CVE-2021-21295 - Medium Severity Vulnerability
Vulnerable Libraries - netty-codec-http-4.1.34.Final.jar, netty-codec-http-4.1.43.Final.jar
netty-codec-http-4.1.34.Final.jar
Netty is an asynchronous event-driven network application framework for
rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers and
clients.
Library home page: http://netty.io/
Path to vulnerable library: /home/wss-scanner/.ivy2/cache/io.netty/netty-codec-http/jars/netty-codec-http-4.1.34.Final.jar
Dependency Hierarchy:
- play-netty-server_2.13-2.7.5.jar (Root Library)
- netty-reactive-streams-http-2.0.3.jar
- ❌ netty-codec-http-4.1.34.Final.jar (Vulnerable Library)
netty-codec-http-4.1.43.Final.jar
Netty is an asynchronous event-driven network application framework for
rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers and
clients.
Library home page: https://netty.io/
Path to vulnerable library: /home/wss-scanner/.ivy2/cache/io.netty/netty-codec-http/jars/netty-codec-http-4.1.43.Final.jar
Dependency Hierarchy:
- play-netty-server_2.13-2.8.2.jar (Root Library)
- netty-reactive-streams-http-2.0.4.jar
- ❌ netty-codec-http-4.1.43.Final.jar (Vulnerable Library)
Found in HEAD commit: 2819174635979a19573ec0ce8e3e2b63a3848079
Found in base branch: master
Vulnerability Details
Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by "Http2MultiplexHandler" as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects ("HttpRequest", "HttpContent", etc.) via "Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec "and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is true: "HTTP2MultiplexCodec" or "Http2FrameCodec" is used, "Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec" is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom "ChannelInboundHandler" that is put in the "ChannelPipeline" behind "Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec".
Publish Date: 2021-03-09
URL: CVE-2021-21295
CVSS 3 Score Details (5.9)
Base Score Metrics:
- Exploitability Metrics:
- Attack Vector: Network
- Attack Complexity: High
- Privileges Required: None
- User Interaction: None
- Scope: Unchanged
- Impact Metrics:
- Confidentiality Impact: None
- Integrity Impact: High
- Availability Impact: None
For more information on CVSS3 Scores, click here.
Suggested Fix
Type: Upgrade version
Origin: GHSA-wm47-8v5p-wjpj
Release Date: 2021-03-09
Fix Resolution (io.netty:netty-codec-http): 4.1.60.Final
Direct dependency fix Resolution (com.typesafe.play:play-netty-server_2.13): 2.8.16
Fix Resolution (io.netty:netty-codec-http): 4.1.60.Final
Direct dependency fix Resolution (com.typesafe.play:play-netty-server_2.13): 2.8.16
CVE-2021-21295 - Medium Severity Vulnerability
netty-codec-http-4.1.34.Final.jar
Netty is an asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers and clients.
Library home page: http://netty.io/
Path to vulnerable library: /home/wss-scanner/.ivy2/cache/io.netty/netty-codec-http/jars/netty-codec-http-4.1.34.Final.jar
Dependency Hierarchy:
netty-codec-http-4.1.43.Final.jar
Netty is an asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers and clients.
Library home page: https://netty.io/
Path to vulnerable library: /home/wss-scanner/.ivy2/cache/io.netty/netty-codec-http/jars/netty-codec-http-4.1.43.Final.jar
Dependency Hierarchy:
Found in HEAD commit: 2819174635979a19573ec0ce8e3e2b63a3848079
Found in base branch: master
Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by "Http2MultiplexHandler" as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects ("HttpRequest", "HttpContent", etc.) via "Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec "and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is true: "HTTP2MultiplexCodec" or "Http2FrameCodec" is used, "Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec" is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom "ChannelInboundHandler" that is put in the "ChannelPipeline" behind "Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec".
Publish Date: 2021-03-09
URL: CVE-2021-21295
Base Score Metrics:
- Exploitability Metrics:
- Attack Vector: Network
- Attack Complexity: High
- Privileges Required: None
- User Interaction: None
- Scope: Unchanged
- Impact Metrics:
- Confidentiality Impact: None
- Integrity Impact: High
- Availability Impact: None
For more information on CVSS3 Scores, click here.Type: Upgrade version
Origin: GHSA-wm47-8v5p-wjpj
Release Date: 2021-03-09
Fix Resolution (io.netty:netty-codec-http): 4.1.60.Final
Direct dependency fix Resolution (com.typesafe.play:play-netty-server_2.13): 2.8.16
Fix Resolution (io.netty:netty-codec-http): 4.1.60.Final
Direct dependency fix Resolution (com.typesafe.play:play-netty-server_2.13): 2.8.16