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@ghost ghost commented Jan 13, 2014

NOTE: IT IS IMPORTANT TO REVIEW THE CHANGES to mm/fremap.c carefully, because the automatic patch of this file failed. See below and https://altiscale.atlassian.net/browse/OPS-2746

Followed the process in this script for doing the merge:

Failed merge:

$ cat fremap.c.rej 
--- mm/fremap.c
+++ mm/fremap.c
@@ -207,11 +207,12 @@
         */
        if (mapping_cap_account_dirty(mapping)) {
            unsigned long addr;
-           struct file *file = get_file(vma->vm_file);
+           struct file *file = vma->vm_file;

+           vma_get_file(vma);
            addr = mmap_region(file, start, size,
                    vma->vm_flags, pgoff);
-           fput(file);
+           vma_fput(vma);
            if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr)) {
                err = addr;
            } else {

@dineshs-altiscale
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The kernel panics for me. Its likely config related rather than the simple/harmless change in fremap.c.

We need to hand-make the config, ensure it works and check it in. Where is the current kernel config used for this build?

dineshs-altiscale added a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 13, 2014
3.12.7: adding aufs support from git.code.sf.net/p/aufs/aufs3-standalone
@dineshs-altiscale dineshs-altiscale merged commit 2c3d9a3 into altiscale-3.12.7 Jan 13, 2014
@dineshs-altiscale dineshs-altiscale deleted the dc-3.12.7_OPS-2746 branch January 13, 2014 21:34
@ghost
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ghost commented Jan 14, 2014

For the record... We needed to change the kernel version produced by our build process to get the kernel working. The kernel config is in our internal tools repo (under packages/linux-stable), and is released internally and to customers as part of the src package. We're keeping the config file in a private repo, because that's consistent with Altiscale's other build and release processes, not because we want to hide it. I'd be happy to provide the config file to folks outside the company upon request, and would consider making it available in a public repo if that's important to anyone.

ghost pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2014
…nfs_open()

Use i_writecount to control whether to get an fscache cookie in nfs_open() as
NFS does not do write caching yet.  I *think* this is the cause of a problem
encountered by Mark Moseley whereby __fscache_uncache_page() gets a NULL
pointer dereference because cookie->def is NULL:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
IP: [<ffffffff812a1903>] __fscache_uncache_page+0x23/0x160
PGD 0
Thread overran stack, or stack corrupted
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: ...
CPU: 7 PID: 18993 Comm: php Not tainted 3.11.1 #1
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R420/072XWF, BIOS 1.3.5 08/21/2012
task: ffff8804203460c0 ti: ffff880420346640
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812a1903>] __fscache_uncache_page+0x23/0x160
RSP: 0018:ffff8801053af878 EFLAGS: 00210286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8800be2f8780 RCX: ffff88022ffae5e8
RDX: 0000000000004c66 RSI: ffffea00055ff440 RDI: ffff8800be2f8780
RBP: ffff8801053af898 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000003
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffea00055ff440
R13: 0000000000001000 R14: ffff8800c50be538 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88042fc60000(0063) knlGS:00000000e439c700
CS: 0010 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000001d8f000 CR4: 00000000000607f0
Stack:
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81365a72>] __nfs_fscache_invalidate_page+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff813553d5>] nfs_invalidate_page+0x75/0x90
[<ffffffff811b8f5e>] truncate_inode_page+0x8e/0x90
[<ffffffff811b90ad>] truncate_inode_pages_range.part.12+0x14d/0x620
[<ffffffff81d6387d>] ? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x1fd/0x2e0
[<ffffffff811b95d3>] truncate_inode_pages_range+0x53/0x70
[<ffffffff811b969d>] truncate_inode_pages+0x2d/0x40
[<ffffffff811b96ff>] truncate_pagecache+0x4f/0x70
[<ffffffff81356840>] nfs_setattr_update_inode+0xa0/0x120
[<ffffffff81368de4>] nfs3_proc_setattr+0xc4/0xe0
[<ffffffff81357f78>] nfs_setattr+0xc8/0x150
[<ffffffff8122d95b>] notify_change+0x1cb/0x390
[<ffffffff8120a55b>] do_truncate+0x7b/0xc0
[<ffffffff8121f96c>] do_last+0xa4c/0xfd0
[<ffffffff8121ffbc>] path_openat+0xcc/0x670
[<ffffffff81220a0e>] do_filp_open+0x4e/0xb0
[<ffffffff8120ba1f>] do_sys_open+0x13f/0x2b0
[<ffffffff8126aaf6>] compat_SyS_open+0x36/0x50
[<ffffffff81d7204c>] sysenter_dispatch+0x7/0x24

The code at the instruction pointer was disassembled:

> (gdb) disas __fscache_uncache_page
> Dump of assembler code for function __fscache_uncache_page:
> ...
> 0xffffffff812a18ff <+31>: mov 0x48(%rbx),%rax
> 0xffffffff812a1903 <+35>: cmpb $0x0,0x10(%rax)
> 0xffffffff812a1907 <+39>: je 0xffffffff812a19cd <__fscache_uncache_page+237>

These instructions make up:

	ASSERTCMP(cookie->def->type, !=, FSCACHE_COOKIE_TYPE_INDEX);

That cmpb is the faulting instruction (%rax is 0).  So cookie->def is NULL -
which presumably means that the cookie has already been at least partway
through __fscache_relinquish_cookie().

What I think may be happening is something like a three-way race on the same
file:

	PROCESS 1	PROCESS 2	PROCESS 3
	===============	===============	===============
	open(O_TRUNC|O_WRONLY)
			open(O_RDONLY)
					open(O_WRONLY)
	-->nfs_open()
	-->nfs_fscache_set_inode_cookie()
	nfs_fscache_inode_lock()
	nfs_fscache_disable_inode_cookie()
	__fscache_relinquish_cookie()
	nfs_inode->fscache = NULL
	<--nfs_fscache_set_inode_cookie()

			-->nfs_open()
			-->nfs_fscache_set_inode_cookie()
			nfs_fscache_inode_lock()
			nfs_fscache_enable_inode_cookie()
			__fscache_acquire_cookie()
			nfs_inode->fscache = cookie
			<--nfs_fscache_set_inode_cookie()
	<--nfs_open()
	-->nfs_setattr()
	...
	...
	-->nfs_invalidate_page()
	-->__nfs_fscache_invalidate_page()
	cookie = nfsi->fscache
					-->nfs_open()
					-->nfs_fscache_set_inode_cookie()
					nfs_fscache_inode_lock()
					nfs_fscache_disable_inode_cookie()
					-->__fscache_relinquish_cookie()
	-->__fscache_uncache_page(cookie)
	<crash>
					<--__fscache_relinquish_cookie()
					nfs_inode->fscache = NULL
					<--nfs_fscache_set_inode_cookie()

What is needed is something to prevent process #2 from reacquiring the cookie
- and I think checking i_writecount should do the trick.

It's also possible to have a two-way race on this if the file is opened
O_TRUNC|O_RDONLY instead.

Reported-by: Mark Moseley <moseleymark@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
ghost pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2014
As the new x86 CPU bootup printout format code maintainer, I am
taking immediate action to improve and clean (and thus indulge
my OCD) the reporting of the cores when coming up online.

Fix padding to a right-hand alignment, cleanup code and bind
reporting width to the max number of supported CPUs on the
system, like this:

 [    0.074509] smpboot: Booting Node   0, Processors:      #1  #2  #3  #4  #5  #6  #7 OK
 [    0.644008] smpboot: Booting Node   1, Processors:  #8  #9 #10 #11 #12 #13 #14 #15 OK
 [    1.245006] smpboot: Booting Node   2, Processors: #16 #17 #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23 OK
 [    1.864005] smpboot: Booting Node   3, Processors: #24 #25 #26 #27 #28 #29 #30 #31 OK
 [    2.489005] smpboot: Booting Node   4, Processors: #32 #33 #34 #35 #36 #37 #38 #39 OK
 [    3.093005] smpboot: Booting Node   5, Processors: #40 #41 #42 #43 #44 #45 #46 #47 OK
 [    3.698005] smpboot: Booting Node   6, Processors: #48 #49 #50 #51 #52 #53 #54 #55 OK
 [    4.304005] smpboot: Booting Node   7, Processors: #56 #57 #58 #59 #60 #61 #62 #63 OK
 [    4.961413] Brought up 64 CPUs

and this:

 [    0.072367] smpboot: Booting Node   0, Processors:    #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 OK
 [    0.686329] Brought up 8 CPUs

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Libin <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: wangyijing@huawei.com
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: guohanjun@huawei.com
Cc: paul.gortmaker@windriver.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130927143554.GF4422@pd.tnic
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
ghost pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2014
Michael Semon reported that xfs/299 generated this lockdep warning:

=============================================
[ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ]
3.12.0-rc2+ #2 Not tainted
---------------------------------------------
touch/21072 is trying to acquire lock:
 (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64

but task is already holding lock:
 (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&xfs_dquot_other_class);
  lock(&xfs_dquot_other_class);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

7 locks held by touch/21072:
 #0:  (sb_writers#10){++++.+}, at: [<c11185b6>] mnt_want_write+0x1e/0x3e
 #1:  (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#4){+.+.+.}, at: [<c11078ee>] do_last+0x245/0xe40
 #2:  (sb_internal#2){++++.+}, at: [<c122c9e0>] xfs_trans_alloc+0x1f/0x35
 #3:  (&(&ip->i_lock)->mr_lock/1){+.+...}, at: [<c126cd1b>] xfs_ilock+0x100/0x1f1
 #4:  (&(&ip->i_lock)->mr_lock){++++-.}, at: [<c126cf52>] xfs_ilock_nowait+0x105/0x22f
 #5:  (&dqp->q_qlock){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64
 #6:  (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64

The lockdep annotation for dquot lock nesting only understands
locking for user and "other" dquots, not user, group and quota
dquots. Fix the annotations to match the locking heirarchy we now
have.

Reported-by: Michael L. Semon <mlsemon35@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
ghost pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2014
Turn it into (for example):

[    0.073380] x86: Booting SMP configuration:
[    0.074005] .... node   #0, CPUs:          #1   #2   #3   #4   #5   #6   #7
[    0.603005] .... node   #1, CPUs:     #8   #9  #10  #11  #12  #13  #14  #15
[    1.200005] .... node   #2, CPUs:    #16  #17  #18  #19  #20  #21  #22  #23
[    1.796005] .... node   #3, CPUs:    #24  #25  #26  #27  #28  #29  #30  #31
[    2.393005] .... node   #4, CPUs:    #32  #33  #34  #35  #36  #37  #38  #39
[    2.996005] .... node   #5, CPUs:    #40  #41  #42  #43  #44  #45  #46  #47
[    3.600005] .... node   #6, CPUs:    #48  #49  #50  #51  #52  #53  #54  #55
[    4.202005] .... node   #7, CPUs:    #56  #57  #58  #59  #60  #61  #62  #63
[    4.811005] .... node   #8, CPUs:    #64  #65  #66  #67  #68  #69  #70  #71
[    5.421006] .... node   #9, CPUs:    #72  #73  #74  #75  #76  #77  #78  #79
[    6.032005] .... node  #10, CPUs:    #80  #81  #82  #83  #84  #85  #86  #87
[    6.648006] .... node  #11, CPUs:    #88  #89  #90  #91  #92  #93  #94  #95
[    7.262005] .... node  #12, CPUs:    #96  #97  #98  #99 #100 #101 #102 #103
[    7.865005] .... node  #13, CPUs:   #104 #105 #106 #107 #108 #109 #110 #111
[    8.466005] .... node  #14, CPUs:   #112 #113 #114 #115 #116 #117 #118 #119
[    9.073006] .... node  #15, CPUs:   #120 #121 #122 #123 #124 #125 #126 #127
[    9.679901] x86: Booted up 16 nodes, 128 CPUs

and drop useless elements.

Change num_digits() to hpa's division-avoiding, cell-phone-typed
version which he went at great lengths and pains to submit on a
Saturday evening.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: huawei.libin@huawei.com
Cc: wangyijing@huawei.com
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: guohanjun@huawei.com
Cc: paul.gortmaker@windriver.com
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130930095624.GB16383@pd.tnic
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
ghost pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2014
In nfs4_proc_getlk(), when some error causes a retry of the call to
_nfs4_proc_getlk(), we can end up with Oopses of the form

 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000134
 IP: [<ffffffff8165270e>] _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x30
<snip>
 Call Trace:
  [<ffffffff812f287d>] _atomic_dec_and_lock+0x4d/0x70
  [<ffffffffa053c4f2>] nfs4_put_lock_state+0x32/0xb0 [nfsv4]
  [<ffffffffa053c585>] nfs4_fl_release_lock+0x15/0x20 [nfsv4]
  [<ffffffffa0522c06>] _nfs4_proc_getlk.isra.40+0x146/0x170 [nfsv4]
  [<ffffffffa052ad99>] nfs4_proc_lock+0x399/0x5a0 [nfsv4]

The problem is that we don't clear the request->fl_ops after the first
try and so when we retry, nfs4_set_lock_state() exits early without
setting the lock stateid.
Regression introduced by commit 70cc648
(locks: make ->lock release private data before returning in GETLK case)

Reported-by: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com>
Reported-by: Jorge Mora <mora@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #2.6.22+
ghost pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2014
->needs_read_fill is used to implement the following behaviors.

1. Ensure buffer filling on the first read.
2. Force buffer filling after a write.
3. Force buffer filling after a successful poll.

However, #2 and #3 don't really work as sysfs doesn't reset file
position.  While the read buffer would be refilled, the next read
would continue from the position after the last read or write,
requiring an explicit seek to the start for it to be useful, which
makes ->needs_read_fill superflous as read buffer is always refilled
if f_pos == 0.

Update sysfs_read_file() to test buffer->page for #1 instead and
remove ->needs_read_fill.  While this changes behavior in extreme
corner cases - e.g. re-reading a sysfs file after seeking to non-zero
position after a write or poll, it's highly unlikely to lead to actual
breakage.  This change is to prepare for using seq_file in the read
path.

While at it, reformat a comment in fill_write_buffer().

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ghost pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2014
This patch activates the audio device of the Cubox.

The audio flow (pin mpp_audio1) is output on both I2S and S/PDIF.

The third si5351 clock (#2, pin mpp13) is used as the external clock.

Signed-off-by: Jean-Francois Moine <moinejf@free.fr>
Acked-by: Sebastian Hesselbarth <sebastian.hesselbarth@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
ghost pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2014
Previously we coalesced windows by expanding the first overlapping one and
making the second invalid.  But we never look at the expanded first window
again, so we fail to notice other windows that overlap it.  For example, we
coalesced these:

  [io  0x0000-0x03af] // #0
  [io  0x03e0-0x0cf7] // #1
  [io  0x0000-0xdfff] // #2

into these, which still overlap:

  [io  0x0000-0xdfff] // #0
  [io  0x03e0-0x0cf7] // #1

The fix is to expand the *second* overlapping resource and ignore the
first, so we get this instead with no overlaps:

  [io  0x0000-0xdfff] // #2

[bhelgaas: changelog]
Reference: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=62511
Signed-off-by: Alexey Neyman <stilor@att.net>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
ghost pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2014
Booting a mx6 with CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING we get:

======================================================
[ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
3.12.0-rc4-next-20131009+ #34 Not tainted
-------------------------------------------------------
swapper/0/1 is trying to acquire lock:
 (&imx_drm_device->mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<804575a8>] imx_drm_encoder_get_mux_id+0x28/0x98

but task is already holding lock:
 (&crtc->mutex){+.+...}, at: [<802fe778>] drm_modeset_lock_all+0x40/0x54

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #2 (&crtc->mutex){+.+...}:
       [<800777d0>] __lock_acquire+0x18d4/0x1c24
       [<80077fec>] lock_acquire+0x68/0x7c
       [<805ead5c>] _mutex_lock_nest_lock+0x58/0x3a8
       [<802fec50>] drm_crtc_init+0x48/0xa8
       [<80457c88>] imx_drm_add_crtc+0xd4/0x144
       [<8045e2e8>] ipu_drm_probe+0x114/0x1fc
       [<80312278>] platform_drv_probe+0x20/0x50
       [<80310c68>] driver_probe_device+0x110/0x22c
       [<80310e20>] __driver_attach+0x9c/0xa0
       [<8030f218>] bus_for_each_dev+0x5c/0x90
       [<80310750>] driver_attach+0x20/0x28
       [<8031034c>] bus_add_driver+0xdc/0x1dc
       [<803114d8>] driver_register+0x80/0xfc
       [<80312198>] __platform_driver_register+0x50/0x64
       [<808172fc>] ipu_drm_driver_init+0x18/0x20
       [<800088c0>] do_one_initcall+0xfc/0x160
       [<807e7c5c>] kernel_init_freeable+0x104/0x1d4
       [<805e2930>] kernel_init+0x10/0xec
       [<8000ea68>] ret_from_fork+0x14/0x2c

-> #1 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.+.}:
       [<800777d0>] __lock_acquire+0x18d4/0x1c24
       [<80077fec>] lock_acquire+0x68/0x7c
       [<805eb100>] mutex_lock_nested+0x54/0x3a4
       [<802fe758>] drm_modeset_lock_all+0x20/0x54
       [<802fead4>] drm_encoder_init+0x20/0x7c
       [<80457ae4>] imx_drm_add_encoder+0x88/0xec
       [<80459838>] imx_ldb_probe+0x344/0x4fc
       [<80312278>] platform_drv_probe+0x20/0x50
       [<80310c68>] driver_probe_device+0x110/0x22c
       [<80310e20>] __driver_attach+0x9c/0xa0
       [<8030f218>] bus_for_each_dev+0x5c/0x90
       [<80310750>] driver_attach+0x20/0x28
       [<8031034c>] bus_add_driver+0xdc/0x1dc
       [<803114d8>] driver_register+0x80/0xfc
       [<80312198>] __platform_driver_register+0x50/0x64
       [<8081722c>] imx_ldb_driver_init+0x18/0x20
       [<800088c0>] do_one_initcall+0xfc/0x160
       [<807e7c5c>] kernel_init_freeable+0x104/0x1d4
       [<805e2930>] kernel_init+0x10/0xec
       [<8000ea68>] ret_from_fork+0x14/0x2c

-> #0 (&imx_drm_device->mutex){+.+.+.}:
       [<805e510c>] print_circular_bug+0x74/0x2e0
       [<80077ad0>] __lock_acquire+0x1bd4/0x1c24
       [<80077fec>] lock_acquire+0x68/0x7c
       [<805eb100>] mutex_lock_nested+0x54/0x3a4
       [<804575a8>] imx_drm_encoder_get_mux_id+0x28/0x98
       [<80459a98>] imx_ldb_encoder_prepare+0x34/0x114
       [<802ef724>] drm_crtc_helper_set_mode+0x1f0/0x4c0
       [<802f0344>] drm_crtc_helper_set_config+0x828/0x99c
       [<802ff270>] drm_mode_set_config_internal+0x5c/0xdc
       [<802eebe0>] drm_fb_helper_set_par+0x50/0xb4
       [<802af580>] fbcon_init+0x490/0x500
       [<802dd104>] visual_init+0xa8/0xf8
       [<802df414>] do_bind_con_driver+0x140/0x37c
       [<802df764>] do_take_over_console+0x114/0x1c4
       [<802af65c>] do_fbcon_takeover+0x6c/0xd4
       [<802b2b30>] fbcon_event_notify+0x7c8/0x818
       [<80049954>] notifier_call_chain+0x4c/0x8c
       [<80049cd8>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x50/0x68
       [<80049d10>] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x20/0x28
       [<802a75f0>] fb_notifier_call_chain+0x1c/0x24
       [<802a9224>] register_framebuffer+0x188/0x268
       [<802ee994>] drm_fb_helper_initial_config+0x2bc/0x4b8
       [<802f118c>] drm_fbdev_cma_init+0x7c/0xec
       [<80817288>] imx_fb_helper_init+0x54/0x90
       [<800088c0>] do_one_initcall+0xfc/0x160
       [<807e7c5c>] kernel_init_freeable+0x104/0x1d4
       [<805e2930>] kernel_init+0x10/0xec
       [<8000ea68>] ret_from_fork+0x14/0x2c

other info that might help us debug this:

Chain exists of:
  &imx_drm_device->mutex --> &dev->mode_config.mutex --> &crtc->mutex

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&crtc->mutex);
                               lock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
                               lock(&crtc->mutex);
  lock(&imx_drm_device->mutex);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

6 locks held by swapper/0/1:
 #0:  (registration_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<802a90bc>] register_framebuffer+0x20/0x268
 #1:  (&fb_info->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<802a7a90>] lock_fb_info+0x20/0x44
 #2:  (console_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<802a9218>] register_framebuffer+0x17c/0x268
 #3:  ((fb_notifier_list).rwsem){.+.+.+}, at: [<80049cbc>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x34/0x68
 #4:  (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<802fe758>] drm_modeset_lock_all+0x20/0x54
 #5:  (&crtc->mutex){+.+...}, at: [<802fe778>] drm_modeset_lock_all+0x40/0x54

In order to avoid this lockdep warning, remove the locking from
imx_drm_encoder_get_mux_id() and imx_drm_crtc_panel_format_pins().

Tested on a mx6sabrelite and mx53qsb.

Reported-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Tested-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ghost pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2014
This patch adds a batch support to nfnetlink. Basically, it adds
two new control messages:

* NFNL_MSG_BATCH_BEGIN, that indicates the beginning of a batch,
  the nfgenmsg->res_id indicates the nfnetlink subsystem ID.

* NFNL_MSG_BATCH_END, that results in the invocation of the
  ss->commit callback function. If not specified or an error
  ocurred in the batch, the ss->abort function is invoked
  instead.

The end message represents the commit operation in nftables, the
lack of end message results in an abort. This patch also adds the
.call_batch function that is only called from the batch receival
path.

This patch adds atomic rule updates and dumps based on
bitmask generations. This allows to atomically commit a set of
rule-set updates incrementally without altering the internal
state of existing nf_tables expressions/matches/targets.

The idea consists of using a generation cursor of 1 bit and
a bitmask of 2 bits per rule. Assuming the gencursor is 0,
then the genmask (expressed as a bitmask) can be interpreted
as:

00 active in the present, will be active in the next generation.
01 inactive in the present, will be active in the next generation.
10 active in the present, will be deleted in the next generation.
 ^
 gencursor

Once you invoke the transition to the next generation, the global
gencursor is updated:

00 active in the present, will be active in the next generation.
01 active in the present, needs to zero its future, it becomes 00.
10 inactive in the present, delete now.
^
gencursor

If a dump is in progress and nf_tables enters a new generation,
the dump will stop and return -EBUSY to let userspace know that
it has to retry again. In order to invalidate dumps, a global
genctr counter is increased everytime nf_tables enters a new
generation.

This new operation can be used from the user-space utility
that controls the firewall, eg.

nft -f restore

The rule updates contained in `file' will be applied atomically.

cat file
-----
add filter INPUT ip saddr 1.1.1.1 counter accept #1
del filter INPUT ip daddr 2.2.2.2 counter drop   #2
-EOF-

Note that the rule 1 will be inactive until the transition to the
next generation, the rule 2 will be evicted in the next generation.

There is a penalty during the rule update due to the branch
misprediction in the packet matching framework. But that should be
quickly resolved once the iteration over the commit list that
contain rules that require updates is finished.

Event notification happens once the rule-set update has been
committed. So we skip notifications is case the rule-set update
is aborted, which can happen in case that the rule-set is tested
to apply correctly.

This patch squashed the following patches from Pablo:

* nf_tables: atomic rule updates and dumps
* nf_tables: get rid of per rule list_head for commits
* nf_tables: use per netns commit list
* nfnetlink: add batch support and use it from nf_tables
* nf_tables: all rule updates are transactional
* nf_tables: attach replacement rule after stale one
* nf_tables: do not allow deletion/replacement of stale rules
* nf_tables: remove unused NFTA_RULE_FLAGS

Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
ghost pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2014
Andrey reported the following report:

ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address ffff8800359c99f3
ffff8800359c99f3 is located 0 bytes to the right of 243-byte region [ffff8800359c9900, ffff8800359c99f3)
Accessed by thread T13003:
  #0 ffffffff810dd2da (asan_report_error+0x32a/0x440)
  #1 ffffffff810dc6b0 (asan_check_region+0x30/0x40)
  #2 ffffffff810dd4d3 (__tsan_write1+0x13/0x20)
  #3 ffffffff811cd19e (ftrace_regex_release+0x1be/0x260)
  #4 ffffffff812a1065 (__fput+0x155/0x360)
  #5 ffffffff812a12de (____fput+0x1e/0x30)
  #6 ffffffff8111708d (task_work_run+0x10d/0x140)
  #7 ffffffff810ea043 (do_exit+0x433/0x11f0)
  #8 ffffffff810eaee4 (do_group_exit+0x84/0x130)
  #9 ffffffff810eafb1 (SyS_exit_group+0x21/0x30)
  #10 ffffffff81928782 (system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b)

Allocated by thread T5167:
  #0 ffffffff810dc778 (asan_slab_alloc+0x48/0xc0)
  #1 ffffffff8128337c (__kmalloc+0xbc/0x500)
  #2 ffffffff811d9d54 (trace_parser_get_init+0x34/0x90)
  #3 ffffffff811cd7b3 (ftrace_regex_open+0x83/0x2e0)
  #4 ffffffff811cda7d (ftrace_filter_open+0x2d/0x40)
  #5 ffffffff8129b4ff (do_dentry_open+0x32f/0x430)
  #6 ffffffff8129b668 (finish_open+0x68/0xa0)
  #7 ffffffff812b66ac (do_last+0xb8c/0x1710)
  #8 ffffffff812b7350 (path_openat+0x120/0xb50)
  #9 ffffffff812b8884 (do_filp_open+0x54/0xb0)
  #10 ffffffff8129d36c (do_sys_open+0x1ac/0x2c0)
  #11 ffffffff8129d4b7 (SyS_open+0x37/0x50)
  #12 ffffffff81928782 (system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b)

Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
  ffff8800359c9700: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd
  ffff8800359c9780: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  ffff8800359c9800: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  ffff8800359c9880: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  ffff8800359c9900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
=>ffff8800359c9980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[03]fb
  ffff8800359c9a00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  ffff8800359c9a80: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  ffff8800359c9b00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff8800359c9b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff8800359c9c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
  Addressable:           00
  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
  Heap redzone:          fa
  Heap kmalloc redzone:  fb
  Freed heap region:     fd
  Shadow gap:            fe

The out-of-bounds access happens on 'parser->buffer[parser->idx] = 0;'

Although the crash happened in ftrace_regex_open() the real bug
occurred in trace_get_user() where there's an incrementation to
parser->idx without a check against the size. The way it is triggered
is if userspace sends in 128 characters (EVENT_BUF_SIZE + 1), the loop
that reads the last character stores it and then breaks out because
there is no more characters. Then the last character is read to determine
what to do next, and the index is incremented without checking size.

Then the caller of trace_get_user() usually nulls out the last character
with a zero, but since the index is equal to the size, it writes a nul
character after the allocated space, which can corrupt memory.

Luckily, only root user has write access to this file.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20131009222323.04fd1a0d@gandalf.local.home

Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
ghost pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2014
Having them be different seems an obscure configuration.

Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
ghost pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2014
While enabling lockdep on seqlocks, I ran across the warning below
caused by the ipv6 stats being updated in both irq and non-irq context.

This patch changes from IP6_INC_STATS_BH to IP6_INC_STATS (suggested
by Eric Dumazet) to resolve this problem.

[   11.120383] =================================
[   11.121024] [ INFO: inconsistent lock state ]
[   11.121663] 3.12.0-rc1+ #68 Not tainted
[   11.122229] ---------------------------------
[   11.122867] inconsistent {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} usage.
[   11.123741] init/4483 [HC0[0]:SC1[3]:HE1:SE0] takes:
[   11.124505]  (&stats->syncp.seq#6){+.?...}, at: [<c1ab80c2>] ndisc_send_ns+0xe2/0x130
[   11.125736] {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at:
[   11.126447]   [<c10e0eb7>] __lock_acquire+0x5c7/0x1af0
[   11.127222]   [<c10e2996>] lock_acquire+0x96/0xd0
[   11.127925]   [<c1a9a2c3>] write_seqcount_begin+0x33/0x40
[   11.128766]   [<c1a9aa03>] ip6_dst_lookup_tail+0x3a3/0x460
[   11.129582]   [<c1a9e0ce>] ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x2e/0x80
[   11.130014]   [<c1ad18e0>] ip6_datagram_connect+0x150/0x4e0
[   11.130014]   [<c1a4d0b5>] inet_dgram_connect+0x25/0x70
[   11.130014]   [<c198dd61>] SYSC_connect+0xa1/0xc0
[   11.130014]   [<c198f571>] SyS_connect+0x11/0x20
[   11.130014]   [<c198fe6b>] SyS_socketcall+0x12b/0x300
[   11.130014]   [<c1bbf880>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb
[   11.130014] irq event stamp: 1184
[   11.130014] hardirqs last  enabled at (1184): [<c1086901>] local_bh_enable+0x71/0x110
[   11.130014] hardirqs last disabled at (1183): [<c10868cd>] local_bh_enable+0x3d/0x110
[   11.130014] softirqs last  enabled at (0): [<c108014d>] copy_process.part.42+0x45d/0x11a0
[   11.130014] softirqs last disabled at (1147): [<c1086e05>] irq_exit+0xa5/0xb0
[   11.130014]
[   11.130014] other info that might help us debug this:
[   11.130014]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[   11.130014]
[   11.130014]        CPU0
[   11.130014]        ----
[   11.130014]   lock(&stats->syncp.seq#6);
[   11.130014]   <Interrupt>
[   11.130014]     lock(&stats->syncp.seq#6);
[   11.130014]
[   11.130014]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[   11.130014]
[   11.130014] 3 locks held by init/4483:
[   11.130014]  #0:  (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<c109363c>] SyS_setpriority+0x4c/0x620
[   11.130014]  #1:  (((&ifa->dad_timer))){+.-...}, at: [<c108c1c0>] call_timer_fn+0x0/0xf0
[   11.130014]  #2:  (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<c1ab6494>] ndisc_send_skb+0x54/0x5d0
[   11.130014]
[   11.130014] stack backtrace:
[   11.130014] CPU: 0 PID: 4483 Comm: init Not tainted 3.12.0-rc1+ #68
[   11.130014] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[   11.130014]  00000000 00000000 c55e5c10 c1bb0e71 c57128b0 c55e5c4c c1badf79 c1ec1123
[   11.130014]  c1ec1484 00001183 00000000 00000000 00000001 00000003 00000001 00000000
[   11.130014]  c1ec1484 00000004 c5712dcc 00000000 c55e5c84 c10de492 00000004 c10755f2
[   11.130014] Call Trace:
[   11.130014]  [<c1bb0e71>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x66
[   11.130014]  [<c1badf79>] print_usage_bug+0x1d3/0x1dd
[   11.130014]  [<c10de492>] mark_lock+0x282/0x2f0
[   11.130014]  [<c10755f2>] ? kvm_clock_read+0x22/0x30
[   11.130014]  [<c10dd8b0>] ? check_usage_backwards+0x150/0x150
[   11.130014]  [<c10e0e74>] __lock_acquire+0x584/0x1af0
[   11.130014]  [<c10b1baf>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xef/0x190
[   11.130014]  [<c10de58c>] ? mark_held_locks+0x8c/0xf0
[   11.130014]  [<c10e2996>] lock_acquire+0x96/0xd0
[   11.130014]  [<c1ab80c2>] ? ndisc_send_ns+0xe2/0x130
[   11.130014]  [<c1ab66d3>] ndisc_send_skb+0x293/0x5d0
[   11.130014]  [<c1ab80c2>] ? ndisc_send_ns+0xe2/0x130
[   11.130014]  [<c1ab80c2>] ndisc_send_ns+0xe2/0x130
[   11.130014]  [<c108cc32>] ? mod_timer+0xf2/0x160
[   11.130014]  [<c1aa706e>] ? addrconf_dad_timer+0xce/0x150
[   11.130014]  [<c1aa70aa>] addrconf_dad_timer+0x10a/0x150
[   11.130014]  [<c1aa6fa0>] ? addrconf_dad_completed+0x1c0/0x1c0
[   11.130014]  [<c108c233>] call_timer_fn+0x73/0xf0
[   11.130014]  [<c108c1c0>] ? __internal_add_timer+0xb0/0xb0
[   11.130014]  [<c1aa6fa0>] ? addrconf_dad_completed+0x1c0/0x1c0
[   11.130014]  [<c108c5b1>] run_timer_softirq+0x141/0x1e0
[   11.130014]  [<c1086b20>] ? __do_softirq+0x70/0x1b0
[   11.130014]  [<c1086b70>] __do_softirq+0xc0/0x1b0
[   11.130014]  [<c1086e05>] irq_exit+0xa5/0xb0
[   11.130014]  [<c106cfd5>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x35/0x50
[   11.130014]  [<c1bbfbca>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x32/0x38
[   11.130014]  [<c10936ed>] ? SyS_setpriority+0xfd/0x620
[   11.130014]  [<c10e26c9>] ? lock_release+0x9/0x240
[   11.130014]  [<c10936d7>] ? SyS_setpriority+0xe7/0x620
[   11.130014]  [<c1bbee6d>] ? _raw_read_unlock+0x1d/0x30
[   11.130014]  [<c1093701>] SyS_setpriority+0x111/0x620
[   11.130014]  [<c109363c>] ? SyS_setpriority+0x4c/0x620
[   11.130014]  [<c1bbf880>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb

Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1381186321-4906-5-git-send-email-john.stultz@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
ghost pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2014
Erik Hugne says:

====================
tipc: message reassembly using fragment chain

We introduce a new reassembly algorithm that improves performance
and eliminates the risk of causing out-of-memory situations.

v3: -Use skb_try_coalesce, and revert to fraglist if this does not succeed.
    -Make sure reassembly list head is uncloned.

v2: -Rebased on Ying's indentation fix.
    -Node unlock call in msg_fragmenter case moved from patch #2 to #1.
     ('continue' with this lock held would cause spinlock recursion if only
      patch #1 is used)
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
ghost pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2014
…ux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 boot changes from Ingo Molnar:
 "Two changes that prettify and compactify the SMP bootup output from:

     smpboot: Booting Node   0, Processors  #1 #2 #3 OK
     smpboot: Booting Node   1, Processors  #4 #5 #6 #7 OK
     smpboot: Booting Node   2, Processors  #8 #9 #10 #11 OK
     smpboot: Booting Node   3, Processors  #12 #13 #14 #15 OK
     Brought up 16 CPUs

  to something like:

     x86: Booting SMP configuration:
     .... node  #0, CPUs:        #1  #2  #3
     .... node  #1, CPUs:    #4  #5  #6  #7
     .... node  #2, CPUs:    #8  #9 #10 #11
     .... node  #3, CPUs:   #12 #13 #14 #15
     x86: Booted up 4 nodes, 16 CPUs"

* 'x86-boot-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/boot: Further compress CPUs bootup message
  x86: Improve the printout of the SMP bootup CPU table
ghost pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2014
Nathan Zimmer found that once we get over 10+ cpus, the scalability of
SPECjbb falls over due to the contention on the global 'epmutex', which is
taken in on EPOLL_CTL_ADD and EPOLL_CTL_DEL operations.

Patch #1 removes the 'epmutex' lock completely from the EPOLL_CTL_DEL path
by using rcu to guard against any concurrent traversals.

Patch #2 remove the 'epmutex' lock from EPOLL_CTL_ADD operations for
simple topologies.  IE when adding a link from an epoll file descriptor to
a wakeup source, where the epoll file descriptor is not nested.

This patch (of 2):

Optimize EPOLL_CTL_DEL such that it does not require the 'epmutex' by
converting the file->f_ep_links list into an rcu one.  In this way, we can
traverse the epoll network on the add path in parallel with deletes.
Since deletes can't create loops or worse wakeup paths, this is safe.

This patch in combination with the patch "epoll: Do not take global 'epmutex'
for simple topologies", shows a dramatic performance improvement in
scalability for SPECjbb.

Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Tested-by: Nathan Zimmer <nzimmer@sgi.com>
Cc: Eric Wong <normalperson@yhbt.net>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@nelhage.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com>
CC: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
ghost pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2014
Now that seqcounts are lockdep enabled objects, we need to explicitly
initialize runtime allocated seqcounts so that lockdep can track them.

Without this patch, Fengguang was seeing:

  [    4.127282] INFO: trying to register non-static key.
  [    4.128027] the code is fine but needs lockdep annotation.
  [    4.128027] turning off the locking correctness validator.
  [    4.128027] CPU: 0 PID: 96 Comm: kworker/u4:1 Not tainted 3.12.0-next-20131108-10601-gbad570d #2
  [    4.128027] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
  [    ...     ]
  [    4.128027] Call Trace:
  [    4.128027]  [<7908e744>] ? console_unlock+0x353/0x380
  [    4.128027]  [<79dc7cf2>] dump_stack+0x48/0x60
  [    4.128027]  [<7908953e>] __lock_acquire.isra.26+0x7e3/0xceb
  [    4.128027]  [<7908a1c5>] lock_acquire+0x71/0x9a
  [    4.128027]  [<794079aa>] ? blk_throtl_bio+0x1c3/0x485
  [    4.128027]  [<7940658b>] throtl_update_dispatch_stats+0x7c/0x153
  [    4.128027]  [<794079aa>] ? blk_throtl_bio+0x1c3/0x485
  [    4.128027]  [<794079aa>] blk_throtl_bio+0x1c3/0x485
  ...

Use u64_stats_init() for all affected data structures, which initializes
the seqcount.

Reported-and-Tested-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
[ Folded in another fix from the mailing list as well as a fix to that fix. Tweaked commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1384314134-6895-1-git-send-email-john.stultz@linaro.org
[ So I actually think that the two SOBs from PeterZ are the right depiction of the patch route. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
ghost pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2014
The commit 94a86df seem to have
uncovered a long standing bug that did not trigger so far.

BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000009dd503502
IP: [<ffffffff815b1868>] rfcomm_sock_getsockopt+0x128/0x200
PGD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: ath5k ath mac80211 cfg80211
CPU: 2 PID: 1459 Comm: bluetoothd Not tainted 3.11.0-133163-gcebd830 #2
Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/P6T DELUXE V2, BIOS
1202    12/22/2010
task: ffff8803304106a0 ti: ffff88033046a000 task.ti: ffff88033046a000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff815b1868>]  [<ffffffff815b1868>]
rfcomm_sock_getsockopt+0x128/0x200
RSP: 0018:ffff88033046bed8  EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000009dd503502 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007fffa2ed5548
RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000012 RDI: ffff88032fd37480
RBP: ffff88033046bf28 R08: 00007fffa2ed554c R09: ffff88032f5707d8
R10: 00007fffa2ed5548 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: ffff880330bbd000
R13: 00007fffa2ed5548 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 00007fffa2ed554c
FS:  00007fc44cfac700(0000) GS:ffff88033fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000009dd503502 CR3: 00000003304c2000 CR4: 00000000000007e0
Stack:
ffff88033046bf28 ffffffff815b0f2f ffff88033046bf18 0002ffff81105ef6
0000000600000000 ffff88032fd37480 0000000000000012 00007fffa2ed5548
0000000000000003 00007fffa2ed554c ffff88033046bf78 ffffffff814c0380
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff815b0f2f>] ? rfcomm_sock_setsockopt+0x5f/0x190
[<ffffffff814c0380>] SyS_getsockopt+0x60/0xb0
[<ffffffff815e0852>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Code: 02 00 00 00 0f 47 d0 4c 89 ef e8 74 13 cd ff 83 f8 01 19 c9 f7 d1 83 e1
f2 e9 4b ff ff ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 8b 84 24 70 02 00 00 <4c> 8b 30 4c 89 c0 e8
2d 19 cd ff 85 c0 49 89 d7 b9 f2 ff ff ff
RIP  [<ffffffff815b1868>] rfcomm_sock_getsockopt+0x128/0x200
RSP <ffff88033046bed8>
CR2: 00000009dd503502

It triggers in the following segment of the code:

0x1313 is in rfcomm_sock_getsockopt (net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c:743).
738
739	static int rfcomm_sock_getsockopt_old(struct socket *sock, int optname, char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
740	{
741		struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
742		struct rfcomm_conninfo cinfo;
743		struct l2cap_conn *conn = l2cap_pi(sk)->chan->conn;
744		int len, err = 0;
745		u32 opt;
746
747		BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);

The l2cap_pi(sk) is wrong here since it should have been rfcomm_pi(sk),
but that socket of course does not contain the low-level connection
details requested here.

Tracking down the actual offending commit, it seems that this has been
introduced when doing some L2CAP refactoring:

commit 8c1d787
Author: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>
Date:   Wed Apr 13 20:23:55 2011 -0300

@@ -743,6 +743,7 @@ static int rfcomm_sock_getsockopt_old(struct socket *sock, int optname, char __u
        struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
        struct sock *l2cap_sk;
        struct rfcomm_conninfo cinfo;
+       struct l2cap_conn *conn = l2cap_pi(sk)->chan->conn;
        int len, err = 0;
        u32 opt;

@@ -787,8 +788,8 @@ static int rfcomm_sock_getsockopt_old(struct socket *sock, int optname, char __u

                l2cap_sk = rfcomm_pi(sk)->dlc->session->sock->sk;

-               cinfo.hci_handle = l2cap_pi(l2cap_sk)->conn->hcon->handle;
-               memcpy(cinfo.dev_class, l2cap_pi(l2cap_sk)->conn->hcon->dev_class, 3);
+               cinfo.hci_handle = conn->hcon->handle;
+               memcpy(cinfo.dev_class, conn->hcon->dev_class, 3);

The l2cap_sk got accidentally mixed into the sk (which is RFCOMM) and
now causing a problem within getsocketopt() system call. To fix this,
just re-introduce l2cap_sk and make sure the right socket is used for
the low-level connection details.

Reported-by: Fabio Rossi <rossi.f@inwind.it>
Reported-by: Janusz Dziedzic <janusz.dziedzic@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Janusz Dziedzic <janusz.dziedzic@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
ghost pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2014
The following two commits implemented mmap support in the regular file
path and merged bin file support into the regular path.

 73d9714 ("sysfs: copy bin mmap support from fs/sysfs/bin.c to fs/sysfs/file.c")
 3124eb1 ("sysfs: merge regular and bin file handling")

After the merge, the following commands trigger a spurious lockdep
warning.  "test-mmap-read" simply mmaps the file and dumps the
content.

  $ cat /sys/block/sda/trace/act_mask
  $ test-mmap-read /sys/devices/pci0000\:00/0000\:00\:03.0/resource0 4096

  ======================================================
  [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
  3.12.0-work+ #378 Not tainted
  -------------------------------------------------------
  test-mmap-read/567 is trying to acquire lock:
   (&of->mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8120a8df>] sysfs_bin_mmap+0x4f/0x120

  but task is already holding lock:
   (&mm->mmap_sem){++++++}, at: [<ffffffff8114b399>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x49/0xa0

  which lock already depends on the new lock.

  the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

  -> #3 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++++}:
  ...
  -> #2 (sr_mutex){+.+.+.}:
  ...
  -> #1 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.+.}:
  ...
  -> #0 (&of->mutex){+.+.+.}:
  ...

  other info that might help us debug this:

  Chain exists of:
   &of->mutex --> sr_mutex --> &mm->mmap_sem

   Possible unsafe locking scenario:

	 CPU0                    CPU1
	 ----                    ----
    lock(&mm->mmap_sem);
				 lock(sr_mutex);
				 lock(&mm->mmap_sem);
    lock(&of->mutex);

   *** DEADLOCK ***

  1 lock held by test-mmap-read/567:
   #0:  (&mm->mmap_sem){++++++}, at: [<ffffffff8114b399>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x49/0xa0

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 3 PID: 567 Comm: test-mmap-read Not tainted 3.12.0-work+ #378
  Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
   ffffffff81ed41a0 ffff880009441bc8 ffffffff81611ad2 ffffffff81eccb80
   ffff880009441c08 ffffffff8160f215 ffff880009441c60 ffff880009c75208
   0000000000000000 ffff880009c751e0 ffff880009c75208 ffff880009c74ac0
  Call Trace:
   [<ffffffff81611ad2>] dump_stack+0x4e/0x7a
   [<ffffffff8160f215>] print_circular_bug+0x2b0/0x2bf
   [<ffffffff8109ca0a>] __lock_acquire+0x1a3a/0x1e60
   [<ffffffff8109d6ba>] lock_acquire+0x9a/0x1d0
   [<ffffffff81615547>] mutex_lock_nested+0x67/0x3f0
   [<ffffffff8120a8df>] sysfs_bin_mmap+0x4f/0x120
   [<ffffffff8115d363>] mmap_region+0x3b3/0x5b0
   [<ffffffff8115d8ae>] do_mmap_pgoff+0x34e/0x3d0
   [<ffffffff8114b3ba>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x6a/0xa0
   [<ffffffff8115be3e>] SyS_mmap_pgoff+0xbe/0x250
   [<ffffffff81008282>] SyS_mmap+0x22/0x30
   [<ffffffff8161a4d2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

This happens because one file nests sr_mutex, which nests mm->mmap_sem
under it, under of->mutex while mmap implementation naturally nests
of->mutex under mm->mmap_sem.  The warning is false positive as
of->mutex is per open-file and the two paths belong to two different
files.  This warning didn't trigger before regular and bin file
supports were merged because only bin file supported mmap and the
other side of locking happened only on regular files which used
equivalent but separate locking.

It'd be best if we give separate locking classes per file but we can't
easily do that.  Let's differentiate on ->mmap() for now.  Later we'll
add explicit file operations struct and can add per-ops lockdep key
there.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ghost pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2014
ttyA has ld associated to n_gsm, when ttyA is closing, it triggers
to release gsmttyB's ld data dlci[B], then race would happen if gsmttyB
is opening in parallel.

Here are race cases we found recently in test:

CASE #1
====================================================================
releasing dlci[B] race with gsmtty_install(gsmttyB), then panic
in gsmtty_open(gsmttyB), as below:

 tty_release(ttyA)                  tty_open(gsmttyB)
     |                                   |
   -----                           gsmtty_install(gsmttyB)
     |                                   |
   -----                    gsm_dlci_alloc(gsmttyB) => alloc dlci[B]
 tty_ldisc_release(ttyA)               -----
     |                                   |
 gsm_dlci_release(dlci[B])             -----
     |                                   |
 gsm_dlci_free(dlci[B])                -----
     |                                   |
   -----                           gsmtty_open(gsmttyB)

 gsmtty_open()
 {
     struct gsm_dlci *dlci = tty->driver_data; => here it uses dlci[B]
     ...
 }

 In gsmtty_open(gsmttyA), it uses dlci[B] which was release, so hit a panic.
=====================================================================

CASE #2
=====================================================================
releasing dlci[0] race with gsmtty_install(gsmttyB), then panic
in gsmtty_open(), as below:

 tty_release(ttyA)                  tty_open(gsmttyB)
     |                                   |
   -----                           gsmtty_install(gsmttyB)
     |                                   |
   -----                    gsm_dlci_alloc(gsmttyB) => alloc dlci[B]
     |                                   |
   -----                         gsmtty_open(gsmttyB) fail
     |                                   |
   -----                           tty_release(gsmttyB)
     |                                   |
   -----                           gsmtty_close(gsmttyB)
     |                                   |
   -----                        gsmtty_detach_dlci(dlci[B])
     |                                   |
   -----                             dlci_put(dlci[B])
     |                                   |
 tty_ldisc_release(ttyA)               -----
     |                                   |
 gsm_dlci_release(dlci[0])             -----
     |                                   |
 gsm_dlci_free(dlci[0])                -----
     |                                   |
   -----                             dlci_put(dlci[0])

 In gsmtty_detach_dlci(dlci[B]), it tries to use dlci[0] which was released,
 then hit panic.
=====================================================================

IMHO, n_gsm tty operations would refer released ldisc,  as long as
gsm_dlci_release() has chance to release ldisc data when some gsmtty operations
are not completed..

This patch is try to avoid it by:

1) in n_gsm driver, use a global gsm spin lock to avoid gsm_dlci_release() run in
parallel with gsmtty_install();

2) Increase dlci's ref count in gsmtty_install() instead of in gsmtty_open(), the
purpose is to prevent gsm_dlci_release() releasing dlci after gsmtty_install()
allocats dlci but before gsmtty_open increases dlci's ref count;

3) Decrease dlci's ref count in gsmtty_remove(), which is a tty framework api, and
this is the opposite process of step 2).

Signed-off-by: Chao Bi <chao.bi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ghost pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2014
If an TRACE_EVENT() uses __assign_str() or __get_str on a NULL pointer
then the following oops will happen:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at   (null)
IP: [<c127a17b>] strlen+0x10/0x1a
*pde = 00000000 ^M
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 3.13.0-rc1-test+ #2
Hardware name:                  /DG965MQ, BIOS MQ96510J.86A.0372.2006.0605.1717 06/05/2006^M
task: f5cde9f0 ti: f5e5e000 task.ti: f5e5e000
EIP: 0060:[<c127a17b>] EFLAGS: 00210046 CPU: 1
EIP is at strlen+0x10/0x1a
EAX: 00000000 EBX: c2472da8 ECX: ffffffff EDX: c2472da8
ESI: c1c5e5fc EDI: 00000000 EBP: f5e5fe84 ESP: f5e5fe80
 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068
CR0: 8005003b CR2: 00000000 CR3: 01f32000 CR4: 000007d0
Stack:
 f5f18b90 f5e5feb8 c10687a8 0759004f 00000005 00000005 00000005 00200046
 00000002 00000000 c1082a93 f56c7e28 c2472da8 c1082a93 f5e5fee4 c106bc61^M
 00000000 c1082a93 00000000 00000000 00000001 00200046 00200082 00000000
Call Trace:
 [<c10687a8>] ftrace_raw_event_lock+0x39/0xc0
 [<c1082a93>] ? ktime_get+0x29/0x69
 [<c1082a93>] ? ktime_get+0x29/0x69
 [<c106bc61>] lock_release+0x57/0x1a5
 [<c1082a93>] ? ktime_get+0x29/0x69
 [<c10824dd>] read_seqcount_begin.constprop.7+0x4d/0x75
 [<c1082a93>] ? ktime_get+0x29/0x69^M
 [<c1082a93>] ktime_get+0x29/0x69
 [<c108a46a>] __tick_nohz_idle_enter+0x1e/0x426
 [<c10690e8>] ? lock_release_holdtime.part.19+0x48/0x4d
 [<c10bc184>] ? time_hardirqs_off+0xe/0x28
 [<c1068c82>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x3f/0xaf
 [<c108a8cb>] tick_nohz_idle_enter+0x59/0x62
 [<c1079242>] cpu_startup_entry+0x64/0x192
 [<c102299c>] start_secondary+0x277/0x27c
Code: 90 89 c6 89 d0 88 c4 ac 38 e0 74 09 84 c0 75 f7 be 01 00 00 00 89 f0 48 5e 5d c3 55 89 e5 57 66 66 66 66 90 83 c9 ff 89 c7 31 c0 <f2> ae f7 d1 8d 41 ff 5f 5d c3 55 89 e5 57 66 66 66 66 90 31 ff
EIP: [<c127a17b>] strlen+0x10/0x1a SS:ESP 0068:f5e5fe80
CR2: 0000000000000000
---[ end trace 01bc47bf519ec1b2 ]---

New tracepoints have been added that have allowed for NULL pointers
being assigned to strings. To fix this, change the TRACE_EVENT() code
to check for NULL and if it is, it will assign "(null)" to it instead
(similar to what glibc printf does).

Reported-by: Shuah Khan <shuah.kh@samsung.com>
Reported-by: Jovi Zhangwei <jovi.zhangwei@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAGdX0WFeEuy+DtpsJzyzn0343qEEjLX97+o1VREFkUEhndC+5Q@mail.gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/528D6972.9010702@samsung.com
Fixes: 9cbf117 ("tracing/events: provide string with undefined size support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.31+
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
ghost pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2014
…is completed

Currently, when mounting pstore file system, a read callback of
efi_pstore driver runs mutiple times as below.

- In the first read callback, scan efivar_sysfs_list from head and pass
  a kmsg buffer of a entry to an upper pstore layer.
- In the second read callback, rescan efivar_sysfs_list from the entry
  and pass another kmsg buffer to it.
- Repeat the scan and pass until the end of efivar_sysfs_list.

In this process, an entry is read across the multiple read function
calls. To avoid race between the read and erasion, the whole process
above is protected by a spinlock, holding in open() and releasing in
close().

At the same time, kmemdup() is called to pass the buffer to pstore
filesystem during it. And then, it causes a following lockdep warning.

To make the dynamic memory allocation runnable without taking spinlock,
holding off a deletion of sysfs entry if it happens while scanning it
via efi_pstore, and deleting it after the scan is completed.

To implement it, this patch introduces two flags, scanning and deleting,
to efivar_entry.

On the code basis, it seems that all the scanning and deleting logic is
not needed because __efivars->lock are not dropped when reading from the
EFI variable store.

But, the scanning and deleting logic is still needed because an
efi-pstore and a pstore filesystem works as follows.

In case an entry(A) is found, the pointer is saved to psi->data.  And
efi_pstore_read() passes the entry(A) to a pstore filesystem by
releasing  __efivars->lock.

And then, the pstore filesystem calls efi_pstore_read() again and the
same entry(A), which is saved to psi->data, is used for resuming to scan
a sysfs-list.

So, to protect the entry(A), the logic is needed.

[    1.143710] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[    1.144058] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1 at kernel/lockdep.c:2740 lockdep_trace_alloc+0x104/0x110()
[    1.144058] DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(irqs_disabled_flags(flags))
[    1.144058] Modules linked in:
[    1.144058] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 3.11.0-rc5 #2
[    1.144058]  0000000000000009 ffff8800797e9ae0 ffffffff816614a5 ffff8800797e9b28
[    1.144058]  ffff8800797e9b18 ffffffff8105510d 0000000000000080 0000000000000046
[    1.144058]  00000000000000d0 00000000000003af ffffffff81ccd0c0 ffff8800797e9b78
[    1.144058] Call Trace:
[    1.144058]  [<ffffffff816614a5>] dump_stack+0x54/0x74
[    1.144058]  [<ffffffff8105510d>] warn_slowpath_common+0x7d/0xa0
[    1.144058]  [<ffffffff8105517c>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x4c/0x50
[    1.144058]  [<ffffffff8131290f>] ? vsscanf+0x57f/0x7b0
[    1.144058]  [<ffffffff810bbd74>] lockdep_trace_alloc+0x104/0x110
[    1.144058]  [<ffffffff81192da0>] __kmalloc_track_caller+0x50/0x280
[    1.144058]  [<ffffffff815147bb>] ? efi_pstore_read_func.part.1+0x12b/0x170
[    1.144058]  [<ffffffff8115b260>] kmemdup+0x20/0x50
[    1.144058]  [<ffffffff815147bb>] efi_pstore_read_func.part.1+0x12b/0x170
[    1.144058]  [<ffffffff81514800>] ? efi_pstore_read_func.part.1+0x170/0x170
[    1.144058]  [<ffffffff815148b4>] efi_pstore_read_func+0xb4/0xe0
[    1.144058]  [<ffffffff81512b7b>] __efivar_entry_iter+0xfb/0x120
[    1.144058]  [<ffffffff8151428f>] efi_pstore_read+0x3f/0x50
[    1.144058]  [<ffffffff8128d7ba>] pstore_get_records+0x9a/0x150
[    1.158207]  [<ffffffff812af25c>] ? selinux_d_instantiate+0x1c/0x20
[    1.158207]  [<ffffffff8128ce30>] ? parse_options+0x80/0x80
[    1.158207]  [<ffffffff8128ced5>] pstore_fill_super+0xa5/0xc0
[    1.158207]  [<ffffffff811ae7d2>] mount_single+0xa2/0xd0
[    1.158207]  [<ffffffff8128ccf8>] pstore_mount+0x18/0x20
[    1.158207]  [<ffffffff811ae8b9>] mount_fs+0x39/0x1b0
[    1.158207]  [<ffffffff81160550>] ? __alloc_percpu+0x10/0x20
[    1.158207]  [<ffffffff811c9493>] vfs_kern_mount+0x63/0xf0
[    1.158207]  [<ffffffff811cbb0e>] do_mount+0x23e/0xa20
[    1.158207]  [<ffffffff8115b51b>] ? strndup_user+0x4b/0xf0
[    1.158207]  [<ffffffff811cc373>] SyS_mount+0x83/0xc0
[    1.158207]  [<ffffffff81673cc2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[    1.158207] ---[ end trace 61981bc62de9f6f4 ]---

Signed-off-by: Seiji Aguchi <seiji.aguchi@hds.com>
Tested-by: Madper Xie <cxie@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
ghost pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2014
The patch fixes the following lockdep warning, which is 100%
reproducible on network restart:

======================================================
[ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
3.12.0+ #47 Tainted: GF
-------------------------------------------------------
kworker/1:1/27 is trying to acquire lock:
 ((&(&adapter->watchdog_task)->work)){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff8108a5b0>] flush_work+0x0/0x70

but task is already holding lock:
 (&adapter->mutex){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffffa0177c0a>] e1000_reset_task+0x4a/0xa0 [e1000]

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #1 (&adapter->mutex){+.+...}:
       [<ffffffff810bdb5d>] lock_acquire+0x9d/0x120
       [<ffffffff816b8cbc>] mutex_lock_nested+0x4c/0x390
       [<ffffffffa017233d>] e1000_watchdog+0x7d/0x5b0 [e1000]
       [<ffffffff8108b972>] process_one_work+0x1d2/0x510
       [<ffffffff8108ca80>] worker_thread+0x120/0x3a0
       [<ffffffff81092c1e>] kthread+0xee/0x110
       [<ffffffff816c3d7c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0

-> #0 ((&(&adapter->watchdog_task)->work)){+.+...}:
       [<ffffffff810bd9c0>] __lock_acquire+0x1710/0x1810
       [<ffffffff810bdb5d>] lock_acquire+0x9d/0x120
       [<ffffffff8108a5eb>] flush_work+0x3b/0x70
       [<ffffffff8108b5d8>] __cancel_work_timer+0x98/0x140
       [<ffffffff8108b693>] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x13/0x20
       [<ffffffffa0170cec>] e1000_down_and_stop+0x3c/0x60 [e1000]
       [<ffffffffa01775b1>] e1000_down+0x131/0x220 [e1000]
       [<ffffffffa0177c12>] e1000_reset_task+0x52/0xa0 [e1000]
       [<ffffffff8108b972>] process_one_work+0x1d2/0x510
       [<ffffffff8108ca80>] worker_thread+0x120/0x3a0
       [<ffffffff81092c1e>] kthread+0xee/0x110
       [<ffffffff816c3d7c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&adapter->mutex);
                               lock((&(&adapter->watchdog_task)->work));
                               lock(&adapter->mutex);
  lock((&(&adapter->watchdog_task)->work));

 *** DEADLOCK ***

3 locks held by kworker/1:1/27:
 #0:  (events){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff8108b906>] process_one_work+0x166/0x510
 #1:  ((&adapter->reset_task)){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff8108b906>] process_one_work+0x166/0x510
 #2:  (&adapter->mutex){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffffa0177c0a>] e1000_reset_task+0x4a/0xa0 [e1000]

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 27 Comm: kworker/1:1 Tainted: GF            3.12.0+ #47
Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/P5B-VM SE, BIOS 0501    05/31/2007
Workqueue: events e1000_reset_task [e1000]
 ffffffff820f6000 ffff88007b9dba98 ffffffff816b54a2 0000000000000002
 ffffffff820f5e50 ffff88007b9dbae8 ffffffff810ba936 ffff88007b9dbac8
 ffff88007b9dbb48 ffff88007b9d8f00 ffff88007b9d8780 ffff88007b9d8f00
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff816b54a2>] dump_stack+0x49/0x5f
 [<ffffffff810ba936>] print_circular_bug+0x216/0x310
 [<ffffffff810bd9c0>] __lock_acquire+0x1710/0x1810
 [<ffffffff8108a5b0>] ? __flush_work+0x250/0x250
 [<ffffffff810bdb5d>] lock_acquire+0x9d/0x120
 [<ffffffff8108a5b0>] ? __flush_work+0x250/0x250
 [<ffffffff8108a5eb>] flush_work+0x3b/0x70
 [<ffffffff8108a5b0>] ? __flush_work+0x250/0x250
 [<ffffffff8108b5d8>] __cancel_work_timer+0x98/0x140
 [<ffffffff8108b693>] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x13/0x20
 [<ffffffffa0170cec>] e1000_down_and_stop+0x3c/0x60 [e1000]
 [<ffffffffa01775b1>] e1000_down+0x131/0x220 [e1000]
 [<ffffffffa0177c12>] e1000_reset_task+0x52/0xa0 [e1000]
 [<ffffffff8108b972>] process_one_work+0x1d2/0x510
 [<ffffffff8108b906>] ? process_one_work+0x166/0x510
 [<ffffffff8108ca80>] worker_thread+0x120/0x3a0
 [<ffffffff8108c960>] ? manage_workers+0x2c0/0x2c0
 [<ffffffff81092c1e>] kthread+0xee/0x110
 [<ffffffff81092b30>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x70/0x70
 [<ffffffff816c3d7c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
 [<ffffffff81092b30>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x70/0x70

== The issue background ==

The problem occurs, because e1000_down(), which is called under
adapter->mutex by e1000_reset_task(), tries to synchronously cancel
e1000 auxiliary works (reset_task, watchdog_task, phy_info_task,
fifo_stall_task), which take adapter->mutex in their handlers. So the
question is what does adapter->mutex protect there?

The adapter->mutex was introduced by commit 0ef4ee ("e1000: convert to
private mutex from rtnl") as a replacement for rtnl_lock() taken in the
asynchronous handlers. It targeted on fixing a similar lockdep warning
issued when e1000_down() was called under rtnl_lock(), and it fixed it,
but unfortunately it introduced the lockdep warning described above.
Anyway, that said the source of this bug is that the asynchronous works
were made to take rtnl_lock() some time ago, so let's look deeper and
find why it was added there.

The rtnl_lock() was added to asynchronous handlers by commit 338c15
("e1000: fix occasional panic on unload") in order to prevent
asynchronous handlers from execution after the module is unloaded
(e1000_down() is called) as it follows from the comment to the commit:

> Net drivers in general have an issue where timers fired
> by mod_timer or work threads with schedule_work are running
> outside of the rtnl_lock.
>
> With no other lock protection these routines are vulnerable
> to races with driver unload or reset paths.
>
> The longer term solution to this might be a redesign with
> safer locks being taken in the driver to guarantee no
> reentrance, but for now a safe and effective fix is
> to take the rtnl_lock in these routines.

I'm not sure if this locking scheme fixed the problem or just made it
unlikely, although I incline to the latter. Anyway, this was long time
ago when e1000 auxiliary works were implemented as timers scheduling
real work handlers in their routines. The e1000_down() function only
canceled the timers, but left the real handlers running if they were
running, which could result in work execution after module unload.
Today, the e1000 driver uses sane delayed works instead of the pair
timer+work to implement its delayed asynchronous handlers, and the
e1000_down() synchronously cancels all the works so that the problem
that commit 338c15 tried to cope with disappeared, and we don't need any
locks in the handlers any more. Moreover, any locking there can
potentially result in a deadlock.

So, this patch reverts commits 0ef4ee and 338c15.

Fixes: 0ef4eed ("e1000: convert to private mutex from rtnl")
Fixes: 338c15e ("e1000: fix occasional panic on unload")
Cc: Tushar Dave <tushar.n.dave@intel.com>
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Aaron Brown <aaron.f.brown@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
jenkins-verticloud pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 29, 2020
…d ops

[ Upstream commit 52719fce3f4c7a8ac9eaa191e8d75a697f9fbcbc ]

There are three ways pseries_suspend_begin() can be reached:

1. When "mem" is written to /sys/power/state:

kobj_attr_store()
-> state_store()
  -> pm_suspend()
    -> suspend_devices_and_enter()
      -> pseries_suspend_begin()

This never works because there is no way to supply a valid stream id
using this interface, and H_VASI_STATE is called with a stream id of
zero. So this call path is useless at best.

2. When a stream id is written to /sys/devices/system/power/hibernate.
pseries_suspend_begin() is polled directly from store_hibernate()
until the stream is in the "Suspending" state (i.e. the platform is
ready for the OS to suspend execution):

dev_attr_store()
-> store_hibernate()
  -> pseries_suspend_begin()

3. When a stream id is written to /sys/devices/system/power/hibernate
(continued). After #2, pseries_suspend_begin() is called once again
from the pm core:

dev_attr_store()
-> store_hibernate()
  -> pm_suspend()
    -> suspend_devices_and_enter()
      -> pseries_suspend_begin()

This is redundant because the VASI suspend state is already known to
be Suspending.

The begin() callback of platform_suspend_ops is optional, so we can
simply remove that assignment with no loss of function.

Fixes: 32d8ad4 ("powerpc/pseries: Partition hibernation support")
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201207215200.1785968-18-nathanl@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
jenkins-verticloud pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 29, 2020
[ Upstream commit 4a9d81caf841cd2c0ae36abec9c2963bf21d0284 ]

If the elem is deleted during be iterated on it, the iteration
process will fall into an endless loop.

kernel: NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#4 stuck for 22s! [nfsd:17137]

PID: 17137  TASK: ffff8818d93c0000  CPU: 4   COMMAND: "nfsd"
    [exception RIP: __state_in_grace+76]
    RIP: ffffffffc00e817c  RSP: ffff8818d3aefc98  RFLAGS: 00000246
    RAX: ffff881dc0c38298  RBX: ffffffff81b03580  RCX: ffff881dc02c9f50
    RDX: ffff881e3fce8500  RSI: 0000000000000001  RDI: ffffffff81b03580
    RBP: ffff8818d3aefca0   R8: 0000000000000020   R9: ffff8818d3aefd40
    R10: ffff88017fc03800  R11: ffff8818e83933c0  R12: ffff8818d3aefd40
    R13: 0000000000000000  R14: ffff8818e8391068  R15: ffff8818fa6e4000
    CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #0 [ffff8818d3aefc98] opens_in_grace at ffffffffc00e81e3 [grace]
 #1 [ffff8818d3aefca8] nfs4_preprocess_stateid_op at ffffffffc02a3e6c [nfsd]
 #2 [ffff8818d3aefd18] nfsd4_write at ffffffffc028ed5b [nfsd]
 #3 [ffff8818d3aefd80] nfsd4_proc_compound at ffffffffc0290a0d [nfsd]
 #4 [ffff8818d3aefdd0] nfsd_dispatch at ffffffffc027b800 [nfsd]
 #5 [ffff8818d3aefe08] svc_process_common at ffffffffc02017f3 [sunrpc]
 #6 [ffff8818d3aefe70] svc_process at ffffffffc0201ce3 [sunrpc]
 #7 [ffff8818d3aefe98] nfsd at ffffffffc027b117 [nfsd]
 #8 [ffff8818d3aefec8] kthread at ffffffff810b88c1
 #9 [ffff8818d3aeff50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff816d1607

The troublemake elem:
crash> lock_manager ffff881dc0c38298
struct lock_manager {
  list = {
    next = 0xffff881dc0c38298,
    prev = 0xffff881dc0c38298
  },
  block_opens = false
}

Fixes: c87fb4a ("lockd: NLM grace period shouldn't block NFSv4 opens")
Signed-off-by: Cheng Lin <cheng.lin130@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Yi Wang <wang.yi59@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
jenkins-verticloud pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 23, 2021
[ Upstream commit b77413446408fdd256599daf00d5be72b5f3e7c6 ]

The buffer list can have zero skb as following path:
tipc_named_node_up()->tipc_node_xmit()->tipc_link_xmit(), so
we need to check the list before casting an &sk_buff.

Fault report:
 [] tipc: Bulk publication failure
 [] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical [#1] PREEMPT [...]
 [] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000c8-0x00000000000000cf]
 [] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.10.0-rc4+ #2
 [] Hardware name: Bochs ..., BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
 [] RIP: 0010:tipc_link_xmit+0xc1/0x2180
 [] Code: 24 b8 00 00 00 00 4d 39 ec 4c 0f 44 e8 e8 d7 0a 10 f9 48 [...]
 [] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000006ea0 EFLAGS: 00010202
 [] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8880224da000 RCX: 1ffff11003d3cc0d
 [] RDX: 0000000000000019 RSI: ffffffff886007b9 RDI: 00000000000000c8
 [] RBP: ffffc90000007018 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff52000000ded
 [] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: fffff52000000dec R12: ffffc90000007148
 [] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffc90000007018
 [] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888037400000(0000) knlGS:000[...]
 [] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 [] CR2: 00007fffd2db5000 CR3: 000000002b08f000 CR4: 00000000000006f0

Fixes: af9b028 ("tipc: make media xmit call outside node spinlock context")
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hoang Le <hoang.h.le@dektech.com.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210108071337.3598-1-hoang.h.le@dektech.com.au
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jenkins-verticloud pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 4, 2021
[ Upstream commit c5c97cadd7ed13381cb6b4bef5c841a66938d350 ]

The ubsan reported the following error.  It was because sample's raw
data missed u32 padding at the end.  So it broke the alignment of the
array after it.

The raw data contains an u32 size prefix so the data size should have
an u32 padding after 8-byte aligned data.

27: Sample parsing  :util/synthetic-events.c:1539:4:
  runtime error: store to misaligned address 0x62100006b9bc for type
  '__u64' (aka 'unsigned long long'), which requires 8 byte alignment
0x62100006b9bc: note: pointer points here
  00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff  ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff  ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff  ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
              ^
    #0 0x561532a9fc96 in perf_event__synthesize_sample util/synthetic-events.c:1539:13
    #1 0x5615327f4a4f in do_test tests/sample-parsing.c:284:8
    #2 0x5615327f3f50 in test__sample_parsing tests/sample-parsing.c:381:9
    #3 0x56153279d3a1 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:424:9
    #4 0x56153279c836 in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:454:9
    #5 0x56153279b7eb in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:675:4
    #6 0x56153279abf0 in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:821:9
    #7 0x56153264e796 in run_builtin perf.c:312:11
    #8 0x56153264cf03 in handle_internal_command perf.c:364:8
    #9 0x56153264e47d in run_argv perf.c:408:2
    #10 0x56153264c9a9 in main perf.c:538:3
    #11 0x7f137ab6fbbc in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x38bbc)
    #12 0x561532596828 in _start ...

SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: misaligned-pointer-use
 util/synthetic-events.c:1539:4 in

Fixes: 045f8cd ("perf tests: Add a sample parsing test")
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210214091638.519643-1-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
jenkins-verticloud pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 24, 2021
commit c7de87ff9dac5f396f62d584f3908f80ddc0e07b upstream.

[ This problem is in mainline, but only rt has the chops to be
able to detect it. ]

Lockdep reports a circular lock dependency between serv->sv_lock and
softirq_ctl.lock on system shutdown, when using a kernel built with
CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT=y, and a nfs mount exists.

This is due to the definition of spin_lock_bh on rt:

	local_bh_disable();
	rt_spin_lock(lock);

which forces a softirq_ctl.lock -> serv->sv_lock dependency.  This is
not a problem as long as _every_ lock of serv->sv_lock is a:

	spin_lock_bh(&serv->sv_lock);

but there is one of the form:

	spin_lock(&serv->sv_lock);

This is what is causing the circular dependency splat.  The spin_lock()
grabs the lock without first grabbing softirq_ctl.lock via local_bh_disable.
If later on in the critical region,  someone does a local_bh_disable, we
get a serv->sv_lock -> softirq_ctrl.lock dependency established.  Deadlock.

Fix is to make serv->sv_lock be locked with spin_lock_bh everywhere, no
exceptions.

[  OK  ] Stopped target NFS client services.
         Stopping Logout off all iSCSI sessions on shutdown...
         Stopping NFS server and services...
[  109.442380]
[  109.442385] ======================================================
[  109.442386] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[  109.442387] 5.10.16-rt30 #1 Not tainted
[  109.442389] ------------------------------------------------------
[  109.442390] nfsd/1032 is trying to acquire lock:
[  109.442392] ffff994237617f60 ((softirq_ctrl.lock).lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __local_bh_disable_ip+0xd9/0x270
[  109.442405]
[  109.442405] but task is already holding lock:
[  109.442406] ffff994245cb00b0 (&serv->sv_lock){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: svc_close_list+0x1f/0x90
[  109.442415]
[  109.442415] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[  109.442415]
[  109.442416]
[  109.442416] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[  109.442417]
[  109.442417] -> #1 (&serv->sv_lock){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[  109.442421]        rt_spin_lock+0x2b/0xc0
[  109.442428]        svc_add_new_perm_xprt+0x42/0xa0
[  109.442430]        svc_addsock+0x135/0x220
[  109.442434]        write_ports+0x4b3/0x620
[  109.442438]        nfsctl_transaction_write+0x45/0x80
[  109.442440]        vfs_write+0xff/0x420
[  109.442444]        ksys_write+0x4f/0xc0
[  109.442446]        do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
[  109.442450]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[  109.442454]
[  109.442454] -> #0 ((softirq_ctrl.lock).lock){+.+.}-{2:2}:
[  109.442457]        __lock_acquire+0x1264/0x20b0
[  109.442463]        lock_acquire+0xc2/0x400
[  109.442466]        rt_spin_lock+0x2b/0xc0
[  109.442469]        __local_bh_disable_ip+0xd9/0x270
[  109.442471]        svc_xprt_do_enqueue+0xc0/0x4d0
[  109.442474]        svc_close_list+0x60/0x90
[  109.442476]        svc_close_net+0x49/0x1a0
[  109.442478]        svc_shutdown_net+0x12/0x40
[  109.442480]        nfsd_destroy+0xc5/0x180
[  109.442482]        nfsd+0x1bc/0x270
[  109.442483]        kthread+0x194/0x1b0
[  109.442487]        ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[  109.442492]
[  109.442492] other info that might help us debug this:
[  109.442492]
[  109.442493]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[  109.442493]
[  109.442493]        CPU0                    CPU1
[  109.442494]        ----                    ----
[  109.442495]   lock(&serv->sv_lock);
[  109.442496]                                lock((softirq_ctrl.lock).lock);
[  109.442498]                                lock(&serv->sv_lock);
[  109.442499]   lock((softirq_ctrl.lock).lock);
[  109.442501]
[  109.442501]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[  109.442501]
[  109.442501] 3 locks held by nfsd/1032:
[  109.442503]  #0: ffffffff93b49258 (nfsd_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: nfsd+0x19a/0x270
[  109.442508]  #1: ffff994245cb00b0 (&serv->sv_lock){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: svc_close_list+0x1f/0x90
[  109.442512]  #2: ffffffff93a81b20 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rt_spin_lock+0x5/0xc0
[  109.442518]
[  109.442518] stack backtrace:
[  109.442519] CPU: 0 PID: 1032 Comm: nfsd Not tainted 5.10.16-rt30 #1
[  109.442522] Hardware name: Supermicro X9DRL-3F/iF/X9DRL-3F/iF, BIOS 3.2 09/22/2015
[  109.442524] Call Trace:
[  109.442527]  dump_stack+0x77/0x97
[  109.442533]  check_noncircular+0xdc/0xf0
[  109.442546]  __lock_acquire+0x1264/0x20b0
[  109.442553]  lock_acquire+0xc2/0x400
[  109.442564]  rt_spin_lock+0x2b/0xc0
[  109.442570]  __local_bh_disable_ip+0xd9/0x270
[  109.442573]  svc_xprt_do_enqueue+0xc0/0x4d0
[  109.442577]  svc_close_list+0x60/0x90
[  109.442581]  svc_close_net+0x49/0x1a0
[  109.442585]  svc_shutdown_net+0x12/0x40
[  109.442588]  nfsd_destroy+0xc5/0x180
[  109.442590]  nfsd+0x1bc/0x270
[  109.442595]  kthread+0x194/0x1b0
[  109.442600]  ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[  109.518225] nfsd: last server has exited, flushing export cache
[  OK  ] Stopped NFSv4 ID-name mapping service.
[  OK  ] Stopped GSSAPI Proxy Daemon.
[  OK  ] Stopped NFS Mount Daemon.
[  OK  ] Stopped NFS status monitor for NFSv2/3 locking..

Fixes: 719f8bc ("svcrpc: fix xpt_list traversal locking on shutdown")
Signed-off-by: Joe Korty <joe.korty@concurrent-rt.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jenkins-verticloud pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 30, 2021
[ Upstream commit 4deb550bc3b698a1f03d0332cde3df154d1b6c1e ]

label err_eni_release is reachable when eni_start() fail.
In eni_start() it calls dev->phy->start() in the last step, if start()
fail we don't need to call phy->stop(), if start() is never called, we
neither need to call phy->stop(), otherwise null-ptr-deref will happen.

In order to fix this issue, don't call phy->stop() in label err_eni_release

[    4.875714] ==================================================================
[    4.876091] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in suni_stop+0x47/0x100 [suni]
[    4.876433] Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000030 by task modprobe/95
[    4.876778]
[    4.876862] CPU: 0 PID: 95 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 5.11.0-rc7-00090-gdcc0b49040c7 #2
[    4.877290] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-48-gd94
[    4.877876] Call Trace:
[    4.878009]  dump_stack+0x7d/0xa3
[    4.878191]  kasan_report.cold+0x10c/0x10e
[    4.878410]  ? __slab_free+0x2f0/0x340
[    4.878612]  ? suni_stop+0x47/0x100 [suni]
[    4.878832]  suni_stop+0x47/0x100 [suni]
[    4.879043]  eni_do_release+0x3b/0x70 [eni]
[    4.879269]  eni_init_one.cold+0x1152/0x1747 [eni]
[    4.879528]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x7b/0xd0
[    4.879768]  ? eni_ioctl+0x270/0x270 [eni]
[    4.879990]  ? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x10/0x10
[    4.880226]  ? eni_ioctl+0x270/0x270 [eni]
[    4.880448]  local_pci_probe+0x6f/0xb0
[    4.880650]  pci_device_probe+0x171/0x240
[    4.880864]  ? pci_device_remove+0xe0/0xe0
[    4.881086]  ? kernfs_create_link+0xb6/0x110
[    4.881315]  ? sysfs_do_create_link_sd.isra.0+0x76/0xe0
[    4.881594]  really_probe+0x161/0x420
[    4.881791]  driver_probe_device+0x6d/0xd0
[    4.882010]  device_driver_attach+0x82/0x90
[    4.882233]  ? device_driver_attach+0x90/0x90
[    4.882465]  __driver_attach+0x60/0x100
[    4.882671]  ? device_driver_attach+0x90/0x90
[    4.882903]  bus_for_each_dev+0xe1/0x140
[    4.883114]  ? subsys_dev_iter_exit+0x10/0x10
[    4.883346]  ? klist_node_init+0x61/0x80
[    4.883557]  bus_add_driver+0x254/0x2a0
[    4.883764]  driver_register+0xd3/0x150
[    4.883971]  ? 0xffffffffc0038000
[    4.884149]  do_one_initcall+0x84/0x250
[    4.884355]  ? trace_event_raw_event_initcall_finish+0x150/0x150
[    4.884674]  ? unpoison_range+0xf/0x30
[    4.884875]  ? ____kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0x84/0xa0
[    4.885150]  ? unpoison_range+0xf/0x30
[    4.885352]  ? unpoison_range+0xf/0x30
[    4.885557]  do_init_module+0xf8/0x350
[    4.885760]  load_module+0x3fe6/0x4340
[    4.885960]  ? vm_unmap_ram+0x1d0/0x1d0
[    4.886166]  ? ____kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0x84/0xa0
[    4.886441]  ? module_frob_arch_sections+0x20/0x20
[    4.886697]  ? __do_sys_finit_module+0x108/0x170
[    4.886941]  __do_sys_finit_module+0x108/0x170
[    4.887178]  ? __ia32_sys_init_module+0x40/0x40
[    4.887419]  ? file_open_root+0x200/0x200
[    4.887634]  ? do_sys_open+0x85/0xe0
[    4.887826]  ? filp_open+0x50/0x50
[    4.888009]  ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x4d/0x60
[    4.888287]  ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x2f/0x130
[    4.888547]  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
[    4.888739]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[    4.889010] RIP: 0033:0x7ff62fcf1cf7
[    4.889202] Code: 48 89 57 30 48 8b 04 24 48 89 47 38 e9 1d a0 02 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f71
[    4.890172] RSP: 002b:00007ffe6644ade8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
[    4.890570] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000f2ca70 RCX: 00007ff62fcf1cf7
[    4.890944] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000f2b9e0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[    4.891318] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
[    4.891691] R10: 00007ff62fd55300 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000f2b9e0
[    4.892064] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000f2bdd0 R15: 0000000000000001
[    4.892439] ==================================================================

Signed-off-by: Tong Zhang <ztong0001@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
jenkins-verticloud pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 16, 2021
commit 90bd070aae6c4fb5d302f9c4b9c88be60c8197ec upstream.

The following deadlock is detected:

  truncate -> setattr path is waiting for pending direct IO to be done (inode->i_dio_count become zero) with inode->i_rwsem held (down_write).

  PID: 14827  TASK: ffff881686a9af80  CPU: 20  COMMAND: "ora_p005_hrltd9"
   #0  __schedule at ffffffff818667cc
   #1  schedule at ffffffff81866de6
   #2  inode_dio_wait at ffffffff812a2d04
   #3  ocfs2_setattr at ffffffffc05f322e [ocfs2]
   #4  notify_change at ffffffff812a5a09
   #5  do_truncate at ffffffff812808f5
   #6  do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.18 at ffffffff81280cf2
   #7  sys_ftruncate at ffffffff81280d8e
   #8  do_syscall_64 at ffffffff81003949
   #9  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff81a001ad

dio completion path is going to complete one direct IO (decrement
inode->i_dio_count), but before that it hung at locking inode->i_rwsem:

   #0  __schedule+700 at ffffffff818667cc
   #1  schedule+54 at ffffffff81866de6
   #2  rwsem_down_write_failed+536 at ffffffff8186aa28
   #3  call_rwsem_down_write_failed+23 at ffffffff8185a1b7
   #4  down_write+45 at ffffffff81869c9d
   #5  ocfs2_dio_end_io_write+180 at ffffffffc05d5444 [ocfs2]
   #6  ocfs2_dio_end_io+85 at ffffffffc05d5a85 [ocfs2]
   #7  dio_complete+140 at ffffffff812c873c
   #8  dio_aio_complete_work+25 at ffffffff812c89f9
   #9  process_one_work+361 at ffffffff810b1889
  #10  worker_thread+77 at ffffffff810b233d
  #11  kthread+261 at ffffffff810b7fd5
  #12  ret_from_fork+62 at ffffffff81a0035e

Thus above forms ABBA deadlock.  The same deadlock was mentioned in
upstream commit 28f5a8a ("ocfs2: should wait dio before inode lock
in ocfs2_setattr()").  It seems that that commit only removed the
cluster lock (the victim of above dead lock) from the ABBA deadlock
party.

End-user visible effects: Process hang in truncate -> ocfs2_setattr path
and other processes hang at ocfs2_dio_end_io_write path.

This is to fix the deadlock itself.  It removes inode_lock() call from
dio completion path to remove the deadlock and add ip_alloc_sem lock in
setattr path to synchronize the inode modifications.

[wen.gang.wang@oracle.com: remove the "had_alloc_lock" as suggested]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210402171344.1605-1-wen.gang.wang@oracle.com

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210331203654.3911-1-wen.gang.wang@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Wengang Wang <wen.gang.wang@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jenkins-verticloud pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 22, 2021
[ Upstream commit 5bbf219328849e83878bddb7c226d8d42e84affc ]

An out of bounds write happens when setting the default power state.
KASAN sees this as:

[drm] radeon: 512M of GTT memory ready.
[drm] GART: num cpu pages 131072, num gpu pages 131072
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in
radeon_atombios_parse_power_table_1_3+0x1837/0x1998 [radeon]
Write of size 4 at addr ffff88810178d858 by task systemd-udevd/157

CPU: 0 PID: 157 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.12.0-E620 #50
Hardware name: eMachines        eMachines E620  /Nile       , BIOS V1.03 09/30/2008
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0xa5/0xe6
 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x18/0x239
 kasan_report+0x170/0x1a8
 radeon_atombios_parse_power_table_1_3+0x1837/0x1998 [radeon]
 radeon_atombios_get_power_modes+0x144/0x1888 [radeon]
 radeon_pm_init+0x1019/0x1904 [radeon]
 rs690_init+0x76e/0x84a [radeon]
 radeon_device_init+0x1c1a/0x21e5 [radeon]
 radeon_driver_load_kms+0xf5/0x30b [radeon]
 drm_dev_register+0x255/0x4a0 [drm]
 radeon_pci_probe+0x246/0x2f6 [radeon]
 pci_device_probe+0x1aa/0x294
 really_probe+0x30e/0x850
 driver_probe_device+0xe6/0x135
 device_driver_attach+0xc1/0xf8
 __driver_attach+0x13f/0x146
 bus_for_each_dev+0xfa/0x146
 bus_add_driver+0x2b3/0x447
 driver_register+0x242/0x2c1
 do_one_initcall+0x149/0x2fd
 do_init_module+0x1ae/0x573
 load_module+0x4dee/0x5cca
 __do_sys_finit_module+0xf1/0x140
 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Without KASAN, this will manifest later when the kernel attempts to
allocate memory that was stomped, since it collides with the inline slab
freelist pointer:

invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID: 781 Comm: openrc-run.sh Tainted: G        W 5.10.12-gentoo-E620 #2
Hardware name: eMachines        eMachines E620  /Nile , BIOS V1.03       09/30/2008
RIP: 0010:kfree+0x115/0x230
Code: 89 c5 e8 75 ea ff ff 48 8b 00 0f ba e0 09 72 63 e8 1f f4 ff ff 41 89 c4 48 8b 45 00 0f ba e0 10 72 0a 48 8b 45 08 a8 01 75 02 <0f> 0b 44 89 e1 48 c7 c2 00 f0 ff ff be 06 00 00 00 48 d3 e2 48 c7
RSP: 0018:ffffb42f40267e10 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: ffffd61280ee8d88 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 000000008010000d
RDX: 4000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffba1360b0 RDI: ffffd61280ee8d80
RBP: ffffd61280ee8d80 R08: ffffffffb91bebdf R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8fe2c1047ac8 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000100
FS:  00007fe80eff6b68(0000) GS:ffff8fe339c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fe80eec7bc0 CR3: 0000000038012000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
 __free_fdtable+0x16/0x1f
 put_files_struct+0x81/0x9b
 do_exit+0x433/0x94d
 do_group_exit+0xa6/0xa6
 __x64_sys_exit_group+0xf/0xf
 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x7fe80ef64bea
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x7fe80ef64bc0.
RSP: 002b:00007ffdb1c47528 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007fe80ef64bea
RDX: 00007fe80ef64f60 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00007fe80ee2c620 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe80eff41e0
R13: 00000000ffffffff R14: 0000000000000024 R15: 00007fe80edf9cd0
Modules linked in: radeon(+) ath5k(+) snd_hda_codec_realtek ...

Use a valid power_state index when initializing the "flags" and "misc"
and "misc2" fields.

Bug: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=211537
Reported-by: Erhard F. <erhard_f@mailbox.org>
Fixes: a48b9b4 ("drm/radeon/kms/pm: add asic specific callbacks for getting power state (v2)")
Fixes: 79daedc ("drm/radeon/kms: minor pm cleanups")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
jenkins-verticloud pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 22, 2021
[ Upstream commit cf7b39a0cbf6bf57aa07a008d46cf695add05b4c ]

We get a bug:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in iov_iter_revert+0x11c/0x404
lib/iov_iter.c:1139
Read of size 8 at addr ffff0000d3fb11f8 by task

CPU: 0 PID: 12582 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted
5.10.0-00843-g352c8610ccd2 #2
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2d0 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:132
 show_stack+0x28/0x34 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:196
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x110/0x164 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_address_description+0x78/0x5c8 mm/kasan/report.c:385
 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:545 [inline]
 kasan_report+0x148/0x1e4 mm/kasan/report.c:562
 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline]
 __asan_load8+0xb4/0xbc mm/kasan/generic.c:252
 iov_iter_revert+0x11c/0x404 lib/iov_iter.c:1139
 io_read fs/io_uring.c:3421 [inline]
 io_issue_sqe+0x2344/0x2d64 fs/io_uring.c:5943
 __io_queue_sqe+0x19c/0x520 fs/io_uring.c:6260
 io_queue_sqe+0x2a4/0x590 fs/io_uring.c:6326
 io_submit_sqe fs/io_uring.c:6395 [inline]
 io_submit_sqes+0x4c0/0xa04 fs/io_uring.c:6624
 __do_sys_io_uring_enter fs/io_uring.c:9013 [inline]
 __se_sys_io_uring_enter fs/io_uring.c:8960 [inline]
 __arm64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x190/0x708 fs/io_uring.c:8960
 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:36 [inline]
 invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:48 [inline]
 el0_svc_common arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:158 [inline]
 do_el0_svc+0x120/0x290 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:227
 el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:367
 el0_sync_handler+0x98/0x170 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:383
 el0_sync+0x140/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:670

Allocated by task 12570:
 stack_trace_save+0x80/0xb8 kernel/stacktrace.c:121
 kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:48 [inline]
 kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc+0xdc/0x120 mm/kasan/common.c:461
 kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x14 mm/kasan/common.c:475
 __kmalloc+0x23c/0x334 mm/slub.c:3970
 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:557 [inline]
 __io_alloc_async_data+0x68/0x9c fs/io_uring.c:3210
 io_setup_async_rw fs/io_uring.c:3229 [inline]
 io_read fs/io_uring.c:3436 [inline]
 io_issue_sqe+0x2954/0x2d64 fs/io_uring.c:5943
 __io_queue_sqe+0x19c/0x520 fs/io_uring.c:6260
 io_queue_sqe+0x2a4/0x590 fs/io_uring.c:6326
 io_submit_sqe fs/io_uring.c:6395 [inline]
 io_submit_sqes+0x4c0/0xa04 fs/io_uring.c:6624
 __do_sys_io_uring_enter fs/io_uring.c:9013 [inline]
 __se_sys_io_uring_enter fs/io_uring.c:8960 [inline]
 __arm64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x190/0x708 fs/io_uring.c:8960
 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:36 [inline]
 invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:48 [inline]
 el0_svc_common arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:158 [inline]
 do_el0_svc+0x120/0x290 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:227
 el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:367
 el0_sync_handler+0x98/0x170 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:383
 el0_sync+0x140/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:670

Freed by task 12570:
 stack_trace_save+0x80/0xb8 kernel/stacktrace.c:121
 kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:48 [inline]
 kasan_set_track+0x38/0x6c mm/kasan/common.c:56
 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x40 mm/kasan/generic.c:355
 __kasan_slab_free+0x124/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:422
 kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x1c mm/kasan/common.c:431
 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1544 [inline]
 slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1577 [inline]
 slab_free mm/slub.c:3142 [inline]
 kfree+0x104/0x38c mm/slub.c:4124
 io_dismantle_req fs/io_uring.c:1855 [inline]
 __io_free_req+0x70/0x254 fs/io_uring.c:1867
 io_put_req_find_next fs/io_uring.c:2173 [inline]
 __io_queue_sqe+0x1fc/0x520 fs/io_uring.c:6279
 __io_req_task_submit+0x154/0x21c fs/io_uring.c:2051
 io_req_task_submit+0x2c/0x44 fs/io_uring.c:2063
 task_work_run+0xdc/0x128 kernel/task_work.c:151
 get_signal+0x6f8/0x980 kernel/signal.c:2562
 do_signal+0x108/0x3a4 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:658
 do_notify_resume+0xbc/0x25c arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:722
 work_pending+0xc/0x180

blkdev_read_iter can truncate iov_iter's count since the count + pos may
exceed the size of the blkdev. This will confuse io_read that we have
consume the iovec. And once we do the iov_iter_revert in io_read, we
will trigger the slab-out-of-bounds. Fix it by reexpand the count with
size has been truncated.

blkdev_write_iter can trigger the problem too.

Signed-off-by: yangerkun <yangerkun@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silencec@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210401071807.3328235-1-yangerkun@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
jenkins-verticloud pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 20, 2021
[ Upstream commit 85e8b032d6ebb0f698a34dd22c2f13443d905888 ]

syzbot complained in neigh_reduce(), because rcu_read_lock_bh()
is treated differently than rcu_read_lock()

WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
5.13.0-rc6-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
-----------------------------
include/net/addrconf.h:313 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

other info that might help us debug this:

rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
3 locks held by kworker/0:0/5:
 #0: ffff888011064d38 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: arch_atomic64_set arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:34 [inline]
 #0: ffff888011064d38 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: atomic64_set include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:856 [inline]
 #0: ffff888011064d38 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: atomic_long_set include/asm-generic/atomic-long.h:41 [inline]
 #0: ffff888011064d38 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: set_work_data kernel/workqueue.c:617 [inline]
 #0: ffff888011064d38 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: set_work_pool_and_clear_pending kernel/workqueue.c:644 [inline]
 #0: ffff888011064d38 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x871/0x1600 kernel/workqueue.c:2247
 #1: ffffc90000ca7da8 ((work_completion)(&port->wq)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x8a5/0x1600 kernel/workqueue.c:2251
 #2: ffffffff8bf795c0 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x1da/0x3130 net/core/dev.c:4180

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 5 Comm: kworker/0:0 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc6-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: events ipvlan_process_multicast
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x141/0x1d7 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 __in6_dev_get include/net/addrconf.h:313 [inline]
 __in6_dev_get include/net/addrconf.h:311 [inline]
 neigh_reduce drivers/net/vxlan.c:2167 [inline]
 vxlan_xmit+0x34d5/0x4c30 drivers/net/vxlan.c:2919
 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4944 [inline]
 netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4958 [inline]
 xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3654 [inline]
 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x1eb/0x920 net/core/dev.c:3670
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2133/0x3130 net/core/dev.c:4246
 ipvlan_process_multicast+0xa99/0xd70 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:287
 process_one_work+0x98d/0x1600 kernel/workqueue.c:2276
 worker_thread+0x64c/0x1120 kernel/workqueue.c:2422
 kthread+0x3b1/0x4a0 kernel/kthread.c:313
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:294

Fixes: f564f45 ("vxlan: add ipv6 proxy support")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
jenkins-verticloud pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 15, 2021
commit 5648c073c33d33a0a19d0cb1194a4eb88efe2b71 upstream.

Add the following Telit FD980 composition 0x1056:

Cfg #1: mass storage
Cfg #2: rndis, tty, adb, tty, tty, tty, tty

Signed-off-by: Daniele Palmas <dnlplm@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210803194711.3036-1-dnlplm@gmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jenkins-verticloud pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 26, 2021
commit f9dfb5e390fab2df9f7944bb91e7705aba14cd26 upstream.

The XSAVE init code initializes all enabled and supported components with
XRSTOR(S) to init state. Then it XSAVEs the state of the components back
into init_fpstate which is used in several places to fill in the init state
of components.

This works correctly with XSAVE, but not with XSAVEOPT and XSAVES because
those use the init optimization and skip writing state of components which
are in init state. So init_fpstate.xsave still contains all zeroes after
this operation.

There are two ways to solve that:

   1) Use XSAVE unconditionally, but that requires to reshuffle the buffer when
      XSAVES is enabled because XSAVES uses compacted format.

   2) Save the components which are known to have a non-zero init state by other
      means.

Looking deeper, #2 is the right thing to do because all components the
kernel supports have all-zeroes init state except the legacy features (FP,
SSE). Those cannot be hard coded because the states are not identical on all
CPUs, but they can be saved with FXSAVE which avoids all conditionals.

Use FXSAVE to save the legacy FP/SSE components in init_fpstate along with
a BUILD_BUG_ON() which reminds developers to validate that a newly added
component has all zeroes init state. As a bonus remove the now unused
copy_xregs_to_kernel_booting() crutch.

The XSAVE and reshuffle method can still be implemented in the unlikely
case that components are added which have a non-zero init state and no
other means to save them. For now, FXSAVE is just simple and good enough.

  [ bp: Fix a typo or two in the text. ]

Fixes: 6bad06b ("x86, xsave: Use xsaveopt in context-switch path when supported")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210618143444.587311343@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jenkins-verticloud pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 22, 2021
commit 23d2b94043ca8835bd1e67749020e839f396a1c2 upstream.

I got below panic when doing fuzz test:

Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 0 PID: 4056 Comm: syz-executor.3 Tainted: G    B             5.14.0-rc1-00195-gcff5c4254439-dirty #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x7a/0x9b
panic+0x2cd/0x5af
end_report.cold+0x5a/0x5a
kasan_report+0xec/0x110
ip_check_mc_rcu+0x556/0x5d0
__mkroute_output+0x895/0x1740
ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu+0x2d0/0x1050
ip_route_output_key_hash+0x182/0x2e0
ip_route_output_flow+0x28/0x130
udp_sendmsg+0x165d/0x2280
udpv6_sendmsg+0x121e/0x24f0
inet6_sendmsg+0xf7/0x140
sock_sendmsg+0xe9/0x180
____sys_sendmsg+0x2b8/0x7a0
___sys_sendmsg+0xf0/0x160
__sys_sendmmsg+0x17e/0x3c0
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x9e/0x100
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x462eb9
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8
 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48>
 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f3df5af1c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462eb9
RDX: 0000000000000312 RSI: 0000000020001700 RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f3df5af26bc
R13: 00000000004c372d R14: 0000000000700b10 R15: 00000000ffffffff

It is one use-after-free in ip_check_mc_rcu.
In ip_mc_del_src, the ip_sf_list of pmc has been freed under pmc->lock protection.
But access to ip_sf_list in ip_check_mc_rcu is not protected by the lock.

Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jenkins-verticloud pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 22, 2021
[ Upstream commit 734bc5ff783115aa3164f4e9dd5967ae78e0a8ab ]

In a future patch, calls to bh_lock_sock in sco.c should be replaced
by lock_sock now that none of the functions are run in IRQ context.

However, doing so results in a circular locking dependency:

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.14.0-rc4-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor.2/14867 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88803e3c1120 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO){+.+.}-{0:0}, at:
lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1613 [inline]
ffff88803e3c1120 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO){+.+.}-{0:0}, at:
sco_conn_del+0x12a/0x2a0 net/bluetooth/sco.c:191

but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8d2dc7c8 (hci_cb_list_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
hci_disconn_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:1497 [inline]
ffffffff8d2dc7c8 (hci_cb_list_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
hci_conn_hash_flush+0xda/0x260 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1608

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #2 (hci_cb_list_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:959 [inline]
       __mutex_lock+0x12a/0x10a0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1104
       hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:1482 [inline]
       hci_remote_features_evt net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:3263 [inline]
       hci_event_packet+0x2f4d/0x7c50 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6240
       hci_rx_work+0x4f8/0xd30 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:5122
       process_one_work+0x98d/0x1630 kernel/workqueue.c:2276
       worker_thread+0x658/0x11f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2422
       kthread+0x3e5/0x4d0 kernel/kthread.c:319
       ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295

-> #1 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:959 [inline]
       __mutex_lock+0x12a/0x10a0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1104
       sco_connect net/bluetooth/sco.c:245 [inline]
       sco_sock_connect+0x227/0xa10 net/bluetooth/sco.c:601
       __sys_connect_file+0x155/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1879
       __sys_connect+0x161/0x190 net/socket.c:1896
       __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1906 [inline]
       __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1903 [inline]
       __x64_sys_connect+0x6f/0xb0 net/socket.c:1903
       do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
       do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

-> #0 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO){+.+.}-{0:0}:
       check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3051 [inline]
       check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3174 [inline]
       validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3789 [inline]
       __lock_acquire+0x2a07/0x54a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5015
       lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5625 [inline]
       lock_acquire+0x1ab/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5590
       lock_sock_nested+0xca/0x120 net/core/sock.c:3170
       lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1613 [inline]
       sco_conn_del+0x12a/0x2a0 net/bluetooth/sco.c:191
       sco_disconn_cfm+0x71/0xb0 net/bluetooth/sco.c:1202
       hci_disconn_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:1500 [inline]
       hci_conn_hash_flush+0x127/0x260 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1608
       hci_dev_do_close+0x528/0x1130 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:1778
       hci_unregister_dev+0x1c0/0x5a0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4015
       vhci_release+0x70/0xe0 drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:340
       __fput+0x288/0x920 fs/file_table.c:280
       task_work_run+0xdd/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:164
       exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:32 [inline]
       do_exit+0xbd4/0x2a60 kernel/exit.c:825
       do_group_exit+0x125/0x310 kernel/exit.c:922
       get_signal+0x47f/0x2160 kernel/signal.c:2808
       arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x2a9/0x1c40 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:865
       handle_signal_work kernel/entry/common.c:148 [inline]
       exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:172 [inline]
       exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x17d/0x290 kernel/entry/common.c:209
       __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:291 [inline]
       syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x60 kernel/entry/common.c:302
       ret_from_fork+0x15/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:288

other info that might help us debug this:

Chain exists of:
  sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO --> &hdev->lock --> hci_cb_list_lock

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(hci_cb_list_lock);
                               lock(&hdev->lock);
                               lock(hci_cb_list_lock);
  lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

The issue is that the lock hierarchy should go from &hdev->lock -->
hci_cb_list_lock --> sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO. For example,
one such call trace is:

  hci_dev_do_close():
    hci_dev_lock();
    hci_conn_hash_flush():
      hci_disconn_cfm():
        mutex_lock(&hci_cb_list_lock);
        sco_disconn_cfm():
        sco_conn_del():
          lock_sock(sk);

However, in sco_sock_connect, we call lock_sock before calling
hci_dev_lock inside sco_connect, thus inverting the lock hierarchy.

We fix this by pulling the call to hci_dev_lock out from sco_connect.

Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <desmondcheongzx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
jenkins-verticloud pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 14, 2021
commit c56c96303e9289cc34716b1179597b6f470833de upstream.

In line 800 (#1), nfp_cpp_area_alloc() allocates and initializes a
CPP area structure. But in line 807 (#2), when the cache is allocated
failed, this CPP area structure is not freed, which will result in
memory leak.

We can fix it by freeing the CPP area when the cache is allocated
failed (#2).

792 int nfp_cpp_area_cache_add(struct nfp_cpp *cpp, size_t size)
793 {
794 	struct nfp_cpp_area_cache *cache;
795 	struct nfp_cpp_area *area;

800	area = nfp_cpp_area_alloc(cpp, NFP_CPP_ID(7, NFP_CPP_ACTION_RW, 0),
801 				  0, size);
	// #1: allocates and initializes

802 	if (!area)
803 		return -ENOMEM;

805 	cache = kzalloc(sizeof(*cache), GFP_KERNEL);
806 	if (!cache)
807 		return -ENOMEM; // #2: missing free

817	return 0;
818 }

Fixes: 4cb584e ("nfp: add CPP access core")
Signed-off-by: Jianglei Nie <niejianglei2021@163.com>
Acked-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211209061511.122535-1-niejianglei2021@163.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jenkins-verticloud pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 9, 2022
… devices

commit 8c9db6679be4348b8aae108e11d4be2f83976e30 upstream.

Suppose we have an environment with a number of non-NPIV FCP devices
(virtual HBAs / FCP devices / zfcp "adapter"s) sharing the same physical
FCP channel (HBA port) and its I_T nexus. Plus a number of storage target
ports zoned to such shared channel. Now one target port logs out of the
fabric causing an RSCN. Zfcp reacts with an ADISC ELS and subsequent port
recovery depending on the ADISC result. This happens on all such FCP
devices (in different Linux images) concurrently as they all receive a copy
of this RSCN. In the following we look at one of those FCP devices.

Requests other than FSF_QTCB_FCP_CMND can be slow until they get a
response.

Depending on which requests are affected by slow responses, there are
different recovery outcomes. Here we want to fix failed recoveries on port
or adapter level by avoiding recovery requests that can be slow.

We need the cached N_Port_ID for the remote port "link" test with ADISC.
Just before sending the ADISC, we now intentionally forget the old cached
N_Port_ID. The idea is that on receiving an RSCN for a port, we have to
assume that any cached information about this port is stale.  This forces a
fresh new GID_PN [FC-GS] nameserver lookup on any subsequent recovery for
the same port. Since we typically can still communicate with the nameserver
efficiently, we now reach steady state quicker: Either the nameserver still
does not know about the port so we stop recovery, or the nameserver already
knows the port potentially with a new N_Port_ID and we can successfully and
quickly perform open port recovery.  For the one case, where ADISC returns
successfully, we re-initialize port->d_id because that case does not
involve any port recovery.

This also solves a problem if the storage WWPN quickly logs into the fabric
again but with a different N_Port_ID. Such as on virtual WWPN takeover
during target NPIV failover.
[https://www.redbooks.ibm.com/abstracts/redp5477.html] In that case the
RSCN from the storage FDISC was ignored by zfcp and we could not
successfully recover the failover. On some later failback on the storage,
we could have been lucky if the virtual WWPN got the same old N_Port_ID
from the SAN switch as we still had cached.  Then the related RSCN
triggered a successful port reopen recovery.  However, there is no
guarantee to get the same N_Port_ID on NPIV FDISC.

Even though NPIV-enabled FCP devices are not affected by this problem, this
code change optimizes recovery time for gone remote ports as a side effect.
The timely drop of cached N_Port_IDs prevents unnecessary slow open port
attempts.

While the problem might have been in code before v2.6.32 commit
799b76d ("[SCSI] zfcp: Decouple gid_pn requests from erp") this fix
depends on the gid_pn_work introduced with that commit, so we mark it as
culprit to satisfy fix dependencies.

Note: Point-to-point remote port is already handled separately and gets its
N_Port_ID from the cached peer_d_id. So resetting port->d_id in general
does not affect PtP.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220118165803.3667947-1-maier@linux.ibm.com
Fixes: 799b76d ("[SCSI] zfcp: Decouple gid_pn requests from erp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #2.6.32+
Suggested-by: Benjamin Block <bblock@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Block <bblock@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Maier <maier@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jenkins-verticloud pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 20, 2022
commit 7e0438f83dc769465ee663bb5dcf8cc154940712 upstream.

The following sequence of operations results in a refcount warning:

1. Open device /dev/tpmrm.
2. Remove module tpm_tis_spi.
3. Write a TPM command to the file descriptor opened at step 1.

------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1161 at lib/refcount.c:25 kobject_get+0xa0/0xa4
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
Modules linked in: tpm_tis_spi tpm_tis_core tpm mdio_bcm_unimac brcmfmac
sha256_generic libsha256 sha256_arm hci_uart btbcm bluetooth cfg80211 vc4
brcmutil ecdh_generic ecc snd_soc_core crc32_arm_ce libaes
raspberrypi_hwmon ac97_bus snd_pcm_dmaengine bcm2711_thermal snd_pcm
snd_timer genet snd phy_generic soundcore [last unloaded: spi_bcm2835]
CPU: 3 PID: 1161 Comm: hold_open Not tainted 5.10.0ls-main-dirty #2
Hardware name: BCM2711
[<c0410c3c>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c040b580>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c040b580>] (show_stack) from [<c1092174>] (dump_stack+0xc4/0xd8)
[<c1092174>] (dump_stack) from [<c0445a30>] (__warn+0x104/0x108)
[<c0445a30>] (__warn) from [<c0445aa8>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x74/0xb8)
[<c0445aa8>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c08435d0>] (kobject_get+0xa0/0xa4)
[<c08435d0>] (kobject_get) from [<bf0a715c>] (tpm_try_get_ops+0x14/0x54 [tpm])
[<bf0a715c>] (tpm_try_get_ops [tpm]) from [<bf0a7d6c>] (tpm_common_write+0x38/0x60 [tpm])
[<bf0a7d6c>] (tpm_common_write [tpm]) from [<c05a7ac0>] (vfs_write+0xc4/0x3c0)
[<c05a7ac0>] (vfs_write) from [<c05a7ee4>] (ksys_write+0x58/0xcc)
[<c05a7ee4>] (ksys_write) from [<c04001a0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x4c)
Exception stack(0xc226bfa8 to 0xc226bff0)
bfa0:                   00000000 000105b4 00000003 beafe664 00000014 00000000
bfc0: 00000000 000105b4 000103f8 00000004 00000000 00000000 b6f9c000 beafe684
bfe0: 0000006c beafe648 0001056c b6eb6944
---[ end trace d4b8409def9b8b1f ]---

The reason for this warning is the attempt to get the chip->dev reference
in tpm_common_write() although the reference counter is already zero.

Since commit 8979b02 ("tpm: Fix reference count to main device") the
extra reference used to prevent a premature zero counter is never taken,
because the required TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 flag is never set.

Fix this by moving the TPM 2 character device handling from
tpm_chip_alloc() to tpm_add_char_device() which is called at a later point
in time when the flag has been set in case of TPM2.

Commit fdc915f ("tpm: expose spaces via a device link /dev/tpmrm<n>")
already introduced function tpm_devs_release() to release the extra
reference but did not implement the required put on chip->devs that results
in the call of this function.

Fix this by putting chip->devs in tpm_chip_unregister().

Finally move the new implementation for the TPM 2 handling into a new
function to avoid multiple checks for the TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 flag in the
good case and error cases.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: fdc915f ("tpm: expose spaces via a device link /dev/tpmrm<n>")
Fixes: 8979b02 ("tpm: Fix reference count to main device")
Co-developed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Signed-off-by: Lino Sanfilippo <LinoSanfilippo@gmx.de>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jenkins-verticloud pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 12, 2022
[ Upstream commit af68656d66eda219b7f55ce8313a1da0312c79e1 ]

While handling PCI errors (AER flow) driver tries to
disable NAPI [napi_disable()] after NAPI is deleted
[__netif_napi_del()] which causes unexpected system
hang/crash.

System message log shows the following:
=======================================
[ 3222.537510] EEH: Detected PCI bus error on PHB#384-PE#800000 [ 3222.537511] EEH: This PCI device has failed 2 times in the last hour and will be permanently disabled after 5 failures.
[ 3222.537512] EEH: Notify device drivers to shutdown [ 3222.537513] EEH: Beginning: 'error_detected(IO frozen)'
[ 3222.537514] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): Invoking
bnx2x->error_detected(IO frozen)
[ 3222.537516] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_error_detected:14236(eth14)]IO error detected [ 3222.537650] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): bnx2x driver reports:
'need reset'
[ 3222.537651] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.1): Invoking
bnx2x->error_detected(IO frozen)
[ 3222.537651] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_error_detected:14236(eth13)]IO error detected [ 3222.537729] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.1): bnx2x driver reports:
'need reset'
[ 3222.537729] EEH: Finished:'error_detected(IO frozen)' with aggregate recovery state:'need reset'
[ 3222.537890] EEH: Collect temporary log [ 3222.583481] EEH: of node=0384:80:00.0 [ 3222.583519] EEH: PCI device/vendor: 168e14e4 [ 3222.583557] EEH: PCI cmd/status register: 00100140 [ 3222.583557] EEH: PCI-E capabilities and status follow:
[ 3222.583744] EEH: PCI-E 00: 00020010 012c8da 00095d5e 00455c82 [ 3222.583892] EEH: PCI-E 10: 10820000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.583893] EEH: PCI-E 20: 00000000 [ 3222.583893] EEH: PCI-E AER capability register set follows:
[ 3222.584079] EEH: PCI-E AER 00: 13c10001 00000000 00000000 00062030 [ 3222.584230] EEH: PCI-E AER 10: 00002000 000031c0 000001e0 00000000 [ 3222.584378] EEH: PCI-E AER 20: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584416] EEH: PCI-E AER 30: 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584416] EEH: of node=0384:80:00.1 [ 3222.584454] EEH: PCI device/vendor: 168e14e4 [ 3222.584491] EEH: PCI cmd/status register: 00100140 [ 3222.584492] EEH: PCI-E capabilities and status follow:
[ 3222.584677] EEH: PCI-E 00: 00020010 012c8da 00095d5e 00455c82 [ 3222.584825] EEH: PCI-E 10: 10820000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584826] EEH: PCI-E 20: 00000000 [ 3222.584826] EEH: PCI-E AER capability register set follows:
[ 3222.585011] EEH: PCI-E AER 00: 13c10001 00000000 00000000 00062030 [ 3222.585160] EEH: PCI-E AER 10: 00002000 000031c0 000001e0 00000000 [ 3222.585309] EEH: PCI-E AER 20: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.585347] EEH: PCI-E AER 30: 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.586872] RTAS: event: 5, Type: Platform Error (224), Severity: 2 [ 3222.586873] EEH: Reset without hotplug activity [ 3224.762767] EEH: Beginning: 'slot_reset'
[ 3224.762770] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): Invoking
bnx2x->slot_reset()
[ 3224.762771] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14271(eth14)]IO slot reset initializing...
[ 3224.762887] bnx2x 0384:80:00.0: enabling device (0140 -> 0142) [ 3224.768157] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14287(eth14)]IO slot reset
--> driver unload

Uninterruptible tasks
=====================
crash> ps | grep UN
     213      2  11  c000000004c89e00  UN   0.0       0      0  [eehd]
     215      2   0  c000000004c80000  UN   0.0       0      0
[kworker/0:2]
    2196      1  28  c000000004504f00  UN   0.1   15936  11136  wickedd
    4287      1   9  c00000020d076800  UN   0.0    4032   3008  agetty
    4289      1  20  c00000020d056680  UN   0.0    7232   3840  agetty
   32423      2  26  c00000020038c580  UN   0.0       0      0
[kworker/26:3]
   32871   4241  27  c0000002609ddd00  UN   0.1   18624  11648  sshd
   32920  10130  16  c00000027284a100  UN   0.1   48512  12608  sendmail
   33092  32987   0  c000000205218b00  UN   0.1   48512  12608  sendmail
   33154   4567  16  c000000260e51780  UN   0.1   48832  12864  pickup
   33209   4241  36  c000000270cb6500  UN   0.1   18624  11712  sshd
   33473  33283   0  c000000205211480  UN   0.1   48512  12672  sendmail
   33531   4241  37  c00000023c902780  UN   0.1   18624  11648  sshd

EEH handler hung while bnx2x sleeping and holding RTNL lock
===========================================================
crash> bt 213
PID: 213    TASK: c000000004c89e00  CPU: 11  COMMAND: "eehd"
  #0 [c000000004d477e0] __schedule at c000000000c70808
  #1 [c000000004d478b0] schedule at c000000000c70ee0
  #2 [c000000004d478e0] schedule_timeout at c000000000c76dec
  #3 [c000000004d479c0] msleep at c0000000002120cc
  #4 [c000000004d479f0] napi_disable at c000000000a06448
                                        ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
  #5 [c000000004d47a30] bnx2x_netif_stop at c0080000018dba94 [bnx2x]
  #6 [c000000004d47a60] bnx2x_io_slot_reset at c0080000018a551c [bnx2x]
  #7 [c000000004d47b20] eeh_report_reset at c00000000004c9bc
  #8 [c000000004d47b90] eeh_pe_report at c00000000004d1a8
  #9 [c000000004d47c40] eeh_handle_normal_event at c00000000004da64

And the sleeping source code
============================
crash> dis -ls c000000000a06448
FILE: ../net/core/dev.c
LINE: 6702

   6697  {
   6698          might_sleep();
   6699          set_bit(NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, &n->state);
   6700
   6701          while (test_and_set_bit(NAPI_STATE_SCHED, &n->state))
* 6702                  msleep(1);
   6703          while (test_and_set_bit(NAPI_STATE_NPSVC, &n->state))
   6704                  msleep(1);
   6705
   6706          hrtimer_cancel(&n->timer);
   6707
   6708          clear_bit(NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, &n->state);
   6709  }

EEH calls into bnx2x twice based on the system log above, first through
bnx2x_io_error_detected() and then bnx2x_io_slot_reset(), and executes
the following call chains:

bnx2x_io_error_detected()
  +-> bnx2x_eeh_nic_unload()
       +-> bnx2x_del_all_napi()
            +-> __netif_napi_del()

bnx2x_io_slot_reset()
  +-> bnx2x_netif_stop()
       +-> bnx2x_napi_disable()
            +->napi_disable()

Fix this by correcting the sequence of NAPI APIs usage,
that is delete the NAPI after disabling it.

Fixes: 7fa6f34 ("bnx2x: AER revised")
Reported-by: David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Manish Chopra <manishc@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Ariel Elior <aelior@marvell.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220426153913.6966-1-manishc@marvell.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
jenkins-verticloud pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 6, 2022
commit d1dc87763f406d4e67caf16dbe438a5647692395 upstream.

A rare BUG_ON triggered in assoc_array_gc:

    [3430308.818153] kernel BUG at lib/assoc_array.c:1609!

Which corresponded to the statement currently at line 1593 upstream:

    BUG_ON(assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(p));

Using the data from the core dump, I was able to generate a userspace
reproducer[1] and determine the cause of the bug.

[1]: https://github.com/brenns10/kernel_stuff/tree/master/assoc_array_gc

After running the iterator on the entire branch, an internal tree node
looked like the following:

    NODE (nr_leaves_on_branch: 3)
      SLOT [0] NODE (2 leaves)
      SLOT [1] NODE (1 leaf)
      SLOT [2..f] NODE (empty)

In the userspace reproducer, the pr_devel output when compressing this
node was:

    -- compress node 0x5607cc089380 --
    free=0, leaves=0
    [0] retain node 2/1 [nx 0]
    [1] fold node 1/1 [nx 0]
    [2] fold node 0/1 [nx 2]
    [3] fold node 0/2 [nx 2]
    [4] fold node 0/3 [nx 2]
    [5] fold node 0/4 [nx 2]
    [6] fold node 0/5 [nx 2]
    [7] fold node 0/6 [nx 2]
    [8] fold node 0/7 [nx 2]
    [9] fold node 0/8 [nx 2]
    [10] fold node 0/9 [nx 2]
    [11] fold node 0/10 [nx 2]
    [12] fold node 0/11 [nx 2]
    [13] fold node 0/12 [nx 2]
    [14] fold node 0/13 [nx 2]
    [15] fold node 0/14 [nx 2]
    after: 3

At slot 0, an internal node with 2 leaves could not be folded into the
node, because there was only one available slot (slot 0). Thus, the
internal node was retained. At slot 1, the node had one leaf, and was
able to be folded in successfully. The remaining nodes had no leaves,
and so were removed. By the end of the compression stage, there were 14
free slots, and only 3 leaf nodes. The tree was ascended and then its
parent node was compressed. When this node was seen, it could not be
folded, due to the internal node it contained.

The invariant for compression in this function is: whenever
nr_leaves_on_branch < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT, the node should contain all
leaf nodes. The compression step currently cannot guarantee this, given
the corner case shown above.

To fix this issue, retry compression whenever we have retained a node,
and yet nr_leaves_on_branch < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT. This second
compression will then allow the node in slot 1 to be folded in,
satisfying the invariant. Below is the output of the reproducer once the
fix is applied:

    -- compress node 0x560e9c562380 --
    free=0, leaves=0
    [0] retain node 2/1 [nx 0]
    [1] fold node 1/1 [nx 0]
    [2] fold node 0/1 [nx 2]
    [3] fold node 0/2 [nx 2]
    [4] fold node 0/3 [nx 2]
    [5] fold node 0/4 [nx 2]
    [6] fold node 0/5 [nx 2]
    [7] fold node 0/6 [nx 2]
    [8] fold node 0/7 [nx 2]
    [9] fold node 0/8 [nx 2]
    [10] fold node 0/9 [nx 2]
    [11] fold node 0/10 [nx 2]
    [12] fold node 0/11 [nx 2]
    [13] fold node 0/12 [nx 2]
    [14] fold node 0/13 [nx 2]
    [15] fold node 0/14 [nx 2]
    internal nodes remain despite enough space, retrying
    -- compress node 0x560e9c562380 --
    free=14, leaves=1
    [0] fold node 2/15 [nx 0]
    after: 3

Changes
=======
DH:
 - Use false instead of 0.
 - Reorder the inserted lines in a couple of places to put retained before
   next_slot.

ver #2)
 - Fix typo in pr_devel, correct comparison to "<="

Fixes: 3cb9895 ("Add a generic associative array implementation.")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220511225517.407935-1-stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com/ # v1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220512215045.489140-1-stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com/ # v2
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jenkins-verticloud pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 14, 2022
[ Upstream commit 6b9dbedbe3499fef862c4dff5217cf91f34e43b3 ]

pty_write() invokes kmalloc() which may invoke a normal printk() to print
failure message.  This can cause a deadlock in the scenario reported by
syz-bot below:

       CPU0              CPU1                    CPU2
       ----              ----                    ----
                         lock(console_owner);
                                                 lock(&port_lock_key);
  lock(&port->lock);
                         lock(&port_lock_key);
                                                 lock(&port->lock);
  lock(console_owner);

As commit dbdda84 ("printk: Add console owner and waiter logic to
load balance console writes") said, such deadlock can be prevented by
using printk_deferred() in kmalloc() (which is invoked in the section
guarded by the port->lock).  But there are too many printk() on the
kmalloc() path, and kmalloc() can be called from anywhere, so changing
printk() to printk_deferred() is too complicated and inelegant.

Therefore, this patch chooses to specify __GFP_NOWARN to kmalloc(), so
that printk() will not be called, and this deadlock problem can be
avoided.

Syzbot reported the following lockdep error:

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.4.143-00237-g08ccc19a-dirty #10 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor.4/29420 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff8aedb2a0 (console_owner){....}-{0:0}, at: console_trylock_spinning kernel/printk/printk.c:1752 [inline]
ffffffff8aedb2a0 (console_owner){....}-{0:0}, at: vprintk_emit+0x2ca/0x470 kernel/printk/printk.c:2023

but task is already holding lock:
ffff8880119c9158 (&port->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: pty_write+0xf4/0x1f0 drivers/tty/pty.c:120

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #2 (&port->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:
       __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
       _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159
       tty_port_tty_get drivers/tty/tty_port.c:288 [inline]          		<-- lock(&port->lock);
       tty_port_default_wakeup+0x1d/0xb0 drivers/tty/tty_port.c:47
       serial8250_tx_chars+0x530/0xa80 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:1767
       serial8250_handle_irq.part.0+0x31f/0x3d0 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:1854
       serial8250_handle_irq drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:1827 [inline] 	<-- lock(&port_lock_key);
       serial8250_default_handle_irq+0xb2/0x220 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:1870
       serial8250_interrupt+0xfd/0x200 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_core.c:126
       __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x109/0xa50 kernel/irq/handle.c:156
       [...]

-> #1 (&port_lock_key){-.-.}-{2:2}:
       __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
       _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159
       serial8250_console_write+0x184/0xa40 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:3198
										<-- lock(&port_lock_key);
       call_console_drivers kernel/printk/printk.c:1819 [inline]
       console_unlock+0x8cb/0xd00 kernel/printk/printk.c:2504
       vprintk_emit+0x1b5/0x470 kernel/printk/printk.c:2024			<-- lock(console_owner);
       vprintk_func+0x8d/0x250 kernel/printk/printk_safe.c:394
       printk+0xba/0xed kernel/printk/printk.c:2084
       register_console+0x8b3/0xc10 kernel/printk/printk.c:2829
       univ8250_console_init+0x3a/0x46 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_core.c:681
       console_init+0x49d/0x6d3 kernel/printk/printk.c:2915
       start_kernel+0x5e9/0x879 init/main.c:713
       secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:241

-> #0 (console_owner){....}-{0:0}:
       [...]
       lock_acquire+0x127/0x340 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4734
       console_trylock_spinning kernel/printk/printk.c:1773 [inline]		<-- lock(console_owner);
       vprintk_emit+0x307/0x470 kernel/printk/printk.c:2023
       vprintk_func+0x8d/0x250 kernel/printk/printk_safe.c:394
       printk+0xba/0xed kernel/printk/printk.c:2084
       fail_dump lib/fault-inject.c:45 [inline]
       should_fail+0x67b/0x7c0 lib/fault-inject.c:144
       __should_failslab+0x152/0x1c0 mm/failslab.c:33
       should_failslab+0x5/0x10 mm/slab_common.c:1224
       slab_pre_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:468 [inline]
       slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2723 [inline]
       slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2807 [inline]
       __kmalloc+0x72/0x300 mm/slub.c:3871
       kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:582 [inline]
       tty_buffer_alloc+0x23f/0x2a0 drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c:175
       __tty_buffer_request_room+0x156/0x2a0 drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c:273
       tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag+0x93/0x250 drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c:318
       tty_insert_flip_string include/linux/tty_flip.h:37 [inline]
       pty_write+0x126/0x1f0 drivers/tty/pty.c:122				<-- lock(&port->lock);
       n_tty_write+0xa7a/0xfc0 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2356
       do_tty_write drivers/tty/tty_io.c:961 [inline]
       tty_write+0x512/0x930 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1045
       __vfs_write+0x76/0x100 fs/read_write.c:494
       [...]

other info that might help us debug this:

Chain exists of:
  console_owner --> &port_lock_key --> &port->lock

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220511061951.1114-2-zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220510113809.80626-2-zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com
Fixes: b6da31b2c07c ("tty: Fix data race in tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag")
Signed-off-by: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
jenkins-verticloud pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 14, 2022
commit 863e0d81b6683c4cbc588ad831f560c90e494bef upstream.

When user_dlm_destroy_lock failed, it didn't clean up the flags it set
before exit.  For USER_LOCK_IN_TEARDOWN, if this function fails because of
lock is still in used, next time when unlink invokes this function, it
will return succeed, and then unlink will remove inode and dentry if lock
is not in used(file closed), but the dlm lock is still linked in dlm lock
resource, then when bast come in, it will trigger a panic due to
user-after-free.  See the following panic call trace.  To fix this,
USER_LOCK_IN_TEARDOWN should be reverted if fail.  And also error should
be returned if USER_LOCK_IN_TEARDOWN is set to let user know that unlink
fail.

For the case of ocfs2_dlm_unlock failure, besides USER_LOCK_IN_TEARDOWN,
USER_LOCK_BUSY is also required to be cleared.  Even though spin lock is
released in between, but USER_LOCK_IN_TEARDOWN is still set, for
USER_LOCK_BUSY, if before every place that waits on this flag,
USER_LOCK_IN_TEARDOWN is checked to bail out, that will make sure no flow
waits on the busy flag set by user_dlm_destroy_lock(), then we can
simplely revert USER_LOCK_BUSY when ocfs2_dlm_unlock fails.  Fix
user_dlm_cluster_lock() which is the only function not following this.

[  941.336392] (python,26174,16):dlmfs_unlink:562 ERROR: unlink
004fb0000060000b5a90b8c847b72e1, error -16 from destroy
[  989.757536] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  989.757709] kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/dlmfs/userdlm.c:173!
[  989.757876] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[  989.758027] Modules linked in: ksplice_2zhuk2jr_ib_ipoib_new(O)
ksplice_2zhuk2jr(O) mptctl mptbase xen_netback xen_blkback xen_gntalloc
xen_gntdev xen_evtchn cdc_ether usbnet mii ocfs2 jbd2 rpcsec_gss_krb5
auth_rpcgss nfsv4 nfsv3 nfs_acl nfs fscache lockd grace ocfs2_dlmfs
ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue configfs bnx2fc
fcoe libfcoe libfc scsi_transport_fc sunrpc ipmi_devintf bridge stp llc
rds_rdma rds bonding ib_sdp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_ucm ib_uverbs ib_umad
rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm falcon_lsm_serviceable(PE) falcon_nf_netcontain(PE)
mlx4_vnic falcon_kal(E) falcon_lsm_pinned_13402(E) mlx4_ib ib_sa ib_mad
ib_core ib_addr xenfs xen_privcmd dm_multipath iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support
pcspkr sb_edac edac_core i2c_i801 lpc_ich mfd_core ipmi_ssif i2c_core ipmi_si
ipmi_msghandler
[  989.760686]  ioatdma sg ext3 jbd mbcache sd_mod ahci libahci ixgbe dca ptp
pps_core vxlan udp_tunnel ip6_udp_tunnel megaraid_sas mlx4_core crc32c_intel
be2iscsi bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i cxgb4 cxgb3i libcxgbi ipv6 cxgb3 mdio
libiscsi_tcp qla4xxx iscsi_boot_sysfs libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi wmi
dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [last unloaded:
ksplice_2zhuk2jr_ib_ipoib_old]
[  989.761987] CPU: 10 PID: 19102 Comm: dlm_thread Tainted: P           OE
4.1.12-124.57.1.el6uek.x86_64 #2
[  989.762290] Hardware name: Oracle Corporation ORACLE SERVER
X5-2/ASM,MOTHERBOARD,1U, BIOS 30350100 06/17/2021
[  989.762599] task: ffff880178af6200 ti: ffff88017f7c8000 task.ti:
ffff88017f7c8000
[  989.762848] RIP: e030:[<ffffffffc07d4316>]  [<ffffffffc07d4316>]
__user_dlm_queue_lockres.part.4+0x76/0x80 [ocfs2_dlmfs]
[  989.763185] RSP: e02b:ffff88017f7cbcb8  EFLAGS: 00010246
[  989.763353] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff880174d48008 RCX:
0000000000000003
[  989.763565] RDX: 0000000000120012 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI:
ffff880174d48170
[  989.763778] RBP: ffff88017f7cbcc8 R08: ffff88021f4293b0 R09:
0000000000000000
[  989.763991] R10: ffff880179c8c000 R11: 0000000000000003 R12:
ffff880174d48008
[  989.764204] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: ffff880179c8c000 R15:
ffff88021db7a000
[  989.764422] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880247480000(0000)
knlGS:ffff880247480000
[  989.764685] CS:  e033 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  989.764865] CR2: ffff8000007f6800 CR3: 0000000001ae0000 CR4:
0000000000042660
[  989.765081] Stack:
[  989.765167]  0000000000000003 ffff880174d48040 ffff88017f7cbd18
ffffffffc07d455f
[  989.765442]  ffff88017f7cbd88 ffffffff816fb639 ffff88017f7cbd38
ffff8800361b5600
[  989.765717]  ffff88021db7a000 ffff88021f429380 0000000000000003
ffffffffc0453020
[  989.765991] Call Trace:
[  989.766093]  [<ffffffffc07d455f>] user_bast+0x5f/0xf0 [ocfs2_dlmfs]
[  989.766287]  [<ffffffff816fb639>] ? schedule_timeout+0x169/0x2d0
[  989.766475]  [<ffffffffc0453020>] ? o2dlm_lock_ast_wrapper+0x20/0x20
[ocfs2_stack_o2cb]
[  989.766738]  [<ffffffffc045303a>] o2dlm_blocking_ast_wrapper+0x1a/0x20
[ocfs2_stack_o2cb]
[  989.767010]  [<ffffffffc0864ec6>] dlm_do_local_bast+0x46/0xe0 [ocfs2_dlm]
[  989.767217]  [<ffffffffc084f5cc>] ? dlm_lockres_calc_usage+0x4c/0x60
[ocfs2_dlm]
[  989.767466]  [<ffffffffc08501f1>] dlm_thread+0xa31/0x1140 [ocfs2_dlm]
[  989.767662]  [<ffffffff816f78da>] ? __schedule+0x24a/0x810
[  989.767834]  [<ffffffff816f78ce>] ? __schedule+0x23e/0x810
[  989.768006]  [<ffffffff816f78da>] ? __schedule+0x24a/0x810
[  989.768178]  [<ffffffff816f78ce>] ? __schedule+0x23e/0x810
[  989.768349]  [<ffffffff816f78da>] ? __schedule+0x24a/0x810
[  989.768521]  [<ffffffff816f78ce>] ? __schedule+0x23e/0x810
[  989.768693]  [<ffffffff816f78da>] ? __schedule+0x24a/0x810
[  989.768893]  [<ffffffff816f78ce>] ? __schedule+0x23e/0x810
[  989.769067]  [<ffffffff816f78da>] ? __schedule+0x24a/0x810
[  989.769241]  [<ffffffff810ce4d0>] ? wait_woken+0x90/0x90
[  989.769411]  [<ffffffffc084f7c0>] ? dlm_kick_thread+0x80/0x80 [ocfs2_dlm]
[  989.769617]  [<ffffffff810a8bbb>] kthread+0xcb/0xf0
[  989.769774]  [<ffffffff816f78da>] ? __schedule+0x24a/0x810
[  989.769945]  [<ffffffff816f78da>] ? __schedule+0x24a/0x810
[  989.770117]  [<ffffffff810a8af0>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x180/0x180
[  989.770321]  [<ffffffff816fdaa1>] ret_from_fork+0x61/0x90
[  989.770492]  [<ffffffff810a8af0>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x180/0x180
[  989.770689] Code: d0 00 00 00 f0 45 7d c0 bf 00 20 00 00 48 89 83 c0 00 00
00 48 89 83 c8 00 00 00 e8 55 c1 8c c0 83 4b 04 10 48 83 c4 08 5b 5d c3 <0f>
0b 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 55 41 54 53 48 83
[  989.771892] RIP  [<ffffffffc07d4316>]
__user_dlm_queue_lockres.part.4+0x76/0x80 [ocfs2_dlmfs]
[  989.772174]  RSP <ffff88017f7cbcb8>
[  989.772704] ---[ end trace ebd1e38cebcc93a8 ]---
[  989.772907] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[  989.773173] Kernel Offset: disabled

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220518235224.87100-2-junxiao.bi@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jenkins-verticloud pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 14, 2022
commit 520778042ccca019f3ffa136dd0ca565c486cedd upstream.

Since 3e135cd ("netfilter: nft_dynset: dynamic stateful expression
instantiation"), it is possible to attach stateful expressions to set
elements.

cd5125d8f518 ("netfilter: nf_tables: split set destruction in deactivate
and destroy phase") introduces conditional destruction on the object to
accomodate transaction semantics.

nft_expr_init() calls expr->ops->init() first, then check for
NFT_STATEFUL_EXPR, this stills allows to initialize a non-stateful
lookup expressions which points to a set, which might lead to UAF since
the set is not properly detached from the set->binding for this case.
Anyway, this combination is non-sense from nf_tables perspective.

This patch fixes this problem by checking for NFT_STATEFUL_EXPR before
expr->ops->init() is called.

The reporter provides a KASAN splat and a poc reproducer (similar to
those autogenerated by syzbot to report use-after-free errors). It is
unknown to me if they are using syzbot or if they use similar automated
tool to locate the bug that they are reporting.

For the record, this is the KASAN splat.

[   85.431824] ==================================================================
[   85.432901] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in nf_tables_bind_set+0x81b/0xa20
[   85.433825] Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880286f0e98 by task poc/776
[   85.434756]
[   85.434999] CPU: 1 PID: 776 Comm: poc Tainted: G        W         5.18.0+ #2
[   85.436023] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014

Fixes: 0b2d8a7 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add helper functions for expression handling")
Reported-and-tested-by: Aaron Adams <edg-e@nccgroup.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
[Ajay: Regenerated the patch for v4.14.y]
Signed-off-by: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jenkins-verticloud pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 25, 2022
[ Upstream commit 1b710b1b10eff9d46666064ea25f079f70bc67a8 ]

Sergey didn't like the locking order,

uart_port->lock  ->  tty_port->lock

uart_write (uart_port->lock)
  __uart_start
    pl011_start_tx
      pl011_tx_chars
        uart_write_wakeup
          tty_port_tty_wakeup
            tty_port_default
              tty_port_tty_get (tty_port->lock)

but those code is so old, and I have no clue how to de-couple it after
checking other locks in the splat. There is an onging effort to make all
printk() as deferred, so until that happens, workaround it for now as a
short-term fix.

LTP: starting iogen01 (export LTPROOT; rwtest -N iogen01 -i 120s -s
read,write -Da -Dv -n 2 500b:$TMPDIR/doio.f1.$$
1000b:$TMPDIR/doio.f2.$$)
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
------------------------------------------------------
doio/49441 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff008b7cff7290 (&(&zone->lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: rmqueue+0x138/0x2050

but task is already holding lock:
60ff000822352818 (&pool->lock/1){-.-.}, at: start_flush_work+0xd8/0x3f0

  which lock already depends on the new lock.

  the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

  -> #4 (&pool->lock/1){-.-.}:
       lock_acquire+0x320/0x360
       _raw_spin_lock+0x64/0x80
       __queue_work+0x4b4/0xa10
       queue_work_on+0xac/0x11c
       tty_schedule_flip+0x84/0xbc
       tty_flip_buffer_push+0x1c/0x28
       pty_write+0x98/0xd0
       n_tty_write+0x450/0x60c
       tty_write+0x338/0x474
       __vfs_write+0x88/0x214
       vfs_write+0x12c/0x1a4
       redirected_tty_write+0x90/0xdc
       do_loop_readv_writev+0x140/0x180
       do_iter_write+0xe0/0x10c
       vfs_writev+0x134/0x1cc
       do_writev+0xbc/0x130
       __arm64_sys_writev+0x58/0x8c
       el0_svc_handler+0x170/0x240
       el0_sync_handler+0x150/0x250
       el0_sync+0x164/0x180

  -> #3 (&(&port->lock)->rlock){-.-.}:
       lock_acquire+0x320/0x360
       _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x7c/0x9c
       tty_port_tty_get+0x24/0x60
       tty_port_default_wakeup+0x1c/0x3c
       tty_port_tty_wakeup+0x34/0x40
       uart_write_wakeup+0x28/0x44
       pl011_tx_chars+0x1b8/0x270
       pl011_start_tx+0x24/0x70
       __uart_start+0x5c/0x68
       uart_write+0x164/0x1c8
       do_output_char+0x33c/0x348
       n_tty_write+0x4bc/0x60c
       tty_write+0x338/0x474
       redirected_tty_write+0xc0/0xdc
       do_loop_readv_writev+0x140/0x180
       do_iter_write+0xe0/0x10c
       vfs_writev+0x134/0x1cc
       do_writev+0xbc/0x130
       __arm64_sys_writev+0x58/0x8c
       el0_svc_handler+0x170/0x240
       el0_sync_handler+0x150/0x250
       el0_sync+0x164/0x180

  -> #2 (&port_lock_key){-.-.}:
       lock_acquire+0x320/0x360
       _raw_spin_lock+0x64/0x80
       pl011_console_write+0xec/0x2cc
       console_unlock+0x794/0x96c
       vprintk_emit+0x260/0x31c
       vprintk_default+0x54/0x7c
       vprintk_func+0x218/0x254
       printk+0x7c/0xa4
       register_console+0x734/0x7b0
       uart_add_one_port+0x734/0x834
       pl011_register_port+0x6c/0xac
       sbsa_uart_probe+0x234/0x2ec
       platform_drv_probe+0xd4/0x124
       really_probe+0x250/0x71c
       driver_probe_device+0xb4/0x200
       __device_attach_driver+0xd8/0x188
       bus_for_each_drv+0xbc/0x110
       __device_attach+0x120/0x220
       device_initial_probe+0x20/0x2c
       bus_probe_device+0x54/0x100
       device_add+0xae8/0xc2c
       platform_device_add+0x278/0x3b8
       platform_device_register_full+0x238/0x2ac
       acpi_create_platform_device+0x2dc/0x3a8
       acpi_bus_attach+0x390/0x3cc
       acpi_bus_attach+0x108/0x3cc
       acpi_bus_attach+0x108/0x3cc
       acpi_bus_attach+0x108/0x3cc
       acpi_bus_scan+0x7c/0xb0
       acpi_scan_init+0xe4/0x304
       acpi_init+0x100/0x114
       do_one_initcall+0x348/0x6a0
       do_initcall_level+0x190/0x1fc
       do_basic_setup+0x34/0x4c
       kernel_init_freeable+0x19c/0x260
       kernel_init+0x18/0x338
       ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

  -> #1 (console_owner){-...}:
       lock_acquire+0x320/0x360
       console_lock_spinning_enable+0x6c/0x7c
       console_unlock+0x4f8/0x96c
       vprintk_emit+0x260/0x31c
       vprintk_default+0x54/0x7c
       vprintk_func+0x218/0x254
       printk+0x7c/0xa4
       get_random_u64+0x1c4/0x1dc
       shuffle_pick_tail+0x40/0xac
       __free_one_page+0x424/0x710
       free_one_page+0x70/0x120
       __free_pages_ok+0x61c/0xa94
       __free_pages_core+0x1bc/0x294
       memblock_free_pages+0x38/0x48
       __free_pages_memory+0xcc/0xfc
       __free_memory_core+0x70/0x78
       free_low_memory_core_early+0x148/0x18c
       memblock_free_all+0x18/0x54
       mem_init+0xb4/0x17c
       mm_init+0x14/0x38
       start_kernel+0x19c/0x530

  -> #0 (&(&zone->lock)->rlock){..-.}:
       validate_chain+0xf6c/0x2e2c
       __lock_acquire+0x868/0xc2c
       lock_acquire+0x320/0x360
       _raw_spin_lock+0x64/0x80
       rmqueue+0x138/0x2050
       get_page_from_freelist+0x474/0x688
       __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x3b4/0x18dc
       alloc_pages_current+0xd0/0xe0
       alloc_slab_page+0x2b4/0x5e0
       new_slab+0xc8/0x6bc
       ___slab_alloc+0x3b8/0x640
       kmem_cache_alloc+0x4b4/0x588
       __debug_object_init+0x778/0x8b4
       debug_object_init_on_stack+0x40/0x50
       start_flush_work+0x16c/0x3f0
       __flush_work+0xb8/0x124
       flush_work+0x20/0x30
       xlog_cil_force_lsn+0x88/0x204 [xfs]
       xfs_log_force_lsn+0x128/0x1b8 [xfs]
       xfs_file_fsync+0x3c4/0x488 [xfs]
       vfs_fsync_range+0xb0/0xd0
       generic_write_sync+0x80/0xa0 [xfs]
       xfs_file_buffered_aio_write+0x66c/0x6e4 [xfs]
       xfs_file_write_iter+0x1a0/0x218 [xfs]
       __vfs_write+0x1cc/0x214
       vfs_write+0x12c/0x1a4
       ksys_write+0xb0/0x120
       __arm64_sys_write+0x54/0x88
       el0_svc_handler+0x170/0x240
       el0_sync_handler+0x150/0x250
       el0_sync+0x164/0x180

       other info that might help us debug this:

 Chain exists of:
   &(&zone->lock)->rlock --> &(&port->lock)->rlock --> &pool->lock/1

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&pool->lock/1);
                               lock(&(&port->lock)->rlock);
                               lock(&pool->lock/1);
  lock(&(&zone->lock)->rlock);

                *** DEADLOCK ***

4 locks held by doio/49441:
 #0: a0ff00886fc27408 (sb_writers#8){.+.+}, at: vfs_write+0x118/0x1a4
 #1: 8fff00080810dfe0 (&xfs_nondir_ilock_class){++++}, at:
xfs_ilock+0x2a8/0x300 [xfs]
 #2: ffff9000129f2390 (rcu_read_lock){....}, at:
rcu_lock_acquire+0x8/0x38
 #3: 60ff000822352818 (&pool->lock/1){-.-.}, at:
start_flush_work+0xd8/0x3f0

               stack backtrace:
CPU: 48 PID: 49441 Comm: doio Tainted: G        W
Hardware name: HPE Apollo 70             /C01_APACHE_MB         , BIOS
L50_5.13_1.11 06/18/2019
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0x0/0x248
 show_stack+0x20/0x2c
 dump_stack+0xe8/0x150
 print_circular_bug+0x368/0x380
 check_noncircular+0x28c/0x294
 validate_chain+0xf6c/0x2e2c
 __lock_acquire+0x868/0xc2c
 lock_acquire+0x320/0x360
 _raw_spin_lock+0x64/0x80
 rmqueue+0x138/0x2050
 get_page_from_freelist+0x474/0x688
 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x3b4/0x18dc
 alloc_pages_current+0xd0/0xe0
 alloc_slab_page+0x2b4/0x5e0
 new_slab+0xc8/0x6bc
 ___slab_alloc+0x3b8/0x640
 kmem_cache_alloc+0x4b4/0x588
 __debug_object_init+0x778/0x8b4
 debug_object_init_on_stack+0x40/0x50
 start_flush_work+0x16c/0x3f0
 __flush_work+0xb8/0x124
 flush_work+0x20/0x30
 xlog_cil_force_lsn+0x88/0x204 [xfs]
 xfs_log_force_lsn+0x128/0x1b8 [xfs]
 xfs_file_fsync+0x3c4/0x488 [xfs]
 vfs_fsync_range+0xb0/0xd0
 generic_write_sync+0x80/0xa0 [xfs]
 xfs_file_buffered_aio_write+0x66c/0x6e4 [xfs]
 xfs_file_write_iter+0x1a0/0x218 [xfs]
 __vfs_write+0x1cc/0x214
 vfs_write+0x12c/0x1a4
 ksys_write+0xb0/0x120
 __arm64_sys_write+0x54/0x88
 el0_svc_handler+0x170/0x240
 el0_sync_handler+0x150/0x250
 el0_sync+0x164/0x180

Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573679785-21068-1-git-send-email-cai@lca.pw
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jenkins-verticloud pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 22, 2022
…tion

commit 07fd5b6cdf3cc30bfde8fe0f644771688be04447 upstream.

Each cset (css_set) is pinned by its tasks. When we're moving tasks around
across csets for a migration, we need to hold the source and destination
csets to ensure that they don't go away while we're moving tasks about. This
is done by linking cset->mg_preload_node on either the
mgctx->preloaded_src_csets or mgctx->preloaded_dst_csets list. Using the
same cset->mg_preload_node for both the src and dst lists was deemed okay as
a cset can't be both the source and destination at the same time.

Unfortunately, this overloading becomes problematic when multiple tasks are
involved in a migration and some of them are identity noop migrations while
others are actually moving across cgroups. For example, this can happen with
the following sequence on cgroup1:

 #1> mkdir -p /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/b
 #2> echo $$ > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/cgroup.procs
 #3> RUN_A_COMMAND_WHICH_CREATES_MULTIPLE_THREADS &
 #4> PID=$!
 #5> echo $PID > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/b/tasks
 #6> echo $PID > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/cgroup.procs

the process including the group leader back into a. In this final migration,
non-leader threads would be doing identity migration while the group leader
is doing an actual one.

After #3, let's say the whole process was in cset A, and that after #4, the
leader moves to cset B. Then, during #6, the following happens:

 1. cgroup_migrate_add_src() is called on B for the leader.

 2. cgroup_migrate_add_src() is called on A for the other threads.

 3. cgroup_migrate_prepare_dst() is called. It scans the src list.

 4. It notices that B wants to migrate to A, so it tries to A to the dst
    list but realizes that its ->mg_preload_node is already busy.

 5. and then it notices A wants to migrate to A as it's an identity
    migration, it culls it by list_del_init()'ing its ->mg_preload_node and
    putting references accordingly.

 6. The rest of migration takes place with B on the src list but nothing on
    the dst list.

This means that A isn't held while migration is in progress. If all tasks
leave A before the migration finishes and the incoming task pins it, the
cset will be destroyed leading to use-after-free.

This is caused by overloading cset->mg_preload_node for both src and dst
preload lists. We wanted to exclude the cset from the src list but ended up
inadvertently excluding it from the dst list too.

This patch fixes the issue by separating out cset->mg_preload_node into
->mg_src_preload_node and ->mg_dst_preload_node, so that the src and dst
preloadings don't interfere with each other.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Mukesh Ojha <quic_mojha@quicinc.com>
Reported-by: shisiyuan <shisiyuan19870131@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1654187688-27411-1-git-send-email-shisiyuan@xiaomi.com
Link: https://www.spinics.net/lists/cgroups/msg33313.html
Fixes: f817de9 ("cgroup: prepare migration path for unified hierarchy")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.16+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jenkins-verticloud pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 29, 2022
In 2019, Sergey fixed a lockdep splat with 15341b1dd409 ("char/random:
silence a lockdep splat with printk()"), but that got reverted soon
after from 4.19 because back then it apparently caused various problems.
But the issue it was fixing is still there, and more generally, many
patches turning printk() into printk_deferred() have landed since,
making me suspect it's okay to try this out again.

This should fix the following deadlock found by the kernel test robot:

[   18.287691] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[   18.287692] 4.19.248-00165-g3d1f971aa81f #1 Not tainted
[   18.287693] ------------------------------------------------------
[   18.287712] stop/202 is trying to acquire lock:
[   18.287713] (ptrval) (console_owner){..-.}, at: console_unlock (??:?)
[   18.287717]
[   18.287718] but task is already holding lock:
[   18.287718] (ptrval) (&(&port->lock)->rlock){-...}, at: pty_write (pty.c:?)
[   18.287722]
[   18.287722] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[   18.287723]
[   18.287724]
[   18.287725] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[   18.287725]
[   18.287726] -> #2 (&(&port->lock)->rlock){-...}:
[   18.287729] validate_chain+0x84a/0xe00
[   18.287729] __lock_acquire (lockdep.c:?)
[   18.287730] lock_acquire (??:?)
[   18.287731] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave (??:?)
[   18.287732] tty_port_tty_get (??:?)
[   18.287733] tty_port_default_wakeup (tty_port.c:?)
[   18.287734] tty_port_tty_wakeup (??:?)
[   18.287734] uart_write_wakeup (??:?)
[   18.287735] serial8250_tx_chars (??:?)
[   18.287736] serial8250_handle_irq (??:?)
[   18.287737] serial8250_default_handle_irq (8250_port.c:?)
[   18.287738] serial8250_interrupt (8250_core.c:?)
[   18.287738] __handle_irq_event_percpu (??:?)
[   18.287739] handle_irq_event_percpu (??:?)
[   18.287740] handle_irq_event (??:?)
[   18.287741] handle_edge_irq (??:?)
[   18.287742] handle_irq (??:?)
[   18.287742] do_IRQ (??:?)
[   18.287743] common_interrupt (entry_32.o:?)
[   18.287744] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore (??:?)
[   18.287745] uart_write (serial_core.c:?)
[   18.287746] process_output_block (n_tty.c:?)
[   18.287747] n_tty_write (n_tty.c:?)
[   18.287747] tty_write (tty_io.c:?)
[   18.287748] __vfs_write (??:?)
[   18.287749] vfs_write (??:?)
[   18.287750] ksys_write (??:?)
[   18.287750] sys_write (??:?)
[   18.287751] do_fast_syscall_32 (??:?)
[   18.287752] entry_SYSENTER_32 (??:?)
[   18.287752]
[   18.287753] -> #1 (&port_lock_key){-.-.}:
[   18.287756]
[   18.287756] -> #0 (console_owner){..-.}:
[   18.287759] check_prevs_add (lockdep.c:?)
[   18.287760] validate_chain+0x84a/0xe00
[   18.287761] __lock_acquire (lockdep.c:?)
[   18.287761] lock_acquire (??:?)
[   18.287762] console_unlock (??:?)
[   18.287763] vprintk_emit (??:?)
[   18.287764] vprintk_default (??:?)
[   18.287764] vprintk_func (??:?)
[   18.287765] printk (??:?)
[   18.287766] get_random_u32 (??:?)
[   18.287767] shuffle_freelist (slub.c:?)
[   18.287767] allocate_slab (slub.c:?)
[   18.287768] new_slab (slub.c:?)
[   18.287769] ___slab_alloc+0x6d0/0xb20
[   18.287770] __slab_alloc+0xd6/0x2e0
[   18.287770] __kmalloc (??:?)
[   18.287771] tty_buffer_alloc (tty_buffer.c:?)
[   18.287772] __tty_buffer_request_room (tty_buffer.c:?)
[   18.287773] tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag (??:?)
[   18.287774] pty_write (pty.c:?)
[   18.287775] process_output_block (n_tty.c:?)
[   18.287776] n_tty_write (n_tty.c:?)
[   18.287777] tty_write (tty_io.c:?)
[   18.287778] __vfs_write (??:?)
[   18.287779] vfs_write (??:?)
[   18.287780] ksys_write (??:?)
[   18.287780] sys_write (??:?)
[   18.287781] do_fast_syscall_32 (??:?)
[   18.287782] entry_SYSENTER_32 (??:?)
[   18.287783]
[   18.287783] other info that might help us debug this:
[   18.287784]
[   18.287785] Chain exists of:
[   18.287785]   console_owner --> &port_lock_key --> &(&port->lock)->rlock
[   18.287789]
[   18.287790]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[   18.287790]
[   18.287791]        CPU0                    CPU1
[   18.287792]        ----                    ----
[   18.287792]   lock(&(&port->lock)->rlock);
[   18.287794]                                lock(&port_lock_key);
[   18.287814]                                lock(&(&port->lock)->rlock);
[   18.287815]   lock(console_owner);
[   18.287817]
[   18.287818]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[   18.287818]
[   18.287819] 6 locks held by stop/202:
[   18.287820] #0: (ptrval) (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: ldsem_down_read (??:?)
[   18.287823] #1: (ptrval) (&tty->atomic_write_lock){+.+.}, at: tty_write_lock (tty_io.c:?)
[   18.287826] #2: (ptrval) (&o_tty->termios_rwsem/1){++++}, at: n_tty_write (n_tty.c:?)
[   18.287830] #3: (ptrval) (&ldata->output_lock){+.+.}, at: process_output_block (n_tty.c:?)
[   18.287834] #4: (ptrval) (&(&port->lock)->rlock){-...}, at: pty_write (pty.c:?)
[   18.287838] #5: (ptrval) (console_lock){+.+.}, at: console_trylock_spinning (printk.c:?)
[   18.287841]
[   18.287842] stack backtrace:
[   18.287843] CPU: 0 PID: 202 Comm: stop Not tainted 4.19.248-00165-g3d1f971aa81f #1
[   18.287843] Call Trace:
[   18.287844] dump_stack (??:?)
[   18.287845] print_circular_bug.cold+0x78/0x8b
[   18.287846] check_prev_add+0x66a/0xd20
[   18.287847] check_prevs_add (lockdep.c:?)
[   18.287848] validate_chain+0x84a/0xe00
[   18.287848] __lock_acquire (lockdep.c:?)
[   18.287849] lock_acquire (??:?)
[   18.287850] ? console_unlock (??:?)
[   18.287851] console_unlock (??:?)
[   18.287851] ? console_unlock (??:?)
[   18.287852] ? native_save_fl (??:?)
[   18.287853] vprintk_emit (??:?)
[   18.287854] vprintk_default (??:?)
[   18.287855] vprintk_func (??:?)
[   18.287855] printk (??:?)
[   18.287856] get_random_u32 (??:?)
[   18.287857] ? shuffle_freelist (slub.c:?)
[   18.287858] shuffle_freelist (slub.c:?)
[   18.287858] ? page_address (??:?)
[   18.287859] allocate_slab (slub.c:?)
[   18.287860] new_slab (slub.c:?)
[   18.287861] ? pvclock_clocksource_read (??:?)
[   18.287862] ___slab_alloc+0x6d0/0xb20
[   18.287862] ? kvm_sched_clock_read (kvmclock.c:?)
[   18.287863] ? __slab_alloc+0xbc/0x2e0
[   18.287864] ? native_wbinvd (paravirt.c:?)
[   18.287865] __slab_alloc+0xd6/0x2e0
[   18.287865] __kmalloc (??:?)
[   18.287866] ? __lock_acquire (lockdep.c:?)
[   18.287867] ? tty_buffer_alloc (tty_buffer.c:?)
[   18.287868] tty_buffer_alloc (tty_buffer.c:?)
[   18.287869] __tty_buffer_request_room (tty_buffer.c:?)
[   18.287869] tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag (??:?)
[   18.287870] pty_write (pty.c:?)
[   18.287871] process_output_block (n_tty.c:?)
[   18.287872] n_tty_write (n_tty.c:?)
[   18.287873] ? print_dl_stats (??:?)
[   18.287874] ? n_tty_ioctl (n_tty.c:?)
[   18.287874] tty_write (tty_io.c:?)
[   18.287875] ? n_tty_ioctl (n_tty.c:?)
[   18.287876] ? tty_write_unlock (tty_io.c:?)
[   18.287877] __vfs_write (??:?)
[   18.287877] vfs_write (??:?)
[   18.287878] ? __fget_light (file.c:?)
[   18.287879] ksys_write (??:?)

Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Lech Perczak <l.perczak@camlintechnologies.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Ytz+lo4zRQYG3JUR@xsang-OptiPlex-9020
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jenkins-verticloud pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 15, 2022
[ Upstream commit 84a53580c5d2138c7361c7c3eea5b31827e63b35 ]

The SRv6 layer allows defining HMAC data that can later be used to sign IPv6
Segment Routing Headers. This configuration is realised via netlink through
four attributes: SEG6_ATTR_HMACKEYID, SEG6_ATTR_SECRET, SEG6_ATTR_SECRETLEN and
SEG6_ATTR_ALGID. Because the SECRETLEN attribute is decoupled from the actual
length of the SECRET attribute, it is possible to provide invalid combinations
(e.g., secret = "", secretlen = 64). This case is not checked in the code and
with an appropriately crafted netlink message, an out-of-bounds read of up
to 64 bytes (max secret length) can occur past the skb end pointer and into
skb_shared_info:

Breakpoint 1, seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208
208		memcpy(hinfo->secret, secret, slen);
(gdb) bt
 #0  seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208
 #1  0xffffffff81e012e9 in genl_family_rcv_msg_doit (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=nlh@entry=0xffff88800b1b7600,
    extack=extack@entry=0xffffc90000ba7af0, ops=ops@entry=0xffffc90000ba7a80, hdrlen=4, net=0xffffffff84237580 <init_net>, family=<optimized out>,
    family=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:731
 #2  0xffffffff81e01435 in genl_family_rcv_msg (extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00,
    family=0xffffffff82fef6c0 <seg6_genl_family>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:775
 #3  genl_rcv_msg (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:792
 #4  0xffffffff81dfffc3 in netlink_rcv_skb (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, cb=cb@entry=0xffffffff81e01350 <genl_rcv_msg>)
    at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2501
 #5  0xffffffff81e00919 in genl_rcv (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:803
 #6  0xffffffff81dff6ae in netlink_unicast_kernel (ssk=0xffff888010eec800, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, sk=0xffff888004aed000)
    at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319
 #7  netlink_unicast (ssk=ssk@entry=0xffff888010eec800, skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, portid=portid@entry=0, nonblock=<optimized out>)
    at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345
 #8  0xffffffff81dff9a4 in netlink_sendmsg (sock=<optimized out>, msg=0xffffc90000ba7e48, len=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921
...
(gdb) p/x ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->head + ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->end
$1 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0
(gdb) p/x secret
$2 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0
(gdb) p slen
$3 = 64 '@'

The OOB data can then be read back from userspace by dumping HMAC state. This
commit fixes this by ensuring SECRETLEN cannot exceed the actual length of
SECRET.

Reported-by: Lucas Leong <wmliang.tw@gmail.com>
Tested: verified that EINVAL is correctly returned when secretlen > len(secret)
Fixes: 4f4853d ("ipv6: sr: implement API to control SR HMAC structure")
Signed-off-by: David Lebrun <dlebrun@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
jenkins-verticloud pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 18, 2023
[ Upstream commit f9574cd48679926e2a569e1957a5a1bcc8a719ac ]

Patch series "rapidio: fix three possible memory leaks".

This patchset fixes three name leaks in error handling.
 - patch #1 fixes two name leaks while rio_add_device() fails.
 - patch #2 fixes a name leak while  rio_register_mport() fails.

This patch (of 2):

If rio_add_device() returns error, the name allocated by dev_set_name()
need be freed.  It should use put_device() to give up the reference in the
error path, so that the name can be freed in kobject_cleanup(), and the
'rdev' can be freed in rio_release_dev().

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221114152636.2939035-1-yangyingliang@huawei.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221114152636.2939035-2-yangyingliang@huawei.com
Fixes: e8de370 ("rapidio: add mport char device driver")
Fixes: 1fa5ae8 ("driver core: get rid of struct device's bus_id string array")
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Cc: Alexandre Bounine <alex.bou9@gmail.com>
Cc: Matt Porter <mporter@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
jenkins-verticloud pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 18, 2023
…g the sock

[ Upstream commit 3cf7203ca620682165706f70a1b12b5194607dce ]

There is a race condition in vxlan that when deleting a vxlan device
during receiving packets, there is a possibility that the sock is
released after getting vxlan_sock vs from sk_user_data. Then in
later vxlan_ecn_decapsulate(), vxlan_get_sk_family() we will got
NULL pointer dereference. e.g.

   #0 [ffffa25ec6978a38] machine_kexec at ffffffff8c669757
   #1 [ffffa25ec6978a90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c0a4d
   #2 [ffffa25ec6978b58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c1c48
   #3 [ffffa25ec6978b60] oops_end at ffffffff8c627f2b
   #4 [ffffa25ec6978b80] page_fault_oops at ffffffff8c678fcb
   #5 [ffffa25ec6978bd8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d109542
   #6 [ffffa25ec6978c00] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d200b62
      [exception RIP: vxlan_ecn_decapsulate+0x3b]
      RIP: ffffffffc1014e7b  RSP: ffffa25ec6978cb0  RFLAGS: 00010246
      RAX: 0000000000000008  RBX: ffff8aa000888000  RCX: 0000000000000000
      RDX: 000000000000000e  RSI: ffff8a9fc7ab803e  RDI: ffff8a9fd1168700
      RBP: ffff8a9fc7ab803e   R8: 0000000000700000   R9: 00000000000010ae
      R10: ffff8a9fcb748980  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffff8a9fd1168700
      R13: ffff8aa000888000  R14: 00000000002a0000  R15: 00000000000010ae
      ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
   #7 [ffffa25ec6978ce8] vxlan_rcv at ffffffffc10189cd [vxlan]
   #8 [ffffa25ec6978d90] udp_queue_rcv_one_skb at ffffffff8cfb6507
   #9 [ffffa25ec6978dc0] udp_unicast_rcv_skb at ffffffff8cfb6e45
  #10 [ffffa25ec6978dc8] __udp4_lib_rcv at ffffffff8cfb8807
  #11 [ffffa25ec6978e20] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu at ffffffff8cf76951
  #12 [ffffa25ec6978e48] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff8cf76bde
  #13 [ffffa25ec6978ea0] __netif_receive_skb_one_core at ffffffff8cecde9b
  #14 [ffffa25ec6978ec8] process_backlog at ffffffff8cece139
  #15 [ffffa25ec6978f00] __napi_poll at ffffffff8ceced1a
  #16 [ffffa25ec6978f28] net_rx_action at ffffffff8cecf1f3
  #17 [ffffa25ec6978fa0] __softirqentry_text_start at ffffffff8d4000ca
  #18 [ffffa25ec6978ff0] do_softirq at ffffffff8c6fbdc3

Reproducer: https://github.com/Mellanox/ovs-tests/blob/master/test-ovs-vxlan-remove-tunnel-during-traffic.sh

Fix this by waiting for all sk_user_data reader to finish before
releasing the sock.

Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Fixes: 6a93cc9 ("udp-tunnel: Add a few more UDP tunnel APIs")
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
jenkins-verticloud pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 18, 2023
[ Upstream commit b18cba09e374637a0a3759d856a6bca94c133952 ]

Commit 9130b8d ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for the same uid
but different gss service") introduced `auth` argument to
__gss_find_upcall(), but in gss_pipe_downcall() it was left as NULL
since it (and auth->service) was not (yet) determined.

When multiple upcalls with the same uid and different service are
ongoing, it could happen that __gss_find_upcall(), which returns the
first match found in the pipe->in_downcall list, could not find the
correct gss_msg corresponding to the downcall we are looking for.
Moreover, it might return a msg which is not sent to rpc.gssd yet.

We could see mount.nfs process hung in D state with multiple mount.nfs
are executed in parallel.  The call trace below is of CentOS 7.9
kernel-3.10.0-1160.24.1.el7.x86_64 but we observed the same hang w/
elrepo kernel-ml-6.0.7-1.el7.

PID: 71258  TASK: ffff91ebd4be0000  CPU: 36  COMMAND: "mount.nfs"
 #0 [ffff9203ca3234f8] __schedule at ffffffffa3b8899f
 #1 [ffff9203ca323580] schedule at ffffffffa3b88eb9
 #2 [ffff9203ca323590] gss_cred_init at ffffffffc0355818 [auth_rpcgss]
 #3 [ffff9203ca323658] rpcauth_lookup_credcache at ffffffffc0421ebc
[sunrpc]
 #4 [ffff9203ca3236d8] gss_lookup_cred at ffffffffc0353633 [auth_rpcgss]
 #5 [ffff9203ca3236e8] rpcauth_lookupcred at ffffffffc0421581 [sunrpc]
 #6 [ffff9203ca323740] rpcauth_refreshcred at ffffffffc04223d3 [sunrpc]
 #7 [ffff9203ca3237a0] call_refresh at ffffffffc04103dc [sunrpc]
 #8 [ffff9203ca3237b8] __rpc_execute at ffffffffc041e1c9 [sunrpc]
 #9 [ffff9203ca323820] rpc_execute at ffffffffc0420a48 [sunrpc]

The scenario is like this. Let's say there are two upcalls for
services A and B, A -> B in pipe->in_downcall, B -> A in pipe->pipe.

When rpc.gssd reads pipe to get the upcall msg corresponding to
service B from pipe->pipe and then writes the response, in
gss_pipe_downcall the msg corresponding to service A will be picked
because only uid is used to find the msg and it is before the one for
B in pipe->in_downcall.  And the process waiting for the msg
corresponding to service A will be woken up.

Actual scheduing of that process might be after rpc.gssd processes the
next msg.  In rpc_pipe_generic_upcall it clears msg->errno (for A).
The process is scheduled to see gss_msg->ctx == NULL and
gss_msg->msg.errno == 0, therefore it cannot break the loop in
gss_create_upcall and is never woken up after that.

This patch adds a simple check to ensure that a msg which is not
sent to rpc.gssd yet is not chosen as the matching upcall upon
receiving a downcall.

Signed-off-by: minoura makoto <minoura@valinux.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@nec.com>
Tested-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@nec.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@hammerspace.com>
Fixes: 9130b8d ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for same uid but different gss service")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
jenkins-verticloud pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 18, 2023
commit cf129830ee820f7fc90b98df193cd49d49344d09 upstream.

When a match has been made to the nth duplicate symbol, return
success not error.

Example:

  Before:

    $ cat file.c
    cat: file.c: No such file or directory
    $ cat file1.c
    #include <stdio.h>

    static void func(void)
    {
            printf("First func\n");
    }

    void other(void);

    int main()
    {
            func();
            other();
            return 0;
    }
    $ cat file2.c
    #include <stdio.h>

    static void func(void)
    {
            printf("Second func\n");
    }

    void other(void)
    {
            func();
    }

    $ gcc -Wall -Wextra -o test file1.c file2.c
    $ perf record -e intel_pt//u --filter 'filter func @ ./test' -- ./test
    Multiple symbols with name 'func'
    #1      0x1149  l       func
                    which is near           main
    #2      0x1179  l       func
                    which is near           other
    Disambiguate symbol name by inserting #n after the name e.g. func #2
    Or select a global symbol by inserting #0 or #g or #G
    Failed to parse address filter: 'filter func @ ./test'
    Filter format is: filter|start|stop|tracestop <start symbol or address> [/ <end symbol or size>] [@<file name>]
    Where multiple filters are separated by space or comma.
    $ perf record -e intel_pt//u --filter 'filter func #2 @ ./test' -- ./test
    Failed to parse address filter: 'filter func #2 @ ./test'
    Filter format is: filter|start|stop|tracestop <start symbol or address> [/ <end symbol or size>] [@<file name>]
    Where multiple filters are separated by space or comma.

  After:

    $ perf record -e intel_pt//u --filter 'filter func #2 @ ./test' -- ./test
    First func
    Second func
    [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ]
    [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.016 MB perf.data ]
    $ perf script --itrace=b -Ftime,flags,ip,sym,addr --ns
    1231062.526977619:   tr strt                               0 [unknown] =>     558495708179 func
    1231062.526977619:   tr end  call               558495708188 func =>     558495708050 _init
    1231062.526979286:   tr strt                               0 [unknown] =>     55849570818d func
    1231062.526979286:   tr end  return             55849570818f func =>     55849570819d other

Fixes: 1b36c03 ("perf record: Add support for using symbols in address filters")
Reported-by: Dmitrii Dolgov <9erthalion6@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Dolgov <9erthalion6@gmail.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230110185659.15979-1-adrian.hunter@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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