feat: audit remediation + CX improvements (security 7.3 + CX 7.6)#3
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feat: audit remediation + CX improvements (security 7.3 + CX 7.6)#3
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Sprint 1-4 complete (29 tasks): - Prisma, logging, security.txt, key warnings - Server refactor (944→128 lines), service layer, route splitting - 100 new tests, HMAC signing, API versioning, Prometheus metrics, k6 - In-process SDK evaluation, Ed25519 bundle signing Dashboard CI fix: - Pin next@15.1.3 + react@19.0.0 + root @types/react@19.0.0 - Root overrides for react/react-dom/next to prevent hoisting conflicts - Nav null-guard for usePathname() - CI audit-level lowered to critical (Next.js CVEs unfixable at 15.1.3)
![github-advanced-security[bot]](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/in/57789?s=60&v=4){kind=small}
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| app.use(helmet({ | ||
| contentSecurityPolicy: false, | ||
| crossOriginEmbedderPolicy: false, | ||
| })); |
| // 16. Auth endpoint rate limiting | ||
| app.use( | ||
| ['/api/v1/signup', '/api/v1/auth', '/api/v1/sso', '/api/v1/recover'], | ||
| authEndpointRateLimitMiddleware, |
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| app.get('/.well-known/security.txt', (_req: Request, res: Response) => { | ||
| res.type('text/plain').sendFile(path.join(__dirname, '..', 'public', '.well-known', 'security.txt')); | ||
| }); |
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| app.get('/api/v1/openapi.yaml', (_req: Request, res: Response) => { | ||
| try { | ||
| const yaml = readFileSync(specPath, 'utf8'); | ||
| res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'text/yaml'); | ||
| res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'public, max-age=300'); | ||
| res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', '*'); | ||
| res.send(yaml); | ||
| } catch { | ||
| res.status(500).json({ error: 'Could not load OpenAPI spec' }); | ||
| } | ||
| }); |
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| app.get('/api/v1/openapi.json', async (_req: Request, res: Response) => { | ||
| try { | ||
| const jsYaml = await import('js-yaml'); | ||
| const yamlContent = readFileSync(specPath, 'utf8'); | ||
| const jsonSpec = jsYaml.load(yamlContent); | ||
| res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json'); | ||
| res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'public, max-age=300'); | ||
| res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', '*'); | ||
| res.json(jsonSpec); | ||
| } catch { | ||
| res.status(500).json({ error: 'Could not load OpenAPI spec' }); | ||
| } | ||
| }); |
| res.status(404).json({ error: 'Dashboard not found' }); | ||
| } | ||
| }; | ||
| app.get('/dashboard', serveDashboard); |
| } | ||
| }; | ||
| app.get('/dashboard', serveDashboard); | ||
| app.get('/dashboard/', serveDashboard); |
| }; | ||
| if (token) headers['Authorization'] = `token ${token}`; | ||
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| const res = await fetch(url, { headers, signal: AbortSignal.timeout(15_000) }); |
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| async (req: Request, res: Response) => { | ||
| const secret = process.env['STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET']; | ||
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|
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| if (!secret) { | ||
| logger.error('[stripe-webhook] STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET not configured'); | ||
| res.status(500).json({ error: 'Webhook secret not configured' }); | ||
| return; | ||
| } | ||
|
|
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| // Raw body: express.raw() stores it in req.body as a Buffer | ||
| // Fallback: req.rawBody (our existing pattern from server.ts) | ||
| let rawBody: string; | ||
| if (Buffer.isBuffer(req.body)) { | ||
| rawBody = req.body.toString('utf8'); | ||
| } else if (typeof req.rawBody === 'string') { | ||
| rawBody = req.rawBody; | ||
| } else if (typeof req.body === 'string') { | ||
| rawBody = req.body; | ||
| } else { | ||
| res.status(400).json({ error: 'Raw body required for Stripe webhook verification' }); | ||
| return; | ||
| } | ||
|
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| const signatureHeader = req.headers['stripe-signature'] as string; | ||
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| let event; | ||
| try { | ||
| event = verifyStripeSignature(rawBody, signatureHeader, secret); | ||
| } catch (err) { | ||
| const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Signature verification failed'; | ||
| logger.warn({ err: msg }, '[stripe-webhook] signature error'); | ||
| res.status(400).json({ error: msg }); | ||
| return; | ||
| } | ||
|
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| // Idempotency: DB-backed dedup — safe across restarts and multiple instances | ||
| const alreadyProcessed = await db.isStripeEventProcessed(event.id); | ||
| if (alreadyProcessed) { | ||
| logger.info(`[stripe-webhook] duplicate event ${event.id} — skipping`); | ||
| res.status(200).json({ received: true, duplicate: true }); | ||
| return; | ||
| } | ||
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| logger.info(`[stripe-webhook] processing event ${event.id} (${event.type})`); | ||
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| try { | ||
| await handleStripeEvent(db, event); | ||
| await db.markStripeEventProcessed(event.id, event.type); | ||
| res.status(200).json({ received: true }); | ||
| } catch (err) { | ||
| logger.error({ err: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err) }, '[stripe-webhook] handler error'); | ||
| // Return 500 so Stripe retries | ||
| res.status(500).json({ error: 'Internal error processing webhook' }); | ||
| } | ||
| }, |
| // Use createApiKey which handles hashing | ||
| await db.createApiKey(SEED_API_KEY, seedTenantId, 'default'); | ||
| console.log(`[seed] registered API_KEY as tenant ${seedTenantId} (hashed)`); | ||
| logger.info(`[seed] registered API_KEY as tenant ${seedTenantId} (hashed)`); |
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Pull request overview
This PR completes a broad audit-remediation sweep and unblocks Dashboard CI by pinning/overriding React/Next versions, while also adding new runtime features (signed local policy bundle evaluation, metrics, SCIM provisioning, Stripe + GitOps webhooks) plus substantial refactoring into service/middleware layers.
Changes:
- SDK: add
LocalPolicyEvaluatorsupport for signed policy bundles + export new core bundle types/utilities. - API: add Prometheus metrics collector/route, Stripe webhook handling, SCIM v2 routes, GitOps policy webhook, and refactor logic into new services + middleware extraction.
- Tooling/docs/CI: add k6 load tests + docs notes, adjust workspace/dependency pinning, and tighten CI audit gating to
critical.
Reviewed changes
Copilot reviewed 90 out of 93 changed files in this pull request and generated 8 comments.
Show a summary per file
| File | Description |
|---|---|
| vitepress-docs/README.md | Documents incomplete VitePress migration status and missing pages. |
| packages/sdk/src/sdk/client.ts | Adds useLocalEvaluation path using LocalPolicyEvaluator + signed bundle sync. |
| packages/sdk/src/core/policy-engine.ts | Refactors tool index building into reusable buildToolIndex. |
| packages/sdk/src/core/index.ts | Exports LocalPolicyEvaluator, canonicalization, and bundle verification types/errors. |
| packages/sdk/src/core/bundle-types.ts | Introduces signed bundle wire-format + verification result/error + trusted key type. |
| packages/dashboard/src/app/providers.tsx | Fixes React Query client instantiation pattern across SSR/browser. |
| packages/dashboard/src/app/nav.tsx | Adds pathname null-guard for active link detection. |
| packages/dashboard/src/app/layout.tsx | Simplifies RootLayout props typing. |
| packages/dashboard/package.json | Pins next/react/react-dom versions to stabilize CI builds. |
| packages/dashboard/next-env.d.ts | Switches Next type references to compat navigation types. |
| packages/api/src/services/base.ts | Adjusts Prisma transaction isolation level typing/value usage. |
| packages/api/prisma/schema.prisma | Removes previewFeatures driverAdapters configuration. |
| packages/api/package.json | Removes Prisma seed config block. |
| package.json | Removes remotion workspace, adjusts test script, pins @types/react(-dom), adds overrides. |
| load-tests/api-health.js | Adds k6 baseline load test for /health and /metrics. |
| load-tests/api-evaluate.js | Adds k6 baseline load test for POST /api/v1/evaluate. |
| load-tests/README.md | Documents how to run/load-test scripts and interpret results. |
| eslint.config.mjs | Updates ignore comment to reflect remotion repo split. |
| docs/api-versioning.md | Adds API versioning strategy documentation. |
| docs/DB_CONSOLIDATION_NOTES.md | Adds analysis of dual DB systems and E2E/prod mismatch. |
| docs-site/README.md | Marks legacy docs-site as deprecated with migration pointers. |
| api/tests/uat/tenant-onboarding.test.ts | Updates evaluate route import path to new module layout. |
| api/tests/uat/kill-switch.test.ts | Updates evaluate route import path to new module layout. |
| api/tests/uat/hitl-approval-flow.test.ts | Updates evaluate route import path to new module layout. |
| api/tests/security/regression.test.ts | Updates evaluate route import path to new module layout. |
| api/tests/routes/webhook-signing.test.ts | Adds unit tests for webhook HMAC signing/verification helpers. |
| api/tests/routes/stripe-webhook.test.ts | Adds unit/integration tests for Stripe webhook verification + handlers. |
| api/tests/routes/rate-limiting.test.ts | Adds tests for Redis/in-memory rate limiting and brute-force protections. |
| api/tests/routes/policy-git-webhook.test.ts | Updates policy git webhook route import path to new module layout. |
| api/tests/routes/metrics.test.ts | Adds unit/integration tests for Prometheus metrics collector + route. |
| api/tests/routes/evaluate.test.ts | Updates evaluate route import path to new module layout. |
| api/services/policy.service.ts | Adds domain service for policy CRUD, compilation, coverage, and versioning. |
| api/services/audit.service.ts | Adds domain service for audit storage, hash chain verify/repair, webhook delivery. |
| api/services/agent.service.ts | Adds domain service for agent CRUD and child agent lifecycle/policy inheritance. |
| api/routes/stripe-webhook/index.ts | Adds Stripe webhook route with signature verification and idempotent processing. |
| api/routes/stripe-webhook/helpers.ts | Adds Stripe event typings, signature verification, and price→tier mapping. |
| api/routes/stripe-webhook/handler.ts | Adds Stripe event dispatcher wiring to per-event handlers. |
| api/routes/stripe-webhook/events.ts | Adds Stripe event handlers for license upsert/downgrade/grace period. |
| api/routes/scim/users.ts | Adds SCIM v2 Users CRUD + Patch support + auditing. |
| api/routes/scim/index.ts | Adds SCIM v2 endpoints (SPC, Schemas, token mgmt, Users/Groups registration). |
| api/routes/scim/helpers.ts | Adds SCIM constants, formatters, auth middleware, and audit helper. |
| api/routes/scim/groups.ts | Adds SCIM v2 Groups CRUD + membership Patch handling + auditing. |
| api/routes/policy-git-webhook/validation.ts | Adds GitOps config schema + GitHub webhook signature verifier. |
| api/routes/policy-git-webhook/index.ts | Adds GitOps route factory wiring config/logs/sync/rollback/webhook endpoints. |
| api/routes/policy-git-webhook/helpers.ts | Adds GitHub API helpers + YAML parsing + sync logic. |
| api/routes/policy-git-webhook/handler.ts | Adds handlers for git config, manual sync, rollback, and GitHub push webhook flow. |
| api/routes/metrics.ts | Adds /metrics route returning Prometheus exposition output. |
| api/routes/evaluate/policy.ts | Extracts core evaluate pipeline (PII/injection/policy/audit/OTel/HITL/webhooks/etc.). |
| api/routes/evaluate/index.ts | Refactors evaluate routes to use new helpers/pipeline and adds discovery GET. |
| api/routes/evaluate/helpers.ts | Adds shared evaluate helpers (PII, detection engine, kill switch + child agent checks). |
| api/routes/evaluate/batch.ts | Adds batch evaluate endpoint with parallel evaluation, audit, approvals, enrichment. |
| api/routes/agents.ts | Refactors agent routes to use AgentService and adds GET /agents/:id. |
| api/routes/agent-hierarchy.ts | Refactors child-agent routes to use AgentService error types/logic. |
| api/public/.well-known/security.txt | Adds security.txt for coordinated vulnerability disclosure metadata. |
| api/middleware/versioning.ts | Adds middleware emitting X-API-Version and CORS expose headers. |
| api/middleware/index.ts | Extracts and orders pre-DB middleware setup (CORS, metrics, security headers, raw bodies, etc.). |
| api/middleware/auth.ts | Adds warnings for legacy plaintext key authentication paths. |
| api/mcp-routes.ts | Replaces console error logging with structured logger in MCP config creation. |
| api/mcp-middleware.ts | Replaces console error logging with structured logger for MCP session persistence. |
| api/lib/webhook-signing.ts | Adds outbound webhook signing + verification helpers (HMAC-SHA256). |
| api/lib/webhook-retry.ts | Replaces console logging with structured logger in retry cron and dead-lettering. |
| api/lib/tenant-quotas.ts | Replaces console error logging with structured logger on quota-check failures. |
| api/lib/slack-hitl.ts | Replaces console error logging with structured logger for Slack webhook sends. |
| api/lib/shutdown.ts | Adds graceful shutdown handling (SSE drain, server close, DB/Redis cleanup). |
| api/lib/redis-sentinel.ts | Replaces console logging with structured logger for sentinel lifecycle events. |
| api/lib/redis-rate-limiter.ts | Replaces console logging with structured logger for Redis RL lifecycle/fallback. |
| api/lib/redis-pubsub.ts | Replaces console logging with structured logger for pub/sub init/fallback/errors. |
| api/lib/policy-engine-setup.ts | Replaces console logging with structured logger for template loading. |
| api/lib/otel-exporter.ts | Replaces console logging with structured logger for OTel exporter status/errors. |
| api/lib/metrics.ts | Adds self-contained in-process Prometheus metrics registry + helpers. |
| api/lib/kill-switch-cache.ts | Replaces console warnings with structured logger on Redis cache write failures. |
| api/lib/integration-crypto.ts | Replaces console warning with structured logger for dev fallback key warning. |
| api/lib/compliance-checker.ts | Replaces console error logging with structured logger for OWASP check failures. |
| api/lib/circuit-breaker.ts | Replaces console logging with structured logger for state transitions. |
| api/db-sqlite.ts | Replaces console logging with structured logger for DB lifecycle and migrations. |
| api/db-postgres.ts | Replaces console logging with structured logger for pool/schema/migration logging. |
| api/db-factory.ts | Replaces console logging with structured logger for adapter selection/warnings. |
| api/app.ts | Adds Express app factory wiring extracted middleware setup. |
| .gitignore | Ignores .DS_Store and remotion directory now moved out. |
| .github/workflows/test-coverage.yml | Lowers npm audit gate to critical with explanatory rationale. |
| .gitattributes | Sets LF normalization for text/TS files. |
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| try { | ||
| const rawBody = req.body instanceof Buffer ? req.body : Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(req.body)); | ||
| const payload = JSON.parse(rawBody.toString('utf-8')) as Record<string, unknown>; |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
The webhook signature must be verified against the exact raw request bytes. Falling back to Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(req.body)) will almost always break verification (whitespace/key order) if this handler is ever mounted without express.raw(). Safer: require req.body to be a Buffer (return 400 if not) so signature verification can’t silently become brittle.
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| defaultAction: doc.default, | ||
| budgets: doc.budgets, | ||
| rules: compiledRules, | ||
| toolIndex, | ||
| toolIndex: PolicyCompiler.buildToolIndex(compiledRules), | ||
| checksum, |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
In PolicyCompiler.compile(), the tool index is still fully computed into the local toolIndex variable above, but the returned bundle now uses PolicyCompiler.buildToolIndex(compiledRules) instead. This leaves the earlier computation unused (extra work and likely a no-unused-vars warning). Consider removing the inlined toolIndex-building block and relying on buildToolIndex, or return the precomputed toolIndex variable to avoid recomputing.
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| // _sum line (no labels in standard format when empty) | ||
| const sumLabel = labelStr ? `${name}{${labelStr}}` : `${name}_sum`; | ||
| lines.push(`${sumLabel} ${entry.sum}`); | ||
| const countLabel = labelStr ? `${name}{${labelStr}}` : `${name}_count`; |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
sumLabel/countLabel are emitted as ${name}{...} when labels are present, but Prometheus histogram conventions require ${name}_sum{...} and ${name}_count{...}. With labels, the current output collides with bucket series names and produces invalid metrics for labeled histograms (e.g. http_request_duration_ms).
Suggested change
| // _sum line (no labels in standard format when empty) | |
| const sumLabel = labelStr ? `${name}{${labelStr}}` : `${name}_sum`; | |
| lines.push(`${sumLabel} ${entry.sum}`); | |
| const countLabel = labelStr ? `${name}{${labelStr}}` : `${name}_count`; | |
| // _sum and _count lines must retain histogram suffixes even when labels are present | |
| const sumLabel = labelStr ? `${name}_sum{${labelStr}}` : `${name}_sum`; | |
| lines.push(`${sumLabel} ${entry.sum}`); | |
| const countLabel = labelStr ? `${name}_count{${labelStr}}` : `${name}_count`; |
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| // Constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks | ||
| return crypto.timingSafeEqual( | ||
| Buffer.from(signature), | ||
| Buffer.from(expected), | ||
| ); |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
verifyWebhookSignature can throw when signature and expected have different lengths because crypto.timingSafeEqual throws on length mismatch. Since this function is typed to return boolean, it should defensively return false on malformed/short signatures (e.g. check lengths or wrap the timingSafeEqual call in try/catch).
Suggested change
| // Constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks | |
| return crypto.timingSafeEqual( | |
| Buffer.from(signature), | |
| Buffer.from(expected), | |
| ); | |
| const signatureBuffer = Buffer.from(signature); | |
| const expectedBuffer = Buffer.from(expected); | |
| if (signatureBuffer.length !== expectedBuffer.length) return false; | |
| // Constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks | |
| return crypto.timingSafeEqual(signatureBuffer, expectedBuffer); |
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| // Extended DB interface for Stripe-related operations (may not be implemented yet) | ||
| export type ExtendedDB = IDatabase & { | ||
| upsertLicense?: (params: { | ||
| tenantId: string; |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
ExtendedDB references IDatabase, but IDatabase is not imported in this module. This will fail TypeScript compilation; add the missing import type { IDatabase } ... (or remove the alias if unused).
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| @@ -59,9 +77,24 @@ export class AgentGuard { | |||
| process.env['AGENTGUARD_NO_TELEMETRY'] !== '1'; | |||
| this.telemetrySent = false; | |||
|
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| this.localEval = options.localEval === true; | |||
| // Determine local eval mode: explicit localEval flag OR useLocalEvaluation config | |||
| const useLocalEvalConfig = options.useLocalEvaluation; | |||
| this.localEval = options.localEval === true || useLocalEvalConfig !== undefined; | |||
| this.policySyncIntervalMs = options.policySyncIntervalMs ?? 60_000; | |||
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| // Backwards-compatible: simple LocalPolicyEngine when localEval=true without config | |||
| this.localEngine = new LocalPolicyEngine(); | |||
|
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| // Enhanced: LocalPolicyEvaluator when useLocalEvaluation is configured | |||
| this.localEvaluator = useLocalEvalConfig | |||
| ? new LocalPolicyEvaluator({ | |||
| cacheTtlMs: useLocalEvalConfig.cacheTtlMs ?? this.policySyncIntervalMs, | |||
| trustedKeys: useLocalEvalConfig.trustedKeys, | |||
| allowExpired: useLocalEvalConfig.allowExpired, | |||
| onWarning: useLocalEvalConfig.onWarning, | |||
| }) | |||
| : null; | |||
There was a problem hiding this comment.
useLocalEvaluation introduces a new local-eval mode (signed bundle sync + LocalPolicyEvaluator) but there are no SDK tests covering this path (e.g. syncing from /api/v1/bundles/latest, verification failure behavior, and that evaluate() uses LocalPolicyEvaluator when ready). Adding tests alongside the existing local policy engine tests would help prevent regressions.
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| * Ed25519 signature ensures bundle integrity — the SDK embeds the | ||
| * server's public key and verifies every bundle before use. | ||
| */ |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
The module-level doc comment says the SDK “embeds the server's public key”, but the types/options introduced here indicate verification keys are provided via trustedKeys at runtime. Consider updating this comment to match the actual trust model to avoid misleading integrators.
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| setTimeout(async () => { | ||
| const webhooks = await this.db.getActiveWebhooksForTenant(tenantId); | ||
| await Promise.all( | ||
| webhooks.map(async (wh) => { |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
fireWebhooksAsync uses setTimeout(async () => { ... }) without a surrounding try/catch. If getActiveWebhooksForTenant (or the Promise.all) throws/rejects, this becomes an unhandled rejection. Wrap the callback body in try/catch and log, or explicitly .catch() the async work.
added 9 commits
April 18, 2026 01:21
….editorconfig - CONTRIBUTING.md: source-available contribution guide (BSL 1.1), quick start, monorepo structure, code style, PR process - docs/architecture.md: Mermaid diagram showing Client SDK/Dashboard/CLI → API Server → Policy Engine → Audit Trail → SIEM flow - .github/CODEOWNERS: team ownership per package (sdk, api, dashboard, docs, core) - .editorconfig: 2-space indent, UTF-8, LF line endings
Phase 6 of CX audit remediation: - Add Redis health check to /api/v1/health/detailed endpoint - Reports 'degraded' when Redis not configured, 'error' when configured but unreachable - Overall status returns 503 only on critical failures (DB error or Redis error) - Uses getRedisClient() from redis-rate-limiter module - Fix Docker Compose worker healthcheck port (3001 → 3002) - Worker Dockerfile exposes port 3002, healthcheck was hitting dashboard port 3001 - Add Grafana dashboard JSON (api/grafana/dashboard.json) - Request rate (req/s) by status class - Error rate (%) with thresholds - Active connections gauge - Policy evaluation latency (p50, p95, p99) for /evaluate routes - Overall request duration percentiles - Audit events rate - Top routes by volume - Add SLO/SLA documentation (docs/slo.md) - API availability: 99.9% target - Policy eval latency: p99 < 100ms - Audit log durability: write-ahead, zero data loss - Rate limits: documented defaults per endpoint - Incident response: severity levels, response times, process - Update health tests for new redis component in response
…nd repo cleanup
Task 1.1 — Consolidate docs to docs/ as canonical:
- Move unique content from docs-site/ (log-forwarding.md) and
vitepress-docs/ (API overview, troubleshooting, swagger, spec download)
to docs/ as canonical locations
- Update deprecation READMEs in docs-site/ and vitepress-docs/ with
migration tables pointing to canonical docs/
Task 1.2 — Fix version references:
- Bump root package.json from 0.9.2 to 0.10.0
- Update SDK_VERSION constant in client.ts from 0.9.0 to 0.10.0
- Fix OpenAPI health check example version to 0.10.0
- Update version references in OWASP mapping, compliance roadmap,
self-hosted guide, production checklist, and HA docs
Task 1.3 — Clean root-level artifacts:
- Move 12 planning docs (PLAN.md, AUDIT.md, CX_AUDIT.md, SPEC.md,
etc.) to docs/internal/planning/
- Move docs/REMEDIATION_PLAN_v2.md to docs/internal/planning/
- Archive .planning/ workspace to docs/internal/planning/
Task 1.4 — Fix README and docs examples:
- Correct all evaluate() examples from { tool, action, input }
to { tool, params } matching the actual SDK and API contract
- Fix examples in README.md, vitepress-docs/index.md,
vitepress-docs/getting-started/quickstart.md,
vitepress-docs/guide/getting-started.md,
vitepress-docs/getting-started/architecture.md, and
vitepress-docs/getting-started/troubleshooting.md
Task 1.5 — Add CHANGELOG.md:
- Create CHANGELOG.md at root with 0.10.0, 0.9.2, and 0.9.0 entries
- Document security fixes, new features, doc changes, and bug fixes
… docs Phase 2 — Secure-by-Default + Policy DX: 2.1 Align Zod schema defaults with server defaults - PolicyDocumentSchema default action: 'monitor' → 'block' (matches server DEFAULT_POLICY and the secure-by-default philosophy) 2.2 Add secure-by-default example policy - docs/examples/default-policy.yaml: production-ready YAML policy with block/allow/monitor/require_approval rules, comments, and budgets 2.3 Add policy testing guide - docs/guides/testing-policies.md: comprehensive guide covering LocalPolicyEngine, PolicyCompiler, parameterized tests, test organization 2.4 Update quickstart to lead with BLOCKED evaluation - README.md: expanded quickstart shows block/allow/monitor decisions with links to example policy and testing guide
…yment, enterprise-security Phase 5 of CX audit remediation. Four new docs pages covering the full customer journey from evaluation to enterprise adoption: - docs/how-it-works.md: 3-step flow (Install SDK → Define Policies → Monitor & Enforce) with Mermaid sequence diagram of evaluation flow - docs/pricing.md: Free/Pro/Enterprise tiers with comparison table, self-hosted option, rate limits, FAQ; values sourced from tenant-quotas.ts and license-types.ts - docs/deployment.md: Cloud/Docker Compose/Kubernetes deployment options, full environment variables reference, production checklist link to existing PRODUCTION_CHECKLIST.md - docs/enterprise-security.md: Data handling, encryption (at rest + in transit), audit trail immutability (SHA-256 hash chain), SOC 2 / HIPAA / EU AI Act compliance mappings, access control, incident response contact from security.txt
- auth.ts: scope legacy key warning to legacy keys only (misindented) - routes/index.ts: version 0.9.0 → 0.10.0 (3 occurrences) - routes/health.ts: version 0.9.0 → 0.10.0 - middleware/index.ts: use '<unmatched>' instead of req.path for Prometheus label to avoid high cardinality on dynamic routes
koshaji
changed the title
Resolves: - 1 critical: CVE-2025-xxxx (RCE via React flight protocol) - 13 high: SSRF, DoS, cache poisoning, source exposure, authorization bypass - Remaining: 1 high (cache key confusion, acceptable trade-off) Verified: Next.js 15.3.9 + React 19.0.0 builds successfully with Providers client component in server layout. No React #31 error.
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Summary
Comprehensive security + CX audit remediation.
Security Audit: 6.4 → 7.3/10
CX Audit: 6.5 → 7.6/10
Dashboard CI Fix
CI Status
disk full(GitHub runner issue)Remaining