seatbelt: honor split filesystem sandbox policies#13448
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💡 Codex Reviewcodex/codex-rs/core/src/sandboxing/mod.rs Lines 357 to 359 in c3b03c7 When additional permissions include any extra read/write roots, this branch rebuilds the filesystem policy from codex/codex-rs/core/src/exec.rs Lines 168 to 169 in c3b03c7 This selection logic keys only on ℹ️ About Codex in GitHubYour team has set up Codex to review pull requests in this repo. Reviews are triggered when you
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## Why `#13434` introduces split `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` and `NetworkSandboxPolicy`, but the runtime still made most execution-time sandbox decisions from the legacy `SandboxPolicy` projection. That projection loses information about combinations like unrestricted filesystem access with restricted network access. In practice, that means the runtime can choose the wrong platform sandbox behavior or set the wrong network-restriction environment for a command even when config has already separated those concerns. This PR carries the split policies through the runtime so sandbox selection, process spawning, and exec handling can consult the policy that actually matters. ## What changed - threaded `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` and `NetworkSandboxPolicy` through `TurnContext`, `ExecRequest`, sandbox attempts, shell escalation state, unified exec, and app-server exec overrides - updated sandbox selection in `core/src/sandboxing/mod.rs` and `core/src/exec.rs` to key off `FileSystemSandboxPolicy.kind` plus `NetworkSandboxPolicy`, rather than inferring behavior only from the legacy `SandboxPolicy` - updated process spawning in `core/src/spawn.rs` and the platform wrappers to use `NetworkSandboxPolicy` when deciding whether to set `CODEX_SANDBOX_NETWORK_DISABLED` - kept additional-permissions handling and legacy `ExternalSandbox` compatibility projections aligned with the split policies, including explicit user-shell execution and Windows restricted-token routing - updated callers across `core`, `app-server`, and `linux-sandbox` to pass the split policies explicitly ## Verification - added regression coverage in `core/tests/suite/user_shell_cmd.rs` to verify `RunUserShellCommand` does not inherit `CODEX_SANDBOX_NETWORK_DISABLED` from the active turn - added coverage in `core/src/exec.rs` for Windows restricted-token sandbox selection when the legacy projection is `ExternalSandbox` - updated Linux sandbox coverage in `linux-sandbox/tests/suite/landlock.rs` to exercise the split-policy exec path - verified the current PR state with `just clippy` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/13439). * #13453 * #13452 * #13451 * #13449 * #13448 * #13445 * #13440 * __->__ #13439 --------- Co-authored-by: viyatb-oai <viyatb@openai.com>
## Why `#13434` and `#13439` introduce split filesystem and network policies, but the only code that could answer basic filesystem questions like "is access effectively unrestricted?" or "which roots are readable and writable for this cwd?" still lived on the legacy `SandboxPolicy` path. That would force later backends to either keep projecting through `SandboxPolicy` or duplicate path-resolution logic. This PR moves those queries onto `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` itself so later runtime and platform changes can consume the split policy directly. ## What changed - added `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` helpers for full-read/full-write checks, platform-default reads, readable roots, writable roots, and explicit unreadable roots resolved against a cwd - added a shared helper for the default read-only carveouts under writable roots so the legacy and split-policy paths stay aligned - added protocol coverage for full-access detection and derived readable, writable, and unreadable roots ## Verification - added protocol coverage in `protocol/src/protocol.rs` and `protocol/src/permissions.rs` for full-root access and derived filesystem roots - verified the current PR state with `just clippy` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/13440). * #13453 * #13452 * #13451 * #13449 * #13448 * #13445 * __->__ #13440 * #13439 --------- Co-authored-by: viyatb-oai <viyatb@openai.com>
## Why `apply_patch` safety approval was still checking writable paths through the legacy `SandboxPolicy` projection. That can hide explicit `none` carveouts when a split filesystem policy projects back to compatibility `ExternalSandbox`, which leaves one more approval path that can auto-approve writes inside paths that are intentionally blocked. ## What changed - passed `turn.file_system_sandbox_policy` into `assess_patch_safety` - changed writable-path checks to derive effective access from `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` instead of the legacy `SandboxPolicy` - made those checks reject explicit unreadable roots before considering broad write access or writable roots - added regression coverage showing that an `ExternalSandbox` compatibility projection still asks for approval when the split filesystem policy blocks a subpath ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-core safety::tests::` - `cargo test -p codex-core test_sandbox_config_parsing` - `cargo clippy -p codex-core --all-targets -- -D warnings` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/13445). * #13453 * #13452 * #13451 * #13449 * #13448 * __->__ #13445 * #13440 * #13439 --------- Co-authored-by: viyatb-oai <viyatb@openai.com>
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dylan-hurd-oai
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1 non-blocking comment from me, but also let's see what codex says about the current version 😄
| Ok(path) => path, | ||
| Err(err) => panic!("root path must be absolute: {err}"), | ||
| } | ||
| } |
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This should probably be a method on AbsolutePathBuf?
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probably but we only use it here in seatbelt. trying to reduce number of edits outside this file :(
Why
After
#13440and#13445, macOS Seatbelt policy generation was still deriving filesystem and network behavior from the legacySandboxPolicyprojection.That projection loses explicit unreadable carveouts and conflates split network decisions, so the generated Seatbelt policy could still be wider than the split policy that Codex had already computed.
What changed
FileSystemSandboxPolicyandNetworkSandboxPolicydirectlyNetworkSandboxPolicydirectlyVerification
core/src/seatbelt.rsfor unreadable carveouts under both full-disk and scoped-readable policiesjust clippyStack created with Sapling. Best reviewed with ReviewStack.