diff --git a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/email.py b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/email.py
index b25e2d015c4..afba06ddcc0 100644
--- a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/email.py
+++ b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/email.py
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 )
 from plane.utils.path_validator import get_safe_redirect_url, validate_next_path, get_allowed_hosts
 
+
 class SignInAuthSpaceEndpoint(View):
     def post(self, request):
         next_path = request.POST.get("next_path")
@@ -99,13 +100,13 @@ def post(self, request):
             user = provider.authenticate()
             # Login the user and record his device info
             user_login(request=request, user=user, is_space=True)
-            # redirect to next path
-            url = get_safe_redirect_url(
-                base_url=base_host(request=request, is_space=True),
-                next_path=next_path,
-                params={}
-            )
-            return HttpResponseRedirect(url)
+            # redirect to referer path
+            next_path = validate_next_path(next_path=next_path)
+            url = f"{base_host(request=request, is_space=True).rstrip('/')}{next_path}"
+            if url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme(url, allowed_hosts=get_allowed_hosts()):
+                return HttpResponseRedirect(url)
+            else:
+                return HttpResponseRedirect(base_host(request=request, is_space=True))
         except AuthenticationException as e:
             params = e.get_error_dict()
             url = get_safe_redirect_url(
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/github.py b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/github.py
index acc956cf3b0..1a7d51d6638 100644
--- a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/github.py
+++ b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/github.py
@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ def get(self, request):
             # Process workspace and project invitations
             # redirect to referer path
             next_path = validate_next_path(next_path=next_path)
+            
             url = f"{base_host(request=request, is_space=True).rstrip('/')}{next_path}"
             if url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme(url, allowed_hosts=get_allowed_hosts()):
                 return HttpResponseRedirect(url)
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/gitlab.py b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/gitlab.py
index 493cd823e28..26ed17f3260 100644
--- a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/gitlab.py
+++ b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/gitlab.py
@@ -15,7 +15,8 @@
     AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES,
     AuthenticationException,
 )
-from plane.utils.path_validator import get_safe_redirect_url, get_allowed_hosts, validate_next_path
+from plane.utils.path_validator import get_safe_redirect_url, validate_next_path, get_allowed_hosts
+
 
 
 class GitLabOauthInitiateSpaceEndpoint(View):
@@ -96,6 +97,7 @@ def get(self, request):
             # Process workspace and project invitations
             # redirect to referer path
             next_path = validate_next_path(next_path=next_path)
+
             url = f"{base_host(request=request, is_space=True).rstrip('/')}{next_path}"
             if url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme(url, allowed_hosts=get_allowed_hosts()):
                 return HttpResponseRedirect(url)
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/google.py b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/google.py
index c7c8337716b..617216d64d7 100644
--- a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/google.py
+++ b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/google.py
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ def get(self, request):
             user_login(request=request, user=user, is_space=True)
             # redirect to referer path
             next_path = validate_next_path(next_path=next_path)
+
             url = f"{base_host(request=request, is_space=True).rstrip('/')}{next_path}"
             if url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme(url, allowed_hosts=get_allowed_hosts()):
                 return HttpResponseRedirect(url)
diff --git a/apps/space/app/page.tsx b/apps/space/app/page.tsx
index a75275e0d59..f544bcb103e 100644
--- a/apps/space/app/page.tsx
+++ b/apps/space/app/page.tsx
@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
 "use client";
-
+import { useEffect } from "react";
 import { observer } from "mobx-react";
+import { useSearchParams, useRouter } from "next/navigation";
+// plane imports
+import { isValidNextPath } from "@plane/utils";
 // components
 import { UserLoggedIn } from "@/components/account/user-logged-in";
 import { LogoSpinner } from "@/components/common/logo-spinner";
@@ -10,6 +13,15 @@ import { useUser } from "@/hooks/store/use-user";
 
 const HomePage = observer(() => {
   const { data: currentUser, isAuthenticated, isInitializing } = useUser();
+  const searchParams = useSearchParams();
+  const router = useRouter();
+  const nextPath = searchParams.get("next_path");
+
+  useEffect(() => {
+    if (currentUser && isAuthenticated && nextPath && isValidNextPath(nextPath)) {
+      router.replace(nextPath);
+    }
+  }, [currentUser, isAuthenticated, nextPath, router]);
 
   if (isInitializing)
     return (
@@ -18,7 +30,16 @@ const HomePage = observer(() => {
       </div>
     );
 
-  if (currentUser && isAuthenticated) return <UserLoggedIn />;
+  if (currentUser && isAuthenticated) {
+    if (nextPath && isValidNextPath(nextPath)) {
+      return (
+        <div className="flex h-screen min-h-[500px] w-full justify-center items-center">
+          <LogoSpinner />
+        </div>
+      );
+    }
+    return <UserLoggedIn />;
+  }
 
   return <AuthView />;
 });
diff --git a/packages/utils/src/url.ts b/packages/utils/src/url.ts
index 638839bb06c..738d935d5c8 100644
--- a/packages/utils/src/url.ts
+++ b/packages/utils/src/url.ts
@@ -114,22 +114,6 @@ export function extractHostname(url: string): string {
  *    - Removes hash fragments (everything after '#')
  *    - Removes port numbers (everything after ':')
  * 3. Validates the TLD against a list of known TLDs
- *
- * @example
- * // Valid cases (returns the TLD)
- * extractTLD('example.com')                    // returns 'com'
- * extractTLD('sub.example.com')                // returns 'com'
- * extractTLD('example.com/path')               // returns 'com'
- * extractTLD('example.com:8080')               // returns 'com'
- * extractTLD('example.com?query=1')            // returns 'com'
- * extractTLD('example.com#hash')               // returns 'com'
- *
- * // Invalid cases (returns empty string)
- * extractTLD('')                               // returns ''
- * extractTLD('.example.com')                   // returns ''
- * extractTLD('example.com.')                   // returns ''
- * extractTLD('example.invalid')                // returns ''
- * extractTLD('localhost')                      // returns ''
  */
 
 export function extractTLD(urlString: string): string {
@@ -257,3 +241,66 @@ export function extractURLComponents(url: URL | string): IURLComponents | undefi
     return undefined;
   }
 }
+
+/**
+ * Validates that a next_path parameter is safe for redirection.
+ * Only allows relative paths starting with "/" to prevent open redirect vulnerabilities.
+ *
+ * @param url - The next_path URL to validate
+ * @returns True if the URL is a safe relative path, false otherwise
+ *
+ * @example
+ * isValidNextPath("/dashboard") // true
+ * isValidNextPath("/workspace/123") // true
+ * isValidNextPath("https://malicious.com") // false
+ * isValidNextPath("//malicious.com") // false (protocol-relative)
+ * isValidNextPath("javascript:alert(1)") // false
+ * isValidNextPath("") // false
+ * isValidNextPath("dashboard") // false (must start with /)
+ * isValidNextPath("\\malicious") // false (backslash)
+ * isValidNextPath("  /dashboard  ") // true (trimmed)
+ */
+export function isValidNextPath(url: string): boolean {
+  if (!url || typeof url !== "string") return false;
+
+  // Trim leading/trailing whitespace
+  const trimmedUrl = url.trim();
+
+  if (!trimmedUrl) return false;
+
+  // Only allow relative paths starting with /
+  if (!trimmedUrl.startsWith("/")) return false;
+
+  // Block protocol-relative URLs (//example.com) - open redirect vulnerability
+  if (trimmedUrl.startsWith("//")) return false;
+
+  // Block backslashes which can be used for path traversal or Windows-style paths
+  if (trimmedUrl.includes("\\")) return false;
+
+  try {
+    // Use URL constructor with a dummy base to normalize and validate the path
+    const normalizedUrl = new URL(trimmedUrl, "http://localhost");
+
+    // Ensure the path is still relative (no host change from our dummy base)
+    if (normalizedUrl.hostname !== "localhost" || normalizedUrl.protocol !== "http:") {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    // Use the normalized pathname for additional security checks
+    const pathname = normalizedUrl.pathname;
+
+    // Additional security checks for malicious patterns in the normalized path
+    const maliciousPatterns = [
+      /javascript:/i,
+      /data:/i,
+      /vbscript:/i,
+      /<script/i,
+      /on\w+=/i, // Event handlers like onclick=, onload=
+    ];
+
+    return !maliciousPatterns.some((pattern) => pattern.test(pathname));
+  } catch (error) {
+    // If URL constructor fails, it's an invalid path
+    return false;
+  }
+}