Fix insecure deserialization in ZookeeperDistributedQueue (CWE-502)#23
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Fix insecure deserialization in ZookeeperDistributedQueue (CWE-502)#23devin-ai-integration[bot] wants to merge 5 commits intodevelop-7.0.xfrom
devin-ai-integration[bot] wants to merge 5 commits intodevelop-7.0.xfrom
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Add allowlist-based class filtering to the deserialize() method to prevent Remote Code Execution via untrusted ObjectInputStream.readObject() calls. - Override resolveClass() with an anonymous ObjectInputStream that validates class names against a configurable set of allowed prefixes - Default allowlist includes org.broadleafcommerce.*, java.lang.*, java.util.*, java.math.*, java.time.*, and primitive array types - Extract isClassAllowed() as a protected method for subclass extensibility - Reject all classes not on the allowlist with InvalidClassException Co-Authored-By: Arjun Mishra <arjunsaxmishra@gmail.com>
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Recursively strip leading '[' characters so types like byte[][] ("[[B")
and String[][] ("[[Ljava.lang.String;") are correctly validated against
the allowlist instead of being rejected.
Co-Authored-By: Arjun Mishra <arjunsaxmishra@gmail.com>
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The entry was ineffective (resolveClass is never called for interfaces) and its prefix match inadvertently permitted java.io.SerializablePermission. Co-Authored-By: Arjun Mishra <arjunsaxmishra@gmail.com>
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IncrementalUpdateCommand contains List<SolrInputDocument> fields from org.apache.solr.common, which must be permitted during deserialization. Co-Authored-By: Arjun Mishra <arjunsaxmishra@gmail.com>
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Without this, crafted streams using java.lang.reflect.Proxy with allowed interfaces could bypass the resolveClass filter entirely. Co-Authored-By: Arjun Mishra <arjunsaxmishra@gmail.com>
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Fix insecure deserialization in ZookeeperDistributedQueue (CWE-502)
Fixes the critical insecure deserialization vulnerability where
ObjectInputStream.readObject()was called without any class filtering, potentially allowing Remote Code Execution if an attacker can influence data stored in Zookeeper.A Brief Overview
ZookeeperDistributedQueue.deserialize()previously used a rawObjectInputStreamwith no validation on which classes could be instantiated during deserialization. This is a well-known attack vector (CWE-502) that can lead to RCE via gadget chains.The fix introduces an allowlist-based class filter by overriding
resolveClass()in theObjectInputStream. Only classes matching configured safe prefixes are permitted:org.broadleafcommerce.*— Broadleaf domain typesjava.lang.*,java.util.*,java.math.*,java.time.*— safe JDK typesbyte[],char[],int[], etc.)[Lorg.broadleafcommerce.SomeClass;)Any class not on the allowlist triggers an
InvalidClassException, blocking exploitation.The
isClassAllowed()method isprotectedso subclasses can extend the allowlist if needed.Labels: Security, critical, ready-for-code-review
Additional context
ZookeeperDistributedQueue.java:830-835mvn compile -pl core/broadleaf-framework -ampasses cleanlyLink to Devin session: https://app.devin.ai/sessions/16deafe0069b46828ad1d10a741ae10b
Requested by: @Colhodm
Devin Review