Disable default cache usage in release workflow to reduce the cache poisoning vector attack#471
Merged
fr4nc1sc0-r4m0n merged 1 commit intoelastic:mainfrom Feb 3, 2026
Conversation
v1v
approved these changes
Jan 29, 2026
mallendem
approved these changes
Jan 30, 2026
Contributor
Author
It's not a good practice to add links to private content in public repositories. |
v1v
approved these changes
Jan 30, 2026
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
3 participants
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
What does this pull request do?
After a deep analysis, remove explicit cache usage in release related workflow to reduce the cache poisoning vector attack.
Why
In the context of Docker builds, the docker/setup-buildx-action is caching binaries by default.
If a workflow running untrusted code has access to the cache, it can poison the cache with malicious content. For example, a compromised dependency could inject malicious code into a Golang binary or Docker image, which would then be included in subsequent builds using the same cache key.
This attack is particularly dangerous because the malicious artefact can be signed and distributed as part of an SLSA Level 3 build, leaving no trace in the source code or build logs.