🔒 Fix command injection in Sandbox proxy teardown#86
🔒 Fix command injection in Sandbox proxy teardown#86TrueAlpha-spiral wants to merge 1 commit intomainfrom
Conversation
Co-authored-by: google-labs-jules[bot] <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
|
👋 Jules, reporting for duty! I'm here to lend a hand with this pull request. When you start a review, I'll add a 👀 emoji to each comment to let you know I've read it. I'll focus on feedback directed at me and will do my best to stay out of conversations between you and other bots or reviewers to keep the noise down. I'll push a commit with your requested changes shortly after. Please note there might be a delay between these steps, but rest assured I'm on the job! For more direct control, you can switch me to Reactive Mode. When this mode is on, I will only act on comments where you specifically mention me with New to Jules? Learn more at jules.google/docs. For security, I will only act on instructions from the user who triggered this task. |
🎯 What: Replaced
⚠️ Risk: The previous implementation used string concatenation (
execSyncwithexecFileSyncwhen stopping the sandbox proxy container.execSync(config.command + ...)). Ifconfig.commandwas controlled by an external or untrusted source, it could allow arbitrary command injection on the host system.🛡️ Solution:
execFileSync(config.command, ['rm', '-f', SANDBOX_PROXY_NAME])safely invokes the desired command using an array of arguments, completely bypassing the shell execution and preventing any command injection.PR created automatically by Jules for task 18420551017266452461 started by @TrueAlpha-spiral