Security: Mitigate username enumeration and timing attacks#3
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…unctions - Replaced "Usuário não encontrado" messages with a generic "Os dados de acesso estão incorretos." to prevent username enumeration in `Login`, `Mine`, `UsuariosController`, and `ClientLoginController`. - Implemented dummy `password_verify` checks in cases where the user is not found to normalize response times, mitigating timing attacks. Co-authored-by: cezargf <25113573+cezargf@users.noreply.github.com>
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Code Review
This pull request implements mitigations against timing attacks and username enumeration across several login controllers by normalizing error messages and introducing a dummy password_verify call when a user is not found. The review feedback identifies that the dummy hash strings provided may be invalid, potentially causing password_verify to return early and fail the mitigation. It is recommended to use a valid bcrypt hash, address remaining timing leaks in expired account checks, and centralize the dummy hash value to avoid code duplication.
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This change improves the security of the application's authentication flows. By replacing specific "User not found" messages with generic "Invalid credentials" messages, we prevent attackers from enumerating valid usernames. Furthermore, by introducing a dummy
password_verifyexecution when a user is not found, we normalize the response time for both successful and unsuccessful login attempts, mitigating timing attacks that could otherwise be used to infer the existence of a user.PR created automatically by Jules for task 1991321859301721256 started by @cezargf