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docs: AI-assisted safety + cyber engineering — HITL contract#176

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docs/ai-safety-cyber-hitl
Apr 22, 2026
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docs: AI-assisted safety + cyber engineering — HITL contract#176
avrabe merged 1 commit intomainfrom
docs/ai-safety-cyber-hitl

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@avrabe avrabe commented Apr 22, 2026

Summary

Single-commit design doc docs/design/ai-safety-cyber-hitl.md (~2500 words) that frames the recurring objection "but a qualified human still has to sign off" as the shape of AI assistance in a regulated SDLC, not an argument against it.

Chosen one-sentence frame: AI proposes structure; a qualified human owns judgment; every transition between the two is a separately-stamped, git-reviewable event.

Contents

  • §1 TL;DR — one-sentence frame, with "everything follows from this" framing.
  • §2 The regulatory reality — 12-row table across ISO 26262:2018, IEC 61508-1, IEC 62304, DO-178C / DO-330, EN 50128, ISO/SAE 21434, ISO 27001, IEC 62443-4-1, ASPICE 4.0, EU AI Act Art. 14, NIST AI RMF. Each row: role, what they sign, what AI can NEVER do. Clause numbers flagged (unverified clause-level) where the primary text could not be fetched this session.
  • §3 How existing tools handle the tension — Jama Advisor, Polarion, Codebeamer, Ansys medini, BTC, TÜV. Distinguishes honest framing (AI output labelled, sign-off a separate state, AI doesn't sign) from overclaiming.
  • §4 The pattern — 6-row table mapping authoring/linking/validation/gap-detection/summarisation/sign-off onto AI role, human role, and concrete rivet commands.
  • §5 Rivet's four-point HITL contract — what's in main today vs. v0.5.0 proposals:
    1. Every AI-authored artifact carries provenance (today — schemas/common.yaml ai-generated-needs-review rule; proposed: promote to error on status: approved and add self-approval-loophole lint).
    2. Human sign-off as a separate stamp (today — rivet stamp --reviewed-by; gaps: structured rationale, rivet approve alias, Part 11 e-signature).
    3. rivet audit-trail <id> (v0.5.0 proposal — chronological view over git history + provenance transitions).
    4. Structural-only validator boundary (today — rivet validate never assesses credibility).
  • §6 FAQ — pocket answers to five customer objections (can't-do-safety, hallucination, liability, Copilot-difference, TÜV-acceptance).
  • §7 What rivet explicitly does NOT claim — six-item anti-overclaim list.
  • §8 Cross-references + implementation backlog — proposed text updates to docs/what-is-rivet.md (not made here); five-item v0.5.0 backlog.

Honest constraints

  • Live WebFetch / WebSearch were unavailable this session; every external regulatory clause citation and vendor marketing phrase is flagged *(unverified)* per the task constraint "mark unverified."
  • Rivet does NOT have rivet approve or rivet audit-trail subcommands today. Both are called out as v0.5.0 proposals, not claimed as features.
  • Word count: 2498 (under the 2500 limit).

Refs: FEAT-001 (Evidence-as-Code positioning), REQ-002 (STPA artifact support — the cyber-safety joint analysis pattern), REQ-030 (formal verification — the structural-only enforcement boundary).

Test plan

  • Product lead reviews §1 frame sentence for use in sales materials.
  • Safety lead verifies clause numbers in §2 against paid copies of ISO 26262, IEC 61508, IEC 62304, DO-178C, EN 50128, ISO/SAE 21434 before external quotation.
  • Competitive research re-fetches §3 vendor marketing phrases (Jama, Polarion, Codebeamer, Ansys, BTC, TÜV) before external use.
  • PM evaluates §5/§8 backlog items (promote ai-generated-needs-review to error on approved, self-approval-loophole lint, rivet approve alias, rivet audit-trail <id>, structured reviewed-by.rationale for ASIL ≥ B / CAL ≥ 2) for v0.5.0 scope.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

Frame for the recurring customer objection "a qualified human still
has to do this." Enumerates the named-human sign-off role across ISO
26262, IEC 61508, IEC 62304, DO-178C, EN 50128, ISO/SAE 21434,
ISO 27001, IEC 62443, ASPICE 4.0, EU AI Act Art. 14, and NIST AI RMF.

Then establishes rivet's four-point HITL contract:
1. Provenance-on-author (today — schemas/common.yaml already gates
   ai-generated artifacts reaching `active` without reviewed-by).
2. Human sign-off as a separate stamp (today — `rivet stamp
   --reviewed-by`; gaps: no structured rationale, no `rivet approve`
   alias, no Part 11 e-signature).
3. Audit-trail view (v0.5.0 proposal — `rivet audit-trail <id>` over
   git history + provenance transitions).
4. Structural-only validator boundary (today — `rivet validate` never
   claims to assess credibility).

Explicitly lists what rivet does NOT claim (no safety analysis, no
hazard-credibility assessment, no assessor replacement, no TCL/TQL
self-qualification, no regulatory guarantee, no 21 CFR Part 11).
Five implementation items for v0.5.0 backlog are called out.

Live web fetch was unavailable this session; external standard
clauses and vendor marketing phrases are flagged *(unverified)* per
the constraint "mark unverified."

Refs: FEAT-001, REQ-002, REQ-030

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
@avrabe avrabe merged commit c1d0d01 into main Apr 22, 2026
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@avrabe avrabe deleted the docs/ai-safety-cyber-hitl branch April 22, 2026 05:25
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