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[5.15-velinux] Intel: backport KVM Fix for Clearing SGX EDECCSSA to 5.15#44

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[5.15-velinux] Intel: backport KVM Fix for Clearing SGX EDECCSSA to 5.15#44
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This PR includes incremental backporting patches which mainly covers some SGX bug fixes which are missing in VeLinux.

About the patches
The total patch number is 4:

5f4d1fd5b5d3 selftests/sgx: Ignore OpenSSL 3.0 deprecated functions warning
ee56a283988d x86/sgx: Improve comments for sgx_encl_lookup/alloc_backing()
370839c241f7 x86/sgx: Allow enclaves to use Asynchrounous Exit Notification
7efb4d8a392a KVM: VMX: Also clear SGX EDECCSSA in KVM CPU caps when SGX is disabled

Tests

  1. Build successfully for each commit
  2. Kernel selftest - SGX: PASSED
cd tools/testing/selftests/sgx/
make
./test_sgx
  1. Kernel selftest - SGX in VM: PASSED
  2. Function test

Step 1. Original SGX EDECCSSA status in guest

[root@guest ~]# cpuid -1 -l 0x12
CPU:
   Software Guard Extensions (SGX) capability (0x12/0):
      SGX1 supported                           = true
      SGX2 supported                           = true
      SGX ENCLV E*VIRTCHILD, ESETCONTEXT       = false
      SGX ENCLS ETRACKC, ERDINFO, ELDBC, ELDUC = false
      SGX ENCLU EVERIFYREPORT2                 = false
      SGX ENCLS EUPDATESVN                     = false
      SGX ENCLU EDECCSSA                       = true
      MISCSELECT.EXINFO supported: #PF & #GP   = true
      MISCSELECT.CPINFO supported: #CP         = false
      MaxEnclaveSize_Not64 (log2)              = 0x1f (31)
      MaxEnclaveSize_64 (log2)                 = 0x38 (56)

Step 2. Disable SGX in guest

root@KVM-host:~# rmmod kvm_intel
root@KVM-host:~# modprobe kvm_intel sgx=0 

Step 3. The SGX EDECCSSA capability is cleared in KVM, then its status becomes false

[root@guest ~]# cpuid -1 -l 0x12
CPU:
   Software Guard Extensions (SGX) capability (0x12/0):
      SGX1 supported                           = false
      SGX2 supported                           = false
      SGX ENCLV E*VIRTCHILD, ESETCONTEXT       = false
      SGX ENCLS ETRACKC, ERDINFO, ELDBC, ELDUC = false
      SGX ENCLU EVERIFYREPORT2                 = false
      SGX ENCLS EUPDATESVN                     = false
      SGX ENCLU EDECCSSA                       = false
      MISCSELECT.EXINFO supported: #PF & #GP   = false
      MISCSELECT.CPINFO supported: #CP         = false
      MaxEnclaveSize_Not64 (log2)              = 0x0 (0)
      MaxEnclaveSize_64 (log2)                 = 0x0 (0)
[root@TDX-guest ~]# 

Known issue:
None

Default config change:
None

kaccardi and others added 4 commits March 4, 2025 18:23
commit 5f4d1fd upstream.

OpenSSL 3.0 deprecates some of the functions used in the SGX
selftests, causing build errors on new distros. For now ignore
the warnings until support for the functions is no longer
available and mark FIXME so that it can be clear this should
be removed at some point.

Intel-SIG: commit 5f4d1fd selftests/sgx: Ignore OpenSSL 3.0
deprecated functions warning
Backport some SGX bug fixes.

Signed-off-by: Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Zhiquan Li: amend commit log ]
Signed-off-by: Zhiquan Li <zhiquan1.li@intel.com>
commit ee56a28 upstream.

Modify the comments for sgx_encl_lookup_backing() and for
sgx_encl_alloc_backing() to indicate that they take a reference
which must be dropped with a call to sgx_encl_put_backing().
Make sgx_encl_lookup_backing() static for now, and change the
name of sgx_encl_get_backing() to __sgx_encl_get_backing() to
make it more clear that sgx_encl_get_backing() is an internal
function.

Intel-SIG: commit ee56a28 x86/sgx: Improve comments for
sgx_encl_lookup/alloc_backing()
Backport some SGX bug fixes.

Signed-off-by: Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen.c.accardi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/YtUs3MKLzFg+rqEV@zn.tnic/
[ Zhiquan Li: amend commit log ]
Signed-off-by: Zhiquan Li <zhiquan1.li@intel.com>
commit 370839c upstream.

Short Version:

Allow enclaves to use the new Asynchronous EXit (AEX)
notification mechanism.  This mechanism lets enclaves run a
handler after an AEX event.  These handlers can run mitigations
for things like SGX-Step[1].

AEX Notify will be made available both on upcoming processors and
on some older processors through microcode updates.

Long Version:

== SGX Attribute Background ==

The SGX architecture includes a list of SGX "attributes".  These
attributes ensure consistency and transparency around specific
enclave features.

As a simple example, the "DEBUG" attribute allows an enclave to
be debugged, but also destroys virtually all of SGX security.
Using attributes, enclaves can know that they are being debugged.
Attributes also affect enclave attestation so an enclave can, for
instance, be denied access to secrets while it is being debugged.

The kernel keeps a list of known attributes and will only
initialize enclaves that use a known set of attributes.  This
kernel policy eliminates the chance that a new SGX attribute
could cause undesired effects.

For example, imagine a new attribute was added called
"PROVISIONKEY2" that provided similar functionality to
"PROVISIIONKEY".  A kernel policy that allowed indiscriminate use
of unknown attributes and thus PROVISIONKEY2 would undermine the
existing kernel policy which limits use of PROVISIONKEY enclaves.

== AEX Notify Background ==

"Intel Architecture Instruction Set Extensions and Future
Features - Version 45" is out[2].  There is a new chapter:

	Asynchronous Enclave Exit Notify and the EDECCSSA User Leaf Function.

Enclaves exit can be either synchronous and consensual (EEXIT for
instance) or asynchronous (on an interrupt or fault).  The
asynchronous ones can evidently be exploited to single step
enclaves[1], on top of which other naughty things can be built.

AEX Notify will be made available both on upcoming processors and
on some older processors through microcode updates.

== The Problem ==

These attacks are currently entirely opaque to the enclave since
the hardware does the save/restore under the covers. The
Asynchronous Enclave Exit Notify (AEX Notify) mechanism provides
enclaves an ability to detect and mitigate potential exposure to
these kinds of attacks.

== The Solution ==

Define the new attribute value for AEX Notification.  Ensure the
attribute is cleared from the list reserved attributes.  Instead
of adding to the open-coded lists of individual attributes,
add named lists of privileged (disallowed by default) and
unprivileged (allowed by default) attributes.  Add the AEX notify
attribute as an unprivileged attribute, which will keep the kernel
from rejecting enclaves with it set.

1. https://github.com/jovanbulck/sgx-step
2. https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/671368?explicitVersion=true

Intel-SIG: commit 370839c x86/sgx: Allow enclaves to use
Asynchrounous Exit Notification
Backport some SGX bug fixes.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220720191347.1343986-1-dave.hansen%40linux.intel.com
[ Zhiquan Li: amend commit log ]
Signed-off-by: Zhiquan Li <zhiquan1.li@intel.com>
commit 16a7fe3 upstream.

The new Asynchronous Exit (AEX) notification mechanism (AEX-notify)
allows one enclave to receive a notification in the ERESUME after the
enclave exit due to an AEX.  EDECCSSA is a new SGX user leaf function
(ENCLU[EDECCSSA]) to facilitate the AEX notification handling.  The new
EDECCSSA is enumerated via CPUID(EAX=0x12,ECX=0x0):EAX[11].

Besides Allowing reporting the new AEX-notify attribute to KVM guests,
also allow reporting the new EDECCSSA user leaf function to KVM guests
so the guest can fully utilize the AEX-notify mechanism.

Similar to existing X86_FEATURE_SGX1 and X86_FEATURE_SGX2, introduce a
new scattered X86_FEATURE_SGX_EDECCSSA bit for the new EDECCSSA, and
report it in KVM's supported CPUIDs.

Note, no additional KVM enabling is required to allow the guest to use
EDECCSSA.  It's impossible to trap ENCLU (without completely preventing
the guest from using SGX).  Advertise EDECCSSA as supported purely so
that userspace doesn't need to special case EDECCSSA, i.e. doesn't need
to manually check host CPUID.

The inability to trap ENCLU also means that KVM can't prevent the guest
from using EDECCSSA, but that virtualization hole is benign as far as
KVM is concerned.  EDECCSSA is simply a fancy way to modify internal
enclave state.

More background about how do AEX-notify and EDECCSSA work:

SGX maintains a Current State Save Area Frame (CSSA) for each enclave
thread.  When AEX happens, the enclave thread context is saved to the
CSSA and the CSSA is increased by 1.  For a normal ERESUME which doesn't
deliver AEX notification, it restores the saved thread context from the
previously saved SSA and decreases the CSSA.  If AEX-notify is enabled
for one enclave, the ERESUME acts differently.  Instead of restoring the
saved thread context and decreasing the CSSA, it acts like EENTER which
doesn't decrease the CSSA but establishes a clean slate thread context
using the CSSA for the enclave to handle the notification.  After some
handling, the enclave must discard the "new-established" SSA and switch
back to the previously saved SSA (upon AEX).  Otherwise, the enclave
will run out of SSA space upon further AEXs and eventually fail to run.

To solve this problem, the new EDECCSSA essentially decreases the CSSA.
It can be used by the enclave notification handler to switch back to the
previous saved SSA when needed, i.e. after it handles the notification.

Intel-SIG: commit 16a7fe3 KVM/VMX: Allow exposing EDECCSSA user
leaf function to KVM guest
Backport some SGX bug fixes.

Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221101022422.858944-1-kai.huang%40intel.com
[ Zhiquan Li: amend commit log ]
Signed-off-by: Zhiquan Li <zhiquan1.li@intel.com>
guojinhui-liam pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 3, 2026
commit 5d92c7c upstream.

If the ata_port_alloc() call in ata_host_alloc() fails,
ata_host_release() will get called.

However, the code in ata_host_release() tries to free ata_port struct
members unconditionally, which can lead to the following:

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000003990
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 10 PID: 594 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.10.0-rc5 #44
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:ata_host_release.cold+0x2f/0x6e [libata]
Code: e4 4d 63 f4 44 89 e2 48 c7 c6 90 ad 32 c0 48 c7 c7 d0 70 33 c0 49 83 c6 0e 41
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000ebb968 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000041 RBX: ffff88810fb52e78 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88813b3218c0 RDI: ffff88813b3218c0
RBP: ffff88810fb52e40 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 6c65725f74736f68
R10: ffffc90000ebb738 R11: 73692033203a746e R12: 0000000000000004
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000011 R15: 0000000000000006
FS:  00007f6cc55b9980(0000) GS:ffff88813b300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000003990 CR3: 00000001122a2000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27
 ? page_fault_oops+0x15a/0x2f0
 ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x180
 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
 ? ata_host_release.cold+0x2f/0x6e [libata]
 ? ata_host_release.cold+0x2f/0x6e [libata]
 release_nodes+0x35/0xb0
 devres_release_group+0x113/0x140
 ata_host_alloc+0xed/0x120 [libata]
 ata_host_alloc_pinfo+0x14/0xa0 [libata]
 ahci_init_one+0x6c9/0xd20 [ahci]

Do not access ata_port struct members unconditionally.

Fixes: 633273a ("libata-pmp: hook PMP support and enable it")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: John Garry <john.g.garry@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240629124210.181537-7-cassel@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <cassel@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Diangang Li <lidiangang@bytedance.com>
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