Enable tone generator - Part 1 #2
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This patch proposes to enable kcontrols for siggen type dapm widgets. This will allow triggering the tone generating siggen component and also modifying the run-time attributes such as frequency, amplitude etc. Signed-off-by: Ranjani Sridharan <ranjani.sridharan@linux.intel.com>
Check if the siggen comp has exactly 1 kcontrol for triggering. Since the kcontrol for the siggen serves as an ON/OFF switch, its max value should be 1. Signed-off-by: Ranjani Sridharan <ranjani.sridharan@linux.intel.com>
This patch proposes a new IO handler for switch type kcontrols which can be used to trigger components such as siggen or control volume mute functionality. Signed-off-by: Ranjani Sridharan <ranjani.sridharan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ranjani Sridharan <ranjani.sridharan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ranjani Sridharan <ranjani.sridharan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ranjani Sridharan <ranjani.sridharan@linux.intel.com>
…rol IO handler This patch adds the changes to the switch control IO handler to handle the additional steps required to trigger the siggen pipeline based on user input.wq When the user switches the siggen control ON, the IO handler sends the ipc messages required to set up the pcm params and start the pipeline. When the user switches it off, it frees the pcm and resets the pipeline. Signed-off-by: Ranjani Sridharan <ranjani.sridharan@linux.intel.com>
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Closing this one as I need to modify the PR |
RanderWang
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Jun 28, 2018
Calling XDP redirection requires bh disabled. Softirq can call another XDP function and redirection functions, then the percpu static variable ri->map can be overwritten to NULL. This is a generic XDP case called from tun. [ 3535.736058] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018 [ 3535.743974] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 3535.746530] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 3535.750049] Modules linked in: vhost_net vhost tap tun bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter sunrpc vfat fat ext4 mbcache jbd2 intel_rapl skx_edac nfit libnvdimm x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel kvm ipmi_ssif irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc ses aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd enclosure hpwdt hpilo glue_helper ipmi_si pcspkr wmi mei_me ioatdma mei ipmi_devintf shpchp dca ipmi_msghandler lpc_ich acpi_power_meter sch_fq_codel ip_tables xfs libcrc32c sd_mod mgag200 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm smartpqi i40e crc32c_intel scsi_transport_sas tg3 i2c_core ptp pps_core [ 3535.813456] CPU: 5 PID: 1630 Comm: vhost-1614 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc4 thesofproject#2 [ 3535.820127] Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL360 Gen10/ProLiant DL360 Gen10, BIOS U32 11/14/2017 [ 3535.828732] RIP: 0010:__xdp_map_lookup_elem+0x5/0x30 [ 3535.833740] RSP: 0018:ffffb4bc47bf7c58 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 3535.839009] RAX: ffff9fdfcfea1c40 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff9fdf27fe3100 [ 3535.846205] RDX: ffff9fdfca769200 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 3535.853402] RBP: ffffb4bc491d9000 R08: 00000000000045ad R09: 0000000000000ec0 [ 3535.860597] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff9fdf26c3ce4e R12: ffff9fdf9e72c000 [ 3535.867794] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: fffffffffffffff2 R15: ffff9fdfc82cdd00 [ 3535.874990] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9fdfcfe80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 3535.883152] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 3535.888948] CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 0000000bde724004 CR4: 00000000007626e0 [ 3535.896145] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 3535.903342] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 3535.910538] PKRU: 55555554 [ 3535.913267] Call Trace: [ 3535.915736] xdp_do_generic_redirect+0x7a/0x310 [ 3535.920310] do_xdp_generic.part.117+0x285/0x370 [ 3535.924970] tun_get_user+0x5b9/0x1260 [tun] [ 3535.929279] tun_sendmsg+0x52/0x70 [tun] [ 3535.933237] handle_tx+0x2ad/0x5f0 [vhost_net] [ 3535.937721] vhost_worker+0xa5/0x100 [vhost] [ 3535.942030] kthread+0xf5/0x130 [ 3535.945198] ? vhost_dev_ioctl+0x3b0/0x3b0 [vhost] [ 3535.950031] ? kthread_bind+0x10/0x10 [ 3535.953727] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 [ 3535.957334] Code: 0e 74 15 83 f8 10 75 05 e9 49 aa b3 ff f3 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 c3 e9 29 9d b3 ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 <8b> 47 18 83 f8 0e 74 0d 83 f8 10 75 05 e9 49 a9 b3 ff 31 c0 c3 [ 3535.976387] RIP: __xdp_map_lookup_elem+0x5/0x30 RSP: ffffb4bc47bf7c58 [ 3535.982883] CR2: 0000000000000018 [ 3535.987096] ---[ end trace 383b299dd1430240 ]--- [ 3536.131325] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 3536.137484] Kernel Offset: 0x26a00000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) [ 3536.281406] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]--- And a kernel with generic case fixed still panics in tun driver XDP redirect, because it disabled only preemption, but not bh. [ 2055.128746] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018 [ 2055.136662] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 2055.139219] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 2055.142736] Modules linked in: vhost_net vhost tap tun bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter sunrpc vfat fat ext4 mbcache jbd2 intel_rapl skx_edac nfit libnvdimm x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc ses aesni_intel ipmi_ssif crypto_simd enclosure cryptd hpwdt glue_helper ioatdma hpilo wmi dca pcspkr ipmi_si acpi_power_meter ipmi_devintf shpchp mei_me ipmi_msghandler mei lpc_ich sch_fq_codel ip_tables xfs libcrc32c sd_mod mgag200 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm i40e smartpqi tg3 scsi_transport_sas crc32c_intel i2c_core ptp pps_core [ 2055.206142] CPU: 6 PID: 1693 Comm: vhost-1683 Tainted: G W 4.17.0-rc5-fix-tun+ #1 [ 2055.215011] Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL360 Gen10/ProLiant DL360 Gen10, BIOS U32 11/14/2017 [ 2055.223617] RIP: 0010:__xdp_map_lookup_elem+0x5/0x30 [ 2055.228624] RSP: 0018:ffff998b07607cc0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 2055.233892] RAX: ffff8dbd8e235700 RBX: ffff8dbd8ff21c40 RCX: 0000000000000004 [ 2055.241089] RDX: ffff998b097a9000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 2055.248286] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00000000000065a8 R09: 0000000000005d80 [ 2055.255483] R10: 0000000000000040 R11: ffff8dbcf0100000 R12: ffff998b097a9000 [ 2055.262681] R13: ffff8dbd8c98c000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff998b07607d78 [ 2055.269879] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8dbd8ff00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 2055.278039] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 2055.283834] CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 0000000c0c8cc005 CR4: 00000000007626e0 [ 2055.291030] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 2055.298227] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 2055.305424] PKRU: 55555554 [ 2055.308153] Call Trace: [ 2055.310624] xdp_do_redirect+0x7b/0x380 [ 2055.314499] tun_get_user+0x10fe/0x12a0 [tun] [ 2055.318895] tun_sendmsg+0x52/0x70 [tun] [ 2055.322852] handle_tx+0x2ad/0x5f0 [vhost_net] [ 2055.327337] vhost_worker+0xa5/0x100 [vhost] [ 2055.331646] kthread+0xf5/0x130 [ 2055.334813] ? vhost_dev_ioctl+0x3b0/0x3b0 [vhost] [ 2055.339646] ? kthread_bind+0x10/0x10 [ 2055.343343] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 [ 2055.346950] Code: 0e 74 15 83 f8 10 75 05 e9 e9 aa b3 ff f3 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 c3 e9 c9 9d b3 ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 <8b> 47 18 83 f8 0e 74 0d 83 f8 10 75 05 e9 e9 a9 b3 ff 31 c0 c3 [ 2055.366004] RIP: __xdp_map_lookup_elem+0x5/0x30 RSP: ffff998b07607cc0 [ 2055.372500] CR2: 0000000000000018 [ 2055.375856] ---[ end trace 2a2dcc5e9e174268 ]--- [ 2055.523626] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 2055.529796] Kernel Offset: 0x2e000000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) [ 2055.677539] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]--- v2: - Removed preempt_disable/enable since local_bh_disable will prevent preemption as well, feedback from Jason Wang. Fixes: 761876c ("tap: XDP support") Signed-off-by: Toshiaki Makita <makita.toshiaki@lab.ntt.co.jp> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
RanderWang
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Jun 28, 2018
The dw_hdmi_setup_rx_sense exported function should not use struct device to recover the dw-hdmi context using drvdata, but take struct dw_hdmi directly like other exported functions. This caused a regression using Meson DRM on S905X since v4.17-rc1 : Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [...] CPU: 0 PID: 124 Comm: irq/32-dw_hdmi_ Not tainted 4.17.0-rc7 thesofproject#2 Hardware name: Libre Technology CC (DT) [...] pc : osq_lock+0x54/0x188 lr : __mutex_lock.isra.0+0x74/0x530 [...] Process irq/32-dw_hdmi_ (pid: 124, stack limit = 0x00000000adf418cb) Call trace: osq_lock+0x54/0x188 __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x10/0x18 mutex_lock+0x30/0x38 __dw_hdmi_setup_rx_sense+0x28/0x98 dw_hdmi_setup_rx_sense+0x10/0x18 dw_hdmi_top_thread_irq+0x2c/0x50 irq_thread_fn+0x28/0x68 irq_thread+0x10c/0x1a0 kthread+0x128/0x130 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 Code: 34000964 d00050a2 51000484 9135c042 (f864d844) ---[ end trace 945641e1fbbc07da ]--- note: irq/32-dw_hdmi_[124] exited with preempt_count 1 genirq: exiting task "irq/32-dw_hdmi_" (124) is an active IRQ thread (irq 32) Fixes: eea034a ("drm/bridge/synopsys: dw-hdmi: don't clobber drvdata") Signed-off-by: Neil Armstrong <narmstrong@baylibre.com> Tested-by: Koen Kooi <koen@dominion.thruhere.net> Signed-off-by: Sean Paul <seanpaul@chromium.org> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/1527673438-20643-1-git-send-email-narmstrong@baylibre.com
plbossart
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Aug 13, 2018
AF_RXRPC has a keepalive message generator that generates a message for a
peer ~20s after the last transmission to that peer to keep firewall ports
open. The implementation is incorrect in the following ways:
(1) It mixes up ktime_t and time64_t types.
(2) It uses ktime_get_real(), the output of which may jump forward or
backward due to adjustments to the time of day.
(3) If the current time jumps forward too much or jumps backwards, the
generator function will crank the base of the time ring round one slot
at a time (ie. a 1s period) until it catches up, spewing out VERSION
packets as it goes.
Fix the problem by:
(1) Only using time64_t. There's no need for sub-second resolution.
(2) Use ktime_get_seconds() rather than ktime_get_real() so that time
isn't perceived to go backwards.
(3) Simplifying rxrpc_peer_keepalive_worker() by splitting it into two
parts:
(a) The "worker" function that manages the buckets and the timer.
(b) The "dispatch" function that takes the pending peers and
potentially transmits a keepalive packet before putting them back
in the ring into the slot appropriate to the revised last-Tx time.
(4) Taking everything that's pending out of the ring and splicing it into
a temporary collector list for processing.
In the case that there's been a significant jump forward, the ring
gets entirely emptied and then the time base can be warped forward
before the peers are processed.
The warping can't happen if the ring isn't empty because the slot a
peer is in is keepalive-time dependent, relative to the base time.
(5) Limit the number of iterations of the bucket array when scanning it.
(6) Set the timer to skip any empty slots as there's no point waking up if
there's nothing to do yet.
This can be triggered by an incoming call from a server after a reboot with
AF_RXRPC and AFS built into the kernel causing a peer record to be set up
before userspace is started. The system clock is then adjusted by
userspace, thereby potentially causing the keepalive generator to have a
meltdown - which leads to a message like:
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 23s! [kworker/0:1:23]
...
Workqueue: krxrpcd rxrpc_peer_keepalive_worker
EIP: lock_acquire+0x69/0x80
...
Call Trace:
? rxrpc_peer_keepalive_worker+0x5e/0x350
? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x29/0x60
? rxrpc_peer_keepalive_worker+0x5e/0x350
? rxrpc_peer_keepalive_worker+0x5e/0x350
? __lock_acquire+0x3d3/0x870
? process_one_work+0x110/0x340
? process_one_work+0x166/0x340
? process_one_work+0x110/0x340
? worker_thread+0x39/0x3c0
? kthread+0xdb/0x110
? cancel_delayed_work+0x90/0x90
? kthread_stop+0x70/0x70
? ret_from_fork+0x19/0x24
Fixes: ace45be ("rxrpc: Fix firewall route keepalive")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
plbossart
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Aug 13, 2018
Pull networking fixes from David Miller:
1) The real fix for the ipv6 route metric leak Sabrina was seeing, from
Cong Wang.
2) Fix syzbot triggers AF_PACKET v3 ring buffer insufficient room
conditions, from Willem de Bruijn.
3) vsock can reinitialize active work struct, fix from Cong Wang.
4) RXRPC keepalive generator can wedge a cpu, fix from David Howells.
5) Fix locking in AF_SMC ioctl, from Ursula Braun.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net:
dsa: slave: eee: Allow ports to use phylink
net/smc: move sock lock in smc_ioctl()
net/smc: allow sysctl rmem and wmem defaults for servers
net/smc: no shutdown in state SMC_LISTEN
net: aquantia: Fix IFF_ALLMULTI flag functionality
rxrpc: Fix the keepalive generator [ver #2]
net/mlx5e: Cleanup of dcbnl related fields
net/mlx5e: Properly check if hairpin is possible between two functions
vhost: reset metadata cache when initializing new IOTLB
llc: use refcount_inc_not_zero() for llc_sap_find()
dccp: fix undefined behavior with 'cwnd' shift in ccid2_cwnd_restart()
tipc: fix an interrupt unsafe locking scenario
vsock: split dwork to avoid reinitializations
net: thunderx: check for failed allocation lmac->dmacs
cxgb4: mk_act_open_req() buggers ->{local, peer}_ip on big-endian hosts
packet: refine ring v3 block size test to hold one frame
ip6_tunnel: use the right value for ipv4 min mtu check in ip6_tnl_xmit
ipv6: fix double refcount of fib6_metrics
cujomalainey
referenced
this pull request
in cujomalainey/linux
Sep 14, 2018
commit 4e1a720 upstream. slub debug reported: [ 440.648642] ============================================================================= [ 440.648649] BUG kmalloc-1024 (Tainted: G BU O ): Poison overwritten [ 440.648651] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- [ 440.648655] INFO: 0xe70f4bec-0xe70f4bec. First byte 0x6a instead of 0x6b [ 440.648665] INFO: Allocated in sk_prot_alloc+0x6b/0xc6 age=33155 cpu=1 pid=1047 [ 440.648671] ___slab_alloc.constprop.24+0x1fc/0x292 [ 440.648675] __slab_alloc.isra.18.constprop.23+0x1c/0x25 [ 440.648677] __kmalloc+0xb6/0x17f [ 440.648680] sk_prot_alloc+0x6b/0xc6 [ 440.648683] sk_alloc+0x1e/0xa1 [ 440.648700] sco_sock_alloc.constprop.6+0x26/0xaf [bluetooth] [ 440.648716] sco_connect_cfm+0x166/0x281 [bluetooth] [ 440.648731] hci_conn_request_evt.isra.53+0x258/0x281 [bluetooth] [ 440.648746] hci_event_packet+0x28b/0x2326 [bluetooth] [ 440.648759] hci_rx_work+0x161/0x291 [bluetooth] [ 440.648764] process_one_work+0x163/0x2b2 [ 440.648767] worker_thread+0x1a9/0x25c [ 440.648770] kthread+0xf8/0xfd [ 440.648774] ret_from_fork+0x2e/0x38 [ 440.648779] INFO: Freed in __sk_destruct+0xd3/0xdf age=3815 cpu=1 pid=1047 [ 440.648782] __slab_free+0x4b/0x27a [ 440.648784] kfree+0x12e/0x155 [ 440.648787] __sk_destruct+0xd3/0xdf [ 440.648790] sk_destruct+0x27/0x29 [ 440.648793] __sk_free+0x75/0x91 [ 440.648795] sk_free+0x1c/0x1e [ 440.648810] sco_sock_kill+0x5a/0x5f [bluetooth] [ 440.648825] sco_conn_del+0x8e/0xba [bluetooth] [ 440.648840] sco_disconn_cfm+0x3a/0x41 [bluetooth] [ 440.648855] hci_event_packet+0x45e/0x2326 [bluetooth] [ 440.648868] hci_rx_work+0x161/0x291 [bluetooth] [ 440.648872] process_one_work+0x163/0x2b2 [ 440.648875] worker_thread+0x1a9/0x25c [ 440.648877] kthread+0xf8/0xfd [ 440.648880] ret_from_fork+0x2e/0x38 [ 440.648884] INFO: Slab 0xf4718580 objects=27 used=27 fp=0x (null) flags=0x40008100 [ 440.648886] INFO: Object 0xe70f4b88 @offset=19336 fp=0xe70f54f8 When KASAN was enabled, it reported: [ 210.096613] ================================================================== [ 210.096634] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ex_handler_refcount+0x5b/0x127 [ 210.096641] Write of size 4 at addr ffff880107e17160 by task kworker/u9:1/2040 [ 210.096651] CPU: 1 PID: 2040 Comm: kworker/u9:1 Tainted: G U O 4.14.47-20180606+ #2 [ 210.096654] Hardware name: , BIOS 2017.01-00087-g43e04de 08/30/2017 [ 210.096693] Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work [bluetooth] [ 210.096698] Call Trace: [ 210.096711] dump_stack+0x46/0x59 [ 210.096722] print_address_description+0x6b/0x23b [ 210.096729] ? ex_handler_refcount+0x5b/0x127 [ 210.096736] kasan_report+0x220/0x246 [ 210.096744] ex_handler_refcount+0x5b/0x127 [ 210.096751] ? ex_handler_clear_fs+0x85/0x85 [ 210.096757] fixup_exception+0x8c/0x96 [ 210.096766] do_trap+0x66/0x2c1 [ 210.096773] do_error_trap+0x152/0x180 [ 210.096781] ? fixup_bug+0x78/0x78 [ 210.096817] ? hci_debugfs_create_conn+0x244/0x26a [bluetooth] [ 210.096824] ? __schedule+0x113b/0x1453 [ 210.096830] ? sysctl_net_exit+0xe/0xe [ 210.096837] ? __wake_up_common+0x343/0x343 [ 210.096843] ? insert_work+0x107/0x163 [ 210.096850] invalid_op+0x1b/0x40 [ 210.096888] RIP: 0010:hci_debugfs_create_conn+0x244/0x26a [bluetooth] [ 210.096892] RSP: 0018:ffff880094a0f970 EFLAGS: 00010296 [ 210.096898] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff880107e170e8 RCX: ffff880107e17160 [ 210.096902] RDX: 000000000000002f RSI: ffff88013b80ed40 RDI: ffffffffa058b940 [ 210.096906] RBP: ffff88011b2b0578 R08: 00000000852f0ec9 R09: ffffffff81cfcf9b [ 210.096909] R10: 00000000d21bdad7 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8800967b0488 [ 210.096913] R13: ffff880107e17168 R14: 0000000000000068 R15: ffff8800949c0008 [ 210.096920] ? __sk_destruct+0x2c6/0x2d4 [ 210.096959] hci_event_packet+0xff5/0x7de2 [bluetooth] [ 210.096969] ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0x43/0x5b [ 210.097004] ? l2cap_sock_recv_cb+0x158/0x166 [bluetooth] [ 210.097039] ? hci_le_meta_evt+0x2bb3/0x2bb3 [bluetooth] [ 210.097075] ? l2cap_ertm_init+0x94e/0x94e [bluetooth] [ 210.097093] ? xhci_urb_enqueue+0xbd8/0xcf5 [xhci_hcd] [ 210.097102] ? __accumulate_pelt_segments+0x24/0x33 [ 210.097109] ? __accumulate_pelt_segments+0x24/0x33 [ 210.097115] ? __update_load_avg_se.isra.2+0x217/0x3a4 [ 210.097122] ? set_next_entity+0x7c3/0x12cd [ 210.097128] ? pick_next_entity+0x25e/0x26c [ 210.097135] ? pick_next_task_fair+0x2ca/0xc1a [ 210.097141] ? switch_mm_irqs_off+0x346/0xb4f [ 210.097147] ? __switch_to+0x769/0xbc4 [ 210.097153] ? compat_start_thread+0x66/0x66 [ 210.097188] ? hci_conn_check_link_mode+0x1cd/0x1cd [bluetooth] [ 210.097195] ? finish_task_switch+0x392/0x431 [ 210.097228] ? hci_rx_work+0x154/0x487 [bluetooth] [ 210.097260] hci_rx_work+0x154/0x487 [bluetooth] [ 210.097269] process_one_work+0x579/0x9e9 [ 210.097277] worker_thread+0x68f/0x804 [ 210.097285] kthread+0x31c/0x32b [ 210.097292] ? rescuer_thread+0x70c/0x70c [ 210.097299] ? kthread_create_on_node+0xa3/0xa3 [ 210.097306] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 [ 210.097314] Allocated by task 2040: [ 210.097323] kasan_kmalloc.part.1+0x51/0xc7 [ 210.097328] __kmalloc+0x17f/0x1b6 [ 210.097335] sk_prot_alloc+0xf2/0x1a3 [ 210.097340] sk_alloc+0x22/0x297 [ 210.097375] sco_sock_alloc.constprop.7+0x23/0x202 [bluetooth] [ 210.097410] sco_connect_cfm+0x2d0/0x566 [bluetooth] [ 210.097443] hci_conn_request_evt.isra.53+0x6d3/0x762 [bluetooth] [ 210.097476] hci_event_packet+0x85e/0x7de2 [bluetooth] [ 210.097507] hci_rx_work+0x154/0x487 [bluetooth] [ 210.097512] process_one_work+0x579/0x9e9 [ 210.097517] worker_thread+0x68f/0x804 [ 210.097523] kthread+0x31c/0x32b [ 210.097529] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 [ 210.097533] Freed by task 2040: [ 210.097539] kasan_slab_free+0xb3/0x15e [ 210.097544] kfree+0x103/0x1a9 [ 210.097549] __sk_destruct+0x2c6/0x2d4 [ 210.097584] sco_conn_del.isra.1+0xba/0x10e [bluetooth] [ 210.097617] hci_event_packet+0xff5/0x7de2 [bluetooth] [ 210.097648] hci_rx_work+0x154/0x487 [bluetooth] [ 210.097653] process_one_work+0x579/0x9e9 [ 210.097658] worker_thread+0x68f/0x804 [ 210.097663] kthread+0x31c/0x32b [ 210.097670] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 [ 210.097676] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff880107e170e8 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1024 of size 1024 [ 210.097681] The buggy address is located 120 bytes inside of 1024-byte region [ffff880107e170e8, ffff880107e174e8) [ 210.097683] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 210.097689] page:ffffea00041f8400 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0xffff880107e15b68 compound_mapcount: 0 [ 210.110194] flags: 0x8000000000008100(slab|head) [ 210.115441] raw: 8000000000008100 0000000000000000 ffff880107e15b68 0000000100170016 [ 210.115448] raw: ffffea0004a47620 ffffea0004b48e20 ffff88013b80ed40 0000000000000000 [ 210.115451] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 210.115454] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 210.115460] ffff880107e17000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 210.115465] ffff880107e17080: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb [ 210.115469] >ffff880107e17100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 210.115472] ^ [ 210.115477] ffff880107e17180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 210.115481] ffff880107e17200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 210.115483] ================================================================== And finally when BT_DBG() and ftrace was enabled it showed: <...>-14979 [001] .... 186.104191: sco_sock_kill <-sco_sock_close <...>-14979 [001] .... 186.104191: sco_sock_kill <-sco_sock_release <...>-14979 [001] .... 186.104192: sco_sock_kill: sk ef0497a0 state 9 <...>-14979 [001] .... 186.104193: bt_sock_unlink <-sco_sock_kill kworker/u9:2-792 [001] .... 186.104246: sco_sock_kill <-sco_conn_del kworker/u9:2-792 [001] .... 186.104248: sco_sock_kill: sk ef0497a0 state 9 kworker/u9:2-792 [001] .... 186.104249: bt_sock_unlink <-sco_sock_kill kworker/u9:2-792 [001] .... 186.104250: sco_sock_destruct <-__sk_destruct kworker/u9:2-792 [001] .... 186.104250: sco_sock_destruct: sk ef0497a0 kworker/u9:2-792 [001] .... 186.104860: hci_conn_del <-hci_event_packet kworker/u9:2-792 [001] .... 186.104864: hci_conn_del: hci0 hcon ef0484c0 handle 266 Only in the failed case, sco_sock_kill() gets called with the same sock pointer two times. Add a check for SOCK_DEAD to avoid continue killing a socket which has already been killed. Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
cujomalainey
referenced
this pull request
in cujomalainey/linux
Sep 18, 2018
…sfers [ Upstream commit d52e4d0 ] This bug happens only when the UDC needs to sleep during usb_ep_dequeue, as is the case for (at least) dwc3. [ 382.200896] BUG: scheduling while atomic: screen/1808/0x00000100 [ 382.207124] 4 locks held by screen/1808: [ 382.211266] #0: (rcu_callback){....}, at: [<c10b4ff0>] rcu_process_callbacks+0x260/0x440 [ 382.219949] #1: (rcu_read_lock_sched){....}, at: [<c1358ba0>] percpu_ref_switch_to_atomic_rcu+0xb0/0x130 [ 382.230034] #2: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){....}, at: [<c11f0c73>] free_ioctx_users+0x23/0xd0 [ 382.230096] #3: (&(&ffs->eps_lock)->rlock){....}, at: [<f81e7710>] ffs_aio_cancel+0x20/0x60 [usb_f_fs] [ 382.230160] Modules linked in: usb_f_fs libcomposite configfs bnep btsdio bluetooth ecdh_generic brcmfmac brcmutil intel_powerclamp coretemp dwc3 kvm_intel ulpi udc_core kvm irqbypass crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel pcbc dwc3_pci aesni_intel aes_i586 crypto_simd cryptd ehci_pci ehci_hcd gpio_keys usbcore basincove_gpadc industrialio usb_common [ 382.230407] CPU: 1 PID: 1808 Comm: screen Not tainted 4.14.0-edison+ thesofproject#117 [ 382.230416] Hardware name: Intel Corporation Merrifield/BODEGA BAY, BIOS 542 2015.01.21:18.19.48 [ 382.230425] Call Trace: [ 382.230438] <SOFTIRQ> [ 382.230466] dump_stack+0x47/0x62 [ 382.230498] __schedule_bug+0x61/0x80 [ 382.230522] __schedule+0x43/0x7a0 [ 382.230587] schedule+0x5f/0x70 [ 382.230625] dwc3_gadget_ep_dequeue+0x14c/0x270 [dwc3] [ 382.230669] ? do_wait_intr_irq+0x70/0x70 [ 382.230724] usb_ep_dequeue+0x19/0x90 [udc_core] [ 382.230770] ffs_aio_cancel+0x37/0x60 [usb_f_fs] [ 382.230798] kiocb_cancel+0x31/0x40 [ 382.230822] free_ioctx_users+0x4d/0xd0 [ 382.230858] percpu_ref_switch_to_atomic_rcu+0x10a/0x130 [ 382.230881] ? percpu_ref_exit+0x40/0x40 [ 382.230904] rcu_process_callbacks+0x2b3/0x440 [ 382.230965] __do_softirq+0xf8/0x26b [ 382.231011] ? __softirqentry_text_start+0x8/0x8 [ 382.231033] do_softirq_own_stack+0x22/0x30 [ 382.231042] </SOFTIRQ> [ 382.231071] irq_exit+0x45/0xc0 [ 382.231089] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x13c/0x150 [ 382.231118] apic_timer_interrupt+0x35/0x3c [ 382.231132] EIP: __copy_user_ll+0xe2/0xf0 [ 382.231142] EFLAGS: 00210293 CPU: 1 [ 382.231154] EAX: bfd4508 EBX: 00000004 ECX: 00000003 EDX: f3d8fe50 [ 382.231165] ESI: f3d8fe51 EDI: bfd4508d EBP: f3d8fe14 ESP: f3d8fe08 [ 382.231176] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 [ 382.231265] core_sys_select+0x25f/0x320 [ 382.231346] ? __wake_up_common_lock+0x62/0x80 [ 382.231399] ? tty_ldisc_deref+0x13/0x20 [ 382.231438] ? ldsem_up_read+0x1b/0x40 [ 382.231459] ? tty_ldisc_deref+0x13/0x20 [ 382.231479] ? tty_write+0x29f/0x2e0 [ 382.231514] ? n_tty_ioctl+0xe0/0xe0 [ 382.231541] ? tty_write_unlock+0x30/0x30 [ 382.231566] ? __vfs_write+0x22/0x110 [ 382.231604] ? security_file_permission+0x2f/0xd0 [ 382.231635] ? rw_verify_area+0xac/0x120 [ 382.231677] ? vfs_write+0x103/0x180 [ 382.231711] SyS_select+0x87/0xc0 [ 382.231739] ? SyS_write+0x42/0x90 [ 382.231781] do_fast_syscall_32+0xd6/0x1a0 [ 382.231836] entry_SYSENTER_32+0x47/0x71 [ 382.231848] EIP: 0xb7f75b05 [ 382.231857] EFLAGS: 00000246 CPU: 1 [ 382.231868] EAX: ffffffda EBX: 00000400 ECX: bfd4508 EDX: bfd4510c [ 382.231878] ESI: 00000000 EDI: 00000000 EBP: 00000000 ESP: bfd45020 [ 382.231889] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 007b [ 382.232281] softirq: huh, entered softirq 9 RCU c10b4d90 with preempt_count 00000100, exited with 00000000? Tested-by: Sam Protsenko <semen.protsenko@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Vincent Pelletier <plr.vincent@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
cujomalainey
referenced
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in cujomalainey/linux
Sep 18, 2018
commit a5ba1d9 upstream. We have reports of the following crash: PID: 7 TASK: ffff88085c6d61c0 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "kworker/u25:0" #0 [ffff88085c6db710] machine_kexec at ffffffff81046239 #1 [ffff88085c6db760] crash_kexec at ffffffff810fc248 #2 [ffff88085c6db830] oops_end at ffffffff81008ae7 #3 [ffff88085c6db860] no_context at ffffffff81050b8f thesofproject#4 [ffff88085c6db8b0] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff81050d75 thesofproject#5 [ffff88085c6db900] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff81050e83 thesofproject#6 [ffff88085c6db910] __do_page_fault at ffffffff8105132e thesofproject#7 [ffff88085c6db9b0] do_page_fault at ffffffff8105152c thesofproject#8 [ffff88085c6db9c0] page_fault at ffffffff81a3f122 [exception RIP: uart_put_char+149] RIP: ffffffff814b67b5 RSP: ffff88085c6dba78 RFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: 0000000000000292 RBX: ffffffff827c5120 RCX: 0000000000000081 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000005f RDI: ffffffff827c5120 RBP: ffff88085c6dba98 R8: 000000000000012c R9: ffffffff822ea320 R10: ffff88085fe4db04 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff881059f9c000 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 000000000000005f R15: 0000000000000fba ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 thesofproject#9 [ffff88085c6dbaa0] tty_put_char at ffffffff81497544 thesofproject#10 [ffff88085c6dbac0] do_output_char at ffffffff8149c91c thesofproject#11 [ffff88085c6dbae0] __process_echoes at ffffffff8149cb8b thesofproject#12 [ffff88085c6dbb30] commit_echoes at ffffffff8149cdc2 thesofproject#13 [ffff88085c6dbb60] n_tty_receive_buf_fast at ffffffff8149e49b thesofproject#14 [ffff88085c6dbbc0] __receive_buf at ffffffff8149ef5a thesofproject#15 [ffff88085c6dbc20] n_tty_receive_buf_common at ffffffff8149f016 thesofproject#16 [ffff88085c6dbca0] n_tty_receive_buf2 at ffffffff8149f194 thesofproject#17 [ffff88085c6dbcb0] flush_to_ldisc at ffffffff814a238a thesofproject#18 [ffff88085c6dbd50] process_one_work at ffffffff81090be2 thesofproject#19 [ffff88085c6dbe20] worker_thread at ffffffff81091b4d thesofproject#20 [ffff88085c6dbeb0] kthread at ffffffff81096384 thesofproject#21 [ffff88085c6dbf50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81a3d69f after slogging through some dissasembly: ffffffff814b6720 <uart_put_char>: ffffffff814b6720: 55 push %rbp ffffffff814b6721: 48 89 e5 mov %rsp,%rbp ffffffff814b6724: 48 83 ec 20 sub $0x20,%rsp ffffffff814b6728: 48 89 1c 24 mov %rbx,(%rsp) ffffffff814b672c: 4c 89 64 24 08 mov %r12,0x8(%rsp) ffffffff814b6731: 4c 89 6c 24 10 mov %r13,0x10(%rsp) ffffffff814b6736: 4c 89 74 24 18 mov %r14,0x18(%rsp) ffffffff814b673b: e8 b0 8e 58 00 callq ffffffff81a3f5f0 <mcount> ffffffff814b6740: 4c 8b a7 88 02 00 00 mov 0x288(%rdi),%r12 ffffffff814b6747: 45 31 ed xor %r13d,%r13d ffffffff814b674a: 41 89 f6 mov %esi,%r14d ffffffff814b674d: 49 83 bc 24 70 01 00 cmpq $0x0,0x170(%r12) ffffffff814b6754: 00 00 ffffffff814b6756: 49 8b 9c 24 80 01 00 mov 0x180(%r12),%rbx ffffffff814b675d: 00 ffffffff814b675e: 74 2f je ffffffff814b678f <uart_put_char+0x6f> ffffffff814b6760: 48 89 df mov %rbx,%rdi ffffffff814b6763: e8 a8 67 58 00 callq ffffffff81a3cf10 <_raw_spin_lock_irqsave> ffffffff814b6768: 41 8b 8c 24 78 01 00 mov 0x178(%r12),%ecx ffffffff814b676f: 00 ffffffff814b6770: 89 ca mov %ecx,%edx ffffffff814b6772: f7 d2 not %edx ffffffff814b6774: 41 03 94 24 7c 01 00 add 0x17c(%r12),%edx ffffffff814b677b: 00 ffffffff814b677c: 81 e2 ff 0f 00 00 and $0xfff,%edx ffffffff814b6782: 75 23 jne ffffffff814b67a7 <uart_put_char+0x87> ffffffff814b6784: 48 89 c6 mov %rax,%rsi ffffffff814b6787: 48 89 df mov %rbx,%rdi ffffffff814b678a: e8 e1 64 58 00 callq ffffffff81a3cc70 <_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore> ffffffff814b678f: 44 89 e8 mov %r13d,%eax ffffffff814b6792: 48 8b 1c 24 mov (%rsp),%rbx ffffffff814b6796: 4c 8b 64 24 08 mov 0x8(%rsp),%r12 ffffffff814b679b: 4c 8b 6c 24 10 mov 0x10(%rsp),%r13 ffffffff814b67a0: 4c 8b 74 24 18 mov 0x18(%rsp),%r14 ffffffff814b67a5: c9 leaveq ffffffff814b67a6: c3 retq ffffffff814b67a7: 49 8b 94 24 70 01 00 mov 0x170(%r12),%rdx ffffffff814b67ae: 00 ffffffff814b67af: 48 63 c9 movslq %ecx,%rcx ffffffff814b67b2: 41 b5 01 mov $0x1,%r13b ffffffff814b67b5: 44 88 34 0a mov %r14b,(%rdx,%rcx,1) ffffffff814b67b9: 41 8b 94 24 78 01 00 mov 0x178(%r12),%edx ffffffff814b67c0: 00 ffffffff814b67c1: 83 c2 01 add $0x1,%edx ffffffff814b67c4: 81 e2 ff 0f 00 00 and $0xfff,%edx ffffffff814b67ca: 41 89 94 24 78 01 00 mov %edx,0x178(%r12) ffffffff814b67d1: 00 ffffffff814b67d2: eb b0 jmp ffffffff814b6784 <uart_put_char+0x64> ffffffff814b67d4: 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 data32 data32 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1) ffffffff814b67db: 00 00 00 00 00 for our build, this is crashing at: circ->buf[circ->head] = c; Looking in uart_port_startup(), it seems that circ->buf (state->xmit.buf) protected by the "per-port mutex", which based on uart_port_check() is state->port.mutex. Indeed, the lock acquired in uart_put_char() is uport->lock, i.e. not the same lock. Anyway, since the lock is not acquired, if uart_shutdown() is called, the last chunk of that function may release state->xmit.buf before its assigned to null, and cause the race above. To fix it, let's lock uport->lock when allocating/deallocating state->xmit.buf in addition to the per-port mutex. v2: switch to locking uport->lock on allocation/deallocation instead of locking the per-port mutex in uart_put_char. Note that since uport->lock is a spin lock, we have to switch the allocation to GFP_ATOMIC. v3: move the allocation outside the lock, so we can switch back to GFP_KERNEL Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
cujomalainey
referenced
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in cujomalainey/linux
Sep 18, 2018
commit d1c392c upstream. I hit the following splat in my tests: ------------[ cut here ]------------ IRQs not enabled as expected WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 0 at kernel/time/tick-sched.c:982 tick_nohz_idle_enter+0x44/0x8c Modules linked in: ip6t_REJECT nf_reject_ipv6 ip6table_filter ip6_tables ipv6 CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc2-test+ #2 Hardware name: MSI MS-7823/CSM-H87M-G43 (MS-7823), BIOS V1.6 02/22/2014 EIP: tick_nohz_idle_enter+0x44/0x8c Code: ec 05 00 00 00 75 26 83 b8 c0 05 00 00 00 75 1d 80 3d d0 36 3e c1 00 75 14 68 94 63 12 c1 c6 05 d0 36 3e c1 01 e8 04 ee f8 ff <0f> 0b 58 fa bb a0 e5 66 c1 e8 25 0f 04 00 64 03 1d 28 31 52 c1 8b EAX: 0000001c EBX: f26e7f8c ECX: 00000006 EDX: 00000007 ESI: f26dd1c0 EDI: 00000000 EBP: f26e7f40 ESP: f26e7f38 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010296 CR0: 80050033 CR2: 0813c6b0 CR3: 2f342000 CR4: 001406f0 Call Trace: do_idle+0x33/0x202 cpu_startup_entry+0x61/0x63 start_secondary+0x18e/0x1ed startup_32_smp+0x164/0x168 irq event stamp: 18773830 hardirqs last enabled at (18773829): [<c040150c>] trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0xc/0x10 hardirqs last disabled at (18773830): [<c040151c>] trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0xc/0x10 softirqs last enabled at (18773824): [<c0ddaa6f>] __do_softirq+0x25f/0x2bf softirqs last disabled at (18773767): [<c0416bbe>] call_on_stack+0x45/0x4b ---[ end trace b7c64aa79e17954a ]--- After a bit of debugging, I found what was happening. This would trigger when performing "perf" with a high NMI interrupt rate, while enabling and disabling function tracer. Ftrace uses breakpoints to convert the nops at the start of functions to calls to the function trampolines. The breakpoint traps disable interrupts and this makes calls into lockdep via the trace_hardirqs_off_thunk in the entry.S code. What happens is the following: do_idle { [interrupts enabled] <interrupt> [interrupts disabled] TRACE_IRQS_OFF [lockdep says irqs off] [...] TRACE_IRQS_IRET test if pt_regs say return to interrupts enabled [yes] TRACE_IRQS_ON [lockdep says irqs are on] <nmi> nmi_enter() { printk_nmi_enter() [traced by ftrace] [ hit ftrace breakpoint ] <breakpoint exception> TRACE_IRQS_OFF [lockdep says irqs off] [...] TRACE_IRQS_IRET [return from breakpoint] test if pt_regs say interrupts enabled [no] [iret back to interrupt] [iret back to code] tick_nohz_idle_enter() { lockdep_assert_irqs_enabled() [lockdep say no!] Although interrupts are indeed enabled, lockdep thinks it is not, and since we now do asserts via lockdep, it gives a false warning. The issue here is that printk_nmi_enter() is called before lockdep_off(), which disables lockdep (for this reason) in NMIs. By simply not allowing ftrace to see printk_nmi_enter() (via notrace annotation) we keep lockdep from getting confused. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 42a0bb3 ("printk/nmi: generic solution for safe printk in NMI") Acked-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Acked-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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When netvsc device is removed it can call reschedule in RCU context. This happens because canceling the subchannel setup work could (in theory) cause a reschedule when manipulating the timer. To reproduce, run with lockdep enabled kernel and unbind a network device from hv_netvsc (via sysfs). [ 160.682011] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 160.707466] 4.19.0-rc3-uio+ #2 Not tainted [ 160.709937] ----------------------------- [ 160.712352] ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:302 Illegal context switch in RCU read-side critical section! [ 160.723691] [ 160.723691] other info that might help us debug this: [ 160.723691] [ 160.730955] [ 160.730955] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [ 160.762813] 5 locks held by rebind-eth.sh/1812: [ 160.766851] #0: 000000008befa37a (sb_writers#6){.+.+}, at: vfs_write+0x184/0x1b0 [ 160.773416] #1: 00000000b097f236 (&of->mutex){+.+.}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0xe2/0x1a0 [ 160.783766] #2: 0000000041ee6889 (kn->count#3){++++}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0xeb/0x1a0 [ 160.787465] #3: 0000000056d92a74 (&dev->mutex){....}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x39/0x250 [ 160.816987] #4: 0000000030f6031e (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: netvsc_remove+0x1e/0x250 [hv_netvsc] [ 160.828629] [ 160.828629] stack backtrace: [ 160.831966] CPU: 1 PID: 1812 Comm: rebind-eth.sh Not tainted 4.19.0-rc3-uio+ #2 [ 160.832952] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS Hyper-V UEFI Release v1.0 11/26/2012 [ 160.832952] Call Trace: [ 160.832952] dump_stack+0x85/0xcb [ 160.832952] ___might_sleep+0x1a3/0x240 [ 160.832952] __flush_work+0x57/0x2e0 [ 160.832952] ? __mutex_lock+0x83/0x990 [ 160.832952] ? __kernfs_remove+0x24f/0x2e0 [ 160.832952] ? __kernfs_remove+0x1b2/0x2e0 [ 160.832952] ? mark_held_locks+0x50/0x80 [ 160.832952] ? get_work_pool+0x90/0x90 [ 160.832952] __cancel_work_timer+0x13c/0x1e0 [ 160.832952] ? netvsc_remove+0x1e/0x250 [hv_netvsc] [ 160.832952] ? __lock_is_held+0x55/0x90 [ 160.832952] netvsc_remove+0x9a/0x250 [hv_netvsc] [ 160.832952] vmbus_remove+0x26/0x30 [ 160.832952] device_release_driver_internal+0x18a/0x250 [ 160.832952] unbind_store+0xb4/0x180 [ 160.832952] kernfs_fop_write+0x113/0x1a0 [ 160.832952] __vfs_write+0x36/0x1a0 [ 160.832952] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x6b/0x80 [ 160.832952] ? rcu_sync_lockdep_assert+0x2e/0x60 [ 160.832952] ? __sb_start_write+0x141/0x1a0 [ 160.832952] ? vfs_write+0x184/0x1b0 [ 160.832952] vfs_write+0xbe/0x1b0 [ 160.832952] ksys_write+0x55/0xc0 [ 160.832952] do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1b0 [ 160.832952] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 160.832952] RIP: 0033:0x7fe48f4c8154 Resolve this by getting RTNL earlier. This is safe because the subchannel work queue does trylock on RTNL and will detect the race. Fixes: 7b2ee50 ("hv_netvsc: common detach logic") Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Directories and inodes don't necessarily need to be in the same lockdep class. For ex, hugetlbfs splits them out too to prevent false positives in lockdep. Annotate correctly after new inode creation. If its a directory inode, it will be put into a different class. This should fix a lockdep splat reported by syzbot: > ====================================================== > WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected > 4.18.0-rc8-next-20180810+ #36 Not tainted > ------------------------------------------------------ > syz-executor900/4483 is trying to acquire lock: > 00000000d2bfc8fe (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){++++}, at: inode_lock > include/linux/fs.h:765 [inline] > 00000000d2bfc8fe (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){++++}, at: > shmem_fallocate+0x18b/0x12e0 mm/shmem.c:2602 > > but task is already holding lock: > 0000000025208078 (ashmem_mutex){+.+.}, at: ashmem_shrink_scan+0xb4/0x630 > drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c:448 > > which lock already depends on the new lock. > > -> #2 (ashmem_mutex){+.+.}: > __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:925 [inline] > __mutex_lock+0x171/0x1700 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1073 > mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1088 > ashmem_mmap+0x55/0x520 drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c:361 > call_mmap include/linux/fs.h:1844 [inline] > mmap_region+0xf27/0x1c50 mm/mmap.c:1762 > do_mmap+0xa10/0x1220 mm/mmap.c:1535 > do_mmap_pgoff include/linux/mm.h:2298 [inline] > vm_mmap_pgoff+0x213/0x2c0 mm/util.c:357 > ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x4da/0x660 mm/mmap.c:1585 > __do_sys_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:100 [inline] > __se_sys_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:91 [inline] > __x64_sys_mmap+0xe9/0x1b0 arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:91 > do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe > > -> #1 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}: > __might_fault+0x155/0x1e0 mm/memory.c:4568 > _copy_to_user+0x30/0x110 lib/usercopy.c:25 > copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline] > filldir+0x1ea/0x3a0 fs/readdir.c:196 > dir_emit_dot include/linux/fs.h:3464 [inline] > dir_emit_dots include/linux/fs.h:3475 [inline] > dcache_readdir+0x13a/0x620 fs/libfs.c:193 > iterate_dir+0x48b/0x5d0 fs/readdir.c:51 > __do_sys_getdents fs/readdir.c:231 [inline] > __se_sys_getdents fs/readdir.c:212 [inline] > __x64_sys_getdents+0x29f/0x510 fs/readdir.c:212 > do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe > > -> #0 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){++++}: > lock_acquire+0x1e4/0x540 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3924 > down_write+0x8f/0x130 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:70 > inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:765 [inline] > shmem_fallocate+0x18b/0x12e0 mm/shmem.c:2602 > ashmem_shrink_scan+0x236/0x630 drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c:455 > ashmem_ioctl+0x3ae/0x13a0 drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c:797 > vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline] > file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:501 [inline] > do_vfs_ioctl+0x1de/0x1720 fs/ioctl.c:685 > ksys_ioctl+0xa9/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:702 > __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:709 [inline] > __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:707 [inline] > __x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:707 > do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe > > other info that might help us debug this: > > Chain exists of: > &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9 --> &mm->mmap_sem --> ashmem_mutex > > Possible unsafe locking scenario: > > CPU0 CPU1 > ---- ---- > lock(ashmem_mutex); > lock(&mm->mmap_sem); > lock(ashmem_mutex); > lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9); > > *** DEADLOCK *** > > 1 lock held by syz-executor900/4483: > #0: 0000000025208078 (ashmem_mutex){+.+.}, at: > ashmem_shrink_scan+0xb4/0x630 drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c:448 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180821231835.166639-1-joel@joelfernandes.org Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> Suggested-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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While reading block, it is possible that io error return due to underlying storage issue, in this case, BH_NeedsValidate was left in the buffer head. Then when reading the very block next time, if it was already linked into journal, that will trigger the following panic. [203748.702517] kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/buffer_head_io.c:342! [203748.702533] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP [203748.702561] Modules linked in: ocfs2 ocfs2_dlmfs ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue configfs sunrpc dm_switch dm_queue_length dm_multipath bonding be2iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i iw_cxgb4 cxgb4 cxgb3i libcxgbi iw_cxgb3 cxgb3 mdio ib_iser rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm ib_sa ib_mad ib_core ib_addr ipv6 iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ipmi_devintf iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support dcdbas ipmi_ssif i2c_core ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler acpi_pad pcspkr sb_edac edac_core lpc_ich mfd_core shpchp sg tg3 ptp pps_core ext4 jbd2 mbcache2 sr_mod cdrom sd_mod ahci libahci megaraid_sas wmi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [203748.703024] CPU: 7 PID: 38369 Comm: touch Not tainted 4.1.12-124.18.6.el6uek.x86_64 #2 [203748.703045] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R620/0PXXHP, BIOS 2.5.2 01/28/2015 [203748.703067] task: ffff880768139c00 ti: ffff88006ff48000 task.ti: ffff88006ff48000 [203748.703088] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa05e9f09>] [<ffffffffa05e9f09>] ocfs2_read_blocks+0x669/0x7f0 [ocfs2] [203748.703130] RSP: 0018:ffff88006ff4b818 EFLAGS: 00010206 [203748.703389] RAX: 0000000008620029 RBX: ffff88006ff4b910 RCX: 0000000000000000 [203748.703885] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000023079fe [203748.704382] RBP: ffff88006ff4b8d8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8807578c25b0 [203748.704877] R10: 000000000f637376 R11: 000000003030322e R12: 0000000000000000 [203748.705373] R13: ffff88006ff4b910 R14: ffff880732fe38f0 R15: 0000000000000000 [203748.705871] FS: 00007f401992c700(0000) GS:ffff880bfebc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [203748.706370] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [203748.706627] CR2: 00007f4019252440 CR3: 00000000a621e000 CR4: 0000000000060670 [203748.707124] Stack: [203748.707371] ffff88006ff4b828 ffffffffa0609f52 ffff88006ff4b838 0000000000000001 [203748.707885] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff880bf67c3800 ffffffffa05eca00 [203748.708399] 00000000023079ff ffffffff81c58b80 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [203748.708915] Call Trace: [203748.709175] [<ffffffffa0609f52>] ? ocfs2_inode_cache_io_unlock+0x12/0x20 [ocfs2] [203748.709680] [<ffffffffa05eca00>] ? ocfs2_empty_dir_filldir+0x80/0x80 [ocfs2] [203748.710185] [<ffffffffa05ec0cb>] ocfs2_read_dir_block_direct+0x3b/0x200 [ocfs2] [203748.710691] [<ffffffffa05f0fbf>] ocfs2_prepare_dx_dir_for_insert.isra.57+0x19f/0xf60 [ocfs2] [203748.711204] [<ffffffffa065660f>] ? ocfs2_metadata_cache_io_unlock+0x1f/0x30 [ocfs2] [203748.711716] [<ffffffffa05f4f3a>] ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert+0x13a/0x890 [ocfs2] [203748.712227] [<ffffffffa05f442e>] ? ocfs2_check_dir_for_entry+0x8e/0x140 [ocfs2] [203748.712737] [<ffffffffa061b2f2>] ocfs2_mknod+0x4b2/0x1370 [ocfs2] [203748.713003] [<ffffffffa061c385>] ocfs2_create+0x65/0x170 [ocfs2] [203748.713263] [<ffffffff8121714b>] vfs_create+0xdb/0x150 [203748.713518] [<ffffffff8121b225>] do_last+0x815/0x1210 [203748.713772] [<ffffffff812192e9>] ? path_init+0xb9/0x450 [203748.714123] [<ffffffff8121bca0>] path_openat+0x80/0x600 [203748.714378] [<ffffffff811bcd45>] ? handle_pte_fault+0xd15/0x1620 [203748.714634] [<ffffffff8121d7ba>] do_filp_open+0x3a/0xb0 [203748.714888] [<ffffffff8122a767>] ? __alloc_fd+0xa7/0x130 [203748.715143] [<ffffffff81209ffc>] do_sys_open+0x12c/0x220 [203748.715403] [<ffffffff81026ddb>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase1+0x11b/0x180 [203748.715668] [<ffffffff816f0c9f>] ? system_call_after_swapgs+0xe9/0x190 [203748.715928] [<ffffffff8120a10e>] SyS_open+0x1e/0x20 [203748.716184] [<ffffffff816f0d5e>] system_call_fastpath+0x18/0xd7 [203748.716440] Code: 00 00 48 8b 7b 08 48 83 c3 10 45 89 f8 44 89 e1 44 89 f2 4c 89 ee e8 07 06 11 e1 48 8b 03 48 85 c0 75 df 8b 5d c8 e9 4d fa ff ff <0f> 0b 48 8b 7d a0 e8 dc c6 06 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 [203748.717505] RIP [<ffffffffa05e9f09>] ocfs2_read_blocks+0x669/0x7f0 [ocfs2] [203748.717775] RSP <ffff88006ff4b818> Joesph ever reported a similar panic. Link: https://oss.oracle.com/pipermail/ocfs2-devel/2013-May/008931.html Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180912063207.29484-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This change has the following effects, in order of descreasing importance: 1) Prevent a stack buffer overflow 2) Do not append an unnecessary NULL to an anyway binary buffer, which is writing one byte past client_digest when caller is: chap_string_to_hex(client_digest, chap_r, strlen(chap_r)); The latter was found by KASAN (see below) when input value hes expected size (32 hex chars), and further analysis revealed a stack buffer overflow can happen when network-received value is longer, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to smash up to 17 bytes after destination buffer (16 bytes attacker-controlled and one null). As switching to hex2bin requires specifying destination buffer length, and does not internally append any null, it solves both issues. This addresses CVE-2018-14633. Beyond this: - Validate received value length and check hex2bin accepted the input, to log this rejection reason instead of just failing authentication. - Only log received CHAP_R and CHAP_C values once they passed sanity checks. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod] Write of size 1 at addr ffff8801090ef7c8 by task kworker/0:0/1021 CPU: 0 PID: 1021 Comm: kworker/0:0 Tainted: G O 4.17.8kasan.sess.connops+ #2 Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./Aptio CRB, BIOS 5.6.5 05/19/2014 Workqueue: events iscsi_target_do_login_rx [iscsi_target_mod] Call Trace: dump_stack+0x71/0xac print_address_description+0x65/0x22e ? chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod] kasan_report.cold.6+0x241/0x2fd chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod] chap_server_compute_md5.isra.2+0x2cb/0x860 [iscsi_target_mod] ? chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex.constprop.5+0x50/0x50 [iscsi_target_mod] ? ftrace_caller_op_ptr+0xe/0xe ? __orc_find+0x6f/0xc0 ? unwind_next_frame+0x231/0x850 ? kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? deref_stack_reg+0xd0/0xd0 ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? is_module_text_address+0xa/0x11 ? kernel_text_address+0x4c/0x110 ? __save_stack_trace+0x82/0x100 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ? save_stack+0x8c/0xb0 ? 0xffffffffc1660000 ? iscsi_target_do_login+0x155/0x8d0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? process_one_work+0x35c/0x640 ? worker_thread+0x66/0x5d0 ? kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ? iscsi_update_param_value+0x80/0x80 [iscsi_target_mod] ? iscsit_release_cmd+0x170/0x170 [iscsi_target_mod] chap_main_loop+0x172/0x570 [iscsi_target_mod] ? chap_server_compute_md5.isra.2+0x860/0x860 [iscsi_target_mod] ? rx_data+0xd6/0x120 [iscsi_target_mod] ? iscsit_print_session_params+0xd0/0xd0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? cyc2ns_read_begin.part.2+0x90/0x90 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x25/0x50 ? memcmp+0x45/0x70 iscsi_target_do_login+0x875/0x8d0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? iscsi_target_check_first_request.isra.5+0x1a0/0x1a0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? del_timer+0xe0/0xe0 ? memset+0x1f/0x40 ? flush_sigqueue+0x29/0xd0 iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? iscsi_target_nego_release+0x80/0x80 [iscsi_target_mod] ? iscsi_target_restore_sock_callbacks+0x130/0x130 [iscsi_target_mod] process_one_work+0x35c/0x640 worker_thread+0x66/0x5d0 ? flush_rcu_work+0x40/0x40 kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0 ? kthread_bind+0x30/0x30 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0004243bc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 flags: 0x17fffc000000000() raw: 017fffc000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff raw: ffffea0004243c20 ffffea0004243ba0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8801090ef680: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 01 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 ffff8801090ef700: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 02 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 >ffff8801090ef780: 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 ^ ffff8801090ef800: 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 02 f2 f2 f2 f2 ffff8801090ef880: f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 ================================================================== Signed-off-by: Vincent Pelletier <plr.vincent@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
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Oct 15, 2018
Syzkaller reported this on a slightly older kernel but it's still applicable to the current kernel - ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 4.18.0-next-20180823+ #46 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor4/26841 is trying to acquire lock: 00000000dd41ef48 ((wq_completion)bond_dev->name){+.+.}, at: flush_workqueue+0x2db/0x1e10 kernel/workqueue.c:2652 but task is already holding lock: 00000000768ab431 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: rtnl_lock net/core/rtnetlink.c:77 [inline] 00000000768ab431 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x412/0xc30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4708 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:925 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x171/0x1700 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1073 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1088 rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:77 bond_netdev_notify drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:1310 [inline] bond_netdev_notify_work+0x44/0xd0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:1320 process_one_work+0xc73/0x1aa0 kernel/workqueue.c:2153 worker_thread+0x189/0x13c0 kernel/workqueue.c:2296 kthread+0x35a/0x420 kernel/kthread.c:246 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:415 -> #1 ((work_completion)(&(&nnw->work)->work)){+.+.}: process_one_work+0xc0b/0x1aa0 kernel/workqueue.c:2129 worker_thread+0x189/0x13c0 kernel/workqueue.c:2296 kthread+0x35a/0x420 kernel/kthread.c:246 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:415 -> #0 ((wq_completion)bond_dev->name){+.+.}: lock_acquire+0x1e4/0x4f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3901 flush_workqueue+0x30a/0x1e10 kernel/workqueue.c:2655 drain_workqueue+0x2a9/0x640 kernel/workqueue.c:2820 destroy_workqueue+0xc6/0x9d0 kernel/workqueue.c:4155 __alloc_workqueue_key+0xef9/0x1190 kernel/workqueue.c:4138 bond_init+0x269/0x940 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:4734 register_netdevice+0x337/0x1100 net/core/dev.c:8410 bond_newlink+0x49/0xa0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_netlink.c:453 rtnl_newlink+0xef4/0x1d50 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3099 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x46e/0xc30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4711 netlink_rcv_skb+0x172/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2454 rtnetlink_rcv+0x1c/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4729 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x5a0/0x760 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343 netlink_sendmsg+0xa18/0xfc0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:622 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:632 ___sys_sendmsg+0x7fd/0x930 net/socket.c:2115 __sys_sendmsg+0x11d/0x290 net/socket.c:2153 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2162 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2160 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2160 do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (wq_completion)bond_dev->name --> (work_completion)(&(&nnw->work)->work) --> rtnl_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(rtnl_mutex); lock((work_completion)(&(&nnw->work)->work)); lock(rtnl_mutex); lock((wq_completion)bond_dev->name); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz-executor4/26841: stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 26841 Comm: syz-executor4 Not tainted 4.18.0-next-20180823+ #46 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1c9/0x2b4 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_circular_bug.isra.34.cold.55+0x1bd/0x27d kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1222 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1862 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1975 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2416 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x3449/0x5020 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3412 lock_acquire+0x1e4/0x4f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3901 flush_workqueue+0x30a/0x1e10 kernel/workqueue.c:2655 drain_workqueue+0x2a9/0x640 kernel/workqueue.c:2820 destroy_workqueue+0xc6/0x9d0 kernel/workqueue.c:4155 __alloc_workqueue_key+0xef9/0x1190 kernel/workqueue.c:4138 bond_init+0x269/0x940 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:4734 register_netdevice+0x337/0x1100 net/core/dev.c:8410 bond_newlink+0x49/0xa0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_netlink.c:453 rtnl_newlink+0xef4/0x1d50 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3099 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x46e/0xc30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4711 netlink_rcv_skb+0x172/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2454 rtnetlink_rcv+0x1c/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4729 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x5a0/0x760 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343 netlink_sendmsg+0xa18/0xfc0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:622 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:632 ___sys_sendmsg+0x7fd/0x930 net/socket.c:2115 __sys_sendmsg+0x11d/0x290 net/socket.c:2153 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2162 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2160 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2160 do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x457089 Code: fd b4 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 cb b4 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f2df20a5c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f2df20a66d4 RCX: 0000000000457089 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000930140 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff R13: 00000000004d40b8 R14: 00000000004c8ad8 R15: 0000000000000001 Signed-off-by: Mahesh Bandewar <maheshb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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If I attach a vfio-ccw device to my guest, I get the following warning on the host when the host kernel is CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y [250757.595325] Bad or missing usercopy whitelist? Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to SLUB object 'dma-kmalloc-512' (offset 64, size 124)! [250757.595365] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 10958 at mm/usercopy.c:81 usercopy_warn+0xac/0xd8 [250757.595369] Modules linked in: kvm vhost_net vhost tap xt_CHECKSUM iptable_mangle ipt_MASQUERADE iptable_nat nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack libcrc32c devlink tun bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables sunrpc dm_multipath s390_trng crc32_vx_s390 ghash_s390 prng aes_s390 des_s390 des_generic sha512_s390 sha1_s390 eadm_sch tape_3590 tape tape_class qeth_l2 qeth ccwgroup vfio_ccw vfio_mdev zcrypt_cex4 mdev vfio_iommu_type1 zcrypt vfio sha256_s390 sha_common zfcp scsi_transport_fc qdio dasd_eckd_mod dasd_mod [250757.595424] CPU: 2 PID: 10958 Comm: CPU 2/KVM Not tainted 4.18.0-derp #2 [250757.595426] Hardware name: IBM 3906 M05 780 (LPAR) ...snip regs... [250757.595523] Call Trace: [250757.595529] ([<0000000000349210>] usercopy_warn+0xa8/0xd8) [250757.595535] [<000000000032daaa>] __check_heap_object+0xfa/0x160 [250757.595540] [<0000000000349396>] __check_object_size+0x156/0x1d0 [250757.595547] [<000003ff80332d04>] vfio_ccw_mdev_write+0x74/0x148 [vfio_ccw] [250757.595552] [<000000000034ed12>] __vfs_write+0x3a/0x188 [250757.595556] [<000000000034f040>] vfs_write+0xa8/0x1b8 [250757.595559] [<000000000034f4e6>] ksys_pwrite64+0x86/0xc0 [250757.595568] [<00000000008959a0>] system_call+0xdc/0x2b0 [250757.595570] Last Breaking-Event-Address: [250757.595573] [<0000000000349210>] usercopy_warn+0xa8/0xd8 While vfio_ccw_mdev_{write|read} validates that the input position/count does not run over the ccw_io_region struct, the usercopy code that does copy_{to|from}_user doesn't necessarily know this. It sees the variable length and gets worried that it's affecting a normal kmalloc'd struct, and generates the above warning. Adjust how the ccw_io_region is alloc'd with a whitelist to remove this warning. The boundary checking will continue to do its thing. Signed-off-by: Eric Farman <farman@linux.ibm.com> Message-Id: <20180921204013.95804-3-farman@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
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Fixes a crash when the report encounters an address that could not be associated with an mmaped region: #0 0x00005555557bdc4a in callchain_srcline (ip=<error reading variable: Cannot access memory at address 0x38>, sym=0x0, map=0x0) at util/machine.c:2329 #1 unwind_entry (entry=entry@entry=0x7fffffff9180, arg=arg@entry=0x7ffff5642498) at util/machine.c:2329 #2 0x00005555558370af in entry (arg=0x7ffff5642498, cb=0x5555557bdb50 <unwind_entry>, thread=<optimized out>, ip=18446744073709551615) at util/unwind-libunwind-local.c:586 #3 get_entries (ui=ui@entry=0x7fffffff9620, cb=0x5555557bdb50 <unwind_entry>, arg=0x7ffff5642498, max_stack=<optimized out>) at util/unwind-libunwind-local.c:703 #4 0x0000555555837192 in _unwind__get_entries (cb=<optimized out>, arg=<optimized out>, thread=<optimized out>, data=<optimized out>, max_stack=<optimized out>) at util/unwind-libunwind-local.c:725 #5 0x00005555557c310f in thread__resolve_callchain_unwind (max_stack=127, sample=0x7fffffff9830, evsel=0x555555c7b3b0, cursor=0x7ffff5642498, thread=0x555555c7f6f0) at util/machine.c:2351 #6 thread__resolve_callchain (thread=0x555555c7f6f0, cursor=0x7ffff5642498, evsel=0x555555c7b3b0, sample=0x7fffffff9830, parent=0x7fffffff97b8, root_al=0x7fffffff9750, max_stack=127) at util/machine.c:2378 #7 0x00005555557ba4ee in sample__resolve_callchain (sample=<optimized out>, cursor=<optimized out>, parent=parent@entry=0x7fffffff97b8, evsel=<optimized out>, al=al@entry=0x7fffffff9750, max_stack=<optimized out>) at util/callchain.c:1085 Signed-off-by: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com> Tested-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Jin Yao <yao.jin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Fixes: 2a9d505 ("perf script: Show correct offsets for DWARF-based unwinding") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180926135207.30263-1-milian.wolff@kdab.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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Julian Wiedmann says: ==================== s390/qeth: fixes 2019-09-26 please apply two qeth patches for -net. The first is a trivial cleanup required for patch #2 by Jean, which fixes a potential endless loop. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This reverts commit d76c743. While commit d76c743 ("serial: 8250_dw: Fix runtime PM handling") fixes runtime PM handling when using kgdb, it introduces a traceback for everyone else. BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at /mnt/host/source/src/third_party/kernel/next/drivers/base/power/runtime.c:1034 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, pid: 1, name: swapper/0 7 locks held by swapper/0/1: #0: 000000005ec5bc72 (&dev->mutex){....}, at: __driver_attach+0xb5/0x12b #1: 000000005d5fa9e5 (&dev->mutex){....}, at: __device_attach+0x3e/0x15b #2: 0000000047e93286 (serial_mutex){+.+.}, at: serial8250_register_8250_port+0x51/0x8bb #3: 000000003b328f07 (port_mutex){+.+.}, at: uart_add_one_port+0xab/0x8b0 #4: 00000000fa313d4d (&port->mutex){+.+.}, at: uart_add_one_port+0xcc/0x8b0 #5: 00000000090983ca (console_lock){+.+.}, at: vprintk_emit+0xdb/0x217 #6: 00000000c743e583 (console_owner){-...}, at: console_unlock+0x211/0x60f irq event stamp: 735222 __down_trylock_console_sem+0x4a/0x84 console_unlock+0x338/0x60f __do_softirq+0x4a4/0x50d irq_exit+0x64/0xe2 CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc5 #6 Hardware name: Google Caroline/Caroline, BIOS Google_Caroline.7820.286.0 03/15/2017 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x7d/0xbd ___might_sleep+0x238/0x259 __pm_runtime_resume+0x4e/0xa4 ? serial8250_rpm_get+0x2e/0x44 serial8250_console_write+0x44/0x301 ? lock_acquire+0x1b8/0x1fa console_unlock+0x577/0x60f vprintk_emit+0x1f0/0x217 printk+0x52/0x6e register_console+0x43b/0x524 uart_add_one_port+0x672/0x8b0 ? set_io_from_upio+0x150/0x162 serial8250_register_8250_port+0x825/0x8bb dw8250_probe+0x80c/0x8b0 ? dw8250_serial_inq+0x8e/0x8e ? dw8250_check_lcr+0x108/0x108 ? dw8250_runtime_resume+0x5b/0x5b ? dw8250_serial_outq+0xa1/0xa1 ? dw8250_remove+0x115/0x115 platform_drv_probe+0x76/0xc5 really_probe+0x1f1/0x3ee ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x5d/0x5d driver_probe_device+0xd6/0x112 ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x5d/0x5d bus_for_each_drv+0xbe/0xe5 __device_attach+0xdd/0x15b bus_probe_device+0x5a/0x10b device_add+0x501/0x894 ? _raw_write_unlock+0x27/0x3a platform_device_add+0x224/0x2b7 mfd_add_device+0x718/0x75b ? __kmalloc+0x144/0x16a ? mfd_add_devices+0x38/0xdb mfd_add_devices+0x9b/0xdb intel_lpss_probe+0x7d4/0x8ee intel_lpss_pci_probe+0xac/0xd4 pci_device_probe+0x101/0x18e ... Revert the offending patch until a more comprehensive solution is available. Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Phil Edworthy <phil.edworthy@renesas.com> Fixes: d76c743 ("serial: 8250_dw: Fix runtime PM handling") Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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…inux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into kvm-master KVM/arm fixes for 4.19, take #2 - Correctly order GICv3 SGI registers in the cp15 array
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…-flight
Reject migration of SEV{-ES} state if either the source or destination VM
is actively creating a vCPU, i.e. if kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu() is in the
section between incrementing created_vcpus and online_vcpus. The bulk of
vCPU creation runs _outside_ of kvm->lock to allow creating multiple vCPUs
in parallel, and so sev_info.es_active can get toggled from false=>true in
the destination VM after (or during) svm_vcpu_create(), resulting in an
SEV{-ES} VM effectively having a non-SEV{-ES} vCPU.
The issue manifests most visibly as a crash when trying to free a vCPU's
NULL VMSA page in an SEV-ES VM, but any number of things can go wrong.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffebde00000000
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 227 UID: 0 PID: 64063 Comm: syz.5.60023 Tainted: G U O 6.15.0-smp-DEV #2 NONE
Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 12.52.0-0 10/28/2024
RIP: 0010:constant_test_bit arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:206 [inline]
RIP: 0010:arch_test_bit arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:238 [inline]
RIP: 0010:_test_bit include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:142 [inline]
RIP: 0010:PageHead include/linux/page-flags.h:866 [inline]
RIP: 0010:___free_pages+0x3e/0x120 mm/page_alloc.c:5067
Code: <49> f7 06 40 00 00 00 75 05 45 31 ff eb 0c 66 90 4c 89 f0 4c 39 f0
RSP: 0018:ffff8984551978d0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000777f80000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff918aeb98
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffebde00000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffebde00000007 R09: 1ffffd7bc0000000
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff97bc0000001 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: ffff8983e19751a8 R14: ffffebde00000000 R15: 1ffffd7bc0000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff89ee661d3000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffebde00000000 CR3: 000000793ceaa000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000b5f DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
sev_free_vcpu+0x413/0x630 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c:3169
svm_vcpu_free+0x13a/0x2a0 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:1515
kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy+0x6a/0x1d0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:12396
kvm_vcpu_destroy virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:470 [inline]
kvm_destroy_vcpus+0xd1/0x300 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:490
kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x636/0x820 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:12895
kvm_put_kvm+0xb8e/0xfb0 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1310
kvm_vm_release+0x48/0x60 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1369
__fput+0x3e4/0x9e0 fs/file_table.c:465
task_work_run+0x1a9/0x220 kernel/task_work.c:227
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:40 [inline]
do_exit+0x7f0/0x25b0 kernel/exit.c:953
do_group_exit+0x203/0x2d0 kernel/exit.c:1102
get_signal+0x1357/0x1480 kernel/signal.c:3034
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x40/0x690 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:111 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline]
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x67/0xb0 kernel/entry/common.c:218
do_syscall_64+0x7c/0x150 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7f87a898e969
</TASK>
Modules linked in: gq(O)
gsmi: Log Shutdown Reason 0x03
CR2: ffffebde00000000
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Deliberately don't check for a NULL VMSA when freeing the vCPU, as crashing
the host is likely desirable due to the VMSA being consumed by hardware.
E.g. if KVM manages to allow VMRUN on the vCPU, hardware may read/write a
bogus VMSA page. Accessing PFN 0 is "fine"-ish now that it's sequestered
away thanks to L1TF, but panicking in this scenario is preferable to
potentially running with corrupted state.
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Fixes: 0b020f5 ("KVM: SEV: Add support for SEV-ES intra host migration")
Fixes: b566393 ("KVM: SEV: Add support for SEV intra host migration")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: James Houghton <jthoughton@google.com>
Cc: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: James Houghton <jthoughton@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250602224459.41505-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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If the PHY driver uses another PHY internally (e.g. in case of eUSB2, repeaters are represented as PHYs), then it would trigger the following lockdep splat because all PHYs use a single static lockdep key and thus lockdep can not identify whether there is a dependency or not and reports a false positive. Make PHY subsystem use dynamic lockdep keys, assigning each driver a separate key. This way lockdep can correctly identify dependency graph between mutexes. ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.15.0-rc7-next-20250522-12896-g3932f283970c #3455 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- kworker/u51:0/78 is trying to acquire lock: ffff0008116554f0 (&phy->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: phy_init+0x4c/0x12c but task is already holding lock: ffff000813c10cf0 (&phy->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: phy_init+0x4c/0x12c other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&phy->mutex); lock(&phy->mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 4 locks held by kworker/u51:0/78: #0: ffff000800010948 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x18c/0x5ec #1: ffff80008036bdb0 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1b4/0x5ec #2: ffff0008094ac8f8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach+0x38/0x188 #3: ffff000813c10cf0 (&phy->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: phy_init+0x4c/0x12c stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 78 Comm: kworker/u51:0 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc7-next-20250522-12896-g3932f283970c #3455 PREEMPT Hardware name: Qualcomm CRD, BIOS 6.0.240904.BOOT.MXF.2.4-00528.1-HAMOA-1 09/ 4/2024 Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func Call trace: show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C) dump_stack_lvl+0x90/0xd0 dump_stack+0x18/0x24 print_deadlock_bug+0x258/0x348 __lock_acquire+0x10fc/0x1f84 lock_acquire+0x1c8/0x338 __mutex_lock+0xb8/0x59c mutex_lock_nested+0x24/0x30 phy_init+0x4c/0x12c snps_eusb2_hsphy_init+0x54/0x1a0 phy_init+0xe0/0x12c dwc3_core_init+0x450/0x10b4 dwc3_core_probe+0xce4/0x15fc dwc3_probe+0x64/0xb0 platform_probe+0x68/0xc4 really_probe+0xbc/0x298 __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x12c driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x160 __device_attach_driver+0xb8/0x138 bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xe0 __device_attach+0x9c/0x188 device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20 bus_probe_device+0xac/0xb0 deferred_probe_work_func+0x8c/0xc8 process_one_work+0x208/0x5ec worker_thread+0x1c0/0x368 kthread+0x14c/0x20c ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Fixes: 3584f63 ("phy: qcom: phy-qcom-snps-eusb2: Add support for eUSB2 repeater") Fixes: e246355 ("phy: amlogic: Add Amlogic AXG PCIE PHY Driver") Reviewed-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Abel Vesa <abel.vesa@linaro.org> Reported-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZnpoAVGJMG4Zu-Jw@hovoldconsulting.com/ Reviewed-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro@kernel.org> Tested-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@oss.qualcomm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250605-phy-subinit-v3-1-1e1e849e10cd@oss.qualcomm.com Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
bardliao
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If "try_verify_in_tasklet" is set for dm-verity, DM_BUFIO_CLIENT_NO_SLEEP
is enabled for dm-bufio. However, when bufio tries to evict buffers, there
is a chance to trigger scheduling in spin_lock_bh, the following warning
is hit:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at drivers/md/dm-bufio.c:2745
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 123, name: kworker/2:2
preempt_count: 201, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
4 locks held by kworker/2:2/123:
#0: ffff88800a2d1548 ((wq_completion)dm_bufio_cache){....}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0xe46/0x1970
#1: ffffc90000d97d20 ((work_completion)(&dm_bufio_replacement_work)){....}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x763/0x1970
#2: ffffffff8555b528 (dm_bufio_clients_lock){....}-{3:3}, at: do_global_cleanup+0x1ce/0x710
#3: ffff88801d5820b8 (&c->spinlock){....}-{2:2}, at: do_global_cleanup+0x2a5/0x710
Preemption disabled at:
[<0000000000000000>] 0x0
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 123 Comm: kworker/2:2 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3-g90548c634bd0 #305 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: dm_bufio_cache do_global_cleanup
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70
__might_resched+0x360/0x4e0
do_global_cleanup+0x2f5/0x710
process_one_work+0x7db/0x1970
worker_thread+0x518/0xea0
kthread+0x359/0x690
ret_from_fork+0xf3/0x1b0
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
That can be reproduced by:
veritysetup format --data-block-size=4096 --hash-block-size=4096 /dev/vda /dev/vdb
SIZE=$(blockdev --getsz /dev/vda)
dmsetup create myverity -r --table "0 $SIZE verity 1 /dev/vda /dev/vdb 4096 4096 <data_blocks> 1 sha256 <root_hash> <salt> 1 try_verify_in_tasklet"
mount /dev/dm-0 /mnt -o ro
echo 102400 > /sys/module/dm_bufio/parameters/max_cache_size_bytes
[read files in /mnt]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.4+
Fixes: 450e8de ("dm bufio: improve concurrent IO performance")
Signed-off-by: Wang Shuai <wangshuai12@xiaomi.com>
Signed-off-by: Sheng Yong <shengyong1@xiaomi.com>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
bardliao
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This reverts commit 7796c97. This patch broke Dragonboard 845c (sdm845). I see: Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1 Internal error: BRK handler: 00000000f20003e8 [#1] SMP pc : qcom_swrm_set_channel_map+0x7c/0x80 [soundwire_qcom] lr : snd_soc_dai_set_channel_map+0x34/0x78 Call trace: qcom_swrm_set_channel_map+0x7c/0x80 [soundwire_qcom] (P) sdm845_dai_init+0x18c/0x2e0 [snd_soc_sdm845] snd_soc_link_init+0x28/0x6c snd_soc_bind_card+0x5f4/0xb0c snd_soc_register_card+0x148/0x1a4 devm_snd_soc_register_card+0x50/0xb0 sdm845_snd_platform_probe+0x124/0x148 [snd_soc_sdm845] platform_probe+0x6c/0xd0 really_probe+0xc0/0x2a4 __driver_probe_device+0x7c/0x130 driver_probe_device+0x40/0x118 __device_attach_driver+0xc4/0x108 bus_for_each_drv+0x8c/0xf0 __device_attach+0xa4/0x198 device_initial_probe+0x18/0x28 bus_probe_device+0xb8/0xbc deferred_probe_work_func+0xac/0xfc process_one_work+0x244/0x658 worker_thread+0x1b4/0x360 kthread+0x148/0x228 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Kernel panic - not syncing: BRK handler: Fatal exception Dan has also reported following issues with the original patch https://lore.kernel.org/all/33fe8fe7-719a-405a-9ed2-d9f816ce1d57@sabinyo.mountain/ Bug #1: The zeroeth element of ctrl->pconfig[] is supposed to be unused. We start counting at 1. However this code sets ctrl->pconfig[0].ch_mask = 128. Bug #2: There are SLIM_MAX_TX_PORTS (16) elements in tx_ch[] array but only QCOM_SDW_MAX_PORTS + 1 (15) in the ctrl->pconfig[] array so it corrupts memory like Yongqin Liu pointed out. Bug 3: Like Jie Gan pointed out, it erases all the tx information with the rx information. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.15+ Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org> Acked-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srini@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250709174949.8541-1-amit.pundir@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
bardliao
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into HEAD KVM/riscv fixes for 6.16, take #2 - Disable vstimecmp before exiting to user-space - Move HGEI[E|P] CSR access to IMSIC virtualization
marc-hb
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Sep 6, 2025
Use fpu_guest_cfg to calculate guest fpstate settings, open code for __fpstate_reset() to avoid using kernel FPU config. Below configuration steps are currently enforced to get guest fpstate: 1) Kernel sets up guest FPU settings in fpu__init_system_xstate(). 2) User space sets vCPU thread group xstate permits via arch_prctl(). 3) User space creates guest fpstate via __fpu_alloc_init_guest_fpstate() for vcpu thread. 4) User space enables guest dynamic xfeatures and re-allocate guest fpstate. By adding kernel dynamic xfeatures in above thesofproject#1 and thesofproject#2, guest xstate area size is expanded to hold (fpu_kernel_cfg.default_features | kernel dynamic xfeatures | user dynamic xfeatures), then host xsaves/xrstors can operate for all guest xfeatures. The user_* fields remain unchanged for compatibility with KVM uAPIs. Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
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Intel TDX protects guest VM's from malicious host and certain physical attacks. TDX introduces a new operation mode, Secure Arbitration Mode (SEAM) to isolate and protect guest VM's. A TDX guest VM runs in SEAM and, unlike VMX, direct control and interaction with the guest by the host VMM is not possible. Instead, Intel TDX Module, which also runs in SEAM, provides a SEAMCALL API. The SEAMCALL that provides the ability to enter a guest is TDH.VP.ENTER. The TDX Module processes TDH.VP.ENTER, and enters the guest via VMX VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME instructions. When a guest VM-exit requires host VMM interaction, the TDH.VP.ENTER SEAMCALL returns to the host VMM (KVM). Add tdh_vp_enter() to wrap the SEAMCALL invocation of TDH.VP.ENTER; tdh_vp_enter() needs to be noinstr because VM entry in KVM is noinstr as well, which is for two reasons: * marking the area as CT_STATE_GUEST via guest_state_enter_irqoff() and guest_state_exit_irqoff() * IRET must be avoided between VM-exit and NMI handling, in order to avoid prematurely releasing the NMI inhibit. TDH.VP.ENTER is different from other SEAMCALLs in several ways: it uses more arguments, and after it returns some host state may need to be restored. Therefore tdh_vp_enter() uses __seamcall_saved_ret() instead of __seamcall_ret(); since it is the only caller of __seamcall_saved_ret(), it can be made noinstr also. TDH.VP.ENTER arguments are passed through General Purpose Registers (GPRs). For the special case of the TD guest invoking TDG.VP.VMCALL, nearly any GPR can be used, as well as XMM0 to XMM15. Notably, RBP is not used, and Linux mandates the TDX Module feature NO_RBP_MOD, which is enforced elsewhere. Additionally, XMM registers are not required for the existing Guest Hypervisor Communication Interface and are handled by existing KVM code should they be modified by the guest. There are 2 input formats and 5 output formats for TDH.VP.ENTER arguments. Input thesofproject#1 : Initial entry or following a previous async. TD Exit Input thesofproject#2 : Following a previous TDCALL(TDG.VP.VMCALL) Output thesofproject#1 : On Error (No TD Entry) Output thesofproject#2 : Async. Exits with a VMX Architectural Exit Reason Output thesofproject#3 : Async. Exits with a non-VMX TD Exit Status Output thesofproject#4 : Async. Exits with Cross-TD Exit Details Output thesofproject#5 : On TDCALL(TDG.VP.VMCALL) Currently, to keep things simple, the wrapper function does not attempt to support different formats, and just passes all the GPRs that could be used. The GPR values are held by KVM in the area set aside for guest GPRs. KVM code uses the guest GPR area (vcpu->arch.regs[]) to set up for or process results of tdh_vp_enter(). Therefore changing tdh_vp_enter() to use more complex argument formats would also alter the way KVM code interacts with tdh_vp_enter(). Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Message-ID: <20241121201448.36170-2-adrian.hunter@intel.com> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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In the Intel PMU counters test, only validate the counts for architectural events that are supported in hardware. If an arch event isn't supported, the event selector may enable a completely different event, and thus the logic for the expected count is bogus. This fixes test failures on pre-Icelake systems due to the encoding for the architectural Top-Down Slots event corresponding to something else (at least on the Skylake family of CPUs). Note, validation relies on *hardware* support, not KVM support and not guest support. Architectural events are all about enumerating the event selector encoding; lack of enumeration for an architectural event doesn't mean the event itself is unsupported, i.e. the event should still count as expected even if KVM and/or guest CPUID doesn't enumerate the event as being "architectural". Note thesofproject#2, it's desirable to _program_ the architectural event encoding even if hardware doesn't support the event. The count can't be validated when the event is fully enabled, but KVM should still let the guest program the event selector, and the PMC shouldn't count if the event is disabled. Fixes: 4f1bd6b ("KVM: selftests: Test Intel PMU architectural events on gp counters") Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202501141009.30c629b4-lkp@intel.com Debugged-by: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250117234204.2600624-3-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
bardliao
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The commit under the Fixes tag added a netdev_assert_locked() in bnxt_free_ntp_fltrs(). The lock should be held during normal run-time but the assert will be triggered (see below) during bnxt_remove_one() which should not need the lock. The netdev is already unregistered by then. Fix it by calling netdev_assert_locked_or_invisible() which will not assert if the netdev is unregistered. WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 2241 at ./include/net/netdev_lock.h:17 bnxt_free_ntp_fltrs+0xf8/0x100 [bnxt_en] Modules linked in: rpcrdma rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm configfs ib_core bnxt_en(-) bridge stp llc x86_pkg_temp_thermal xfs tg3 [last unloaded: bnxt_re] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 2241 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G S W 6.16.0 #2 PREEMPT(voluntary) Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [W]=WARN Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.4.3 01/17/2017 RIP: 0010:bnxt_free_ntp_fltrs+0xf8/0x100 [bnxt_en] Code: 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 cc cc cc cc 48 8b 47 60 be ff ff ff ff 48 8d b8 28 0c 00 00 e8 d0 cf 41 c3 85 c0 0f 85 2e ff ff ff <0f> 0b e9 27 ff ff ff 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 RSP: 0018:ffffa92082387da0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9e5b593d8000 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff83dc9a70 RDI: ffffffff83e1a1cf RBP: ffff9e5b593d8c80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff8373a2b3 R10: 000000008100009f R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffffffffc01c4478 R14: dead000000000122 R15: dead000000000100 FS: 00007f3a8a52c740(0000) GS:ffff9e631ad1c000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055bb289419c8 CR3: 000000011274e001 CR4: 00000000003706f0 Call Trace: <TASK> bnxt_remove_one+0x57/0x180 [bnxt_en] pci_device_remove+0x39/0xc0 device_release_driver_internal+0xa5/0x130 driver_detach+0x42/0x90 bus_remove_driver+0x61/0xc0 pci_unregister_driver+0x38/0x90 bnxt_exit+0xc/0x7d0 [bnxt_en] Fixes: 004b500 ("eth: bnxt: remove most dependencies on RTNL") Reviewed-by: Pavan Chebbi <pavan.chebbi@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Fedorenko <vadim.fedorenko@linux.dev> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250816183850.4125033-1-michael.chan@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
bardliao
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…dlock When a user creates a dualpi2 qdisc it automatically sets a timer. This timer will run constantly and update the qdisc's probability field. The issue is that the timer acquires the qdisc root lock and runs in hardirq. The qdisc root lock is also acquired in dev.c whenever a packet arrives for this qdisc. Since the dualpi2 timer callback runs in hardirq, it may interrupt the packet processing running in softirq. If that happens and it runs on the same CPU, it will acquire the same lock and cause a deadlock. The following splat shows up when running a kernel compiled with lock debugging: [ +0.000224] WARNING: inconsistent lock state [ +0.000224] 6.16.0+ #10 Not tainted [ +0.000169] -------------------------------- [ +0.000029] inconsistent {IN-HARDIRQ-W} -> {HARDIRQ-ON-W} usage. [ +0.000000] ping/156 [HC0[0]:SC0[2]:HE1:SE0] takes: [ +0.000000] ffff897841242110 (&sch->root_lock_key){?.-.}-{3:3}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x86d/0x1140 [ +0.000000] {IN-HARDIRQ-W} state was registered at: [ +0.000000] lock_acquire.part.0+0xb6/0x220 [ +0.000000] _raw_spin_lock+0x31/0x80 [ +0.000000] dualpi2_timer+0x6f/0x270 [ +0.000000] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1c5/0x360 [ +0.000000] hrtimer_interrupt+0x115/0x260 [ +0.000000] __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6d/0x1a0 [ +0.000000] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6e/0x80 [ +0.000000] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 [ +0.000000] pv_native_safe_halt+0xf/0x20 [ +0.000000] default_idle+0x9/0x10 [ +0.000000] default_idle_call+0x7e/0x1e0 [ +0.000000] do_idle+0x1e8/0x250 [ +0.000000] cpu_startup_entry+0x29/0x30 [ +0.000000] rest_init+0x151/0x160 [ +0.000000] start_kernel+0x6f3/0x700 [ +0.000000] x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x30 [ +0.000000] x86_64_start_kernel+0xc8/0xd0 [ +0.000000] common_startup_64+0x13e/0x148 [ +0.000000] irq event stamp: 6884 [ +0.000000] hardirqs last enabled at (6883): [<ffffffffa75700b3>] neigh_resolve_output+0x223/0x270 [ +0.000000] hardirqs last disabled at (6882): [<ffffffffa7570078>] neigh_resolve_output+0x1e8/0x270 [ +0.000000] softirqs last enabled at (6880): [<ffffffffa757006b>] neigh_resolve_output+0x1db/0x270 [ +0.000000] softirqs last disabled at (6884): [<ffffffffa755b533>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x73/0x1140 [ +0.000000] other info that might help us debug this: [ +0.000000] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ +0.000000] CPU0 [ +0.000000] ---- [ +0.000000] lock(&sch->root_lock_key); [ +0.000000] <Interrupt> [ +0.000000] lock(&sch->root_lock_key); [ +0.000000] *** DEADLOCK *** [ +0.000000] 4 locks held by ping/156: [ +0.000000] #0: ffff897842332e08 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: raw_sendmsg+0x41e/0xf40 [ +0.000000] #1: ffffffffa816f880 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: ip_output+0x2c/0x190 [ +0.000000] #2: ffffffffa816f880 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: ip_finish_output2+0xad/0x950 [ +0.000000] #3: ffffffffa816f840 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:3}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x73/0x1140 I am able to reproduce it consistently when running the following: tc qdisc add dev lo handle 1: root dualpi2 ping -f 127.0.0.1 To fix it, make the timer run in softirq. Fixes: 320d031 ("sched: Struct definition and parsing of dualpi2 qdisc") Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: Victor Nogueira <victor@mojatatu.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250815135317.664993-1-victor@mojatatu.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
bardliao
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Commit 3c7ac40 ("scsi: ufs: core: Delegate the interrupt service routine to a threaded IRQ handler") introduced an IRQ lock inversion issue. Fix this lock inversion by changing the spin_lock_irq() calls into spin_lock_irqsave() calls in code that can be called either from interrupt context or from thread context. This patch fixes the following lockdep complaint: WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected 6.12.30-android16-5-maybe-dirty-4k #1 Tainted: G W OE -------------------------------------------------------- kworker/u28:0/12 just changed the state of lock: ffffff881e29dd60 (&hba->clk_gating.lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: ufshcd_release_scsi_cmd+0x60/0x110 but this lock took another, HARDIRQ-unsafe lock in the past: (shost->host_lock){+.+.}-{2:2} and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them. other info that might help us debug this: Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(shost->host_lock); local_irq_disable(); lock(&hba->clk_gating.lock); lock(shost->host_lock); <Interrupt> lock(&hba->clk_gating.lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 4 locks held by kworker/u28:0/12: #0: ffffff8800ac6158 ((wq_completion)async){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1bc/0x65c #1: ffffffc085c93d70 ((work_completion)(&entry->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1e4/0x65c #2: ffffff881e29c0e0 (&shost->scan_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __scsi_add_device+0x74/0x120 #3: ffffff881960ea00 (&hwq->cq_lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0x28/0x104 the shortest dependencies between 2nd lock and 1st lock: -> (shost->host_lock){+.+.}-{2:2} { HARDIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4 _raw_spin_lock+0x48/0x64 ufshcd_sl_intr+0x4c/0xa08 ufshcd_threaded_intr+0x70/0x12c irq_thread_fn+0x48/0xa8 irq_thread+0x130/0x1ec kthread+0x110/0x134 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 SOFTIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4 _raw_spin_lock+0x48/0x64 ufshcd_sl_intr+0x4c/0xa08 ufshcd_threaded_intr+0x70/0x12c irq_thread_fn+0x48/0xa8 irq_thread+0x130/0x1ec kthread+0x110/0x134 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 INITIAL USE at: lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4 _raw_spin_lock+0x48/0x64 ufshcd_sl_intr+0x4c/0xa08 ufshcd_threaded_intr+0x70/0x12c irq_thread_fn+0x48/0xa8 irq_thread+0x130/0x1ec kthread+0x110/0x134 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 } ... key at: [<ffffffc085ba1a98>] scsi_host_alloc.__key+0x0/0x10 ... acquired at: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80 __ufshcd_release+0x78/0x118 ufshcd_send_uic_cmd+0xe4/0x118 ufshcd_dme_set_attr+0x88/0x1c8 ufs_google_phy_initialization+0x68/0x418 [ufs] ufs_google_link_startup_notify+0x78/0x27c [ufs] ufshcd_link_startup+0x84/0x720 ufshcd_init+0xf3c/0x1330 ufshcd_pltfrm_init+0x728/0x7d8 ufs_google_probe+0x30/0x84 [ufs] platform_probe+0xa0/0xe0 really_probe+0x114/0x454 __driver_probe_device+0xa4/0x160 driver_probe_device+0x44/0x23c __driver_attach_async_helper+0x60/0xd4 async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x17c process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c worker_thread+0x33c/0x498 kthread+0x110/0x134 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 -> (&hba->clk_gating.lock){-...}-{2:2} { IN-HARDIRQ-W at: lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80 ufshcd_release_scsi_cmd+0x60/0x110 ufshcd_compl_one_cqe+0x2c0/0x3f4 ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0xb0/0x104 ufs_google_mcq_intr+0x80/0xa0 [ufs] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x104/0x32c handle_irq_event+0x40/0x9c handle_fasteoi_irq+0x170/0x2e8 generic_handle_domain_irq+0x58/0x80 gic_handle_irq+0x48/0x104 call_on_irq_stack+0x3c/0x50 do_interrupt_handler+0x7c/0xd8 el1_interrupt+0x34/0x58 el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24 el1h_64_irq+0x68/0x6c _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x6c debug_object_assert_init+0x16c/0x21c __mod_timer+0x4c/0x48c schedule_timeout+0xd4/0x16c io_schedule_timeout+0x48/0x70 do_wait_for_common+0x100/0x194 wait_for_completion_io_timeout+0x48/0x6c blk_execute_rq+0x124/0x17c scsi_execute_cmd+0x18c/0x3f8 scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0x204/0xd74 __scsi_add_device+0xbc/0x120 ufshcd_async_scan+0x80/0x3c0 async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x17c process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c worker_thread+0x33c/0x498 kthread+0x110/0x134 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 INITIAL USE at: lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80 ufshcd_hold+0x34/0x14c ufshcd_send_uic_cmd+0x28/0x118 ufshcd_dme_set_attr+0x88/0x1c8 ufs_google_phy_initialization+0x68/0x418 [ufs] ufs_google_link_startup_notify+0x78/0x27c [ufs] ufshcd_link_startup+0x84/0x720 ufshcd_init+0xf3c/0x1330 ufshcd_pltfrm_init+0x728/0x7d8 ufs_google_probe+0x30/0x84 [ufs] platform_probe+0xa0/0xe0 really_probe+0x114/0x454 __driver_probe_device+0xa4/0x160 driver_probe_device+0x44/0x23c __driver_attach_async_helper+0x60/0xd4 async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x17c process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c worker_thread+0x33c/0x498 kthread+0x110/0x134 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 } ... key at: [<ffffffc085ba6fe8>] ufshcd_init.__key+0x0/0x10 ... acquired at: mark_lock+0x1c4/0x224 __lock_acquire+0x438/0x2e1c lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80 ufshcd_release_scsi_cmd+0x60/0x110 ufshcd_compl_one_cqe+0x2c0/0x3f4 ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0xb0/0x104 ufs_google_mcq_intr+0x80/0xa0 [ufs] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x104/0x32c handle_irq_event+0x40/0x9c handle_fasteoi_irq+0x170/0x2e8 generic_handle_domain_irq+0x58/0x80 gic_handle_irq+0x48/0x104 call_on_irq_stack+0x3c/0x50 do_interrupt_handler+0x7c/0xd8 el1_interrupt+0x34/0x58 el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24 el1h_64_irq+0x68/0x6c _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x6c debug_object_assert_init+0x16c/0x21c __mod_timer+0x4c/0x48c schedule_timeout+0xd4/0x16c io_schedule_timeout+0x48/0x70 do_wait_for_common+0x100/0x194 wait_for_completion_io_timeout+0x48/0x6c blk_execute_rq+0x124/0x17c scsi_execute_cmd+0x18c/0x3f8 scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0x204/0xd74 __scsi_add_device+0xbc/0x120 ufshcd_async_scan+0x80/0x3c0 async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x17c process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c worker_thread+0x33c/0x498 kthread+0x110/0x134 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 stack backtrace: CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/u28:0 Tainted: G W OE 6.12.30-android16-5-maybe-dirty-4k #1 ccd4020fe444bdf629efc3b86df6be920b8df7d0 Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: Spacecraft board based on MALIBU (DT) Workqueue: async async_run_entry_fn Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xfc/0x17c show_stack+0x18/0x28 dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0xa0 dump_stack+0x18/0x24 print_irq_inversion_bug+0x2fc/0x304 mark_lock_irq+0x388/0x4fc mark_lock+0x1c4/0x224 __lock_acquire+0x438/0x2e1c lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80 ufshcd_release_scsi_cmd+0x60/0x110 ufshcd_compl_one_cqe+0x2c0/0x3f4 ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0xb0/0x104 ufs_google_mcq_intr+0x80/0xa0 [ufs dd6f385554e109da094ab91d5f7be18625a2222a] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x104/0x32c handle_irq_event+0x40/0x9c handle_fasteoi_irq+0x170/0x2e8 generic_handle_domain_irq+0x58/0x80 gic_handle_irq+0x48/0x104 call_on_irq_stack+0x3c/0x50 do_interrupt_handler+0x7c/0xd8 el1_interrupt+0x34/0x58 el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24 el1h_64_irq+0x68/0x6c _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x6c debug_object_assert_init+0x16c/0x21c __mod_timer+0x4c/0x48c schedule_timeout+0xd4/0x16c io_schedule_timeout+0x48/0x70 do_wait_for_common+0x100/0x194 wait_for_completion_io_timeout+0x48/0x6c blk_execute_rq+0x124/0x17c scsi_execute_cmd+0x18c/0x3f8 scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0x204/0xd74 __scsi_add_device+0xbc/0x120 ufshcd_async_scan+0x80/0x3c0 async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x17c process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c worker_thread+0x33c/0x498 kthread+0x110/0x134 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Cc: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org> Cc: André Draszik <andre.draszik@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Peter Wang <peter.wang@mediatek.com> Fixes: 3c7ac40 ("scsi: ufs: core: Delegate the interrupt service routine to a threaded IRQ handler") Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250815155842.472867-2-bvanassche@acm.org Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
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These iterations require the read lock, otherwise RCU lockdep will splat: ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.17.0-rc3-00014-g31419c045d64 #6 Tainted: G O ----------------------------- drivers/base/power/main.c:1333 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 5 locks held by rtcwake/547: #0: 00000000643ab418 (sb_writers#6){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: file_start_write+0x2b/0x3a #1: 0000000067a0ca88 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x181/0x24b #2: 00000000631eac40 (kn->active#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x191/0x24b #3: 00000000609a1308 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: pm_suspend+0xaf/0x30b #4: 0000000060c0fdb0 (device_links_srcu){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: device_links_read_lock+0x75/0x98 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 547 Comm: rtcwake Tainted: G O 6.17.0-rc3-00014-g31419c045d64 #6 VOLUNTARY Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE Stack: 223721b3a80 6089eac6 00000001 00000001 ffffff00 6089eac6 00000535 6086e528 721b3ac0 6003c294 00000000 60031fc0 Call Trace: [<600407ed>] show_stack+0x10e/0x127 [<6003c294>] dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xc6 [<6003c2fd>] dump_stack+0x1a/0x20 [<600bc2f8>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x116/0x13e [<603d8ea1>] dpm_async_suspend_superior+0x117/0x17e [<603d980f>] device_suspend+0x528/0x541 [<603da24b>] dpm_suspend+0x1a2/0x267 [<603da837>] dpm_suspend_start+0x5d/0x72 [<600ca0c9>] suspend_devices_and_enter+0xab/0x736 [...] Add the fourth argument to the iteration to annotate this and avoid the splat. Fixes: 0679963 ("PM: sleep: Make async suspend handle suppliers like parents") Fixes: ed18738 ("PM: sleep: Make async resume handle consumers like children") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250826134348.aba79f6e6299.I9ecf55da46ccf33778f2c018a82e1819d815b348@changeid Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
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With CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_TIMERS unloading hfcpci module leads to the following splat: [ 250.215892] ODEBUG: assert_init not available (active state 0) object: ffffffffc01a3dc0 object type: timer_list hint: 0x0 [ 250.217520] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 233 at lib/debugobjects.c:612 debug_print_object+0x1b6/0x2c0 [ 250.218775] Modules linked in: hfcpci(-) mISDN_core [ 250.219537] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 233 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2-g6f713187ac98 #2 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 250.220940] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 250.222377] RIP: 0010:debug_print_object+0x1b6/0x2c0 [ 250.223131] Code: fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 75 4f 41 56 48 8b 14 dd a0 4e 01 9f 48 89 ee 48 c7 c7 20 46 01 9f e8 cb 84d [ 250.225805] RSP: 0018:ffff888015ea7c08 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 250.226608] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: ffffffff9be93a95 [ 250.227708] RDX: 1ffff1100d945138 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88806ca289c0 [ 250.228993] RBP: ffffffff9f014a00 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1002bd4f39 [ 250.230043] R10: ffff888015ea79cf R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 250.231185] R13: ffffffff9eea0520 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888015ea7cc8 [ 250.232454] FS: 00007f3208f01540(0000) GS:ffff8880caf5a000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 250.233851] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 250.234856] CR2: 00007f32090a7421 CR3: 0000000004d63000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 250.236117] Call Trace: [ 250.236599] <TASK> [ 250.236967] ? trace_irq_enable.constprop.0+0xd4/0x130 [ 250.237920] debug_object_assert_init+0x1f6/0x310 [ 250.238762] ? __pfx_debug_object_assert_init+0x10/0x10 [ 250.239658] ? __lock_acquire+0xdea/0x1c70 [ 250.240369] __try_to_del_timer_sync+0x69/0x140 [ 250.241172] ? __pfx___try_to_del_timer_sync+0x10/0x10 [ 250.242058] ? __timer_delete_sync+0xc6/0x120 [ 250.242842] ? lock_acquire+0x30/0x80 [ 250.243474] ? __timer_delete_sync+0xc6/0x120 [ 250.244262] __timer_delete_sync+0x98/0x120 [ 250.245015] HFC_cleanup+0x10/0x20 [hfcpci] [ 250.245704] __do_sys_delete_module+0x348/0x510 [ 250.246461] ? __pfx___do_sys_delete_module+0x10/0x10 [ 250.247338] do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x360 [ 250.247924] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Fix this by initializing hfc_tl timer with DEFINE_TIMER macro. Also, use mod_timer instead of manual timeout update. Fixes: 87c5fa1 ("mISDN: Add different different timer settings for hfc-pci") Fixes: 175302f ("mISDN: hfcpci: Fix use-after-free bug in hfcpci_softirq") Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <ferr.lambarginio@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/aKiy2D_LiWpQ5kXq@vova-pc Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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If preparing a write bio fails then blk_zone_wplug_bio_work() calls
bio_endio() with zwplug->lock held. If a device mapper driver is stacked
on top of the zoned block device then this results in nested locking of
zwplug->lock. The resulting lockdep complaint is a false positive
because this is nested locking and not recursive locking. Suppress this
false positive by calling blk_zone_wplug_bio_io_error() without holding
zwplug->lock. This is safe because no code in
blk_zone_wplug_bio_io_error() depends on zwplug->lock being held. This
patch suppresses the following lockdep complaint:
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
--------------------------------------------
kworker/3:0H/46 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffff882968b830 (&zwplug->lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: blk_zone_write_plug_bio_endio+0x64/0x1f0
but task is already holding lock:
ffffff88315bc230 (&zwplug->lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: blk_zone_wplug_bio_work+0x8c/0x48c
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(&zwplug->lock);
lock(&zwplug->lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
May be due to missing lock nesting notation
3 locks held by kworker/3:0H/46:
#0: ffffff8809486758 ((wq_completion)sdd_zwplugs){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1bc/0x65c
#1: ffffffc085de3d70 ((work_completion)(&zwplug->bio_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1e4/0x65c
#2: ffffff88315bc230 (&zwplug->lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: blk_zone_wplug_bio_work+0x8c/0x48c
stack backtrace:
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 46 Comm: kworker/3:0H Tainted: G W OE 6.12.38-android16-5-maybe-dirty-4k #1 8b362b6f76e3645a58cd27d86982bce10d150025
Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: Spacecraft board based on MALIBU (DT)
Workqueue: sdd_zwplugs blk_zone_wplug_bio_work
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0xfc/0x17c
show_stack+0x18/0x28
dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0xa0
dump_stack+0x18/0x24
print_deadlock_bug+0x38c/0x398
__lock_acquire+0x13e8/0x2e1c
lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80
blk_zone_write_plug_bio_endio+0x64/0x1f0
bio_endio+0x9c/0x240
__dm_io_complete+0x214/0x260
clone_endio+0xe8/0x214
bio_endio+0x218/0x240
blk_zone_wplug_bio_work+0x204/0x48c
process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c
worker_thread+0x33c/0x498
kthread+0x110/0x134
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Fixes: dd291d7 ("block: Introduce zone write plugging")
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250825182720.1697203-1-bvanassche@acm.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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…ux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 changes for 6.17, take #2 - Correctly handle 'invariant' system registers for protected VMs - Improved handling of VNCR data aborts, including external aborts - Fixes for handling of FEAT_RAS for NV guests, providing a sane fault context during SEA injection and preventing the use of RASv1p1 fault injection hardware - Ensure that page table destruction when a VM is destroyed gives an opportunity to reschedule - Large fix to KVM's infrastructure for managing guest context loaded on the CPU, addressing issues where the output of AT emulation doesn't get reflected to the guest - Fix AT S12 emulation to actually perform stage-2 translation when necessary - Avoid attempting vLPI irqbypass when GICv4 has been explicitly disabled for a VM - Minor KVM + selftest fixes
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In gicv5_irs_of_init_affinity() a WARN_ON() is triggered if:
1) a phandle in the "cpus" property does not correspond to a valid OF
node
2 a CPU logical id does not exist for a given OF cpu_node
#1 is a firmware bug and should be reported as such but does not warrant a
WARN_ON() backtrace.
#2 is not necessarily an error condition (eg a kernel can be booted with
nr_cpus=X limiting the number of cores artificially) and therefore there
is no reason to clutter the kernel log with WARN_ON() output when the
condition is hit.
Rework the IRS affinity parsing code to remove undue WARN_ON()s thus
making it less noisy.
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lpieralisi@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250814094138.1611017-1-lpieralisi@kernel.org
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When the "proxy" option is enabled on a VXLAN device, the device will suppress ARP requests and IPv6 Neighbor Solicitation messages if it is able to reply on behalf of the remote host. That is, if a matching and valid neighbor entry is configured on the VXLAN device whose MAC address is not behind the "any" remote (0.0.0.0 / ::). The code currently assumes that the FDB entry for the neighbor's MAC address points to a valid remote destination, but this is incorrect if the entry is associated with an FDB nexthop group. This can result in a NPD [1][3] which can be reproduced using [2][4]. Fix by checking that the remote destination exists before dereferencing it. [1] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [...] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 365 Comm: arping Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2-virtme-g2a89cb21162c #2 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-4.fc41 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:vxlan_xmit+0xb58/0x15f0 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> dev_hard_start_xmit+0x5d/0x1c0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x246/0xfd0 packet_sendmsg+0x113a/0x1850 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x70 __sys_sendto+0x126/0x180 __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30 do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 [2] #!/bin/bash ip address add 192.0.2.1/32 dev lo ip nexthop add id 1 via 192.0.2.2 fdb ip nexthop add id 10 group 1 fdb ip link add name vx0 up type vxlan id 10010 local 192.0.2.1 dstport 4789 proxy ip neigh add 192.0.2.3 lladdr 00:11:22:33:44:55 nud perm dev vx0 bridge fdb add 00:11:22:33:44:55 dev vx0 self static nhid 10 arping -b -c 1 -s 192.0.2.1 -I vx0 192.0.2.3 [3] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [...] CPU: 13 UID: 0 PID: 372 Comm: ndisc6 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2-virtmne-g6ee90cb26014 #3 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1v996), BIOS 1.17.0-4.fc41 04/01/2x014 RIP: 0010:vxlan_xmit+0x803/0x1600 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> dev_hard_start_xmit+0x5d/0x1c0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x246/0xfd0 ip6_finish_output2+0x210/0x6c0 ip6_finish_output+0x1af/0x2b0 ip6_mr_output+0x92/0x3e0 ip6_send_skb+0x30/0x90 rawv6_sendmsg+0xe6e/0x12e0 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x70 __sys_sendto+0x126/0x180 __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30 do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7f383422ec77 [4] #!/bin/bash ip address add 2001:db8:1::1/128 dev lo ip nexthop add id 1 via 2001:db8:1::1 fdb ip nexthop add id 10 group 1 fdb ip link add name vx0 up type vxlan id 10010 local 2001:db8:1::1 dstport 4789 proxy ip neigh add 2001:db8:1::3 lladdr 00:11:22:33:44:55 nud perm dev vx0 bridge fdb add 00:11:22:33:44:55 dev vx0 self static nhid 10 ndisc6 -r 1 -s 2001:db8:1::1 -w 1 2001:db8:1::3 vx0 Fixes: 1274e1c ("vxlan: ecmp support for mac fdb entries") Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250901065035.159644-3-idosch@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Ido Schimmel says:
====================
vxlan: Fix NPDs when using nexthop objects
With FDB nexthop groups, VXLAN FDB entries do not necessarily point to
a remote destination but rather to an FDB nexthop group. This means that
first_remote_{rcu,rtnl}() can return NULL and a few places in the driver
were not ready for that, resulting in NULL pointer dereferences.
Patches #1-#2 fix these NPDs.
Note that vxlan_fdb_find_uc() still dereferences the remote returned by
first_remote_rcu() without checking that it is not NULL, but this
function is only invoked by a single driver which vetoes the creation of
FDB nexthop groups. I will patch this in net-next to make the code less
fragile.
Patch #3 adds a selftests which exercises these code paths and tests
basic Tx functionality with FDB nexthop groups. I verified that the test
crashes the kernel without the first two patches.
====================
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250901065035.159644-1-idosch@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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When transmitting a PTP frame which is timestamp using 2 step, the following warning appears if CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING is enabled: ============================= [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 6.17.0-rc1-00326-ge6160462704e #427 Not tainted ----------------------------- ptp4l/119 is trying to lock: c2a44ed4 (&vsc8531->ts_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: vsc85xx_txtstamp+0x50/0xac other info that might help us debug this: context-{4:4} 4 locks held by ptp4l/119: #0: c145f068 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x58/0x1440 #1: c29df974 (dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock){+...}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x5c4/0x1440 #2: c2aaaad0 (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sch_direct_xmit+0x108/0x350 #3: c2aac170 (&lan966x->tx_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: lan966x_port_xmit+0xd0/0x350 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 119 Comm: ptp4l Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1-00326-ge6160462704e #427 NONE Hardware name: Generic DT based system Call trace: unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14 show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x7c/0xac dump_stack_lvl from __lock_acquire+0x8e8/0x29dc __lock_acquire from lock_acquire+0x108/0x38c lock_acquire from __mutex_lock+0xb0/0xe78 __mutex_lock from mutex_lock_nested+0x1c/0x24 mutex_lock_nested from vsc85xx_txtstamp+0x50/0xac vsc85xx_txtstamp from lan966x_fdma_xmit+0xd8/0x3a8 lan966x_fdma_xmit from lan966x_port_xmit+0x1bc/0x350 lan966x_port_xmit from dev_hard_start_xmit+0xc8/0x2c0 dev_hard_start_xmit from sch_direct_xmit+0x8c/0x350 sch_direct_xmit from __dev_queue_xmit+0x680/0x1440 __dev_queue_xmit from packet_sendmsg+0xfa4/0x1568 packet_sendmsg from __sys_sendto+0x110/0x19c __sys_sendto from sys_send+0x18/0x20 sys_send from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c Exception stack(0xf0b05fa8 to 0xf0b05ff0) 5fa0: 00000001 0000000 0000000 0004b47a 0000003a 00000000 5fc0: 00000001 0000000 00000000 00000121 0004af58 00044874 00000000 00000000 5fe0: 00000001 bee9d420 00025a10 b6e75c7c So, instead of using the ts_lock for tx_queue, use the spinlock that skb_buff_head has. Reviewed-by: Vadim Fedorenko <vadim.fedorenko@linux.dev> Fixes: 7d272e6 ("net: phy: mscc: timestamping and PHC support") Signed-off-by: Horatiu Vultur <horatiu.vultur@microchip.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250902121259.3257536-1-horatiu.vultur@microchip.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Since blamed commit, unregister_netdevice_many_notify() takes the netdev
mutex if the device needs it.
If the device list is too long, this will lock more device mutexes than
lockdep can handle:
unshare -n \
bash -c 'for i in $(seq 1 100);do ip link add foo$i type dummy;done'
BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low!
turning off the locking correctness validator.
depth: 48 max: 48!
48 locks held by kworker/u16:1/69:
#0: ..148 ((wq_completion)netns){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
#1: ..d40 (net_cleanup_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
#2: ..bd0 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: cleanup_net
#3: ..aa8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: default_device_exit_batch
#4: ..cb0 (&dev_instance_lock_key#3){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: unregister_netdevice_many_notify
[..]
Add a helper to close and then unlock a list of net_devices.
Devices that are not up have to be skipped - netif_close_many always
removes them from the list without any other actions taken, so they'd
remain in locked state.
Close devices whenever we've used up half of the tracking slots or we
processed entire list without hitting the limit.
Fixes: 7e4d784 ("net: hold netdev instance lock during rtnetlink operations")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251013185052.14021-1-fw@strlen.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Expand the prefault memory selftest to add a regression test for a KVM bug where KVM's retry logic would result in (breakable) deadlock due to the memslot deletion waiting on prefaulting to release SRCU, and prefaulting waiting on the memslot to fully disappear (KVM uses a two-step process to delete memslots, and KVM x86 retries page faults if a to-be-deleted, a.k.a. INVALID, memslot is encountered). To exercise concurrent memslot remove, spawn a second thread to initiate memslot removal at roughly the same time as prefaulting. Test memslot removal for all testcases, i.e. don't limit concurrent removal to only the success case. There are essentially three prefault scenarios (so far) that are of interest: 1. Success 2. ENOENT due to no memslot 3. EAGAIN due to INVALID memslot For all intents and purposes, #1 and #2 are mutually exclusive, or rather, easier to test via separate testcases since writing to non-existent memory is trivial. But for #3, making it mutually exclusive with #1 _or_ #2 is actually more complex than testing memslot removal for all scenarios. The only requirement to let memslot removal coexist with other scenarios is a way to guarantee a stable result, e.g. that the "no memslot" test observes ENOENT, not EAGAIN, for the final checks. So, rather than make memslot removal mutually exclusive with the ENOENT scenario, simply restore the memslot and retry prefaulting. For the "no memslot" case, KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY should be idempotent, i.e. should always fail with ENOENT regardless of how many times userspace attempts prefaulting. Pass in both the base GPA and the offset (instead of the "full" GPA) so that the worker can recreate the memslot. Signed-off-by: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250924174255.2141847-1-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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The original code causes a circular locking dependency found by lockdep. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ #1 Tainted: G S U ------------------------------------------------------ xe_fault_inject/5091 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888156815688 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 but task is already holding lock: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: mutex_lock_nested+0x4e/0xc0 devcd_data_write+0x27/0x90 sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x80/0xf0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #1 (kn->active#236){++++}-{0:0}: kernfs_drain+0x1e2/0x200 __kernfs_remove+0xae/0x400 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x5d/0xc0 remove_files+0x54/0x70 sysfs_remove_group+0x3d/0xa0 sysfs_remove_groups+0x2e/0x60 device_remove_attrs+0xc7/0x100 device_del+0x15d/0x3b0 devcd_del+0x19/0x30 process_one_work+0x22b/0x6f0 worker_thread+0x1e8/0x3d0 kthread+0x11c/0x250 ret_from_fork+0x26c/0x2e0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe] devm_action_release+0x12/0x30 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work) --> kn->active#236 --> &devcd->mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&devcd->mutex); lock(kn->active#236); lock(&devcd->mutex); lock((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by xe_fault_inject/5091: #0: ffff8881129f9488 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 #1: ffff88810c755078 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x123/0x220 #2: ffff8881054811a0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x55/0x280 #3: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0 #4: ffffffff8359e020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x72/0x660 stack backtrace: CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 5091 Comm: xe_fault_inject Tainted: G S U 6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ #1 PREEMPT_{RT,(lazy)} Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [U]=USER Hardware name: Micro-Star International Co., Ltd. MS-7D25/PRO Z690-A DDR4(MS-7D25), BIOS 1.10 12/13/2021 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360 check_noncircular+0x135/0x150 ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x4a0 __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 ? mark_held_locks+0x46/0x90 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1e/0xd0 ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe] devm_action_release+0x12/0x30 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280 ? bus_find_device+0xa8/0xe0 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 ? __f_unlock_pos+0x15/0x20 ? __x64_sys_getdents64+0x9b/0x130 ? __pfx_filldir64+0x10/0x10 ? do_syscall_64+0x1a2/0xb60 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x76e292edd574 Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d d5 ea 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89 RSP: 002b:00007fffe247a828 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000076e292edd574 RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 00006267f6306063 RDI: 000000000000000b RBP: 000000000000000c R08: 000076e292fc4b20 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00006267f6306063 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00006267e6859c00 R15: 000076e29322a000 </TASK> xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] Xe device coredump has been deleted. Fixes: 01daccf ("devcoredump : Serialize devcd_del work") Cc: Mukesh Ojha <quic_mojha@quicinc.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael@kernel.org> Cc: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.1+ Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <dev@lankhorst.se> Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com> Acked-by: Mukesh Ojha <mukesh.ojha@oss.qualcomm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250723142416.1020423-1-dev@lankhorst.se Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Michael Chan says: ==================== bnxt_en: Bug fixes Patches 1, 3, and 4 are bug fixes related to the FW log tracing driver coredump feature recently added in 6.13. Patch #1 adds the necessary call to shutdown the FW logging DMA during PCI shutdown. Patch #3 fixes a possible null pointer derefernce when using early versions of the FW with this feature. Patch #4 adds the coredump header information unconditionally to make it more robust. Patch #2 fixes a possible memory leak during PTP shutdown. Patch #5 eliminates a dmesg warning when doing devlink reload. ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251104005700.542174-1-michael.chan@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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On completion of i915_vma_pin_ww(), a synchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() is called. When pinning a VMA to GGTT address space on a Cherry View family processor, or on a Broxton generation SoC with VTD enabled, i.e., when stop_machine() is then called from intel_ggtt_bind_vma(), that can potentially lead to lock inversion among reservation_ww and cpu_hotplug locks. [86.861179] ====================================================== [86.861193] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [86.861209] 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 Tainted: G U [86.861226] ------------------------------------------------------ [86.861238] i915_module_loa/1432 is trying to acquire lock: [86.861252] ffffffff83489090 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.861290] but task is already holding lock: [86.861303] ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.862233] which lock already depends on the new lock. [86.862251] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [86.862265] -> #5 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [86.862292] dma_resv_lockdep+0x19a/0x390 [86.862315] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862334] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862353] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862369] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862383] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862399] -> #4 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}: [86.862425] dma_resv_lockdep+0x178/0x390 [86.862440] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862454] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862470] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862482] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862495] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862509] -> #3 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}: [86.862531] down_read_killable+0x46/0x1e0 [86.862546] lock_mm_and_find_vma+0xa2/0x280 [86.862561] do_user_addr_fault+0x266/0x8e0 [86.862578] exc_page_fault+0x8a/0x2f0 [86.862593] asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 [86.862607] filldir64+0xeb/0x180 [86.862620] kernfs_fop_readdir+0x118/0x480 [86.862635] iterate_dir+0xcf/0x2b0 [86.862648] __x64_sys_getdents64+0x84/0x140 [86.862661] x64_sys_call+0x1058/0x2660 [86.862675] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.862689] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.862703] -> #2 (&root->kernfs_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}: [86.862725] down_write+0x3e/0xf0 [86.862738] kernfs_add_one+0x30/0x3c0 [86.862751] kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x53/0xb0 [86.862765] internal_create_group+0x134/0x4c0 [86.862779] sysfs_create_group+0x13/0x20 [86.862792] topology_add_dev+0x1d/0x30 [86.862806] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x4b5/0x850 [86.862822] cpuhp_issue_call+0xbf/0x1f0 [86.862836] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x111/0x320 [86.862852] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 [86.862866] topology_sysfs_init+0x30/0x50 [86.862879] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862893] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862908] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862921] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862934] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862947] -> #1 (cpuhp_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [86.862969] __mutex_lock+0xaa/0xed0 [86.862982] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [86.862995] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x67/0x320 [86.863012] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 [86.863026] page_alloc_init_cpuhp+0x2d/0x60 [86.863041] mm_core_init+0x22/0x2d0 [86.863054] start_kernel+0x576/0xbd0 [86.863068] x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 [86.863084] x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110 [86.863098] common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 [86.863114] -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: [86.863135] __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810 [86.863152] lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 [86.863166] cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100 [86.863180] stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.863194] bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915] [86.863987] intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915] [86.864735] __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915] [86.865510] fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915] [86.866248] fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915] [86.866983] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915] [86.867719] i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915] [86.868453] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915] [86.869228] i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915] [86.870001] initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915] [86.870774] intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915] [86.871546] intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915] [86.872330] i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915] [86.873057] i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915] [86.873782] local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0 [86.873802] pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260 [86.873817] really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0 [86.873833] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180 [86.873848] driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0 [86.873862] __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220 [86.873876] bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0 [86.873892] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30 [86.873904] bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290 [86.873917] driver_register+0x5e/0x130 [86.873931] __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90 [86.873945] i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915] [86.874678] i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915] [86.875347] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.875369] do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0 [86.875385] load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80 [86.875398] init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.875413] idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330 [86.875426] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100 [86.875440] x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660 [86.875454] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.875470] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.875486] other info that might help us debug this: [86.875502] Chain exists of: cpu_hotplug_lock --> reservation_ww_class_acquire --> reservation_ww_class_mutex [86.875539] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [86.875552] CPU0 CPU1 [86.875563] ---- ---- [86.875573] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [86.875588] lock(reservation_ww_class_acquire); [86.875606] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [86.875624] rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock); [86.875637] *** DEADLOCK *** [86.875650] 3 locks held by i915_module_loa/1432: [86.875663] #0: ffff888101f5c1b0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __driver_attach+0x104/0x220 [86.875699] #1: ffffc90002e0b4a0 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.876512] #2: ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.877305] stack backtrace: [86.877326] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1432 Comm: i915_module_loa Tainted: G U 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) [86.877334] Tainted: [U]=USER [86.877336] Hardware name: /NUC5CPYB, BIOS PYBSWCEL.86A.0079.2020.0420.1316 04/20/2020 [86.877339] Call Trace: [86.877344] <TASK> [86.877353] dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 [86.877364] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [86.877369] print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360 [86.877379] check_noncircular+0x135/0x150 [86.877390] __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810 [86.877403] lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 [86.877408] ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.877422] ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.878173] cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100 [86.878182] ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.878191] ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.878916] stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.878927] bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915] [86.879652] intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915] [86.880375] __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915] [86.881133] fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915] [86.881851] fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915] [86.882566] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915] [86.883286] i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915] [86.884003] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915] [86.884756] ? i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x6c/0x1d0 [i915] [86.885513] i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915] [86.886281] initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915] [86.887049] intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915] [86.887819] intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915] [86.888587] i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915] [86.889293] ? mutex_unlock+0x12/0x20 [86.889301] ? drm_privacy_screen_get+0x171/0x190 [86.889308] ? acpi_dev_found+0x66/0x80 [86.889321] i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915] [86.890038] local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0 [86.890049] pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260 [86.890058] really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0 [86.890067] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180 [86.890072] driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0 [86.890078] __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220 [86.890083] ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 [86.890088] bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0 [86.890097] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30 [86.890101] bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290 [86.890107] driver_register+0x5e/0x130 [86.890113] __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90 [86.890119] i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915] [86.890833] i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915] [86.891482] ? __pfx_i915_init+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.892135] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.892145] ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x33f/0x470 [86.892157] do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0 [86.892164] load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80 [86.892168] ? __kernel_read+0x15c/0x300 [86.892185] ? kernel_read_file+0x2b1/0x320 [86.892195] init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.892199] ? init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.892211] idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330 [86.892224] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100 [86.892230] x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660 [86.892236] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.892243] ? irqentry_exit+0x77/0xb0 [86.892249] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0 [86.892256] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.892261] RIP: 0033:0x7303e1b2725d [86.892271] Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 8b bb 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [86.892276] RSP: 002b:00007ffddd1fdb38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 [86.892281] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005d771d88fd90 RCX: 00007303e1b2725d [86.892285] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00005d771d893aa0 RDI: 000000000000000c [86.892287] RBP: 00007ffddd1fdbf0 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 00007ffddd1fdb80 [86.892289] R10: 00007303e1c03b20 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005d771d893aa0 [86.892292] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00005d771d88f0d0 R15: 00005d771d895710 [86.892304] </TASK> Call asynchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() in that case. v3: Provide more verbose in-line comment (Andi), - mention target environments in commit message. Fixes: 7d1c261 ("drm/i915: Take reservation lock around i915_vma_pin.") Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/i915/kernel/-/issues/14985 Cc: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Janusz Krzysztofik <janusz.krzysztofik@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Sebastian Brzezinka <sebastian.brzezinka@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Karas <krzysztof.karas@intel.com> Acked-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251023082925.351307-6-janusz.krzysztofik@linux.intel.com (cherry picked from commit 648ef13) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
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When a connector is connected but inactive (e.g., disabled by desktop environments), pipe_ctx->stream_res.tg will be destroyed. Then, reading odm_combine_segments causes kernel NULL pointer dereference. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 16 UID: 0 PID: 26474 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.17.0+ #2 PREEMPT(lazy) e6a17af9ee6db7c63e9d90dbe5b28ccab67520c6 Hardware name: LENOVO 21Q4/LNVNB161216, BIOS PXCN25WW 03/27/2025 RIP: 0010:odm_combine_segments_show+0x93/0xf0 [amdgpu] Code: 41 83 b8 b0 00 00 00 01 75 6e 48 98 ba a1 ff ff ff 48 c1 e0 0c 48 8d 8c 07 d8 02 00 00 48 85 c9 74 2d 48 8b bc 07 f0 08 00 00 <48> 8b 07 48 8b 80 08 02 00> RSP: 0018:ffffd1bf4b953c58 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000005000 RBX: ffff8e35976b02d0 RCX: ffff8e3aeed052d8 RDX: 00000000ffffffa1 RSI: ffff8e35a3120800 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8e3580eb0000 R09: ffff8e35976b02d0 R10: ffffd1bf4b953c78 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffd1bf4b953d08 R13: 0000000000040000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f44d3f9f740(0000) GS:ffff8e3caa47f000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000006485c2000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> seq_read_iter+0x125/0x490 ? __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x18f/0x350 seq_read+0x12c/0x170 full_proxy_read+0x51/0x80 vfs_read+0xbc/0x390 ? __handle_mm_fault+0xa46/0xef0 ? do_syscall_64+0x71/0x900 ksys_read+0x73/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x71/0x900 ? count_memcg_events+0xc2/0x190 ? handle_mm_fault+0x1d7/0x2d0 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x21a/0x690 ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74 RIP: 0033:0x7f44d4031687 Code: 48 89 fa 4c 89 df e8 58 b3 00 00 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 1a 5b c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 44 24 10 0f 05 <5b> c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00> RSP: 002b:00007ffdb4b5f0b0 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f44d3f9f740 RCX: 00007f44d4031687 RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: 00007f44d3f5e000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000040000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007f44d3f5e000 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000040000 </TASK> Modules linked in: tls tcp_diag inet_diag xt_mark ccm snd_hrtimer snd_seq_dummy snd_seq_midi snd_seq_oss snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi snd_seq snd_seq_device x> snd_hda_codec_atihdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek_lib lenovo_wmi_helpers think_lmi snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_soc_core kvm snd_compress uvcvideo sn> platform_profile joydev amd_pmc mousedev mac_hid sch_fq_codel uinput i2c_dev parport_pc ppdev lp parport nvme_fabrics loop nfnetlink ip_tables x_tables dm_cryp> CR2: 0000000000000000 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:odm_combine_segments_show+0x93/0xf0 [amdgpu] Code: 41 83 b8 b0 00 00 00 01 75 6e 48 98 ba a1 ff ff ff 48 c1 e0 0c 48 8d 8c 07 d8 02 00 00 48 85 c9 74 2d 48 8b bc 07 f0 08 00 00 <48> 8b 07 48 8b 80 08 02 00> RSP: 0018:ffffd1bf4b953c58 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000005000 RBX: ffff8e35976b02d0 RCX: ffff8e3aeed052d8 RDX: 00000000ffffffa1 RSI: ffff8e35a3120800 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8e3580eb0000 R09: ffff8e35976b02d0 R10: ffffd1bf4b953c78 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffd1bf4b953d08 R13: 0000000000040000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f44d3f9f740(0000) GS:ffff8e3caa47f000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000006485c2000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Fix this by checking pipe_ctx->stream_res.tg before dereferencing. Fixes: 07926ba ("drm/amd/display: Add debugfs interface for ODM combine info") Signed-off-by: Rong Zhang <i@rong.moe> Reviewed-by: Mario Limoncello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> (cherry picked from commit f19bbec) Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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into HEAD KVM/riscv fixes for 6.18, take #2 - Fix check for local interrupts on riscv32 - Read HGEIP CSR on the correct cpu when checking for IMSIC interrupts - Remove automatic I/O mapping from kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region()
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Add VMX exit handlers for SEAMCALL and TDCALL to inject a #UD if a non-TD guest attempts to execute SEAMCALL or TDCALL. Neither SEAMCALL nor TDCALL is gated by any software enablement other than VMXON, and so will generate a VM-Exit instead of e.g. a native #UD when executed from the guest kernel. Note! No unprivileged DoS of the L1 kernel is possible as TDCALL and SEAMCALL #GP at CPL > 0, and the CPL check is performed prior to the VMX non-root (VM-Exit) check, i.e. userspace can't crash the VM. And for a nested guest, KVM forwards unknown exits to L1, i.e. an L2 kernel can crash itself, but not L1. Note #2! The Intel® Trust Domain CPU Architectural Extensions spec's pseudocode shows the CPL > 0 check for SEAMCALL coming _after_ the VM-Exit, but that appears to be a documentation bug (likely because the CPL > 0 check was incorrectly bundled with other lower-priority #GP checks). Testing on SPR and EMR shows that the CPL > 0 check is performed before the VMX non-root check, i.e. SEAMCALL #GPs when executed in usermode. Note #3! The aforementioned Trust Domain spec uses confusing pseudocode that says that SEAMCALL will #UD if executed "inSEAM", but "inSEAM" specifically means in SEAM Root Mode, i.e. in the TDX-Module. The long- form description explicitly states that SEAMCALL generates an exit when executed in "SEAM VMX non-root operation". But that's a moot point as the TDX-Module injects #UD if the guest attempts to execute SEAMCALL, as documented in the "Unconditionally Blocked Instructions" section of the TDX-Module base specification. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251016182148.69085-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm654 fixes for 6.18, take #2 * Core fixes - Fix trapping regression when no in-kernel irqchip is present (20251021094358.1963807-1-sascha.bischoff@arm.com) - Check host-provided, untrusted ranges and offsets in pKVM (20251016164541.3771235-1-vdonnefort@google.com) (20251017075710.2605118-1-sebastianene@google.com) - Fix regression restoring the ID_PFR1_EL1 register (20251030122707.2033690-1-maz@kernel.org - Fix vgic ITS locking issues when LPIs are not directly injected (20251107184847.1784820-1-oupton@kernel.org) * Test fixes - Correct target CPU programming in vgic_lpi_stress selftest (20251020145946.48288-1-mdittgen@amazon.de) - Fix exposure of SCTLR2_EL2 and ZCR_EL2 in get-reg-list selftest (20251023-b4-kvm-arm64-get-reg-list-sctlr-el2-v1-1-088f88ff992a@kernel.org) (20251024-kvm-arm64-get-reg-list-zcr-el2-v1-1-0cd0ff75e22f@kernel.org) * Misc - Update Oliver's email address (20251107012830.1708225-1-oupton@kernel.org)
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When freeing indexed arrays, the corresponding free function should
be called for each entry of the indexed array. For example, for
for 'struct tc_act_attrs' 'tc_act_attrs_free(...)' needs to be called
for each entry.
Previously, memory leaks were reported when enabling the ASAN
analyzer.
=================================================================
==874==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 24 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7f221fd20cb5 in malloc ./debug/gcc/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:67
#1 0x55c98db048af in tc_act_attrs_set_options_vlan_parms ../generated/tc-user.h:2813
#2 0x55c98db048af in main ./linux/tools/net/ynl/samples/tc-filter-add.c:71
Direct leak of 24 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7f221fd20cb5 in malloc ./debug/gcc/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:67
#1 0x55c98db04a93 in tc_act_attrs_set_options_vlan_parms ../generated/tc-user.h:2813
#2 0x55c98db04a93 in main ./linux/tools/net/ynl/samples/tc-filter-add.c:74
Direct leak of 10 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7f221fd20cb5 in malloc ./debug/gcc/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:67
#1 0x55c98db0527d in tc_act_attrs_set_kind ../generated/tc-user.h:1622
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 58 byte(s) leaked in 4 allocation(s).
The following diff illustrates the changes introduced compared to the
previous version of the code.
void tc_flower_attrs_free(struct tc_flower_attrs *obj)
{
+ unsigned int i;
+
free(obj->indev);
+ for (i = 0; i < obj->_count.act; i++)
+ tc_act_attrs_free(&obj->act[i]);
free(obj->act);
free(obj->key_eth_dst);
free(obj->key_eth_dst_mask);
Signed-off-by: Zahari Doychev <zahari.doychev@linux.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251106151529.453026-3-zahari.doychev@linux.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
bardliao
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Dec 1, 2025
Handle skb allocation failures in RX path, to avoid NULL pointer dereference and RX stalls under memory pressure. If the refill fails with -ENOMEM, complete napi polling and wake up later to retry via timer. Also explicitly re-enable RX DMA after oom, so the dmac doesn't remain stopped in this situation. Previously, memory pressure could lead to skb allocation failures and subsequent Oops like: Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#2] Hardware name: SonyPS3 Cell Broadband Engine 0x701000 PS3 NIP [c0003d0000065900] gelic_net_poll+0x6c/0x2d0 [ps3_gelic] (unreliable) LR [c0003d00000659c4] gelic_net_poll+0x130/0x2d0 [ps3_gelic] Call Trace: gelic_net_poll+0x130/0x2d0 [ps3_gelic] (unreliable) __napi_poll+0x44/0x168 net_rx_action+0x178/0x290 Steps to reproduce the issue: 1. Start a continuous network traffic, like scp of a 20GB file 2. Inject failslab errors using the kernel fault injection: echo -1 > /sys/kernel/debug/failslab/times echo 30 > /sys/kernel/debug/failslab/interval echo 100 > /sys/kernel/debug/failslab/probability 3. After some time, traces start to appear, kernel Oopses and the system stops Step 2 is not always necessary, as it is usually already triggered by the transfer of a big enough file. Fixes: 02c1889 ("ps3: gigabit ethernet driver for PS3, take3") Signed-off-by: Florian Fuchs <fuchsfl@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251113181000.3914980-1-fuchsfl@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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This patchset adds the support for triggering hostless siggen pipelines using the kcontrol associated with the siggen widget. It also proposes a bespoke IO handler for switch type kcontrols
such as those required for triggering the tone component.
This patchset is followed by another series that enables the BE for hostless pipelines.
Tested with:
Minnowboard turbot with RT5651 and Up squared board with HifiBerry DAC+
SOF kernel: https://github.com/ranj063/sound branch: topic/tone
SOF: https://github.com/ranj063/sof branch: topic/tone
SOFT: https://github.com/ranj063/soft branch: topic/tone
Please store the config before switching to the tone topology using:
alsactl store -f config.state
And restore after switching to the tone topology with:
alsactl restore -f config.state
v4 changes:
1. minor changes to switch kcontrol IO Handler
2. included the patch to enable kcontrol for siggen widget
Please ignore the patchset in the mailing list.