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ci: declare workflow-level contents: read on the 11 remaining workflows#2123

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arpitjain099:chore/declare-workflow-perms-readonly
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ci: declare workflow-level contents: read on the 11 remaining workflows#2123
arpitjain099 wants to merge 1 commit into
nasa:masterfrom
arpitjain099:chore/declare-workflow-perms-readonly

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@arpitjain099
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Pins the default GITHUB_TOKEN to contents: read on the 11 workflows in .github/workflows/ that don't actually need any write scope:

  • alt_linux_distros.yml, docker.yml, test_32_oracle.yml, test_linux.yml, test_linux_py2.yml, test_macos.yml, trickops.yml: build and test workflows, no GitHub API mutation.
  • report_alt_linux_distros.yml, report_linux.yml, report_linux_py2.yml: status-report workflows that read CI artifacts and post no comments.
  • code_coverage.yml: uploads to Coveralls via coverallsapp/github-action. The github-token passed to that action is used to identify with coveralls.io, not for any GitHub API mutation, so contents: read is sufficient.

Why

CVE-2025-30066 (March 2025 tj-actions/changed-files supply-chain compromise) exfiltrated GITHUB_TOKEN from workflow logs and the leaked token retained whatever scope was issued at the workflow level. Pinning per workflow caps that runtime authority irrespective of the repo or org default, gives drift protection if the default ever widens, and is credited per-file by the OpenSSF Scorecard Token-Permissions check.

YAML validated locally with yaml.safe_load on each touched file.

Pins the default GITHUB_TOKEN to contents: read on the 11 workflows
in .github/workflows/ that don't actually need any write scope:

- alt_linux_distros.yml, docker.yml, test_*.yml, trickops.yml: build/
  test workflows, no GitHub API.
- report_*.yml: status-report workflows.
- code_coverage.yml: uploads coverage to Coveralls via
  coverallsapp/github-action; the GITHUB_TOKEN there is used for
  identification with coveralls.io, not for any GitHub API mutation,
  so contents: read is sufficient.

Motivation: CVE-2025-30066 (March 2025 tj-actions/changed-files
compromise) exfiltrated GITHUB_TOKEN from workflow logs. Per-workflow
caps bound runtime authority irrespective of repo or org default,
give drift protection if the default ever widens, and are credited
per-file by the OpenSSF Scorecard Token-Permissions check.

YAML validated locally with yaml.safe_load.

Signed-off-by: Arpit Jain <arpitjain099@gmail.com>
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Coverage Status

coverage: 56.933%. remained the same — arpitjain099:chore/declare-workflow-perms-readonly into nasa:master

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