Intel idle add GNR support and C6 fix#12
Conversation
enable pull request checking workflow for 6.6-velinux branch
commit 370406b upstream. Add Granite Rapids Xeon C-states, which are C1, C1E, C6, and C6P. Comparing to previous Xeon Generations (e.g., Emerald Rapids), C6 requests end up only in core C6 state, and no package C-state promotion takes place even if all cores in the package are in core C6. C6P requests also end up in core C6, but if all cores have requested C6P, the SoC will enter the package C6 state. Intel-SIG: commit 370406b intel_idle: add Granite Rapids Xeon support. Backport intel_idle GNR support Signed-off-by: Artem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240806160310.3719205-1-artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com [ rjw: Changelog edits ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> [ Yingbao Jia: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yingbao Jia <yingbao.jia@intel.com>
commit 4c411cc upstream. Background ~~~~~~~~~~ The driver uses 'use_acpi = true' in C-state custom table for all Xeon platforms. The meaning of this flag is as follows. 1. If a C-state from the custom table is defined in ACPI _CST (matched by the mwait hint), then enable this C-state. 2. Otherwise, disable this C-state, unless the C-sate definition in the custom table has the 'CPUIDLE_FLAG_ALWAYS_ENABLE' flag set, in which case enabled it. The goal is to honor BIOS C6 settings - If BIOS disables C6, disable it by default in the OS too (but it can be enabled via sysfs). This works well on Xeons that expose only one flavor of C6. This are all Xeons except for the newest Granite Rapids (GNR) and Sierra Forest (SRF). The problem ~~~~~~~~~~~ GNR and SRF have 2 flavors of C6: C6/C6P on GNR, C6S/C6SP on SRF. The the "P" flavor allows for the package C6, while the "non-P" flavor allows only for core/module C6. As far as this patch is concerned, both GNR and SRF platforms are handled the same way. Therefore, further discussion is focused on GNR, but it applies to SRF as well. On Intel Xeon platforms, BIOS exposes only 2 ACPI C-states: C1 and C2. Well, depending on BIOS settings, C2 may be named as C3. But there still will be only 2 states - C1 and C3. But this is a non-essential detail, so further discussion is focused on the ACPI C1 and C2 case. On pre-GNR/SRF Xeon platforms, ACPI C1 is mapped to C1 or C1E, and ACPI C2 is mapped to C6. The 'use_acpi' flag works just fine: * If ACPI C2 enabled, enable C6. * Otherwise, disable C6. However, on GNR there are 2 flavors of C6, so BIOS maps ACPI C2 to either C6 or C6P, depending on the user settings. As a result, due to the 'use_acpi' flag, 'intel_idle' disables least one of the C6 flavors. BIOS | OS | Verdict ----------------------------------------------------|--------- ACPI C2 disabled | C6 disabled, C6P disabled | OK ACPI C2 mapped to C6 | C6 enabled, C6P disabled | Not OK ACPI C2 mapped to C6P | C6 disabled, C6P enabled | Not OK The goal of 'use_acpi' is to honor BIOS ACPI C2 disabled case, which works fine. But if ACPI C2 is enabled, the goal is to enable all flavors of C6, not just one of the flavors. This was overlooked when enabling GNR/SRF platforms. In other words, before GNR/SRF, the ACPI C2 status was binary - enabled or disabled. But it is not binary on GNR/SRF, however the goal is to continue treat it as binary. The fix ~~~~~~~ Notice, that current algorithm matches ACPI and custom table C-states by the mwait hint. However, mwait hint consists of the 'state' and 'sub-state' parts, and all C6 flavors have the same state value of 0x20, but different sub-state values. Introduce new C-state table flag - CPUIDLE_FLAG_PARTIAL_HINT_MATCH and add it to both C6 flavors of the GNR/SRF platforms. When matching ACPI _CST and custom table C-states, match only the start part if the C-state has CPUIDLE_FLAG_PARTIAL_HINT_MATCH, other wise match both state and sub-state parts (as before). With this fix, GNR C-states enabled/disabled status looks like this. BIOS | OS ---------------------------------------------------- ACPI C2 disabled | C6 disabled, C6P disabled ACPI C2 mapped to C6 | C6 enabled, C6P enabled ACPI C2 mapped to C6P | C6 enabled, C6P enabled Possible alternative ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The alternative would be to remove 'use_acpi' flag for GNR and SRF. This would be a simpler solution, but it would violate the principle of least surprise - users of Xeon platforms are used to the fact that intel_idle honors C6 enabled/disabled flag. It is more consistent user experience if GNR/SRF continue doing so. How tested ~~~~~~~~~~ Tested on GNR and SRF platform with all the 3 BIOS configurations: ACPI C2 disabled, mapped to C6/C6S, mapped to C6P/C6SP. Tested on Ice lake Xeon and Sapphire Rapids Xeon platforms with ACPI C2 enabled and disabled, just to verify that the patch does not break older Xeons. Intel-SIG: Intel-SIG: commit 4c411cc intel_idle: fix ACPI _CST matching for newer Xeon platforms. Backport intel_idle GNR and SRF support and fix Fixes: 92813fd ("intel_idle: add Sierra Forest SoC support") Fixes: 370406b ("intel_idle: add Granite Rapids Xeon support") Cc: 6.8+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 6.8+ Signed-off-by: Artem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240913165143.4140073-1-dedekind1@gmail.com [ rjw: Changelog edits ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> [ Yingbao Jia: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yingbao Jia <yingbao.jia@intel.com>
|
gnr or grn ? @jiayingbao |
sorry, typo. GNR |
|
LGTM |
1 similar comment
|
LGTM |
|
seems many package is missed on test device. |
|
I don't know what happened on the bot but I can confirm it builds without any issues at my side. |
82f3c42 to
a5de9d8
Compare
Intel idle add GNR support and C6 fix
commit 99d4850 upstream Found by leak sanitizer: ``` ==1632594==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 21 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f2953a7077b in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439 openvelinux#1 0x556701d6fbbf in perf_env__read_cpuid util/env.c:369 openvelinux#2 0x556701d70589 in perf_env__cpuid util/env.c:465 openvelinux#3 0x55670204bba2 in x86__is_amd_cpu arch/x86/util/env.c:14 #4 0x5567020487a2 in arch__post_evsel_config arch/x86/util/evsel.c:83 #5 0x556701d8f78b in evsel__config util/evsel.c:1366 openvelinux#6 0x556701ef5872 in evlist__config util/record.c:108 openvelinux#7 0x556701cd6bcd in test__PERF_RECORD tests/perf-record.c:112 openvelinux#8 0x556701cacd07 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:236 openvelinux#9 0x556701cacfac in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:265 openvelinux#10 0x556701cadddb in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:402 openvelinux#11 0x556701caf2aa in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:559 openvelinux#12 0x556701d3b557 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:323 openvelinux#13 0x556701d3bac8 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:377 openvelinux#14 0x556701d3be90 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:421 openvelinux#15 0x556701d3c3f8 in main tools/perf/perf.c:537 openvelinux#16 0x7f2952a46189 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 21 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). ``` Fixes: f7b58cb ("perf mem/c2c: Add load store event mappings for AMD") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Acked-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613235416.1650755-1-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
commit 99d4850 upstream Found by leak sanitizer: ``` ==1632594==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 21 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f2953a7077b in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439 openvelinux#1 0x556701d6fbbf in perf_env__read_cpuid util/env.c:369 openvelinux#2 0x556701d70589 in perf_env__cpuid util/env.c:465 openvelinux#3 0x55670204bba2 in x86__is_amd_cpu arch/x86/util/env.c:14 #4 0x5567020487a2 in arch__post_evsel_config arch/x86/util/evsel.c:83 #5 0x556701d8f78b in evsel__config util/evsel.c:1366 openvelinux#6 0x556701ef5872 in evlist__config util/record.c:108 openvelinux#7 0x556701cd6bcd in test__PERF_RECORD tests/perf-record.c:112 openvelinux#8 0x556701cacd07 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:236 openvelinux#9 0x556701cacfac in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:265 openvelinux#10 0x556701cadddb in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:402 openvelinux#11 0x556701caf2aa in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:559 openvelinux#12 0x556701d3b557 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:323 openvelinux#13 0x556701d3bac8 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:377 openvelinux#14 0x556701d3be90 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:421 openvelinux#15 0x556701d3c3f8 in main tools/perf/perf.c:537 openvelinux#16 0x7f2952a46189 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 21 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). ``` Fixes: f7b58cb ("perf mem/c2c: Add load store event mappings for AMD") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Acked-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613235416.1650755-1-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
commit 99d4850 upstream Found by leak sanitizer: ``` ==1632594==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 21 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f2953a7077b in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439 openvelinux#1 0x556701d6fbbf in perf_env__read_cpuid util/env.c:369 openvelinux#2 0x556701d70589 in perf_env__cpuid util/env.c:465 openvelinux#3 0x55670204bba2 in x86__is_amd_cpu arch/x86/util/env.c:14 #4 0x5567020487a2 in arch__post_evsel_config arch/x86/util/evsel.c:83 #5 0x556701d8f78b in evsel__config util/evsel.c:1366 openvelinux#6 0x556701ef5872 in evlist__config util/record.c:108 openvelinux#7 0x556701cd6bcd in test__PERF_RECORD tests/perf-record.c:112 openvelinux#8 0x556701cacd07 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:236 openvelinux#9 0x556701cacfac in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:265 openvelinux#10 0x556701cadddb in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:402 openvelinux#11 0x556701caf2aa in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:559 openvelinux#12 0x556701d3b557 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:323 openvelinux#13 0x556701d3bac8 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:377 openvelinux#14 0x556701d3be90 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:421 openvelinux#15 0x556701d3c3f8 in main tools/perf/perf.c:537 openvelinux#16 0x7f2952a46189 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 21 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). ``` Fixes: f7b58cb ("perf mem/c2c: Add load store event mappings for AMD") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Acked-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613235416.1650755-1-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
commit 99d4850 upstream Found by leak sanitizer: ``` ==1632594==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 21 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f2953a7077b in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439 openvelinux#1 0x556701d6fbbf in perf_env__read_cpuid util/env.c:369 openvelinux#2 0x556701d70589 in perf_env__cpuid util/env.c:465 openvelinux#3 0x55670204bba2 in x86__is_amd_cpu arch/x86/util/env.c:14 #4 0x5567020487a2 in arch__post_evsel_config arch/x86/util/evsel.c:83 #5 0x556701d8f78b in evsel__config util/evsel.c:1366 openvelinux#6 0x556701ef5872 in evlist__config util/record.c:108 openvelinux#7 0x556701cd6bcd in test__PERF_RECORD tests/perf-record.c:112 openvelinux#8 0x556701cacd07 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:236 openvelinux#9 0x556701cacfac in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:265 openvelinux#10 0x556701cadddb in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:402 openvelinux#11 0x556701caf2aa in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:559 openvelinux#12 0x556701d3b557 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:323 openvelinux#13 0x556701d3bac8 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:377 openvelinux#14 0x556701d3be90 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:421 openvelinux#15 0x556701d3c3f8 in main tools/perf/perf.c:537 openvelinux#16 0x7f2952a46189 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 21 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). ``` Fixes: f7b58cb ("perf mem/c2c: Add load store event mappings for AMD") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Acked-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613235416.1650755-1-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: PvsNarasimha <PVS.NarasimhaRao@amd.com>
commit 99d4850 upstream Found by leak sanitizer: ``` ==1632594==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 21 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f2953a7077b in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439 openvelinux#1 0x556701d6fbbf in perf_env__read_cpuid util/env.c:369 openvelinux#2 0x556701d70589 in perf_env__cpuid util/env.c:465 openvelinux#3 0x55670204bba2 in x86__is_amd_cpu arch/x86/util/env.c:14 #4 0x5567020487a2 in arch__post_evsel_config arch/x86/util/evsel.c:83 #5 0x556701d8f78b in evsel__config util/evsel.c:1366 openvelinux#6 0x556701ef5872 in evlist__config util/record.c:108 openvelinux#7 0x556701cd6bcd in test__PERF_RECORD tests/perf-record.c:112 openvelinux#8 0x556701cacd07 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:236 openvelinux#9 0x556701cacfac in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:265 openvelinux#10 0x556701cadddb in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:402 openvelinux#11 0x556701caf2aa in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:559 openvelinux#12 0x556701d3b557 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:323 openvelinux#13 0x556701d3bac8 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:377 openvelinux#14 0x556701d3be90 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:421 openvelinux#15 0x556701d3c3f8 in main tools/perf/perf.c:537 openvelinux#16 0x7f2952a46189 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 21 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). ``` Fixes: f7b58cb ("perf mem/c2c: Add load store event mappings for AMD") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Acked-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613235416.1650755-1-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: PvsNarasimha <PVS.NarasimhaRao@amd.com>
commit 99d4850 upstream. Found by leak sanitizer: ``` ==1632594==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 21 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f2953a7077b in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439 openvelinux#1 0x556701d6fbbf in perf_env__read_cpuid util/env.c:369 openvelinux#2 0x556701d70589 in perf_env__cpuid util/env.c:465 openvelinux#3 0x55670204bba2 in x86__is_amd_cpu arch/x86/util/env.c:14 #4 0x5567020487a2 in arch__post_evsel_config arch/x86/util/evsel.c:83 #5 0x556701d8f78b in evsel__config util/evsel.c:1366 openvelinux#6 0x556701ef5872 in evlist__config util/record.c:108 openvelinux#7 0x556701cd6bcd in test__PERF_RECORD tests/perf-record.c:112 openvelinux#8 0x556701cacd07 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:236 openvelinux#9 0x556701cacfac in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:265 openvelinux#10 0x556701cadddb in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:402 openvelinux#11 0x556701caf2aa in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:559 openvelinux#12 0x556701d3b557 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:323 openvelinux#13 0x556701d3bac8 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:377 openvelinux#14 0x556701d3be90 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:421 openvelinux#15 0x556701d3c3f8 in main tools/perf/perf.c:537 openvelinux#16 0x7f2952a46189 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 21 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). ``` Fixes: f7b58cb ("perf mem/c2c: Add load store event mappings for AMD") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Acked-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613235416.1650755-1-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: PvsNarasimha <PVS.NarasimhaRao@amd.com>
commit 99d4850 upstream. Found by leak sanitizer: ``` ==1632594==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 21 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f2953a7077b in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439 #1 0x556701d6fbbf in perf_env__read_cpuid util/env.c:369 #2 0x556701d70589 in perf_env__cpuid util/env.c:465 #3 0x55670204bba2 in x86__is_amd_cpu arch/x86/util/env.c:14 #4 0x5567020487a2 in arch__post_evsel_config arch/x86/util/evsel.c:83 #5 0x556701d8f78b in evsel__config util/evsel.c:1366 #6 0x556701ef5872 in evlist__config util/record.c:108 #7 0x556701cd6bcd in test__PERF_RECORD tests/perf-record.c:112 #8 0x556701cacd07 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:236 #9 0x556701cacfac in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:265 #10 0x556701cadddb in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:402 #11 0x556701caf2aa in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:559 #12 0x556701d3b557 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:323 #13 0x556701d3bac8 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:377 #14 0x556701d3be90 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:421 #15 0x556701d3c3f8 in main tools/perf/perf.c:537 #16 0x7f2952a46189 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 21 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). ``` Fixes: f7b58cb ("perf mem/c2c: Add load store event mappings for AMD") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Acked-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613235416.1650755-1-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: PvsNarasimha <PVS.NarasimhaRao@amd.com>
commit a699781 upstream. A sysfs reader can race with a device reset or removal, attempting to read device state when the device is not actually present. eg: [exception RIP: qed_get_current_link+17] #8 [ffffb9e4f2907c48] qede_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc07a994a [qede] #9 [ffffb9e4f2907cd8] __rh_call_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff992b01a3 #10 [ffffb9e4f2907d38] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff992b04e4 #11 [ffffb9e4f2907d90] duplex_show at ffffffff99260300 #12 [ffffb9e4f2907e38] dev_attr_show at ffffffff9905a01c #13 [ffffb9e4f2907e50] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff98e0145b #14 [ffffb9e4f2907e68] seq_read at ffffffff98d902e3 #15 [ffffb9e4f2907ec8] vfs_read at ffffffff98d657d1 #16 [ffffb9e4f2907f00] ksys_read at ffffffff98d65c3f #17 [ffffb9e4f2907f38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff98a052fb crash> struct net_device.state ffff9a9d21336000 state = 5, state 5 is __LINK_STATE_START (0b1) and __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER (0b100). The device is not present, note lack of __LINK_STATE_PRESENT (0b10). This is the same sort of panic as observed in commit 4224cfd ("net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show"). There are many other callers of __ethtool_get_link_ksettings() which don't have a device presence check. Move this check into ethtool to protect all callers. Fixes: d519e17 ("net: export device speed and duplex via sysfs") Fixes: 4224cfd ("net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show") Signed-off-by: Jamie Bainbridge <jamie.bainbridge@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/8bae218864beaa44ed01628140475b9bf641c5b0.1724393671.git.jamie.bainbridge@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit a699781) Signed-off-by: Tao Ma <matao.9@bytedance.com>
commit c7acef99642b763ba585f4a43af999fcdbcc3dc4 upstream. Dennis reports a boot crash on recent Lenovo laptops with a USB4 dock. Since commit 0fc7088 ("thunderbolt: Reset USB4 v2 host router") and commit 59a54c5 ("thunderbolt: Reset topology created by the boot firmware"), USB4 v2 and v1 Host Routers are reset on probe of the thunderbolt driver. The reset clears the Presence Detect State and Data Link Layer Link Active bits at the USB4 Host Router's Root Port and thus causes hot removal of the dock. The crash occurs when pciehp is unbound from one of the dock's Downstream Ports: pciehp creates a pci_slot on bind and destroys it on unbind. The pci_slot contains a pointer to the pci_bus below the Downstream Port, but a reference on that pci_bus is never acquired. The pci_bus is destroyed before the pci_slot, so a use-after-free ensues when pci_slot_release() accesses slot->bus. In principle this should not happen because pci_stop_bus_device() unbinds pciehp (and therefore destroys the pci_slot) before the pci_bus is destroyed by pci_remove_bus_device(). However the stacktrace provided by Dennis shows that pciehp is unbound from pci_remove_bus_device() instead of pci_stop_bus_device(). To understand the significance of this, one needs to know that the PCI core uses a two step process to remove a portion of the hierarchy: It first unbinds all drivers in the sub-hierarchy in pci_stop_bus_device() and then actually removes the devices in pci_remove_bus_device(). There is no precaution to prevent driver binding in-between pci_stop_bus_device() and pci_remove_bus_device(). In Dennis' case, it seems removal of the hierarchy by pciehp races with driver binding by pci_bus_add_devices(). pciehp is bound to the Downstream Port after pci_stop_bus_device() has run, so it is unbound by pci_remove_bus_device() instead of pci_stop_bus_device(). Because the pci_bus has already been destroyed at that point, accesses to it result in a use-after-free. One might conclude that driver binding needs to be prevented after pci_stop_bus_device() has run. However it seems risky that pci_slot points to pci_bus without holding a reference. Solely relying on correct ordering of driver unbind versus pci_bus destruction is certainly not defensive programming. If pci_slot has a need to access data in pci_bus, it ought to acquire a reference. Amend pci_create_slot() accordingly. Dennis reports that the crash is not reproducible with this change. Abridged stacktrace: pcieport 0000:00:07.0: PME: Signaling with IRQ 156 pcieport 0000:00:07.0: pciehp: Slot #12 AttnBtn- PwrCtrl- MRL- AttnInd- PwrInd- HotPlug+ Surprise+ Interlock- NoCompl+ IbPresDis- LLActRep+ pci_bus 0000:20: dev 00, created physical slot 12 pcieport 0000:00:07.0: pciehp: Slot(12): Card not present ... pcieport 0000:21:02.0: pciehp: pcie_disable_notification: SLOTCTRL d8 write cmd 0 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 13 UID: 0 PID: 134 Comm: irq/156-pciehp Not tainted 6.11.0-devel+ #1 RIP: 0010:dev_driver_string+0x12/0x40 pci_destroy_slot pciehp_remove pcie_port_remove_service device_release_driver_internal bus_remove_device device_del device_unregister remove_iter device_for_each_child pcie_portdrv_remove pci_device_remove device_release_driver_internal bus_remove_device device_del pci_remove_bus_device (recursive invocation) pci_remove_bus_device pciehp_unconfigure_device pciehp_disable_slot pciehp_handle_presence_or_link_change pciehp_ist Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4bfd4c0e976c1776cd08e76603903b338cf25729.1728579288.git.lukas@wunner.de Reported-by: Dennis Wassenberg <Dennis.Wassenberg@secunet.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6de4b45ff2b32dd91a805ec02ec8ec73ef411bf6.camel@secunet.com/ Tested-by: Dennis Wassenberg <Dennis.Wassenberg@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Reviewed-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ashish Bijlani <ashish.bijlani@bytedance.com>
[ Upstream commit 163e5f2b96632b7fb2eaa965562aca0dbdf9f996 ]
When using perf record with the `--overwrite` option, a segmentation fault
occurs if an event fails to open. For example:
perf record -e cycles-ct -F 1000 -a --overwrite
Error:
cycles-ct:H: PMU Hardware doesn't support sampling/overflow-interrupts. Try 'perf stat'
perf: Segmentation fault
#0 0x6466b6 in dump_stack debug.c:366
#1 0x646729 in sighandler_dump_stack debug.c:378
openvelinux#2 0x453fd1 in sigsegv_handler builtin-record.c:722
openvelinux#3 0x7f8454e65090 in __restore_rt libc-2.32.so[54090]
#4 0x6c5671 in __perf_event__synthesize_id_index synthetic-events.c:1862
#5 0x6c5ac0 in perf_event__synthesize_id_index synthetic-events.c:1943
openvelinux#6 0x458090 in record__synthesize builtin-record.c:2075
openvelinux#7 0x45a85a in __cmd_record builtin-record.c:2888
openvelinux#8 0x45deb6 in cmd_record builtin-record.c:4374
openvelinux#9 0x4e5e33 in run_builtin perf.c:349
openvelinux#10 0x4e60bf in handle_internal_command perf.c:401
openvelinux#11 0x4e6215 in run_argv perf.c:448
openvelinux#12 0x4e653a in main perf.c:555
openvelinux#13 0x7f8454e4fa72 in __libc_start_main libc-2.32.so[3ea72]
openvelinux#14 0x43a3ee in _start ??:0
The --overwrite option implies --tail-synthesize, which collects non-sample
events reflecting the system status when recording finishes. However, when
evsel opening fails (e.g., unsupported event 'cycles-ct'), session->evlist
is not initialized and remains NULL. The code unconditionally calls
record__synthesize() in the error path, which iterates through the NULL
evlist pointer and causes a segfault.
To fix it, move the record__synthesize() call inside the error check block, so
it's only called when there was no error during recording, ensuring that evlist
is properly initialized.
Fixes: 4ea648a ("perf record: Add --tail-synthesize option")
Signed-off-by: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 00312419f0863964625d6dcda8183f96849412c6 upstream.
On systems using the hash MMU, there is a software SLB preload cache that
mirrors the entries loaded into the hardware SLB buffer. This preload
cache is subject to periodic eviction — typically after every 256 context
switches — to remove old entry.
To optimize performance, the kernel skips switch_mmu_context() in
switch_mm_irqs_off() when the prev and next mm_struct are the same.
However, on hash MMU systems, this can lead to inconsistencies between
the hardware SLB and the software preload cache.
If an SLB entry for a process is evicted from the software cache on one
CPU, and the same process later runs on another CPU without executing
switch_mmu_context(), the hardware SLB may retain stale entries. If the
kernel then attempts to reload that entry, it can trigger an SLB
multi-hit error.
The following timeline shows how stale SLB entries are created and can
cause a multi-hit error when a process moves between CPUs without a
MMU context switch.
CPU 0 CPU 1
----- -----
Process P
exec swapper/1
load_elf_binary
begin_new_exc
activate_mm
switch_mm_irqs_off
switch_mmu_context
switch_slb
/*
* This invalidates all
* the entries in the HW
* and setup the new HW
* SLB entries as per the
* preload cache.
*/
context_switch
sched_migrate_task migrates process P to cpu-1
Process swapper/0 context switch (to process P)
(uses mm_struct of Process P) switch_mm_irqs_off()
switch_slb
load_slb++
/*
* load_slb becomes 0 here
* and we evict an entry from
* the preload cache with
* preload_age(). We still
* keep HW SLB and preload
* cache in sync, that is
* because all HW SLB entries
* anyways gets evicted in
* switch_slb during SLBIA.
* We then only add those
* entries back in HW SLB,
* which are currently
* present in preload_cache
* (after eviction).
*/
load_elf_binary continues...
setup_new_exec()
slb_setup_new_exec()
sched_switch event
sched_migrate_task migrates
process P to cpu-0
context_switch from swapper/0 to Process P
switch_mm_irqs_off()
/*
* Since both prev and next mm struct are same we don't call
* switch_mmu_context(). This will cause the HW SLB and SW preload
* cache to go out of sync in preload_new_slb_context. Because there
* was an SLB entry which was evicted from both HW and preload cache
* on cpu-1. Now later in preload_new_slb_context(), when we will try
* to add the same preload entry again, we will add this to the SW
* preload cache and then will add it to the HW SLB. Since on cpu-0
* this entry was never invalidated, hence adding this entry to the HW
* SLB will cause a SLB multi-hit error.
*/
load_elf_binary continues...
START_THREAD
start_thread
preload_new_slb_context
/*
* This tries to add a new EA to preload cache which was earlier
* evicted from both cpu-1 HW SLB and preload cache. This caused the
* HW SLB of cpu-0 to go out of sync with the SW preload cache. The
* reason for this was, that when we context switched back on CPU-0,
* we should have ideally called switch_mmu_context() which will
* bring the HW SLB entries on CPU-0 in sync with SW preload cache
* entries by setting up the mmu context properly. But we didn't do
* that since the prev mm_struct running on cpu-0 was same as the
* next mm_struct (which is true for swapper / kernel threads). So
* now when we try to add this new entry into the HW SLB of cpu-0,
* we hit a SLB multi-hit error.
*/
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1810970 at arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/slb.c:62
assert_slb_presence+0x2c/0x50(48 results) 02:47:29 [20157/42149]
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1810970 Comm: dd Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3-dirty openvelinux#12
VOLUNTARY
Hardware name: IBM pSeries (emulated by qemu) POWER8 (architected)
0x4d0200 0xf000004 of:SLOF,HEAD hv:linux,kvm pSeries
NIP: c00000000015426c LR: c0000000001543b4 CTR: 0000000000000000
REGS: c0000000497c77e0 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (6.16.0-rc3-dirty)
MSR: 8000000002823033 <SF,VEC,VSX,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28888482 XER: 00000000
CFAR: c0000000001543b0 IRQMASK: 3
<...>
NIP [c00000000015426c] assert_slb_presence+0x2c/0x50
LR [c0000000001543b4] slb_insert_entry+0x124/0x390
Call Trace:
0x7fffceb5ffff (unreliable)
preload_new_slb_context+0x100/0x1a0
start_thread+0x26c/0x420
load_elf_binary+0x1b04/0x1c40
bprm_execve+0x358/0x680
do_execveat_common+0x1f8/0x240
sys_execve+0x58/0x70
system_call_exception+0x114/0x300
system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4
>From the above analysis, during early exec the hardware SLB is cleared,
and entries from the software preload cache are reloaded into hardware
by switch_slb. However, preload_new_slb_context and slb_setup_new_exec
also attempt to load some of the same entries, which can trigger a
multi-hit. In most cases, these additional preloads simply hit existing
entries and add nothing new. Removing these functions avoids redundant
preloads and eliminates the multi-hit issue. This patch removes these
two functions.
We tested process switching performance using the context_switch
benchmark on POWER9/hash, and observed no regression.
Without this patch: 129041 ops/sec
With this patch: 129341 ops/sec
We also measured SLB faults during boot, and the counts are essentially
the same with and without this patch.
SLB faults without this patch: 19727
SLB faults with this patch: 19786
Fixes: 5434ae7 ("powerpc/64s/hash: Add a SLB preload cache")
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Donet Tom <donettom@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) <ritesh.list@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/0ac694ae683494fe8cadbd911a1a5018d5d3c541.1761834163.git.ritesh.list@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
backport intel_idle support for GNR.
backport intel_idle fix for C6 enable/disable status.
test:
test passed and function ok.