🔒 Fix Command Injection in Sandbox Setup#84
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🎯 What: Fixed a command injection vulnerability when setting up the sandbox proxy.⚠️ Risk: A malicious user or unexpected environment variable could inject arbitrary commands via 'config.command' passed into execSync. 🛡️ Solution: Migrated from execSync (which uses a shell) to execFileSync, passing arguments securely as an array. Co-authored-by: google-labs-jules[bot] <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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🎯 What: Fixed a command injection vulnerability when setting up the sandbox proxy in
⚠️ Risk: A malicious user or an unexpected environment setup could inject arbitrary commands by polluting the
packages/cli/src/utils/sandbox.ts.config.commandvalue that was being unsafely interpolated into anexecSynccommand string, which is run through a shell.🛡️ Solution: Migrated the logic from
execSynctoexecFileSync, which prevents shell evaluation by taking arguments securely as an array:execFileSync(config.command, ['rm', '-f', SANDBOX_PROXY_NAME]). Also wrapped it in atry...catchblock to handle errors silently, replacing previous behavior.PR created automatically by Jules for task 1508165869636238271 started by @TrueAlpha-spiral