Increase default revocation timeout

[t-bast]

We increase the delay after which we disconnect peers that don't send their revocation (which can indicate malicious behavior or a known lnd bug). The previous 20 seconds delay was too aggressive for Tor nodes, or nodes that have large blocking file backups.

Fixes #3081

[pm47]

60 seconds seems a lot, but okay.

Note that we also have a peer-connection.ping-timeout=20s that will also lead to disconnections, but an sqlite db freeze should not prevent answering to pings.

[t-bast]

Note that we also have a peer-connection.ping-timeout=20s that will also lead to disconnections, but an sqlite db freeze should not prevent answering to pings.

Good point, should we also increase this to better support Tor peers?

[pm47]

should we also increase this to better support Tor peers?

Probably. My preference would have been to leave both values to default, but to recommend increasing them in Tor.md (with maybe a hint in reference.conf at the tor.enabled section).

[t-bast]

but to recommend increasing them in Tor.md

Default values are quite sticky, even if we document that they should be changed...it doesn't hurt much to increase those timeouts IMO, I did that in the second commit.

[pm47]

Fair enough!