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Rasenkai wants to merge 2 commits into from
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6.5: tcp patches #3

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@Rasenkai Rasenkai commented Sep 23, 2023

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Kaz205 and others added 2 commits September 23, 2023 19:25
@Kaz205 @Rasenkai
mt7921: Disable mib stats
3e6165d 
Adds a lot of overhead.

Signed-off-by: Kazuki Hashimoto <kazukih0205@gmail.com>
@Panchajanya1999 @Rasenkai
ipv4/tcp: Force applications to use TCP_NODELAY to improve network la…
56c670e 
…tency

`TCP_NODELAY` will disable Nagle's algorithm, which basically collects
small outgoing packets to send all at once.
Thus `TCP_NODELAY` will send the data whenever it is available without
waiting for any period to collect packets.

It will basically optimize network video games and applications
using chatty protocols (source: ExtraHop[1], RedHat[2])

[1]: https://www.extrahop.com/company/blog/2016/tcp-nodelay-nagle-quickack-best-practices/#:~:text=The%20TCP_NODELAY%20socket%20option%20allows,buffer%2C%20whatever%20the%20packet%20size.
[2]: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux_for_real_time/7/html/tuning_guide/tcp_nodelay_and_small_buffer_writes

Signed-off-by: Panchajanya1999 <panchajanya@azure-dev.live>
[Rasenkai: forward-port to 5.4]
Signed-off-by: Rasenkai <rasenkai99@gmail.com>
Change-Id: I2518d04969975c69c61d5e0acab7295702190b0d
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 3, 2023
Merge branch 'fix-the-unmatched-unit_size-of-bpf_mem_cache'
9458964 
Hou Tao says:

====================
Fix the unmatched unit_size of bpf_mem_cache

From: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>

Hi,

The patchset aims to fix the reported warning [0] when the unit_size of
bpf_mem_cache is mismatched with the object size of underly slab-cache.

Patch #1 fixes the warning by adjusting size_index according to the
value of KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE, so bpf_mem_cache with unit_size which is
smaller than KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE or is not aligned with KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE
will be redirected to bpf_mem_cache with bigger unit_size. Patch #2
doesn't do prefill for these redirected bpf_mem_cache to save memory.
Patch #3 adds further error check in bpf_mem_alloc_init() to ensure the
unit_size and object_size are always matched and to prevent potential
issues due to the mismatch.

Please see individual patches for more details. And comments are always
welcome.

[0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/87jztjmmy4.fsf@all.your.base.are.belong.to.us
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230908133923.2675053-1-houtao@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 3, 2023
@saschahauer
net: macb: fix sleep inside spinlock
403f0e7 
macb_set_tx_clk() is called under a spinlock but itself calls clk_set_rate()
which can sleep. This results in:

| BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:580
| pps pps1: new PPS source ptp1
| in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 40, name: kworker/u4:3
| preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
| RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
| 4 locks held by kworker/u4:3/40:
|  #0: ffff000003409148
| macb ff0c000.ethernet: gem-ptp-timer ptp clock registered.
|  ((wq_completion)events_power_efficient){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x14c/0x51c
|  #1: ffff8000833cbdd8 ((work_completion)(&pl->resolve)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x14c/0x51c
|  #2: ffff000004f01578 (&pl->state_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: phylink_resolve+0x44/0x4e8
|  #3: ffff000004f06f50 (&bp->lock){....}-{3:3}, at: macb_mac_link_up+0x40/0x2ac
| irq event stamp: 113998
| hardirqs last  enabled at (113997): [<ffff800080e8503c>] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x30/0x64
| hardirqs last disabled at (113998): [<ffff800080e84478>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xac/0xc8
| softirqs last  enabled at (113608): [<ffff800080010630>] __do_softirq+0x430/0x4e4
| softirqs last disabled at (113597): [<ffff80008001614c>] ____do_softirq+0x10/0x1c
| CPU: 0 PID: 40 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 6.5.0-11717-g9355ce8b2f50-dirty torvalds#368
| Hardware name: ... ZynqMP ... (DT)
| Workqueue: events_power_efficient phylink_resolve
| Call trace:
|  dump_backtrace+0x98/0xf0
|  show_stack+0x18/0x24
|  dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xac
|  dump_stack+0x18/0x24
|  __might_resched+0x144/0x24c
|  __might_sleep+0x48/0x98
|  __mutex_lock+0x58/0x7b0
|  mutex_lock_nested+0x24/0x30
|  clk_prepare_lock+0x4c/0xa8
|  clk_set_rate+0x24/0x8c
|  macb_mac_link_up+0x25c/0x2ac
|  phylink_resolve+0x178/0x4e8
|  process_one_work+0x1ec/0x51c
|  worker_thread+0x1ec/0x3e4
|  kthread+0x120/0x124
|  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

The obvious fix is to move the call to macb_set_tx_clk() out of the
protected area. This seems safe as rx and tx are both disabled anyway at
this point.
It is however not entirely clear what the spinlock shall protect. It
could be the read-modify-write access to the NCFGR register, but this
is accessed in macb_set_rx_mode() and macb_set_rxcsum_feature() as well
without holding the spinlock. It could also be the register accesses
done in mog_init_rings() or macb_init_buffers(), but again these
functions are called without holding the spinlock in macb_hresp_error_task().
The locking seems fishy in this driver and it might deserve another look
before this patch is applied.

Fixes: 633e98a ("net: macb: use resolved link config in mac_link_up()")
Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230908112913.1701766-1-s.hauer@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 3, 2023
@captain5050 @namhyung
perf pmu: Ensure all alias variables are initialized
eaaebb0 
Fix an error detected by memory sanitizer:
```
==4033==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
    #0 0x55fb0fbedfc7 in read_alias_info tools/perf/util/pmu.c:457:6
    #1 0x55fb0fbea339 in check_info_data tools/perf/util/pmu.c:1434:2
    #2 0x55fb0fbea339 in perf_pmu__check_alias tools/perf/util/pmu.c:1504:9
    #3 0x55fb0fbdca85 in parse_events_add_pmu tools/perf/util/parse-events.c:1429:32
    #4 0x55fb0f965230 in parse_events_parse tools/perf/util/parse-events.y:299:6
    #5 0x55fb0fbdf6b2 in parse_events__scanner tools/perf/util/parse-events.c:1822:8
    #6 0x55fb0fbdf8c1 in __parse_events tools/perf/util/parse-events.c:2094:8
    #7 0x55fb0fa8ffa9 in parse_events tools/perf/util/parse-events.h:41:9
    torvalds#8 0x55fb0fa8ffa9 in test_event tools/perf/tests/parse-events.c:2393:8
    torvalds#9 0x55fb0fa8f458 in test__pmu_events tools/perf/tests/parse-events.c:2551:15
    torvalds#10 0x55fb0fa6d93f in run_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:242:9
    torvalds#11 0x55fb0fa6d93f in test_and_print tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:271:8
    torvalds#12 0x55fb0fa6d082 in __cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:442:5
    torvalds#13 0x55fb0fa6d082 in cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:564:9
    torvalds#14 0x55fb0f942720 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:322:11
    torvalds#15 0x55fb0f942486 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:375:8
    torvalds#16 0x55fb0f941dab in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:419:2
    torvalds#17 0x55fb0f941dab in main tools/perf/perf.c:535:3
```

Fixes: 7b723db ("perf pmu: Be lazy about loading event info files from sysfs")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230914022425.1489035-1-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 3, 2023
@BenjaminGrayNp1 @mpe
powerpc/dexcr: Move HASHCHK trap handler
c3f4309 
Syzkaller reported a sleep in atomic context bug relating to the HASHCHK
handler logic:

  BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c:1518
  in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 25040, name: syz-executor
  preempt_count: 0, expected: 0
  RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
  no locks held by syz-executor/25040.
  irq event stamp: 34
  hardirqs last  enabled at (33): [<c000000000048b38>] prep_irq_for_enabled_exit arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c:56 [inline]
  hardirqs last  enabled at (33): [<c000000000048b38>] interrupt_exit_user_prepare_main+0x148/0x600 arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c:230
  hardirqs last disabled at (34): [<c00000000003e6a4>] interrupt_enter_prepare+0x144/0x4f0 arch/powerpc/include/asm/interrupt.h:176
  softirqs last  enabled at (0): [<c000000000281954>] copy_process+0x16e4/0x4750 kernel/fork.c:2436
  softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
  CPU: 15 PID: 25040 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.5.0-rc5-00001-g3ccdff6bb06d #3
  Hardware name: IBM,9105-22A POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1040.00 (NL1040_021) hv:phyp pSeries
  Call Trace:
  [c0000000a8247ce0] [c00000000032b0e4] __might_resched+0x3b4/0x400 kernel/sched/core.c:10189
  [c0000000a8247d80] [c0000000008c7dc8] __might_fault+0xa8/0x170 mm/memory.c:5853
  [c0000000a8247dc0] [c00000000004160c] do_program_check+0x32c/0xb20 arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c:1518
  [c0000000a8247e50] [c000000000009b2c] program_check_common_virt+0x3bc/0x3c0

To determine if a trap was caused by a HASHCHK instruction, we inspect
the user instruction that triggered the trap. However this may sleep
if the page needs to be faulted in (get_user_instr() reaches
__get_user(), which calls might_fault() and triggers the bug message).

Move the HASHCHK handler logic to after we allow IRQs, which is fine
because we are only interested in HASHCHK if it's a user space trap.

Fixes: 5bcba4e ("powerpc/dexcr: Handle hashchk exception")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Gray <bgray@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20230915034604.45393-1-bgray@linux.ibm.com
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 3, 2023
@davem330
Merge branch 'hsr-supervisor-frames'
af21b94 
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior says:

====================
net: hsr: Properly parse HSRv1 supervisor frames.

this is a follow-up to
	https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230825153111.228768-1-lukma@denx.de/
replacing
	https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230914124731.1654059-1-lukma@denx.de/

by grabing/ adding tags and reposting with a commit message plus a
missing __packed to a struct (#2) plus extending the testsuite to sover
HSRv1 which is what broke here (#3-#5).

HSRv0 is (was) not affected.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 6, 2023
@BenjaminGrayNp1 @gregkh
powerpc/dexcr: Move HASHCHK trap handler
82c302f 
[ Upstream commit c3f4309 ]

Syzkaller reported a sleep in atomic context bug relating to the HASHCHK
handler logic:

  BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c:1518
  in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 25040, name: syz-executor
  preempt_count: 0, expected: 0
  RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
  no locks held by syz-executor/25040.
  irq event stamp: 34
  hardirqs last  enabled at (33): [<c000000000048b38>] prep_irq_for_enabled_exit arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c:56 [inline]
  hardirqs last  enabled at (33): [<c000000000048b38>] interrupt_exit_user_prepare_main+0x148/0x600 arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c:230
  hardirqs last disabled at (34): [<c00000000003e6a4>] interrupt_enter_prepare+0x144/0x4f0 arch/powerpc/include/asm/interrupt.h:176
  softirqs last  enabled at (0): [<c000000000281954>] copy_process+0x16e4/0x4750 kernel/fork.c:2436
  softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
  CPU: 15 PID: 25040 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.5.0-rc5-00001-g3ccdff6bb06d #3
  Hardware name: IBM,9105-22A POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1040.00 (NL1040_021) hv:phyp pSeries
  Call Trace:
  [c0000000a8247ce0] [c00000000032b0e4] __might_resched+0x3b4/0x400 kernel/sched/core.c:10189
  [c0000000a8247d80] [c0000000008c7dc8] __might_fault+0xa8/0x170 mm/memory.c:5853
  [c0000000a8247dc0] [c00000000004160c] do_program_check+0x32c/0xb20 arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c:1518
  [c0000000a8247e50] [c000000000009b2c] program_check_common_virt+0x3bc/0x3c0

To determine if a trap was caused by a HASHCHK instruction, we inspect
the user instruction that triggered the trap. However this may sleep
if the page needs to be faulted in (get_user_instr() reaches
__get_user(), which calls might_fault() and triggers the bug message).

Move the HASHCHK handler logic to after we allow IRQs, which is fine
because we are only interested in HASHCHK if it's a user space trap.

Fixes: 5bcba4e ("powerpc/dexcr: Handle hashchk exception")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Gray <bgray@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20230915034604.45393-1-bgray@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 9, 2023
@shayshyi @rleon
RDMA/mlx5: Fix mkey cache possible deadlock on cleanup
374012b 
Fix the deadlock by refactoring the MR cache cleanup flow to flush the
workqueue without holding the rb_lock.
This adds a race between cache cleanup and creation of new entries which
we solve by denied creation of new entries after cache cleanup started.

Lockdep:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
 [ 2785.326074 ] 6.2.0-rc6_for_upstream_debug_2023_01_31_14_02 #1 Not tainted
 [ 2785.339778 ] ------------------------------------------------------
 [ 2785.340848 ] devlink/53872 is trying to acquire lock:
 [ 2785.341701 ] ffff888124f8c0c8 ((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0xc8/0x900
 [ 2785.343403 ]
 [ 2785.343403 ] but task is already holding lock:
 [ 2785.344464 ] ffff88817e8f1260 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0x77/0x250 [mlx5_ib]
 [ 2785.346273 ]
 [ 2785.346273 ] which lock already depends on the new lock.
 [ 2785.346273 ]
 [ 2785.347720 ]
 [ 2785.347720 ] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
 [ 2785.349003 ]
 [ 2785.349003 ] -> #1 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
 [ 2785.350160 ]        __mutex_lock+0x14c/0x15c0
 [ 2785.350962 ]        delayed_cache_work_func+0x2d1/0x610 [mlx5_ib]
 [ 2785.352044 ]        process_one_work+0x7c2/0x1310
 [ 2785.352879 ]        worker_thread+0x59d/0xec0
 [ 2785.353636 ]        kthread+0x28f/0x330
 [ 2785.354370 ]        ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
 [ 2785.355135 ]
 [ 2785.355135 ] -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
 [ 2785.356515 ]        __lock_acquire+0x2d8a/0x5fe0
 [ 2785.357349 ]        lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x540
 [ 2785.358121 ]        __flush_work+0xe8/0x900
 [ 2785.358852 ]        __cancel_work_timer+0x2c7/0x3f0
 [ 2785.359711 ]        mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0xfb/0x250 [mlx5_ib]
 [ 2785.360781 ]        mlx5_ib_stage_pre_ib_reg_umr_cleanup+0x16/0x30 [mlx5_ib]
 [ 2785.361969 ]        __mlx5_ib_remove+0x68/0x120 [mlx5_ib]
 [ 2785.362960 ]        mlx5r_remove+0x63/0x80 [mlx5_ib]
 [ 2785.363870 ]        auxiliary_bus_remove+0x52/0x70
 [ 2785.364715 ]        device_release_driver_internal+0x3c1/0x600
 [ 2785.365695 ]        bus_remove_device+0x2a5/0x560
 [ 2785.366525 ]        device_del+0x492/0xb80
 [ 2785.367276 ]        mlx5_detach_device+0x1a9/0x360 [mlx5_core]
 [ 2785.368615 ]        mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x5a/0x110 [mlx5_core]
 [ 2785.369934 ]        mlx5_devlink_reload_down+0x292/0x580 [mlx5_core]
 [ 2785.371292 ]        devlink_reload+0x439/0x590
 [ 2785.372075 ]        devlink_nl_cmd_reload+0xaef/0xff0
 [ 2785.372973 ]        genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0x1bd/0x290
 [ 2785.374011 ]        genl_rcv_msg+0x3ca/0x6c0
 [ 2785.374798 ]        netlink_rcv_skb+0x12c/0x360
 [ 2785.375612 ]        genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
 [ 2785.376295 ]        netlink_unicast+0x438/0x710
 [ 2785.377121 ]        netlink_sendmsg+0x7a1/0xca0
 [ 2785.377926 ]        sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190
 [ 2785.378668 ]        __sys_sendto+0x1bc/0x290
 [ 2785.379440 ]        __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0
 [ 2785.380255 ]        do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
 [ 2785.381031 ]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
 [ 2785.381967 ]
 [ 2785.381967 ] other info that might help us debug this:
 [ 2785.381967 ]
 [ 2785.383448 ]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
 [ 2785.383448 ]
 [ 2785.384544 ]        CPU0                    CPU1
 [ 2785.385383 ]        ----                    ----
 [ 2785.386193 ]   lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock);
 [ 2785.386940 ]				lock((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work));
 [ 2785.388327 ]				lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock);
 [ 2785.389425 ]   lock((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work));
 [ 2785.390414 ]
 [ 2785.390414 ]  *** DEADLOCK ***
 [ 2785.390414 ]
 [ 2785.391579 ] 6 locks held by devlink/53872:
 [ 2785.392341 ]  #0: ffffffff84c17a50 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40
 [ 2785.393630 ]  #1: ffff888142280218 (&devlink->lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: devlink_get_from_attrs_lock+0x12d/0x2d0
 [ 2785.395324 ]  #2: ffff8881422d3c38 (&dev->lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x4a/0x110 [mlx5_core]
 [ 2785.397322 ]  #3: ffffffffa0e59068 (mlx5_intf_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_detach_device+0x60/0x360 [mlx5_core]
 [ 2785.399231 ]  #4: ffff88810e3cb0e8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8d/0x600
 [ 2785.400864 ]  #5: ffff88817e8f1260 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0x77/0x250 [mlx5_ib]

Fixes: b958451 ("RDMA/mlx5: Change the cache structure to an RB-tree")
Signed-off-by: Shay Drory <shayd@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Guralnik <michaelgur@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 9, 2023
@biger410 @martinkpetersen
scsi: target: core: Fix deadlock due to recursive locking
a154f5f 
The following call trace shows a deadlock issue due to recursive locking of
mutex "device_mutex". First lock acquire is in target_for_each_device() and
second in target_free_device().

 PID: 148266   TASK: ffff8be21ffb5d00  CPU: 10   COMMAND: "iscsi_ttx"
  #0 [ffffa2bfc9ec3b18] __schedule at ffffffffa8060e7f
  #1 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ba0] schedule at ffffffffa8061224
  #2 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bb8] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa80615ee
  #3 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bc8] __mutex_lock at ffffffffa8062fd7
  #4 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c40] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffffa80631d3
  #5 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c50] mutex_lock at ffffffffa806320c
  #6 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c68] target_free_device at ffffffffc0935998 [target_core_mod]
  #7 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c90] target_core_dev_release at ffffffffc092f975 [target_core_mod]
  torvalds#8 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ca0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d250f
  torvalds#9 [ffffa2bfc9ec3cd0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d2583
 torvalds#10 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ce0] target_devices_idr_iter at ffffffffc0933f3a [target_core_mod]
 torvalds#11 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d00] idr_for_each at ffffffffa803f6fc
 torvalds#12 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d60] target_for_each_device at ffffffffc0935670 [target_core_mod]
 torvalds#13 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d98] transport_deregister_session at ffffffffc0946408 [target_core_mod]
 torvalds#14 [ffffa2bfc9ec3dc8] iscsit_close_session at ffffffffc09a44a6 [iscsi_target_mod]
 torvalds#15 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df0] iscsit_close_connection at ffffffffc09a4a88 [iscsi_target_mod]
 torvalds#16 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df8] finish_task_switch at ffffffffa76e5d07
 torvalds#17 [ffffa2bfc9ec3e78] iscsit_take_action_for_connection_exit at ffffffffc0991c23 [iscsi_target_mod]
 torvalds#18 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ea0] iscsi_target_tx_thread at ffffffffc09a403b [iscsi_target_mod]
 torvalds#19 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f08] kthread at ffffffffa76d8080
 torvalds#20 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffa8200364

Fixes: 36d4cb4 ("scsi: target: Avoid that EXTENDED COPY commands trigger lock inversion")
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230918225848.66463-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <michael.christie@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 11, 2023
@biger410 @gregkh
scsi: target: core: Fix deadlock due to recursive locking
5a44dd7 
[ Upstream commit a154f5f ]

The following call trace shows a deadlock issue due to recursive locking of
mutex "device_mutex". First lock acquire is in target_for_each_device() and
second in target_free_device().

 PID: 148266   TASK: ffff8be21ffb5d00  CPU: 10   COMMAND: "iscsi_ttx"
  #0 [ffffa2bfc9ec3b18] __schedule at ffffffffa8060e7f
  #1 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ba0] schedule at ffffffffa8061224
  #2 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bb8] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa80615ee
  #3 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bc8] __mutex_lock at ffffffffa8062fd7
  #4 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c40] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffffa80631d3
  #5 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c50] mutex_lock at ffffffffa806320c
  #6 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c68] target_free_device at ffffffffc0935998 [target_core_mod]
  #7 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c90] target_core_dev_release at ffffffffc092f975 [target_core_mod]
  torvalds#8 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ca0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d250f
  torvalds#9 [ffffa2bfc9ec3cd0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d2583
 torvalds#10 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ce0] target_devices_idr_iter at ffffffffc0933f3a [target_core_mod]
 torvalds#11 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d00] idr_for_each at ffffffffa803f6fc
 torvalds#12 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d60] target_for_each_device at ffffffffc0935670 [target_core_mod]
 torvalds#13 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d98] transport_deregister_session at ffffffffc0946408 [target_core_mod]
 torvalds#14 [ffffa2bfc9ec3dc8] iscsit_close_session at ffffffffc09a44a6 [iscsi_target_mod]
 torvalds#15 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df0] iscsit_close_connection at ffffffffc09a4a88 [iscsi_target_mod]
 torvalds#16 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df8] finish_task_switch at ffffffffa76e5d07
 torvalds#17 [ffffa2bfc9ec3e78] iscsit_take_action_for_connection_exit at ffffffffc0991c23 [iscsi_target_mod]
 torvalds#18 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ea0] iscsi_target_tx_thread at ffffffffc09a403b [iscsi_target_mod]
 torvalds#19 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f08] kthread at ffffffffa76d8080
 torvalds#20 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffa8200364

Fixes: 36d4cb4 ("scsi: target: Avoid that EXTENDED COPY commands trigger lock inversion")
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230918225848.66463-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <michael.christie@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 11, 2023
@shayshyi @gregkh
RDMA/mlx5: Fix mkey cache possible deadlock on cleanup
42ec848 
commit 374012b upstream.

Fix the deadlock by refactoring the MR cache cleanup flow to flush the
workqueue without holding the rb_lock.
This adds a race between cache cleanup and creation of new entries which
we solve by denied creation of new entries after cache cleanup started.

Lockdep:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
 [ 2785.326074 ] 6.2.0-rc6_for_upstream_debug_2023_01_31_14_02 #1 Not tainted
 [ 2785.339778 ] ------------------------------------------------------
 [ 2785.340848 ] devlink/53872 is trying to acquire lock:
 [ 2785.341701 ] ffff888124f8c0c8 ((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0xc8/0x900
 [ 2785.343403 ]
 [ 2785.343403 ] but task is already holding lock:
 [ 2785.344464 ] ffff88817e8f1260 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0x77/0x250 [mlx5_ib]
 [ 2785.346273 ]
 [ 2785.346273 ] which lock already depends on the new lock.
 [ 2785.346273 ]
 [ 2785.347720 ]
 [ 2785.347720 ] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
 [ 2785.349003 ]
 [ 2785.349003 ] -> #1 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
 [ 2785.350160 ]        __mutex_lock+0x14c/0x15c0
 [ 2785.350962 ]        delayed_cache_work_func+0x2d1/0x610 [mlx5_ib]
 [ 2785.352044 ]        process_one_work+0x7c2/0x1310
 [ 2785.352879 ]        worker_thread+0x59d/0xec0
 [ 2785.353636 ]        kthread+0x28f/0x330
 [ 2785.354370 ]        ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
 [ 2785.355135 ]
 [ 2785.355135 ] -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
 [ 2785.356515 ]        __lock_acquire+0x2d8a/0x5fe0
 [ 2785.357349 ]        lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x540
 [ 2785.358121 ]        __flush_work+0xe8/0x900
 [ 2785.358852 ]        __cancel_work_timer+0x2c7/0x3f0
 [ 2785.359711 ]        mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0xfb/0x250 [mlx5_ib]
 [ 2785.360781 ]        mlx5_ib_stage_pre_ib_reg_umr_cleanup+0x16/0x30 [mlx5_ib]
 [ 2785.361969 ]        __mlx5_ib_remove+0x68/0x120 [mlx5_ib]
 [ 2785.362960 ]        mlx5r_remove+0x63/0x80 [mlx5_ib]
 [ 2785.363870 ]        auxiliary_bus_remove+0x52/0x70
 [ 2785.364715 ]        device_release_driver_internal+0x3c1/0x600
 [ 2785.365695 ]        bus_remove_device+0x2a5/0x560
 [ 2785.366525 ]        device_del+0x492/0xb80
 [ 2785.367276 ]        mlx5_detach_device+0x1a9/0x360 [mlx5_core]
 [ 2785.368615 ]        mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x5a/0x110 [mlx5_core]
 [ 2785.369934 ]        mlx5_devlink_reload_down+0x292/0x580 [mlx5_core]
 [ 2785.371292 ]        devlink_reload+0x439/0x590
 [ 2785.372075 ]        devlink_nl_cmd_reload+0xaef/0xff0
 [ 2785.372973 ]        genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0x1bd/0x290
 [ 2785.374011 ]        genl_rcv_msg+0x3ca/0x6c0
 [ 2785.374798 ]        netlink_rcv_skb+0x12c/0x360
 [ 2785.375612 ]        genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
 [ 2785.376295 ]        netlink_unicast+0x438/0x710
 [ 2785.377121 ]        netlink_sendmsg+0x7a1/0xca0
 [ 2785.377926 ]        sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190
 [ 2785.378668 ]        __sys_sendto+0x1bc/0x290
 [ 2785.379440 ]        __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0
 [ 2785.380255 ]        do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
 [ 2785.381031 ]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
 [ 2785.381967 ]
 [ 2785.381967 ] other info that might help us debug this:
 [ 2785.381967 ]
 [ 2785.383448 ]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
 [ 2785.383448 ]
 [ 2785.384544 ]        CPU0                    CPU1
 [ 2785.385383 ]        ----                    ----
 [ 2785.386193 ]   lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock);
 [ 2785.386940 ]				lock((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work));
 [ 2785.388327 ]				lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock);
 [ 2785.389425 ]   lock((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work));
 [ 2785.390414 ]
 [ 2785.390414 ]  *** DEADLOCK ***
 [ 2785.390414 ]
 [ 2785.391579 ] 6 locks held by devlink/53872:
 [ 2785.392341 ]  #0: ffffffff84c17a50 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40
 [ 2785.393630 ]  #1: ffff888142280218 (&devlink->lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: devlink_get_from_attrs_lock+0x12d/0x2d0
 [ 2785.395324 ]  #2: ffff8881422d3c38 (&dev->lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x4a/0x110 [mlx5_core]
 [ 2785.397322 ]  #3: ffffffffa0e59068 (mlx5_intf_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_detach_device+0x60/0x360 [mlx5_core]
 [ 2785.399231 ]  #4: ffff88810e3cb0e8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8d/0x600
 [ 2785.400864 ]  #5: ffff88817e8f1260 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0x77/0x250 [mlx5_ib]

Fixes: b958451 ("RDMA/mlx5: Change the cache structure to an RB-tree")
Signed-off-by: Shay Drory <shayd@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Guralnik <michaelgur@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 20, 2023
@captain5050 @gregkh
perf stat: Fix aggr mode initialization
4b9d563 
[ Upstream commit a84fbf2 ]

Generating metrics llc_code_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch,
llc_data_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch,
llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_read,
llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_write,
nllc_miss_remote_memory_bandwidth_read, memory_bandwidth_read,
memory_bandwidth_write, uncore_frequency, upi_data_transmit_bw,
C2_Pkg_Residency, C3_Core_Residency, C3_Pkg_Residency,
C6_Core_Residency, C6_Pkg_Residency, C7_Core_Residency,
C7_Pkg_Residency, UNCORE_FREQ and tma_info_system_socket_clks would
trigger an address sanitizer heap-buffer-overflows on a SkylakeX.

```
==2567752==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x5020003ed098 at pc 0x5621a816654e bp 0x7fffb55d4da0 sp 0x7fffb55d4d98
READ of size 4 at 0x5020003eee78 thread T0
    #0 0x558265d6654d in aggr_cpu_id__is_empty tools/perf/util/cpumap.c:694:12
    #1 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_aggr tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1490:6
    #2 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_global_cached tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1530:9
    #3 0x558265e53290 in should_skip_zero_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:947:31
    #4 0x558265e53290 in print_counter_aggrdata tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:985:18
    #5 0x558265e51931 in print_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1110:3
    #6 0x558265e51931 in evlist__print_counters tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1571:5
    #7 0x558265c8ec87 in print_counters tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:981:2
    torvalds#8 0x558265c8cc71 in cmd_stat tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:2837:3
    torvalds#9 0x558265bb9bd4 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:323:11
    torvalds#10 0x558265bb98eb in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:377:8
    torvalds#11 0x558265bb9389 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:421:2
    torvalds#12 0x558265bb9389 in main tools/perf/perf.c:537:3
```

The issue was the use of testing a cpumap with NULL rather than using
empty, as a map containing the dummy value isn't NULL and the -1
results in an empty aggr map being allocated which legitimately
overflows when any member is accessed.

Fixes: 8a96f45 ("perf stat: Avoid SEGV if core.cpus isn't set")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230906003912.3317462-1-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 20, 2023
@captain5050 @gregkh
perf parse-events: Fix tracepoint name memory leak
e3c2dc9 
[ Upstream commit ede72dc ]

Fuzzing found that an invalid tracepoint name would create a memory
leak with an address sanitizer build:
```
$ perf stat -e '*:o/' true
event syntax error: '*:o/'
                       \___ parser error
Run 'perf list' for a list of valid events

 Usage: perf stat [<options>] [<command>]

    -e, --event <event>   event selector. use 'perf list' to list available events

=================================================================
==59380==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

Direct leak of 4 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f38ac07077b in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439
    #1 0x55f2f41be73b in str util/parse-events.l:49
    #2 0x55f2f41d08e8 in parse_events_lex util/parse-events.l:338
    #3 0x55f2f41dc3b1 in parse_events_parse util/parse-events-bison.c:1464
    #4 0x55f2f410b8b3 in parse_events__scanner util/parse-events.c:1822
    #5 0x55f2f410d1b9 in __parse_events util/parse-events.c:2094
    #6 0x55f2f410e57f in parse_events_option util/parse-events.c:2279
    #7 0x55f2f4427b56 in get_value tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:251
    torvalds#8 0x55f2f4428d98 in parse_short_opt tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:351
    torvalds#9 0x55f2f4429d80 in parse_options_step tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:539
    torvalds#10 0x55f2f442acb9 in parse_options_subcommand tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:654
    torvalds#11 0x55f2f3ec99fc in cmd_stat tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:2501
    torvalds#12 0x55f2f4093289 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:322
    torvalds#13 0x55f2f40937f5 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:375
    torvalds#14 0x55f2f4093bbd in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:419
    torvalds#15 0x55f2f409412b in main tools/perf/perf.c:535

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 4 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s).
```
Fix by adding the missing destructor.

Fixes: 865582c ("perf tools: Adds the tracepoint name parsing support")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: He Kuang <hekuang@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230914164028.363220-1-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 20, 2023
@mpe @gregkh
powerpc: Hide empty pt_regs at base of the stack
e3742a5 
[ Upstream commit d45c4b4 ]

A thread started via eg. user_mode_thread() runs in the kernel to begin
with and then may later return to userspace. While it's running in the
kernel it has a pt_regs at the base of its kernel stack, but that
pt_regs is all zeroes.

If the thread oopses in that state, it leads to an ugly stack trace with
a big block of zero GPRs, as reported by Joel:

  Kernel panic - not syncing: VFS: Unable to mount root fs on unknown-block(0,0)
  CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc7-00004-gf7757129e3de-dirty #3
  Hardware name: IBM PowerNV (emulated by qemu) POWER9 0x4e1200 opal:v7.0 PowerNV
  Call Trace:
  [c0000000036afb00] [c0000000010dd058] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x9c (unreliable)
  [c0000000036afb30] [c00000000013c524] panic+0x178/0x424
  [c0000000036afbd0] [c000000002005100] mount_root_generic+0x250/0x324
  [c0000000036afca0] [c0000000020057d0] prepare_namespace+0x2d4/0x344
  [c0000000036afd20] [c0000000020049c0] kernel_init_freeable+0x358/0x3ac
  [c0000000036afdf0] [c0000000000111b0] kernel_init+0x30/0x1a0
  [c0000000036afe50] [c00000000000debc] ret_from_kernel_user_thread+0x14/0x1c
  --- interrupt: 0 at 0x0
  NIP:  0000000000000000 LR: 0000000000000000 CTR: 0000000000000000
  REGS: c0000000036afe80 TRAP: 0000   Not tainted  (6.5.0-rc7-00004-gf7757129e3de-dirty)
  MSR:  0000000000000000 <>  CR: 00000000  XER: 00000000
  CFAR: 0000000000000000 IRQMASK: 0
  GPR00: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR04: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR12: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR24: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR28: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  NIP [0000000000000000] 0x0
  LR [0000000000000000] 0x0
  --- interrupt: 0

The all-zero pt_regs looks ugly and conveys no useful information, other
than its presence. So detect that case and just show the presence of the
frame by printing the interrupt marker, eg:

  Kernel panic - not syncing: VFS: Unable to mount root fs on unknown-block(0,0)
  CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc3-00126-g18e9506562a0-dirty torvalds#301
  Hardware name: IBM pSeries (emulated by qemu) POWER9 (raw) 0x4e1202 0xf000005 of:SLOF,HEAD hv:linux,kvm pSeries
  Call Trace:
  [c000000003aabb00] [c000000001143db8] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x9c (unreliable)
  [c000000003aabb30] [c00000000014c624] panic+0x178/0x424
  [c000000003aabbd0] [c0000000020050fc] mount_root_generic+0x250/0x324
  [c000000003aabca0] [c0000000020057cc] prepare_namespace+0x2d4/0x344
  [c000000003aabd20] [c0000000020049bc] kernel_init_freeable+0x358/0x3ac
  [c000000003aabdf0] [c0000000000111b0] kernel_init+0x30/0x1a0
  [c000000003aabe50] [c00000000000debc] ret_from_kernel_user_thread+0x14/0x1c
  --- interrupt: 0 at 0x0

To avoid ever suppressing a valid pt_regs make sure the pt_regs has a
zero MSR and TRAP value, and is located at the very base of the stack.

Fixes: 6895dfc ("powerpc: copy_thread fill in interrupt frame marker and back chain")
Reported-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
Reported-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20230824064210.907266-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 20, 2023
@gregkh
virtio/vsock: Fix uninit-value in virtio_transport_recv_pkt()
0b8906f 
[ Upstream commit 34c4eff ]

KMSAN reported the following uninit-value access issue:

=====================================================
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x1dfb/0x26a0 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:1421
 virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x1dfb/0x26a0 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:1421
 vsock_loopback_work+0x3bb/0x5a0 net/vmw_vsock/vsock_loopback.c:120
 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2630 [inline]
 process_scheduled_works+0xff6/0x1e60 kernel/workqueue.c:2703
 worker_thread+0xeca/0x14d0 kernel/workqueue.c:2784
 kthread+0x3cc/0x520 kernel/kthread.c:388
 ret_from_fork+0x66/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304

Uninit was stored to memory at:
 virtio_transport_space_update net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:1274 [inline]
 virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x1ee8/0x26a0 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:1415
 vsock_loopback_work+0x3bb/0x5a0 net/vmw_vsock/vsock_loopback.c:120
 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2630 [inline]
 process_scheduled_works+0xff6/0x1e60 kernel/workqueue.c:2703
 worker_thread+0xeca/0x14d0 kernel/workqueue.c:2784
 kthread+0x3cc/0x520 kernel/kthread.c:388
 ret_from_fork+0x66/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304

Uninit was created at:
 slab_post_alloc_hook+0x105/0xad0 mm/slab.h:767
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3478 [inline]
 kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5a2/0xaf0 mm/slub.c:3523
 kmalloc_reserve+0x13c/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:559
 __alloc_skb+0x2fd/0x770 net/core/skbuff.c:650
 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1286 [inline]
 virtio_vsock_alloc_skb include/linux/virtio_vsock.h:66 [inline]
 virtio_transport_alloc_skb+0x90/0x11e0 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:58
 virtio_transport_reset_no_sock net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:957 [inline]
 virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x1279/0x26a0 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:1387
 vsock_loopback_work+0x3bb/0x5a0 net/vmw_vsock/vsock_loopback.c:120
 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2630 [inline]
 process_scheduled_works+0xff6/0x1e60 kernel/workqueue.c:2703
 worker_thread+0xeca/0x14d0 kernel/workqueue.c:2784
 kthread+0x3cc/0x520 kernel/kthread.c:388
 ret_from_fork+0x66/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304

CPU: 1 PID: 10664 Comm: kworker/1:5 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3-00146-g9f3ebbef746f #3
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-1.fc38 04/01/2014
Workqueue: vsock-loopback vsock_loopback_work
=====================================================

The following simple reproducer can cause the issue described above:

int main(void)
{
  int sock;
  struct sockaddr_vm addr = {
    .svm_family = AF_VSOCK,
    .svm_cid = VMADDR_CID_ANY,
    .svm_port = 1234,
  };

  sock = socket(AF_VSOCK, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
  connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
  return 0;
}

This issue occurs because the `buf_alloc` and `fwd_cnt` fields of the
`struct virtio_vsock_hdr` are not initialized when a new skb is allocated
in `virtio_transport_init_hdr()`. This patch resolves the issue by
initializing these fields during allocation.

Fixes: 71dc9ec ("virtio/vsock: replace virtio_vsock_pkt with sk_buff")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+0c8ce1da0ac31abbadcd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=0c8ce1da0ac31abbadcd
Signed-off-by: Shigeru Yoshida <syoshida@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231104150531.257952-1-syoshida@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 27, 2023
Merge branch 'bpf-control-flow-graph-and-precision-backtrack-fixes'
8c74b27 
Andrii Nakryiko says:

====================
BPF control flow graph and precision backtrack fixes

A small fix to BPF verifier's CFG logic around handling and reporting ldimm64
instructions. Patch #1 was previously submitted separately ([0]), and so this
patch set supersedes that patch.

Second patch is fixing obscure corner case in mark_chain_precise() logic. See
patch for details. Patch #3 adds a dedicated test, however fragile it might.

  [0] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/patch/20231101205626.119243-1-andrii@kernel.org/
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231110002638.4168352-1-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 27, 2023
@airlied @dakr
nouveau: use an rwlock for the event lock.
a2e36cd 
This allows it to break the following circular locking dependency.

Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ======================================================
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: 6.4.0-rc7+ torvalds#10 Not tainted
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ------------------------------------------------------
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: wireplumber/2236 is trying to acquire lock:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ffff8fca5320da18 (&fctx->lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:
                                but task is already holding lock:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ffff8fca41208610 (&event->list_lock#2){-...}-{2:2}, at: nvkm_event_ntfy+0x50/0xf0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:
                                which lock already depends on the new lock.
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:
                                the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:
                                -> #3 (&event->list_lock#2){-...}-{2:2}:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvkm_event_ntfy+0x50/0xf0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        ga100_fifo_nonstall_intr+0x24/0x30 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvkm_intr+0x12c/0x240 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x88/0x240
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        handle_irq_event+0x38/0x80
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        handle_edge_irq+0xa3/0x240
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        __common_interrupt+0x72/0x160
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        common_interrupt+0x60/0xe0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:
                                -> #2 (&device->intr.lock){-...}-{2:2}:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvkm_inth_allow+0x2c/0x80 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvkm_event_ntfy_state+0x181/0x250 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvkm_event_ntfy_allow+0x63/0xd0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvkm_uevent_mthd+0x4d/0x70 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvkm_ioctl+0x10b/0x250 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvif_object_mthd+0xa8/0x1f0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvif_event_allow+0x2a/0xa0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nouveau_fence_enable_signaling+0x78/0x80 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        __dma_fence_enable_signaling+0x5e/0x100
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        dma_fence_add_callback+0x4b/0xd0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nouveau_cli_work_queue+0xae/0x110 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nouveau_gem_object_close+0x1d1/0x2a0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        drm_gem_handle_delete+0x70/0xe0 [drm]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        drm_ioctl_kernel+0xa5/0x150 [drm]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        drm_ioctl+0x256/0x490 [drm]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nouveau_drm_ioctl+0x5a/0xb0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        __x64_sys_ioctl+0x91/0xd0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x90
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:
                                -> #1 (&event->refs_lock#4){....}-{2:2}:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvkm_event_ntfy_state+0x37/0x250 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvkm_event_ntfy_allow+0x63/0xd0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvkm_uevent_mthd+0x4d/0x70 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvkm_ioctl+0x10b/0x250 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvif_object_mthd+0xa8/0x1f0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvif_event_allow+0x2a/0xa0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nouveau_fence_enable_signaling+0x78/0x80 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        __dma_fence_enable_signaling+0x5e/0x100
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        dma_fence_add_callback+0x4b/0xd0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nouveau_cli_work_queue+0xae/0x110 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nouveau_gem_object_close+0x1d1/0x2a0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        drm_gem_handle_delete+0x70/0xe0 [drm]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        drm_ioctl_kernel+0xa5/0x150 [drm]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        drm_ioctl+0x256/0x490 [drm]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nouveau_drm_ioctl+0x5a/0xb0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        __x64_sys_ioctl+0x91/0xd0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x90
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:
                                -> #0 (&fctx->lock){-...}-{2:2}:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        __lock_acquire+0x14e3/0x2240
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2a0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvkm_client_event+0xf/0x20 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvkm_event_ntfy+0x9b/0xf0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        ga100_fifo_nonstall_intr+0x24/0x30 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvkm_intr+0x12c/0x240 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x88/0x240
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        handle_irq_event+0x38/0x80
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        handle_edge_irq+0xa3/0x240
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        __common_interrupt+0x72/0x160
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        common_interrupt+0x60/0xe0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:
                                other info that might help us debug this:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Chain exists of:
                                  &fctx->lock --> &device->intr.lock --> &event->list_lock#2
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        CPU0                    CPU1
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        ----                    ----
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:   lock(&event->list_lock#2);
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:                                lock(&device->intr.lock);
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:                                lock(&event->list_lock#2);
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:   lock(&fctx->lock);
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:
                                 *** DEADLOCK ***
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: 2 locks held by wireplumber/2236:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  #0: ffff8fca53177bf8 (&device->intr.lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: nvkm_intr+0x29/0x240 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  #1: ffff8fca41208610 (&event->list_lock#2){-...}-{2:2}, at: nvkm_event_ntfy+0x50/0xf0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:
                                stack backtrace:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: CPU: 6 PID: 2236 Comm: wireplumber Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7+ torvalds#10
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. Z390 I AORUS PRO WIFI/Z390 I AORUS PRO WIFI-CF, BIOS F8 11/05/2021
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Call Trace:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  <TASK>
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  dump_stack_lvl+0x5b/0x90
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  check_noncircular+0xe2/0x110
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  __lock_acquire+0x14e3/0x2240
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2a0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  ? nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  ? lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2a0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  ? nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  nvkm_client_event+0xf/0x20 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  nvkm_event_ntfy+0x9b/0xf0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  ga100_fifo_nonstall_intr+0x24/0x30 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  nvkm_intr+0x12c/0x240 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x88/0x240
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  handle_irq_event+0x38/0x80
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  handle_edge_irq+0xa3/0x240
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  __common_interrupt+0x72/0x160
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  common_interrupt+0x60/0xe0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RIP: 0033:0x7fb66174d700
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Code: c1 e2 05 29 ca 8d 0c 10 0f be 07 84 c0 75 eb 89 c8 c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa e9 d7 0f fc ff 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 <f3> 0f 1e fa e9 c7 0f fc>
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RSP: 002b:00007ffdd3c48438 EFLAGS: 00000206
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RAX: 000055bb758763c0 RBX: 000055bb758752c0 RCX: 00000000000028b0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RDX: 000055bb758752c0 RSI: 000055bb75887490 RDI: 000055bb75862950
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RBP: 00007ffdd3c48490 R08: 000055bb75873b10 R09: 0000000000000001
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 000055bb7587f000 R12: 000055bb75887490
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: R13: 000055bb757f6280 R14: 000055bb758875c0 R15: 000055bb757f6280
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  </TASK>

Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231107053255.2257079-1-airlied@gmail.com
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 27, 2023
Merge branch 'verify-callbacks-as-if-they-are-called-unknown-number-o…
acb12c8 
…f-times'

Eduard Zingerman says:

====================
verify callbacks as if they are called unknown number of times

This series updates verifier logic for callback functions handling.
Current master simulates callback body execution exactly once,
which leads to verifier not detecting unsafe programs like below:

    static int unsafe_on_zero_iter_cb(__u32 idx, struct num_context *ctx)
    {
        ctx->i = 0;
        return 0;
    }

    SEC("?raw_tp")
    int unsafe_on_zero_iter(void *unused)
    {
        struct num_context loop_ctx = { .i = 32 };
        __u8 choice_arr[2] = { 0, 1 };

        bpf_loop(100, unsafe_on_zero_iter_cb, &loop_ctx, 0);
        return choice_arr[loop_ctx.i];
    }

This was reported previously in [0].
The basic idea of the fix is to schedule callback entry state for
verification in env->head until some identical, previously visited
state in current DFS state traversal is found. Same logic as with open
coded iterators, and builds on top recent fixes [1] for those.

The series is structured as follows:
- patches #1,2,3 update strobemeta, xdp_synproxy selftests and
  bpf_loop_bench benchmark to allow convergence of the bpf_loop
  callback states;
- patches #4,5 just shuffle the code a bit;
- patch #6 is the main part of the series;
- patch #7 adds test cases for #6;
- patch torvalds#8 extend patch #6 with same speculative scalar widening
  logic, as used for open coded iterators;
- patch torvalds#9 adds test cases for torvalds#8;
- patch torvalds#10 extends patch #6 to track maximal number of callback
  executions specifically for bpf_loop();
- patch torvalds#11 adds test cases for torvalds#10.

Veristat results comparing this series to master+patches #1,2,3 using selftests
show the following difference:

File                       Program        States (A)  States (B)  States (DIFF)
-------------------------  -------------  ----------  ----------  -------------
bpf_loop_bench.bpf.o       benchmark               1           2  +1 (+100.00%)
pyperf600_bpf_loop.bpf.o   on_event              322         407  +85 (+26.40%)
strobemeta_bpf_loop.bpf.o  on_event              113         151  +38 (+33.63%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.o    syncookie_tc          341         291  -50 (-14.66%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.o    syncookie_xdp         344         301  -43 (-12.50%)

Veristat results comparing this series to master using Tetragon BPF
files [2] also show some differences.
States diff varies from +2% to +15% on 23 programs out of 186,
no new failures.

Changelog:
- V3 [5] -> V4, changes suggested by Andrii:
  - validate mark_chain_precision() result in patch torvalds#10;
  - renaming s/cumulative_callback_depth/callback_unroll_depth/.
- V2 [4] -> V3:
  - fixes in expected log messages for test cases:
    - callback_result_precise;
    - parent_callee_saved_reg_precise_with_callback;
    - parent_stack_slot_precise_with_callback;
  - renamings (suggested by Alexei):
    - s/callback_iter_depth/cumulative_callback_depth/
    - s/is_callback_iter_next/calls_callback/
    - s/mark_callback_iter_next/mark_calls_callback/
  - prepare_func_exit() updated to exit with -EFAULT when
    callee->in_callback_fn is true but calls_callback() is not true
    for callsite;
  - test case 'bpf_loop_iter_limit_nested' rewritten to use return
    value check instead of verifier log message checks
    (suggested by Alexei).
- V1 [3] -> V2, changes suggested by Andrii:
  - small changes for error handling code in __check_func_call();
  - callback body processing log is now matched in relevant
    verifier_subprog_precision.c tests;
  - R1 passed to bpf_loop() is now always marked as precise;
  - log level 2 message for bpf_loop() iteration termination instead of
    iteration depth messages;
  - __no_msg macro removed;
  - bpf_loop_iter_limit_nested updated to avoid using __no_msg;
  - commit message for patch #3 updated according to Alexei's request.

[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CA+vRuzPChFNXmouzGG+wsy=6eMcfr1mFG0F3g7rbg-sedGKW3w@mail.gmail.com/
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231024000917.12153-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/
[2] git@github.com:cilium/tetragon.git
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231116021803.9982-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/T/#t
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231118013355.7943-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/T/#t
[5] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231120225945.11741-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/T/#t
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231121020701.26440-1-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 29, 2023
@gregkh
tty/sysrq: replace smp_processor_id() with get_cpu()
aa267cf 
commit dd976a9 upstream.

The smp_processor_id() shouldn't be called from preemptible code.
Instead use get_cpu() and put_cpu() which disables preemption in
addition to getting the processor id. Enable preemption back after
calling schedule_work() to make sure that the work gets scheduled on all
cores other than the current core. We want to avoid a scenario where
current core's stack trace is printed multiple times and one core's
stack trace isn't printed because of scheduling of current task.

This fixes the following bug:

[  119.143590] sysrq: Show backtrace of all active CPUs
[  119.143902] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: bash/873
[  119.144586] caller is debug_smp_processor_id+0x20/0x30
[  119.144827] CPU: 6 PID: 873 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.10.124-dirty #3
[  119.144861] Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 2023.05-1 07/22/2023
[  119.145053] Call trace:
[  119.145093]  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1a0
[  119.145122]  show_stack+0x18/0x70
[  119.145141]  dump_stack+0xc4/0x11c
[  119.145159]  check_preemption_disabled+0x100/0x110
[  119.145175]  debug_smp_processor_id+0x20/0x30
[  119.145195]  sysrq_handle_showallcpus+0x20/0xc0
[  119.145211]  __handle_sysrq+0x8c/0x1a0
[  119.145227]  write_sysrq_trigger+0x94/0x12c
[  119.145247]  proc_reg_write+0xa8/0xe4
[  119.145266]  vfs_write+0xec/0x280
[  119.145282]  ksys_write+0x6c/0x100
[  119.145298]  __arm64_sys_write+0x20/0x30
[  119.145315]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e4
[  119.145332]  do_el0_svc+0x24/0x8c
[  119.145348]  el0_svc+0x10/0x20
[  119.145364]  el0_sync_handler+0x134/0x140
[  119.145381]  el0_sync+0x180/0x1c0

Cc: jirislaby@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 47cab6a ("debug lockups: Improve lockup detection, fix generic arch fallback")
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231009162021.3607632-1-usama.anjum@collabora.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 29, 2023
@gregkh
ksmbd: fix recursive locking in vfs helpers
c012fba 
commit 807252f upstream.

Running smb2.rename test from Samba smbtorture suite against a kernel built
with lockdep triggers a "possible recursive locking detected" warning.

This is because mnt_want_write() is called twice with no mnt_drop_write()
in between:
  -> ksmbd_vfs_mkdir()
    -> ksmbd_vfs_kern_path_create()
       -> kern_path_create()
          -> filename_create()
            -> mnt_want_write()
       -> mnt_want_write()

Fix this by removing the mnt_want_write/mnt_drop_write calls from vfs
helpers that call kern_path_create().

Full lockdep trace below:

============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.6.0-rc5 torvalds#775 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
kworker/1:1/32 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888005ac83f8 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksmbd_vfs_mkdir+0xe1/0x410

but task is already holding lock:
ffff888005ac83f8 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: filename_create+0xb6/0x260

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(sb_writers#5);
  lock(sb_writers#5);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

4 locks held by kworker/1:1/32:
 #0: ffff8880064e4138 ((wq_completion)ksmbd-io){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x40e/0x980
 #1: ffff888005b0fdd0 ((work_completion)(&work->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x40e/0x980
 #2: ffff888005ac83f8 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: filename_create+0xb6/0x260
 #3: ffff8880057ce760 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#3/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: filename_create+0x123/0x260

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 40b268d ("ksmbd: add mnt_want_write to ksmbd vfs functions")
Signed-off-by: Marios Makassikis <mmakassikis@freebox.fr>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 29, 2023
@ccpalex @gregkh
net: dsa: lan9303: consequently nested-lock physical MDIO
4517b15 
commit 5a22fbc upstream.

When LAN9303 is MDIO-connected two callchains exist into
mdio->bus->write():

1. switch ports 1&2 ("physical" PHYs):

virtual (switch-internal) MDIO bus (lan9303_switch_ops->phy_{read|write})->
  lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write} -> mdiobus_{read|write}_nested

2. LAN9303 virtual PHY:

virtual MDIO bus (lan9303_phy_{read|write}) ->
  lan9303_virt_phy_reg_{read|write} -> regmap -> lan9303_mdio_{read|write}

If the latter functions just take
mutex_lock(&sw_dev->device->bus->mdio_lock) it triggers a LOCKDEP
false-positive splat. It's false-positive because the first
mdio_lock in the second callchain above belongs to virtual MDIO bus, the
second mdio_lock belongs to physical MDIO bus.

Consequent annotation in lan9303_mdio_{read|write} as nested lock
(similar to lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write}, it's the same physical MDIO bus)
prevents the following splat:

WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.15.71 #1 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
kworker/u4:3/609 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff000011531c68 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: regmap_lock_mutex
but task is already holding lock:
ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       lock_acquire
       __mutex_lock
       mutex_lock_nested
       lan9303_mdio_read
       _regmap_read
       regmap_read
       lan9303_probe
       lan9303_mdio_probe
       mdio_probe
       really_probe
       __driver_probe_device
       driver_probe_device
       __device_attach_driver
       bus_for_each_drv
       __device_attach
       device_initial_probe
       bus_probe_device
       deferred_probe_work_func
       process_one_work
       worker_thread
       kthread
       ret_from_fork
-> #0 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __lock_acquire
       lock_acquire.part.0
       lock_acquire
       __mutex_lock
       mutex_lock_nested
       regmap_lock_mutex
       regmap_read
       lan9303_phy_read
       dsa_slave_phy_read
       __mdiobus_read
       mdiobus_read
       get_phy_device
       mdiobus_scan
       __mdiobus_register
       dsa_register_switch
       lan9303_probe
       lan9303_mdio_probe
       mdio_probe
       really_probe
       __driver_probe_device
       driver_probe_device
       __device_attach_driver
       bus_for_each_drv
       __device_attach
       device_initial_probe
       bus_probe_device
       deferred_probe_work_func
       process_one_work
       worker_thread
       kthread
       ret_from_fork
other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:
       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&bus->mdio_lock);
                               lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock);
                               lock(&bus->mdio_lock);
  lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
5 locks held by kworker/u4:3/609:
 #0: ffff000002842938 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
 #1: ffff80000bacbd60 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
 #2: ffff000007645178 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_attach
 #3: ffff8000096e6e78 (dsa2_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dsa_register_switch
 #4: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 609 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 5.15.71 #1
Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace
 show_stack
 dump_stack_lvl
 dump_stack
 print_circular_bug
 check_noncircular
 __lock_acquire
 lock_acquire.part.0
 lock_acquire
 __mutex_lock
 mutex_lock_nested
 regmap_lock_mutex
 regmap_read
 lan9303_phy_read
 dsa_slave_phy_read
 __mdiobus_read
 mdiobus_read
 get_phy_device
 mdiobus_scan
 __mdiobus_register
 dsa_register_switch
 lan9303_probe
 lan9303_mdio_probe
...

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: dc70058 ("net: dsa: LAN9303: add MDIO managed mode support")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231027065741.534971-1-alexander.sverdlin@siemens.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 4, 2023
@keithbusch
nvme: check for valid nvme_identify_ns() before using it
d8b90d6 
When scanning namespaces, it is possible to get valid data from the first
call to nvme_identify_ns() in nvme_alloc_ns(), but not from the second
call in nvme_update_ns_info_block().  In particular, if the NSID becomes
inactive between the two commands, a storage device may return a buffer
filled with zero as per 4.1.5.1.  In this case, we can get a kernel crash
due to a divide-by-zero in blk_stack_limits() because ns->lba_shift will
be set to zero.

PID: 326      TASK: ffff95fec3cd8000  CPU: 29   COMMAND: "kworker/u98:10"
 #0 [ffffad8f8702f9e0] machine_kexec at ffffffff91c76ec7
 #1 [ffffad8f8702fa38] __crash_kexec at ffffffff91dea4fa
 #2 [ffffad8f8702faf8] crash_kexec at ffffffff91deb788
 #3 [ffffad8f8702fb00] oops_end at ffffffff91c2e4bb
 #4 [ffffad8f8702fb20] do_trap at ffffffff91c2a4ce
 #5 [ffffad8f8702fb70] do_error_trap at ffffffff91c2a595
 #6 [ffffad8f8702fbb0] exc_divide_error at ffffffff928506e6
 #7 [ffffad8f8702fbd0] asm_exc_divide_error at ffffffff92a00926
    [exception RIP: blk_stack_limits+434]
    RIP: ffffffff92191872  RSP: ffffad8f8702fc80  RFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff95efa0c91800  RCX: 0000000000000001
    RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: 0000000000000001  RDI: 0000000000000001
    RBP: 00000000ffffffff   R8: ffff95fec7df35a8   R9: 0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000001  R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: 0000000000000000  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: ffff95fed33c09a8
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 torvalds#8 [ffffad8f8702fce0] nvme_update_ns_info_block at ffffffffc06d3533 [nvme_core]
 torvalds#9 [ffffad8f8702fd18] nvme_scan_ns at ffffffffc06d6fa7 [nvme_core]

This happened when the check for valid data was moved out of nvme_identify_ns()
into one of the callers.  Fix this by checking in both callers.

Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218186
Fixes: 0dd6fff ("nvme: bring back auto-removal of deleted namespaces during sequential scan")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ewan D. Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 8, 2023
@gregkh
nvme: check for valid nvme_identify_ns() before using it
2bda53c 
commit d8b90d6 upstream.

When scanning namespaces, it is possible to get valid data from the first
call to nvme_identify_ns() in nvme_alloc_ns(), but not from the second
call in nvme_update_ns_info_block().  In particular, if the NSID becomes
inactive between the two commands, a storage device may return a buffer
filled with zero as per 4.1.5.1.  In this case, we can get a kernel crash
due to a divide-by-zero in blk_stack_limits() because ns->lba_shift will
be set to zero.

PID: 326      TASK: ffff95fec3cd8000  CPU: 29   COMMAND: "kworker/u98:10"
 #0 [ffffad8f8702f9e0] machine_kexec at ffffffff91c76ec7
 #1 [ffffad8f8702fa38] __crash_kexec at ffffffff91dea4fa
 #2 [ffffad8f8702faf8] crash_kexec at ffffffff91deb788
 #3 [ffffad8f8702fb00] oops_end at ffffffff91c2e4bb
 #4 [ffffad8f8702fb20] do_trap at ffffffff91c2a4ce
 #5 [ffffad8f8702fb70] do_error_trap at ffffffff91c2a595
 #6 [ffffad8f8702fbb0] exc_divide_error at ffffffff928506e6
 #7 [ffffad8f8702fbd0] asm_exc_divide_error at ffffffff92a00926
    [exception RIP: blk_stack_limits+434]
    RIP: ffffffff92191872  RSP: ffffad8f8702fc80  RFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff95efa0c91800  RCX: 0000000000000001
    RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: 0000000000000001  RDI: 0000000000000001
    RBP: 00000000ffffffff   R8: ffff95fec7df35a8   R9: 0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000001  R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: 0000000000000000  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: ffff95fed33c09a8
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 torvalds#8 [ffffad8f8702fce0] nvme_update_ns_info_block at ffffffffc06d3533 [nvme_core]
 torvalds#9 [ffffad8f8702fd18] nvme_scan_ns at ffffffffc06d6fa7 [nvme_core]

This happened when the check for valid data was moved out of nvme_identify_ns()
into one of the callers.  Fix this by checking in both callers.

Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218186
Fixes: 0dd6fff ("nvme: bring back auto-removal of deleted namespaces during sequential scan")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ewan D. Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 11, 2023
@jgunthorpe
RDMA/irdma: Avoid free the non-cqp_request scratch
e3e82fc 
When creating ceq_0 during probing irdma, cqp.sc_cqp will be sent as a
cqp_request to cqp->sc_cqp.sq_ring. If the request is pending when
removing the irdma driver or unplugging its aux device, cqp.sc_cqp will be
dereferenced as wrong struct in irdma_free_pending_cqp_request().

  PID: 3669   TASK: ffff88aef892c000  CPU: 28  COMMAND: "kworker/28:0"
   #0 [fffffe0000549e38] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff810e3a34
   #1 [fffffe0000549e40] nmi_handle at ffffffff810788b2
   #2 [fffffe0000549ea0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8107938f
   #3 [fffffe0000549eb8] do_nmi at ffffffff81079582
   #4 [fffffe0000549ef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff82e016b4
      [exception RIP: native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+1291]
      RIP: ffffffff8127e72b  RSP: ffff88aa841ef778  RFLAGS: 00000046
      RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff88b01f849700  RCX: ffffffff8127e47e
      RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: 0000000000000004  RDI: ffffffff83857ec0
      RBP: ffff88afe3e4efc8   R8: ffffed15fc7c9dfa   R9: ffffed15fc7c9dfa
      R10: 0000000000000001  R11: ffffed15fc7c9df9  R12: 0000000000740000
      R13: ffff88b01f849708  R14: 0000000000000003  R15: ffffed1603f092e1
      ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0000
  -- <NMI exception stack> --
   #5 [ffff88aa841ef778] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8127e72b
   #6 [ffff88aa841ef7b0] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff82c22aa4
   #7 [ffff88aa841ef7c8] __wake_up_common_lock at ffffffff81257363
   torvalds#8 [ffff88aa841ef888] irdma_free_pending_cqp_request at ffffffffa0ba12cc [irdma]
   torvalds#9 [ffff88aa841ef958] irdma_cleanup_pending_cqp_op at ffffffffa0ba1469 [irdma]
   torvalds#10 [ffff88aa841ef9c0] irdma_ctrl_deinit_hw at ffffffffa0b2989f [irdma]
   torvalds#11 [ffff88aa841efa28] irdma_remove at ffffffffa0b252df [irdma]
   torvalds#12 [ffff88aa841efae8] auxiliary_bus_remove at ffffffff8219afdb
   torvalds#13 [ffff88aa841efb00] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff821882e6
   torvalds#14 [ffff88aa841efb38] bus_remove_device at ffffffff82184278
   torvalds#15 [ffff88aa841efb88] device_del at ffffffff82179d23
   torvalds#16 [ffff88aa841efc48] ice_unplug_aux_dev at ffffffffa0eb1c14 [ice]
   torvalds#17 [ffff88aa841efc68] ice_service_task at ffffffffa0d88201 [ice]
   torvalds#18 [ffff88aa841efde8] process_one_work at ffffffff811c589a
   torvalds#19 [ffff88aa841efe60] worker_thread at ffffffff811c71ff
   torvalds#20 [ffff88aa841eff10] kthread at ffffffff811d87a0
   torvalds#21 [ffff88aa841eff50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff82e0022f

Fixes: 44d9e52 ("RDMA/irdma: Implement device initialization definitions")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130081415.891006-1-lishifeng@sangfor.com.cn
Suggested-by: "Ismail, Mustafa" <mustafa.ismail@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Shifeng Li <lishifeng@sangfor.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Shiraz Saleem <shiraz.saleem@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 11, 2023
@hkallweit @kuba-moo
leds: trigger: netdev: fix RTNL handling to prevent potential deadlock
fe2b122 
When working on LED support for r8169 I got the following lockdep
warning. Easiest way to prevent this scenario seems to be to take
the RTNL lock before the trigger_data lock in set_device_name().

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.7.0-rc2-next-20231124+ #2 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
bash/383 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888103aa1c68 (&trigger_data->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: netdev_trig_notify+0xec/0x190 [ledtrig_netdev]

but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8cddf808 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnl_lock+0x12/0x20

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #1 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xb50
       mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20
       rtnl_lock+0x12/0x20
       set_device_name+0xa9/0x120 [ledtrig_netdev]
       netdev_trig_activate+0x1a1/0x230 [ledtrig_netdev]
       led_trigger_set+0x172/0x2c0
       led_trigger_write+0xf1/0x140
       sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x5d/0x80
       kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x15d/0x210
       vfs_write+0x1f0/0x510
       ksys_write+0x6c/0xf0
       __x64_sys_write+0x14/0x20
       do_syscall_64+0x3f/0xf0
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74

-> #0 (&trigger_data->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __lock_acquire+0x1459/0x25a0
       lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2d0
       __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xb50
       mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20
       netdev_trig_notify+0xec/0x190 [ledtrig_netdev]
       call_netdevice_register_net_notifiers+0x5a/0x100
       register_netdevice_notifier+0x85/0x120
       netdev_trig_activate+0x1d4/0x230 [ledtrig_netdev]
       led_trigger_set+0x172/0x2c0
       led_trigger_write+0xf1/0x140
       sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x5d/0x80
       kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x15d/0x210
       vfs_write+0x1f0/0x510
       ksys_write+0x6c/0xf0
       __x64_sys_write+0x14/0x20
       do_syscall_64+0x3f/0xf0
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(rtnl_mutex);
                               lock(&trigger_data->lock);
                               lock(rtnl_mutex);
  lock(&trigger_data->lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

8 locks held by bash/383:
 #0: ffff888103ff33f0 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x6c/0xf0
 #1: ffff888103aa1e88 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x114/0x210
 #2: ffff8881036f1890 (kn->active#82){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11d/0x210
 #3: ffff888108e2c358 (&led_cdev->led_access){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: led_trigger_write+0x30/0x140
 #4: ffffffff8cdd9e10 (triggers_list_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: led_trigger_write+0x75/0x140
 #5: ffff888108e2c270 (&led_cdev->trigger_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: led_trigger_write+0xe3/0x140
 #6: ffffffff8cdde3d0 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: register_netdevice_notifier+0x1c/0x120
 #7: ffffffff8cddf808 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnl_lock+0x12/0x20

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 383 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.7.0-rc2-next-20231124+ #2
Hardware name: Default string Default string/Default string, BIOS ADLN.M6.SODIMM.ZB.CY.015 08/08/2023
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x5c/0xd0
 dump_stack+0x10/0x20
 print_circular_bug+0x2dd/0x410
 check_noncircular+0x131/0x150
 __lock_acquire+0x1459/0x25a0
 lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2d0
 ? netdev_trig_notify+0xec/0x190 [ledtrig_netdev]
 __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xb50
 ? netdev_trig_notify+0xec/0x190 [ledtrig_netdev]
 ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
 ? netdev_trig_notify+0xec/0x190 [ledtrig_netdev]
 ? __cancel_work_timer+0x11c/0x1b0
 ? __mutex_lock+0x123/0xb50
 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20
 ? mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20
 netdev_trig_notify+0xec/0x190 [ledtrig_netdev]
 call_netdevice_register_net_notifiers+0x5a/0x100
 register_netdevice_notifier+0x85/0x120
 netdev_trig_activate+0x1d4/0x230 [ledtrig_netdev]
 led_trigger_set+0x172/0x2c0
 ? preempt_count_add+0x49/0xc0
 led_trigger_write+0xf1/0x140
 sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x5d/0x80
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x15d/0x210
 vfs_write+0x1f0/0x510
 ksys_write+0x6c/0xf0
 __x64_sys_write+0x14/0x20
 do_syscall_64+0x3f/0xf0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74
RIP: 0033:0x7f269055d034
Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d 35 c3 0d 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffddb7ef748 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000007 RCX: 00007f269055d034
RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 000055bf5f4af3c0 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 000055bf5f4af3c0 R08: 0000000000000073 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000007
R13: 00007f26906325c0 R14: 00007f269062ff20 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>

Fixes: d5e0126 ("leds: trigger: netdev: add additional specific link speed mode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Acked-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/fb5c8294-2a10-4bf5-8f10-3d2b77d2757e@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 16, 2023
@airlied @gregkh
nouveau: use an rwlock for the event lock.
f5fb5ac 
[ Upstream commit a2e36cd ]

This allows it to break the following circular locking dependency.

Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ======================================================
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: 6.4.0-rc7+ torvalds#10 Not tainted
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ------------------------------------------------------
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: wireplumber/2236 is trying to acquire lock:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ffff8fca5320da18 (&fctx->lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:
                                but task is already holding lock:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ffff8fca41208610 (&event->list_lock#2){-...}-{2:2}, at: nvkm_event_ntfy+0x50/0xf0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:
                                which lock already depends on the new lock.
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:
                                the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:
                                -> #3 (&event->list_lock#2){-...}-{2:2}:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvkm_event_ntfy+0x50/0xf0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        ga100_fifo_nonstall_intr+0x24/0x30 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvkm_intr+0x12c/0x240 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x88/0x240
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        handle_irq_event+0x38/0x80
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        handle_edge_irq+0xa3/0x240
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        __common_interrupt+0x72/0x160
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        common_interrupt+0x60/0xe0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:
                                -> #2 (&device->intr.lock){-...}-{2:2}:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvkm_inth_allow+0x2c/0x80 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvkm_event_ntfy_state+0x181/0x250 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvkm_event_ntfy_allow+0x63/0xd0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvkm_uevent_mthd+0x4d/0x70 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvkm_ioctl+0x10b/0x250 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvif_object_mthd+0xa8/0x1f0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvif_event_allow+0x2a/0xa0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nouveau_fence_enable_signaling+0x78/0x80 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        __dma_fence_enable_signaling+0x5e/0x100
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        dma_fence_add_callback+0x4b/0xd0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nouveau_cli_work_queue+0xae/0x110 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nouveau_gem_object_close+0x1d1/0x2a0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        drm_gem_handle_delete+0x70/0xe0 [drm]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        drm_ioctl_kernel+0xa5/0x150 [drm]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        drm_ioctl+0x256/0x490 [drm]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nouveau_drm_ioctl+0x5a/0xb0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        __x64_sys_ioctl+0x91/0xd0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x90
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:
                                -> #1 (&event->refs_lock#4){....}-{2:2}:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvkm_event_ntfy_state+0x37/0x250 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvkm_event_ntfy_allow+0x63/0xd0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvkm_uevent_mthd+0x4d/0x70 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvkm_ioctl+0x10b/0x250 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvif_object_mthd+0xa8/0x1f0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvif_event_allow+0x2a/0xa0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nouveau_fence_enable_signaling+0x78/0x80 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        __dma_fence_enable_signaling+0x5e/0x100
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        dma_fence_add_callback+0x4b/0xd0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nouveau_cli_work_queue+0xae/0x110 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nouveau_gem_object_close+0x1d1/0x2a0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        drm_gem_handle_delete+0x70/0xe0 [drm]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        drm_ioctl_kernel+0xa5/0x150 [drm]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        drm_ioctl+0x256/0x490 [drm]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nouveau_drm_ioctl+0x5a/0xb0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        __x64_sys_ioctl+0x91/0xd0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x90
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:
                                -> #0 (&fctx->lock){-...}-{2:2}:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        __lock_acquire+0x14e3/0x2240
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2a0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvkm_client_event+0xf/0x20 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvkm_event_ntfy+0x9b/0xf0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        ga100_fifo_nonstall_intr+0x24/0x30 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        nvkm_intr+0x12c/0x240 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x88/0x240
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        handle_irq_event+0x38/0x80
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        handle_edge_irq+0xa3/0x240
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        __common_interrupt+0x72/0x160
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        common_interrupt+0x60/0xe0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:
                                other info that might help us debug this:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Chain exists of:
                                  &fctx->lock --> &device->intr.lock --> &event->list_lock#2
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        CPU0                    CPU1
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:        ----                    ----
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:   lock(&event->list_lock#2);
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:                                lock(&device->intr.lock);
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:                                lock(&event->list_lock#2);
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:   lock(&fctx->lock);
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:
                                 *** DEADLOCK ***
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: 2 locks held by wireplumber/2236:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  #0: ffff8fca53177bf8 (&device->intr.lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: nvkm_intr+0x29/0x240 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  #1: ffff8fca41208610 (&event->list_lock#2){-...}-{2:2}, at: nvkm_event_ntfy+0x50/0xf0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:
                                stack backtrace:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: CPU: 6 PID: 2236 Comm: wireplumber Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7+ torvalds#10
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. Z390 I AORUS PRO WIFI/Z390 I AORUS PRO WIFI-CF, BIOS F8 11/05/2021
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Call Trace:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  <TASK>
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  dump_stack_lvl+0x5b/0x90
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  check_noncircular+0xe2/0x110
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  __lock_acquire+0x14e3/0x2240
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2a0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  ? nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  ? lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2a0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  ? nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  nvkm_client_event+0xf/0x20 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  nvkm_event_ntfy+0x9b/0xf0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  ga100_fifo_nonstall_intr+0x24/0x30 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  nvkm_intr+0x12c/0x240 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x88/0x240
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  handle_irq_event+0x38/0x80
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  handle_edge_irq+0xa3/0x240
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  __common_interrupt+0x72/0x160
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  common_interrupt+0x60/0xe0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RIP: 0033:0x7fb66174d700
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Code: c1 e2 05 29 ca 8d 0c 10 0f be 07 84 c0 75 eb 89 c8 c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa e9 d7 0f fc ff 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 <f3> 0f 1e fa e9 c7 0f fc>
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RSP: 002b:00007ffdd3c48438 EFLAGS: 00000206
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RAX: 000055bb758763c0 RBX: 000055bb758752c0 RCX: 00000000000028b0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RDX: 000055bb758752c0 RSI: 000055bb75887490 RDI: 000055bb75862950
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RBP: 00007ffdd3c48490 R08: 000055bb75873b10 R09: 0000000000000001
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 000055bb7587f000 R12: 000055bb75887490
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: R13: 000055bb757f6280 R14: 000055bb758875c0 R15: 000055bb757f6280
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:  </TASK>

Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231107053255.2257079-1-airlied@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 16, 2023
@gregkh
RDMA/irdma: Avoid free the non-cqp_request scratch
fc05413 
[ Upstream commit e3e82fc ]

When creating ceq_0 during probing irdma, cqp.sc_cqp will be sent as a
cqp_request to cqp->sc_cqp.sq_ring. If the request is pending when
removing the irdma driver or unplugging its aux device, cqp.sc_cqp will be
dereferenced as wrong struct in irdma_free_pending_cqp_request().

  PID: 3669   TASK: ffff88aef892c000  CPU: 28  COMMAND: "kworker/28:0"
   #0 [fffffe0000549e38] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff810e3a34
   #1 [fffffe0000549e40] nmi_handle at ffffffff810788b2
   #2 [fffffe0000549ea0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8107938f
   #3 [fffffe0000549eb8] do_nmi at ffffffff81079582
   #4 [fffffe0000549ef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff82e016b4
      [exception RIP: native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+1291]
      RIP: ffffffff8127e72b  RSP: ffff88aa841ef778  RFLAGS: 00000046
      RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff88b01f849700  RCX: ffffffff8127e47e
      RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: 0000000000000004  RDI: ffffffff83857ec0
      RBP: ffff88afe3e4efc8   R8: ffffed15fc7c9dfa   R9: ffffed15fc7c9dfa
      R10: 0000000000000001  R11: ffffed15fc7c9df9  R12: 0000000000740000
      R13: ffff88b01f849708  R14: 0000000000000003  R15: ffffed1603f092e1
      ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0000
  -- <NMI exception stack> --
   #5 [ffff88aa841ef778] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8127e72b
   #6 [ffff88aa841ef7b0] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff82c22aa4
   #7 [ffff88aa841ef7c8] __wake_up_common_lock at ffffffff81257363
   torvalds#8 [ffff88aa841ef888] irdma_free_pending_cqp_request at ffffffffa0ba12cc [irdma]
   torvalds#9 [ffff88aa841ef958] irdma_cleanup_pending_cqp_op at ffffffffa0ba1469 [irdma]
   torvalds#10 [ffff88aa841ef9c0] irdma_ctrl_deinit_hw at ffffffffa0b2989f [irdma]
   torvalds#11 [ffff88aa841efa28] irdma_remove at ffffffffa0b252df [irdma]
   torvalds#12 [ffff88aa841efae8] auxiliary_bus_remove at ffffffff8219afdb
   torvalds#13 [ffff88aa841efb00] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff821882e6
   torvalds#14 [ffff88aa841efb38] bus_remove_device at ffffffff82184278
   torvalds#15 [ffff88aa841efb88] device_del at ffffffff82179d23
   torvalds#16 [ffff88aa841efc48] ice_unplug_aux_dev at ffffffffa0eb1c14 [ice]
   torvalds#17 [ffff88aa841efc68] ice_service_task at ffffffffa0d88201 [ice]
   torvalds#18 [ffff88aa841efde8] process_one_work at ffffffff811c589a
   torvalds#19 [ffff88aa841efe60] worker_thread at ffffffff811c71ff
   torvalds#20 [ffff88aa841eff10] kthread at ffffffff811d87a0
   torvalds#21 [ffff88aa841eff50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff82e0022f

Fixes: 44d9e52 ("RDMA/irdma: Implement device initialization definitions")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130081415.891006-1-lishifeng@sangfor.com.cn
Suggested-by: "Ismail, Mustafa" <mustafa.ismail@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Shifeng Li <lishifeng@sangfor.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Shiraz Saleem <shiraz.saleem@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 16, 2023
@hkallweit @gregkh
leds: trigger: netdev: fix RTNL handling to prevent potential deadlock
3c0adff 
commit fe2b122 upstream.

When working on LED support for r8169 I got the following lockdep
warning. Easiest way to prevent this scenario seems to be to take
the RTNL lock before the trigger_data lock in set_device_name().

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.7.0-rc2-next-20231124+ #2 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
bash/383 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888103aa1c68 (&trigger_data->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: netdev_trig_notify+0xec/0x190 [ledtrig_netdev]

but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8cddf808 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnl_lock+0x12/0x20

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #1 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xb50
       mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20
       rtnl_lock+0x12/0x20
       set_device_name+0xa9/0x120 [ledtrig_netdev]
       netdev_trig_activate+0x1a1/0x230 [ledtrig_netdev]
       led_trigger_set+0x172/0x2c0
       led_trigger_write+0xf1/0x140
       sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x5d/0x80
       kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x15d/0x210
       vfs_write+0x1f0/0x510
       ksys_write+0x6c/0xf0
       __x64_sys_write+0x14/0x20
       do_syscall_64+0x3f/0xf0
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74

-> #0 (&trigger_data->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __lock_acquire+0x1459/0x25a0
       lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2d0
       __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xb50
       mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20
       netdev_trig_notify+0xec/0x190 [ledtrig_netdev]
       call_netdevice_register_net_notifiers+0x5a/0x100
       register_netdevice_notifier+0x85/0x120
       netdev_trig_activate+0x1d4/0x230 [ledtrig_netdev]
       led_trigger_set+0x172/0x2c0
       led_trigger_write+0xf1/0x140
       sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x5d/0x80
       kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x15d/0x210
       vfs_write+0x1f0/0x510
       ksys_write+0x6c/0xf0
       __x64_sys_write+0x14/0x20
       do_syscall_64+0x3f/0xf0
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(rtnl_mutex);
                               lock(&trigger_data->lock);
                               lock(rtnl_mutex);
  lock(&trigger_data->lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

8 locks held by bash/383:
 #0: ffff888103ff33f0 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x6c/0xf0
 #1: ffff888103aa1e88 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x114/0x210
 #2: ffff8881036f1890 (kn->active#82){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11d/0x210
 #3: ffff888108e2c358 (&led_cdev->led_access){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: led_trigger_write+0x30/0x140
 #4: ffffffff8cdd9e10 (triggers_list_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: led_trigger_write+0x75/0x140
 #5: ffff888108e2c270 (&led_cdev->trigger_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: led_trigger_write+0xe3/0x140
 #6: ffffffff8cdde3d0 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: register_netdevice_notifier+0x1c/0x120
 #7: ffffffff8cddf808 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnl_lock+0x12/0x20

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 383 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.7.0-rc2-next-20231124+ #2
Hardware name: Default string Default string/Default string, BIOS ADLN.M6.SODIMM.ZB.CY.015 08/08/2023
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x5c/0xd0
 dump_stack+0x10/0x20
 print_circular_bug+0x2dd/0x410
 check_noncircular+0x131/0x150
 __lock_acquire+0x1459/0x25a0
 lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2d0
 ? netdev_trig_notify+0xec/0x190 [ledtrig_netdev]
 __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xb50
 ? netdev_trig_notify+0xec/0x190 [ledtrig_netdev]
 ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
 ? netdev_trig_notify+0xec/0x190 [ledtrig_netdev]
 ? __cancel_work_timer+0x11c/0x1b0
 ? __mutex_lock+0x123/0xb50
 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20
 ? mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20
 netdev_trig_notify+0xec/0x190 [ledtrig_netdev]
 call_netdevice_register_net_notifiers+0x5a/0x100
 register_netdevice_notifier+0x85/0x120
 netdev_trig_activate+0x1d4/0x230 [ledtrig_netdev]
 led_trigger_set+0x172/0x2c0
 ? preempt_count_add+0x49/0xc0
 led_trigger_write+0xf1/0x140
 sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x5d/0x80
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x15d/0x210
 vfs_write+0x1f0/0x510
 ksys_write+0x6c/0xf0
 __x64_sys_write+0x14/0x20
 do_syscall_64+0x3f/0xf0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74
RIP: 0033:0x7f269055d034
Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d 35 c3 0d 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffddb7ef748 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000007 RCX: 00007f269055d034
RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 000055bf5f4af3c0 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 000055bf5f4af3c0 R08: 0000000000000073 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000007
R13: 00007f26906325c0 R14: 00007f269062ff20 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>

Fixes: d5e0126 ("leds: trigger: netdev: add additional specific link speed mode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Acked-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/fb5c8294-2a10-4bf5-8f10-3d2b77d2757e@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 31, 2025
@gregkh
devcoredump: Fix circular locking dependency with devcd->mutex.
a31e8a3 
commit a91c809 upstream.

The original code causes a circular locking dependency found by lockdep.

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ #1 Tainted: G S   U
------------------------------------------------------
xe_fault_inject/5091 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888156815688 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x25d/0x660

but task is already holding lock:

ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #2 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       mutex_lock_nested+0x4e/0xc0
       devcd_data_write+0x27/0x90
       sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x80/0xf0
       kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220
       vfs_write+0x293/0x560
       ksys_write+0x72/0xf0
       __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30
       x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660
       do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
-> #1 (kn->active#236){++++}-{0:0}:
       kernfs_drain+0x1e2/0x200
       __kernfs_remove+0xae/0x400
       kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x5d/0xc0
       remove_files+0x54/0x70
       sysfs_remove_group+0x3d/0xa0
       sysfs_remove_groups+0x2e/0x60
       device_remove_attrs+0xc7/0x100
       device_del+0x15d/0x3b0
       devcd_del+0x19/0x30
       process_one_work+0x22b/0x6f0
       worker_thread+0x1e8/0x3d0
       kthread+0x11c/0x250
       ret_from_fork+0x26c/0x2e0
       ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
-> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
       __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860
       lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0
       __flush_work+0x27a/0x660
       flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0
       dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0
       xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe]
       devm_action_release+0x12/0x30
       release_nodes+0x3a/0x120
       devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0
       device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80
       device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280
       device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20
       unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0
       drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50
       sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80
       kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220
       vfs_write+0x293/0x560
       ksys_write+0x72/0xf0
       __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30
       x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660
       do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work) --> kn->active#236 --> &devcd->mutex
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:
       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&devcd->mutex);
                               lock(kn->active#236);
                               lock(&devcd->mutex);
  lock((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work));
 *** DEADLOCK ***
5 locks held by xe_fault_inject/5091:
 #0: ffff8881129f9488 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x72/0xf0
 #1: ffff88810c755078 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x123/0x220
 #2: ffff8881054811a0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x55/0x280
 #3: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0
 #4: ffffffff8359e020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x72/0x660
stack backtrace:
CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 5091 Comm: xe_fault_inject Tainted: G S   U              6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ #1 PREEMPT_{RT,(lazy)}
Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [U]=USER
Hardware name: Micro-Star International Co., Ltd. MS-7D25/PRO Z690-A DDR4(MS-7D25), BIOS 1.10 12/13/2021
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0
 dump_stack+0x10/0x20
 print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360
 check_noncircular+0x135/0x150
 ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x4a0
 __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860
 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0
 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660
 ? mark_held_locks+0x46/0x90
 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660
 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660
 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660
 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1e/0xd0
 ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10
 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0
 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0
 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe]
 devm_action_release+0x12/0x30
 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120
 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0
 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80
 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280
 ? bus_find_device+0xa8/0xe0
 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20
 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0
 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50
 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220
 vfs_write+0x293/0x560
 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0
 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30
 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660
 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60
 ? __f_unlock_pos+0x15/0x20
 ? __x64_sys_getdents64+0x9b/0x130
 ? __pfx_filldir64+0x10/0x10
 ? do_syscall_64+0x1a2/0xb60
 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80
 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x76e292edd574
Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d d5 ea 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89
RSP: 002b:00007fffe247a828 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000076e292edd574
RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 00006267f6306063 RDI: 000000000000000b
RBP: 000000000000000c R08: 000076e292fc4b20 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00006267f6306063
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00006267e6859c00 R15: 000076e29322a000
 </TASK>
xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] Xe device coredump has been deleted.

Fixes: 01daccf ("devcoredump : Serialize devcd_del work")
Cc: Mukesh Ojha <quic_mojha@quicinc.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael@kernel.org>
Cc: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.1+
Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <dev@lankhorst.se>
Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Acked-by: Mukesh Ojha <mukesh.ojha@oss.qualcomm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250723142416.1020423-1-dev@lankhorst.se
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 31, 2025
@Vudentz @gregkh
Bluetooth: hci_event: Fix UAF in hci_conn_tx_dequeue
dde3312 
[ Upstream commit 2e12868 ]

This fixes the following UAF caused by not properly locking hdev when
processing HCI_EV_NUM_COMP_PKTS:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_conn_tx_dequeue+0x1be/0x220 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:3036
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880740f0940 by task kworker/u11:0/54

CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kworker/u11:0 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc7 #3 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: hci1 hci_rx_work
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
 print_report+0xca/0x230 mm/kasan/report.c:480
 kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:593
 hci_conn_tx_dequeue+0x1be/0x220 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:3036
 hci_num_comp_pkts_evt+0x1c8/0xa50 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:4404
 hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7477 [inline]
 hci_event_packet+0x7e0/0x1200 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7531
 hci_rx_work+0x46a/0xe80 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4070
 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3238 [inline]
 process_scheduled_works+0xae1/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3321
 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3402
 kthread+0x70e/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:464
 ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 home/kwqcheii/source/fuzzing/kernel/kasan/linux-6.16-rc7/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
 </TASK>

Allocated by task 54:
 kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
 kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394
 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]
 __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x230/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:4359
 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:905 [inline]
 kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1039 [inline]
 __hci_conn_add+0x233/0x1b30 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:939
 le_conn_complete_evt+0x3d6/0x1220 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:5628
 hci_le_enh_conn_complete_evt+0x189/0x470 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:5794
 hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7474 [inline]
 hci_event_packet+0x78c/0x1200 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7531
 hci_rx_work+0x46a/0xe80 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4070
 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3238 [inline]
 process_scheduled_works+0xae1/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3321
 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3402
 kthread+0x70e/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:464
 ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 home/kwqcheii/source/fuzzing/kernel/kasan/linux-6.16-rc7/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245

Freed by task 9572:
 kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
 kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
 kasan_save_free_info+0x46/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:576
 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0x62/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264
 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline]
 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2381 [inline]
 slab_free mm/slub.c:4643 [inline]
 kfree+0x18e/0x440 mm/slub.c:4842
 device_release+0x9c/0x1c0
 kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:689 [inline]
 kobject_release lib/kobject.c:720 [inline]
 kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline]
 kobject_put+0x22b/0x480 lib/kobject.c:737
 hci_conn_cleanup net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:175 [inline]
 hci_conn_del+0x8ff/0xcb0 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1173
 hci_abort_conn_sync+0x5d1/0xdf0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5689
 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x210/0x3a0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:332
 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3238 [inline]
 process_scheduled_works+0xae1/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3321
 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3402
 kthread+0x70e/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:464
 ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 home/kwqcheii/source/fuzzing/kernel/kasan/linux-6.16-rc7/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245

Fixes: 134f4b3 ("Bluetooth: add support for skb TX SND/COMPLETION timestamping")
Reported-by: Junvyyang, Tencent Zhuque Lab <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 31, 2025
@Vudentz @gregkh
Bluetooth: hci_event: Fix UAF in hci_acl_create_conn_sync
a78fd4f 
[ Upstream commit 9e62280 ]

This fixes the following UFA in hci_acl_create_conn_sync where a
connection still pending is command submission (conn->state == BT_OPEN)
maybe freed, also since this also can happen with the likes of
hci_le_create_conn_sync fix it as well:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_acl_create_conn_sync+0x5ef/0x790 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:6861
Write of size 2 at addr ffff88805ffcc038 by task kworker/u11:2/9541

CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 9541 Comm: kworker/u11:2 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc7 #3 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: hci3 hci_cmd_sync_work
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
 print_report+0xca/0x230 mm/kasan/report.c:480
 kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:593
 hci_acl_create_conn_sync+0x5ef/0x790 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:6861
 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x210/0x3a0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:332
 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3238 [inline]
 process_scheduled_works+0xae1/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3321
 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3402
 kthread+0x70e/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:464
 ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 home/kwqcheii/source/fuzzing/kernel/kasan/linux-6.16-rc7/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
 </TASK>

Allocated by task 123736:
 kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
 kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394
 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]
 __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x230/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:4359
 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:905 [inline]
 kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1039 [inline]
 __hci_conn_add+0x233/0x1b30 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:939
 hci_conn_add_unset net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1051 [inline]
 hci_connect_acl+0x16c/0x4e0 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1634
 pair_device+0x418/0xa70 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:3556
 hci_mgmt_cmd+0x9c9/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1719
 hci_sock_sendmsg+0x6ca/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1839
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg+0x219/0x270 net/socket.c:727
 sock_write_iter+0x258/0x330 net/socket.c:1131
 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline]
 vfs_write+0x54b/0xa90 fs/read_write.c:686
 ksys_write+0x145/0x250 fs/read_write.c:738
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Freed by task 103680:
 kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
 kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
 kasan_save_free_info+0x46/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:576
 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0x62/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264
 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline]
 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2381 [inline]
 slab_free mm/slub.c:4643 [inline]
 kfree+0x18e/0x440 mm/slub.c:4842
 device_release+0x9c/0x1c0
 kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:689 [inline]
 kobject_release lib/kobject.c:720 [inline]
 kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline]
 kobject_put+0x22b/0x480 lib/kobject.c:737
 hci_conn_cleanup net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:175 [inline]
 hci_conn_del+0x8ff/0xcb0 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1173
 hci_conn_complete_evt+0x3c7/0x1040 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:3199
 hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7477 [inline]
 hci_event_packet+0x7e0/0x1200 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7531
 hci_rx_work+0x46a/0xe80 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4070
 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3238 [inline]
 process_scheduled_works+0xae1/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3321
 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3402
 kthread+0x70e/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:464
 ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 home/kwqcheii/source/fuzzing/kernel/kasan/linux-6.16-rc7/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245

Last potentially related work creation:
 kasan_save_stack+0x3e/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:47
 kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbd/0xd0 mm/kasan/generic.c:548
 insert_work+0x3d/0x330 kernel/workqueue.c:2183
 __queue_work+0xbd9/0xfe0 kernel/workqueue.c:2345
 queue_delayed_work_on+0x18b/0x280 kernel/workqueue.c:2561
 pairing_complete+0x1e7/0x2b0 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:3451
 pairing_complete_cb+0x1ac/0x230 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:3487
 hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2064 [inline]
 hci_conn_failed+0x24d/0x310 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1275
 hci_conn_complete_evt+0x3c7/0x1040 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:3199
 hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7477 [inline]
 hci_event_packet+0x7e0/0x1200 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7531
 hci_rx_work+0x46a/0xe80 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4070
 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3238 [inline]
 process_scheduled_works+0xae1/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3321
 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3402
 kthread+0x70e/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:464
 ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 home/kwqcheii/source/fuzzing/kernel/kasan/linux-6.16-rc7/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245

Fixes: aef2aa4 ("Bluetooth: hci_event: Fix creating hci_conn object on error status")
Reported-by: Junvyyang, Tencent Zhuque Lab <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
pongo1231 pushed a commit to pongo1231/linux that referenced this pull request Nov 7, 2025
@kuba-moo
Merge branch 'bnxt_en-bug-fixes'
a30297d 
Michael Chan says:

====================
bnxt_en: Bug fixes

Patches 1, 3, and 4 are bug fixes related to the FW log tracing driver
coredump feature recently added in 6.13.  Patch CachyOS#1 adds the necessary
call to shutdown the FW logging DMA during PCI shutdown.  Patch CachyOS#3 fixes
a possible null pointer derefernce when using early versions of the FW
with this feature.  Patch CachyOS#4 adds the coredump header information
unconditionally to make it more robust.

Patch CachyOS#2 fixes a possible memory leak during PTP shutdown.  Patch CachyOS#5
eliminates a dmesg warning when doing devlink reload.
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251104005700.542174-1-michael.chan@broadcom.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
1Naim pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 10, 2025
@jkrzyszt-intel @rodrigovivi
drm/i915: Avoid lock inversion when pinning to GGTT on CHV/BXT+VTD
84bbe32 
On completion of i915_vma_pin_ww(), a synchronous variant of
dma_fence_work_commit() is called.  When pinning a VMA to GGTT address
space on a Cherry View family processor, or on a Broxton generation SoC
with VTD enabled, i.e., when stop_machine() is then called from
intel_ggtt_bind_vma(), that can potentially lead to lock inversion among
reservation_ww and cpu_hotplug locks.

[86.861179] ======================================================
[86.861193] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[86.861209] 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 Tainted: G     U
[86.861226] ------------------------------------------------------
[86.861238] i915_module_loa/1432 is trying to acquire lock:
[86.861252] ffffffff83489090 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: stop_machine+0x1c/0x50
[86.861290]
but task is already holding lock:
[86.861303] ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915]
[86.862233]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
[86.862251]
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[86.862265]
-> #5 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[86.862292]        dma_resv_lockdep+0x19a/0x390
[86.862315]        do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0
[86.862334]        kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680
[86.862353]        kernel_init+0x1b/0x200
[86.862369]        ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70
[86.862383]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[86.862399]
-> #4 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[86.862425]        dma_resv_lockdep+0x178/0x390
[86.862440]        do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0
[86.862454]        kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680
[86.862470]        kernel_init+0x1b/0x200
[86.862482]        ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70
[86.862495]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[86.862509]
-> #3 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}:
[86.862531]        down_read_killable+0x46/0x1e0
[86.862546]        lock_mm_and_find_vma+0xa2/0x280
[86.862561]        do_user_addr_fault+0x266/0x8e0
[86.862578]        exc_page_fault+0x8a/0x2f0
[86.862593]        asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30
[86.862607]        filldir64+0xeb/0x180
[86.862620]        kernfs_fop_readdir+0x118/0x480
[86.862635]        iterate_dir+0xcf/0x2b0
[86.862648]        __x64_sys_getdents64+0x84/0x140
[86.862661]        x64_sys_call+0x1058/0x2660
[86.862675]        do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90
[86.862689]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[86.862703]
-> #2 (&root->kernfs_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}:
[86.862725]        down_write+0x3e/0xf0
[86.862738]        kernfs_add_one+0x30/0x3c0
[86.862751]        kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x53/0xb0
[86.862765]        internal_create_group+0x134/0x4c0
[86.862779]        sysfs_create_group+0x13/0x20
[86.862792]        topology_add_dev+0x1d/0x30
[86.862806]        cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x4b5/0x850
[86.862822]        cpuhp_issue_call+0xbf/0x1f0
[86.862836]        __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x111/0x320
[86.862852]        __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220
[86.862866]        topology_sysfs_init+0x30/0x50
[86.862879]        do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0
[86.862893]        kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680
[86.862908]        kernel_init+0x1b/0x200
[86.862921]        ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70
[86.862934]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[86.862947]
-> #1 (cpuhp_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[86.862969]        __mutex_lock+0xaa/0xed0
[86.862982]        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[86.862995]        __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x67/0x320
[86.863012]        __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220
[86.863026]        page_alloc_init_cpuhp+0x2d/0x60
[86.863041]        mm_core_init+0x22/0x2d0
[86.863054]        start_kernel+0x576/0xbd0
[86.863068]        x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30
[86.863084]        x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110
[86.863098]        common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141
[86.863114]
-> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}:
[86.863135]        __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810
[86.863152]        lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0
[86.863166]        cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100
[86.863180]        stop_machine+0x1c/0x50
[86.863194]        bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915]
[86.863987]        intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915]
[86.864735]        __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915]
[86.865510]        fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915]
[86.866248]        fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915]
[86.866983]        __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915]
[86.867719]        i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915]
[86.868453]        i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915]
[86.869228]        i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915]
[86.870001]        initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915]
[86.870774]        intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915]
[86.871546]        intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915]
[86.872330]        i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915]
[86.873057]        i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915]
[86.873782]        local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0
[86.873802]        pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260
[86.873817]        really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0
[86.873833]        __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180
[86.873848]        driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0
[86.873862]        __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220
[86.873876]        bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0
[86.873892]        driver_attach+0x1e/0x30
[86.873904]        bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290
[86.873917]        driver_register+0x5e/0x130
[86.873931]        __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90
[86.873945]        i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915]
[86.874678]        i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915]
[86.875347]        do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0
[86.875369]        do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0
[86.875385]        load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80
[86.875398]        init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0
[86.875413]        idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330
[86.875426]        __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100
[86.875440]        x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660
[86.875454]        do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90
[86.875470]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[86.875486]
other info that might help us debug this:
[86.875502] Chain exists of:
  cpu_hotplug_lock --> reservation_ww_class_acquire --> reservation_ww_class_mutex
[86.875539]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[86.875552]        CPU0                    CPU1
[86.875563]        ----                    ----
[86.875573]   lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex);
[86.875588]                                lock(reservation_ww_class_acquire);
[86.875606]                                lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex);
[86.875624]   rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock);
[86.875637]
 *** DEADLOCK ***
[86.875650] 3 locks held by i915_module_loa/1432:
[86.875663]  #0: ffff888101f5c1b0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __driver_attach+0x104/0x220
[86.875699]  #1: ffffc90002e0b4a0 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915]
[86.876512]  #2: ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915]
[86.877305]
stack backtrace:
[86.877326] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1432 Comm: i915_module_loa Tainted: G     U              6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[86.877334] Tainted: [U]=USER
[86.877336] Hardware name:  /NUC5CPYB, BIOS PYBSWCEL.86A.0079.2020.0420.1316 04/20/2020
[86.877339] Call Trace:
[86.877344]  <TASK>
[86.877353]  dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0
[86.877364]  dump_stack+0x10/0x20
[86.877369]  print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360
[86.877379]  check_noncircular+0x135/0x150
[86.877390]  __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810
[86.877403]  lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0
[86.877408]  ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50
[86.877422]  ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915]
[86.878173]  cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100
[86.878182]  ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50
[86.878191]  ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915]
[86.878916]  stop_machine+0x1c/0x50
[86.878927]  bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915]
[86.879652]  intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915]
[86.880375]  __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915]
[86.881133]  fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915]
[86.881851]  fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915]
[86.882566]  __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915]
[86.883286]  i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915]
[86.884003]  i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915]
[86.884756]  ? i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x6c/0x1d0 [i915]
[86.885513]  i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915]
[86.886281]  initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915]
[86.887049]  intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915]
[86.887819]  intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915]
[86.888587]  i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915]
[86.889293]  ? mutex_unlock+0x12/0x20
[86.889301]  ? drm_privacy_screen_get+0x171/0x190
[86.889308]  ? acpi_dev_found+0x66/0x80
[86.889321]  i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915]
[86.890038]  local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0
[86.890049]  pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260
[86.890058]  really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0
[86.890067]  __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180
[86.890072]  driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0
[86.890078]  __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220
[86.890083]  ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10
[86.890088]  bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0
[86.890097]  driver_attach+0x1e/0x30
[86.890101]  bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290
[86.890107]  driver_register+0x5e/0x130
[86.890113]  __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90
[86.890119]  i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915]
[86.890833]  i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915]
[86.891482]  ? __pfx_i915_init+0x10/0x10 [i915]
[86.892135]  do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0
[86.892145]  ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x33f/0x470
[86.892157]  do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0
[86.892164]  load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80
[86.892168]  ? __kernel_read+0x15c/0x300
[86.892185]  ? kernel_read_file+0x2b1/0x320
[86.892195]  init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0
[86.892199]  ? init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0
[86.892211]  idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330
[86.892224]  __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100
[86.892230]  x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660
[86.892236]  do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90
[86.892243]  ? irqentry_exit+0x77/0xb0
[86.892249]  ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0
[86.892256]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[86.892261] RIP: 0033:0x7303e1b2725d
[86.892271] Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 8b bb 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[86.892276] RSP: 002b:00007ffddd1fdb38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
[86.892281] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005d771d88fd90 RCX: 00007303e1b2725d
[86.892285] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00005d771d893aa0 RDI: 000000000000000c
[86.892287] RBP: 00007ffddd1fdbf0 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 00007ffddd1fdb80
[86.892289] R10: 00007303e1c03b20 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005d771d893aa0
[86.892292] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00005d771d88f0d0 R15: 00005d771d895710
[86.892304]  </TASK>

Call asynchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() in that case.

v3: Provide more verbose in-line comment (Andi),
  - mention target environments in commit message.

Fixes: 7d1c261 ("drm/i915: Take reservation lock around i915_vma_pin.")
Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/i915/kernel/-/issues/14985
Cc: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Janusz Krzysztofik <janusz.krzysztofik@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Sebastian Brzezinka <sebastian.brzezinka@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Karas <krzysztof.karas@intel.com>
Acked-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251023082925.351307-6-janusz.krzysztofik@linux.intel.com
(cherry picked from commit 648ef13)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
pongo1231 pushed a commit to pongo1231/linux that referenced this pull request Nov 10, 2025
@sean-jc
KVM: VMX: Inject #UD if guest tries to execute SEAMCALL or TDCALL
9d7dfb9 
Add VMX exit handlers for SEAMCALL and TDCALL to inject a #UD if a non-TD
guest attempts to execute SEAMCALL or TDCALL.  Neither SEAMCALL nor TDCALL
is gated by any software enablement other than VMXON, and so will generate
a VM-Exit instead of e.g. a native #UD when executed from the guest kernel.

Note!  No unprivileged DoS of the L1 kernel is possible as TDCALL and
SEAMCALL #GP at CPL > 0, and the CPL check is performed prior to the VMX
non-root (VM-Exit) check, i.e. userspace can't crash the VM. And for a
nested guest, KVM forwards unknown exits to L1, i.e. an L2 kernel can
crash itself, but not L1.

Note CachyOS#2!  The Intel® Trust Domain CPU Architectural Extensions spec's
pseudocode shows the CPL > 0 check for SEAMCALL coming _after_ the VM-Exit,
but that appears to be a documentation bug (likely because the CPL > 0
check was incorrectly bundled with other lower-priority #GP checks).
Testing on SPR and EMR shows that the CPL > 0 check is performed before
the VMX non-root check, i.e. SEAMCALL #GPs when executed in usermode.

Note CachyOS#3!  The aforementioned Trust Domain spec uses confusing pseudocode
that says that SEAMCALL will #UD if executed "inSEAM", but "inSEAM"
specifically means in SEAM Root Mode, i.e. in the TDX-Module.  The long-
form description explicitly states that SEAMCALL generates an exit when
executed in "SEAM VMX non-root operation".  But that's a moot point as the
TDX-Module injects #UD if the guest attempts to execute SEAMCALL, as
documented in the "Unconditionally Blocked Instructions" section of the
TDX-Module base specification.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251016182148.69085-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
1Naim pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 14, 2025
@YuKuai-huawei @gregkh
blk-cgroup: fix possible deadlock while configuring policy
0585b24 
[ Upstream commit 5d726c4 ]

Following deadlock can be triggered easily by lockdep:

WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.17.0-rc3-00124-ga12c2658ced0 #1665 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
check/1334 is trying to acquire lock:
ff1100011d9d0678 (&q->sysfs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: blk_unregister_queue+0x53/0x180

but task is already holding lock:
ff1100011d9d00e0 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3){++++}-{0:0}, at: del_gendisk+0xba/0x110

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #2 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3){++++}-{0:0}:
       blk_queue_enter+0x40b/0x470
       blkg_conf_prep+0x7b/0x3c0
       tg_set_limit+0x10a/0x3e0
       cgroup_file_write+0xc6/0x420
       kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x189/0x280
       vfs_write+0x256/0x490
       ksys_write+0x83/0x190
       __x64_sys_write+0x21/0x30
       x64_sys_call+0x4608/0x4630
       do_syscall_64+0xdb/0x6b0
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

-> #1 (&q->rq_qos_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
       __mutex_lock+0xd8/0xf50
       mutex_lock_nested+0x2b/0x40
       wbt_init+0x17e/0x280
       wbt_enable_default+0xe9/0x140
       blk_register_queue+0x1da/0x2e0
       __add_disk+0x38c/0x5d0
       add_disk_fwnode+0x89/0x250
       device_add_disk+0x18/0x30
       virtblk_probe+0x13a3/0x1800
       virtio_dev_probe+0x389/0x610
       really_probe+0x136/0x620
       __driver_probe_device+0xb3/0x230
       driver_probe_device+0x2f/0xe0
       __driver_attach+0x158/0x250
       bus_for_each_dev+0xa9/0x130
       driver_attach+0x26/0x40
       bus_add_driver+0x178/0x3d0
       driver_register+0x7d/0x1c0
       __register_virtio_driver+0x2c/0x60
       virtio_blk_init+0x6f/0xe0
       do_one_initcall+0x94/0x540
       kernel_init_freeable+0x56a/0x7b0
       kernel_init+0x2b/0x270
       ret_from_fork+0x268/0x4c0
       ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

-> #0 (&q->sysfs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
       __lock_acquire+0x1835/0x2940
       lock_acquire+0xf9/0x450
       __mutex_lock+0xd8/0xf50
       mutex_lock_nested+0x2b/0x40
       blk_unregister_queue+0x53/0x180
       __del_gendisk+0x226/0x690
       del_gendisk+0xba/0x110
       sd_remove+0x49/0xb0 [sd_mod]
       device_remove+0x87/0xb0
       device_release_driver_internal+0x11e/0x230
       device_release_driver+0x1a/0x30
       bus_remove_device+0x14d/0x220
       device_del+0x1e1/0x5a0
       __scsi_remove_device+0x1ff/0x2f0
       scsi_remove_device+0x37/0x60
       sdev_store_delete+0x77/0x100
       dev_attr_store+0x1f/0x40
       sysfs_kf_write+0x65/0x90
       kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x189/0x280
       vfs_write+0x256/0x490
       ksys_write+0x83/0x190
       __x64_sys_write+0x21/0x30
       x64_sys_call+0x4608/0x4630
       do_syscall_64+0xdb/0x6b0
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

other info that might help us debug this:

Chain exists of:
  &q->sysfs_lock --> &q->rq_qos_mutex --> &q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3);
                               lock(&q->rq_qos_mutex);
                               lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3);
  lock(&q->sysfs_lock);

Root cause is that queue_usage_counter is grabbed with rq_qos_mutex
held in blkg_conf_prep(), while queue should be freezed before
rq_qos_mutex from other context.

The blk_queue_enter() from blkg_conf_prep() is used to protect against
policy deactivation, which is already protected with blkcg_mutex, hence
convert blk_queue_enter() to blkcg_mutex to fix this problem. Meanwhile,
consider that blkcg_mutex is held after queue is freezed from policy
deactivation, also convert blkg_alloc() to use GFP_NOIO.

Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
pongo1231 pushed a commit to pongo1231/linux that referenced this pull request Nov 23, 2025
@bonzini
Merge tag 'kvmarm-fixes-6.18-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux…
b82ebaf 
…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD

KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.18, take CachyOS#3

- Only adjust the ID registers when no irqchip has been created once
  per VM run, instead of doing it once per vcpu, as this otherwise
  triggers a pretty bad conbsistency check failure in the sysreg code.

- Make sure the per-vcpu Fine Grain Traps are computed before we load
  the system registers on the HW, as we otherwise start running without
  anything set until the first preemption of the vcpu.
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 24, 2025
@jkrzyszt-intel @gregkh
drm/i915: Avoid lock inversion when pinning to GGTT on CHV/BXT+VTD
858a501 
[ Upstream commit 84bbe32 ]

On completion of i915_vma_pin_ww(), a synchronous variant of
dma_fence_work_commit() is called.  When pinning a VMA to GGTT address
space on a Cherry View family processor, or on a Broxton generation SoC
with VTD enabled, i.e., when stop_machine() is then called from
intel_ggtt_bind_vma(), that can potentially lead to lock inversion among
reservation_ww and cpu_hotplug locks.

[86.861179] ======================================================
[86.861193] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[86.861209] 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 Tainted: G     U
[86.861226] ------------------------------------------------------
[86.861238] i915_module_loa/1432 is trying to acquire lock:
[86.861252] ffffffff83489090 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: stop_machine+0x1c/0x50
[86.861290]
but task is already holding lock:
[86.861303] ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915]
[86.862233]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
[86.862251]
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[86.862265]
-> #5 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[86.862292]        dma_resv_lockdep+0x19a/0x390
[86.862315]        do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0
[86.862334]        kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680
[86.862353]        kernel_init+0x1b/0x200
[86.862369]        ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70
[86.862383]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[86.862399]
-> #4 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[86.862425]        dma_resv_lockdep+0x178/0x390
[86.862440]        do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0
[86.862454]        kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680
[86.862470]        kernel_init+0x1b/0x200
[86.862482]        ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70
[86.862495]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[86.862509]
-> #3 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}:
[86.862531]        down_read_killable+0x46/0x1e0
[86.862546]        lock_mm_and_find_vma+0xa2/0x280
[86.862561]        do_user_addr_fault+0x266/0x8e0
[86.862578]        exc_page_fault+0x8a/0x2f0
[86.862593]        asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30
[86.862607]        filldir64+0xeb/0x180
[86.862620]        kernfs_fop_readdir+0x118/0x480
[86.862635]        iterate_dir+0xcf/0x2b0
[86.862648]        __x64_sys_getdents64+0x84/0x140
[86.862661]        x64_sys_call+0x1058/0x2660
[86.862675]        do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90
[86.862689]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[86.862703]
-> #2 (&root->kernfs_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}:
[86.862725]        down_write+0x3e/0xf0
[86.862738]        kernfs_add_one+0x30/0x3c0
[86.862751]        kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x53/0xb0
[86.862765]        internal_create_group+0x134/0x4c0
[86.862779]        sysfs_create_group+0x13/0x20
[86.862792]        topology_add_dev+0x1d/0x30
[86.862806]        cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x4b5/0x850
[86.862822]        cpuhp_issue_call+0xbf/0x1f0
[86.862836]        __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x111/0x320
[86.862852]        __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220
[86.862866]        topology_sysfs_init+0x30/0x50
[86.862879]        do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0
[86.862893]        kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680
[86.862908]        kernel_init+0x1b/0x200
[86.862921]        ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70
[86.862934]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[86.862947]
-> #1 (cpuhp_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[86.862969]        __mutex_lock+0xaa/0xed0
[86.862982]        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[86.862995]        __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x67/0x320
[86.863012]        __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220
[86.863026]        page_alloc_init_cpuhp+0x2d/0x60
[86.863041]        mm_core_init+0x22/0x2d0
[86.863054]        start_kernel+0x576/0xbd0
[86.863068]        x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30
[86.863084]        x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110
[86.863098]        common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141
[86.863114]
-> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}:
[86.863135]        __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810
[86.863152]        lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0
[86.863166]        cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100
[86.863180]        stop_machine+0x1c/0x50
[86.863194]        bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915]
[86.863987]        intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915]
[86.864735]        __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915]
[86.865510]        fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915]
[86.866248]        fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915]
[86.866983]        __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915]
[86.867719]        i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915]
[86.868453]        i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915]
[86.869228]        i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915]
[86.870001]        initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915]
[86.870774]        intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915]
[86.871546]        intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915]
[86.872330]        i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915]
[86.873057]        i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915]
[86.873782]        local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0
[86.873802]        pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260
[86.873817]        really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0
[86.873833]        __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180
[86.873848]        driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0
[86.873862]        __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220
[86.873876]        bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0
[86.873892]        driver_attach+0x1e/0x30
[86.873904]        bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290
[86.873917]        driver_register+0x5e/0x130
[86.873931]        __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90
[86.873945]        i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915]
[86.874678]        i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915]
[86.875347]        do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0
[86.875369]        do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0
[86.875385]        load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80
[86.875398]        init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0
[86.875413]        idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330
[86.875426]        __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100
[86.875440]        x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660
[86.875454]        do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90
[86.875470]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[86.875486]
other info that might help us debug this:
[86.875502] Chain exists of:
  cpu_hotplug_lock --> reservation_ww_class_acquire --> reservation_ww_class_mutex
[86.875539]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[86.875552]        CPU0                    CPU1
[86.875563]        ----                    ----
[86.875573]   lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex);
[86.875588]                                lock(reservation_ww_class_acquire);
[86.875606]                                lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex);
[86.875624]   rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock);
[86.875637]
 *** DEADLOCK ***
[86.875650] 3 locks held by i915_module_loa/1432:
[86.875663]  #0: ffff888101f5c1b0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __driver_attach+0x104/0x220
[86.875699]  #1: ffffc90002e0b4a0 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915]
[86.876512]  #2: ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915]
[86.877305]
stack backtrace:
[86.877326] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1432 Comm: i915_module_loa Tainted: G     U              6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[86.877334] Tainted: [U]=USER
[86.877336] Hardware name:  /NUC5CPYB, BIOS PYBSWCEL.86A.0079.2020.0420.1316 04/20/2020
[86.877339] Call Trace:
[86.877344]  <TASK>
[86.877353]  dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0
[86.877364]  dump_stack+0x10/0x20
[86.877369]  print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360
[86.877379]  check_noncircular+0x135/0x150
[86.877390]  __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810
[86.877403]  lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0
[86.877408]  ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50
[86.877422]  ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915]
[86.878173]  cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100
[86.878182]  ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50
[86.878191]  ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915]
[86.878916]  stop_machine+0x1c/0x50
[86.878927]  bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915]
[86.879652]  intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915]
[86.880375]  __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915]
[86.881133]  fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915]
[86.881851]  fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915]
[86.882566]  __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915]
[86.883286]  i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915]
[86.884003]  i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915]
[86.884756]  ? i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x6c/0x1d0 [i915]
[86.885513]  i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915]
[86.886281]  initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915]
[86.887049]  intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915]
[86.887819]  intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915]
[86.888587]  i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915]
[86.889293]  ? mutex_unlock+0x12/0x20
[86.889301]  ? drm_privacy_screen_get+0x171/0x190
[86.889308]  ? acpi_dev_found+0x66/0x80
[86.889321]  i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915]
[86.890038]  local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0
[86.890049]  pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260
[86.890058]  really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0
[86.890067]  __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180
[86.890072]  driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0
[86.890078]  __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220
[86.890083]  ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10
[86.890088]  bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0
[86.890097]  driver_attach+0x1e/0x30
[86.890101]  bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290
[86.890107]  driver_register+0x5e/0x130
[86.890113]  __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90
[86.890119]  i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915]
[86.890833]  i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915]
[86.891482]  ? __pfx_i915_init+0x10/0x10 [i915]
[86.892135]  do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0
[86.892145]  ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x33f/0x470
[86.892157]  do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0
[86.892164]  load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80
[86.892168]  ? __kernel_read+0x15c/0x300
[86.892185]  ? kernel_read_file+0x2b1/0x320
[86.892195]  init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0
[86.892199]  ? init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0
[86.892211]  idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330
[86.892224]  __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100
[86.892230]  x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660
[86.892236]  do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90
[86.892243]  ? irqentry_exit+0x77/0xb0
[86.892249]  ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0
[86.892256]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[86.892261] RIP: 0033:0x7303e1b2725d
[86.892271] Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 8b bb 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[86.892276] RSP: 002b:00007ffddd1fdb38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
[86.892281] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005d771d88fd90 RCX: 00007303e1b2725d
[86.892285] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00005d771d893aa0 RDI: 000000000000000c
[86.892287] RBP: 00007ffddd1fdbf0 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 00007ffddd1fdb80
[86.892289] R10: 00007303e1c03b20 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005d771d893aa0
[86.892292] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00005d771d88f0d0 R15: 00005d771d895710
[86.892304]  </TASK>

Call asynchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() in that case.

v3: Provide more verbose in-line comment (Andi),
  - mention target environments in commit message.

Fixes: 7d1c261 ("drm/i915: Take reservation lock around i915_vma_pin.")
Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/i915/kernel/-/issues/14985
Cc: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Janusz Krzysztofik <janusz.krzysztofik@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Sebastian Brzezinka <sebastian.brzezinka@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Karas <krzysztof.karas@intel.com>
Acked-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251023082925.351307-6-janusz.krzysztofik@linux.intel.com
(cherry picked from commit 648ef13)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 24, 2025
@sean-jc @gregkh
KVM: VMX: Inject #UD if guest tries to execute SEAMCALL or TDCALL
350d846 
[ Upstream commit 9d7dfb9 ]

Add VMX exit handlers for SEAMCALL and TDCALL to inject a #UD if a non-TD
guest attempts to execute SEAMCALL or TDCALL.  Neither SEAMCALL nor TDCALL
is gated by any software enablement other than VMXON, and so will generate
a VM-Exit instead of e.g. a native #UD when executed from the guest kernel.

Note!  No unprivileged DoS of the L1 kernel is possible as TDCALL and
SEAMCALL #GP at CPL > 0, and the CPL check is performed prior to the VMX
non-root (VM-Exit) check, i.e. userspace can't crash the VM. And for a
nested guest, KVM forwards unknown exits to L1, i.e. an L2 kernel can
crash itself, but not L1.

Note #2!  The Intel® Trust Domain CPU Architectural Extensions spec's
pseudocode shows the CPL > 0 check for SEAMCALL coming _after_ the VM-Exit,
but that appears to be a documentation bug (likely because the CPL > 0
check was incorrectly bundled with other lower-priority #GP checks).
Testing on SPR and EMR shows that the CPL > 0 check is performed before
the VMX non-root check, i.e. SEAMCALL #GPs when executed in usermode.

Note #3!  The aforementioned Trust Domain spec uses confusing pseudocode
that says that SEAMCALL will #UD if executed "inSEAM", but "inSEAM"
specifically means in SEAM Root Mode, i.e. in the TDX-Module.  The long-
form description explicitly states that SEAMCALL generates an exit when
executed in "SEAM VMX non-root operation".  But that's a moot point as the
TDX-Module injects #UD if the guest attempts to execute SEAMCALL, as
documented in the "Unconditionally Blocked Instructions" section of the
TDX-Module base specification.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251016182148.69085-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
pongo1231 pushed a commit to pongo1231/linux that referenced this pull request Nov 28, 2025
@storulf
pmdomains: mtk-pm-domains: Fix spinlock recursion in probe
c1bac49 
For some reason, of_find_node_with_property() is creating a spinlock
recursion issue along with fwnode_count_parents(), and this issue
is making all MediaTek boards unbootable.

As of kernel v6.18-rc6, there are only three users of this function,
one of which is this driver.

Migrate away from of_find_node_with_property() by adding a local
scpsys_get_legacy_regmap_node() function, which acts similarly to
of_find_node_with_property(), and calling the former in place of
the latter.

This resolves the following spinlock recursion issue:

[    1.773979] BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#2, kworker/u24:1/60
[    1.790485]  lock: devtree_lock+0x0/0x40, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: kworker/u24:1/60, .owner_cpu: 2
[    1.791644] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 60 Comm: kworker/u24:1 Tainted: G        W           6.18.0-rc6 CachyOS#3 PREEMPT
[    1.791649] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[    1.791650] Hardware name: MediaTek Genio-510 EVK (DT)
[    1.791653] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
[    1.791658] Call trace:
[    1.791659]  show_stack+0x18/0x30 (C)
[    1.791664]  dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x94
[    1.791668]  dump_stack+0x18/0x24
[    1.791672]  spin_dump+0x78/0x88
[    1.791678]  do_raw_spin_lock+0x110/0x140
[    1.791684]  _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x58/0x6c
[    1.791690]  of_get_parent+0x28/0x74
[    1.791694]  of_fwnode_get_parent+0x38/0x7c
[    1.791700]  fwnode_count_parents+0x34/0xf0
[    1.791705]  fwnode_full_name_string+0x28/0x120
[    1.791710]  device_node_string+0x3e4/0x50c
[    1.791715]  pointer+0x294/0x430
[    1.791718]  vsnprintf+0x21c/0x5bc
[    1.791722]  vprintk_store+0x108/0x47c
[    1.791728]  vprintk_emit+0xc4/0x350
[    1.791732]  vprintk_default+0x34/0x40
[    1.791736]  vprintk+0x24/0x30
[    1.791740]  _printk+0x60/0x8c
[    1.791744]  of_node_release+0x154/0x194
[    1.791749]  kobject_put+0xa0/0x120
[    1.791753]  of_node_put+0x18/0x28
[    1.791756]  of_find_node_with_property+0x74/0x100
[    1.791761]  scpsys_probe+0x338/0x5e0
[    1.791765]  platform_probe+0x5c/0xa4
[    1.791770]  really_probe+0xbc/0x2ac
[    1.791774]  __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x118
[    1.791779]  driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x170
[    1.791783]  __device_attach_driver+0xb8/0x150
[    1.791788]  bus_for_each_drv+0x88/0xe8
[    1.791792]  __device_attach+0x9c/0x1a0
[    1.791796]  device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20
[    1.791801]  bus_probe_device+0xa0/0xa4
[    1.791805]  deferred_probe_work_func+0x88/0xd0
[    1.791809]  process_one_work+0x1e8/0x448
[    1.791813]  worker_thread+0x1ac/0x340
[    1.791816]  kthread+0x138/0x220
[    1.791821]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

Fixes: c29345f ("pmdomain: mediatek: Refactor bus protection regmaps retrieval")
Signed-off-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <angelogioacchino.delregno@collabora.com>
Tested-by: Louis-Alexis Eyraud <louisalexis.eyraud@collabora.com>
Tested-by: Macpaul Lin <macpaul.lin@mediatek.com>
Reviewed-by: Macpaul Lin <macpaul.lin@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
pongo1231 pushed a commit to pongo1231/linux that referenced this pull request Nov 28, 2025
@MrCry0 @jhovold
USB: serial: ftdi_sio: add support for u-blox EVK-M101
2d8ab77 
The U-Blox EVK-M101 enumerates as 1546:0506 [1] with four FTDI interfaces:
- EVK-M101 current sensors
- EVK-M101 I2C
- EVK-M101 UART
- EVK-M101 port D

Only the third USB interface is a UART. This change lets ftdi_sio probe
the VID/PID and registers only interface CachyOS#3 as a TTY, leaving the rest
available for other drivers.

[1]
usb 5-1.3: new high-speed USB device number 11 using xhci_hcd
usb 5-1.3: New USB device found, idVendor=1546, idProduct=0506, bcdDevice= 8.00
usb 5-1.3: New USB device strings: Mfr=1, Product=2, SerialNumber=0
usb 5-1.3: Product: EVK-M101
usb 5-1.3: Manufacturer: u-blox AG

Datasheet: https://content.u-blox.com/sites/default/files/documents/EVK-M10_UserGuide_UBX-21003949.pdf

Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Suvorov <cryosay@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250926060235.3442748-1-cryosay@gmail.com/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
pongo1231 pushed a commit to pongo1231/linux that referenced this pull request Dec 5, 2025
@metze-samba @rleon
RDMA/siw: reclassify sockets in order to avoid false positives from l…
3a2c32d 
…ockdep

While developing IPPROTO_SMBDIRECT support for the code
under fs/smb/common/smbdirect [1], I noticed false positives like this:

[T79] ======================================================
[T79] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[T79] 6.18.0-rc4-metze-kasan-lockdep.01+ CachyOS#1 Tainted: G           OE
[T79] ------------------------------------------------------
[T79] kworker/2:0/79 is trying to acquire lock:
[T79] ffff88801f968278 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0},
                        at: sock_set_reuseaddr+0x14/0x70
[T79]
        but task is already holding lock:
[T79] ffffffffc10f7230 (lock#9){+.+.}-{4:4},
                        at: rdma_listen+0x3d2/0x740 [rdma_cm]
[T79]
        which lock already depends on the new lock.

[T79]
        the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[T79]
        -> CachyOS#1 (lock#9){+.+.}-{4:4}:
[T79]        __lock_acquire+0x535/0xc30
[T79]        lock_acquire.part.0+0xb3/0x240
[T79]        lock_acquire+0x60/0x140
[T79]        __mutex_lock+0x1af/0x1c10
[T79]        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[T79]        cma_get_port+0xba/0x7d0 [rdma_cm]
[T79]        rdma_bind_addr_dst+0x598/0x9a0 [rdma_cm]
[T79]        cma_bind_addr+0x107/0x320 [rdma_cm]
[T79]        rdma_resolve_addr+0xa3/0x830 [rdma_cm]
[T79]        destroy_lease_table+0x12b/0x420 [ksmbd]
[T79]        ksmbd_NTtimeToUnix+0x3e/0x80 [ksmbd]
[T79]        ndr_encode_posix_acl+0x6e9/0xab0 [ksmbd]
[T79]        ndr_encode_v4_ntacl+0x53/0x870 [ksmbd]
[T79]        __sys_connect_file+0x131/0x1c0
[T79]        __sys_connect+0x111/0x140
[T79]        __x64_sys_connect+0x72/0xc0
[T79]        x64_sys_call+0xe7d/0x26a0
[T79]        do_syscall_64+0x93/0xff0
[T79]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[T79]
        -> #0 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[T79]        check_prev_add+0xf3/0xcd0
[T79]        validate_chain+0x466/0x590
[T79]        __lock_acquire+0x535/0xc30
[T79]        lock_acquire.part.0+0xb3/0x240
[T79]        lock_acquire+0x60/0x140
[T79]        lock_sock_nested+0x3b/0xf0
[T79]        sock_set_reuseaddr+0x14/0x70
[T79]        siw_create_listen+0x145/0x1540 [siw]
[T79]        iw_cm_listen+0x313/0x5b0 [iw_cm]
[T79]        cma_iw_listen+0x271/0x3c0 [rdma_cm]
[T79]        rdma_listen+0x3b1/0x740 [rdma_cm]
[T79]        cma_listen_on_dev+0x46a/0x750 [rdma_cm]
[T79]        rdma_listen+0x4b0/0x740 [rdma_cm]
[T79]        ksmbd_rdma_init+0x12b/0x270 [ksmbd]
[T79]        ksmbd_conn_transport_init+0x26/0x70 [ksmbd]
[T79]        server_ctrl_handle_work+0x1e5/0x280 [ksmbd]
[T79]        process_one_work+0x86c/0x1930
[T79]        worker_thread+0x6f0/0x11f0
[T79]        kthread+0x3ec/0x8b0
[T79]        ret_from_fork+0x314/0x400
[T79]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[T79]
        other info that might help us debug this:

[T79]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[T79]        CPU0                    CPU1
[T79]        ----                    ----
[T79]   lock(lock#9);
[T79]                                lock(sk_lock-AF_INET);
[T79]                                lock(lock#9);
[T79]   lock(sk_lock-AF_INET);
[T79]
         *** DEADLOCK ***

[T79] 5 locks held by kworker/2:0/79:
[T79] #0: ffff88800120b158 ((wq_completion)events_long){+.+.}-{0:0},
                           at: process_one_work+0xfca/0x1930
[T79] CachyOS#1: ffffc9000474fd00 ((work_completion)(&ctrl->ctrl_work))
                           {+.+.}-{0:0},
                           at: process_one_work+0x804/0x1930
[T79] CachyOS#2: ffffffffc11307d0 (ctrl_lock){+.+.}-{4:4},
                           at: server_ctrl_handle_work+0x21/0x280 [ksmbd]
[T79] CachyOS#3: ffffffffc11347b0 (init_lock){+.+.}-{4:4},
                           at: ksmbd_conn_transport_init+0x18/0x70 [ksmbd]
[T79] CachyOS#4: ffffffffc10f7230 (lock#9){+.+.}-{4:4},
                            at: rdma_listen+0x3d2/0x740 [rdma_cm]
[T79]
        stack backtrace:
[T79] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 79 Comm: kworker/2:0 Kdump: loaded
      Tainted: G           OE
      6.18.0-rc4-metze-kasan-lockdep.01+ CachyOS#1 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[T79] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
[T79] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox,
      BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[T79] Workqueue: events_long server_ctrl_handle_work [ksmbd]
...
[T79]  print_circular_bug+0xfd/0x130
[T79]  check_noncircular+0x150/0x170
[T79]  check_prev_add+0xf3/0xcd0
[T79]  validate_chain+0x466/0x590
[T79]  __lock_acquire+0x535/0xc30
[T79]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[T79]  lock_acquire.part.0+0xb3/0x240
[T79]  ? sock_set_reuseaddr+0x14/0x70
[T79]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[T79]  ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
[T79]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[T79]  ? apparmor_socket_post_create+0x180/0x700
[T79]  lock_acquire+0x60/0x140
[T79]  ? sock_set_reuseaddr+0x14/0x70
[T79]  lock_sock_nested+0x3b/0xf0
[T79]  ? sock_set_reuseaddr+0x14/0x70
[T79]  sock_set_reuseaddr+0x14/0x70
[T79]  siw_create_listen+0x145/0x1540 [siw]
[T79]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[T79]  ? local_clock_noinstr+0xe/0xd0
[T79]  ? __pfx_siw_create_listen+0x10/0x10 [siw]
[T79]  ? trace_preempt_on+0x4c/0x130
[T79]  ? __raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x4a/0x90
[T79]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[T79]  ? preempt_count_sub+0x52/0x80
[T79]  iw_cm_listen+0x313/0x5b0 [iw_cm]
[T79]  cma_iw_listen+0x271/0x3c0 [rdma_cm]
[T79]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[T79]  rdma_listen+0x3b1/0x740 [rdma_cm]
[T79]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2c/0x60
[T79]  ? __pfx_rdma_listen+0x10/0x10 [rdma_cm]
[T79]  ? rdma_restrack_add+0x12c/0x630 [ib_core]
[T79]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[T79]  cma_listen_on_dev+0x46a/0x750 [rdma_cm]
[T79]  rdma_listen+0x4b0/0x740 [rdma_cm]
[T79]  ? __pfx_rdma_listen+0x10/0x10 [rdma_cm]
[T79]  ? cma_get_port+0x30d/0x7d0 [rdma_cm]
[T79]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[T79]  ? rdma_bind_addr_dst+0x598/0x9a0 [rdma_cm]
[T79]  ksmbd_rdma_init+0x12b/0x270 [ksmbd]
[T79]  ? __pfx_ksmbd_rdma_init+0x10/0x10 [ksmbd]
[T79]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[T79]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[T79]  ? register_netdevice_notifier+0x1dc/0x240
[T79]  ksmbd_conn_transport_init+0x26/0x70 [ksmbd]
[T79]  server_ctrl_handle_work+0x1e5/0x280 [ksmbd]
[T79]  process_one_work+0x86c/0x1930
[T79]  ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10
[T79]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[T79]  ? assign_work+0x16f/0x280
[T79]  worker_thread+0x6f0/0x11f0

I was not able to reproduce this as I was testing with various
runs switching siw and rxe as well as IPPROTO_SMBDIRECT sockets,
while the above stack used siw with the non IPPROTO_SMBDIRECT
patches [1].

Even if this patch doesn't solve the above I think it's
a good idea to reclassify the sockets used by siw,
I also send patches for rxe to reclassify, as well
as my IPPROTO_SMBDIRECT socket patches [1] will do it,
this should minimize potential false positives.

[1]
https://git.samba.org/?p=metze/linux/wip.git;a=shortlog;h=refs/heads/master-ipproto-smbdirect

Cc: Bernard Metzler <bernard.metzler@linux.dev>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251126150842.1837072-1-metze@samba.org
Acked-by: Bernard Metzler <bernard.metzler@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
pongo1231 pushed a commit to pongo1231/linux that referenced this pull request Dec 6, 2025
@maddy-kerneldev
macintosh/mac_hid: fix race condition in mac_hid_toggle_emumouse
1e4b207 
The following warning appears when running syzkaller, and this issue also
exists in the mainline code.

 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 list_add double add: new=ffffffffa57eee28, prev=ffffffffa57eee28, next=ffffffffa5e63100.
 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1491 at lib/list_debug.c:35 __list_add_valid_or_report+0xf7/0x130
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 0 PID: 1491 Comm: syz.1.28 Not tainted 6.6.0+ CachyOS#3
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
 RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0xf7/0x130
 RSP: 0018:ff1100010dfb7b78 EFLAGS: 00010282
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffa57eee18 RCX: ffffffff97fc9817
 RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffa0000002383000 RDI: 0000000000000001
 RBP: ffffffffa57eee28 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffe21c0021bf6f2c
 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 6464615f7473696c R12: ffffffffa5e63100
 R13: ffffffffa57eee28 R14: ffffffffa57eee28 R15: ff1100010dfb7d48
 FS:  00007fb14398b640(0000) GS:ff11000119600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000010d096005 CR4: 0000000000773ef0
 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
 PKRU: 80000000
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  input_register_handler+0xb3/0x210
  mac_hid_start_emulation+0x1c5/0x290
  mac_hid_toggle_emumouse+0x20a/0x240
  proc_sys_call_handler+0x4c2/0x6e0
  new_sync_write+0x1b1/0x2d0
  vfs_write+0x709/0x950
  ksys_write+0x12a/0x250
  do_syscall_64+0x5a/0x110
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0xe2

The WARNING occurs when two processes concurrently write to the mac-hid
emulation sysctl, causing a race condition in mac_hid_toggle_emumouse().
Both processes read old_val=0, then both try to register the input handler,
leading to a double list_add of the same handler.

  CPU0                             CPU1
  -------------------------        -------------------------
  vfs_write() //write 1            vfs_write()  //write 1
    proc_sys_write()                 proc_sys_write()
      mac_hid_toggle_emumouse()          mac_hid_toggle_emumouse()
        old_val = *valp // old_val=0
                                           old_val = *valp // old_val=0
                                           mutex_lock_killable()
                                           proc_dointvec() // *valp=1
                                           mac_hid_start_emulation()
                                             input_register_handler()
                                           mutex_unlock()
        mutex_lock_killable()
        proc_dointvec()
        mac_hid_start_emulation()
          input_register_handler() //Trigger Warning
        mutex_unlock()

Fix this by moving the old_val read inside the mutex lock region.

Fixes: 99b089c ("Input: Mac button emulation - implement as an input filter")
Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250819091035.2263329-1-leo.lilong@huaweicloud.com
pongo1231 pushed a commit to pongo1231/linux that referenced this pull request Dec 6, 2025
@rananta468
KVM: arm64: Reschedule as needed when destroying the stage-2 page-tables
4ddfab5 
When a large VM, specifically one that holds a significant number of PTEs,
gets abruptly destroyed, the following warning is seen during the
page-table walk:

 sched: CPU 0 need_resched set for > 100018840 ns (100 ticks) without schedule
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9617 Comm: kvm_page_table_ Tainted: G O 6.16.0-smp-DEV CachyOS#3 NONE
 Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE
 Call trace:
  show_stack+0x20/0x38 (C)
  dump_stack_lvl+0x3c/0xb8
  dump_stack+0x18/0x30
  resched_latency_warn+0x7c/0x88
  sched_tick+0x1c4/0x268
  update_process_times+0xa8/0xd8
  tick_nohz_handler+0xc8/0x168
  __hrtimer_run_queues+0x11c/0x338
  hrtimer_interrupt+0x104/0x308
  arch_timer_handler_phys+0x40/0x58
  handle_percpu_devid_irq+0x8c/0x1b0
  generic_handle_domain_irq+0x48/0x78
  gic_handle_irq+0x1b8/0x408
  call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x30
  do_interrupt_handler+0x54/0x78
  el1_interrupt+0x44/0x88
  el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x28
  el1h_64_irq+0x84/0x88
  stage2_free_walker+0x30/0xa0 (P)
  __kvm_pgtable_walk+0x11c/0x258
  __kvm_pgtable_walk+0x180/0x258
  __kvm_pgtable_walk+0x180/0x258
  __kvm_pgtable_walk+0x180/0x258
  kvm_pgtable_walk+0xc4/0x140
  kvm_pgtable_stage2_destroy+0x5c/0xf0
  kvm_free_stage2_pgd+0x6c/0xe8
  kvm_uninit_stage2_mmu+0x24/0x48
  kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all+0x80/0xa0
  kvm_mmu_notifier_release+0x38/0x78
  __mmu_notifier_release+0x15c/0x250
  exit_mmap+0x68/0x400
  __mmput+0x38/0x1c8
  mmput+0x30/0x68
  exit_mm+0xd4/0x198
  do_exit+0x1a4/0xb00
  do_group_exit+0x8c/0x120
  get_signal+0x6d4/0x778
  do_signal+0x90/0x718
  do_notify_resume+0x70/0x170
  el0_svc+0x74/0xd8
  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x60/0xc8
  el0t_64_sync+0x1b0/0x1b8

The warning is seen majorly on the host kernels that are configured
not to force-preempt, such as CONFIG_PREEMPT_NONE=y. To avoid this,
instead of walking the entire page-table in one go, split it into
smaller ranges, by checking for cond_resched() between each range.
Since the path is executed during VM destruction, after the
page-table structure is unlinked from the KVM MMU, relying on
cond_resched_rwlock_write() isn't necessary.

Signed-off-by: Raghavendra Rao Ananta <rananta@google.com>
Link: https://msgid.link/20251113052452.975081-4-rananta@google.com
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>
pongo1231 pushed a commit to pongo1231/linux that referenced this pull request Dec 9, 2025
@TianyouLi @namhyung
perf annotate: fix a crash when annotate the same symbol with 's' and…
262c614 
… 'T'

When perf report with annotation for a symbol, press 's' and 'T', then exit
the annotate browser. Once annotate the same symbol, the annotate browser
will crash.

The browser.arch was required to be correctly updated when data type
feature was enabled by 'T'. Usually it was initialized by symbol__annotate2
function. If a symbol has already been correctly annotated at the first
time, it should not call the symbol__annotate2 function again, thus the
browser.arch will not get initialized. Then at the second time to show the
annotate browser, the data type needs to be displayed but the browser.arch
is empty.

Stack trace as below:

Perf: Segmentation fault
-------- backtrace --------
    #0 0x55d365 in ui__signal_backtrace setup.c:0
    CachyOS#1 0x7f5ff1a3e930 in __restore_rt libc.so.6[3e930]
    CachyOS#2 0x570f08 in arch__is perf[570f08]
    CachyOS#3 0x562186 in annotate_get_insn_location perf[562186]
    CachyOS#4 0x562626 in __hist_entry__get_data_type annotate.c:0
    CachyOS#5 0x56476d in annotation_line__write perf[56476d]
    CachyOS#6 0x54e2db in annotate_browser__write annotate.c:0
    CachyOS#7 0x54d061 in ui_browser__list_head_refresh perf[54d061]
    torvalds#8 0x54dc9e in annotate_browser__refresh annotate.c:0
    torvalds#9 0x54c03d in __ui_browser__refresh browser.c:0
    torvalds#10 0x54ccf8 in ui_browser__run perf[54ccf8]
    torvalds#11 0x54eb92 in __hist_entry__tui_annotate perf[54eb92]
    torvalds#12 0x552293 in do_annotate hists.c:0
    torvalds#13 0x55941c in evsel__hists_browse hists.c:0
    torvalds#14 0x55b00f in evlist__tui_browse_hists perf[55b00f]
    torvalds#15 0x42ff02 in cmd_report perf[42ff02]
    torvalds#16 0x494008 in run_builtin perf.c:0
    torvalds#17 0x494305 in handle_internal_command perf.c:0
    torvalds#18 0x410547 in main perf[410547]
    torvalds#19 0x7f5ff1a295d0 in __libc_start_call_main libc.so.6[295d0]
    torvalds#20 0x7f5ff1a29680 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 libc.so.6[29680]
    torvalds#21 0x410b75 in _start perf[410b75]

Fixes: 1d4374a ("perf annotate: Add 'T' hot key to toggle data type display")
Reviewed-by: James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tianyou Li <tianyou.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
pongo1231 pushed a commit to pongo1231/linux that referenced this pull request Dec 9, 2025
@axiqia @namhyung
perf record: skip synthesize event when open evsel failed
163e5f2 
When using perf record with the `--overwrite` option, a segmentation fault
occurs if an event fails to open. For example:

  perf record -e cycles-ct -F 1000 -a --overwrite
  Error:
  cycles-ct:H: PMU Hardware doesn't support sampling/overflow-interrupts. Try 'perf stat'
  perf: Segmentation fault
      #0 0x6466b6 in dump_stack debug.c:366
      CachyOS#1 0x646729 in sighandler_dump_stack debug.c:378
      CachyOS#2 0x453fd1 in sigsegv_handler builtin-record.c:722
      CachyOS#3 0x7f8454e65090 in __restore_rt libc-2.32.so[54090]
      CachyOS#4 0x6c5671 in __perf_event__synthesize_id_index synthetic-events.c:1862
      CachyOS#5 0x6c5ac0 in perf_event__synthesize_id_index synthetic-events.c:1943
      CachyOS#6 0x458090 in record__synthesize builtin-record.c:2075
      CachyOS#7 0x45a85a in __cmd_record builtin-record.c:2888
      torvalds#8 0x45deb6 in cmd_record builtin-record.c:4374
      torvalds#9 0x4e5e33 in run_builtin perf.c:349
      torvalds#10 0x4e60bf in handle_internal_command perf.c:401
      torvalds#11 0x4e6215 in run_argv perf.c:448
      torvalds#12 0x4e653a in main perf.c:555
      torvalds#13 0x7f8454e4fa72 in __libc_start_main libc-2.32.so[3ea72]
      torvalds#14 0x43a3ee in _start ??:0

The --overwrite option implies --tail-synthesize, which collects non-sample
events reflecting the system status when recording finishes. However, when
evsel opening fails (e.g., unsupported event 'cycles-ct'), session->evlist
is not initialized and remains NULL. The code unconditionally calls
record__synthesize() in the error path, which iterates through the NULL
evlist pointer and causes a segfault.

To fix it, move the record__synthesize() call inside the error check block, so
it's only called when there was no error during recording, ensuring that evlist
is properly initialized.

Fixes: 4ea648a ("perf record: Add --tail-synthesize option")
Signed-off-by: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
pongo1231 pushed a commit to pongo1231/linux that referenced this pull request Dec 9, 2025
@captain5050 @namhyung
perf stat: Improve handling of termination by signal
d509d14 
When interrupting perf stat in repeat mode with a signal the signal is
passed to the child process but the repeat doesn't terminate:
```
$ perf stat -v --null --repeat 10 sleep 1
Control descriptor is not initialized
[ perf stat: executing run CachyOS#1 ... ]
[ perf stat: executing run CachyOS#2 ... ]
^Csleep: Interrupt
[ perf stat: executing run CachyOS#3 ... ]
[ perf stat: executing run CachyOS#4 ... ]
[ perf stat: executing run CachyOS#5 ... ]
[ perf stat: executing run CachyOS#6 ... ]
[ perf stat: executing run CachyOS#7 ... ]
[ perf stat: executing run torvalds#8 ... ]
[ perf stat: executing run torvalds#9 ... ]
[ perf stat: executing run torvalds#10 ... ]

 Performance counter stats for 'sleep 1' (10 runs):

            0.9500 +- 0.0512 seconds time elapsed  ( +-  5.39% )

0.01user 0.02system 0:09.53elapsed 0%CPU (0avgtext+0avgdata 18940maxresident)k
29944inputs+0outputs (0major+2629minor)pagefaults 0swaps
```

Terminate the repeated run and give a reasonable exit value:
```
$ perf stat -v --null --repeat 10 sleep 1
Control descriptor is not initialized
[ perf stat: executing run CachyOS#1 ... ]
[ perf stat: executing run CachyOS#2 ... ]
[ perf stat: executing run CachyOS#3 ... ]
^Csleep: Interrupt

 Performance counter stats for 'sleep 1' (10 runs):

             0.680 +- 0.321 seconds time elapsed  ( +- 47.16% )

Command exited with non-zero status 130
0.00user 0.01system 0:02.05elapsed 0%CPU (0avgtext+0avgdata 70688maxresident)k
0inputs+0outputs (0major+5002minor)pagefaults 0swaps
```

Note, this also changes the exit value for non-repeat runs when
interrupted by a signal.

Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/aS5wjmbAM9ka3M2g@gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Tested-by: Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 18, 2025
@axiqia @gregkh
perf record: skip synthesize event when open evsel failed
d733e1e 
[ Upstream commit 163e5f2 ]

When using perf record with the `--overwrite` option, a segmentation fault
occurs if an event fails to open. For example:

  perf record -e cycles-ct -F 1000 -a --overwrite
  Error:
  cycles-ct:H: PMU Hardware doesn't support sampling/overflow-interrupts. Try 'perf stat'
  perf: Segmentation fault
      #0 0x6466b6 in dump_stack debug.c:366
      #1 0x646729 in sighandler_dump_stack debug.c:378
      #2 0x453fd1 in sigsegv_handler builtin-record.c:722
      #3 0x7f8454e65090 in __restore_rt libc-2.32.so[54090]
      #4 0x6c5671 in __perf_event__synthesize_id_index synthetic-events.c:1862
      #5 0x6c5ac0 in perf_event__synthesize_id_index synthetic-events.c:1943
      #6 0x458090 in record__synthesize builtin-record.c:2075
      #7 0x45a85a in __cmd_record builtin-record.c:2888
      torvalds#8 0x45deb6 in cmd_record builtin-record.c:4374
      torvalds#9 0x4e5e33 in run_builtin perf.c:349
      torvalds#10 0x4e60bf in handle_internal_command perf.c:401
      torvalds#11 0x4e6215 in run_argv perf.c:448
      torvalds#12 0x4e653a in main perf.c:555
      torvalds#13 0x7f8454e4fa72 in __libc_start_main libc-2.32.so[3ea72]
      torvalds#14 0x43a3ee in _start ??:0

The --overwrite option implies --tail-synthesize, which collects non-sample
events reflecting the system status when recording finishes. However, when
evsel opening fails (e.g., unsupported event 'cycles-ct'), session->evlist
is not initialized and remains NULL. The code unconditionally calls
record__synthesize() in the error path, which iterates through the NULL
evlist pointer and causes a segfault.

To fix it, move the record__synthesize() call inside the error check block, so
it's only called when there was no error during recording, ensuring that evlist
is properly initialized.

Fixes: 4ea648a ("perf record: Add --tail-synthesize option")
Signed-off-by: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 18, 2025
@gregkh
macintosh/mac_hid: fix race condition in mac_hid_toggle_emumouse
48a7d42 
[ Upstream commit 1e4b207 ]

The following warning appears when running syzkaller, and this issue also
exists in the mainline code.

 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 list_add double add: new=ffffffffa57eee28, prev=ffffffffa57eee28, next=ffffffffa5e63100.
 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1491 at lib/list_debug.c:35 __list_add_valid_or_report+0xf7/0x130
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 0 PID: 1491 Comm: syz.1.28 Not tainted 6.6.0+ #3
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
 RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0xf7/0x130
 RSP: 0018:ff1100010dfb7b78 EFLAGS: 00010282
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffa57eee18 RCX: ffffffff97fc9817
 RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffa0000002383000 RDI: 0000000000000001
 RBP: ffffffffa57eee28 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffe21c0021bf6f2c
 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 6464615f7473696c R12: ffffffffa5e63100
 R13: ffffffffa57eee28 R14: ffffffffa57eee28 R15: ff1100010dfb7d48
 FS:  00007fb14398b640(0000) GS:ff11000119600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000010d096005 CR4: 0000000000773ef0
 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
 PKRU: 80000000
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  input_register_handler+0xb3/0x210
  mac_hid_start_emulation+0x1c5/0x290
  mac_hid_toggle_emumouse+0x20a/0x240
  proc_sys_call_handler+0x4c2/0x6e0
  new_sync_write+0x1b1/0x2d0
  vfs_write+0x709/0x950
  ksys_write+0x12a/0x250
  do_syscall_64+0x5a/0x110
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0xe2

The WARNING occurs when two processes concurrently write to the mac-hid
emulation sysctl, causing a race condition in mac_hid_toggle_emumouse().
Both processes read old_val=0, then both try to register the input handler,
leading to a double list_add of the same handler.

  CPU0                             CPU1
  -------------------------        -------------------------
  vfs_write() //write 1            vfs_write()  //write 1
    proc_sys_write()                 proc_sys_write()
      mac_hid_toggle_emumouse()          mac_hid_toggle_emumouse()
        old_val = *valp // old_val=0
                                           old_val = *valp // old_val=0
                                           mutex_lock_killable()
                                           proc_dointvec() // *valp=1
                                           mac_hid_start_emulation()
                                             input_register_handler()
                                           mutex_unlock()
        mutex_lock_killable()
        proc_dointvec()
        mac_hid_start_emulation()
          input_register_handler() //Trigger Warning
        mutex_unlock()

Fix this by moving the old_val read inside the mutex lock region.

Fixes: 99b089c ("Input: Mac button emulation - implement as an input filter")
Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250819091035.2263329-1-leo.lilong@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 18, 2025
@MrCry0 @gregkh
USB: serial: ftdi_sio: add support for u-blox EVK-M101
317ee5d 
commit 2d8ab77 upstream.

The U-Blox EVK-M101 enumerates as 1546:0506 [1] with four FTDI interfaces:
- EVK-M101 current sensors
- EVK-M101 I2C
- EVK-M101 UART
- EVK-M101 port D

Only the third USB interface is a UART. This change lets ftdi_sio probe
the VID/PID and registers only interface #3 as a TTY, leaving the rest
available for other drivers.

[1]
usb 5-1.3: new high-speed USB device number 11 using xhci_hcd
usb 5-1.3: New USB device found, idVendor=1546, idProduct=0506, bcdDevice= 8.00
usb 5-1.3: New USB device strings: Mfr=1, Product=2, SerialNumber=0
usb 5-1.3: Product: EVK-M101
usb 5-1.3: Manufacturer: u-blox AG

Datasheet: https://content.u-blox.com/sites/default/files/documents/EVK-M10_UserGuide_UBX-21003949.pdf

Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Suvorov <cryosay@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250926060235.3442748-1-cryosay@gmail.com/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 18, 2025
@axiqia @gregkh
perf record: skip synthesize event when open evsel failed
49755ec 
[ Upstream commit 163e5f2 ]

When using perf record with the `--overwrite` option, a segmentation fault
occurs if an event fails to open. For example:

  perf record -e cycles-ct -F 1000 -a --overwrite
  Error:
  cycles-ct:H: PMU Hardware doesn't support sampling/overflow-interrupts. Try 'perf stat'
  perf: Segmentation fault
      #0 0x6466b6 in dump_stack debug.c:366
      #1 0x646729 in sighandler_dump_stack debug.c:378
      #2 0x453fd1 in sigsegv_handler builtin-record.c:722
      #3 0x7f8454e65090 in __restore_rt libc-2.32.so[54090]
      #4 0x6c5671 in __perf_event__synthesize_id_index synthetic-events.c:1862
      #5 0x6c5ac0 in perf_event__synthesize_id_index synthetic-events.c:1943
      #6 0x458090 in record__synthesize builtin-record.c:2075
      #7 0x45a85a in __cmd_record builtin-record.c:2888
      torvalds#8 0x45deb6 in cmd_record builtin-record.c:4374
      torvalds#9 0x4e5e33 in run_builtin perf.c:349
      torvalds#10 0x4e60bf in handle_internal_command perf.c:401
      torvalds#11 0x4e6215 in run_argv perf.c:448
      torvalds#12 0x4e653a in main perf.c:555
      torvalds#13 0x7f8454e4fa72 in __libc_start_main libc-2.32.so[3ea72]
      torvalds#14 0x43a3ee in _start ??:0

The --overwrite option implies --tail-synthesize, which collects non-sample
events reflecting the system status when recording finishes. However, when
evsel opening fails (e.g., unsupported event 'cycles-ct'), session->evlist
is not initialized and remains NULL. The code unconditionally calls
record__synthesize() in the error path, which iterates through the NULL
evlist pointer and causes a segfault.

To fix it, move the record__synthesize() call inside the error check block, so
it's only called when there was no error during recording, ensuring that evlist
is properly initialized.

Fixes: 4ea648a ("perf record: Add --tail-synthesize option")
Signed-off-by: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 18, 2025
@gregkh
macintosh/mac_hid: fix race condition in mac_hid_toggle_emumouse
388391d 
[ Upstream commit 1e4b207 ]

The following warning appears when running syzkaller, and this issue also
exists in the mainline code.

 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 list_add double add: new=ffffffffa57eee28, prev=ffffffffa57eee28, next=ffffffffa5e63100.
 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1491 at lib/list_debug.c:35 __list_add_valid_or_report+0xf7/0x130
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 0 PID: 1491 Comm: syz.1.28 Not tainted 6.6.0+ #3
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
 RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0xf7/0x130
 RSP: 0018:ff1100010dfb7b78 EFLAGS: 00010282
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffa57eee18 RCX: ffffffff97fc9817
 RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffa0000002383000 RDI: 0000000000000001
 RBP: ffffffffa57eee28 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffe21c0021bf6f2c
 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 6464615f7473696c R12: ffffffffa5e63100
 R13: ffffffffa57eee28 R14: ffffffffa57eee28 R15: ff1100010dfb7d48
 FS:  00007fb14398b640(0000) GS:ff11000119600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000010d096005 CR4: 0000000000773ef0
 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
 PKRU: 80000000
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  input_register_handler+0xb3/0x210
  mac_hid_start_emulation+0x1c5/0x290
  mac_hid_toggle_emumouse+0x20a/0x240
  proc_sys_call_handler+0x4c2/0x6e0
  new_sync_write+0x1b1/0x2d0
  vfs_write+0x709/0x950
  ksys_write+0x12a/0x250
  do_syscall_64+0x5a/0x110
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0xe2

The WARNING occurs when two processes concurrently write to the mac-hid
emulation sysctl, causing a race condition in mac_hid_toggle_emumouse().
Both processes read old_val=0, then both try to register the input handler,
leading to a double list_add of the same handler.

  CPU0                             CPU1
  -------------------------        -------------------------
  vfs_write() //write 1            vfs_write()  //write 1
    proc_sys_write()                 proc_sys_write()
      mac_hid_toggle_emumouse()          mac_hid_toggle_emumouse()
        old_val = *valp // old_val=0
                                           old_val = *valp // old_val=0
                                           mutex_lock_killable()
                                           proc_dointvec() // *valp=1
                                           mac_hid_start_emulation()
                                             input_register_handler()
                                           mutex_unlock()
        mutex_lock_killable()
        proc_dointvec()
        mac_hid_start_emulation()
          input_register_handler() //Trigger Warning
        mutex_unlock()

Fix this by moving the old_val read inside the mutex lock region.

Fixes: 99b089c ("Input: Mac button emulation - implement as an input filter")
Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250819091035.2263329-1-leo.lilong@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
pongo1231 pushed a commit to pongo1231/linux that referenced this pull request Dec 25, 2025
@idosch @kuba-moo
mlxsw: spectrum_router: Fix neighbour use-after-free
8b0e697 
We sometimes observe use-after-free when dereferencing a neighbour [1].
The problem seems to be that the driver stores a pointer to the
neighbour, but without holding a reference on it. A reference is only
taken when the neighbour is used by a nexthop.

Fix by simplifying the reference counting scheme. Always take a
reference when storing a neighbour pointer in a neighbour entry. Avoid
taking a referencing when the neighbour is used by a nexthop as the
neighbour entry associated with the nexthop already holds a reference.

Tested by running the test that uncovered the problem over 300 times.
Without this patch the problem was reproduced after a handful of
iterations.

[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mlxsw_sp_neigh_entry_update+0x2d4/0x310
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88817f8e3420 by task ip/3929

CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 3929 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.18.0-rc4-virtme-g36b21a067510 CachyOS#3 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Nvidia SN5600/VMOD0013, BIOS 5.13 05/31/2023
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xa0
 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x6e/0x300
 print_report+0xfc/0x1fb
 kasan_report+0xe4/0x110
 mlxsw_sp_neigh_entry_update+0x2d4/0x310
 mlxsw_sp_router_rif_gone_sync+0x35f/0x510
 mlxsw_sp_rif_destroy+0x1ea/0x730
 mlxsw_sp_inetaddr_port_vlan_event+0xa1/0x1b0
 __mlxsw_sp_inetaddr_lag_event+0xcc/0x130
 __mlxsw_sp_inetaddr_event+0xf5/0x3c0
 mlxsw_sp_router_netdevice_event+0x1015/0x1580
 notifier_call_chain+0xcc/0x150
 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x7e/0x100
 __netdev_upper_dev_unlink+0x10b/0x210
 netdev_upper_dev_unlink+0x79/0xa0
 vrf_del_slave+0x18/0x50
 do_set_master+0x146/0x7d0
 do_setlink.isra.0+0x9a0/0x2880
 rtnl_newlink+0x637/0xb20
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x6fe/0xb90
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x123/0x380
 netlink_unicast+0x4a3/0x770
 netlink_sendmsg+0x75b/0xc90
 __sock_sendmsg+0xbe/0x160
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x5b2/0x7d0
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xfd/0x180
 __sys_sendmsg+0x124/0x1c0
 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0xfd0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
[...]

Allocated by task 109:
 kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
 __kasan_kmalloc+0x7b/0x90
 __kmalloc_noprof+0x2c1/0x790
 neigh_alloc+0x6af/0x8f0
 ___neigh_create+0x63/0xe90
 mlxsw_sp_nexthop_neigh_init+0x430/0x7e0
 mlxsw_sp_nexthop_type_init+0x212/0x960
 mlxsw_sp_nexthop6_group_info_init.constprop.0+0x81f/0x1280
 mlxsw_sp_nexthop6_group_get+0x392/0x6a0
 mlxsw_sp_fib6_entry_create+0x46a/0xfd0
 mlxsw_sp_router_fib6_replace+0x1ed/0x5f0
 mlxsw_sp_router_fib6_event_work+0x10a/0x2a0
 process_one_work+0xd57/0x1390
 worker_thread+0x4d6/0xd40
 kthread+0x355/0x5b0
 ret_from_fork+0x1d4/0x270
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20

Freed by task 154:
 kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
 __kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
 __kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70
 kmem_cache_free_bulk.part.0+0x1eb/0x5e0
 kvfree_rcu_bulk+0x1f2/0x260
 kfree_rcu_work+0x130/0x1b0
 process_one_work+0xd57/0x1390
 worker_thread+0x4d6/0xd40
 kthread+0x355/0x5b0
 ret_from_fork+0x1d4/0x270
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20

Last potentially related work creation:
 kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
 kasan_record_aux_stack+0x8c/0xa0
 kvfree_call_rcu+0x93/0x5b0
 mlxsw_sp_router_neigh_event_work+0x67d/0x860
 process_one_work+0xd57/0x1390
 worker_thread+0x4d6/0xd40
 kthread+0x355/0x5b0
 ret_from_fork+0x1d4/0x270
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20

Fixes: 6cf3c97 ("mlxsw: spectrum_router: Add private neigh table")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/92d75e21d95d163a41b5cea67a15cd33f547cba6.1764695650.git.petrm@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
pongo1231 pushed a commit to pongo1231/linux that referenced this pull request Dec 25, 2025
@kuba-moo
Merge branch 'selftests-forwarding-vxlan_bridge_1q_mc_ul-fix-flakiness'
237c1e1 
Petr Machata says:

====================
selftests: forwarding: vxlan_bridge_1q_mc_ul: Fix flakiness

The net/forwarding/vxlan_bridge_1q_mc_ul selftest runs an overlay traffic,
forwarded over a multicast-routed VXLAN underlay. In order to determine
whether packets reach their intended destination, it uses a TC match. For
convenience, it uses a flower match, which however does not allow matching
on the encapsulated packet. So various service traffic ends up being
indistinguishable from the test packets, and ends up confusing the test. To
alleviate the problem, the test uses sleep to allow the necessary service
traffic to run and clear the channel, before running the test traffic. This
worked for a while, but lately we have nevertheless seen flakiness of the
test in the CI.

In this patchset, first generalize tc_rule_stats_get() to support u32 in
patch CachyOS#1, then in patch CachyOS#2 convert the test to use u32 to allow parsing
deeper into the packet, and in CachyOS#3 drop the now-unnecessary sleep.
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/cover.1765289566.git.petrm@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
pongo1231 pushed a commit to pongo1231/linux that referenced this pull request Dec 25, 2025
@jhsmt
net/sched: act_mirred: fix loop detection
1d85625 
Fix a loop scenario of ethx:egress->ethx:egress

Example setup to reproduce:
tc qdisc add dev ethx root handle 1: drr
tc filter add dev ethx parent 1: protocol ip prio 1 matchall \
         action mirred egress redirect dev ethx

Now ping out of ethx and you get a deadlock:

[  116.892898][  T307] ============================================
[  116.893182][  T307] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[  116.893418][  T307] 6.18.0-rc6-01205-ge05021a829b8-dirty torvalds#204 Not tainted
[  116.893682][  T307] --------------------------------------------
[  116.893926][  T307] ping/307 is trying to acquire lock:
[  116.894133][  T307] ffff88800c122908 (&sch->root_lock_key){+...}-{3:3}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x2210/0x3b50
[  116.894517][  T307]
[  116.894517][  T307] but task is already holding lock:
[  116.894836][  T307] ffff88800c122908 (&sch->root_lock_key){+...}-{3:3}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x2210/0x3b50
[  116.895252][  T307]
[  116.895252][  T307] other info that might help us debug this:
[  116.895608][  T307]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[  116.895608][  T307]
[  116.895901][  T307]        CPU0
[  116.896057][  T307]        ----
[  116.896200][  T307]   lock(&sch->root_lock_key);
[  116.896392][  T307]   lock(&sch->root_lock_key);
[  116.896605][  T307]
[  116.896605][  T307]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[  116.896605][  T307]
[  116.896864][  T307]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[  116.896864][  T307]
[  116.897123][  T307] 6 locks held by ping/307:
[  116.897302][  T307]  #0: ffff88800b4b0250 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: raw_sendmsg+0xb20/0x2cf0
[  116.897808][  T307]  CachyOS#1: ffffffff88c839c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: ip_output+0xa9/0x600
[  116.898138][  T307]  CachyOS#2: ffffffff88c839c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x2c6/0x1ee0
[  116.898459][  T307]  CachyOS#3: ffffffff88c83960 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:3}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x200/0x3b50
[  116.898782][  T307]  CachyOS#4: ffff88800c122908 (&sch->root_lock_key){+...}-{3:3}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x2210/0x3b50
[  116.899132][  T307]  CachyOS#5: ffffffff88c83960 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:3}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x200/0x3b50
[  116.899442][  T307]
[  116.899442][  T307] stack backtrace:
[  116.899667][  T307] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 307 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.18.0-rc6-01205-ge05021a829b8-dirty torvalds#204 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[  116.899672][  T307] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[  116.899675][  T307] Call Trace:
[  116.899678][  T307]  <TASK>
[  116.899680][  T307]  dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xb0
[  116.899688][  T307]  print_deadlock_bug.cold+0xc0/0xdc
[  116.899695][  T307]  __lock_acquire+0x11f7/0x1be0
[  116.899704][  T307]  lock_acquire+0x162/0x300
[  116.899707][  T307]  ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x2210/0x3b50
[  116.899713][  T307]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  116.899717][  T307]  ? stack_trace_save+0x93/0xd0
[  116.899723][  T307]  _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x40
[  116.899728][  T307]  ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x2210/0x3b50
[  116.899731][  T307]  __dev_queue_xmit+0x2210/0x3b50

Fixes: 178ca30 ("Revert "net/sched: Fix mirred deadlock on device recursion"")
Tested-by: Victor Nogueira <victor@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251210162255.1057663-1-jhs@mojatatu.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
pongo1231 pushed a commit to pongo1231/linux that referenced this pull request Dec 25, 2025
@sean-jc
KVM: Disallow toggling KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD on an existing memslot
9935df5 
Reject attempts to disable KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD on a memslot that was
initially created with a guest_memfd binding, as KVM doesn't support
toggling KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD on existing memslots.  KVM prevents enabling
KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD, but doesn't prevent clearing the flag.

Failure to reject the new memslot results in a use-after-free due to KVM
not unbinding from the guest_memfd instance.  Unbinding on a FLAGS_ONLY
change is easy enough, and can/will be done as a hardening measure (in
anticipation of KVM supporting dirty logging on guest_memfd at some point),
but fixing the use-after-free would only address the immediate symptom.

  ==================================================================
  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kvm_gmem_release+0x362/0x400 [kvm]
  Write of size 8 at addr ffff8881111ae908 by task repro/745

  CPU: 7 UID: 1000 PID: 745 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.18.0-rc6-115d5de2eef3-next-kasan CachyOS#3 NONE
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x60
   print_report+0xcb/0x5c0
   kasan_report+0xb4/0xe0
   kvm_gmem_release+0x362/0x400 [kvm]
   __fput+0x2fa/0x9d0
   task_work_run+0x12c/0x200
   do_exit+0x6ae/0x2100
   do_group_exit+0xa8/0x230
   __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3a/0x50
   x64_sys_call+0x737/0x740
   do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x900
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
  RIP: 0033:0x7f581f2eac31
   </TASK>

  Allocated by task 745 on cpu 6 at 9.746971s:
   kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40
   kasan_save_track+0x13/0x50
   __kasan_kmalloc+0x77/0x90
   kvm_set_memory_region.part.0+0x652/0x1110 [kvm]
   kvm_vm_ioctl+0x14b0/0x3290 [kvm]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x129/0x1a0
   do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x900
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

  Freed by task 745 on cpu 6 at 9.747467s:
   kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40
   kasan_save_track+0x13/0x50
   __kasan_save_free_info+0x37/0x50
   __kasan_slab_free+0x3b/0x60
   kfree+0xf5/0x440
   kvm_set_memslot+0x3c2/0x1160 [kvm]
   kvm_set_memory_region.part.0+0x86a/0x1110 [kvm]
   kvm_vm_ioctl+0x14b0/0x3290 [kvm]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x129/0x1a0
   do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x900
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Fixes: a7800aa ("KVM: Add KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD ioctl() for guest-specific backing memory")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251202020334.1171351-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
pongo1231 pushed a commit to pongo1231/linux that referenced this pull request Dec 31, 2025
@xiaoleiwang123456
net: macb: Relocate mog_init_rings() callback from macb_mac_link_up()…
99537d5 
… to macb_open()

In the non-RT kernel, local_bh_disable() merely disables preemption,
whereas it maps to an actual spin lock in the RT kernel. Consequently,
when attempting to refill RX buffers via netdev_alloc_skb() in
macb_mac_link_up(), a deadlock scenario arises as follows:

   WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
   6.18.0-08691-g2061f18ad76e torvalds#39 Not tainted
   ------------------------------------------------------
   kworker/0:0/8 is trying to acquire lock:
   ffff00080369bbe0 (&bp->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: macb_start_xmit+0x808/0xb7c

   but task is already holding lock:
   ffff000803698e58 (&queue->tx_ptr_lock){+...}-{3:3}, at: macb_start_xmit
   +0x148/0xb7c

   which lock already depends on the new lock.

   the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

   -> CachyOS#3 (&queue->tx_ptr_lock){+...}-{3:3}:
          rt_spin_lock+0x50/0x1f0
          macb_start_xmit+0x148/0xb7c
          dev_hard_start_xmit+0x94/0x284
          sch_direct_xmit+0x8c/0x37c
          __dev_queue_xmit+0x708/0x1120
          neigh_resolve_output+0x148/0x28c
          ip6_finish_output2+0x2c0/0xb2c
          __ip6_finish_output+0x114/0x308
          ip6_output+0xc4/0x4a4
          mld_sendpack+0x220/0x68c
          mld_ifc_work+0x2a8/0x4f4
          process_one_work+0x20c/0x5f8
          worker_thread+0x1b0/0x35c
          kthread+0x144/0x200
          ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

   -> CachyOS#2 (_xmit_ETHER#2){+...}-{3:3}:
          rt_spin_lock+0x50/0x1f0
          sch_direct_xmit+0x11c/0x37c
          __dev_queue_xmit+0x708/0x1120
          neigh_resolve_output+0x148/0x28c
          ip6_finish_output2+0x2c0/0xb2c
          __ip6_finish_output+0x114/0x308
          ip6_output+0xc4/0x4a4
          mld_sendpack+0x220/0x68c
          mld_ifc_work+0x2a8/0x4f4
          process_one_work+0x20c/0x5f8
          worker_thread+0x1b0/0x35c
          kthread+0x144/0x200
          ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

   -> CachyOS#1 ((softirq_ctrl.lock)){+.+.}-{3:3}:
          lock_release+0x250/0x348
          __local_bh_enable_ip+0x7c/0x240
          __netdev_alloc_skb+0x1b4/0x1d8
          gem_rx_refill+0xdc/0x240
          gem_init_rings+0xb4/0x108
          macb_mac_link_up+0x9c/0x2b4
          phylink_resolve+0x170/0x614
          process_one_work+0x20c/0x5f8
          worker_thread+0x1b0/0x35c
          kthread+0x144/0x200
          ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

   -> #0 (&bp->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
          __lock_acquire+0x15a8/0x2084
          lock_acquire+0x1cc/0x350
          rt_spin_lock+0x50/0x1f0
          macb_start_xmit+0x808/0xb7c
          dev_hard_start_xmit+0x94/0x284
          sch_direct_xmit+0x8c/0x37c
          __dev_queue_xmit+0x708/0x1120
          neigh_resolve_output+0x148/0x28c
          ip6_finish_output2+0x2c0/0xb2c
          __ip6_finish_output+0x114/0x308
          ip6_output+0xc4/0x4a4
          mld_sendpack+0x220/0x68c
          mld_ifc_work+0x2a8/0x4f4
          process_one_work+0x20c/0x5f8
          worker_thread+0x1b0/0x35c
          kthread+0x144/0x200
          ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

   other info that might help us debug this:

   Chain exists of:
     &bp->lock --> _xmit_ETHER#2 --> &queue->tx_ptr_lock

    Possible unsafe locking scenario:

          CPU0                    CPU1
          ----                    ----
     lock(&queue->tx_ptr_lock);
                                  lock(_xmit_ETHER#2);
                                  lock(&queue->tx_ptr_lock);
     lock(&bp->lock);

    *** DEADLOCK ***

   Call trace:
    show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C)
    dump_stack_lvl+0xa0/0xf0
    dump_stack+0x18/0x24
    print_circular_bug+0x28c/0x370
    check_noncircular+0x198/0x1ac
    __lock_acquire+0x15a8/0x2084
    lock_acquire+0x1cc/0x350
    rt_spin_lock+0x50/0x1f0
    macb_start_xmit+0x808/0xb7c
    dev_hard_start_xmit+0x94/0x284
    sch_direct_xmit+0x8c/0x37c
    __dev_queue_xmit+0x708/0x1120
    neigh_resolve_output+0x148/0x28c
    ip6_finish_output2+0x2c0/0xb2c
    __ip6_finish_output+0x114/0x308
    ip6_output+0xc4/0x4a4
    mld_sendpack+0x220/0x68c
    mld_ifc_work+0x2a8/0x4f4
    process_one_work+0x20c/0x5f8
    worker_thread+0x1b0/0x35c
    kthread+0x144/0x200
    ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

Notably, invoking the mog_init_rings() callback upon link establishment
is unnecessary. Instead, we can exclusively call mog_init_rings() within
the ndo_open() callback. This adjustment resolves the deadlock issue.
Furthermore, since MACB_CAPS_MACB_IS_EMAC cases do not use mog_init_rings()
when opening the network interface via at91ether_open(), moving
mog_init_rings() to macb_open() also eliminates the MACB_CAPS_MACB_IS_EMAC
check.

Fixes: 633e98a ("net: macb: use resolved link config in mac_link_up()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Kevin Hao <kexin.hao@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiaolei Wang <xiaolei.wang@windriver.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251222015624.1994551-1-xiaolei.wang@windriver.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 2, 2026
@idosch @gregkh
mlxsw: spectrum_router: Fix neighbour use-after-free
675c5ae 
[ Upstream commit 8b0e697 ]

We sometimes observe use-after-free when dereferencing a neighbour [1].
The problem seems to be that the driver stores a pointer to the
neighbour, but without holding a reference on it. A reference is only
taken when the neighbour is used by a nexthop.

Fix by simplifying the reference counting scheme. Always take a
reference when storing a neighbour pointer in a neighbour entry. Avoid
taking a referencing when the neighbour is used by a nexthop as the
neighbour entry associated with the nexthop already holds a reference.

Tested by running the test that uncovered the problem over 300 times.
Without this patch the problem was reproduced after a handful of
iterations.

[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mlxsw_sp_neigh_entry_update+0x2d4/0x310
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88817f8e3420 by task ip/3929

CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 3929 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.18.0-rc4-virtme-g36b21a067510 #3 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Nvidia SN5600/VMOD0013, BIOS 5.13 05/31/2023
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xa0
 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x6e/0x300
 print_report+0xfc/0x1fb
 kasan_report+0xe4/0x110
 mlxsw_sp_neigh_entry_update+0x2d4/0x310
 mlxsw_sp_router_rif_gone_sync+0x35f/0x510
 mlxsw_sp_rif_destroy+0x1ea/0x730
 mlxsw_sp_inetaddr_port_vlan_event+0xa1/0x1b0
 __mlxsw_sp_inetaddr_lag_event+0xcc/0x130
 __mlxsw_sp_inetaddr_event+0xf5/0x3c0
 mlxsw_sp_router_netdevice_event+0x1015/0x1580
 notifier_call_chain+0xcc/0x150
 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x7e/0x100
 __netdev_upper_dev_unlink+0x10b/0x210
 netdev_upper_dev_unlink+0x79/0xa0
 vrf_del_slave+0x18/0x50
 do_set_master+0x146/0x7d0
 do_setlink.isra.0+0x9a0/0x2880
 rtnl_newlink+0x637/0xb20
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x6fe/0xb90
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x123/0x380
 netlink_unicast+0x4a3/0x770
 netlink_sendmsg+0x75b/0xc90
 __sock_sendmsg+0xbe/0x160
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x5b2/0x7d0
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xfd/0x180
 __sys_sendmsg+0x124/0x1c0
 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0xfd0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
[...]

Allocated by task 109:
 kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
 __kasan_kmalloc+0x7b/0x90
 __kmalloc_noprof+0x2c1/0x790
 neigh_alloc+0x6af/0x8f0
 ___neigh_create+0x63/0xe90
 mlxsw_sp_nexthop_neigh_init+0x430/0x7e0
 mlxsw_sp_nexthop_type_init+0x212/0x960
 mlxsw_sp_nexthop6_group_info_init.constprop.0+0x81f/0x1280
 mlxsw_sp_nexthop6_group_get+0x392/0x6a0
 mlxsw_sp_fib6_entry_create+0x46a/0xfd0
 mlxsw_sp_router_fib6_replace+0x1ed/0x5f0
 mlxsw_sp_router_fib6_event_work+0x10a/0x2a0
 process_one_work+0xd57/0x1390
 worker_thread+0x4d6/0xd40
 kthread+0x355/0x5b0
 ret_from_fork+0x1d4/0x270
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20

Freed by task 154:
 kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
 __kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
 __kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70
 kmem_cache_free_bulk.part.0+0x1eb/0x5e0
 kvfree_rcu_bulk+0x1f2/0x260
 kfree_rcu_work+0x130/0x1b0
 process_one_work+0xd57/0x1390
 worker_thread+0x4d6/0xd40
 kthread+0x355/0x5b0
 ret_from_fork+0x1d4/0x270
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20

Last potentially related work creation:
 kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
 kasan_record_aux_stack+0x8c/0xa0
 kvfree_call_rcu+0x93/0x5b0
 mlxsw_sp_router_neigh_event_work+0x67d/0x860
 process_one_work+0xd57/0x1390
 worker_thread+0x4d6/0xd40
 kthread+0x355/0x5b0
 ret_from_fork+0x1d4/0x270
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20

Fixes: 6cf3c97 ("mlxsw: spectrum_router: Add private neigh table")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/92d75e21d95d163a41b5cea67a15cd33f547cba6.1764695650.git.petrm@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
ptr1337 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 2, 2026
@sean-jc @gregkh
KVM: Disallow toggling KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD on an existing memslot
cb51bef 
commit 9935df5 upstream.

Reject attempts to disable KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD on a memslot that was
initially created with a guest_memfd binding, as KVM doesn't support
toggling KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD on existing memslots.  KVM prevents enabling
KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD, but doesn't prevent clearing the flag.

Failure to reject the new memslot results in a use-after-free due to KVM
not unbinding from the guest_memfd instance.  Unbinding on a FLAGS_ONLY
change is easy enough, and can/will be done as a hardening measure (in
anticipation of KVM supporting dirty logging on guest_memfd at some point),
but fixing the use-after-free would only address the immediate symptom.

  ==================================================================
  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kvm_gmem_release+0x362/0x400 [kvm]
  Write of size 8 at addr ffff8881111ae908 by task repro/745

  CPU: 7 UID: 1000 PID: 745 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.18.0-rc6-115d5de2eef3-next-kasan #3 NONE
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x60
   print_report+0xcb/0x5c0
   kasan_report+0xb4/0xe0
   kvm_gmem_release+0x362/0x400 [kvm]
   __fput+0x2fa/0x9d0
   task_work_run+0x12c/0x200
   do_exit+0x6ae/0x2100
   do_group_exit+0xa8/0x230
   __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3a/0x50
   x64_sys_call+0x737/0x740
   do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x900
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
  RIP: 0033:0x7f581f2eac31
   </TASK>

  Allocated by task 745 on cpu 6 at 9.746971s:
   kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40
   kasan_save_track+0x13/0x50
   __kasan_kmalloc+0x77/0x90
   kvm_set_memory_region.part.0+0x652/0x1110 [kvm]
   kvm_vm_ioctl+0x14b0/0x3290 [kvm]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x129/0x1a0
   do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x900
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

  Freed by task 745 on cpu 6 at 9.747467s:
   kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40
   kasan_save_track+0x13/0x50
   __kasan_save_free_info+0x37/0x50
   __kasan_slab_free+0x3b/0x60
   kfree+0xf5/0x440
   kvm_set_memslot+0x3c2/0x1160 [kvm]
   kvm_set_memory_region.part.0+0x86a/0x1110 [kvm]
   kvm_vm_ioctl+0x14b0/0x3290 [kvm]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x129/0x1a0
   do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x900
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Fixes: a7800aa ("KVM: Add KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD ioctl() for guest-specific backing memory")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251202020334.1171351-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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4 participants

@Rasenkai @ptr1337 @Kaz205 @Panchajanya1999