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According to the AMD IOMMU spec, the commit 73db2fc ("iommu/amd: Increase interrupt remapping table limit to 512 entries") also requires the interrupt table length (IntTabLen) to be set to 9 (power of 2) in the device table mapping entry (DTE). Fixes: 73db2fc ("iommu/amd: Increase interrupt remapping table limit to 512 entries") Reported-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201207091920.3052-1-suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
…git/arm64/linux Pull iommu fix from Will Deacon: "Fix interrupt table length definition for AMD IOMMU. It's actually a fix for a fix, where the size of the interrupt remapping table was increased but a related constant for the size of the interrupt table was forgotten" * tag 'iommu-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: iommu/amd: Set DTE[IntTabLen] to represent 512 IRTEs
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Add a test case to assert that the skb->pkt_type which was set from the BPF program is retained from the netkit xmit side to the peer's device at tcx ingress location. # ./vmtest.sh -- ./test_progs -t netkit [...] ./test_progs -t netkit [ 1.140780] bpf_testmod: loading out-of-tree module taints kernel. [ 1.141127] bpf_testmod: module verification failed: signature and/or required key missing - tainting kernel [ 1.284601] tsc: Refined TSC clocksource calibration: 3408.006 MHz [ 1.286672] clocksource: tsc: mask: 0xffffffffffffffff max_cycles: 0x311fd9b189d, max_idle_ns: 440795225691 ns [ 1.290384] clocksource: Switched to clocksource tsc #345 tc_netkit_basic:OK #346 tc_netkit_device:OK #347 tc_netkit_multi_links:OK #348 tc_netkit_multi_opts:OK #349 tc_netkit_neigh_links:OK #350 tc_netkit_pkt_type:OK Summary: 6/0 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240524163619.26001-4-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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While working on the lazy MMU mode enablement for s390 I hit pretty curious issues in the kasan code. The first is related to a custom kasan-based sanitizer aimed at catching invalid accesses to PTEs and is inspired by [1] conversation. The kasan complains on valid PTE accesses, while the shadow memory is reported as unpoisoned: [ 102.783993] ================================================================== [ 102.784008] BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in set_pte_range+0x36c/0x390 [ 102.784016] Read of size 8 at addr 0000780084cf9608 by task vmalloc_test/0/5542 [ 102.784019] [ 102.784040] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5542 Comm: vmalloc_test/0 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.16.0-gcc-ipte-kasan-11657-gb2d930c4950e #340 PREEMPT [ 102.784047] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 102.784049] Hardware name: IBM 8561 T01 703 (LPAR) [ 102.784052] Call Trace: [ 102.784054] [<00007fffe0147ac0>] dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x140 [ 102.784059] [<00007fffe0112484>] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x34/0x2d0 [ 102.784066] [<00007fffe011282c>] print_report+0x10c/0x1f8 [ 102.784071] [<00007fffe090785a>] kasan_report+0xfa/0x220 [ 102.784078] [<00007fffe01d3dec>] set_pte_range+0x36c/0x390 [ 102.784083] [<00007fffe01d41c2>] leave_ipte_batch+0x3b2/0xb10 [ 102.784088] [<00007fffe07d3650>] apply_to_pte_range+0x2f0/0x4e0 [ 102.784094] [<00007fffe07e62e4>] apply_to_pmd_range+0x194/0x3e0 [ 102.784099] [<00007fffe07e820e>] __apply_to_page_range+0x2fe/0x7a0 [ 102.784104] [<00007fffe07e86d8>] apply_to_page_range+0x28/0x40 [ 102.784109] [<00007fffe090a3ec>] __kasan_populate_vmalloc+0xec/0x310 [ 102.784114] [<00007fffe090aa36>] kasan_populate_vmalloc+0x96/0x130 [ 102.784118] [<00007fffe0833a04>] alloc_vmap_area+0x3d4/0xf30 [ 102.784123] [<00007fffe083a8ba>] __get_vm_area_node+0x1aa/0x4c0 [ 102.784127] [<00007fffe083c4f6>] __vmalloc_node_range_noprof+0x126/0x4e0 [ 102.784131] [<00007fffe083c980>] __vmalloc_node_noprof+0xd0/0x110 [ 102.784135] [<00007fffe083ca32>] vmalloc_noprof+0x32/0x40 [ 102.784139] [<00007fff608aa336>] fix_size_alloc_test+0x66/0x150 [test_vmalloc] [ 102.784147] [<00007fff608aa710>] test_func+0x2f0/0x430 [test_vmalloc] [ 102.784153] [<00007fffe02841f8>] kthread+0x3f8/0x7a0 [ 102.784159] [<00007fffe014d8b4>] __ret_from_fork+0xd4/0x7d0 [ 102.784164] [<00007fffe299c00a>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x30 [ 102.784173] no locks held by vmalloc_test/0/5542. [ 102.784176] [ 102.784178] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 102.784186] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x84cf9 [ 102.784198] flags: 0x3ffff00000000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1ffff) [ 102.784212] page_type: f2(table) [ 102.784225] raw: 3ffff00000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000122 0000000000000000 [ 102.784234] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 f200000000000001 0000000000000000 [ 102.784248] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 102.784250] [ 102.784252] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 102.784260] 0000780084cf9500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 102.784274] 0000780084cf9580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 102.784277] >0000780084cf9600: fd 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 102.784290] ^ [ 102.784293] 0000780084cf9680: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 102.784303] 0000780084cf9700: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 102.784306] ================================================================== The second issue hits when the custom sanitizer above is not implemented, but the kasan itself is still active: [ 1554.438028] Unable to handle kernel pointer dereference in virtual kernel address space [ 1554.438065] Failing address: 001c0ff0066f0000 TEID: 001c0ff0066f0403 [ 1554.438076] Fault in home space mode while using kernel ASCE. [ 1554.438103] AS:00000000059d400b R2:0000000ffec5c00b R3:00000000c6c9c007 S:0000000314470001 P:00000000d0ab413d [ 1554.438158] Oops: 0011 ilc:2 [#1]SMP [ 1554.438175] Modules linked in: test_vmalloc(E+) nft_fib_inet(E) nft_fib_ipv4(E) nft_fib_ipv6(E) nft_fib(E) nft_reject_inet(E) nf_reject_ipv4(E) nf_reject_ipv6(E) nft_reject(E) nft_ct(E) nft_chain_nat(E) nf_nat(E) nf_conntrack(E) nf_defrag_ipv6(E) nf_defrag_ipv4(E) nf_tables(E) sunrpc(E) pkey_pckmo(E) uvdevice(E) s390_trng(E) rng_core(E) eadm_sch(E) vfio_ccw(E) mdev(E) vfio_iommu_type1(E) vfio(E) sch_fq_codel(E) drm(E) loop(E) i2c_core(E) drm_panel_orientation_quirks(E) nfnetlink(E) ctcm(E) fsm(E) zfcp(E) scsi_transport_fc(E) diag288_wdt(E) watchdog(E) ghash_s390(E) prng(E) aes_s390(E) des_s390(E) libdes(E) sha3_512_s390(E) sha3_256_s390(E) sha512_s390(E) sha1_s390(E) sha_common(E) pkey(E) autofs4(E) [ 1554.438319] Unloaded tainted modules: pkey_uv(E):1 hmac_s390(E):2 [ 1554.438354] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1715 Comm: vmalloc_test/0 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 6.16.0-gcc-ipte-kasan-11657-gb2d930c4950e #350 PREEMPT [ 1554.438368] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 1554.438374] Hardware name: IBM 8561 T01 703 (LPAR) [ 1554.438381] Krnl PSW : 0704e00180000000 00007fffe1d3d6ae (memset+0x5e/0x98) [ 1554.438396] R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:2 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 [ 1554.438409] Krnl GPRS: 0000000000000001 001c0ff0066f0000 001c0ff0066f0000 00000000000000f8 [ 1554.438418] 00000000000009fe 0000000000000009 0000000000000000 0000000000000002 [ 1554.438426] 0000000000005000 000078031ae655c8 00000feffdcf9f59 0000780258672a20 [ 1554.438433] 0000780243153500 00007f8033780000 00007fffe083a510 00007f7fee7cfa00 [ 1554.438452] Krnl Code: 00007fffe1d3d6a0: eb540008000c srlg %r5,%r4,8 00007fffe1d3d6a6: b9020055 ltgr %r5,%r5 #00007fffe1d3d6aa: a784000b brc 8,00007fffe1d3d6c0 >00007fffe1d3d6ae: 42301000 stc %r3,0(%r1) 00007fffe1d3d6b2: d2fe10011000 mvc 1(255,%r1),0(%r1) 00007fffe1d3d6b8: 41101100 la %r1,256(%r1) 00007fffe1d3d6bc: a757fff9 brctg %r5,00007fffe1d3d6ae 00007fffe1d3d6c0: 42301000 stc %r3,0(%r1) [ 1554.438539] Call Trace: [ 1554.438545] [<00007fffe1d3d6ae>] memset+0x5e/0x98 [ 1554.438552] ([<00007fffe083a510>] remove_vm_area+0x220/0x400) [ 1554.438562] [<00007fffe083a9d6>] vfree.part.0+0x26/0x810 [ 1554.438569] [<00007fff6073bd50>] fix_align_alloc_test+0x50/0x90 [test_vmalloc] [ 1554.438583] [<00007fff6073c73a>] test_func+0x46a/0x6c0 [test_vmalloc] [ 1554.438593] [<00007fffe0283ac8>] kthread+0x3f8/0x7a0 [ 1554.438603] [<00007fffe014d8b4>] __ret_from_fork+0xd4/0x7d0 [ 1554.438613] [<00007fffe299ac0a>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x30 [ 1554.438622] INFO: lockdep is turned off. [ 1554.438627] Last Breaking-Event-Address: [ 1554.438632] [<00007fffe1d3d65c>] memset+0xc/0x98 [ 1554.438644] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception: panic_on_oops This series fixes the above issues and is a pre-requisite for the s390 lazy MMU mode implementation. test_vmalloc was used to stress-test the fixes. This patch (of 2): When vmalloc shadow memory is established the modification of the corresponding page tables is not protected by any locks. Instead, the locking is done per-PTE. This scheme however has defects. kasan_populate_vmalloc_pte() - while ptep_get() read is atomic the sequence pte_none(ptep_get()) is not. Doing that outside of the lock might lead to a concurrent PTE update and what could be seen as a shadow memory corruption as result. kasan_depopulate_vmalloc_pte() - by the time a page whose address was extracted from ptep_get() read and cached in a local variable outside of the lock is attempted to get free, could actually be freed already. To avoid these put ptep_get() itself and the code that manipulates the result of the read under lock. In addition, move freeing of the page out of the atomic context. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1755528662.git.agordeev@linux.ibm.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/adb258634194593db294c0d1fb35646e894d6ead.1755528662.git.agordeev@linux.ibm.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/5b0609c9-95ee-4e48-bb6d-98f57c5d2c31@arm.com/ [1] Fixes: 3c5c3cf ("kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow memory") Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Cc: Marc Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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