security: validate trusted proxy before trusting IP headers#410
Merged
its-me-abhishek merged 2 commits intomainfrom Jan 20, 2026
Merged
security: validate trusted proxy before trusting IP headers#410its-me-abhishek merged 2 commits intomainfrom
its-me-abhishek merged 2 commits intomainfrom
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Only trust X-Real-IP and X-Forwarded-For headers when the request originates from a trusted proxy, preventing rate limit bypass via spoofed headers. Trusted proxies: - Loopback addresses (nginx on same server) - IPs specified in TRUSTED_PROXIES env var (comma-separated, CIDR supported) - Docker bridge network (172.16.0.0/12) in production For untrusted connections, use RemoteAddr directly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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its-me-abhishek
requested changes
Jan 19, 2026
Addresses review feedback to document the TRUSTED_PROXIES environment variable usage in both backend/README.md and production/README.md. Explains: - Automatic trust for loopback and Docker networks - Manual configuration via TRUSTED_PROXIES env var - When to use in different deployment scenarios Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
its-me-abhishek
approved these changes
Jan 20, 2026
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Summary
Security Issue Addressed
Rate Limiter IP Spoofing (Medium) - Previously, the rate limiter trusted X-Real-IP and X-Forwarded-For headers from any source. An attacker could bypass rate limiting by sending fake headers with different IP addresses.
Changes
backend/middleware/ratelimit.go:isTrustedProxy()function to validate proxy sourceTRUSTED_PROXIESenv var for additional trusted IPs (comma-separated, CIDR supported)Configuration
To configure additional trusted proxies, set the
TRUSTED_PROXIESenvironment variable:Test plan
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