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🔒 fix command injection in sandbox proxy command execution#55

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TrueAlpha-spiral wants to merge 1 commit intomainfrom
fix-sandbox-proxy-command-injection-16733833787291557428
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🔒 fix command injection in sandbox proxy command execution#55
TrueAlpha-spiral wants to merge 1 commit intomainfrom
fix-sandbox-proxy-command-injection-16733833787291557428

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@TrueAlpha-spiral
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The vulnerability was located in packages/cli/src/utils/sandbox.ts where spawn was called with shell: true using a command string from the GEMINI_SANDBOX_PROXY_COMMAND environment variable. This allowed for command injection.

The fix involves:

  1. Parsing the proxyCommand string into an array of arguments using the parse function from the shell-quote library.
  2. Filtering the parsed arguments to ensure only strings are passed (removing any shell operators like |, &&, etc. that shell-quote might identify).
  3. Invoking spawn with the parsed command and arguments, and removing the shell: true option.

A reproduction security test was added in packages/cli/src/utils/sandbox_repro.security.test.ts to verify the fix.


PR created automatically by Jules for task 16733833787291557428 started by @TrueAlpha-spiral

Using `shell: true` when executing commands from external sources like environment variables is a command injection vector. This fix parses the `GEMINI_SANDBOX_PROXY_COMMAND` environment variable using `shell-quote` and executes it directly without a shell.

🎯 **What:** The vulnerability fixed is a command injection in the sandbox proxy execution.
⚠️ **Risk:** An attacker who can control the `GEMINI_SANDBOX_PROXY_COMMAND` environment variable could execute arbitrary commands on the host system.
🛡️ **Solution:** The `proxyCommand` is now parsed into an argument array and passed to `spawn` with `shell: false` (the default).

Co-authored-by: google-labs-jules[bot] <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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