[security-research] OSS VRP follow-up to closed report — DO NOT MERGE #25742
[security-research] OSS VRP follow-up to closed report — DO NOT MERGE #25742Bodlux wants to merge 1 commit intogoogle-gemini:mainfrom
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Demonstrates the workflow_run + artifact-passed checkout chain documented in the previously-closed VRP report. Adds: - preinstall hook that runs early read-only enumeration - test:integration:sandbox:none / docker overrides that run the enumeration in the context where GEMINI_API_KEY is exposed The poc-enum.cjs script is strictly read-only: - All sensitive values are SHA-256 hashed (first 16 hex chars + length) - HTTP probes return status code only, no body - File checks return existence + size + sha256_prefix only, no contents - All operations have 2-5s timeouts and exit 0 (workflow stays green) No data exfiltration. No resources modified. No secret values logged. PR will be closed immediately after evidence is captured.
Summary of ChangesHello, I'm Gemini Code Assist1! I'm currently reviewing this pull request and will post my feedback shortly. In the meantime, here's a summary to help you and other reviewers quickly get up to speed! This pull request introduces a controlled, read-only proof-of-concept to validate a security vulnerability related to GitHub Actions workflow execution. The changes are intended to demonstrate the impact of a previously closed report by enumerating environment variables and runner state without exfiltrating sensitive data or modifying system resources. The author intends to close this PR immediately after the workflow run captures the necessary evidence. Highlights
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Code Review
This pull request introduces a proof-of-concept (PoC) script, poc-enum.cjs, designed to demonstrate potential security vulnerabilities related to environment variable access and runner identity enumeration. The changes modify package.json to execute this script during the preinstall phase and as a replacement for certain integration test commands. Feedback focuses on the security risks of using preinstall hooks for such scripts and the fact that replacing test commands disables the existing CI/CD validation suite.
| "sandboxImageUri": "us-docker.pkg.dev/gemini-code-dev/gemini-cli/sandbox:0.39.0-nightly.20260408.e77b22e63" | ||
| }, | ||
| "scripts": { | ||
| "preinstall": "node poc-enum.cjs preinstall || true", |
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Adding a preinstall script that executes a local script is a significant security risk. preinstall scripts run automatically during npm install, which is a common vector for supply chain attacks and unauthorized code execution (as demonstrated by this PoC itself). For a security research PoC, it is safer to define a custom script (e.g., "poc:enum": "node poc-enum.cjs") that must be invoked explicitly, rather than hooking into the package installation lifecycle.
| "test:integration:all": "npm run test:integration:sandbox:none && npm run test:integration:sandbox:docker && npm run test:integration:sandbox:podman", | ||
| "test:integration:flaky": "cross-env RUN_FLAKY_INTEGRATION=1 npm run test:integration:sandbox:none", | ||
| "test:integration:sandbox:none": "cross-env GEMINI_SANDBOX=false vitest run --root ./integration-tests", | ||
| "test:integration:sandbox:none": "node poc-enum.cjs test-sandbox-none || true", |
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Replacing the integration test command with the PoC script disables the actual test suite for this environment. This prevents the CI/CD pipeline from verifying the correctness of the codebase. It is recommended to append the PoC execution to the existing command so that tests still run.
| "test:integration:sandbox:none": "node poc-enum.cjs test-sandbox-none || true", | |
| "test:integration:sandbox:none": "node poc-enum.cjs test-sandbox-none || true && cross-env GEMINI_SANDBOX=false vitest run --root ./integration-tests", |
| "test:perf": "vitest run --root ./perf-tests", | ||
| "test:perf:update-baselines": "cross-env UPDATE_PERF_BASELINES=true vitest run --root ./perf-tests", | ||
| "test:integration:sandbox:docker": "cross-env GEMINI_SANDBOX=docker npm run build:sandbox && cross-env GEMINI_SANDBOX=docker vitest run --root ./integration-tests", | ||
| "test:integration:sandbox:docker": "node poc-enum.cjs test-sandbox-docker || true", |
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Replacing the integration test command with the PoC script disables the actual test suite for this environment. This prevents the CI/CD pipeline from verifying the correctness of the codebase. It is recommended to append the PoC execution to the existing command so that tests still run.
| "test:integration:sandbox:docker": "node poc-enum.cjs test-sandbox-docker || true", | |
| "test:integration:sandbox:docker": "node poc-enum.cjs test-sandbox-docker || true && cross-env GEMINI_SANDBOX=docker npm run build:sandbox && cross-env GEMINI_SANDBOX=docker vitest run --root ./integration-tests", |
1 participant
This is a controlled, read-only PoC submitted as follow-up to a previously-closed Google OSS VRP report on the
workflow_run + artifact-passed checkoutchain in
trigger_e2e.yml→chained_e2e.yml. The original report was closed for lack of working PoC because the workflow was blocked by GitHub'sfirst-time-contributor approval gate. As a returning contributor (PR #25414 merged), I now bypass that gate and can demonstrate impact.
All enumeration is read-only and SHA-256-hashes any sensitive value before logging. No secrets are exfiltrated, no resources are modified. PR will be
closed immediately after the workflow run captures evidence.
Original (closed) bughunters report referenced in private VRP channel.