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Description
Proof of Personhood
Building trustless protocols with incentives has so far required disincentivizing the creation of Sybil identities. For example, in cryptocurrencies based on Proof-of-Work, you only have a finite amount of resources and it does not behoove you to split across multiple identities. However, These protocols could be simplified with an external prevention of Sybil identities. In addition, there are specific applications in which the desired incentive structure cannot solve the intended problem if they are modified to resist Sybil identities. While these problems may seem impossible to solve in a trustless, distributed manner, I argue that the introduction of a Proof of Personhood as a cryptographic primitive would drastically simplify the solutions of these problems.
Examples of interesting problems include
- A Universal Basic Income token, in which every unique individual who registers receives some amount of tokens.
- A secure and anonymous method of tracking unique visitors or users
- Electronic Voting
Solution constraints
- Security: It should be (cryptographically) difficult for one individual to generate two proofs that register as different individuals
- Privacy: It should be (cryptographically) difficult to recognizable an individual from any publicly broadcasted proof
Ideally it would be nice to have
- Anonymity: It should be difficult to recognize two publicly broadcasted proofs to belong to the same individual
- Proofs are succinct and easily provable (linear in space and time).
Note that it likely isn't necessary that it should be (cryptographically) difficult to forge a proof of a known individual, since a Proof of Personhood could probably be combined with a cryptographic signature.