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x/vulndb: potential Go vuln in github.com/evmos/ethermint: CVE-2022-35936 #388

@jba

Description

@jba

CVE-2022-35936 references github.com/evmos/ethermint, which may be a Go module.

Description:
Ethermint is an Ethereum library. In Ethermint running versions before v0.17.2, the contract selfdestruct invocation permanently removes the corresponding bytecode from the internal database storage. However, due to a bug in the DeleteAccountfunction, all contracts that used the identical bytecode (i.e shared the same CodeHash) will also stop working once one contract invokes selfdestruct, even though the other contracts did not invoke the selfdestruct OPCODE. This vulnerability has been patched in Ethermint version v0.18.0. The patch has state machine-breaking changes for applications using Ethermint, so a coordinated upgrade procedure is required. A workaround is available. If a contract is subject to DoS due to this issue, the user can redeploy the same contract, i.e. with identical bytecode, so that the original contract's code is recovered. The new contract deployment restores the bytecode hash -> bytecode entry in the internal state.

Links:

See doc/triage.md for instructions on how to triage this report.

module: github.com/evmos/ethermint
package: ethermint
description: |
    Ethermint is an Ethereum library. In Ethermint running versions before `v0.17.2`, the contract `selfdestruct` invocation permanently removes the corresponding bytecode from the internal database storage. However, due to a bug in the `DeleteAccount`function, all contracts that used the identical bytecode (i.e shared the same `CodeHash`) will also stop working once one contract invokes `selfdestruct`, even though the other contracts did not invoke the `selfdestruct` OPCODE. This vulnerability has been patched in Ethermint version v0.18.0. The patch has state machine-breaking changes for applications using Ethermint, so a coordinated upgrade procedure is required. A workaround is available. If a contract is subject to DoS due to this issue, the user can redeploy the same contract, i.e. with identical bytecode, so that the original contract's code is recovered. The new contract deployment restores the `bytecode hash -> bytecode` entry in the internal state.
cves:
  - CVE-2022-35936
links:
    commit: https://github.com/evmos/ethermint/commit/144741832007a26dbe950512acbda4ed95b2a451
    context:
      - https://github.com/evmos/ethermint/blob/c9d42d667b753147977a725e98ed116c933c76cb/x/evm/keeper/statedb.go#L199-L203
      - https://github.com/evmos/ethermint/security/advisories/GHSA-f92v-grc2-w2fg

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