson-Shah emissary discussions, 205 Legalization, 209 - Mattison memoranda, 246 - National Intelligence Estimates, 259 - NIE–75, 143, 150, 152 - NSC discussions, 171 - U.S.-Baghai discussions, 135 - U.S. covert activities, 213 - Warne memoranda, 258 - Zahedi coup plots, 188 + Mattison memoranda, 246 + National Intelligence Estimates, 259 + NIE–75, 143, 150, 152 + NSC discussions, 171 + U.S.-Baghai discussions, 135 + U.S. covert activities, 213 + Warne memoranda, 258 + Zahedi coup plots, 188 - Operation Ajax and, 262, 276, 283, - 295, 296, 297, 307 + Operation Ajax and, 262, 276, 283, + 295, 296, 297, 307 Qavam appointment - crisis (July 1952), 91, 98, + crisis (July 1952), 91, 98, 111 Wagner memoranda, 1 Zahedi government period (see also - Tudeh Party suppression under Zahedi government), 327, 336, - 339, 342, 359, 375 + Tudeh Party suppression under Zahedi government), 327, 336, + 339, 342, 359, 375 Tudeh Party suppression under Zahedi government: - Baghai on, 335, 337, 341 + Baghai on, 335, 337, 341 Bryant memoranda, 315 CIA Directorate of Plans memoranda, 374 CIA internal discussions, 307 - CIA monthly reports, 308, 326, + CIA monthly reports, 308, 326, 343 - Allen Dulles briefing notes, 319 + Allen Dulles briefing notes, 319 Melbourne memoranda, 344 - National Intelligence Estimates, 347, 375 + National Intelligence Estimates, 347, 375 NSC discussions, 304 - Kermit Roosevelt memoranda, 322 + Kermit Roosevelt memoranda, 322 Tudeh Party takeover contingency plans: - British paper, 133, 134 + British paper, 133, 134 CIA internal discussions, 53 - CIA monthly reports, 167, 186 - CIA/State/Defense/JCS discussions, 170 - JCS memoranda, 141 + CIA monthly reports, 167, 186 + CIA/State/Defense/JCS discussions, 170 + JCS memoranda, 141 Nash memoranda, 128 NSC 107, 6, 131 - NSC 136, 145, 147, 180, 183 - NSC discussions, 171, 176 + NSC 136, 145, 147, 180, 183 + NSC discussions, 171, 176 Kermit Roosevelt memoranda, 71, 129 - U.S.-British discussions, 158 + U.S.-British discussions, 158 U.S. capabilities analyses, 138, - 168, 169 + 168, 169 Wisner memoranda, 117 - Twining, Gen. Nathan F., 304 + Twining, Gen. Nathan F., 304 - UN Security Council, 49, 51 + UN Security Council, 49, 51 United Kingdom. See British role in Iran; U.S.-British collaborative action U.S. covert activities (see also Operation Ajax): - Ala administration period, 5, 6, 8, 11, 14, - 15, 18 - Arms stockpiling, 105, 108, 109, - 117, 170 + Ala administration period, 5, 6, 8, 11, 14, + 15, 18 + Arms stockpiling, 105, 108, 109, + 117, 170 Iranian tribes and, 109 - British paper, 133 + British paper, 133 CIA Directorate of Plans memoranda, 5 - CIA/State/Defense/JCS discussions, 170 - Long memoranda, 108 - U.S. capabilities analyses, 168, 169 - Wisner memoranda, 117 - Zahedi government period, 345, 350 + CIA/State/Defense/JCS discussions, 170 + Long memoranda, 108 + U.S. capabilities analyses, 168, 169 + Wisner memoranda, 117 + Zahedi government period, 345, 350 - Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 29, 40, - 41, 48, 59, 61, 66 - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period (see also Mossadeq removal proposals): - British paper, 133 + Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951–July 1952), 29, 40, + 41, 48, 59, 61, 66 + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period (see also Mossadeq removal proposals): + British paper, 133 CIA Director’s - meeting discussions, 102 + meeting discussions, 102 CIA monthly reports, 213 - Leavitt memoranda, 122 - NSC 136, 147, 180, 183 - Richards memoranda, 105 - State Department guidance, 109 - Tudeh Party takeover contingency plans, 117, 158, 170 - U.S. capabilities analyses, 138, 168, 169 - Wisner memoranda, 117 + Leavitt memoranda, 122 + NSC 136, 147, 180, 183 + Richards memoranda, 105 + State Department guidance, 109 + Tudeh Party takeover contingency plans, 117, 158, 170 + U.S. capabilities analyses, 138, 168, 169 + Wisner memoranda, 117 - Qashqai tribe and, 40, 48, 102, - 109, 117, 168 - Tudeh Party takeover contingency plans, 117, 158, + Qashqai tribe and, 40, 48, 102, + 109, 117, 168 + Tudeh Party takeover contingency plans, 117, 158, 170 Zahedi government period, 342, - 345, 346, 350, 368, 371 + 345, 346, 350, 368, 371 U.S. economic aid to Iran: Allen Dulles memoranda, 11 Mossadeq administration post-crisis period: - British paper, 133, 134 - Byroade memoranda, 121 - John Foster Dulles-Henderson discussions, 206 - Henderson-Abol Ghassem Amini discussions, 235 - Henderson memoranda, 198 - Henderson-Mossadeq discussions, 137 - Henderson-Shah emissary discussions, 205 - Jernegan memoranda, 218 - Mutual Security-State Department discussions, 215 - Press conference, 252 - Truman-Acheson discussions, 106 - U.S.-Kashani discussions, 115 + British paper, 133, 134 + Byroade memoranda, 121 + John Foster Dulles-Henderson discussions, 206 + Henderson-Abol Ghassem Amini discussions, 235 + Henderson memoranda, 198 + Henderson-Mossadeq discussions, 137 + Henderson-Shah emissary discussions, 205 + Jernegan memoranda, 218 + Mutual Security-State Department discussions, 215 + Press conference, 252 + Truman-Acheson discussions, 106 + U.S.-Kashani discussions, 115 - NSC 107, 6 - NSC 107 progress reports, 31 + NSC 107, 6 + NSC 107 progress reports, 31 Operation Ajax and, 216 Qavam appointment - crisis (July 1952) and, 83, 84, - 85, 89, 90, 96 + crisis (July 1952) and, 83, 84, + 85, 89, 90, 96 U.S.-Shah discussions, 79 Zahedi government: CIA monthly reports, 326 CIA Tehran - Station memoranda, 286 - Allen Dulles briefing notes, 319 - Eisenhower-Zahedi correspondence, 301, 302 - Henderson-Shah discussions, 360 - National Intelligence Estimates, 375 + Station memoranda, 286 + Allen Dulles briefing notes, 319 + Eisenhower-Zahedi correspondence, 301, 302 + Henderson-Shah discussions, 360 + National Intelligence Estimates, 375 NSC discussions, 304, 320 - NSC statement of policy, 355 - Stutesman memoranda, 256 - Wilson memoranda, 299 + NSC statement of policy, 355 + Stutesman memoranda, 256 + Wilson memoranda, 299 Wisner memoranda, 282, 313 @@ -54877,186 +45797,116 @@ U.S.-Iranian relations: CIA Directorate of Plans memoranda, 4 - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 194, 195, - 202, 280 + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 194, 195, + 202, 280 CIA Information Reports, 195 CIA monthly reports, 202 - Allen Dulles briefing notes, 194 - Eisenhower-Mossadeq correspondence, 230, 238, 249, 258, 259 - Henderson-Mossadeq discussions, 280 - Henderson recall proposals, 171 - Henderson recall rumors, 113 + Allen Dulles briefing notes, 194 + Eisenhower-Mossadeq correspondence, 230, 238, 249, 258, 259 + Henderson-Mossadeq discussions, 280 + Henderson recall proposals, 171 + Henderson recall rumors, 113 - NIE–6 on, 13 + NIE–6 on, 13 Warne memoranda, 258 - Zahedi government, 301, 302, 325, - 347, 354, 360, 375 + Zahedi government, 301, 302, 325, + 347, 354, 360, 375 U.S. military aid to Iran (see also U.S. military missions in Iran): Jernegan memoranda, 218 - Mossadeq policy, 60, 63, 65, - 67, 97 + Mossadeq policy, 60, 63, 65, + 67, 97 Zahedi government: CIA memoranda, 339 CIA monthly reports, 343 - Henderson memoranda, 332 - Henderson-Shah discussions, 354, 360 - McClure-Shah discussions, 312 - National Intelligence Estimates, 347, 375 - NSC statement of policy, 355 - Kermit Roosevelt memoranda, 338, 349 + Henderson memoranda, 332 + Henderson-Shah discussions, 354, 360 + McClure-Shah discussions, 312 + National Intelligence Estimates, 347, 375 + NSC statement of policy, 355 + Kermit Roosevelt memoranda, 338, 349 - U.S. military missions in Iran, 1, 6, 60, 135 + U.S. military missions in Iran, 1, 6, 60, 135 U.S. security interests in Iran (see also Soviet policy in Iran): - NIE–6, 10, 13 + NIE–6, 10, 13 NSC 107, 6, - 14, 35 + 14, 35 NSC discussions, 50 - NSC statement of policy, 355 + NSC statement of policy, 355 Valatbar, 165 Van Alstyne, David, 74 - Vandenberg, Gen. Hoyt, 50, 171 - Villard, Henry S., 29, 47 - Vosuq, Maj. Gen. Ahmad, 317, 323, 332 + Vandenberg, Gen. Hoyt, 50, 171 + Villard, Henry S., 29, 47 + Vosuq, Maj. Gen. Ahmad, 317, 323, 332 Wagner, Joseph J., 1 Waller, John H.: - Documents not declassified, 222 + Documents not declassified, 222 Mossadeq administration post-crisis political situation, - 202, 213, 218, 252, 257 + 202, 213, 218, 252, 257 Mossadeq removal proposals, 192, 217 Operation Ajax, 218 - Authorization of, 225 + Authorization of, 225 CIA Directorate - of Plans memoranda, 363 - Execution of, 291, 307 - Henderson briefing, 216 - Qashqai tribe and, 255 + of Plans memoranda, 363 + Execution of, 291, 307 + Henderson briefing, 216 + Qashqai tribe and, 255 Schwartzkopf role, 227, 229 - Warne situation, 253 + Warne situation, 253 - Tudeh Party takeover contingency plans, 170, 186 - Zahedi government, 298, 308, 309, - 318, 351, 364 + Tudeh Party takeover contingency plans, 170, 186 + Zahedi government, 298, 308, 309, + 318, 351, 364 Wangh, 220 Warne, William E.: - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 115, 137, - 156, 198, 207, 258 - Operation Ajax and, 243, 253 + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 115, 137, + 156, 198, 207, 258 + Operation Ajax and, 243, 253 Zahedi government, 315 Watson, Adam, 134 Waugh, Samuel C., 218 - Webb, James E., 21, 31, 57 - White, Col., 104, 282 - Wilber, Donald, 123, 225, 307 + Webb, James E., 21, 31, 57 + White, Col., 104, 282 + Wilber, Donald, 123, 225, 307 Wiley, John, 38 - Wilson, Charles E., 171, 176, 299 + Wilson, Charles E., 171, 176, 299 Wisner, Frank G.: - Ala administration period, 8, 17, 18 - Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951-`-July 1952), 48 - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 108, 110, - 117, 119 - Mossadeq removal proposals, 104 - Operation Ajax, 184, 216, 253, - 255, 297, 307, 334 - Tudeh Party takeover contingency plans, 117, 129, + Ala administration period, 8, 17, 18 + Mossadeq administration period (Apr. 1951-`-July 1952), 48 + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 108, 110, + 117, 119 + Mossadeq removal proposals, 104 + Operation Ajax, 184, 216, 253, + 255, 297, 307, 334 + Tudeh Party takeover contingency plans, 117, 129, 169 - Zahedi government, 282, 294, 298, - 305, 313, 338, 349 + Zahedi government, 282, 294, 298, + 305, 313, 338, 349 Woodhouse, 179 World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), 313 Wright, Col., 170 - Wright (British ChargÉ d’Affaires), 360 + Wright (British ChargÉ d’Affaires), 360 Young, Brig. Gen. Millard C., @@ -55064,262 +45914,142 @@ Zahedi, Ardeshir: - Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 115, 137, - 156, 188, 196 - Mossadeq removal proposals, 217 + Mossadeq administration post-crisis period, 115, 137, + 156, 188, 196 + Mossadeq removal proposals, 217 Operation Ajax, 266 Shah friendship with, 317 - Zahedi government period, 330 + Zahedi government period, 330 - Zahedi, Gen. Fazlullah (see also Zahedi government): - Ala administration period, 17 - As Mossadeq replacement candidate, 42, 73, 107, 127 - Churchill correspondence, 318 + Zahedi, Gen. Fazlullah (see also Zahedi government): + Ala administration period, 17 + As Mossadeq replacement candidate, 42, 73, 107, 127 + Churchill correspondence, 318 Eisenhower correspondence, 301, 302 Mossadeq administration post-crisis period: CIA Office of - National Estimates memoranda, 177 - Coup plots, 156, 182, 187, 188, 191, 193, 195, 196 - Allen Dulles memoranda, 168 - Henderson-Shah emissary discussions, 205 + National Estimates memoranda, 177 + Coup plots, 156, 182, 187, 188, 191, 193, 195, 196 + Allen Dulles memoranda, 168 + Henderson-Shah emissary discussions, 205 - Mossadeq removal proposals and, 105, 189, 192, 217 - Operation Ajax, 240, 245, 248, + Mossadeq removal proposals and, 105, 189, 192, 217 + Operation Ajax, 240, 245, 248, 270 - Execution of, 283, 289, 291, 307 - First attempt, 266, 267 + Execution of, 283, 289, 291, 307 + First attempt, 266, 267 Zahedi government (see also Tudeh Party suppression under Zahedi government): - Baghai on, 335, 337, 341, - 353, 356 + Baghai on, 335, 337, 341, + 353, 356 British relations with, 300, - 318, 325, 330, 341, 347, - 353, 354, 360, 375 - Churchill-Zahedi correspondence, 318 + 318, 325, 330, 341, 347, + 353, 354, 360, 375 + Churchill-Zahedi correspondence, 318 CIA Information Reports, 330 - CIA monthly reports, 326, 351 + CIA monthly reports, 326, 351 CIA Office of National Estimates memoranda, 362 - Corruption problems, 354, 360, 367, + Corruption problems, 354, 360, 367, 370 - Domestic programs, 208, 294, 303 - Allen Dulles briefing notes, 319 - Henderson-Shah discussions, 303 + Domestic programs, 208, 294, 303 + Allen Dulles briefing notes, 319 + Henderson-Shah discussions, 303 Howe memoranda, 372 Intra-government conflicts: CIA Directorate - of Plans memoranda, 374 + of Plans memoranda, 374 CIA Information Reports, 317 CIA monthly - reports, 308, 343, 351 - Allen Dulles briefing notes, 319 - Gannett-Perron discussions, 361 - Henderson memoranda, 332, 335, 340, 348 - Henderson-Shah discussions, 335, 340, 360 - Melbourne memoranda, 325 - National Intelligence Estimates, 347, 362 - NSC discussions, 320 - Kermit Roosevelt memoranda, 322, 323 + reports, 308, 343, 351 + Allen Dulles briefing notes, 319 + Gannett-Perron discussions, 361 + Henderson memoranda, 332, 335, 340, 348 + Henderson-Shah discussions, 335, 340, 360 + Melbourne memoranda, 325 + National Intelligence Estimates, 347, 362 + NSC discussions, 320 + Kermit Roosevelt memoranda, 322, 323 - Majlis dissolution/elections, 325, 332, 346, 347, - 350, 351, 354, 357 - Mossadeq treatment, 303, 307, 322, - 325, 327, 343, 344, 347, - 353, 354, 357 - National Intelligence Estimates, 347, 357, 362, 375 - Nixon visit, 354, 360 - NSC statement of policy, 355 - Opposition activities, 329, 330, 332, - 336, 339, 343, 344, 350 + Majlis dissolution/elections, 325, 332, 346, 347, + 350, 351, 354, 357 + Mossadeq treatment, 303, 307, 322, + 325, 327, 343, 344, 347, + 353, 354, 357 + National Intelligence Estimates, 347, 357, 362, 375 + Nixon visit, 354, 360 + NSC statement of policy, 355 + Opposition activities, 329, 330, 332, + 336, 339, 343, 344, 350 Qashqai tribe relations with: - Bryant memoranda, 315 + Bryant memoranda, 315 CIA Information Cables, 314 CIA Information - Reports, 336, 369 + Reports, 336, 369 CIA monthly - reports, 308, 326, 351 + reports, 308, 326, 351 CIA Tehran - Station memoranda, 324 - Henderson-Zahedi discussions, 358 - Melbourne memoranda, 316, 321 - Murphy-Mohammed Hosein Qashqai discussions, 366 - Saleh ambassadorship, 309 - Soviet relations with, 298 - U.S. anti-communism policy recommendations, 333 - U.S. covert activities, 342, 345, 346, 350, 368, 371 + Station memoranda, 324 + Henderson-Zahedi discussions, 358 + Melbourne memoranda, 316, 321 + Murphy-Mohammed Hosein Qashqai discussions, 366 + Saleh ambassadorship, 309 + Soviet relations with, 298 + U.S. anti-communism policy recommendations, 333 + U.S. covert activities, 342, 345, 346, 350, 368, 371 U.S. economic aid: CIA monthly reports, 326 CIA Tehran - Station memoranda, 286 - Allen Dulles briefing notes, 319 - Eisenhower-Zahedi correspondence, 301, 302 - Henderson-Shah discussions, 360 - National Intelligence Estimates, 375 - NSC discussions, 304, 320 - NSC statement of policy, 355 - Stutesman memoranda, 256 - Wilson memoranda, 299 - Wisner memoranda, 282, 313 + Station memoranda, 286 + Allen Dulles briefing notes, 319 + Eisenhower-Zahedi correspondence, 301, 302 + Henderson-Shah discussions, 360 + National Intelligence Estimates, 375 + NSC discussions, 304, 320 + NSC statement of policy, 355 + Stutesman memoranda, 256 + Wilson memoranda, 299 + Wisner memoranda, 282, 313 U.S. military aid: CIA memoranda, 339 CIA monthly reports, 343 - Henderson memoranda, 332 - Henderson-Shah discussions, 354, 360 - McClure-Shah discussions, 312 - National Intelligence Estimates, 347, 375 - NSC statement of policy, 355 - Kermit Roosevelt memoranda, 338, 349 + Henderson memoranda, 332 + Henderson-Shah discussions, 354, 360 + McClure-Shah discussions, 312 + National Intelligence Estimates, 347, 375 + NSC statement of policy, 355 + Kermit Roosevelt memoranda, 338, 349 - U.S. relations with, 301, 302, 325, 347, 354, 360, 375 + U.S. relations with, 301, 302, 325, 347, 354, 360, 375 Zanganeh, Ahmad, 258 Zia Tabatabai, Seyyid: - Ala administration period, 17, 22, 23, 51 + Ala administration period, 17, 22, 23, 51 As Ala - replacement candidate, 16 - Mossadeq removal proposals, 42, 46, 73 - Stutesman report, 65 - Zahedi government period, 330 + replacement candidate, 16 + Mossadeq removal proposals, 42, 46, 73 + Stutesman report, 65 + Zahedi government period, 330 Zimmerman, Maj. Gen. Wayne, 168 - Zirakzadeh, 325, 344 + Zirakzadeh, 325, 344
- + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/volumes/frus1981-88v03.xml b/volumes/frus1981-88v03.xml index 29d7209fa..04afe75aa 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1981-88v03.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1981-88v03.xml @@ -246,21 +246,29 @@ >Reagan administration’s policy toward the Soviet Union from January 1981 until January 1983.

- - Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. - - - General Editor - - + + Adam + M. Howard, Ph.D. + + + General Editor + + - - Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D. - - - The Historian - - + + Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D. + + + The Historian + + Bureau of Public Affairs @@ -2685,8 +2693,8 @@ front of the Embassy on the President and Vice-President-elect continues to draw impressive crowds.

- - Watson + + Watson
@@ -3057,8 +3065,8 @@ >Korniyenko took, all of which are standard fare, and all of which we are likely to hear repeated in the future.

- - Matlock + + Matlock
@@ -3148,8 +3156,8 @@

Sincerely, Alexander Haig. End text.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -3912,8 +3920,8 @@

Moscow, January 28, 1981.

End text.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -4126,8 +4134,8 @@ corresp="#p_DA_2">Dobrynin, as usual, came alone and took no notes.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -5247,8 +5255,8 @@ substantiating that the Soviets have indulged in indirect or covert support for such groups? If so, this is important to know.

- - Matlock + + Matlock
@@ -5904,10 +5912,10 @@ this.

Respectfully,

- - L. BrezhnevPrinted from a copy that bears this typed - signature. + + L. + BrezhnevPrinted from a + copy that bears this typed signature.
@@ -7622,8 +7630,8 @@ reminded him that we intend to judge Soviet intentions by their actions, not just words.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -7867,9 +7875,10 @@ embargo.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

- - J.H. Rixse - The Special Assistant + + J.H. Rixse + + The Special Assistant
@@ -8143,8 +8152,9 @@ responsibilities.

Sincerely,

- - Ronald Reagan + + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -8248,8 +8258,9 @@ to Soviet-American relations.

Respectively

- - L. Brezhnev + + L. + Brezhnev
@@ -8876,9 +8887,10 @@ the event of an invasion by the U.S.)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

- - J.H. Rixse - The Special Assistant + + J.H. Rixse + + The Special Assistant
@@ -9011,8 +9023,9 @@ in fulfilling our joint obligation to find lasting peace.

Sincerely

- - Ronald Reagan + + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -9157,8 +9170,9 @@ what pace we may begin to build a better and happier relationship.

Sincerely,

- - Ronald Reagan + + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -9556,8 +9570,8 @@ right-hand margin, and wrote: “Superb job here & there!” Unquote.

- - Clark + + Clark
@@ -10165,9 +10179,9 @@

Sincerely,

- A. GromykoPrinted from a copy bearing this typed - signature. + A. + GromykoPrinted from + a copy bearing this typed signature. @@ -10239,10 +10253,10 @@ Israelis alike.

Sincerely,

- - Alexander M. HaigPrinted from a copy bearing this typed - signature. + + Alexander M. + HaigPrinted from + a copy bearing this typed signature. @@ -11408,10 +11422,10 @@ its timing, I believe, at a moment acceptable to both of us.

Sincerely,

- - L. BrezhnevPrinted from a copy bearing this typed - signature. + + L. + BrezhnevPrinted from + a copy bearing this typed signature. @@ -11710,10 +11724,10 @@ settle disagreements by negotiations.

Sincerely,

- - L. BrezhnevPrinted from a copy bearing this typed - signature. + + L. + BrezhnevPrinted from + a copy bearing this typed signature. @@ -11912,8 +11926,8 @@ visiting Americans over the past couple of months. His visitors are likely to hear more of the same over the coming months.

- - Matlock + + Matlock
@@ -12628,8 +12642,8 @@ that in this case the Soviet Union would be free to take such measures as would be dictated by the emerging situation. End text.

- - Stoessel + + Stoessel
@@ -12934,9 +12948,9 @@ saying that half a year has gone by already and that, in his view, it is urgent to enter into serious talks about our relationship.

- - Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. + + Walter J. Stoessel, + Jr. Stoessel signed the memorandum “WJS.” @@ -15091,8 +15105,8 @@ ensure a productive outcome. Sincerely, Alexander M. Haig, Jr. End text

- - Rashish + + Rashish
@@ -15217,10 +15231,10 @@ solution. We are in favour of it.

Sincerely,

- - A. GromykoPrinted from a copy bearing this typed - signature. + + A. + GromykoPrinted from a + copy bearing this typed signature.
@@ -15598,8 +15612,8 @@ them “not unuseful” (nebezpoleznye), and hoped they would continue upon Charge’s return from Washington.

- - Matlock + + Matlock
@@ -16092,8 +16106,8 @@ would help lead the crisis toward a political solution. The Afghan proposal clearly does not advance this purpose.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -16211,10 +16225,11 @@ public,” and wrote beside it: “agree.”

- - Larry EagleburgerAn unknown hand initialed “LSE” on Eagleburger’s behalf. + + Larry + EagleburgerAn unknown + hand initialed “LSE” on Eagleburger’s behalf.
@@ -16524,8 +16539,8 @@ effectiveness of Soviet complaints about the alleged U.S. unwillingness to enter into a real dialogue and negotiate differences.

- - Matlock + + Matlock
@@ -20240,10 +20255,10 @@ relations.

Sincerely,

- - L. BrezhnevPrinted from a copy bearing this typed - signature. + + L. + BrezhnevPrinted from a + copy bearing this typed signature.
@@ -21396,8 +21411,8 @@ you—a dialogue which is indispensable to progress in our bilateral relations and to enhancement of the prospects for peace. End text.

- - Hartman + + Hartman
@@ -22114,9 +22129,9 @@ conference could hardly say that this was an effort to inflate the issue.

- - E. Anthony Wayne + + E. Anthony + Wayne Wayne initialled “EAW” over his typed signature. @@ -22376,15 +22391,15 @@ ready partner.

Sincerely,

- - Ronald ReaganPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature - with an indication Reagan - signed it. Hartman handed - the letter to Gromyko in - Moscow on November 18. (Telegram 15964 from Moscow, November 18; - Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, - N810009–0249) + + Ronald + ReaganPrinted from a + copy that bears this typed signature with an indication Reagan signed it. Hartman handed the letter to + Gromyko in Moscow on + November 18. (Telegram 15964 from Moscow, November 18; Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, N810009–0249)
@@ -22941,8 +22956,8 @@ President in his November 17 letter to President Brezhnev. End text.

- - Clark + + Clark
@@ -23115,10 +23130,10 @@ prepared for such work.

Sincerely,

- - L. BrezhnevPrinted from a copy that bears this typed - signature. + + L. + BrezhnevPrinted from a + copy that bears this typed signature.
@@ -23440,8 +23455,8 @@ instructed to emphasize that there is no such issue in Soviet/American relations.

- - Stoessel + + Stoessel
@@ -23960,8 +23975,8 @@ Finally, they support the thesis that the decision to release Liza Alexeyeva has indeed been taken.

- - Clark + + Clark
@@ -24110,8 +24125,8 @@ meeting before the press, both sides would take the line that several subjects were discussed, Poland among them, and decline further comment.

- - Clark + + Clark
@@ -24189,8 +24204,8 @@

7. I will be returning from Brussels this afternoon and will be in touch with you upon my arrival.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -24327,9 +24342,9 @@ facs="0422" xml:id="pg_391"/> the authorities, Solidarity, and the Church which could lead to a process of reconciliation.

- - Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. + + Walter J. Stoessel, + Jr. Stoessel initialed the memorandum above his typed signature. @@ -24529,10 +24544,10 @@

I hope to hear from you in the next few days.

Sincerely,

- - Ronald ReaganPrinted from a copy bearing this typed - signature. + + Ronald + ReaganPrinted from a + copy bearing this typed signature.
@@ -24757,10 +24772,10 @@ people need this no less than the Soviet and other people.

Respectfully,

- - L. BrezhnevPrinted from a copy that bears this typed - signature. + + L. + BrezhnevPrinted + from a copy that bears this typed signature. @@ -25375,8 +25390,8 @@ corresp="#p_HAM_1">Haig and Gromyko at Geneva.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -25493,8 +25508,8 @@ the September meetings. As far as any announcements were concerned, the Acting Secretary added, he could not say.

- - Stoessel + + Stoessel
@@ -25635,9 +25650,9 @@ and thereby bring about a humanitarian solution before it is too late.

- - Ronald Reagan + + Ronald + Reagan Reagan did not sign the proposed letter. @@ -25697,8 +25712,8 @@ itself and that it would be transmitted to President Brezhnev.

- - Hartman + + Hartman
@@ -25967,9 +25982,9 @@ stable basis in our relationship. So long as such moderation and restraint were absent, then the relationship would only suffer.

- - Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. + + Walter J. Stoessel, + Jr. Stoessel initialed the memorandum above his typed signature. @@ -26088,10 +26103,10 @@ Moscow.

Sincerely,

- - L. BrezhnevPrinted from a copy that bears this typed - signature. + + L. + BrezhnevPrinted from a + copy that bears this typed signature.
@@ -26420,10 +26435,10 @@ >Brezhnev, who is “an emotional old guy—the type who would cry after he threw you over the side.”

- - Keith SchuettePrinted from a copy bearing this typed - signature. + + Keith + SchuettePrinted from a + copy bearing this typed signature.
@@ -26595,8 +26610,8 @@ exacerbate it through raising non-existing questions and making propaganda around them. End text.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -28758,7 +28773,7 @@ we might contribute to a solution.

- Cap + Cap
@@ -28821,8 +28836,8 @@ expressed the hope that the Soviet action in the case would be considered as favorably responsive by the American side.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -29241,9 +29256,9 @@ right of this paragraph.

- - Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. + + Walter J. Stoessel, + Jr. Stoessel initialed “WJS” over his typed signature. @@ -29345,8 +29360,8 @@ what they say and probably even more. He urged us to try them and see what happened. End of text.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -29461,8 +29476,8 @@ something of a backhand criticism at Gosbank and the Soviet Banking System.)

- - Hartman + + Hartman
@@ -29958,8 +29973,9 @@ staff.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

- - William P. Clark + + William P. + Clark
@@ -30038,8 +30054,8 @@ capitals and not allowed to return to their homes until relations between the two countries improve.

- - Zimmermann + + Zimmermann
@@ -30924,8 +30940,9 @@ assurances to Rostow at their previous lunch were not “private” but official.

- - Eugene V. Rostow + + Eugene V. + Rostow
@@ -31476,10 +31493,10 @@ (succession) crises which are likely to make the Soviet leadership more open to active initiatives on our part.

- - Richard PipesPrinted from a copy bearing this typed - signature. + + Richard + PipesPrinted from a + copy bearing this typed signature. @@ -31989,8 +32006,8 @@ purpose of reassuring readers that Leonid Il’Yich will still be around six months from now. End comment.

- - Hartman + + Hartman
@@ -32109,10 +32126,14 @@ West in an effort to alleviate their faltering hard currency positions.

- Nils B. Ohman - Lt Colonel, USAF - Senior Intelligence Analyst - + Nils B. Ohman + Lt + Colonel, USAF + Senior Intelligence Analyst +
@@ -32436,8 +32457,9 @@

Sincerely,

- - Ronald Reagan + + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -32546,8 +32568,8 @@ fishing spoke for itself, and that he would look into the consulates question.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -32994,13 +33016,13 @@ Soviet or the American people.

Sincerely,

- - L. BrezhnevPrinted from a copy that bears this typed - signature. To the right of Brezhnev’s printed signature, Reagan wrote: “He’s a barrel - of laughs.” + + L. + BrezhnevPrinted + from a copy that bears this typed signature. To the right of + Brezhnev’s printed + signature, Reagan wrote: + “He’s a barrel of laughs.” @@ -33111,9 +33133,9 @@

For all these reasons, I urge you strongly to oppose State’s proposal.

Yours sincerely,

- - Richard Pipes + + Richard + Pipes Pipes signed the letter “Dick” above his typed signature. @@ -34042,8 +34064,8 @@ United States will act as necessary to protect those interests. End text.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -34240,10 +34262,10 @@ undertake active steps to have Israel without delay stop its aggression and fulfill the decision of the Security Council.

- - Leonid BrezhnevPrinted from a copy that bears this typed - signature. + + Leonid + BrezhnevPrinted from a + copy that bears this typed signature.
@@ -34314,8 +34336,9 @@ target="#t_PLO_1">PLO, Syria and your other friends in the area in the same direction.

- - Ronald Reagan + + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -34380,8 +34403,9 @@ implement the Security Council resolution depends primarily on the position of the United States.

- - L. Brezhnev + + L. + Brezhnev
@@ -34573,8 +34597,8 @@ Middle East. Sincerely, Ronald Reagan. End text.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -37435,8 +37459,9 @@ all due seriousness and urgency.

Sincerely,

- - L. Brezhnev + + L. + Brezhnev
@@ -38061,8 +38086,9 @@ the easing of the current crisis.

Sincerely,

- - Ronald Reagan + + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -38259,8 +38285,8 @@

Sincerely, L. Brezhnev

- - Shultz + + Shultz
@@ -38319,8 +38345,9 @@ the Lebanese crisis.

Sincerely,

- - Ronald Reagan + + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -39420,8 +39447,9 @@ NSSD will be handled on a strict need-to-know basis. (C)

- - Ronald Reagan + + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -39825,9 +39853,9 @@ governments.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

- - William P. Clark + + William P. + Clark Clark signed the memorandum “Bill Clark” above his typed signature. @@ -39981,10 +40009,10 @@ the content and the style of Gromyko’s presentation.

- - Lawrence S. EagleburgerPrinted from a copy that bears this typed - signature. + + Lawrence S. + EagleburgerPrinted + from a copy that bears this typed signature.
@@ -40657,9 +40685,9 @@ bureaucratic trenches, but rather by offering him your broad ideas directly and getting a reaction.

- - Lawrence S. Eagleburger + + Lawrence S. + Eagleburger Eagleburger initialed the memorandum “LSE” over his typed signature. @@ -42061,10 +42089,10 @@

—that a summit should be linked to progress on these issues (without being more specific than that).

- - Lawrence S. EagleburgerPrinted from a copy that bears this typed - signature. + + Lawrence S. + EagleburgerPrinted + from a copy that bears this typed signature.
@@ -42874,9 +42902,9 @@ accordingly.

- Lawrence S. EagleburgerPrinted from a copy that bears this typed - signature. + Lawrence S. + EagleburgerPrinted + from a copy that bears this typed signature. @@ -44405,8 +44433,9 @@

Sincerely,

- - Ronald Reagan + + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -44635,8 +44664,8 @@ Eagleburger concluded that the reports he had did not show such contradictions.

- - Shultz + + Shultz
@@ -44672,10 +44701,10 @@ matter.

Sincerely,

- - L. BrezhnevPrinted from a copy that bears this typed - signature. + + L. + BrezhnevPrinted from a + copy that bears this typed signature.
@@ -44979,9 +45008,9 @@ provided, not that they are going to receive an even larger slice of the resource pie.

- - L. Paul Bremer, III + + L. Paul Bremer, + III McManaway signed for Bremer above Bremer’s typed @@ -46171,8 +46200,8 @@

13. When you have Secretary-approved text, Vice President asked to have copy sent to his party.

- - Hartman + + Hartman
@@ -46222,8 +46251,8 @@ the Soviets will miss the clear signal of your deep commitment to the cause of human rights in the USSR.

- - Shultz + + Shultz
@@ -46308,7 +46337,7 @@

15. Now back to Africa. Warm regards,

- George + George
@@ -46530,8 +46559,9 @@ been running things for some time and not just grabbing the baton upon the death of Brezhnev.

- - John N. McMahon + + John N. + McMahon
@@ -46787,9 +46817,9 @@ Treaty review. He thinks it was correct to bring the issue up, but that we should realize that we may not get any further response from them.

- - William J. Casey + + William J. + Casey Casey signed W.J. Casey above his typed signature. @@ -46938,8 +46968,9 @@ for an overall bilateral improvement and to acquiesce in Moscow’s desire to place arms control at the center of U.S.-Soviet relations.

- - L. Paul Bremer, III + + L. Paul Bremer, + III @@ -47332,7 +47363,8 @@ target="#t_USSR_1">USSR. (S)

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan @@ -47891,8 +47923,9 @@ positions on a summit appear to be similar.

End of text.

- - Shultz + + Shultz @@ -49006,8 +49039,8 @@ before the event.

- William J. Casey + William J. + Casey Casey signed “W.J. Casey” above his typed signature. @@ -49330,7 +49363,8 @@ to play hard ball.

- Robert M. Gates + Robert M. + Gates @@ -49386,9 +49420,9 @@ which might be influential in the outcome, and the policy implications of possible resolutions.

- - William J. Casey + + William J. + Casey Casey signed “W.J. Casey” above his typed signature. @@ -50342,8 +50376,9 @@ with Moscow, but a serious search for a stable and constructive long-term basis for U.S.-Soviet relations. (S)

- - Ronald Reagan + + Ronald + Reagan
diff --git a/volumes/frus1981-88v04.xml b/volumes/frus1981-88v04.xml index 55830ca6d..697c4a47a 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1981-88v04.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1981-88v04.xml @@ -274,19 +274,20 @@ reliable record of the Reagan administration’s policy toward the Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985.

- - Kathleen B. Rasmussen, Ph.D. - - General Editor - - - Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. - - The Historian - - - Foreign Service Institute - + + + Kathleen B. Rasmussen, + Ph.D. + + General Editor + + + Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. + + The Historian + + + Foreign Service Institute February 2021
@@ -468,9 +469,9 @@ and Publishing Division.

- Elizabeth C. Charles, Ph.D. + Elizabeth C. Charles, Ph.D. - Historian + Historian
@@ -2795,8 +2796,8 @@ corresp="#p_HAA_1">Hartman’s position, see Document 5.

- Hartman + Hartman
@@ -3063,10 +3064,10 @@ more and more concessions making it exceedingly difficult to sustain a firm and resolute course. (S)

- William P. - ClarkPrinted from a copy - that indicates Clark - signed the original. + William P. + ClarkPrinted from + a copy that indicates Clark signed the original.
@@ -5236,13 +5237,14 @@ 1983”, before he departed for Moscow on 12 March. The Secretary replied affirmatively. (Note: a dozen copies were delivered to the Soviet desk at State for the Ambassador on 10 March.)

- Douglas F. - GarthoffGarthoff signed “DF Garthoff” above his typed - signature. - Policy Assistant for Soviet - Affairs + Douglas F. + GarthoffGarthoff signed + “DF Garthoff” above + his typed signature. + + Policy Assistant for Soviet + Affairs
- Hartman + Hartman
TASS had charged in the initial Soviet reaction to the President’s speech.

- Hartman + Hartman
USSR should be expanded at the same time that the U.S. will insist on full reciprocity.

- Charles - HillMcManaway signed for - Hill above Charles + HillMcManaway signed + for Hill above Hill’s typed signature. @@ -9915,8 +9917,8 @@ has succeeded and U.S. counter-strategy which, in my view, is urgently needed if we are to protect our future.

- William J. - CaseyWilliam J. + CaseyCasey signed “WJ Casey” above his typed signature. @@ -10371,9 +10373,10 @@ will be the principal US-Soviet battleground for many years to come.

- Robert M. - Gates - Deputy Director for Intelligence + Robert M. + Gates + + Deputy Director for Intelligence @@ -12277,7 +12280,8 @@ incremental concessions.

Could we discuss this?

- BudPrinted from a + BudPrinted from a copy with this typed signature. At the bottom of the page, Poindexter wrote: “Judge, I agree with @@ -12471,8 +12475,8 @@ to imagine another way. What do you think?

Sincerely,

- William P. - ClarkWilliam P. + ClarkClark signed “Bill” above his typed signature. @@ -12501,7 +12505,8 @@ >Document 54.

Please let me know if you want anything more.

- Cap + Cap @@ -14098,9 +14103,9 @@ among the leadership since the 1980 disruptions in Poland, and one on which he has spoken out in the past.

- Charles - HillMcManaway signed for - Hill above Charles + HillMcManaway signed + for Hill above Hill’s typed signature. @@ -14872,8 +14877,8 @@ of the UN as host to minimize protocol problems.

- William J. - CaseyWilliam J. + CaseyCasey signed “Bill” above his typed signature. @@ -15066,8 +15071,8 @@ communication you will find me ready. I await your reply.

Sincerely,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -15841,11 +15846,12 @@ Reserve Release under the 1978 Finding.

[1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]

- [name not declassified]Printed from a copy that bears two typed - signatures. [name not declassified] typed - signature appears above the [name not - declassified] typed signature. + [name not declassified]Printed from a copy that bears two + typed signatures. [name not + declassified] typed signature appears above the + [name not declassified] typed + signature. @@ -16149,7 +16155,8 @@ DDI are attached.Attached but not printed.

- [name not declassified] + [name not + declassified]
@@ -17753,8 +17760,8 @@ from beginning to end of the meeting.

31. Department distribute as appropriate.

- Zimmermann + Zimmermann

With respect,

- Yu. - Andropov + Yu. + Andropov
@@ -19797,8 +19804,8 @@ of our two countries, nor would it help resolve the major problems which really exist.

[Omitted here is the text of the démarche on Lebanon.]

- Shultz + Shultz
- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
- Zimmermann + Zimmermann
NSC staff.

- Charles - HillDeputy Executive - Secretary Covey signed for Hill above Hill’s typed signature. + Charles + HillDeputy + Executive Secretary Covey signed for Hill above Hill’s typed + signature. Tab 1 @@ -21582,8 +21590,8 @@ >Sokolov said Soviets do not plan to make this statement public.

- Eagleburger + Eagleburger
@@ -23232,8 +23240,8 @@ corresp="#p_GA_1">Gromyko was reacting verbally as a cornered beast would physically.

- Shultz + Shultz
DIA, INR).” [portion marking not declassified]

- Robert M. - GatesRobert M. + GatesGates signed “RG” above his typed signature. @@ -23498,8 +23506,8 @@ be exercised at this time to protect intelligence sources and methods from damaging revelations.

- William J. - Casey + William J. + Casey
@@ -23875,8 +23883,8 @@

3. Please bring this to the attention of all personnel in your department or agency. (U)

- William J. - Casey + William J. + Casey
@@ -24311,8 +24319,8 @@ and luck just to keep things from getting even worse during the next year.

- Robert M. - Gates + Robert M. + Gates
Andropov was personally in control and able to deal with the threat from without.

- Hartman + Hartman

[Omitted here is the body of the telegram.]

- Hartman + Hartman
@@ -25461,8 +25469,8 @@ the President will never be better, and he may not wish to lose the opportunity.

- Hartman + Hartman
@@ -26161,8 +26169,8 @@ take these private exchanges extremely seriously because they show what the President hopes to accomplish in the relationship.

- Hartman + Hartman
what message he has from the Soviet leadership that he wants to convey to the United States.

- RickRickBurt initialed “RB” above his typed signature. @@ -27180,8 +27188,8 @@ >Andropov spent most of his energy on structural party matters and domestic policy. End summary.

[Omitted here is the body of the telegram.]

- Hartman + Hartman
- Hartman + Hartman
Document 159.

- Hartman + Hartman
@@ -30315,8 +30323,8 @@

Sincerely, Ronald Reagan

End text.

- Dam + Dam
- Hartman + Hartman
- Shultz + Shultz
- Richard - BurtRichard + BurtBurt signed “Rick” above his typed name. @@ -34395,8 +34403,8 @@ have occured to me in connection with your letter.

Sincerely,

- Y. - Andropov + Y. + Andropov
@@ -34660,8 +34668,8 @@ helps to knock down Soviet public campaign that things have never been worse. Therefore, we should let loose a few initiatives.

- Hartman + Hartman

Sincerely,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -37095,8 +37103,8 @@ U.S. side.

Sincerely,

- K. - Chernenko + K. + Chernenko
- Hartman + Hartman
@@ -39333,8 +39341,8 @@ determined to do my part in working for that end.

Sincerely,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -40825,8 +40833,8 @@ detail these questions with the Secretary of State.

Sincerely,

- K. - Chernenko + K. + Chernenko @@ -41677,7 +41685,8 @@ good.

I’d be glad to develop further details if you wish.

- Cap + Cap
@@ -42729,7 +42738,8 @@ the Soviet level of concern may be considerably higher than generally believed.

- Herbert E. Meyer + Herbert E. + Meyer Attachment @@ -43171,8 +43181,8 @@ testimony and all major statements on arms control will be cleared in advance through the National Security Advisor. (C)

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald + Reagan

Sincerely,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -44851,8 +44861,8 @@ from us, in short, the Soviets have shot themselves squarely in the foot.

- Zimmermann + Zimmermann
@@ -46320,8 +46330,8 @@ value.

Sincerely,

- K. - Chernenko + K. + Chernenko @@ -47060,10 +47070,10 @@

If you see problems with this scenario I would be pleased to discuss it at any time.

- Robert C. - McFarlaneMcFarlane signed “Bud” above - his typed signature. + Robert C. + McFarlaneMcFarlane signed + “Bud” above his typed signature.
- William J. - CaseyWilliam J. + CaseyCasey signed “W.J. Casey” above his typed signature. @@ -48000,7 +48010,8 @@ “Bud—This is simply to sum-up my oft repeated points!”

Sincerely,

- Cap + Cap
@@ -48403,8 +48414,8 @@ countries and creating a safer world for all.

Sincerely yours,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -48530,8 +48541,8 @@ corresp="#p_SB_1">Brent Scowcroft or Walt Stoessel are possibilities.

- Fred C. - IkleFred C. + IkleIklé signed “Fred” above his typed signature. @@ -48836,8 +48847,8 @@ to sequence, develop, and coordinate other aspects of U.S. preparations. (C)

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -49150,8 +49161,8 @@ force.

Sincerely,

- K. - Chernenko + K. + Chernenko
@@ -49641,8 +49652,8 @@ Union and Eastern Europe.

Sincerely,

- George P. - Shultz + George P. + Shultz @@ -49682,11 +49693,11 @@ rend="italic">name not declassified] and our existing programs well and will be our initial point of contact.

- William J. - CaseyCasey signed “W.J. Casey” above his - typed signature. + William J. + CaseyCasey signed + “W.J. Casey” + above his typed signature.
@@ -49778,10 +49789,10 @@ Library, President’s Daily Diary) No substantive record of the meeting was found. Many thanks.

- Robert C. - McFarlaneMcFarlane signed “Bud” above - his typed signature. + Robert C. + McFarlaneMcFarlane signed + “Bud” above his typed signature.
@@ -49890,8 +49901,8 @@ concrete progress is matched on your part.

Sincerely,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -49924,8 +49935,8 @@ and its impact on decisionmaking there.

Respectfully yours,

- William J. - CaseyWilliam J. + CaseyCasey initialed “WJC” above his typed signature. @@ -50357,8 +50368,8 @@ >Chernenko (84900829))

Sincerely,

- K. - Chernenko + K. + Chernenko
Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984)

- Richard - BurtRichard + BurtBurt signed “Rick” above his typed signature. @@ -50939,8 +50950,8 @@ 18, 1984, at the level of specially appointed delegations.

End text.

- Shultz + Shultz
- K. - Chernenko + K. + Chernenko
@@ -51238,8 +51249,8 @@ that both sides could go beyond an exchange of known positions.

10. Dept pass as desired.

- Hartman + Hartman
@@ -52311,7 +52322,8 @@ or is verifiable, they can do so by voting for Walter Mondale.

Very respectfully,

- Cap + Cap
@@ -53267,9 +53279,10 @@ only way to find out if they are possible is to propose some and see what happens.

- JTTimbie initialed “J.T.” above his typed - initials. + JTTimbie initialed “J.T.” above + his typed initials. @@ -54287,8 +54300,8 @@ intention of begging or bribing Moscow to deal with us on matters which are as much of concern to the Soviets as to ourselves.

- Kamman + Kamman
@@ -54734,7 +54747,8 @@ objectives, you might want to task someone to see how they might be phrased as part of the UN speech.

- Cap + Cap
With best regards,

Sincerely,

- Charles Z. - WickCharles Z. + WickWick signed “Charlie” above his typed signature. @@ -56396,7 +56410,8 @@ together to create agreed objectives and procedures that will make success possible.

- Cap + Cap
@@ -56463,8 +56478,8 @@ some “sneaky”, unacceptable proposal which we’ve failed to warn about.

- Fritz W. - Ermarth + Fritz W. + Ermarth @@ -57713,8 +57728,8 @@ and see how your meeting goes before making a decision.

End text.

- Shultz + Shultz
[Omitted here is the text of the draft letter to Chernenko.]

- Shultz + Shultz
- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -61889,8 +61904,8 @@ something a little more safe and stable if not aesthetically more beautiful.

- Hartman + Hartman
@@ -62590,8 +62605,8 @@ intentions in international affairs.

Sincerely,

- K. - Chernenko + K. + Chernenko
@@ -62853,8 +62868,8 @@ to receiving your reaction to my thoughts and proposals.

Sincerely,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
- Richard - BurtRichard + BurtBurt signed “Rick” above his typed signature. @@ -63081,8 +63096,8 @@

We await, Mr. President, a constructive reply from you.

Sincerely,

- K. - Chernenko + K. + Chernenko
@@ -63491,8 +63506,8 @@ proposals which are only newspaper speculation and not even up to the point of having become official government proposals.

- Hartman + Hartman
Shultz and Gromyko would meet to agree to arrangements or to facilitate the beginning of talks. This was rejected on the grounds that - we would want to make clear ______.Blank is in - the original. + we would want to make clear ______.Blank is + in the original. Perle proposed the phrase “to that end” so that it was made clear that the Soviets had no negotiating mandate in January. Burt @@ -63948,7 +63963,8 @@ the President.

Sincerely,

- Cap + Cap Attachment @@ -64163,8 +64179,8 @@ tough enough adversary in Geneva without our playing from an open hand.

- Hartman + Hartman

Sincerely,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald + Reagan

Sincerely,

- K. - Chernenko + K. + Chernenko
@@ -68115,8 +68131,8 @@ reduction, rather than escalation of tensions in Central America.

Sincerely,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -68770,8 +68786,8 @@ perhaps other ideas as well.

Respectfully yours,

- William J. - Casey + William J. + Casey
@@ -68908,10 +68924,12 @@ deterrent nuclear strategy.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

- John W. Vessey, - Jr. - General, USA - Chairman + John W. Vessey, + Jr. + + General, USA + + Chairman
@@ -69083,7 +69101,8 @@

We must constantly emphasize the nobility, and the morality of that goal, and the hope it offers the world.

- Cap + Cap
@@ -69401,7 +69420,8 @@ more detailed notification of, and even exchange visits to, our respective maneuvers and troop exercises, etc.

- Cap + Cap
@@ -71515,8 +71535,8 @@ setback for the United States in its effort to gain support among allies and within the United States. (C)

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -72682,8 +72702,8 @@ we will be prepared to discuss the possibilities when formal talks are convened.” (S)

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald + Reagan

End text.

- Shultz + Shultz
@@ -73678,8 +73698,8 @@ substance, there appears to be nothing new. We’ll cable again after the afternoon session.

- Shultz + Shultz
- Shultz + Shultz
- Shultz + Shultz
The date of the beginning of the negotiations and their venue will be agreed through diplomatic channels within one month.

- Shultz + Shultz

- Michael H. - ArmacostArmacost initialed “MA” above - his typed signature. + Michael H. + ArmacostArmacost initialed + “MA” above his typed signature.
- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
START group. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850194–0129) (C)

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald + Reagan

Sincerely,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -2447,8 +2447,8 @@ future. End summary.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the telegram.]

- Kampelman + Kampelman
31. No distribution without approval of Charles Hill.

- Hartman + Hartman
- Hartman + Hartman
@@ -3988,8 +3988,8 @@ question of the place and time for the meeting.

Sincerely,

- M. Gorbachev + M. + Gorbachev
@@ -4251,8 +4251,8 @@ American military men and demands that necessary measures be taken so that the provisions of the Agreement of 1947 be strictly enforced.

- Dam + Dam

Sincerely,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -5928,8 +5928,8 @@ have increased tension between our countries.

Sincerely,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -6203,8 +6203,8 @@ people were withdrawing their savings to put them in stocks of vodka—soon to be as valuable as hard currency.

- Hartman + Hartman
@@ -8298,8 +8298,8 @@ allies’ agreement to attendance at Foreign Ministers’ level before announcing a decision.

- Shultz + Shultz
S)

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
- Hartman + Hartman

Sincerely,

- M. Gorbachev + M. + Gorbachev
@@ -12212,10 +12212,9 @@ points? When you have an opportunity, I would like to discuss this with you.

- Paul NitzePrinted from a copy with this typed - signature. + Paul + NitzePrinted from a + copy with this typed signature.
@@ -12450,8 +12449,8 @@ colleagues who have met him in Georgia say that he has always had a big interest in foreign affairs and spoke knowledgeably from a brief.

- Hartman + Hartman
@@ -13139,8 +13138,8 @@ identified.

10. I will take no action until instructed by you.

- Armacost + Armacost
- Whitehead + Whitehead
@@ -14946,7 +14945,7 @@ P850139–1123)

Peace,

- John Denver + John Denver
@@ -16036,8 +16035,8 @@ President’s Daily Diary).

Sincerely,

- M. Gorbachev + M. + Gorbachev
@@ -16292,8 +16291,8 @@

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

- Shultz + Shultz
@@ -16627,10 +16626,10 @@ of the century.

It’s worth a shot.

- Richard BurtBurt - signed “Rick” above his typed signature. + Richard + BurtBurt signed “Rick” above his + typed signature.
- Shultz + Shultz
@@ -18208,8 +18207,8 @@ the Assistant to the President for National Security shall deem necessary. (S)

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -18863,8 +18862,8 @@ Assistant for National Security Affairs by August 23, 1985. (S)

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan

Respectfully yours,

- William J. CaseyCasey signed “Bill Casey” above his typed - signature. + William J. + CaseyCasey signed + “Bill Casey” + above his typed signature.
@@ -19987,12 +19985,12 @@ doubtless some.Robert O. Anderson, Chairman and CEO of Atlantic-Richfield Oil Company, proposed the project to Velikhov during a trip - to the Soviet Union in May 1984. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. - IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 244, - footnote 3. Although it could have considerable - symbolic value, I am inclined to think we don’t have time to staff it - properly.

+ to the Soviet Union in May 1984. See Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January + 1983–March 1985, Document 244, footnote 3. Although + it could have considerable symbolic value, I am inclined to think we + don’t have time to staff it properly.

—A proposal to cooperate in developing microcomputer educational software for secondary school instruction might be a relatively safe one which has Soviet interest (Velikhov @@ -20314,8 +20312,7 @@ corresp="#p_GRM_1">Gates signed “Bob” above his typed signature. - Deputy Director for - Intelligence + Deputy Director for Intelligence @@ -21755,9 +21752,10 @@ know. I cannot overemphasize how closely I want this work held. (S)

- ORIGINAL SIGNED - Ronald - Reagan + ORIGINAL SIGNED + + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -23928,14 +23926,12 @@

14. This report is being made available to the chief US arms control negotiators in Geneva.

- Clair E. GeorgeAn unknown hand signed for George above this typed - signature. + Clair E. + GeorgeAn unknown + hand signed for George + above this typed signature. - Deputy Director for - Operations + Deputy Director for Operations
@@ -25518,8 +25514,8 @@ President of the United States.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

- John W. Vessey, Jr. + John W. Vessey, + Jr. ChairmanJoint Chiefs of Staff @@ -28122,8 +28118,8 @@ Anatoly F. Dobrynin.

Sincerely yours,

- M. Gorbachev + M. + Gorbachev
@@ -28275,8 +28271,8 @@ desire to announce new cooperative programs in Geneva when the general exchanges agreement is signed.

- Shultz + Shultz
@@ -28565,8 +28561,8 @@ clear a statement of military concern as we are likely to see in the Soviet context.

- Hartman + Hartman

Sincerely,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -30409,8 +30405,8 @@ proposals prior to the U.S. and Soviet delegations departing Geneva. (S)

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan

Sincerely,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -30974,8 +30970,8 @@ between our two countries on a more constructive course.

Sincerely yours,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
- Bud + Bud @@ -34166,8 +34162,8 @@ where they might be heading than we did when we arrived in town this morning.

- Shultz + Shultz
@@ -35061,8 +35057,8 @@ given up his optimism and he looks forward to the meeting with the President and sends him his best regards.

- Hartman + Hartman
@@ -35614,8 +35610,8 @@ decisive stage in preparing for the summit and we approached all of the matters under discussion in that light.

- Hartman + Hartman
@@ -37360,8 +37356,11 @@ boost to the Soviet political offensive against our SDI program.

- Fred C. IklePrinted from a copy - that bears this typed signature. + Fred C. IklePrinted from a copy that bears this + typed signature.
- Hartman + Hartman
@@ -42400,8 +42399,8 @@ target="#t_US_1">US Administration.

Sincerely,

- M. Gorbachev + M. + Gorbachev
@@ -42596,8 +42595,8 @@ back.

Sincerely,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
Gorbachev accepted the gift with thanks.

- Hartman + Hartman

7. You might brief the Secretary along these lines.

- Whitehead + Whitehead
PNET). (S)

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -43449,8 +43448,8 @@ to you and your spouse our warmest wishes.

Respectfully,

- M. Gorbachev + M. + Gorbachev
.

Sincerely,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -43774,8 +43773,8 @@ future. I think, the chances are not bad here.

Sincerely,

- M. Gorbachev + M. + Gorbachev
@@ -43921,8 +43920,8 @@ January 15; the electronic text of telegrams 12554, 12553, and 12552 was corrupted. (U)

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan

Sincerely,

- M. Gorbachev + M. + Gorbachev
@@ -44564,10 +44563,9 @@ the Congress and issue a press statement along the lines of the one the Secretary had given him.

- Paul H. NitzePrinted from a copy with this typed - signature. + Paul H. + NitzePrinted + from a copy with this typed signature.
@@ -44659,10 +44657,10 @@ Secretariat Sensitive (01/16/1986–01/17/1986); NLR–775–15–7–3–5)

- Ed RownyRowny - signed “Ed” above his typed signature. + Ed + RownyRowny signed “Ed” above his + typed signature.
@@ -44863,10 +44861,10 @@ in Europe, Soviet agreement to redress the imbalance in conventional forces in Europe would be of overriding importance.

- H. Allen HolmesHolmes - signed “Allen” above his typed signature. + H. Allen + HolmesHolmes signed “Allen” above + his typed signature.
Gorbachev will be scheduled for this year. (C)

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 707)

- Burt + Burt
@@ -48167,8 +48165,8 @@ countries, and a safer world.

Sincerely,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -48626,10 +48624,10 @@ matter.

Sincerely yours,

- George P. ShultzShultz - signed “George” above his typed signature. + George P. + ShultzShultz signed “George” above + his typed signature.
@@ -49158,8 +49156,8 @@

Ronald Reagan

End text.

- Shultz + Shultz
Charles ThomasPalmer - signed “Mark” and Thomas signed “T” above their typed - signatures. + >Palmer signed “Mark” and Thomas + signed “T” above their typed signatures. @@ -50368,8 +50366,8 @@ can be expected when Dobrynin meets with the President April 8.

- Whitehead + Whitehead
@@ -50535,8 +50533,8 @@

I will be looking forward with interest to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

- M. Gorbachev + M. + Gorbachev
- Hartman + Hartman
@@ -51101,7 +51099,8 @@ the official rationale for the initiative.

I would greatly appreciate it if you will give this memorandum to the President, since it embodies a matter I think is very important.

- Cap + Cap
@@ -51862,8 +51861,8 @@ Gorbacheva.

Sincerely,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -52421,10 +52420,10 @@ Sokolov’s own sense that Moscow is anxious to limit damage to the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

- Rozanne L. - RidgwayRidgway signed “RR” above her typed + Rozanne L. + RidgwayRidgway signed + “RR” above her typed signature.
@@ -53037,8 +53036,8 @@ international implications may result, we would appreciate any additional details you can provide on the Chernobyl accident.

- Whitehead + Whitehead
- Whitehead + Whitehead
- Whitehead + Whitehead
- Whitehead + Whitehead
@@ -53627,8 +53626,8 @@ corresp="#p_YB_1">Yel’tsin has overstepped his leash. We suspect the former, but cannot exclude the latter.

- Hartman + Hartman
@@ -53763,8 +53762,8 @@ positive way.

End text.

- Whitehead + Whitehead
Shultz.

- Hartman + Hartman
Kohl had proposed this. End FYI.

- Armacost + Armacost
@@ -54192,12 +54191,12 @@ to divert Western attention from the Soviet performance during the accident.

- Nicholas - PlattKenneth Quinn - signed for Platt. + Nicholas + PlattKenneth + Quinn signed for Platt. - Executive - Secretary + Executive Secretary
@@ -54263,7 +54262,7 @@ get things off dead center. I will send you some specific ideas in the next few days.

- Roz + Roz RidgwayRidgway signed “Roz” above her typed signature. @@ -54519,8 +54518,8 @@ did not say he could not accept the invitation and certainly did not close the door on the possibility.

- Combs + Combs

Sincerely yours,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -55234,8 +55233,8 @@ arms control negotiations.” He asserted that the Soviet Union had always taken a serious approach and wanted progress in arms control.

- Hartman + Hartman

Warm regards.

- Kampelman + Kampelman
@@ -55715,9 +55714,9 @@ the gas mask to protect against mad men.” The bottom line was we should recognize and appreciate what the Soviets have put forward.

- William J. - CaseyPrinted from a copy - that bears his typed signature. + William J. + CaseyPrinted + from a copy that bears his typed signature.
- Hartman + Hartman
@@ -57486,7 +57485,8 @@ and U.S., about which I spoke to you at the beginning of my letter.

End text of letter

- Whitehead + Whitehead
@@ -58209,8 +58209,8 @@

Moscow.

End text.

- Shultz + Shultz
@@ -58333,8 +58333,8 @@ n="1032"/> judgment, but it’s hard not to see here both a challenge and an opportunity demanding an extra effort on our part.

- Fritz W. - Ermarth + Fritz W. + Ermarth

Sincerely yours,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -61203,8 +61203,8 @@ continued. We anticipate that these experts will meet again in the near future, with a date to be set in diplomatic channels.

- Shultz + Shultz
@@ -61396,8 +61396,8 @@ guidance, should be submitted for my approval not later than September 9, 1986. (C)

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -61633,8 +61633,8 @@

10. If ACIS may do more to assist you here, please call. (U)

- Douglas - GeorgeDouglas + GeorgeGeorge signed “Doug” above his typed signature. @@ -61756,8 +61756,8 @@ target="#t_TASS_1">TASS announcement to that effect would be released later August 30.

- Combs + Combs
@@ -61869,8 +61869,8 @@ upsetting our plans for this fall. We will keep you informed as we work with Justice and the Soviets.

- Whitehead + Whitehead
@@ -62008,8 +62008,8 @@ corresp="#p_DN_1">Daniloff once the Soviets have made a decision to tough it out.

- Whitehead + Whitehead

Sincerely,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
- Lynn + Lynn

Sincerely,

- M. Gorbachev + M. + Gorbachev
@@ -62968,8 +62968,8 @@ enable us to put this issue definitively behind us and create a positive climate for work in the weeks ahead.

- Shultz + Shultz
@@ -63615,8 +63615,8 @@

I look forward to your early reply.

Respectfully,

- M. Gorbachev + M. + Gorbachev
@@ -71393,7 +71393,7 @@ learning.

Respectfully yours,

- Cap + Cap
Reagan administration’s policy toward the Soviet Union.

- Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D. - The Historian - - - Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. - General Editor - - - Bureau of Public Affairs - - December 2016 + + Stephen P. Randolph, + Ph.D. + + The Historian + + + Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. + + General Editor + + + Bureau of Public Affairs + December 2016
@@ -409,8 +412,9 @@ the supervision of Carl Ashley, Chief of the Declassification Division. Kerry Hite and Heather McDaniel performed the technical and copy editing.

- James Graham Wilson, Ph.D. - Historian + James Graham Wilson, Ph.D. + + Historian
@@ -4043,8 +4047,8 @@ open the way to an arms control agreement of great significance. I look forward to seeing you in Vienna.

- - Hartman + + Hartman
@@ -4150,9 +4154,12 @@ the public in the U.S. and overseas. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

- JohnPrinted from a copy that bears this - handwritten signature. - + JohnPrinted from a copy that bears this + handwritten signature. +
@@ -6427,9 +6434,9 @@ >Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 869–870) (TS)

- - Frank C. Carlucci + + Frank C. + Carlucci Carlucci signed “Frank” above his typed signature. @@ -6555,8 +6562,8 @@ and Dubinin sharing the hope that the forthcoming round in Geneva would be a productive one.

- - Armacost + + Armacost
@@ -6781,8 +6788,8 @@ corresp="#p_RRW_1">Reagan—even on an insignificant bilateral matter.

- - Hartman + + Hartman
@@ -7022,8 +7029,8 @@ it. I thought Sam Nunn was quite restrained. I am sending a similar message to Frank Carlucci.

- - Kampelman + + Kampelman
@@ -7327,9 +7334,9 @@ thanks for your wonderful letter.

Sincerely,

- - Suzanne Massie + + Suzanne + Massie Massie signed “Suzanne” above her typed signature. @@ -8061,10 +8068,10 @@ the UNGA. This would be useful, and agreement on such consultations could also be announced.

- - Michael H. ArmacostPrinted from a copy that bears his typed - signature. + + Michael H. + ArmacostPrinted from a + copy that bears his typed signature.
@@ -8119,8 +8126,9 @@ with NIS colleagues to pursue jointly the new investigative leads and other appropriate steps.

- - Melvyn Levitsky + + Melvyn + Levitsky
@@ -9083,8 +9091,9 @@ corresp="#p_CJE_1">Carter’s grain embargo as a self-defeating move in dealing with the other superpower.

- - Hartman + + Hartman @@ -9869,8 +9878,8 @@ xml:id="pg_132"/> be faced with Soviet proposals along the lines indicated when you come next week.

- - Matlock + + Matlock
@@ -9931,8 +9940,9 @@ very best regards to you and Raisa.

Sincerely,

- - Ronald Reagan + + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -12160,8 +12170,8 @@ was a mutual desire to take advantage of sharp reductions in nuclear weapons. This was the President’s objective as well.

- - Shultz + + Shultz
@@ -13936,8 +13946,8 @@ xml:id="d43fn4">April 15. so some things here are changing—in part owing to the strong policies you have put in place and stuck with.

- - Shultz + + Shultz
@@ -16134,8 +16144,8 @@ told me that the US is a beacon of strength to those struggling to speak and write freely here.

- - Shultz + + Shultz
@@ -16597,13 +16607,14 @@ family reunification concerns by giving him the travel papers to deliver to two of the families on the Senator’s list.

- - Paul H. NitzePrinted from a copy that bears these typed - signatures. + + Paul H. + NitzePrinted from a copy + that bears these typed signatures. - - Max M. Kampelman + + Max M. + Kampelman
@@ -17087,8 +17098,8 @@

Sincerely, Ronald Reagan

- - Shultz + + Shultz
@@ -17400,8 +17411,9 @@ together, the results will not be long in coming.

Sincerely,

- - M. Gorbachev + + M. + Gorbachev
@@ -18668,8 +18680,9 @@ pursuing a businesslike and constructive dialogue with you.

Sincerely,

- - M. Gorbachev + + M. + Gorbachev
@@ -22676,8 +22689,9 @@ further steps toward our common goals.

Sincerely,

- - Ronald Reagan + + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -29856,8 +29870,8 @@ >SDI”. This may turn out to be the case. But to date the evidence is far from conclusive.

- - Matlock + + Matlock
@@ -29961,8 +29975,8 @@ wants you to be sure not to convey any sense whatever that we are ready to deal on defense and space.

- - Shultz + + Shultz
@@ -30156,10 +30170,10 @@ resolve the relevant issues, as they say, on the spot.

Sincerely,

- - M. GorbachevPrinted from a copy that bears this typed - signature. + + M. + GorbachevPrinted from a + copy that bears this typed signature.
@@ -32494,8 +32508,8 @@ position on this point has changed. But the lack of stress could signal continued flexibility in the Soviet approach.

- - Matlock + + Matlock
@@ -35929,8 +35943,9 @@ somber—reminder of the enduring features of the regime and the still long competition and struggle ahead will be needed. (S)

- - Robert M. Gates + + Robert M. + Gates @@ -40155,9 +40170,9 @@

Gorbachev: When will we have that computer?

-

Velikov: By the end of the five-year plan we should have ______, and ______ by the middle - of the next five-year plan. (The figures he used were not heard by any of - the notetakers.)

+

Velikov: By the end of the five-year plan we should have ______, and ______ + by the middle of the next five-year plan. (The figures he used were not + heard by any of the notetakers.)

Gorbachev: I should add that when we started this program there were many competing firms. The young men were @@ -47347,8 +47362,8 @@

5. With warm regards. End message to Shevardnadze.

- - Shultz + + Shultz
@@ -47548,9 +47563,9 @@ Pakistan. I asked how arms supplied to Pakistan could find their way to the Mujahedin. He had no answer.

- - John C. Whitehead + + John C. + Whitehead Whitehead initialed “JW” above his typed signature. @@ -66958,8 +66973,9 @@

With our best wishes to Mrs. Nancy Reagan and yourself.

Sincerely,

- - Mikhail Gorbachev + + Mikhail + Gorbachev @@ -67314,8 +67330,9 @@ Britain.

Respectfully,

- - M. Gorbachev + + M. + Gorbachev @@ -67464,8 +67481,9 @@ today.

Sincerely,

- - Mikhail Gorbachev + + Mikhail + Gorbachev
diff --git a/volumes/frus1981-88v13.xml b/volumes/frus1981-88v13.xml index 0c72b8c50..bb756c64d 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1981-88v13.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1981-88v13.xml @@ -248,21 +248,29 @@ reliable record of the Reagan administration’s policy toward the conflict in the South Atlantic.

- - Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. - - - General Editor - - + + Adam + M. Howard, Ph.D. + + + General Editor + + - - Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D. - - - The Historian - - + + Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D. + + + The Historian + + Bureau of Public Affairs @@ -493,13 +501,17 @@ Baker performed the copy and technical editing. Do Mi Stauber, Inc., prepared the index.

- - Alexander R. Wieland - - - Historian - - + + Alexander R. Wieland + + + Historian + +
@@ -4769,9 +4781,9 @@ tourists and Argentine pioneers to the Malvinas. In the end, it may well be the sheep and penguins that win out.

- - Chaplin + + Chaplin Chaplin initialed “MC” next to this typewritten signature. @@ -4872,7 +4884,7 @@ terrorists will continue to be an impediment to close relations beyond trade between the Argentine military regime and the Cubans.

- Christopher + Christopher
@@ -4946,8 +4958,8 @@ >Fenn and Pakenham.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -5052,8 +5064,9 @@ quo serves as a useful reminder to Britain of its continuing responsibilities in the Western Hemisphere.

- - Streator + + Streator
@@ -5136,8 +5149,9 @@ sovereignty issue can finally be resolved so that progress can be made on economic problems.

- - Shlaudeman + + Shlaudeman
@@ -5263,8 +5277,9 @@ signing a major commercial agreement, but no other details were offered. Argentina has never had significant trade with the Arab world.

- - Shlaudeman + + Shlaudeman
@@ -5329,8 +5344,9 @@ >GOA about cutting off Argentine air service and supply to the Islands.

- - Shlaudeman + + Shlaudeman
@@ -5416,8 +5432,8 @@ 22.

- - Louis + + Louis
@@ -5684,8 +5700,9 @@ popular posture at a time when any distraction from the nation’s economic woes is welcome.

- - Shlaudeman + + Shlaudeman
@@ -5822,8 +5839,8 @@ >Summarized in Document 12. Text being pouched.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -5894,8 +5911,9 @@ >FCO believes that negotiations will continue, if only for lack of a better option on either side.

- - Streator + + Streator
@@ -5968,8 +5986,9 @@ the scrap job and on when the ship might come around again. It would seem, at least, that the incident may not be closed.

- - Shlaudeman + + Shlaudeman
@@ -6116,8 +6135,9 @@ >NAM where Argentina will continue to look for support from those who frequently do not share our views.

- - Shlaudeman + + Shlaudeman
@@ -6197,8 +6217,9 @@ since the earlier briefing reported reftel.

- - Streator + + Streator
@@ -6279,8 +6300,9 @@ need a high-level message to both sides which at a minimum does the same thing.

- - Shlaudeman + + Shlaudeman
@@ -6402,8 +6424,9 @@ continue. An agreement on reciprocal withdrawals may be possible but it will not be easy to reach.

- - Shlaudeman + + Shlaudeman
@@ -6495,8 +6518,9 @@ that the other South Atlantic archipelagoes come under a separate set of rules for immigration purposes.

- - Shlaudeman + + Shlaudeman
@@ -6666,8 +6690,9 @@ on maneuvers in the Caribbean that could be deployed fairly rapidly to the South Atlantic.

- - Shlaudeman + + Shlaudeman
@@ -6956,8 +6981,8 @@ State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820168–0344)

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -7097,8 +7122,8 @@

4. Instruction to Ambassador Schlaudeman in Buenos Aires sent septel.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -7151,7 +7176,7 @@ your support in this effort too.

Warm personal regards,

- Margaret + Margaret
@@ -7272,8 +7297,9 @@ Document 25. I do not propose to brief him on the Junta’s extraordinary response.

- - Shlaudeman + + Shlaudeman
@@ -7378,8 +7404,8 @@ >ARA/SC and Keith Smith of EUR/NE.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -7486,8 +7512,8 @@ 29.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -7932,8 +7958,8 @@ D820174–0106)

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -8024,8 +8050,9 @@ inflation and I’m afraid that he is capable of doing something stupid.

- - Shlaudeman + + Shlaudeman
@@ -8088,8 +8115,8 @@ instead of a resolution, US should likewise support.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -8183,8 +8210,8 @@

8. Takacs said he would inform his government immediately of the conversation.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -8366,8 +8393,8 @@ 42.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -8417,7 +8444,7 @@ Argentine use of military force.

Warmest wishes,

- Ron + Ron
@@ -8514,19 +8541,20 @@ Book I, p. 411.

- - Robert E. Service - - Falkland Islands Working Group - - - - - Richard W. Erdman - - Senior Watch Officer - - + + + Robert E. + Service + + Falkland Islands Working Group + + + Richard W. + Erdman + + Senior Watch Officer + +
See Document 43. not disseminated telegraphically.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -8757,8 +8785,8 @@ diversionary move, and the military operation would prove to be a major problem for what we are trying to do in this Hemisphere.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -8925,8 +8953,9 @@ >Superb. Report cites source at Gibraltar as saying only that task force is “no longer in our operational area.”

- - Streator + + Streator
@@ -9775,8 +9804,8 @@

- Fred C. Ikle + Fred C. + Ikle Iklé signed “Fred” above his typed signature. @@ -9898,8 +9927,9 @@ could also, of course, prove more difficult than ever after successfully flexing the country’s military muscles.

- - Shlaudeman + + Shlaudeman
@@ -9993,16 +10023,15 @@ 41.

- - Noel C. KochKoch - signed “Noel” above his - typed signature. + + Noel C. + KochKoch signed “Noel” above his typed + signature. - - Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary - International Security Affairs - + Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary + International Security Affairs
@@ -10182,8 +10211,9 @@ that Mrs. Thatcher will emerge at the end without some changes in both personnel and policy.

- - Streator + + Streator
@@ -10267,8 +10297,8 @@ D820184–0455)

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -10318,8 +10348,8 @@ and 4,000 sq meters of storage. A satellite coms terminal operated by seven men is required to operate there from 6 April. End text.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -10388,9 +10418,9 @@ Britain—it would be unwise for the U.S. to come in with any “precooked” schemes for settlement.

- - Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. + + Walter J. Stoessel, + Jr. Stoessel initialed “WJS” above his typed signature. @@ -10945,7 +10975,8 @@ support in the areas of communications, intelligence, and meteorology.

- Francis J. West, Jr + Francis J. West, + Jr

The UK has requested about one @@ -11085,8 +11116,9 @@ Thatcher herself can judge politically.

- - Streator + + Streator
@@ -11712,7 +11744,7 @@ meeting, is attached but not printed.

- Bill + Bill @@ -12151,8 +12183,8 @@ UK-Argentine agreement with HMG.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -12241,8 +12273,8 @@ >ARA/SC Service.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -12368,8 +12400,8 @@ Service.

10. This message for your info only.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -13345,8 +13377,9 @@ Secretary for the information received from the U.S. intelligence and services.

- - Streator + + Streator
@@ -13669,8 +13702,8 @@ >Document 81.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -13841,8 +13874,8 @@ feeling which had characterized this dinner exchange, she laughingly concluded by noting that “we’re nice to other people”.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -14024,8 +14057,8 @@ avoiding at all cost any suggestion that we are encouraged. There is, in fact, little basis for encouragement in any event.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -14239,8 +14272,9 @@ >L/ARA: JEarle. Drafted by: L/PM:ECummings.

- - Eagleburger + + Eagleburger
@@ -14412,12 +14446,10 @@ >UK is authorized an additional 27 channels.

- Lawrence Layman - - Rear Admiral, USN - Acting Director - + Lawrence Layman + + Rear Admiral, USN + Acting Director
@@ -15178,11 +15210,10 @@ target="#t_FM_1">FM would get together to work on a draft.

- - Vernon A. Walters - - Ambassador at Large - + + Vernon A. Walters + + Ambassador at Large
@@ -15251,8 +15282,8 @@

End text.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -15382,8 +15413,8 @@ found.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -15638,8 +15669,9 @@ Policy File, [no film number])

- - Stoessel + + Stoessel
@@ -15878,8 +15910,8 @@

7. In all likelihood, you will know from my next report whether war can be averted.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -15944,8 +15976,8 @@ point.

Warm regards, Al.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -16252,8 +16284,8 @@ Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/12/1982 (2)) End quote.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -17003,8 +17035,9 @@

—Seeking halt of West German and Canadian nuclear cooperation with Argentina.

- - Eagleburger + + Eagleburger
@@ -17642,8 +17675,9 @@ 19, 1982 Falklands)

- - Eagleburger + + Eagleburger
@@ -19093,8 +19127,8 @@

Sincerely, Alexander M. Haig, Jr. End text.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -19557,8 +19591,8 @@ between the parties.

End text.

- - Louis + + Louis
@@ -19601,8 +19635,9 @@

Yours ever, John Nott. End text.

- - Eagleburger + + Eagleburger
@@ -20313,7 +20348,7 @@ interests in this hemisphere.

Warm regards,

- Ron + Ron
@@ -20401,8 +20436,8 @@

7. At this point, the odds of avoiding war still appear very long. We could reach a flash-point at any time.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -20982,8 +21017,9 @@ hoped Gromyko would head the Soviet SSOD delegation.

- - Eagleburger + + Eagleburger
@@ -21106,8 +21142,8 @@ 130. We are not at point where break is inevitable. But events could unfold rapidly, even this evening. Warm regards, Al.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -21354,8 +21390,8 @@

8. The need for discipline with the press has never been greater. Until I make my departure statement we should maintain total silence.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -21506,8 +21542,8 @@ other relevant resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -22250,8 +22286,9 @@ the backdrop of the growing military capability of the approaching British fleet.

- - Eagleburger + + Eagleburger
@@ -22392,8 +22429,8 @@

End text.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -22572,8 +22609,8 @@ >Document 150.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -22708,8 +22745,8 @@ and come directly to London, I ask your permission to do so. Otherwise I will see you tomorrow morning.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -22841,8 +22878,8 @@

Warm regards, Al.

End message.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -23028,8 +23065,8 @@ negotiations to a mutually satisfactory settlement by the date stipulated in subparagraph (A). End of text.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -23221,8 +23258,8 @@ meantime, let me assure you, as the President assured the Prime Minister, that you can indeed count on us. Warm regards. Al.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -23312,7 +23349,8 @@ . . .

- Jim Rentschler + Jim + Rentschler @@ -23771,10 +23809,10 @@

Warm regards,

- Nicanor Costa MendezThe translation indicates that Costa Méndez signed the - original Spanish text. + Nicanor Costa + MendezThe + translation indicates that Costa + Méndez signed the original Spanish text.
@@ -23823,8 +23861,9 @@ would offer shelter to the task force in the face of South Atlantic storms.

- James A. Williams Lieutenant General, U.S. Army - Director + James A. + Williams Lieutenant General, U.S. Army + Director @@ -25829,8 +25868,8 @@

Al Haig. End text.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -26334,8 +26373,8 @@ your time.April 25.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -26397,8 +26436,8 @@ UK, he answered, “technically, yes.”

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -26816,8 +26855,8 @@ you should begin immediately to consider the necessary steps in the event of major conflict.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -26895,8 +26934,8 @@ corresp="#p_HAM_1">Haig (see footnote 4, Document 175)]

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -26981,7 +27020,8 @@ wrote “?” in the space below the paragraph. about him.

- Shlaudeman + Shlaudeman
@@ -27057,8 +27097,8 @@ II, pp. 257–258)

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -27637,8 +27677,8 @@ target="#t_GOA_1">GOA requires in the proposed agreement. The Secretary stressed that we must have that response tonight.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -27715,7 +27755,7 @@ those values on which the Western way of life depends.

Warm personal regards,

- Margaret + Margaret
@@ -27805,11 +27845,11 @@ Secretary, of my highest consideration.

- Nicanor Costa MendezPrinted from a copy that bears this - typewritten signature and an indication that Costa Méndez signed the - Spanish text. + Nicanor Costa + MendezPrinted + from a copy that bears this typewritten signature and an + indication that Costa + Méndez signed the Spanish text.
@@ -28002,9 +28042,9 @@ stand ready to assist in whatever way we can.

Sincerely,

- - Alexander M. Haig, Jr. + + Alexander M. Haig, + Jr. Haig signed the letter “Al” above his typed signature. @@ -28113,9 +28153,9 @@ believes we could again serve that role.

Sincerely,

- - Alexander M. Haig, Jr. + + Alexander M. Haig, + Jr. Haig signed the letter “Al” above his typed signature. @@ -28196,8 +28236,9 @@ we may have gotten through to him and if we are able to offer him a little time that we might be able to move forward.

- - Shlaudeman + + Shlaudeman
@@ -28250,8 +28291,9 @@ useful in the event we had something to offer from the British side. In that case, it would be very useful indeed.

- - Shlaudeman + + Shlaudeman
@@ -28821,13 +28863,12 @@ UK 1982)

- - David C. Jones - - General, USAF - - + + David C. + Jones + + General, USAF +
@@ -28925,8 +28966,8 @@

—Encourage hard thought about long term options, e.g. trusteeship, to avoid “unending hostility and insecurity in the South Atlantic.”

- - Louis + + Louis
@@ -29309,8 +29350,8 @@ definitivo, bajo la responsabilidad del grupo de paises antes mencionado. End text

- - Ortiz + + Ortiz
@@ -29385,8 +29426,8 @@ May 2; ibid.) With warm regards, Alexander Haig. End quote.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -29484,8 +29525,8 @@ will benefit from your counsel. Sincerely yours, Ronald Reagan. End text.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -29670,8 +29711,8 @@ decisions” were “in the other hands”.

9. Reftel transmits current Spanish text.

- - Ortiz + + Ortiz
@@ -29729,14 +29770,13 @@ target="#t_GMT_1">GMT and PhonCon State OPS/NMCC)

3. (U) Selected notifications made as directed by J–30.

- - P.M. Hekman Jr - - Rear Admiral, USN - Deputy Director for Operations (NMCC) - + + P.M. Hekman + Jr + + Rear Admiral, USN + Deputy Director for Operations (NMCC)
@@ -29799,8 +29839,8 @@ 85))

- - Ortiz + + Ortiz
@@ -29870,8 +29910,9 @@ State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820233–0885)

- - Shlaudeman + + Shlaudeman
@@ -30138,10 +30179,10 @@

Sincerely,

- - Alexander M. Haig, Jr.Printed from a copy with this typed - signature. + + Alexander M. Haig, + Jr.Printed from + a copy with this typed signature.
@@ -30306,8 +30347,9 @@ >SYG. During the conversation, the SYG usually took the lead.

- - Kirkpatrick + + Kirkpatrick
@@ -30389,8 +30431,9 @@ the daily report will list completed actions and those still outstanding.

- - Frank Carlucci + + Frank + Carlucci
@@ -30440,8 +30483,9 @@ material and information. This last is taken as confirmation of the allegation.

- - Shlaudeman + + Shlaudeman
@@ -30637,7 +30681,7 @@ make all the difference.

With warmest regards

- Margaret + Margaret

Sincerely,

- Ron + Ron
@@ -30981,8 +31025,8 @@ replied accepting the proposals. If not, each party is free to revert to earlier rules of engagement.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -31066,8 +31110,9 @@ prove peaceable intent in the face of British deaths and pressures from other allies.

- - Streator + + Streator
@@ -31155,15 +31200,14 @@ doubtful. SHEFFIELD’s missile guidance Radar jamming capabilities are not known at this writing but are being researched.

- - P.M. Hekman, Jr - - Rear Admiral, USN - Deputy Director for Operations, NMCC - - + + P.M. Hekman, + Jr + + Rear Admiral, USN + Deputy Director for Operations, NMCC +
@@ -31249,11 +31293,11 @@ channels, would ask the British not to ask us because we wanted to be in a position of saying we were not asked.

- - John N. McMahon - - Executive Director - + + John N. + McMahon + + Executive Director
@@ -31566,7 +31610,7 @@ which you and we believe.

Warm personal regards

- Margaret + Margaret
- Bill + Bill
@@ -31711,8 +31755,8 @@ with his personal thanks for the enormous good will and great effort the Secretary is showing throughout the crisis.

- - Ortiz + + Ortiz
@@ -31882,14 +31926,14 @@

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to the crisis in the South Atlantic.]

- - John R. Lasater - - Brigadier General, USAF - Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Europe/NATO - Policy (Acting) - + + John R. + Lasater + + Brigadier General, USAF + Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Europe/NATO Policy + (Acting)
@@ -32356,8 +32400,9 @@ Haig unquote Eagleburger. Unquote

- - Eagleburger + + Eagleburger
@@ -32455,8 +32500,8 @@ country will actively support efforts to implement this resolution through the Secretary General or any other mechanism. End quote

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -32712,8 +32757,9 @@ changes, some undoubtedly of considerable import. These will be revealed as events take their course.

- - Edward B. Atkeson + + Edward B. + Atkeson
@@ -32760,8 +32806,8 @@ support, requests outstanding, and requests recently completed.

- Fred C. Ikle + Fred C. + Ikle Iklé signed “Fred” above his typed signature. @@ -33245,8 +33291,8 @@

- Fred C. Ikle + Fred C. + Ikle Iklé signed “Fred” above his typed signature. @@ -33595,9 +33641,9 @@ Ministerial Meeting in Luxembourg May 16–18.

- - Lawrence S. Eagleburger + + Lawrence S. + Eagleburger Eagleburger initialed “LSE” above his typed signature. @@ -35225,8 +35271,8 @@ >270.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -35322,8 +35368,9 @@ throughout the crisis. He and I agreed to see each other again Friday to compare notes.

- - Stoessel + + Stoessel
@@ -35619,8 +35666,9 @@ ” next to it.

- - Stoessel + + Stoessel
@@ -35846,8 +35894,9 @@ touch if there was anything else he wanted us to do and I expressed again our willingness to help him in any way possible.

- - Stoessel + + Stoessel
@@ -36005,8 +36054,8 @@

- Fred C. Ikle + Fred C. + Ikle Iklé signed “Fred” above his typed signature. @@ -36097,7 +36146,8 @@ Adm - Thomas B. Hayward + Thomas B. + Hayward USN Acting Chairman @@ -36363,12 +36413,11 @@ security interests.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

- - T.B. Hayward - - Admiral, U.S. Navy Acting Chairman, - JCS - + + T.B. + Hayward + + Admiral, U.S. Navy Acting Chairman, JCS
@@ -36491,8 +36540,9 @@ right-hand margin next to this paragraph.

- - Stoessel + + Stoessel
@@ -36625,8 +36675,8 @@ N820005–0002)

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -36920,8 +36970,8 @@ the principle at stake. They are counting on us—and perhaps only us—for support.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -37263,8 +37313,9 @@

P.S.: Argentines assert that U.S. refueling of British bombers will be tantamount to U.S. bombing of Argentina.

- - Kirkpatrick + + Kirkpatrick
@@ -37315,8 +37366,8 @@

As usual I am available for discussions whenever you want.

- Nicholas Henderson + Nicholas + Henderson Henderson wrote “Yours ever, Nicho” above his typed signature. @@ -37761,11 +37812,11 @@ seem to be overconfidence. [4½ lines not declassified]

- - Harry Cochran - - Special Assistant for Warning - + + Harry + Cochran + + Special Assistant for Warning
@@ -37833,8 +37884,8 @@

- Fred C. Ikle + Fred C. + Ikle Iklé signed “Fred” above his typed signature. @@ -38537,7 +38588,8 @@ concerned.

- George Bush + George + Bush @@ -38726,9 +38778,9 @@ with assurances of United States support. They deeply fear a hard line from New York and current debate.

- - Jeane J. Kirkpatrick + + Jeane J. + Kirkpatrick Kirkpatrick initialed “JJK” next to her typed signature. @@ -38937,8 +38989,8 @@

- Fred C. Ikle + Fred C. + Ikle Iklé wrote “Fred” above his typed signature. @@ -39084,15 +39136,15 @@ >Nott was dispatched. The execute order will be further coordinated prior to dispatch.

- - Thomas G. Tobin - - Brigadier General, USAF - Deputy Director for Operations, NMCC - - + + Thomas G. + Tobin + + Brigadier General, USAF + Deputy Director for Operations, NMCC +
@@ -39151,7 +39203,7 @@

Please let me know what else we can do.

Sincerely,

- Cap + Cap
@@ -39287,8 +39339,9 @@ >US passions in Latin America and enhance the risk of Soviet participation in the conflict.

- - Kirkpatrick + + Kirkpatrick
@@ -39582,8 +39635,9 @@ corresp="#p_MJ_1">Miret indicated that Brazilian draft was acceptable to the chiefs of the Argentina Junta.

- - Kirkpatrick + + Kirkpatrick
@@ -39710,8 +39764,8 @@ target="#t_UK_1">UK plans to veto it, we should also vote against.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -39825,7 +39879,7 @@

End of text.

- Haig + Haig
@@ -39979,8 +40033,9 @@ >NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/25/1982)

- - Motley + + Motley
@@ -40645,8 +40700,9 @@ target="#t_US_1">US to be largely responsible for Britain’s strong military response in the present crisis.

- - Shlaudeman + + Shlaudeman
@@ -40911,9 +40967,9 @@ prepared to transfer the mines.

- Fred C. IklePrinted from a copy that bears this typewritten - signature. + Fred C. + IklePrinted from a + copy that bears this typewritten signature.
@@ -41069,8 +41125,8 @@ guarantee failure.

- Richard Burt + Richard + Burt Burt signed “Rick” above his typed signature. @@ -41481,9 +41537,9 @@ said the little frog!”

- - Lawrence S. Eagleburger + + Lawrence S. + Eagleburger Eagleburger initialed “LSE” above his typed signature. @@ -41617,14 +41673,13 @@ so.

4. No further distribution of this information is being made.

- - William J. CaseyCasey - initialed “WJC” above his typed signature. + + William J. + CaseyCasey initialed “WJC” above + his typed signature. - - Director of Central Intelligence - + Director of Central Intelligence
@@ -42199,8 +42254,9 @@

—1 Magnetic Detector Noise Kit

—24 Shipping Containers

- - Caspar W. Weinberger + + Caspar W. + Weinberger
@@ -42580,8 +42636,9 @@ corresp="#p_MJ_1">Miret and Mellea was pro-forma perhaps because they also favor such a scenario.

- - Kirkpatrick + + Kirkpatrick
@@ -42789,8 +42846,9 @@ D850378–0800)

- - Stoessel + + Stoessel
@@ -43447,8 +43505,9 @@ target="#t_LTG_1">LTG Galtieri.

- - Stoessel + + Stoessel
@@ -43534,8 +43593,8 @@

- Fred C. Ikle + Fred C. + Ikle Zakheim signed for Iklé above his typed signature. @@ -43905,8 +43964,9 @@ negotiate—despite the costs to our bilateral relationship—may be required.

- - Stoessel + + Stoessel
@@ -44124,12 +44184,12 @@ revitalized as quickly as possible, and that the U.S. was being asked to play a key role in this effort.

- - S.S. Clarey - - Captain, U.S. Navy Executive Assistant - to the Chief of Naval Operations - + + S.S. + Clarey + + Captain, U.S. Navy Executive Assistant to + the Chief of Naval Operations
@@ -44291,8 +44351,9 @@ not likely to have the expected outcome but that he would, nevertheless, transmit it to Buenos Aires.

- - Kirkpatrick + + Kirkpatrick
@@ -44714,8 +44775,9 @@ many Argentines see as the biggest prize of them all, in the Falklands.

- - Shlaudeman + + Shlaudeman
@@ -44792,8 +44854,8 @@

5. Buenos Aires minimize considered.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -44916,14 +44978,13 @@

- M.F. Tidwell - - Brigadier General, USAF - Deputy Director for Operations NMCC - - + M.F. Tidwell + + Brigadier General, USAF + Deputy Director for Operations NMCC +
@@ -45059,8 +45120,8 @@ if possible, where she and we can explore the options and the realities obscured by battle.

- - Louis + + Louis
@@ -45635,8 +45696,9 @@ - - Kirkpatrick + + Kirkpatrick
@@ -45739,8 +45801,8 @@ that led to this crisis, there will be continuing tension and further hostilities.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -45798,7 +45860,8 @@ welcome a personal heads-up if we foresee a need for a more timely information flow.

- DCG + DCG Eagleburger drew an arrow to Gompert’s initials and wrote: “See me!” @@ -45888,19 +45951,20 @@ refused to allow the prisoners to be returned directly to Argentina, asking instead that they be taken to Montevideo.

- - Robert E. Service - - Falkland Working Group - - - - - R. Stern - - Senior Watch Officer - - + + + Robert E. + Service + + Falkland Working Group + + + + R. Stern + + Senior Watch Officer + +
It was good to be with you in Paris, London and Bonn.

Warm regards,

- RonPrinted from a copy that bears - this handwritten signature, written in an unknown hand. - + RonPrinted from a copy that bears this + handwritten signature, written in an unknown + hand. +
So far, evidence indicates U.S.-designed equipment and weapons worked as advertised with a higher success rate than we would have predicted.

- John Lehman + John Lehman
@@ -46475,8 +46543,9 @@

Agree

Disagree

- - Eagleburger + + Eagleburger
@@ -46610,8 +46679,8 @@ Atlantic crisis sitrep.

7. Buenos Aires minimize considered.

- - Haig + + Haig
@@ -46937,8 +47006,9 @@ International Communication Agency, the office of the United States Trade Representative, and the National Security Council staff.

- - Ronald Reagan + + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -47579,9 +47649,9 @@ this.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

- - William P. Clark + + William P. + Clark Clark signed “Bill” above his typed signature. @@ -47779,9 +47849,9 @@ FOR THE PRESIDENT:

- - William P. Clark + + William P. + Clark Clark signed “Bill” above his typed signature. @@ -48191,8 +48261,9 @@ of defending his position and protecting the Army’s political primacy.

- - Harry C. Cochran + + Harry C. + Cochran
@@ -48509,8 +48580,9 @@ until a later stage. But elsewhere in Latin America perhaps we can correct some of the distortions more quickly.

- - Shlaudeman + + Shlaudeman
@@ -48716,7 +48788,7 @@ government would make data available to us. When the time is right, we will send some experts to Israel.

- Cap + Cap
@@ -48832,8 +48904,9 @@ EUR/NE Keith Smith.

- - Shultz + + Shultz
@@ -48883,9 +48956,9 @@ recommendation on August 23.

- - Lawrence S. Eagleburger + + Lawrence S. + Eagleburger Eagleburger initialed “LSE” above his typed signature. @@ -49229,8 +49302,9 @@ logistical support in peacetime and in contingencies to ease UK operational requirements.

- - Shultz + + Shultz
@@ -49400,8 +49474,9 @@ economic issues, as such references would be sure to raise suspicions in Argentina.

- - Anderson + + Anderson
@@ -49523,8 +49598,9 @@ Central Foreign Policy File, D820433–1002)

- - Shultz + + Shultz
@@ -49779,8 +49855,9 @@ cause of normalization, and thereby the prospects for a more stable peace.

- - Shlaudeman + + Shlaudeman
@@ -49880,8 +49957,9 @@

I look forward to the talks which we shall be having on this and other subjects this month. End text.

- - Shultz + + Shultz
@@ -50443,11 +50521,10 @@

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

- James D. Watkins - - Admiral, USN - Acting Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff - + James D. Watkins + + Admiral, USN + Acting Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
@@ -50487,9 +50564,12 @@ State was treating the action as routine because it had been discussed for several months at various levels between our two buildings.

- Francis J. West, Jr.West initialed - “FJW”above his typed signature. - + Francis J. West, Jr.West initialed “FJW”above his typed + signature. +
@@ -50695,8 +50775,8 @@ obligations and specifically would welcome foreign capital participation in its development.

- - Dam + + Dam
@@ -50835,8 +50915,9 @@ >EUR/NE Deputy Director Pendleton (notetaker).

- - Shultz + + Shultz
@@ -50935,9 +51016,9 @@ approval on October 4.

- - Richard N. Perle + + Richard N. + Perle Perle signed “Richard Perle” above his typed signature. @@ -51095,8 +51176,8 @@ NDP–1 must be approved at the inter-agency level in Washington.

- - Dam + + Dam
@@ -51811,8 +51892,9 @@ absolutely confident that I would do it all again the same way.

Sincerely, /S/ Ron. End text.

- - Shultz + + Shultz
@@ -51870,7 +51952,7 @@ all we have done together in mind, at least to abstain.

With best wishes

- Margaret + Margaret

With best wishes,

- Ron + Ron
@@ -51988,8 +52070,9 @@

I do urge you to look at this again urgently and personally. So much depends on it.

- - Margaret Thatcher + + Margaret + Thatcher
@@ -52097,8 +52180,9 @@ hemisphere.

End text.

- - Kirkpatrick + + Kirkpatrick
@@ -52147,7 +52231,7 @@

I assure you we stand as firmly with you on the principles of non-use of force, of negotiation and self-determination as ever.

- Ron + Ron
@@ -52573,7 +52657,8 @@ statement.]

- Shultz + Shultz
@@ -52801,8 +52886,9 @@ create internal instability or problems in bilateral relations with the U.S. (TS)

- - Ronald Reagan + + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -52881,7 +52967,8 @@ Atlantic.]

- Shultz + Shultz
@@ -52974,8 +53061,8 @@ and, in a week marked by leaks and surprises on other fronts, perhaps the best surprise was that there were no surprises in it.

- - Louis + + Louis
@@ -53071,8 +53158,9 @@ force have changed. We shall also intensify our efforts to develop additional intelligence.

- - Shlaudeman + + Shlaudeman
@@ -53293,8 +53381,9 @@

6. Embassy London may share information contained in this cable and in Ref B with FCO.

- - Shultz + + Shultz
@@ -53414,8 +53503,9 @@ the United States continues to favor a negotiated settlement when the time and circumstances are right.

- - Shultz + + Shultz
@@ -53517,16 +53607,14 @@ target="#t_COB_1">COB today).”

- - Robert C. McFarlaneMcFarlane signed “Bud” above his typed - signature. + + Robert C. + McFarlaneMcFarlane signed + “Bud” above his typed signature. - - Deputy Assistant to the President for National - Security Affairs - + Deputy Assistant to the President for National + Security Affairs
@@ -54106,8 +54194,8 @@

[Omitted here is a brief discussion of the economic situation in Brazil.]

- - Dam + + Dam
@@ -54239,13 +54327,11 @@ principal officers in London.

- John H. SteinPrinted from a copy that indicates that Duane R. Clarridge - signed for Stein. + John H. SteinPrinted from a copy that indicates that Duane + R. Clarridge signed for Stein. - - Deputy Director for Operations - + Deputy Director for Operations
@@ -54626,10 +54712,10 @@

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the conflict in the South Atlantic.]

- - William J. CaseyPrinted from a copy that bears this typed - signature. + + William J. + CaseyPrinted from a + copy that bears this typed signature.
@@ -54849,8 +54935,9 @@ note, he said that a gesture such as certification would help the US image with the military.

- - Shultz + + Shultz
@@ -55180,8 +55267,9 @@ on the UN resolution and said he would report it immediately to his authorities.

- - Shultz + + Shultz
@@ -55325,8 +55413,8 @@ >DepSec Dam.

- - Rabb + + Rabb
@@ -55698,9 +55786,9 @@ recommendation.

- - Lawrence S. Eagleburger + + Lawrence S. + Eagleburger Eagleburger wrote “LSE” above his typed signature. @@ -55936,7 +56024,7 @@

With warm wishes,

Sincerely,

- Ron + Ron @@ -56009,7 +56097,7 @@

(U) Request you convey my concerns to the President before he makes his decision on Argentine certification.

- Cap + Cap
@@ -56183,8 +56271,9 @@ exercise caution about the resumption of major new supplies. End text.

- - Shultz + + Shultz
@@ -56348,7 +56437,7 @@

4. Signed original will follow.

- Dam + Dam
@@ -56590,8 +56679,8 @@ success.

[Omitted here is discussion of Central America.]

- - Dam + + Dam
@@ -56951,8 +57040,8 @@ D840233–0607)

- - Dam + + Dam
@@ -57034,8 +57123,8 @@ State Secretary of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs with a representative of the Government of Brazil also present. End quote.

- - Price + + Price
@@ -57137,8 +57226,8 @@ came as a surprise to most Argentines who earlier today appeared to support the start of direct contacts with the British. End comment.

- - Ortiz + + Ortiz
@@ -57200,8 +57289,9 @@ UNGA during this or any other meeting with USG officials.)

- - Shultz + + Shultz
@@ -57350,8 +57440,9 @@

20 July 1984

End text of Howe’s letter.

- - Shultz + + Shultz @@ -57401,8 +57492,8 @@ would be inadvisable, but that the U.K. also had to show flexibility.

- - Ortiz + + Ortiz @@ -57550,8 +57641,8 @@ State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840700–0907)

- - Dam + + Dam @@ -57595,8 +57686,8 @@ effort with help from other countries. Perhaps the Argentines were using an extreme case to test Brazilian reactions.

- - Ortiz + + Ortiz diff --git a/volumes/frus1981-88v41.xml b/volumes/frus1981-88v41.xml index 264068cd3..1dedc0204 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1981-88v41.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1981-88v41.xml @@ -243,20 +243,29 @@ >Reagan administration’s approach toward non-military global issues.

- - Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. - - - General Editor - - + + Adam M. + Howard, Ph.D. + + + General Editor + + - - Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D. - - The Historian - - + + Stephen P. + Randolph, Ph.D. + + The Historian + + Bureau of Public Affairs @@ -411,13 +420,17 @@ technical editing under the supervision of Mandy Chalou, Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division.

- - Alexander O. Poster - - - Historian - - + + Alexander + O. Poster + + + Historian + + @@ -3400,8 +3413,8 @@ behavior, illegal IV drug use and to use blood or blood products only in a life saving situation.

- Shultz + Shultz @@ -3671,8 +3684,8 @@ risk of contracting or transmitting AIDS.

- Shultz + Shultz @@ -3805,7 +3818,7 @@ will continue to collaborate with American experts to understand and defeat this mysterious new disease which affects both countries.

- Constable + Constable
GOZ concerns.

- Constable + Constable
@@ -4255,7 +4268,8 @@ Policy File, D840707–0227)

Sincerely,

- Richard M. Krause, M.D. + Richard M. Krause, + M.D. @@ -4715,8 +4729,8 @@ matched with the recipients blood to ensure blood group and type compatibility.

- Dam + Dam
- Bergold + Bergold
- Bennett + Bennett
- Shultz + Shultz

Sincerely,

- John C. - Whitehead + John C. + Whitehead
@@ -6115,8 +6129,8 @@ corresp="#p_BE_1">Bailey) would appreciate receipt of a copy of dossier Embassy Dakar is compiling on the subject.

- Shultz + Shultz @@ -6302,8 +6316,8 @@ >DAS Bailey”.

- Shultz + Shultz

6. Minimize considered.

- Armacost + Armacost

End quote.

- Shultz + Shultz
@@ -7702,8 +7716,8 @@ responsibility for AIDS that may come to your attention.

- Shultz + Shultz

Sincerely yours,

- George P. - Shultz + George P. + Shultz
@@ -8057,8 +8071,8 @@

7. Despite obduracy, the Soviet delegation took careful notes throughout the exchange.

- Matlock + Matlock @@ -8250,9 +8264,12 @@ proposal will be ready for review and any decisions on funding by various agencies in November.

- Katherine J. HallHall signed “Kate” - above her typed name. - + Katherine J. HallHall signed “Kate” above her typed + name. + @@ -8316,7 +8333,8 @@ the establishment of the proposed topics and country priorities. [portion marking not declassified]

- [name not declassified] + [name not + declassified] @@ -9875,10 +9893,12 @@ discussion about U.S. military bases.

Sincerely,

- Michael R. - Peterson, DVM, MPH, DrPH Lt. Colonel, - USAF, BSC Senior Policy Analyst Preventive Medicine - and Health Promotion + Michael R. + Peterson, DVM, MPH, + DrPH + + Lt. Colonel, USAF, BSC Senior Policy Analyst + Preventive Medicine and Health Promotion @@ -10426,7 +10446,7 @@ to emigrate, imprisonment for attempted emigration, and problems concerning family reunification.

- Helman + Helman
USDel should seek further instruction.

- Haig + Haig
- Helman + Helman
- Clark + Clark
@@ -13130,8 +13150,8 @@ >Document 54. prepared for me and outlining our main concerns. I believe you will find it helpful.

- Alexander M. - Haig, Jr. + Alexander M. + Haig, Jr. @@ -13533,7 +13553,7 @@ corresp="#p_SR_1">Schifter and IO Officer Warren Hewitt return.

- Swaebe + Swaebe

Sincerely,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -14152,8 +14172,8 @@ cleared this message.

Planty unquote: Dam

- Shultz + Shultz @@ -14473,7 +14493,7 @@

25. Amb. Stoessel reviewed and cleared this message before his departure from Madrid.

- Killham + Killham @@ -14682,7 +14702,7 @@

6. This cable was cleared by Ambassador Stoessel.

- Louis + Louis @@ -15595,7 +15615,8 @@ envisage a third Stoessel Mission for mid-1985.

- Charles Hill + Charles + Hill
Reagan signed the treaty’s implementing legislation on November 4, 1986.

- Charles Hill + Charles + Hill
@@ -15963,8 +15985,8 @@

[Omitted here is a public statement from Schifter.]

- Kirkpatrick + Kirkpatrick
less than 2 lines not declassified].

- Clair E. - GeorgePrinted from a copy - that indicates George - signed the original. + Clair E. + GeorgePrinted + from a copy that indicates George signed the original.
- Carmen + Carmen
@@ -18138,7 +18160,7 @@ Files, Human Right Files, 1986, Lot 90D53, Human Rights Commission II)

- Flack + Flack
- John C. - WhiteheadWhitehead initialed JW above - his typed signature. + John C. + WhiteheadWhitehead initialed + JW above his typed signature.
@@ -19332,7 +19354,7 @@ my staff handled the complications very effectively. I’ll be back about 6:00 p.m. tonight.

- Rattray + Rattray @@ -19955,10 +19977,10 @@

Thank you for your help and cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely,

- John C. - WhiteheadWhitehead initialed JW above - his typed signature. + John C. + WhiteheadWhitehead initialed + JW above his typed signature. @@ -20087,7 +20109,7 @@ lobbying, and our profound thanks for the way those requests were carried out.

- Petrone + Petrone
Shultz-Shevardnadze) Septel follows.

- Armacost + Armacost
Document 113.

Warm regards

- Margaret + Margaret

- Franklin D. - Kramer + Franklin D. + Kramer

Sincerely,

- James - Watt + James + Watt
- L. Paul Bremer, - III + L. Paul Bremer, + III
@@ -22439,9 +22461,10 @@ Papers, Box 32, 546—Law of the Sea 18 Mar 18–11 May 82)

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

- David C. - Jones - General, USAF + David C. + Jones + + General, USAF @@ -22554,8 +22577,8 @@ Venezuela’s concerns with the U.S. review. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810143–0941)

- Haig + Haig @@ -23932,8 +23955,8 @@ “blowup” at this session, I will notify you immediately with damage control recommendations.

- Harlow + Harlow
11. On balance, the entire US delegation is quite satisfied with the result.

- Helman + Helman
@@ -24243,7 +24266,8 @@ session of the LOS Conference. [portion marking not declassified]

- [name not declassified] + [name not + declassified] @@ -25725,8 +25749,8 @@ Interdepartmental Group on its acceptability in terms of satisfying United States objectives. (C)

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald + Reagan @@ -25893,8 +25917,8 @@

4. USG is assessing developments and guidance will follow.

- Eagleburger + Eagleburger
- Kirkpatrick + Kirkpatrick
7. Action requested:

No action is required at this time.

- Kirkpatrick + Kirkpatrick
@@ -27288,8 +27312,8 @@ President’s consideration by June 16, 1982.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

- William P. - Clark + William P. + Clark @@ -27772,8 +27796,8 @@ xml:id="d162fn4">The meeting took place on June 24. See Document 163.

- L. Paul Bremer, - III + L. Paul Bremer, + III @@ -28412,8 +28436,8 @@ n="4" xml:id="d164fn4">See Document 165.

- L. Paul Bremer, - III + L. Paul Bremer, + III @@ -29158,8 +29182,8 @@ xml:id="d168fn4">See footnote 9, Document 162. (C)

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
- Price + Price
@@ -29456,10 +29480,10 @@ Administration, he has outstanding political sense, and he knows the Europeans.

- Lawrence S. - EagleburgerEagleburger initialed “LSE” - above his typed signature. + Lawrence S. + EagleburgerEagleburger + initialed “LSE” above his typed signature.
- Shultz + Shultz
@@ -30153,8 +30177,8 @@ corresp="#p_WJG_1">Watt directly. (Reagan Library, Guhin, Michael A.: Files, 11/25/1982–11/30/1982) (C)

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
- Ron + Ron
@@ -30506,8 +30530,8 @@ corresp="#p_RDH_1">Rumsfeld will be provided promptly upon confirmation of appointments proposed above.

- Dam + Dam

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

- William P. - ClarkWilliam P. + ClarkClark signed Bill Clark above his typed signature. @@ -30976,8 +31000,8 @@ >LOS resolution fail. General Assembly consideration of the resolution may come late this week.

- L Paul Bremer, - III + L Paul Bremer, + III
@@ -31042,7 +31066,7 @@ LOS matters at a relatively high level within the FRG.

- Woessner + Woessner @@ -31146,8 +31170,8 @@ report.

With warm personal regards,

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald + Reagan @@ -31272,8 +31296,8 @@ country positions on the treaty (which conform to our own estimates) and saw problem in much the same terms as Thorn.

- Shultz + Shultz
USG.

- Dam + Dam
- L. Paul Bremer, - IIIAn unknown hand - signed for Bremer above - his typed signature. + L. Paul Bremer, + IIIAn unknown + hand signed for Bremer + above his typed signature.
@@ -31569,8 +31593,8 @@ pouched to OES/OLP.Not found.

- Kirkpatrick + Kirkpatrick @@ -31883,7 +31907,7 @@ >Eskin; approved: DCM/WRWarne).

- Hewitt + Hewitt @@ -31995,8 +32019,8 @@ to protest in diplomatic channels the excessive claims of littoral countries. (C)

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
- Shultz + Shultz
• Special emphasis should be given to challenging claims which have no record of prior challenge. (C)

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald + Reagan

Sincerely,

- Frank + Frank
- Korn + Korn
Agencies should provide comments on the attached draft National Security Study Directive terms of reference by COB February 10, 1984. (S)

- Robert C. - McFarlane + Robert C. + McFarlane @@ -34141,8 +34165,8 @@ group. Mr. Amstutz is chairman of the DCC Food Aid Subcommittee.

- John R. - Block + John R. + Block
@@ -34246,8 +34270,8 @@ for your time the other morning. I hope something can be worked out. P.”

- M. Peter - McPherson + M. Peter + McPherson @@ -34294,7 +34318,7 @@ strategic and political interest, to alleviate these problems and much can be done to increase public perception of this fact.

- Mac + Mac @@ -34343,8 +34367,8 @@ also be addressed. [portion marking not declassified]

- John N. - McMahon + John N. + McMahon @@ -34539,8 +34563,8 @@ this study will be April 30. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

- Robert C. - McFarlane + Robert C. + McFarlane
NSSD will be handled on a strict need-to-know basis. (S)

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -34757,8 +34781,8 @@ 15.No record of this meeting has been found.

- Robert B. - Keating + Robert B. + Keating @@ -35093,8 +35117,8 @@ target="#t_NSSD_1">NSSD 1–84 Working Group, will take steps to ensure the timely implementation of these actions. (C)

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald + Reagan @@ -35132,10 +35156,10 @@ endorse this course of action. It is the right thing to do, and we need to be out ahead of the problem.

- Michael H. - ArmacostArmacost initialed “MA” above - his typed signature. + Michael H. + ArmacostArmacost initialed + “MA” above his typed signature. @@ -35344,8 +35368,8 @@ humanitarian investigation of why more could not be done by a country which has a capacity to do so.”

- Korn + Korn
- Kirkpatrick + Kirkpatrick

- M. Peter - McPhersonMcPherson initialed above his - typed signature. + M. Peter + McPhersonMcPherson initialed + above his typed signature.
@@ -36099,8 +36123,8 @@ cable is for Ambassador Walters background.

- Dam + Dam

7. Department pass Moscow and other addresses reftel as desired.

- Korn + Korn
@@ -36284,7 +36308,7 @@ >Not found.

10. Department repeat as desired.

- Hartman + Hartman @@ -36510,10 +36534,10 @@ >Keel—ask for comments from OMB.

- M. Peter - McPhersonMcPherson initialed above his - typed signature. + M. Peter + McPhersonMcPherson initialed + above his typed signature. @@ -36639,8 +36663,8 @@ decided upon through the NSC and budget process. (U)

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
- Korn + Korn
@@ -37680,8 +37704,8 @@ 22. Invitations have already been extended to principals for this meeting. (U)

- Robert M. - Kimmitt + Robert M. + Kimmitt @@ -38210,8 +38234,8 @@ provisions of this NSDD and relevant sections of NSDD–156. (U)

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald + Reagan @@ -38655,7 +38679,7 @@ >MT range and re-examine the question on an annual basis thereafter.

- Cheek + Cheek
We will monitor the situation. If there is a need to revise this strategy we will advise your staff.

- Richard C. MeyerGwendolyn H. Joe - from the Office of the Executive Secretary at the Agency for - International Development signed for Richard C. + MeyerGwendolyn + H. Joe from the Office of the Executive Secretary at the Agency + for International Development signed for Meyer. @@ -39081,8 +39106,12 @@ [number not printed] by COB, Thursday, September 25, 1986.

- John A. Svahn - John M. Poindexter + + John A. + Svahn + John M. + Poindexter +

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

- John M. - Poindexter + John M. + Poindexter @@ -40339,8 +40368,8 @@ Committee for Sub-Saharan Africa.

Respectfully,

- M. Peter - McPherson + M. Peter + McPherson @@ -40765,15 +40794,16 @@ around a truly worthy goal—the sustainable end to hunger in Africa.

- John C. - Whitehead - Acting Secretary of - State - - - M. Peter McPherson - Acting Secretary of the - Treasury + + John C. + Whitehead + + Acting Secretary of State + M. + Peter McPherson + Acting Secretary of the + Treasury + @@ -40899,7 +40929,7 @@ Population Commission. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810060–1041)

- Petree + Petree
- Richard - Elliot Benedick + Richard + Elliot Benedick
@@ -41486,8 +41516,8 @@ budgetary stringency and cutback of many domestic and international programs, speaks for itself.

- Stoessel + Stoessel @@ -41631,10 +41661,10 @@ country at the moment, feel free to call me if I can be of assistance in rounding out Jim’s thinking.

- William P. - ClarkPrinted from a copy - that indicates Clark - signed the original. + William P. + ClarkPrinted + from a copy that indicates Clark signed the original. @@ -42405,8 +42435,8 @@

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

- William P. - Clark + William P. + Clark @@ -42652,7 +42682,7 @@ is contributing to improved understanding between the Holy See and the USG.

- Wilson + Wilson @@ -42696,8 +42726,9 @@ 270. This is a joint State–AID report.

- Charles HillMcManaway signed for - Charles + HillMcManaway + signed for Hill. @@ -43885,10 +43916,10 @@ >UNFPA.

We will keep you advised.

- M. Peter - McPhersonMcPherson signed his initials - above his typed signature. + M. Peter + McPhersonMcPherson signed + his initials above his typed signature. @@ -43934,8 +43965,8 @@ Svahn, Assistant to the President for Policy Development.

- Robert M. - Kimmitt + Robert M. + Kimmitt @@ -44191,8 +44222,8 @@ international community which will improve the well-being of generations to come.

- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald + Reagan @@ -44300,10 +44331,10 @@ countries from the need for more aid and more radical economic policies.

- Richard - BenedickBenedick signed “Richard” - above his typed signature. + Richard + BenedickBenedick signed + “Richard” above his typed signature. @@ -44541,9 +44572,10 @@ U.S. foreign policy objectives and is more in accord with the international family planning policies of this Administration.

- Charles HillMcKinley signed for - Charles + HillMcKinley signed + for Hill. @@ -44698,7 +44730,8 @@ attached is the State Department draft scope paper for the International Conference on Population.

- Charles HillCharles + HillMcKinley signed for Hill. @@ -46500,8 +46533,8 @@ conference on population reiterate their commitment and rededicate themselves to the further implementation of the plan. End text.

- Dam + Dam
With warm personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

- George P. - ShultzShultz signed “George” above his typed - signature. + George P. + ShultzShultz signed + “George” above + his typed signature. @@ -46855,10 +46888,10 @@

With the best personal regards to you both,

Sincerely,

- James L. - BuckleyBuckley signed “Jim” above - his typed signature. + James L. + BuckleyBuckley signed + “Jim” above his typed signature.
@@ -47133,8 +47166,8 @@ Files, Miscellaneous Population Files, 1974–1992, Lot 93D393, China UNFPA/1984)

- Shultz + Shultz @@ -47278,7 +47311,8 @@ policy as presented in Mexico City.

Thank you.

- William F. Martin + William F. + Martin @@ -47510,10 +47544,10 @@ USAID/O/Admin/ExecSec, Box 251, ADM–6 Unclassified [Night Notes] FY 85)

- Michael H. - ArmacostArmacost signed his initials - above his typed signature. + Michael H. + ArmacostArmacost signed his + initials above his typed signature. @@ -47694,8 +47728,8 @@ consequences beginning with the planned January 1986 special session.

- Walters + Walters @@ -47966,8 +48000,8 @@ found.

Sincerely,

- Walter J. - Stoessel, Jr. + Walter J. + Stoessel, Jr. @@ -48441,8 +48475,8 @@ 86D362, November #1 1984 Completed Items)

Sincerely yours,

- George P. - ShultzGeorge P. + ShultzShultz signed “George” above his typed signature. @@ -48515,8 +48549,8 @@ Amendment.

Sincerely yours,

- Yasushi - Murazumi + Yasushi + Murazumi @@ -48674,8 +48708,8 @@ target="#d303fn3">footnote 3, Document 303.

Sincerely,

- Malcolm - Baldrige + Malcolm + Baldrige

Sincerely,

- Mac + Mac
, 1981–1988, vol. VIII, Western Europe, 1985–1988.

- Brement + Brement
Not found.

- Stuart + Stuart
. End text. Shultz Unquote.

- Shultz + Shultz
@@ -49766,7 +49800,7 @@ also offer to support a GON effort to reopen this issue at the IWC.

- Stuart + Stuart @@ -50053,8 +50087,8 @@ session at the time. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860444–0937)

- Brown + Brown

Sincerely,

- Malcolm - Baldrige + Malcolm + Baldrige
GON will, of course, be taken into account in the ongoing USG deliberations.

- Stuart + Stuart
@@ -50536,8 +50570,8 @@ indicated that a “package” would be forthcoming soon, probably before the end of the week. (To date no such package has been received.)

- Shultz + Shultz

- Shultz + Shultz
@@ -50808,7 +50842,7 @@ avoid further damage and attempt repairs before public emotion leaves no room for our Icelandic political allies to maneuver.

- Ruwe + Ruwe @@ -50853,8 +50887,8 @@ action, it is likely to be unilateral to avoid the perception that they are acting under duress from the U.S.

- Whitehead + Whitehead @@ -51294,7 +51328,7 @@

17. This message was prepared after Dr. Calio’s departure for Washington.

- Ruwe + Ruwe
NATO Ministerial meeting in Reykjavik.

Sincerely yours,

- George P. - Shultz + George P. + Shultz
- Shultz + Shultz
@@ -51915,7 +51949,7 @@ 1976–1987, Lot 94D419, Whaling Iceland—Aug–Sept ’87)

Sincerely,

- Cap + Cap

Sincerely yours,

- George P. - ShultzShultz signed “George” above his typed - signature. + George P. + ShultzShultz signed + “George” above + his typed signature.
@@ -52843,10 +52877,11 @@ Dean of the NSC staff.

- Melvyn - LevitskyAn unknown hand - signed for Levitsky above - his typed signature. + Melvyn + LevitskyAn + unknown hand signed for Levitsky above his typed + signature. @@ -53349,7 +53384,8 @@ matter.

Sincerely yours,

- Dorsteinn Pálsson + Dorsteinn + Pálsson @@ -54181,8 +54217,8 @@ interim.

Sincerely, Ronald Reagan

- Armacost + Armacost @@ -54290,8 +54326,8 @@ permits, so as to build confidence in that process.

End text.

- Shultz + Shultz @@ -54447,8 +54483,8 @@ procedures towards realization of our idea. End text of press guidance.

- Armacost + Armacost @@ -54483,8 +54519,8 @@ possible.Not found. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

- Colin L. - Powell + Colin L. + Powell @@ -54558,8 +54594,8 @@ that the environmental activist group considered a foregone conclusion.

- Mansfield + Mansfield

Moscow minimize considered.

- Shultz + Shultz
@@ -54861,7 +54897,8 @@ >Reagan, 1988, Book I, pp. 424–425.

Sincerely,

- C. William Verity + C. William + Verity

Moscow minimize considered.

- Shultz + Shultz
- Shultz + Shultz
American Ambassador

End text.

- Ruwe + Ruwe
@@ -55793,8 +55830,8 @@

That you disapprove the proposed authority to sign the Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer.

- Allen - WallisAllen + WallisWallis signed a “W” above his typed signature. @@ -56222,8 +56259,8 @@ >Reagan, 1985, Book II, pp. 1038–1039.

- Shultz + Shultz
harmonized regulatory measures that might in the future be considered necessary to protect this critical global resource.

- Nicholas - PlattNicholas + PlattRichard Mueller signed for Platt above his typed signature. @@ -56726,7 +56763,7 @@ issue to UNEP Executive Director Tolba for resolution.

- Streator + Streator

Hope this helps.

- Paul - Gigot + Paul + Gigot
@@ -56918,8 +56955,8 @@ article which, after some initial questions, was accepted with few modifications as the product of the sub-group.

- Chapman + Chapman
UNEP Secretariat).

- Whitehead + Whitehead
@@ -57863,8 +57900,8 @@ well as the President and the Cabinet.

Sincerely yours,

- Edwin - Meese IIIEdwin Meese + IIIMeese signed “Ed” above his typed signature. @@ -59125,10 +59162,11 @@

Option 2. Do not seek a trade article for the protocol.

- Ralph C. - Bledsoe - Executive SecretaryDomestic Policy - Council + Ralph C. + Bledsoe + + Executive SecretaryDomestic Policy + Council
- Ronald - Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -59462,7 +59500,7 @@ delegations are studying the new EC proposal in conjunction with other developments.

- Stohr + Stohr @@ -59556,7 +59594,7 @@

—Tunisian proposal in Article 5 for guaranteed production rights dropped.

- Stohr + Stohr @@ -59706,8 +59744,8 @@ necessary for entry into force and effective implementation of the Protocol.

- Melvyn - Levitsky + Melvyn + Levitsky From e1fb075b5851f6fd7d3b787bb8412b18886cbbef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joe Wicentowski Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2021 16:01:44 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 17/34] Add signature block checks --- schema/frus.sch | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+) diff --git a/schema/frus.sch b/schema/frus.sch index 3f01e6693..87cf01748 100644 --- a/schema/frus.sch +++ b/schema/frus.sch @@ -603,6 +603,37 @@ character of this element. Fix orientation or delete? + + + Signature block checks + + The @corresp attribute is not allowed on the signed + element; it should be moved to the persName inside the signed element + Signature blocks must contain a + persName + + + People who signed must be wrapped + in a hi/@rend="strong" element + + Text following a persName element must be wrapped in a hi/@rend="italic" element, + not an affiliation element; be sure any line breaks are marked with lb + elements + + Any persName elements followed by italicized text should be separated by lb + elements. + + + This may need to be adapted + to a list/item structure + + Image Checks From c20ea7177ecebfefd7aee5bdb91a726faada9ee2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joe Wicentowski Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2021 16:02:16 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 18/34] Review rules, add before/after documentation --- schema/fix-signature-structure.xq | 166 +++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 93 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-) diff --git a/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq b/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq index ceb7d8d50..6e094753e 100644 --- a/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq +++ b/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq @@ -30,72 +30,70 @@ declare function local:reconstruct-node($nodes as node()*) { (: 1. Insert signed elements in closers where none exist. - - - Inman, Akers and Inman - - +before: + + + + Inman, Akers and Inman + + + +after: + + + + + Inman, Akers and Inman + + + :) - - -(: for $closer in $vol//tei:closer//tei:persName[not(ancestor::tei:signed)] -let $signed := $signed - -return - insert node $signed as first into $closer :) - - - for $closer in $vol//tei:closer[.//tei:persName and not(child::tei:signed)] - - return - replace node $closer - with + replace node $closer with element - {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "closer")} - { - $closer/ - element - {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "signed")} + { QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "closer") } { - - $closer/node() + element + { QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "signed") } + { + $closer/@*, + local:reconstruct-node($closer/node()) + } } - } - - - , (: 2. empty persName elements in signed elements where none exist +before: - - Cutler - - -:) + + Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. + + General Editor + + +after: -for $signed in $vol//tei:closer//tei:signed[not(descendant::tei:persName)] + + Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. + + General Editor + +:) + +for $hi in $vol//tei:signed//tei:hi[@rend="strong"][not(parent::tei:persName)] return - replace node $signed - with + replace node $hi with element - {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "signed")} - { - $signed/ - element - {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "persName")} + { QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "persName") } { - - $signed/node() + local:reconstruct-node($hi) } - } , @@ -112,52 +110,74 @@ find signatures with persNames lacking hi: and insert hi into the persName, making this into: - Hartman + + Hartman + :) for $persName in $vol//tei:signed/tei:persName[not(tei:hi)] return - replace node $persName - with + replace node $persName with element - {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "persName")} - { - $persName/@*, - element - {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "hi")} + { QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "persName") } { - attribute rend {"strong"}, - $persName/node() + $persName/@*, + element + { QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "hi") } + { + attribute rend {"strong"}, + local:reconstruct-node($persName/node()) + } } - } , -(: 4. Delete @corresp from signed elements :) +(: 4. Delete @corresp from signed elements + +before: + + TODO + +after: + + TODO + +:) for $signed in $vol//tei:signed[@corresp][tei:persName/@corresp] return delete node $signed/@corresp , -(: 5. Delete affiliation from closers and keep italicized content :) -for $affiliation in $vol//tei:closer//tei:signed//tei:affiliation[not(child::tei:hi)] +(: 5. Delete affiliation from closers and keep italicized content + +before: + + + Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. + + + General Editor + + + +after: + + + Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. + + General Editor + + +:) +for $affiliation in $vol//tei:signed/tei:affiliation return - replace node $affiliation - with - element - {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "hi")} - { - - attribute rend {"italic"} - - } + replace node $affiliation with + local:reconstruct-node($affiliation/node()) - - - - (: 6. Insert and hi rend="italic" for post-persName content :) + +(: 6. Insert and hi rend="italic" for post-persName content :) From 4a68fecbdb3726b95632f0b80c184693ca4d2e81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: vak2ve Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2021 17:27:49 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 19/34] updates to Reagan files all Reagan files updated with closer fixes based on fix-signature-structure.xq @joewiz query for persName insertion in closers without them accidentally deleted in xquery file while brainstorming; reinstated it. --- schema/fix-signature-structure.xq | 18 ++ volumes/frus1981-88v03.xml | 31 +- volumes/frus1981-88v05.xml | 4 +- volumes/frus1981-88v06.xml | 10 +- volumes/frus1981-88v11.xml | 475 +++++++++++++++++------------- volumes/frus1981-88v13.xml | 14 +- volumes/frus1981-88v41.xml | 1 + 7 files changed, 318 insertions(+), 235 deletions(-) diff --git a/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq b/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq index 6e094753e..6e3e05f26 100644 --- a/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq +++ b/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq @@ -86,6 +86,24 @@ after: :) +for $signed in $vol//tei:closer//tei:signed[not(descendant::tei:persName)] + +return + replace node $signed + with + element + {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "signed")} + { + element + { QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "persName") } + { + $signed/@*, + local:reconstruct-node($signed/node()) + } + } + +, + for $hi in $vol//tei:signed//tei:hi[@rend="strong"][not(parent::tei:persName)] return replace node $hi with diff --git a/volumes/frus1981-88v03.xml b/volumes/frus1981-88v03.xml index 04afe75aa..6d563d891 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1981-88v03.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1981-88v03.xml @@ -247,28 +247,15 @@ January 1981 until January 1983.

- Adam - M. Howard, Ph.D. - - - General Editor - - - - - Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D. - - - The Historian - - + Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. + + General Editor + + + Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D. + + The Historian + Bureau of Public Affairs diff --git a/volumes/frus1981-88v05.xml b/volumes/frus1981-88v05.xml index 55c25983a..61db0d13d 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1981-88v05.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1981-88v05.xml @@ -37356,9 +37356,7 @@ boost to the Soviet political offensive against our SDI program.

- Fred C. IkleFred C. IklePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature. diff --git a/volumes/frus1981-88v06.xml b/volumes/frus1981-88v06.xml index d3a362079..6f03dfa5e 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1981-88v06.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1981-88v06.xml @@ -4154,12 +4154,10 @@ the public in the U.S. and overseas. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

- JohnPrinted from a copy that bears this - handwritten signature. - + JohnPrinted from a copy that bears this handwritten + signature. + diff --git a/volumes/frus1981-88v11.xml b/volumes/frus1981-88v11.xml index 9d5998677..628861168 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1981-88v11.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1981-88v11.xml @@ -270,10 +270,14 @@ xml:id="pg_VII"/>rial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of the Reagan administration’s policy toward START I.

- Kathleen B. Rasmussen, Ph.D. General Editor - - Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. The Historian - + + Kathleen B. Rasmussen, + Ph.D.General + Editor + Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. + + The Historian + Foreign Service Institute April 2021 @@ -410,8 +414,9 @@ copy and technical editing under the supervision of Mandy A. Chalou, Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division.

- James Graham Wilson. Historian - + James Graham Wilson. + Historian + @@ -2205,7 +2210,8 @@ questions is only possible when they are considered in close connection with the other elements of the negotiated agreements.” End text.

- Clark + Clark @@ -2512,7 +2518,8 @@ study material, and the resulting NSDD will be handled on a strict need-to-know basis.

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
START during the week of May 3.

- William P. - ClarkWilliam P. + ClarkClark signed the memorandum “William Clark” above his typed signature. @@ -3841,8 +3848,9 @@ disingenuous. (Are the Soviets supposed not to notice that they are being asked “indirectly” to cut back sharply on throw-weight?)

- Fred C. IklePrinted from a copy that - bears this typed signature. + Fred C. IklePrinted from a copy that bears this + typed signature.
@@ -4705,7 +4713,8 @@ nuclear age.

Sincerely,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan @@ -4964,8 +4973,9 @@ dealt with in our START explanatory efforts.

- Keith SchuettePrinted from a copy - bearing this typed signature. + Keith SchuettePrinted from a copy bearing this typed + signature. @@ -5023,7 +5033,8 @@ corresp="#p_JGlenn_1">Glenn but an unclassified version would be worthwhile.

- Keith Schuette + Keith + Schuette @@ -5149,7 +5160,8 @@ basic proposal. These will be provided for NSC review not later than May 18, 1982.

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
- L. Paul Bremer, - III - Executive Secretary + L. Paul + Bremer, IIIExecutive + Secretary
@@ -6537,7 +6549,8 @@ reconstitution, and on any other items upon which it feels guidance is required.

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan @@ -6795,7 +6808,8 @@ negotiations will have my personal attention.

Sincerely,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan @@ -6945,7 +6959,8 @@ target="#t_ICBM_1">ICBM force reconstitution and addressing the problems posed by non-deployed missiles.

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
- Rowny + Rowny
NSC by December 1, 1982. (C)

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -8092,11 +8108,11 @@ cannot be settled in the bureaucratic trenches, but rather by offering him your broad ideas directly and getting a reaction.

- Lawrence S. EagleburgerEagleburger - initialed the memorandum “LSE” above his typed - signature. + Lawrence S. EagleburgerEagleburger initialed the memorandum “LSE” above + his typed signature. @@ -8280,8 +8296,9 @@ grateful for any reaction you choose to provide.

Sincerely,

- Anne Armstrong - Chairman + Anne + ArmstrongChairman
- Rowny + Rowny
@@ -8701,7 +8718,8 @@

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall establish procedures to implement this Decision Directive. (U)

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan @@ -8751,7 +8769,7 @@ Clark on these matters and keep up the good work.

Sincerely,

- Ron + Ron @@ -8964,7 +8982,7 @@ Andropov, understand military power and will not give us something for nothing.

- Rowny + Rowny @@ -9282,8 +9300,8 @@ be considered by the NSC on January 25th.

- William P. - ClarkWilliam P. + ClarkClark signed the memorandum “Bill Clark” above his typed signature. @@ -9565,7 +9583,8 @@ shows.

Please feel free to call me if you have questions.

- Ron Lehman + Ron + Lehman @@ -12612,7 +12631,8 @@

The above studies should be completed and provided for review by the National Security Council no later than March 15, 1983. (C)

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
- Rowny + Rowny
SLCM as soon as possible.

- L. Paul Bremer, - III - Executive Secretary - + L. Paul + Bremer, IIIExecutive + Secretary @@ -14292,10 +14311,10 @@ procedures as soon as you have time. Rowny’s recommendations can be considered in the context of that review.

- Kenneth W. DamDam signed the memorandum “KWD” above his typed - signature. + Kenneth W. + DamDam signed the memorandum + “KWD” above his typed signature. @@ -15038,8 +15057,9 @@ target="#t_START_1">START.

Respectfully yours,

- William R. Graham Chairman - + William R. Graham + Chairman +
@@ -15421,7 +15441,8 @@

This Decision Directive supplements NSDD–33, NSDD–36, NSDD–44, NSDD–53, and NSDD–78. (U)

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan @@ -17618,7 +17639,8 @@ 53. and NSDD–98.See Document 71. (U)

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan

Respectfully yours,

- Edward L. RownyRowny signed the - letter “E. Rowny” above his typed signature. - ChairmanUS START Delegation + Edward L. RownyRowny signed the letter “E. Rowny” + above his typed signature. + ChairmanUS START + Delegation
@@ -19063,10 +19087,11 @@ This topic could be broached at the anniversary meeting of NATO this May in Washington.

- Kenneth L. - AdelmanAdelman signed the - memorandum “Ken” over his typed signature. + Kenneth + L. AdelmanAdelman + signed the memorandum “Ken” over his typed + signature. @@ -19204,8 +19229,10 @@ forwarding an undated paper, “Guidelines for a START Agreement.”

- RownyRowny signed the paper - “Ed Rowny” above his typed signature. + RownyRowny signed the paper “Ed Rowny” + above his typed + signature. @@ -19289,7 +19316,8 @@ Soviets have demonstrated to us, however, that nonsubstantive moves can give an impression of flexibility and mobility.

- Paul H. Nitze + Paul H. + Nitze @@ -20252,7 +20280,8 @@ statements on arms control will be cleared in advance through the National Security Advisor. (C)

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
OSD but I find his views, especially on process questions, refreshing and stimulating.

- Kenneth W. DamDam initialed the - memorandum “KWD” above his typed signature. Shultz wrote below - this line: “KD for discussion next week G.” + Kenneth W. DamDam initialed the memorandum “KWD” above + his typed signature. Shultz wrote below this line: “KD + for discussion next week + G.” @@ -21624,7 +21656,8 @@ how the process can be strengthened. This report should be available for my review by March 15. (S)

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -22117,8 +22150,8 @@ cannot use Geneva to weaken either our strategic position or our ties with our allies.

- Kampelman + Kampelman @@ -22170,8 +22203,9 @@ points circulated by Jack. Attached is the memorandum I have sent in response to that request.

- Paul H. NitzeNitze signed the - letter “Paul” above his typed signature. + Paul H. NitzeNitze signed the letter “Paul” above + his typed signature. @@ -22338,9 +22372,11 @@ however, to obtain formal agency clearances on the views expressed in the report.

- Michael H. Mobbs Special Counsel to the Head of the - Delegation and Representative of the Secretary of Defense to the - Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms + Michael H. Mobbs + Special Counsel to the Head of the + Delegation and Representative of the Secretary of + Defense to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space + Arms @@ -22723,26 +22759,40 @@ Soviet “peace offensive” not only for its lack of substance but also for its irrelevance to meaningful arms control negotiations.

- THE TIGER TEAM - Michael H. Mobbs (OSD) - Jack D. Crouch (ACDA) - Col. Edward Hamilton (JCS) - Capt. Edward Melanson (OSD) - [name not declassified] - LtCol. Van Perroy (OSD) - William Spahr (CIA) - Greg Suchan (State) - Manfred Schweitzer (State) - William Tobey (OSD) - Verne V. Wattawa (ACDA) + + THE TIGER + TEAM + Michael H. Mobbs (OSD) + Jack D. Crouch (ACDA) + Col. Edward Hamilton + (JCS) + Capt. Edward Melanson + (OSD) + [name not + declassified] + LtCol. Van Perroy (OSD) + William Spahr (CIA) + Greg Suchan + (State) + Manfred Schweitzer + (State) + William Tobey (OSD) + Verne V. Wattawa (ACDA) + @@ -22854,8 +22904,10 @@ answer to questions as to whether we have put forward a concrete and comprehensive proposal at Geneva.

- Paul H. NitzeNitze signed the - memorandum “Paul” above his typed signature. + Paul H. NitzeNitze signed the memorandum “Paul” + above his typed + signature. @@ -24582,8 +24634,8 @@ which we entered the negotiations in March. Our watchwords thus remain patience and perseverance.

- Kampelman + Kampelman @@ -25115,8 +25167,9 @@

However, as Bud commented last night, this is the Soviets’ ingoing position and there are elements we can work with.

- Rozanne L. RidgwayRidgway signed - the letter “Roz” above her typed signature. + Rozanne L. RidgwayRidgway signed the letter “Roz” above + her typed signature. @@ -28145,8 +28198,9 @@ meeting end and resume at 2:30 PM.

Prepared by:

- Mark Parris Department of State - + Mark Parris Department + of State + @@ -28496,8 +28550,9 @@ area for an extended private conversation.

Prepared by:

- Mark Parris Department of State - + Mark Parris Department + of State +
- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
@@ -29869,8 +29925,8 @@ sense there will be growing pressure on the President to do. End comment.

- Kampelman + Kampelman
- Kampelman + Kampelman
- Kampelman + Kampelman
- Whitehead + Whitehead
@@ -30904,8 +30960,8 @@ with the Congress and allies might also be considered.

Warm regards.

- Kampelman + Kampelman

End Text of letter

- Whitehead + Whitehead
@@ -31797,7 +31853,8 @@ overdue.

Sincerely yours,

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
- Kampelman + Kampelman
@@ -42242,7 +42300,8 @@ meeting with him in Reykjavik, Iceland, and provide guidance for building on the agreements we reached there.

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan @@ -42321,7 +42380,7 @@ Soviet efforts to discuss limitations on nuclear testing in the NST forum.

- Shultz + Shultz @@ -42484,7 +42543,7 @@ and concerns, and displaying a political will to reach agreement.

- Shultz + Shultz @@ -42619,7 +42678,7 @@ sides to equal levels by 1991 and total elimination of the offensive ballistic missiles of both sides by 1996.

- Shultz + Shultz @@ -42775,7 +42834,8 @@ the last line of the draft telegram.

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan @@ -43223,8 +43283,8 @@

—The precise means of codifying 50-percent throw-weight reductions

Minimize considered.

- Kampelman + Kampelman @@ -43509,8 +43569,8 @@ nuclear testing condition.

Minimize considered.

- Kampelman + Kampelman
START agreement on the table by the spring of 1987.

- Kampelman + Kampelman
@@ -44882,7 +44942,8 @@ General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland. (S)

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan @@ -45435,8 +45496,8 @@ early and positive response. End text.

13. Moscow minimize has been considered. Nitze.

- Kampelman + Kampelman @@ -47416,7 +47477,8 @@ to the Soviet Union remain in effect unless specifically superseded by this directive. (C)

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
10. Obukhov and Lehman agreed to report to ministers on their exchanges.

- Shultz + Shultz
@@ -48600,7 +48662,7 @@ sight of the need to strengthen the ABM treaty.

- Shultz + Shultz
- Matlock + Matlock
199. we have sent you on this subject.

- JT + JT @@ -49506,10 +49569,11 @@ xml:id="d202fn5">August 31. Perhaps a secure conference call would be in order.

- Frank C. CarlucciPrinted from a - copy bearing Carlucci’s typed signature. + Frank C. CarlucciPrinted from a copy bearing Carlucci’s typed + signature.

Regards.

- Frank + Frank

10. Moscow minimize considered.

- Hanmer + Hanmer
Bessmertnykh where if at all to cut when he arrives at 8:00.

- Tom SimonsSimons initialed the - paper for all three drafters in the right-hand margin beside - their typed signatures. - Jim Timbie - Karen Puschel + Tom SimonsSimons initialed the paper for all + three drafters in the right-hand margin beside their + typed signatures. + Jim + Timbie + Karen + Puschel
@@ -53897,7 +53964,8 @@ together again after the Vorontsov meeting.

29. Moscow minimize considered.

- Lehman + Lehman

22. Moscow minimize considered.

- Lehman + Lehman
ABM Treaty, rather than a new agreement which must be ratified.

- Lehman + Lehman

35. Leningrad minimize considered.

- Matlock + Matlock
@@ -60205,7 +60276,8 @@ a precondition for agreement to the other positions set forth in this NSDD. (TS)

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan
3 lines not declassified]

- Joseph B. Castillo, Jr. + Joseph B. Castillo, + Jr.
@@ -64581,7 +64654,8 @@ corresp="#p_MSGorbachev_1">Gorbachev in Washington. (S)

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan @@ -65554,7 +65628,7 @@ D&S matters, in sharp contrast to their usual approach.

- Hanmer + Hanmer

Sincerely,

- Anne L. Armstrong - Chairman - + Anne L. + ArmstrongChairman
@@ -66196,8 +66270,9 @@ he would probably not be returning to Geneva before the ministerial and hoped to see Obukhov in Moscow during the meeting. End text.

- Cooper/Hanmer + Cooper/Hanmer
- Hanmer + Hanmer
- Whitehead + Whitehead
@@ -67935,10 +68010,9 @@ hard questions, that progress can be carried forward. Above all else, we must not cut corners.

- William J. Crowe, - Jr. - ChairmanJoint Chiefs of Staff - + William J. + Crowe, Jr.ChairmanJoint Chiefs of Staff @@ -69395,8 +69469,8 @@ we have the necessary analyses completed before we table the critical final portions of our Treaty text.

- Carlucci + Carlucci

5. With warm regards. End message to Shevardnadze.

- Shultz + Shultz
- PaulNitze initialed the note PHN - beside his typed signature. + PaulNitze initialed the note PHN beside his typed + signature.
@@ -72243,12 +72318,12 @@ printed. as a possible point of departure.

Sincerely,

- Anne L. - ArmstrongArmstrong signed - the letter “Anne” above her typed signature. - Chairman - + Anne + L. ArmstrongArmstrong signed the letter “Anne” above her + typed signature.Chairman @@ -72571,8 +72646,9 @@ declassified]

Sincerely yours,

- William H. WebsterWebster signed - “Bill” above his typed signature. + William H. WebsterWebster signed “Bill” above his typed + signature. @@ -73075,7 +73151,7 @@ here believe we should recess at or just after the summit and reconvene after the 4th of July weekend for the final push.

- Hammer + Hammer

15. Leningrad minimize considered.

- Matlock + Matlock
@@ -80386,8 +80463,9 @@ be available for presentation to the President by the end of July. (C)

- Colin L. PowellPowell initialed the - memorandum above his typed signature. + Colin L. PowellPowell initialed the memorandum above + his typed signature. @@ -80630,8 +80708,8 @@

20. The formal opening of Round X will begin at 1100 a.m., tomorrow, July 12, at the U.S. Mission.

- Kampelman + Kampelman
Not found.

- William F. - Burns + William + F. Burns @@ -80943,7 +81021,8 @@ during my June 1988 meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Moscow. (S)

- Ronald Reagan + Ronald + Reagan @@ -83146,7 +83225,7 @@ the negotiations left off in whatever detail we considered appropriate.

- Whitehead + Whitehead
- Cooper + Cooper
@@ -84770,7 +84850,7 @@

Nitze and Obukhov agreed to adjourn the meeting at 12:00.

End text.

- Whitehead + Whitehead
- Hanmer/Courtney + Hanmer/Courtney
- - John H. SteinPrinted from a copy that indicates that Duane - R. Clarridge signed for Stein. - - Deputy Director for Operations - + + John H. SteinPrinted from a copy that indicates that Duane R. Clarridge + signed for Stein. + + Deputy Director for Operations +
diff --git a/volumes/frus1981-88v41.xml b/volumes/frus1981-88v41.xml index 1dedc0204..45f37c0fa 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1981-88v41.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1981-88v41.xml @@ -40801,6 +40801,7 @@ Acting Secretary of State M. Peter McPherson + Acting Secretary of the Treasury From 8877173f1dbf4de9765fd3dfb368fc8a85eb4653 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: vak2ve Date: Fri, 3 Dec 2021 15:35:27 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 20/34] fixes from review fixes for errors noted by @joewiz --- volumes/frus1981-88v05.xml | 6 ++-- volumes/frus1981-88v06.xml | 8 ++--- volumes/frus1981-88v11.xml | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------ volumes/frus1981-88v13.xml | 12 ++++---- 4 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) diff --git a/volumes/frus1981-88v05.xml b/volumes/frus1981-88v05.xml index 61db0d13d..9dcb0a81b 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1981-88v05.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1981-88v05.xml @@ -37356,9 +37356,9 @@ boost to the Soviet political offensive against our SDI program.

- Fred C. IklePrinted from a copy that bears this - typed signature. + Fred C. IklePrinted from a copy that bears this typed + signature.
U.S. and overseas. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

- JohnPrinted from a copy that bears this handwritten - signature. - + JohnPrinted from a copy + that bears this handwritten signature. +
diff --git a/volumes/frus1981-88v11.xml b/volumes/frus1981-88v11.xml index 628861168..db9053d67 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1981-88v11.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1981-88v11.xml @@ -414,9 +414,9 @@ copy and technical editing under the supervision of Mandy A. Chalou, Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division.

- James Graham Wilson. - Historian - + James Graham Wilson. + Historian + @@ -8297,8 +8297,9 @@

Sincerely,

Anne - ArmstrongChairman + Armstrong + Chairman +
START.

Respectfully yours,

- William R. Graham - Chairman - + William R. + Graham + + Chairman +
@@ -17957,12 +17960,12 @@ reach an equitable and verifiable agreement.

Respectfully yours,

- Edward L. RownyRowny signed the letter “E. Rowny” - above his typed signature. - ChairmanUS START - Delegation + Edward L. + RownyRowny + signed the letter “E. Rowny” above his typed + signature. + ChairmanUS START Delegation @@ -22372,11 +22375,11 @@ however, to obtain formal agency clearances on the views expressed in the report.

- Michael H. Mobbs - Special Counsel to the Head of the - Delegation and Representative of the Secretary of - Defense to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space - Arms + Michael H. Mobbs + Special Counsel to the Head of the + Delegation and Representative of the Secretary of Defense to + the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space + Arms @@ -28198,9 +28201,9 @@ meeting end and resume at 2:30 PM.

Prepared by:

- Mark Parris Department - of State - + Mark Parris + + Department of State @@ -28550,9 +28553,9 @@ area for an extended private conversation.

Prepared by:

- Mark Parris Department - of State - + Mark Parris + + Department of State
Sincerely,

Anne L. - ArmstrongChairman + Armstrong + + Chairman
@@ -72322,8 +72326,9 @@ L. ArmstrongArmstrong signed the letter “Anne” above her - typed signature.Chairman + typed signature. + + Chairman diff --git a/volumes/frus1981-88v13.xml b/volumes/frus1981-88v13.xml index 81bc78595..01c44e3ae 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1981-88v13.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1981-88v13.xml @@ -54327,12 +54327,12 @@ principal officers in London.

- John H. SteinPrinted from a copy that indicates that Duane R. Clarridge - signed for Stein. - - Deputy Director for Operations - + John H. SteinPrinted from a copy that indicates that Duane + R. Clarridge signed for Stein. + + Deputy Director for Operations + From 9283524bbf13f53bf7899204a85fa0e970a0c990 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joe Wicentowski Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2021 12:55:34 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 21/34] Add test file --- schema/signature-test1.xml | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) create mode 100644 schema/signature-test1.xml diff --git a/schema/signature-test1.xml b/schema/signature-test1.xml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1e1f0fbb7 --- /dev/null +++ b/schema/signature-test1.xml @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + + + Fred C. IklePrinted from a copy that + bears this typed signature. + From 2ea96531de66327988c1c4ad4f466a212c8b6ed3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joe Wicentowski Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2021 12:58:09 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 22/34] Relax wording of warning --- schema/frus.sch | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/schema/frus.sch b/schema/frus.sch index 87cf01748..bbcae35a6 100644 --- a/schema/frus.sch +++ b/schema/frus.sch @@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ persName - People who signed must be wrapped + People who signed should be wrapped in a hi/@rend="strong" element From 68600f04c990de883ab692cc6cd2b520914ecd87 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joe Wicentowski Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2021 12:59:32 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 23/34] Add xspec for signature block checks --- schema/frus-xspec.sch | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ schema/frus.xspec | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 105 insertions(+) create mode 100644 schema/frus-xspec.sch create mode 100644 schema/frus.xspec diff --git a/schema/frus-xspec.sch b/schema/frus-xspec.sch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3d50a1ed3 --- /dev/null +++ b/schema/frus-xspec.sch @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ + + + + + + + Signature block checks + + The @corresp attribute is not allowed + on the signed element; it should be moved to the persName inside the signed + element + Signature + blocks must contain a persName + + + People who signed must + be wrapped in a hi/@rend="strong" element + + Text following a persName element must be wrapped in a hi/@rend="italic" element, + not an affiliation element; be sure any line breaks are marked with lb + elements + + Any persName elements followed by italicized text should be separated by lb + elements. + + + This may need to be adapted + to a list/item structure + + + + diff --git a/schema/frus.xspec b/schema/frus.xspec new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9479b321b --- /dev/null +++ b/schema/frus.xspec @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ + + + + + + + + + + Ronald Reagan + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Zbigniew + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Paul H. Kreisberg + Kreisberg signed “Paul” above his typed + signature. + + + + + + + + + + + + + From a9453a46f4f4e39f1fa9c9e4fc8a874496e0a9e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: vak2ve Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2021 16:19:42 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 24/34] Update fix-signature-structure.xq examples added for all update queries --- schema/fix-signature-structure.xq | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq b/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq index 6e3e05f26..8d387baed 100644 --- a/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq +++ b/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq @@ -102,7 +102,25 @@ return } } -, +,(: 2. empty persName elements in signed elements where none exist + +before: + + + Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. + + General Editor + + +after: + + + Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. + + General Editor + + +:) for $hi in $vol//tei:signed//tei:hi[@rend="strong"][not(parent::tei:persName)] return @@ -155,11 +173,23 @@ return before: - TODO + + + + Ronald Reagan + + + after: - TODO + + + + Ronald Reagan + + + :) From 0a52fa804a054928a94ebff629226a2c350919fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joe Wicentowski Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2021 17:59:32 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 25/34] Use copy-namespaces declaration ... relieving us of the need for the local:reconstruct-node workaround. See https://www.w3.org/TR/xquery-31/#id-copy-namespaces-decl. --- schema/fix-signature-structure.xq | 21 +++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq b/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq index 8d387baed..f3dc811d4 100644 --- a/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq +++ b/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ Do not commit the automatically generated .bak file to git. :) +declare copy-namespaces no-preserve, inherit; + declare namespace tei = "http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0"; declare namespace frus = "http://history.state.gov/frus/ns/1.0"; @@ -19,15 +21,6 @@ declare variable $path external; declare variable $vol := doc($path); -(: reconstruct a node with computed element constructor to avoid saxon inserting unwanted namespace declarations :) -declare function local:reconstruct-node($nodes as node()*) { - for $node in $nodes - return - typeswitch ($node) - case element() return element { node-name($node) } { $node/@*, local:reconstruct-node($node/node()) } - default return $node -}; - (: 1. Insert signed elements in closers where none exist. before: @@ -60,7 +53,7 @@ return { QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "signed") } { $closer/@*, - local:reconstruct-node($closer/node()) + $closer/node() } } , @@ -98,7 +91,7 @@ return { QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "persName") } { $signed/@*, - local:reconstruct-node($signed/node()) + $signed/node() } } @@ -128,7 +121,7 @@ return element { QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "persName") } { - local:reconstruct-node($hi) + $hi } , @@ -163,7 +156,7 @@ return { QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "hi") } { attribute rend {"strong"}, - local:reconstruct-node($persName/node()) + $persName/node() } } @@ -225,7 +218,7 @@ after: for $affiliation in $vol//tei:signed/tei:affiliation return replace node $affiliation with - local:reconstruct-node($affiliation/node()) + $affiliation/node() (: 6. Insert and hi rend="italic" for post-persName content :) From 2e34b8b4d0c8583fd543b0c5868a8b394fb3ae57 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joe Wicentowski Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2021 18:05:08 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 26/34] Delete expression causing over-eager persName We'd deleted this previously, in favor of a rule that targeted the hi/@rend=strong element, but this was reinstated. --- schema/fix-signature-structure.xq | 36 ------------------------------- 1 file changed, 36 deletions(-) diff --git a/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq b/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq index f3dc811d4..772a87e93 100644 --- a/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq +++ b/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq @@ -79,42 +79,6 @@ after: :) -for $signed in $vol//tei:closer//tei:signed[not(descendant::tei:persName)] - -return - replace node $signed - with - element - {QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "signed")} - { - element - { QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "persName") } - { - $signed/@*, - $signed/node() - } - } - -,(: 2. empty persName elements in signed elements where none exist - -before: - - - Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. - - General Editor - - -after: - - - Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. - - General Editor - - -:) - for $hi in $vol//tei:signed//tei:hi[@rend="strong"][not(parent::tei:persName)] return replace node $hi with From d3471576c19a304df0acc27a03a38349efc09957 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joe Wicentowski Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2021 18:07:48 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 27/34] Improve descriptions and examples --- schema/fix-signature-structure.xq | 38 +++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq b/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq index 772a87e93..038d7f416 100644 --- a/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq +++ b/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ declare variable $path external; declare variable $vol := doc($path); -(: 1. Insert signed elements in closers where none exist. +(: 1. Fix closer lacking child signed before: @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ after: :) -for $closer in $vol//tei:closer[.//tei:persName and not(child::tei:signed)] +for $closer in $vol//tei:closer[not(tei:signed) and .//tei:persName[not(ancestor::tei:note)]] return replace node $closer with element @@ -59,22 +59,20 @@ return , -(: 2. empty persName elements in signed elements where none exist +(: 2. Fix hi/@rend="strong" lacking outer persName before: Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. - - General Editor after: - Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. - - General Editor + + Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. + :) @@ -84,23 +82,19 @@ return replace node $hi with element { QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "persName") } - { - $hi - } + { $hi } , -(: 3. Fix missing hi/@rend="strong" on signatures :) - -(: +(: 3. Fix persName lacking inner hi/@rend="strong" -find signatures with persNames lacking hi: +before: Hartman -and insert hi into the persName, making this into: +after: @@ -126,7 +120,7 @@ return , -(: 4. Delete @corresp from signed elements +(: 4. Delete @corresp from signed if child persName has the same @corresp before: @@ -150,14 +144,14 @@ after: :) -for $signed in $vol//tei:signed[@corresp][tei:persName/@corresp] +for $signed in $vol//tei:signed[@corresp = tei:persName/@corresp] return delete node $signed/@corresp , -(: 5. Delete affiliation from closers and keep italicized content +(: 5. Delete affiliation from signed, keeping the child nodes before: @@ -185,4 +179,8 @@ return $affiliation/node() -(: 6. Insert and hi rend="italic" for post-persName content :) +(: 6. Insert and hi rend="italic" for post-persName content + +TODO + +:) From ba8f12209d3bc4f22e744e3a6c822e5152845dfb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joe Wicentowski Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2021 18:47:02 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 28/34] Fix placement of closer's attributes --- schema/fix-signature-structure.xq | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq b/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq index 038d7f416..12e9f2bf3 100644 --- a/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq +++ b/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq @@ -49,11 +49,11 @@ return element { QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "closer") } { + $closer/@*, element { QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "signed") } - { - $closer/@*, - $closer/node() + { + $closer/node() } } , From dca0527d1c8f280c12970ad048ca1734337dc12b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joe Wicentowski Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2021 18:50:07 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 29/34] Add a "debug" mode to track behavior of rules --- schema/fix-signature-structure.xq | 19 ++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq b/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq index 12e9f2bf3..9c23cbbca 100644 --- a/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq +++ b/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ declare namespace frus = "http://history.state.gov/frus/ns/1.0"; declare variable $path external; declare variable $vol := doc($path); +declare variable $debug := false(); (: 1. Fix closer lacking child signed @@ -49,6 +50,7 @@ return element { QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "closer") } { + if ($debug) then attribute ana { "rule-1" } else (), $closer/@*, element { QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "signed") } @@ -82,7 +84,10 @@ return replace node $hi with element { QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "persName") } - { $hi } + { + if ($debug) then attribute ana { "rule-2" } else (), + $hi + } , @@ -109,6 +114,7 @@ return element { QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "persName") } { + if ($debug) then attribute ana { "rule-3" } else (), $persName/@*, element { QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "hi") } @@ -176,8 +182,15 @@ after: for $affiliation in $vol//tei:signed/tei:affiliation return replace node $affiliation with - $affiliation/node() - + if ($debug) then + element + { QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "seg") } + { + attribute ana { "rule-5" }, + $affiliation/node() + } + else + $affiliation/node() (: 6. Insert and hi rend="italic" for post-persName content From fa016200b9211aa68b55be25721a1c38e96f9364 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joe Wicentowski Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2021 18:50:55 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 30/34] Add a rule to fix signed without child persName --- schema/fix-signature-structure.xq | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+) diff --git a/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq b/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq index 9c23cbbca..67e984eb7 100644 --- a/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq +++ b/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq @@ -60,6 +60,40 @@ return } , +(: 1b. Fix signed lacking child persName + +before: + + + Steve + Oxman signed his initials + over his typed signature. + + + +after: + + + + Steve + Oxman signed his initials + over his typed signature. + + + +:) + +for $text in $vol//tei:signed[not(tei:persName)]/node()[normalize-space(.) ne ""][1][. instance of text()] +return + replace node $text with + element + { QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "persName") } + { + if ($debug) then attribute ana { "rule-1b" } else (), + $text + } + +, (: 2. Fix hi/@rend="strong" lacking outer persName From ae4cd2f551fc7eda0bc7bfa24174827c0bdd1471 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joe Wicentowski Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2021 18:52:09 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 31/34] Add whitespace inside newly nested elements --- schema/fix-signature-structure.xq | 20 +++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq b/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq index 67e984eb7..a8284a893 100644 --- a/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq +++ b/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq @@ -116,12 +116,16 @@ after: for $hi in $vol//tei:signed//tei:hi[@rend="strong"][not(parent::tei:persName)] return replace node $hi with - element - { QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "persName") } - { - if ($debug) then attribute ana { "rule-2" } else (), - $hi - } + ( + element + { QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "persName") } + { + if ($debug) then attribute ana { "rule-2" } else (), + text { " " }, + $hi, + text { " " } + } + ) , @@ -150,12 +154,14 @@ return { if ($debug) then attribute ana { "rule-3" } else (), $persName/@*, + text { " " }, element { QName("http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0", "hi") } { attribute rend {"strong"}, $persName/node() - } + }, + text { " " } } , From e7d2425bf3b0061bc18de17fc8cdc2afdd787561 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joe Wicentowski Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2021 18:52:26 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 32/34] Remove unnecessary attribute from documentation --- schema/fix-signature-structure.xq | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq b/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq index a8284a893..416becffe 100644 --- a/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq +++ b/schema/fix-signature-structure.xq @@ -99,13 +99,13 @@ return before: - + Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. after: - + Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. From 4c95dbd3ddc2d726de9c278f640f36c800040a1b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: vak2ve Date: Tue, 7 Dec 2021 15:49:38 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 33/34] Update frus1981-88v11.xml 2 whitespace errors caught by new xquery updates --- volumes/frus1981-88v11.xml | 19 ++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/volumes/frus1981-88v11.xml b/volumes/frus1981-88v11.xml index db9053d67..61661077d 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1981-88v11.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1981-88v11.xml @@ -8298,7 +8298,8 @@ Anne Armstrong - Chairman + + Chairman @@ -17963,7 +17964,8 @@ Edward L. RownyRowny signed the letter “E. Rowny” above his typed - signature. + signature. + ChairmanUS START Delegation @@ -22375,11 +22377,11 @@ however, to obtain formal agency clearances on the views expressed in the report.

- Michael H. Mobbs - Special Counsel to the Head of the - Delegation and Representative of the Secretary of Defense to - the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space - Arms + Michael H. Mobbs + + Special Counsel to the Head of the Delegation and + Representative of the Secretary of Defense to the Negotiations + on Nuclear and Space Arms @@ -22763,8 +22765,7 @@ for its irrelevance to meaningful arms control negotiations.

- THE TIGER - TEAM + THE TIGER TEAM Michael H. Mobbs (OSD) From 818b8302459f55f46e8ae6e45e2cd7b8d62016df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: vak2ve Date: Tue, 7 Dec 2021 17:49:50 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 34/34] frus-xspec updates ongoing --- schema/frus-xspec.sch | 15 +++--- schema/frus.xspec | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/schema/frus-xspec.sch b/schema/frus-xspec.sch index 3d50a1ed3..924eaa990 100644 --- a/schema/frus-xspec.sch +++ b/schema/frus-xspec.sch @@ -14,24 +14,25 @@ blocks must contain a persName - People who signed must - be wrapped in a hi/@rend="strong" element + People who signed must be wrapped in a + hi/@rend="strong" element Text following a persName element must be wrapped in a hi/@rend="italic" element, - not an affiliation element; be sure any line breaks are marked with lb - elements + id="remove-affiliation">Text following a persName element must be wrapped in a + hi/@rend="italic" element, not an affiliation element; be sure any line breaks are + marked with lb elements Any persName elements followed by italicized text should be separated by lb elements. - This may need to be adapted + This may need to be adapted to a list/item structure diff --git a/schema/frus.xspec b/schema/frus.xspec index 9479b321b..f23a60189 100644 --- a/schema/frus.xspec +++ b/schema/frus.xspec @@ -63,4 +63,110 @@ + + + + + + Vance + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D. + + + The Historian + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Walter M. Bastian, Jr. Deputy Director + (Policy and Plans) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Walter M. Bastian, Jr. Deputy Director + (Policy and Plans) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + John Buchanan + Leo J. Ryan + J. Herbert Burke + + + + + + + + + + + + +