Skip to content

Conversation

@dgucsekelly
Copy link

No description provided.

@ecnepsnai
Copy link

Please read the documentation: https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/master/Documentation/SubmittingPatches

Linus doesn't accept pull requests from GitHub: #17 (comment)

ddstreet pushed a commit to ddstreet/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 8, 2015
Orabug: 20189959

PID: 614    TASK: ffff882a739da580  CPU: 3   COMMAND: "ocfs2dc"
  #0 [ffff882ecc3759b0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103b35d
  #1 [ffff882ecc375a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b95b5
  #2 [ffff882ecc375af0] oops_end at ffffffff815091d8
  #3 [ffff882ecc375b20] die at ffffffff8101868b
  #4 [ffff882ecc375b50] do_trap at ffffffff81508bb0
  #5 [ffff882ecc375ba0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810165e5
  torvalds#6 [ffff882ecc375c40] invalid_op at ffffffff815116fb
     [exception RIP: ocfs2_ci_checkpointed+208]
     RIP: ffffffffa0a7e940  RSP: ffff882ecc375cf0  RFLAGS: 00010002
     RAX: 0000000000000001  RBX: 000000000000654b  RCX: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     RDX: 00000000000017d9  RSI: ffff8812dc83f1f8  RDI: ffffffffa0b2c318
     RBP: ffff882ecc375d20   R8: ffff882ef6ecfa60   R9: ffff88301f272200
     R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffffffffffffffff
     R13: ffff8812dc83f4f0  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
  torvalds#7 [ffff882ecc375d28] ocfs2_check_meta_downconvert at ffffffffa0a7edbd [ocfs2]
  torvalds#8 [ffff882ecc375d38] ocfs2_unblock_lock at ffffffffa0a84af8 [ocfs2]
  torvalds#9 [ffff882ecc375dc8] ocfs2_process_blocked_lock at ffffffffa0a85285 [ocfs2]
torvalds#10 [ffff882ecc375e18] ocfs2_downconvert_thread_do_work at ffffffffa0a85445 [ocfs2]
torvalds#11 [ffff882ecc375e68] ocfs2_downconvert_thread at ffffffffa0a854de [ocfs2]
torvalds#12 [ffff882ecc375ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090da7
torvalds#13 [ffff882ecc375f48] kernel_thread_helper at ffffffff81511884
assert is tripped because the tran is not checkpointed and the lock level is PR.

Some time ago, chmod command had been executed. As result, the following call
chain left the inode cluster lock in PR state, latter on causing the assert.
system_call_fastpath
  -> my_chmod
   -> sys_chmod
    -> sys_fchmodat
     -> notify_change
      -> ocfs2_setattr
       -> posix_acl_chmod
        -> ocfs2_iop_set_acl
         -> ocfs2_set_acl
          -> ocfs2_acl_set_mode
Here is how.
1119 int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
1120 {
1247         ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 1); <<< WRONG thing to do.
..
1258         if (!status && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
1259                 status =  posix_acl_chmod(inode, inode->i_mode);

519 posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode)
520 {
..
539         ret = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);

287 int ocfs2_iop_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, ...
288 {
289         return ocfs2_set_acl(NULL, inode, NULL, type, acl, NULL, NULL);

224 int ocfs2_set_acl(handle_t *handle,
225                          struct inode *inode, ...
231 {
..
252                                 ret = ocfs2_acl_set_mode(inode, di_bh,
253                                                          handle, mode);

168 static int ocfs2_acl_set_mode(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head ...
170 {
183         if (handle == NULL) {
                    >>> BUG: inode lock not held in ex at this point <<<
184                 handle = ocfs2_start_trans(OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb),
185                                            OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS);

ocfs2_setattr.torvalds#1247 we unlock and at torvalds#1259 call posix_acl_chmod. When we reach
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#181 and do trans, the inode cluster lock is not held in EX
mode (it should be). How this could have happended?

We are the lock master, were holding lock EX and have released it in
ocfs2_setattr.torvalds#1247. Note that there are no holders of this lock at
this point. Another node needs the lock in PR, and we downconvert from
EX to PR. So the inode lock is PR when do the trans in
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#184. The trans stays in core (not flushed to disc).
Now another node want the lock in EX, downconvert thread gets kicked (the
one that tripped assert abovt), finds an unflushed trans but the lock is
not EX (it is PR). If the lock was at EX, it would have flushed the trans
ocfs2_ci_checkpointed -> ocfs2_start_checkpoint before downconverting (to NULL)
for the request.

ocfs2_setattr must not drop inode lock ex in this code path. If it does,
takes it again before the trans, say in ocfs2_set_acl, another cluster node can
get in between, execute another setattr, overwriting the one in progress
on this node, resulting in a mode acl size combo that is a mix of the two.

Signed-off-by: Tariq Saeed <tariq.x.saeed@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
ddstreet pushed a commit to ddstreet/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 10, 2015
Orabug: 20189959

PID: 614    TASK: ffff882a739da580  CPU: 3   COMMAND: "ocfs2dc"
  #0 [ffff882ecc3759b0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103b35d
  #1 [ffff882ecc375a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b95b5
  #2 [ffff882ecc375af0] oops_end at ffffffff815091d8
  #3 [ffff882ecc375b20] die at ffffffff8101868b
  #4 [ffff882ecc375b50] do_trap at ffffffff81508bb0
  #5 [ffff882ecc375ba0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810165e5
  torvalds#6 [ffff882ecc375c40] invalid_op at ffffffff815116fb
     [exception RIP: ocfs2_ci_checkpointed+208]
     RIP: ffffffffa0a7e940  RSP: ffff882ecc375cf0  RFLAGS: 00010002
     RAX: 0000000000000001  RBX: 000000000000654b  RCX: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     RDX: 00000000000017d9  RSI: ffff8812dc83f1f8  RDI: ffffffffa0b2c318
     RBP: ffff882ecc375d20   R8: ffff882ef6ecfa60   R9: ffff88301f272200
     R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffffffffffffffff
     R13: ffff8812dc83f4f0  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
  torvalds#7 [ffff882ecc375d28] ocfs2_check_meta_downconvert at ffffffffa0a7edbd [ocfs2]
  torvalds#8 [ffff882ecc375d38] ocfs2_unblock_lock at ffffffffa0a84af8 [ocfs2]
  torvalds#9 [ffff882ecc375dc8] ocfs2_process_blocked_lock at ffffffffa0a85285 [ocfs2]
torvalds#10 [ffff882ecc375e18] ocfs2_downconvert_thread_do_work at ffffffffa0a85445 [ocfs2]
torvalds#11 [ffff882ecc375e68] ocfs2_downconvert_thread at ffffffffa0a854de [ocfs2]
torvalds#12 [ffff882ecc375ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090da7
torvalds#13 [ffff882ecc375f48] kernel_thread_helper at ffffffff81511884
assert is tripped because the tran is not checkpointed and the lock level is PR.

Some time ago, chmod command had been executed. As result, the following call
chain left the inode cluster lock in PR state, latter on causing the assert.
system_call_fastpath
  -> my_chmod
   -> sys_chmod
    -> sys_fchmodat
     -> notify_change
      -> ocfs2_setattr
       -> posix_acl_chmod
        -> ocfs2_iop_set_acl
         -> ocfs2_set_acl
          -> ocfs2_acl_set_mode
Here is how.
1119 int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
1120 {
1247         ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 1); <<< WRONG thing to do.
..
1258         if (!status && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
1259                 status =  posix_acl_chmod(inode, inode->i_mode);

519 posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode)
520 {
..
539         ret = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);

287 int ocfs2_iop_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, ...
288 {
289         return ocfs2_set_acl(NULL, inode, NULL, type, acl, NULL, NULL);

224 int ocfs2_set_acl(handle_t *handle,
225                          struct inode *inode, ...
231 {
..
252                                 ret = ocfs2_acl_set_mode(inode, di_bh,
253                                                          handle, mode);

168 static int ocfs2_acl_set_mode(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head ...
170 {
183         if (handle == NULL) {
                    >>> BUG: inode lock not held in ex at this point <<<
184                 handle = ocfs2_start_trans(OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb),
185                                            OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS);

ocfs2_setattr.torvalds#1247 we unlock and at torvalds#1259 call posix_acl_chmod. When we reach
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#181 and do trans, the inode cluster lock is not held in EX
mode (it should be). How this could have happended?

We are the lock master, were holding lock EX and have released it in
ocfs2_setattr.torvalds#1247. Note that there are no holders of this lock at
this point. Another node needs the lock in PR, and we downconvert from
EX to PR. So the inode lock is PR when do the trans in
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#184. The trans stays in core (not flushed to disc).
Now another node want the lock in EX, downconvert thread gets kicked (the
one that tripped assert abovt), finds an unflushed trans but the lock is
not EX (it is PR). If the lock was at EX, it would have flushed the trans
ocfs2_ci_checkpointed -> ocfs2_start_checkpoint before downconverting (to NULL)
for the request.

ocfs2_setattr must not drop inode lock ex in this code path. If it does,
takes it again before the trans, say in ocfs2_set_acl, another cluster node can
get in between, execute another setattr, overwriting the one in progress
on this node, resulting in a mode acl size combo that is a mix of the two.

Signed-off-by: Tariq Saeed <tariq.x.saeed@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
ddstreet pushed a commit to ddstreet/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 20, 2015
Orabug: 20189959

PID: 614    TASK: ffff882a739da580  CPU: 3   COMMAND: "ocfs2dc"
  #0 [ffff882ecc3759b0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103b35d
  #1 [ffff882ecc375a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b95b5
  #2 [ffff882ecc375af0] oops_end at ffffffff815091d8
  #3 [ffff882ecc375b20] die at ffffffff8101868b
  #4 [ffff882ecc375b50] do_trap at ffffffff81508bb0
  #5 [ffff882ecc375ba0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810165e5
  torvalds#6 [ffff882ecc375c40] invalid_op at ffffffff815116fb
     [exception RIP: ocfs2_ci_checkpointed+208]
     RIP: ffffffffa0a7e940  RSP: ffff882ecc375cf0  RFLAGS: 00010002
     RAX: 0000000000000001  RBX: 000000000000654b  RCX: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     RDX: 00000000000017d9  RSI: ffff8812dc83f1f8  RDI: ffffffffa0b2c318
     RBP: ffff882ecc375d20   R8: ffff882ef6ecfa60   R9: ffff88301f272200
     R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffffffffffffffff
     R13: ffff8812dc83f4f0  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
  torvalds#7 [ffff882ecc375d28] ocfs2_check_meta_downconvert at ffffffffa0a7edbd [ocfs2]
  torvalds#8 [ffff882ecc375d38] ocfs2_unblock_lock at ffffffffa0a84af8 [ocfs2]
  torvalds#9 [ffff882ecc375dc8] ocfs2_process_blocked_lock at ffffffffa0a85285 [ocfs2]
torvalds#10 [ffff882ecc375e18] ocfs2_downconvert_thread_do_work at ffffffffa0a85445 [ocfs2]
torvalds#11 [ffff882ecc375e68] ocfs2_downconvert_thread at ffffffffa0a854de [ocfs2]
torvalds#12 [ffff882ecc375ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090da7
torvalds#13 [ffff882ecc375f48] kernel_thread_helper at ffffffff81511884
assert is tripped because the tran is not checkpointed and the lock level is PR.

Some time ago, chmod command had been executed. As result, the following call
chain left the inode cluster lock in PR state, latter on causing the assert.
system_call_fastpath
  -> my_chmod
   -> sys_chmod
    -> sys_fchmodat
     -> notify_change
      -> ocfs2_setattr
       -> posix_acl_chmod
        -> ocfs2_iop_set_acl
         -> ocfs2_set_acl
          -> ocfs2_acl_set_mode
Here is how.
1119 int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
1120 {
1247         ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 1); <<< WRONG thing to do.
..
1258         if (!status && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
1259                 status =  posix_acl_chmod(inode, inode->i_mode);

519 posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode)
520 {
..
539         ret = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);

287 int ocfs2_iop_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, ...
288 {
289         return ocfs2_set_acl(NULL, inode, NULL, type, acl, NULL, NULL);

224 int ocfs2_set_acl(handle_t *handle,
225                          struct inode *inode, ...
231 {
..
252                                 ret = ocfs2_acl_set_mode(inode, di_bh,
253                                                          handle, mode);

168 static int ocfs2_acl_set_mode(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head ...
170 {
183         if (handle == NULL) {
                    >>> BUG: inode lock not held in ex at this point <<<
184                 handle = ocfs2_start_trans(OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb),
185                                            OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS);

ocfs2_setattr.torvalds#1247 we unlock and at torvalds#1259 call posix_acl_chmod. When we reach
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#181 and do trans, the inode cluster lock is not held in EX
mode (it should be). How this could have happended?

We are the lock master, were holding lock EX and have released it in
ocfs2_setattr.torvalds#1247. Note that there are no holders of this lock at
this point. Another node needs the lock in PR, and we downconvert from
EX to PR. So the inode lock is PR when do the trans in
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#184. The trans stays in core (not flushed to disc).
Now another node want the lock in EX, downconvert thread gets kicked (the
one that tripped assert abovt), finds an unflushed trans but the lock is
not EX (it is PR). If the lock was at EX, it would have flushed the trans
ocfs2_ci_checkpointed -> ocfs2_start_checkpoint before downconverting (to NULL)
for the request.

ocfs2_setattr must not drop inode lock ex in this code path. If it does,
takes it again before the trans, say in ocfs2_set_acl, another cluster node can
get in between, execute another setattr, overwriting the one in progress
on this node, resulting in a mode acl size combo that is a mix of the two.

Signed-off-by: Tariq Saeed <tariq.x.saeed@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
ddstreet pushed a commit to ddstreet/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 20, 2015
Orabug: 20189959

PID: 614    TASK: ffff882a739da580  CPU: 3   COMMAND: "ocfs2dc"
  #0 [ffff882ecc3759b0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103b35d
  #1 [ffff882ecc375a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b95b5
  #2 [ffff882ecc375af0] oops_end at ffffffff815091d8
  #3 [ffff882ecc375b20] die at ffffffff8101868b
  #4 [ffff882ecc375b50] do_trap at ffffffff81508bb0
  #5 [ffff882ecc375ba0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810165e5
  torvalds#6 [ffff882ecc375c40] invalid_op at ffffffff815116fb
     [exception RIP: ocfs2_ci_checkpointed+208]
     RIP: ffffffffa0a7e940  RSP: ffff882ecc375cf0  RFLAGS: 00010002
     RAX: 0000000000000001  RBX: 000000000000654b  RCX: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     RDX: 00000000000017d9  RSI: ffff8812dc83f1f8  RDI: ffffffffa0b2c318
     RBP: ffff882ecc375d20   R8: ffff882ef6ecfa60   R9: ffff88301f272200
     R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffffffffffffffff
     R13: ffff8812dc83f4f0  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
  torvalds#7 [ffff882ecc375d28] ocfs2_check_meta_downconvert at ffffffffa0a7edbd [ocfs2]
  torvalds#8 [ffff882ecc375d38] ocfs2_unblock_lock at ffffffffa0a84af8 [ocfs2]
  torvalds#9 [ffff882ecc375dc8] ocfs2_process_blocked_lock at ffffffffa0a85285 [ocfs2]
torvalds#10 [ffff882ecc375e18] ocfs2_downconvert_thread_do_work at ffffffffa0a85445 [ocfs2]
torvalds#11 [ffff882ecc375e68] ocfs2_downconvert_thread at ffffffffa0a854de [ocfs2]
torvalds#12 [ffff882ecc375ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090da7
torvalds#13 [ffff882ecc375f48] kernel_thread_helper at ffffffff81511884
assert is tripped because the tran is not checkpointed and the lock level is PR.

Some time ago, chmod command had been executed. As result, the following call
chain left the inode cluster lock in PR state, latter on causing the assert.
system_call_fastpath
  -> my_chmod
   -> sys_chmod
    -> sys_fchmodat
     -> notify_change
      -> ocfs2_setattr
       -> posix_acl_chmod
        -> ocfs2_iop_set_acl
         -> ocfs2_set_acl
          -> ocfs2_acl_set_mode
Here is how.
1119 int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
1120 {
1247         ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 1); <<< WRONG thing to do.
..
1258         if (!status && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
1259                 status =  posix_acl_chmod(inode, inode->i_mode);

519 posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode)
520 {
..
539         ret = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);

287 int ocfs2_iop_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, ...
288 {
289         return ocfs2_set_acl(NULL, inode, NULL, type, acl, NULL, NULL);

224 int ocfs2_set_acl(handle_t *handle,
225                          struct inode *inode, ...
231 {
..
252                                 ret = ocfs2_acl_set_mode(inode, di_bh,
253                                                          handle, mode);

168 static int ocfs2_acl_set_mode(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head ...
170 {
183         if (handle == NULL) {
                    >>> BUG: inode lock not held in ex at this point <<<
184                 handle = ocfs2_start_trans(OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb),
185                                            OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS);

ocfs2_setattr.torvalds#1247 we unlock and at torvalds#1259 call posix_acl_chmod. When we reach
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#181 and do trans, the inode cluster lock is not held in EX
mode (it should be). How this could have happended?

We are the lock master, were holding lock EX and have released it in
ocfs2_setattr.torvalds#1247. Note that there are no holders of this lock at
this point. Another node needs the lock in PR, and we downconvert from
EX to PR. So the inode lock is PR when do the trans in
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#184. The trans stays in core (not flushed to disc).
Now another node want the lock in EX, downconvert thread gets kicked (the
one that tripped assert abovt), finds an unflushed trans but the lock is
not EX (it is PR). If the lock was at EX, it would have flushed the trans
ocfs2_ci_checkpointed -> ocfs2_start_checkpoint before downconverting (to NULL)
for the request.

ocfs2_setattr must not drop inode lock ex in this code path. If it does,
takes it again before the trans, say in ocfs2_set_acl, another cluster node can
get in between, execute another setattr, overwriting the one in progress
on this node, resulting in a mode acl size combo that is a mix of the two.

Signed-off-by: Tariq Saeed <tariq.x.saeed@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
krzk pushed a commit to krzk/linux that referenced this pull request Jul 9, 2015
Orabug: 20189959

PID: 614    TASK: ffff882a739da580  CPU: 3   COMMAND: "ocfs2dc"
  #0 [ffff882ecc3759b0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103b35d
  #1 [ffff882ecc375a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b95b5
  #2 [ffff882ecc375af0] oops_end at ffffffff815091d8
  #3 [ffff882ecc375b20] die at ffffffff8101868b
  #4 [ffff882ecc375b50] do_trap at ffffffff81508bb0
  #5 [ffff882ecc375ba0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810165e5
  torvalds#6 [ffff882ecc375c40] invalid_op at ffffffff815116fb
     [exception RIP: ocfs2_ci_checkpointed+208]
     RIP: ffffffffa0a7e940  RSP: ffff882ecc375cf0  RFLAGS: 00010002
     RAX: 0000000000000001  RBX: 000000000000654b  RCX: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     RDX: 00000000000017d9  RSI: ffff8812dc83f1f8  RDI: ffffffffa0b2c318
     RBP: ffff882ecc375d20   R8: ffff882ef6ecfa60   R9: ffff88301f272200
     R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffffffffffffffff
     R13: ffff8812dc83f4f0  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
  torvalds#7 [ffff882ecc375d28] ocfs2_check_meta_downconvert at ffffffffa0a7edbd [ocfs2]
  torvalds#8 [ffff882ecc375d38] ocfs2_unblock_lock at ffffffffa0a84af8 [ocfs2]
  torvalds#9 [ffff882ecc375dc8] ocfs2_process_blocked_lock at ffffffffa0a85285 [ocfs2]
torvalds#10 [ffff882ecc375e18] ocfs2_downconvert_thread_do_work at ffffffffa0a85445 [ocfs2]
torvalds#11 [ffff882ecc375e68] ocfs2_downconvert_thread at ffffffffa0a854de [ocfs2]
torvalds#12 [ffff882ecc375ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090da7
torvalds#13 [ffff882ecc375f48] kernel_thread_helper at ffffffff81511884
assert is tripped because the tran is not checkpointed and the lock level is PR.

Some time ago, chmod command had been executed. As result, the following call
chain left the inode cluster lock in PR state, latter on causing the assert.
system_call_fastpath
  -> my_chmod
   -> sys_chmod
    -> sys_fchmodat
     -> notify_change
      -> ocfs2_setattr
       -> posix_acl_chmod
        -> ocfs2_iop_set_acl
         -> ocfs2_set_acl
          -> ocfs2_acl_set_mode
Here is how.
1119 int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
1120 {
1247         ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 1); <<< WRONG thing to do.
..
1258         if (!status && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
1259                 status =  posix_acl_chmod(inode, inode->i_mode);

519 posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode)
520 {
..
539         ret = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);

287 int ocfs2_iop_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, ...
288 {
289         return ocfs2_set_acl(NULL, inode, NULL, type, acl, NULL, NULL);

224 int ocfs2_set_acl(handle_t *handle,
225                          struct inode *inode, ...
231 {
..
252                                 ret = ocfs2_acl_set_mode(inode, di_bh,
253                                                          handle, mode);

168 static int ocfs2_acl_set_mode(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head ...
170 {
183         if (handle == NULL) {
                    >>> BUG: inode lock not held in ex at this point <<<
184                 handle = ocfs2_start_trans(OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb),
185                                            OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS);

ocfs2_setattr.torvalds#1247 we unlock and at torvalds#1259 call posix_acl_chmod. When we reach
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#181 and do trans, the inode cluster lock is not held in EX
mode (it should be). How this could have happended?

We are the lock master, were holding lock EX and have released it in
ocfs2_setattr.torvalds#1247. Note that there are no holders of this lock at
this point. Another node needs the lock in PR, and we downconvert from
EX to PR. So the inode lock is PR when do the trans in
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#184. The trans stays in core (not flushed to disc).
Now another node want the lock in EX, downconvert thread gets kicked (the
one that tripped assert abovt), finds an unflushed trans but the lock is
not EX (it is PR). If the lock was at EX, it would have flushed the trans
ocfs2_ci_checkpointed -> ocfs2_start_checkpoint before downconverting (to NULL)
for the request.

ocfs2_setattr must not drop inode lock ex in this code path. If it does,
takes it again before the trans, say in ocfs2_set_acl, another cluster node can
get in between, execute another setattr, overwriting the one in progress
on this node, resulting in a mode acl size combo that is a mix of the two.

Signed-off-by: Tariq Saeed <tariq.x.saeed@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
martinezjavier pushed a commit to martinezjavier/linux that referenced this pull request Jul 30, 2015
Orabug: 20189959

PID: 614    TASK: ffff882a739da580  CPU: 3   COMMAND: "ocfs2dc"
  #0 [ffff882ecc3759b0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103b35d
  #1 [ffff882ecc375a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b95b5
  #2 [ffff882ecc375af0] oops_end at ffffffff815091d8
  #3 [ffff882ecc375b20] die at ffffffff8101868b
  #4 [ffff882ecc375b50] do_trap at ffffffff81508bb0
  #5 [ffff882ecc375ba0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810165e5
  torvalds#6 [ffff882ecc375c40] invalid_op at ffffffff815116fb
     [exception RIP: ocfs2_ci_checkpointed+208]
     RIP: ffffffffa0a7e940  RSP: ffff882ecc375cf0  RFLAGS: 00010002
     RAX: 0000000000000001  RBX: 000000000000654b  RCX: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     RDX: 00000000000017d9  RSI: ffff8812dc83f1f8  RDI: ffffffffa0b2c318
     RBP: ffff882ecc375d20   R8: ffff882ef6ecfa60   R9: ffff88301f272200
     R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffffffffffffffff
     R13: ffff8812dc83f4f0  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
  torvalds#7 [ffff882ecc375d28] ocfs2_check_meta_downconvert at ffffffffa0a7edbd [ocfs2]
  torvalds#8 [ffff882ecc375d38] ocfs2_unblock_lock at ffffffffa0a84af8 [ocfs2]
  torvalds#9 [ffff882ecc375dc8] ocfs2_process_blocked_lock at ffffffffa0a85285 [ocfs2]
torvalds#10 [ffff882ecc375e18] ocfs2_downconvert_thread_do_work at ffffffffa0a85445 [ocfs2]
torvalds#11 [ffff882ecc375e68] ocfs2_downconvert_thread at ffffffffa0a854de [ocfs2]
torvalds#12 [ffff882ecc375ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090da7
torvalds#13 [ffff882ecc375f48] kernel_thread_helper at ffffffff81511884
assert is tripped because the tran is not checkpointed and the lock level is PR.

Some time ago, chmod command had been executed. As result, the following call
chain left the inode cluster lock in PR state, latter on causing the assert.
system_call_fastpath
  -> my_chmod
   -> sys_chmod
    -> sys_fchmodat
     -> notify_change
      -> ocfs2_setattr
       -> posix_acl_chmod
        -> ocfs2_iop_set_acl
         -> ocfs2_set_acl
          -> ocfs2_acl_set_mode
Here is how.
1119 int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
1120 {
1247         ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 1); <<< WRONG thing to do.
..
1258         if (!status && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
1259                 status =  posix_acl_chmod(inode, inode->i_mode);

519 posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode)
520 {
..
539         ret = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);

287 int ocfs2_iop_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, ...
288 {
289         return ocfs2_set_acl(NULL, inode, NULL, type, acl, NULL, NULL);

224 int ocfs2_set_acl(handle_t *handle,
225                          struct inode *inode, ...
231 {
..
252                                 ret = ocfs2_acl_set_mode(inode, di_bh,
253                                                          handle, mode);

168 static int ocfs2_acl_set_mode(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head ...
170 {
183         if (handle == NULL) {
                    >>> BUG: inode lock not held in ex at this point <<<
184                 handle = ocfs2_start_trans(OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb),
185                                            OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS);

ocfs2_setattr.torvalds#1247 we unlock and at torvalds#1259 call posix_acl_chmod. When we reach
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#181 and do trans, the inode cluster lock is not held in EX
mode (it should be). How this could have happended?

We are the lock master, were holding lock EX and have released it in
ocfs2_setattr.torvalds#1247. Note that there are no holders of this lock at
this point. Another node needs the lock in PR, and we downconvert from
EX to PR. So the inode lock is PR when do the trans in
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#184. The trans stays in core (not flushed to disc).
Now another node want the lock in EX, downconvert thread gets kicked (the
one that tripped assert abovt), finds an unflushed trans but the lock is
not EX (it is PR). If the lock was at EX, it would have flushed the trans
ocfs2_ci_checkpointed -> ocfs2_start_checkpoint before downconverting (to NULL)
for the request.

ocfs2_setattr must not drop inode lock ex in this code path. If it does,
takes it again before the trans, say in ocfs2_set_acl, another cluster node can
get in between, execute another setattr, overwriting the one in progress
on this node, resulting in a mode acl size combo that is a mix of the two.

Signed-off-by: Tariq Saeed <tariq.x.saeed@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
ddstreet pushed a commit to ddstreet/linux that referenced this pull request Jul 31, 2015
Orabug: 20189959

PID: 614    TASK: ffff882a739da580  CPU: 3   COMMAND: "ocfs2dc"
  #0 [ffff882ecc3759b0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103b35d
  #1 [ffff882ecc375a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b95b5
  #2 [ffff882ecc375af0] oops_end at ffffffff815091d8
  #3 [ffff882ecc375b20] die at ffffffff8101868b
  #4 [ffff882ecc375b50] do_trap at ffffffff81508bb0
  #5 [ffff882ecc375ba0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810165e5
  torvalds#6 [ffff882ecc375c40] invalid_op at ffffffff815116fb
     [exception RIP: ocfs2_ci_checkpointed+208]
     RIP: ffffffffa0a7e940  RSP: ffff882ecc375cf0  RFLAGS: 00010002
     RAX: 0000000000000001  RBX: 000000000000654b  RCX: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     RDX: 00000000000017d9  RSI: ffff8812dc83f1f8  RDI: ffffffffa0b2c318
     RBP: ffff882ecc375d20   R8: ffff882ef6ecfa60   R9: ffff88301f272200
     R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffffffffffffffff
     R13: ffff8812dc83f4f0  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
  torvalds#7 [ffff882ecc375d28] ocfs2_check_meta_downconvert at ffffffffa0a7edbd [ocfs2]
  torvalds#8 [ffff882ecc375d38] ocfs2_unblock_lock at ffffffffa0a84af8 [ocfs2]
  torvalds#9 [ffff882ecc375dc8] ocfs2_process_blocked_lock at ffffffffa0a85285 [ocfs2]
torvalds#10 [ffff882ecc375e18] ocfs2_downconvert_thread_do_work at ffffffffa0a85445 [ocfs2]
torvalds#11 [ffff882ecc375e68] ocfs2_downconvert_thread at ffffffffa0a854de [ocfs2]
torvalds#12 [ffff882ecc375ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090da7
torvalds#13 [ffff882ecc375f48] kernel_thread_helper at ffffffff81511884
assert is tripped because the tran is not checkpointed and the lock level is PR.

Some time ago, chmod command had been executed. As result, the following call
chain left the inode cluster lock in PR state, latter on causing the assert.
system_call_fastpath
  -> my_chmod
   -> sys_chmod
    -> sys_fchmodat
     -> notify_change
      -> ocfs2_setattr
       -> posix_acl_chmod
        -> ocfs2_iop_set_acl
         -> ocfs2_set_acl
          -> ocfs2_acl_set_mode
Here is how.
1119 int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
1120 {
1247         ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 1); <<< WRONG thing to do.
..
1258         if (!status && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
1259                 status =  posix_acl_chmod(inode, inode->i_mode);

519 posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode)
520 {
..
539         ret = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);

287 int ocfs2_iop_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, ...
288 {
289         return ocfs2_set_acl(NULL, inode, NULL, type, acl, NULL, NULL);

224 int ocfs2_set_acl(handle_t *handle,
225                          struct inode *inode, ...
231 {
..
252                                 ret = ocfs2_acl_set_mode(inode, di_bh,
253                                                          handle, mode);

168 static int ocfs2_acl_set_mode(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head ...
170 {
183         if (handle == NULL) {
                    >>> BUG: inode lock not held in ex at this point <<<
184                 handle = ocfs2_start_trans(OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb),
185                                            OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS);

ocfs2_setattr.torvalds#1247 we unlock and at torvalds#1259 call posix_acl_chmod. When we reach
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#181 and do trans, the inode cluster lock is not held in EX
mode (it should be). How this could have happended?

We are the lock master, were holding lock EX and have released it in
ocfs2_setattr.torvalds#1247. Note that there are no holders of this lock at
this point. Another node needs the lock in PR, and we downconvert from
EX to PR. So the inode lock is PR when do the trans in
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#184. The trans stays in core (not flushed to disc).
Now another node want the lock in EX, downconvert thread gets kicked (the
one that tripped assert abovt), finds an unflushed trans but the lock is
not EX (it is PR). If the lock was at EX, it would have flushed the trans
ocfs2_ci_checkpointed -> ocfs2_start_checkpoint before downconverting (to NULL)
for the request.

ocfs2_setattr must not drop inode lock ex in this code path. If it does,
takes it again before the trans, say in ocfs2_set_acl, another cluster node can
get in between, execute another setattr, overwriting the one in progress
on this node, resulting in a mode acl size combo that is a mix of the two.

Signed-off-by: Tariq Saeed <tariq.x.saeed@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
ddstreet pushed a commit to ddstreet/linux that referenced this pull request Aug 6, 2015
Orabug: 20189959

PID: 614    TASK: ffff882a739da580  CPU: 3   COMMAND: "ocfs2dc"
  #0 [ffff882ecc3759b0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103b35d
  #1 [ffff882ecc375a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b95b5
  #2 [ffff882ecc375af0] oops_end at ffffffff815091d8
  #3 [ffff882ecc375b20] die at ffffffff8101868b
  #4 [ffff882ecc375b50] do_trap at ffffffff81508bb0
  #5 [ffff882ecc375ba0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810165e5
  torvalds#6 [ffff882ecc375c40] invalid_op at ffffffff815116fb
     [exception RIP: ocfs2_ci_checkpointed+208]
     RIP: ffffffffa0a7e940  RSP: ffff882ecc375cf0  RFLAGS: 00010002
     RAX: 0000000000000001  RBX: 000000000000654b  RCX: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     RDX: 00000000000017d9  RSI: ffff8812dc83f1f8  RDI: ffffffffa0b2c318
     RBP: ffff882ecc375d20   R8: ffff882ef6ecfa60   R9: ffff88301f272200
     R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffffffffffffffff
     R13: ffff8812dc83f4f0  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
  torvalds#7 [ffff882ecc375d28] ocfs2_check_meta_downconvert at ffffffffa0a7edbd [ocfs2]
  torvalds#8 [ffff882ecc375d38] ocfs2_unblock_lock at ffffffffa0a84af8 [ocfs2]
  torvalds#9 [ffff882ecc375dc8] ocfs2_process_blocked_lock at ffffffffa0a85285 [ocfs2]
torvalds#10 [ffff882ecc375e18] ocfs2_downconvert_thread_do_work at ffffffffa0a85445 [ocfs2]
torvalds#11 [ffff882ecc375e68] ocfs2_downconvert_thread at ffffffffa0a854de [ocfs2]
torvalds#12 [ffff882ecc375ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090da7
torvalds#13 [ffff882ecc375f48] kernel_thread_helper at ffffffff81511884
assert is tripped because the tran is not checkpointed and the lock level is PR.

Some time ago, chmod command had been executed. As result, the following call
chain left the inode cluster lock in PR state, latter on causing the assert.
system_call_fastpath
  -> my_chmod
   -> sys_chmod
    -> sys_fchmodat
     -> notify_change
      -> ocfs2_setattr
       -> posix_acl_chmod
        -> ocfs2_iop_set_acl
         -> ocfs2_set_acl
          -> ocfs2_acl_set_mode
Here is how.
1119 int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
1120 {
1247         ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 1); <<< WRONG thing to do.
..
1258         if (!status && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
1259                 status =  posix_acl_chmod(inode, inode->i_mode);

519 posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode)
520 {
..
539         ret = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);

287 int ocfs2_iop_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, ...
288 {
289         return ocfs2_set_acl(NULL, inode, NULL, type, acl, NULL, NULL);

224 int ocfs2_set_acl(handle_t *handle,
225                          struct inode *inode, ...
231 {
..
252                                 ret = ocfs2_acl_set_mode(inode, di_bh,
253                                                          handle, mode);

168 static int ocfs2_acl_set_mode(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head ...
170 {
183         if (handle == NULL) {
                    >>> BUG: inode lock not held in ex at this point <<<
184                 handle = ocfs2_start_trans(OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb),
185                                            OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS);

ocfs2_setattr.torvalds#1247 we unlock and at torvalds#1259 call posix_acl_chmod. When we reach
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#181 and do trans, the inode cluster lock is not held in EX
mode (it should be). How this could have happended?

We are the lock master, were holding lock EX and have released it in
ocfs2_setattr.torvalds#1247. Note that there are no holders of this lock at
this point. Another node needs the lock in PR, and we downconvert from
EX to PR. So the inode lock is PR when do the trans in
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#184. The trans stays in core (not flushed to disc).
Now another node want the lock in EX, downconvert thread gets kicked (the
one that tripped assert abovt), finds an unflushed trans but the lock is
not EX (it is PR). If the lock was at EX, it would have flushed the trans
ocfs2_ci_checkpointed -> ocfs2_start_checkpoint before downconverting (to NULL)
for the request.

ocfs2_setattr must not drop inode lock ex in this code path. If it does,
takes it again before the trans, say in ocfs2_set_acl, another cluster node can
get in between, execute another setattr, overwriting the one in progress
on this node, resulting in a mode acl size combo that is a mix of the two.

Signed-off-by: Tariq Saeed <tariq.x.saeed@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
ddstreet pushed a commit to ddstreet/linux that referenced this pull request Aug 16, 2015
Orabug: 20189959

PID: 614    TASK: ffff882a739da580  CPU: 3   COMMAND: "ocfs2dc"
  #0 [ffff882ecc3759b0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103b35d
  #1 [ffff882ecc375a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b95b5
  #2 [ffff882ecc375af0] oops_end at ffffffff815091d8
  #3 [ffff882ecc375b20] die at ffffffff8101868b
  #4 [ffff882ecc375b50] do_trap at ffffffff81508bb0
  #5 [ffff882ecc375ba0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810165e5
  torvalds#6 [ffff882ecc375c40] invalid_op at ffffffff815116fb
     [exception RIP: ocfs2_ci_checkpointed+208]
     RIP: ffffffffa0a7e940  RSP: ffff882ecc375cf0  RFLAGS: 00010002
     RAX: 0000000000000001  RBX: 000000000000654b  RCX: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     RDX: 00000000000017d9  RSI: ffff8812dc83f1f8  RDI: ffffffffa0b2c318
     RBP: ffff882ecc375d20   R8: ffff882ef6ecfa60   R9: ffff88301f272200
     R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffffffffffffffff
     R13: ffff8812dc83f4f0  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
  torvalds#7 [ffff882ecc375d28] ocfs2_check_meta_downconvert at ffffffffa0a7edbd [ocfs2]
  torvalds#8 [ffff882ecc375d38] ocfs2_unblock_lock at ffffffffa0a84af8 [ocfs2]
  torvalds#9 [ffff882ecc375dc8] ocfs2_process_blocked_lock at ffffffffa0a85285 [ocfs2]
torvalds#10 [ffff882ecc375e18] ocfs2_downconvert_thread_do_work at ffffffffa0a85445 [ocfs2]
torvalds#11 [ffff882ecc375e68] ocfs2_downconvert_thread at ffffffffa0a854de [ocfs2]
torvalds#12 [ffff882ecc375ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090da7
torvalds#13 [ffff882ecc375f48] kernel_thread_helper at ffffffff81511884
assert is tripped because the tran is not checkpointed and the lock level is PR.

Some time ago, chmod command had been executed. As result, the following call
chain left the inode cluster lock in PR state, latter on causing the assert.
system_call_fastpath
  -> my_chmod
   -> sys_chmod
    -> sys_fchmodat
     -> notify_change
      -> ocfs2_setattr
       -> posix_acl_chmod
        -> ocfs2_iop_set_acl
         -> ocfs2_set_acl
          -> ocfs2_acl_set_mode
Here is how.
1119 int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
1120 {
1247         ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 1); <<< WRONG thing to do.
..
1258         if (!status && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
1259                 status =  posix_acl_chmod(inode, inode->i_mode);

519 posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode)
520 {
..
539         ret = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);

287 int ocfs2_iop_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, ...
288 {
289         return ocfs2_set_acl(NULL, inode, NULL, type, acl, NULL, NULL);

224 int ocfs2_set_acl(handle_t *handle,
225                          struct inode *inode, ...
231 {
..
252                                 ret = ocfs2_acl_set_mode(inode, di_bh,
253                                                          handle, mode);

168 static int ocfs2_acl_set_mode(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head ...
170 {
183         if (handle == NULL) {
                    >>> BUG: inode lock not held in ex at this point <<<
184                 handle = ocfs2_start_trans(OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb),
185                                            OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS);

ocfs2_setattr.torvalds#1247 we unlock and at torvalds#1259 call posix_acl_chmod. When we reach
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#181 and do trans, the inode cluster lock is not held in EX
mode (it should be). How this could have happended?

We are the lock master, were holding lock EX and have released it in
ocfs2_setattr.torvalds#1247. Note that there are no holders of this lock at
this point. Another node needs the lock in PR, and we downconvert from
EX to PR. So the inode lock is PR when do the trans in
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#184. The trans stays in core (not flushed to disc).
Now another node want the lock in EX, downconvert thread gets kicked (the
one that tripped assert abovt), finds an unflushed trans but the lock is
not EX (it is PR). If the lock was at EX, it would have flushed the trans
ocfs2_ci_checkpointed -> ocfs2_start_checkpoint before downconverting (to NULL)
for the request.

ocfs2_setattr must not drop inode lock ex in this code path. If it does,
takes it again before the trans, say in ocfs2_set_acl, another cluster node can
get in between, execute another setattr, overwriting the one in progress
on this node, resulting in a mode acl size combo that is a mix of the two.

Signed-off-by: Tariq Saeed <tariq.x.saeed@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
ddstreet pushed a commit to ddstreet/linux that referenced this pull request Aug 19, 2015
Orabug: 20189959

PID: 614    TASK: ffff882a739da580  CPU: 3   COMMAND: "ocfs2dc"
  #0 [ffff882ecc3759b0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103b35d
  #1 [ffff882ecc375a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b95b5
  #2 [ffff882ecc375af0] oops_end at ffffffff815091d8
  #3 [ffff882ecc375b20] die at ffffffff8101868b
  #4 [ffff882ecc375b50] do_trap at ffffffff81508bb0
  #5 [ffff882ecc375ba0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810165e5
  torvalds#6 [ffff882ecc375c40] invalid_op at ffffffff815116fb
     [exception RIP: ocfs2_ci_checkpointed+208]
     RIP: ffffffffa0a7e940  RSP: ffff882ecc375cf0  RFLAGS: 00010002
     RAX: 0000000000000001  RBX: 000000000000654b  RCX: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     RDX: 00000000000017d9  RSI: ffff8812dc83f1f8  RDI: ffffffffa0b2c318
     RBP: ffff882ecc375d20   R8: ffff882ef6ecfa60   R9: ffff88301f272200
     R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffffffffffffffff
     R13: ffff8812dc83f4f0  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
  torvalds#7 [ffff882ecc375d28] ocfs2_check_meta_downconvert at ffffffffa0a7edbd [ocfs2]
  torvalds#8 [ffff882ecc375d38] ocfs2_unblock_lock at ffffffffa0a84af8 [ocfs2]
  torvalds#9 [ffff882ecc375dc8] ocfs2_process_blocked_lock at ffffffffa0a85285 [ocfs2]
torvalds#10 [ffff882ecc375e18] ocfs2_downconvert_thread_do_work at ffffffffa0a85445 [ocfs2]
torvalds#11 [ffff882ecc375e68] ocfs2_downconvert_thread at ffffffffa0a854de [ocfs2]
torvalds#12 [ffff882ecc375ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090da7
torvalds#13 [ffff882ecc375f48] kernel_thread_helper at ffffffff81511884
assert is tripped because the tran is not checkpointed and the lock level is PR.

Some time ago, chmod command had been executed. As result, the following call
chain left the inode cluster lock in PR state, latter on causing the assert.
system_call_fastpath
  -> my_chmod
   -> sys_chmod
    -> sys_fchmodat
     -> notify_change
      -> ocfs2_setattr
       -> posix_acl_chmod
        -> ocfs2_iop_set_acl
         -> ocfs2_set_acl
          -> ocfs2_acl_set_mode
Here is how.
1119 int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
1120 {
1247         ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 1); <<< WRONG thing to do.
..
1258         if (!status && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
1259                 status =  posix_acl_chmod(inode, inode->i_mode);

519 posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode)
520 {
..
539         ret = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);

287 int ocfs2_iop_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, ...
288 {
289         return ocfs2_set_acl(NULL, inode, NULL, type, acl, NULL, NULL);

224 int ocfs2_set_acl(handle_t *handle,
225                          struct inode *inode, ...
231 {
..
252                                 ret = ocfs2_acl_set_mode(inode, di_bh,
253                                                          handle, mode);

168 static int ocfs2_acl_set_mode(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head ...
170 {
183         if (handle == NULL) {
                    >>> BUG: inode lock not held in ex at this point <<<
184                 handle = ocfs2_start_trans(OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb),
185                                            OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS);

ocfs2_setattr.torvalds#1247 we unlock and at torvalds#1259 call posix_acl_chmod. When we reach
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#181 and do trans, the inode cluster lock is not held in EX
mode (it should be). How this could have happended?

We are the lock master, were holding lock EX and have released it in
ocfs2_setattr.torvalds#1247. Note that there are no holders of this lock at
this point. Another node needs the lock in PR, and we downconvert from
EX to PR. So the inode lock is PR when do the trans in
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#184. The trans stays in core (not flushed to disc).
Now another node want the lock in EX, downconvert thread gets kicked (the
one that tripped assert abovt), finds an unflushed trans but the lock is
not EX (it is PR). If the lock was at EX, it would have flushed the trans
ocfs2_ci_checkpointed -> ocfs2_start_checkpoint before downconverting (to NULL)
for the request.

ocfs2_setattr must not drop inode lock ex in this code path. If it does,
takes it again before the trans, say in ocfs2_set_acl, another cluster node can
get in between, execute another setattr, overwriting the one in progress
on this node, resulting in a mode acl size combo that is a mix of the two.

Signed-off-by: Tariq Saeed <tariq.x.saeed@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
ddstreet pushed a commit to ddstreet/linux that referenced this pull request Aug 25, 2015
Orabug: 20189959

PID: 614    TASK: ffff882a739da580  CPU: 3   COMMAND: "ocfs2dc"
  #0 [ffff882ecc3759b0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103b35d
  #1 [ffff882ecc375a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b95b5
  #2 [ffff882ecc375af0] oops_end at ffffffff815091d8
  #3 [ffff882ecc375b20] die at ffffffff8101868b
  #4 [ffff882ecc375b50] do_trap at ffffffff81508bb0
  #5 [ffff882ecc375ba0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810165e5
  torvalds#6 [ffff882ecc375c40] invalid_op at ffffffff815116fb
     [exception RIP: ocfs2_ci_checkpointed+208]
     RIP: ffffffffa0a7e940  RSP: ffff882ecc375cf0  RFLAGS: 00010002
     RAX: 0000000000000001  RBX: 000000000000654b  RCX: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     RDX: 00000000000017d9  RSI: ffff8812dc83f1f8  RDI: ffffffffa0b2c318
     RBP: ffff882ecc375d20   R8: ffff882ef6ecfa60   R9: ffff88301f272200
     R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffffffffffffffff
     R13: ffff8812dc83f4f0  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
  torvalds#7 [ffff882ecc375d28] ocfs2_check_meta_downconvert at ffffffffa0a7edbd [ocfs2]
  torvalds#8 [ffff882ecc375d38] ocfs2_unblock_lock at ffffffffa0a84af8 [ocfs2]
  torvalds#9 [ffff882ecc375dc8] ocfs2_process_blocked_lock at ffffffffa0a85285 [ocfs2]
torvalds#10 [ffff882ecc375e18] ocfs2_downconvert_thread_do_work at ffffffffa0a85445 [ocfs2]
torvalds#11 [ffff882ecc375e68] ocfs2_downconvert_thread at ffffffffa0a854de [ocfs2]
torvalds#12 [ffff882ecc375ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090da7
torvalds#13 [ffff882ecc375f48] kernel_thread_helper at ffffffff81511884
assert is tripped because the tran is not checkpointed and the lock level is PR.

Some time ago, chmod command had been executed. As result, the following call
chain left the inode cluster lock in PR state, latter on causing the assert.
system_call_fastpath
  -> my_chmod
   -> sys_chmod
    -> sys_fchmodat
     -> notify_change
      -> ocfs2_setattr
       -> posix_acl_chmod
        -> ocfs2_iop_set_acl
         -> ocfs2_set_acl
          -> ocfs2_acl_set_mode
Here is how.
1119 int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
1120 {
1247         ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 1); <<< WRONG thing to do.
..
1258         if (!status && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
1259                 status =  posix_acl_chmod(inode, inode->i_mode);

519 posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode)
520 {
..
539         ret = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);

287 int ocfs2_iop_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, ...
288 {
289         return ocfs2_set_acl(NULL, inode, NULL, type, acl, NULL, NULL);

224 int ocfs2_set_acl(handle_t *handle,
225                          struct inode *inode, ...
231 {
..
252                                 ret = ocfs2_acl_set_mode(inode, di_bh,
253                                                          handle, mode);

168 static int ocfs2_acl_set_mode(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head ...
170 {
183         if (handle == NULL) {
                    >>> BUG: inode lock not held in ex at this point <<<
184                 handle = ocfs2_start_trans(OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb),
185                                            OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS);

ocfs2_setattr.torvalds#1247 we unlock and at torvalds#1259 call posix_acl_chmod. When we reach
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#181 and do trans, the inode cluster lock is not held in EX
mode (it should be). How this could have happended?

We are the lock master, were holding lock EX and have released it in
ocfs2_setattr.torvalds#1247. Note that there are no holders of this lock at
this point. Another node needs the lock in PR, and we downconvert from
EX to PR. So the inode lock is PR when do the trans in
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#184. The trans stays in core (not flushed to disc).
Now another node want the lock in EX, downconvert thread gets kicked (the
one that tripped assert abovt), finds an unflushed trans but the lock is
not EX (it is PR). If the lock was at EX, it would have flushed the trans
ocfs2_ci_checkpointed -> ocfs2_start_checkpoint before downconverting (to NULL)
for the request.

ocfs2_setattr must not drop inode lock ex in this code path. If it does,
takes it again before the trans, say in ocfs2_set_acl, another cluster node can
get in between, execute another setattr, overwriting the one in progress
on this node, resulting in a mode acl size combo that is a mix of the two.

Signed-off-by: Tariq Saeed <tariq.x.saeed@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
torvalds pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 5, 2015
PID: 614    TASK: ffff882a739da580  CPU: 3   COMMAND: "ocfs2dc"
  #0 [ffff882ecc3759b0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103b35d
  #1 [ffff882ecc375a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b95b5
  #2 [ffff882ecc375af0] oops_end at ffffffff815091d8
  #3 [ffff882ecc375b20] die at ffffffff8101868b
  #4 [ffff882ecc375b50] do_trap at ffffffff81508bb0
  #5 [ffff882ecc375ba0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810165e5
  #6 [ffff882ecc375c40] invalid_op at ffffffff815116fb
     [exception RIP: ocfs2_ci_checkpointed+208]
     RIP: ffffffffa0a7e940  RSP: ffff882ecc375cf0  RFLAGS: 00010002
     RAX: 0000000000000001  RBX: 000000000000654b  RCX: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     RDX: 00000000000017d9  RSI: ffff8812dc83f1f8  RDI: ffffffffa0b2c318
     RBP: ffff882ecc375d20   R8: ffff882ef6ecfa60   R9: ffff88301f272200
     R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffffffffffffffff
     R13: ffff8812dc83f4f0  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
  #7 [ffff882ecc375d28] ocfs2_check_meta_downconvert at ffffffffa0a7edbd [ocfs2]
  #8 [ffff882ecc375d38] ocfs2_unblock_lock at ffffffffa0a84af8 [ocfs2]
  #9 [ffff882ecc375dc8] ocfs2_process_blocked_lock at ffffffffa0a85285 [ocfs2]
#10 [ffff882ecc375e18] ocfs2_downconvert_thread_do_work at ffffffffa0a85445 [ocfs2]
#11 [ffff882ecc375e68] ocfs2_downconvert_thread at ffffffffa0a854de [ocfs2]
#12 [ffff882ecc375ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090da7
#13 [ffff882ecc375f48] kernel_thread_helper at ffffffff81511884
assert is tripped because the tran is not checkpointed and the lock level is PR.

Some time ago, chmod command had been executed. As result, the following call
chain left the inode cluster lock in PR state, latter on causing the assert.
system_call_fastpath
  -> my_chmod
   -> sys_chmod
    -> sys_fchmodat
     -> notify_change
      -> ocfs2_setattr
       -> posix_acl_chmod
        -> ocfs2_iop_set_acl
         -> ocfs2_set_acl
          -> ocfs2_acl_set_mode
Here is how.
1119 int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
1120 {
1247         ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 1); <<< WRONG thing to do.
..
1258         if (!status && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
1259                 status =  posix_acl_chmod(inode, inode->i_mode);

519 posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode)
520 {
..
539         ret = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);

287 int ocfs2_iop_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, ...
288 {
289         return ocfs2_set_acl(NULL, inode, NULL, type, acl, NULL, NULL);

224 int ocfs2_set_acl(handle_t *handle,
225                          struct inode *inode, ...
231 {
..
252                                 ret = ocfs2_acl_set_mode(inode, di_bh,
253                                                          handle, mode);

168 static int ocfs2_acl_set_mode(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head ...
170 {
183         if (handle == NULL) {
                    >>> BUG: inode lock not held in ex at this point <<<
184                 handle = ocfs2_start_trans(OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb),
185                                            OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS);

ocfs2_setattr.#1247 we unlock and at #1259 call posix_acl_chmod. When we reach
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.#181 and do trans, the inode cluster lock is not held in EX
mode (it should be). How this could have happended?

We are the lock master, were holding lock EX and have released it in
ocfs2_setattr.#1247.  Note that there are no holders of this lock at
this point.  Another node needs the lock in PR, and we downconvert from
EX to PR.  So the inode lock is PR when do the trans in
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.#184.  The trans stays in core (not flushed to disc).
Now another node want the lock in EX, downconvert thread gets kicked
(the one that tripped assert abovt), finds an unflushed trans but the
lock is not EX (it is PR).  If the lock was at EX, it would have flushed
the trans ocfs2_ci_checkpointed -> ocfs2_start_checkpoint before
downconverting (to NULL) for the request.

ocfs2_setattr must not drop inode lock ex in this code path.  If it
does, takes it again before the trans, say in ocfs2_set_acl, another
cluster node can get in between, execute another setattr, overwriting
the one in progress on this node, resulting in a mode acl size combo
that is a mix of the two.

Orabug: 20189959
Signed-off-by: Tariq Saeed <tariq.x.saeed@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
rogerq pushed a commit to rogerq/linux that referenced this pull request Oct 27, 2015
The PM runtime API can't be used in atomic contex on -RT even if
it's configured as irqsafe. As result, below error report can
be seen when PM runtime API called from IRQ chip's callbacks
irq_startup/irq_shutdown/irq_set_type, because they are
protected by RAW spinlock:

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/rtmutex.c:917
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 128, pid: 96, name: insmod
3 locks held by insmod/96:
 #0:  (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c04752c8>] __driver_attach+0x54/0xa0
 #1:  (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c04752d4>] __driver_attach+0x60/0xa0
 #2:  (class){......}, at: [<c00a408c>] __irq_get_desc_lock+0x60/0xa4
irq event stamp: 1834
hardirqs last  enabled at (1833): [<c06ab2a4>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x88/0x90
hardirqs last disabled at (1834): [<c06ab068>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2c/0x64
softirqs last  enabled at (0): [<c003d220>] copy_process.part.52+0x410/0x19d8
softirqs last disabled at (0): [<  (null)>]   (null)
Preemption disabled at:[<  (null)>]   (null)

CPU: 1 PID: 96 Comm: insmod Tainted: G        W  O    4.1.3-rt3-00618-g57e2387-dirty torvalds#184
Hardware name: Generic DRA74X (Flattened Device Tree)
[<c00190f4>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c0014734>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
[<c0014734>] (show_stack) from [<c06a62ec>] (dump_stack+0x88/0xdc)
[<c06a62ec>] (dump_stack) from [<c006ca44>] (___might_sleep+0x198/0x2a8)
[<c006ca44>] (___might_sleep) from [<c06ab6d4>] (rt_spin_lock+0x30/0x70)
[<c06ab6d4>] (rt_spin_lock) from [<c04815ac>] (__pm_runtime_resume+0x68/0xa4)
[<c04815ac>] (__pm_runtime_resume) from [<c04123f4>] (omap_gpio_irq_type+0x188/0x1d8)
[<c04123f4>] (omap_gpio_irq_type) from [<c00a64e4>] (__irq_set_trigger+0x68/0x130)
[<c00a64e4>] (__irq_set_trigger) from [<c00a7bc4>] (irq_set_irq_type+0x44/0x6c)
[<c00a7bc4>] (irq_set_irq_type) from [<c00abbf8>] (irq_create_of_mapping+0x120/0x174)
[<c00abbf8>] (irq_create_of_mapping) from [<c0577b74>] (of_irq_get+0x48/0x58)
[<c0577b74>] (of_irq_get) from [<c0540a14>] (i2c_device_probe+0x54/0x15c)
[<c0540a14>] (i2c_device_probe) from [<c04750dc>] (driver_probe_device+0x184/0x2c8)
[<c04750dc>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c0475310>] (__driver_attach+0x9c/0xa0)
[<c0475310>] (__driver_attach) from [<c0473238>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x7c/0xb0)
[<c0473238>] (bus_for_each_dev) from [<c0474af4>] (driver_attach+0x28/0x30)
[<c0474af4>] (driver_attach) from [<c0474760>] (bus_add_driver+0x154/0x200)
[<c0474760>] (bus_add_driver) from [<c0476348>] (driver_register+0x88/0x108)
[<c0476348>] (driver_register) from [<c0541600>] (i2c_register_driver+0x3c/0x90)
[<c0541600>] (i2c_register_driver) from [<bf003018>] (pcf857x_init+0x18/0x24 [gpio_pcf857x])
[<bf003018>] (pcf857x_init [gpio_pcf857x]) from [<c000998c>] (do_one_initcall+0x128/0x1e8)
[<c000998c>] (do_one_initcall) from [<c06a4220>] (do_init_module+0x6c/0x1bc)
[<c06a4220>] (do_init_module) from [<c00dd0c8>] (load_module+0x18e8/0x21c4)
[<c00dd0c8>] (load_module) from [<c00ddaa0>] (SyS_init_module+0xfc/0x158)
[<c00ddaa0>] (SyS_init_module) from [<c000ff40>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54)

The IRQ chip interface defines only two callbacks which are executed in
non-atomic contex - irq_bus_lock/irq_bus_sync_unlock, so lets move
PM runtime calls there.

Cc: <linux-rt-users@vger.kernel.org>
Tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Tested-by: Austin Schuh <austin@peloton-tech.com>
Signed-off-by: Grygorii Strashko <grygorii.strashko@ti.com>
0day-ci pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Oct 27, 2015
In multi-core system, if the clock is not sync perfectly, it
will make cycle_last that recorded by CPU-A is a little more
than cycle_now that read by CPU-B. With the negative result,
hrtimer_update_base() return a huge and wrong time. It leads
to the cpu can not finish the while loop in hrtimer_interrupt()
until the real nowtime which is returned from ktime_get() catch
up with the wrong time on clock monotonic base.

I was able to reproudce the problem with calling clock_settime
and clock_adjtime repeatedly on each cpu. The params of the calls
is random. Here is the calltrace:

Jan 01 00:02:29 Linux kernel: INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:
Jan 01 00:02:29 Linux kernel:         0: (2 GPs behind) idle=913/1/0 softirq=59289/59291 fqs=488
Jan 01 00:02:29 Linux kernel:         (detected by 20, t=5252 jiffies, g=35769, c=35768, q=567)
Jan 01 00:02:29 Linux kernel: Task dump for CPU 0:
Jan 01 00:02:29 Linux kernel: swapper/0       R  running task        0   0      0 0x00000002
Jan 01 00:02:29 Linux kernel: Call trace:
Jan 01 00:02:29 Linux kernel: [<ffffffc000086c5c>] __switch_to+0x74/0x8c
Jan 01 00:02:29 Linux kernel: rcu_sched kthread starved for 4764 jiffies!
Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 23s! [swapper/0:0]
Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.1.6+ torvalds#184
Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: task: ffffffc00091cdf0 ti: ffffffc000910000 task.ti: ffffffc000910000
Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: PC is at arch_cpu_idle+0x10/0x18
Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: LR is at arch_cpu_idle+0xc/0x18
Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: pc : [<ffffffc00008686c>] lr : [<ffffffc000086868>] pstate: 60000145
Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: sp : ffffffc000913f20
Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: x29: ffffffc000913f20 x28: 000000003f4bbab0
Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: x27: ffffffc00091669c x26: ffffffc00096e000
Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: x25: ffffffc000804000 x24: ffffffc000913f30
Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: x23: 0000000000000001 x22: ffffffc0006817f8
Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: x21: ffffffc0008fdb00 x20: ffffffc000916618
Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: x19: ffffffc000910000 x18: 00000000ffffffff
Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: x17: 0000007f9d6f682c x16: ffffffc0001e19d0
Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: x15: 0000000000000061 x14: 0000000000000072
Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: x13: 0000000000000067 x12: ffffffc000682528
Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: x11: 0000000000000005 x10: 00000001000faf9a
Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: x9 : ffffffc000913e60 x8 : ffffffc00091d350
Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 002b24c4f00026aa
Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: x5 : 0000001ffd5c6000 x4 : ffffffc000913ea0
Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: x3 : ffffffdffdec3b44 x2 : ffffffdffdec3b44
Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000

CPU-A updates the cycle_last in do_settimeofday64() under lock and CPU-B
reads the current cycles which is slightly behind CPU-A to substract the
cycle_last after unlock, then we get a negative result, after masking it
comes to a extremely huge value and lead to "hang" in hrtimer_interrupt().

And multi-core system on X86 had already met such problem and Thomas introduce
a fix which is commit 47001d6 ("x86: tsc prevent time going backwards").
And then Thomas moved the fix code into the core code file of time in
commit 09ec544 ("clocksource: Move cycle_last validation to core code").
Now the validation can be enabled by config CLOCKSOURCE_VALIDATE_LAST_CYCLE.
I think we can fix the problem on arm64 by selecting the config. This is no
side effect for systems with counters running properly.

Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
bjzhang pushed a commit to bjzhang/linux that referenced this pull request Nov 1, 2015
The PM runtime API can't be used in atomic contex on -RT even if
it's configured as irqsafe. As result, below error report can
be seen when PM runtime API called from IRQ chip's callbacks
irq_startup/irq_shutdown/irq_set_type, because they are
protected by RAW spinlock:

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/rtmutex.c:917
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 128, pid: 96, name: insmod
3 locks held by insmod/96:
 #0:  (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c04752c8>] __driver_attach+0x54/0xa0
 #1:  (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c04752d4>] __driver_attach+0x60/0xa0
 #2:  (class){......}, at: [<c00a408c>] __irq_get_desc_lock+0x60/0xa4
irq event stamp: 1834
hardirqs last  enabled at (1833): [<c06ab2a4>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x88/0x90
hardirqs last disabled at (1834): [<c06ab068>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2c/0x64
softirqs last  enabled at (0): [<c003d220>] copy_process.part.52+0x410/0x19d8
softirqs last disabled at (0): [<  (null)>]   (null)
Preemption disabled at:[<  (null)>]   (null)

CPU: 1 PID: 96 Comm: insmod Tainted: G        W  O    4.1.3-rt3-00618-g57e2387-dirty torvalds#184
Hardware name: Generic DRA74X (Flattened Device Tree)
[<c00190f4>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c0014734>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
[<c0014734>] (show_stack) from [<c06a62ec>] (dump_stack+0x88/0xdc)
[<c06a62ec>] (dump_stack) from [<c006ca44>] (___might_sleep+0x198/0x2a8)
[<c006ca44>] (___might_sleep) from [<c06ab6d4>] (rt_spin_lock+0x30/0x70)
[<c06ab6d4>] (rt_spin_lock) from [<c04815ac>] (__pm_runtime_resume+0x68/0xa4)
[<c04815ac>] (__pm_runtime_resume) from [<c04123f4>] (omap_gpio_irq_type+0x188/0x1d8)
[<c04123f4>] (omap_gpio_irq_type) from [<c00a64e4>] (__irq_set_trigger+0x68/0x130)
[<c00a64e4>] (__irq_set_trigger) from [<c00a7bc4>] (irq_set_irq_type+0x44/0x6c)
[<c00a7bc4>] (irq_set_irq_type) from [<c00abbf8>] (irq_create_of_mapping+0x120/0x174)
[<c00abbf8>] (irq_create_of_mapping) from [<c0577b74>] (of_irq_get+0x48/0x58)
[<c0577b74>] (of_irq_get) from [<c0540a14>] (i2c_device_probe+0x54/0x15c)
[<c0540a14>] (i2c_device_probe) from [<c04750dc>] (driver_probe_device+0x184/0x2c8)
[<c04750dc>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c0475310>] (__driver_attach+0x9c/0xa0)
[<c0475310>] (__driver_attach) from [<c0473238>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x7c/0xb0)
[<c0473238>] (bus_for_each_dev) from [<c0474af4>] (driver_attach+0x28/0x30)
[<c0474af4>] (driver_attach) from [<c0474760>] (bus_add_driver+0x154/0x200)
[<c0474760>] (bus_add_driver) from [<c0476348>] (driver_register+0x88/0x108)
[<c0476348>] (driver_register) from [<c0541600>] (i2c_register_driver+0x3c/0x90)
[<c0541600>] (i2c_register_driver) from [<bf003018>] (pcf857x_init+0x18/0x24 [gpio_pcf857x])
[<bf003018>] (pcf857x_init [gpio_pcf857x]) from [<c000998c>] (do_one_initcall+0x128/0x1e8)
[<c000998c>] (do_one_initcall) from [<c06a4220>] (do_init_module+0x6c/0x1bc)
[<c06a4220>] (do_init_module) from [<c00dd0c8>] (load_module+0x18e8/0x21c4)
[<c00dd0c8>] (load_module) from [<c00ddaa0>] (SyS_init_module+0xfc/0x158)
[<c00ddaa0>] (SyS_init_module) from [<c000ff40>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54)

The IRQ chip interface defines only two callbacks which are executed in
non-atomic contex - irq_bus_lock/irq_bus_sync_unlock, so lets move
PM runtime calls there.

Tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Tested-by: Austin Schuh <austin@peloton-tech.com>
Signed-off-by: Grygorii Strashko <grygorii.strashko@ti.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <ssantosh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
10ne1 pushed a commit to 10ne1/linux that referenced this pull request Jan 21, 2016
The PM runtime API can't be used in atomic contex on -RT even if
it's configured as irqsafe. As result, below error report can
be seen when PM runtime API called from IRQ chip's callbacks
irq_startup/irq_shutdown/irq_set_type, because they are
protected by RAW spinlock:

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/rtmutex.c:917
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 128, pid: 96, name: insmod
3 locks held by insmod/96:
 #0:  (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c04752c8>] __driver_attach+0x54/0xa0
 #1:  (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c04752d4>] __driver_attach+0x60/0xa0
 #2:  (class){......}, at: [<c00a408c>] __irq_get_desc_lock+0x60/0xa4
irq event stamp: 1834
hardirqs last  enabled at (1833): [<c06ab2a4>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x88/0x90
hardirqs last disabled at (1834): [<c06ab068>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2c/0x64
softirqs last  enabled at (0): [<c003d220>] copy_process.part.52+0x410/0x19d8
softirqs last disabled at (0): [<  (null)>]   (null)
Preemption disabled at:[<  (null)>]   (null)

CPU: 1 PID: 96 Comm: insmod Tainted: G        W  O    4.1.3-rt3-00618-g57e2387-dirty torvalds#184
Hardware name: Generic DRA74X (Flattened Device Tree)
[<c00190f4>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c0014734>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
[<c0014734>] (show_stack) from [<c06a62ec>] (dump_stack+0x88/0xdc)
[<c06a62ec>] (dump_stack) from [<c006ca44>] (___might_sleep+0x198/0x2a8)
[<c006ca44>] (___might_sleep) from [<c06ab6d4>] (rt_spin_lock+0x30/0x70)
[<c06ab6d4>] (rt_spin_lock) from [<c04815ac>] (__pm_runtime_resume+0x68/0xa4)
[<c04815ac>] (__pm_runtime_resume) from [<c04123f4>] (omap_gpio_irq_type+0x188/0x1d8)
[<c04123f4>] (omap_gpio_irq_type) from [<c00a64e4>] (__irq_set_trigger+0x68/0x130)
[<c00a64e4>] (__irq_set_trigger) from [<c00a7bc4>] (irq_set_irq_type+0x44/0x6c)
[<c00a7bc4>] (irq_set_irq_type) from [<c00abbf8>] (irq_create_of_mapping+0x120/0x174)
[<c00abbf8>] (irq_create_of_mapping) from [<c0577b74>] (of_irq_get+0x48/0x58)
[<c0577b74>] (of_irq_get) from [<c0540a14>] (i2c_device_probe+0x54/0x15c)
[<c0540a14>] (i2c_device_probe) from [<c04750dc>] (driver_probe_device+0x184/0x2c8)
[<c04750dc>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c0475310>] (__driver_attach+0x9c/0xa0)
[<c0475310>] (__driver_attach) from [<c0473238>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x7c/0xb0)
[<c0473238>] (bus_for_each_dev) from [<c0474af4>] (driver_attach+0x28/0x30)
[<c0474af4>] (driver_attach) from [<c0474760>] (bus_add_driver+0x154/0x200)
[<c0474760>] (bus_add_driver) from [<c0476348>] (driver_register+0x88/0x108)
[<c0476348>] (driver_register) from [<c0541600>] (i2c_register_driver+0x3c/0x90)
[<c0541600>] (i2c_register_driver) from [<bf003018>] (pcf857x_init+0x18/0x24 [gpio_pcf857x])
[<bf003018>] (pcf857x_init [gpio_pcf857x]) from [<c000998c>] (do_one_initcall+0x128/0x1e8)
[<c000998c>] (do_one_initcall) from [<c06a4220>] (do_init_module+0x6c/0x1bc)
[<c06a4220>] (do_init_module) from [<c00dd0c8>] (load_module+0x18e8/0x21c4)
[<c00dd0c8>] (load_module) from [<c00ddaa0>] (SyS_init_module+0xfc/0x158)
[<c00ddaa0>] (SyS_init_module) from [<c000ff40>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54)

The IRQ chip interface defines only two callbacks which are executed in
non-atomic contex - irq_bus_lock/irq_bus_sync_unlock, so lets move
PM runtime calls there.

Cc: <linux-rt-users@vger.kernel.org>
Tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Tested-by: Austin Schuh <austin@peloton-tech.com>
Signed-off-by: Grygorii Strashko <grygorii.strashko@ti.com>
Noltari pushed a commit to Noltari/linux that referenced this pull request Feb 1, 2017
commit 3d46a44 upstream.

PID: 614    TASK: ffff882a739da580  CPU: 3   COMMAND: "ocfs2dc"
  #0 [ffff882ecc3759b0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103b35d
  #1 [ffff882ecc375a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b95b5
  #2 [ffff882ecc375af0] oops_end at ffffffff815091d8
  #3 [ffff882ecc375b20] die at ffffffff8101868b
  #4 [ffff882ecc375b50] do_trap at ffffffff81508bb0
  #5 [ffff882ecc375ba0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810165e5
  torvalds#6 [ffff882ecc375c40] invalid_op at ffffffff815116fb
     [exception RIP: ocfs2_ci_checkpointed+208]
     RIP: ffffffffa0a7e940  RSP: ffff882ecc375cf0  RFLAGS: 00010002
     RAX: 0000000000000001  RBX: 000000000000654b  RCX: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     RDX: 00000000000017d9  RSI: ffff8812dc83f1f8  RDI: ffffffffa0b2c318
     RBP: ffff882ecc375d20   R8: ffff882ef6ecfa60   R9: ffff88301f272200
     R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffffffffffffffff
     R13: ffff8812dc83f4f0  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
  torvalds#7 [ffff882ecc375d28] ocfs2_check_meta_downconvert at ffffffffa0a7edbd [ocfs2]
  torvalds#8 [ffff882ecc375d38] ocfs2_unblock_lock at ffffffffa0a84af8 [ocfs2]
  torvalds#9 [ffff882ecc375dc8] ocfs2_process_blocked_lock at ffffffffa0a85285 [ocfs2]
assert is tripped because the tran is not checkpointed and the lock level is PR.

Some time ago, chmod command had been executed. As result, the following call
chain left the inode cluster lock in PR state, latter on causing the assert.
system_call_fastpath
  -> my_chmod
   -> sys_chmod
    -> sys_fchmodat
     -> notify_change
      -> ocfs2_setattr
       -> posix_acl_chmod
        -> ocfs2_iop_set_acl
         -> ocfs2_set_acl
          -> ocfs2_acl_set_mode
Here is how.
1119 int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
1120 {
1247         ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 1); <<< WRONG thing to do.
..
1258         if (!status && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
1259                 status =  posix_acl_chmod(inode, inode->i_mode);

519 posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode)
520 {
..
539         ret = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);

287 int ocfs2_iop_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, ...
288 {
289         return ocfs2_set_acl(NULL, inode, NULL, type, acl, NULL, NULL);

224 int ocfs2_set_acl(handle_t *handle,
225                          struct inode *inode, ...
231 {
..
252                                 ret = ocfs2_acl_set_mode(inode, di_bh,
253                                                          handle, mode);

168 static int ocfs2_acl_set_mode(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head ...
170 {
183         if (handle == NULL) {
                    >>> BUG: inode lock not held in ex at this point <<<
184                 handle = ocfs2_start_trans(OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb),
185                                            OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS);

ocfs2_setattr.torvalds#1247 we unlock and at torvalds#1259 call posix_acl_chmod. When we reach
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#181 and do trans, the inode cluster lock is not held in EX
mode (it should be). How this could have happended?

We are the lock master, were holding lock EX and have released it in
ocfs2_setattr.torvalds#1247.  Note that there are no holders of this lock at
this point.  Another node needs the lock in PR, and we downconvert from
EX to PR.  So the inode lock is PR when do the trans in
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#184.  The trans stays in core (not flushed to disc).
Now another node want the lock in EX, downconvert thread gets kicked
(the one that tripped assert abovt), finds an unflushed trans but the
lock is not EX (it is PR).  If the lock was at EX, it would have flushed
the trans ocfs2_ci_checkpointed -> ocfs2_start_checkpoint before
downconverting (to NULL) for the request.

ocfs2_setattr must not drop inode lock ex in this code path.  If it
does, takes it again before the trans, say in ocfs2_set_acl, another
cluster node can get in between, execute another setattr, overwriting
the one in progress on this node, resulting in a mode acl size combo
that is a mix of the two.

Orabug: 20189959
Signed-off-by: Tariq Saeed <tariq.x.saeed@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
laijs pushed a commit to laijs/linux that referenced this pull request Feb 13, 2017
lkl: Add offload (TSO4, CSUM) support to LKL device, #2 of 2
Noltari pushed a commit to Noltari/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 27, 2017
commit 3d46a44 upstream.

PID: 614    TASK: ffff882a739da580  CPU: 3   COMMAND: "ocfs2dc"
  #0 [ffff882ecc3759b0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103b35d
  #1 [ffff882ecc375a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b95b5
  #2 [ffff882ecc375af0] oops_end at ffffffff815091d8
  #3 [ffff882ecc375b20] die at ffffffff8101868b
  #4 [ffff882ecc375b50] do_trap at ffffffff81508bb0
  #5 [ffff882ecc375ba0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810165e5
  torvalds#6 [ffff882ecc375c40] invalid_op at ffffffff815116fb
     [exception RIP: ocfs2_ci_checkpointed+208]
     RIP: ffffffffa0a7e940  RSP: ffff882ecc375cf0  RFLAGS: 00010002
     RAX: 0000000000000001  RBX: 000000000000654b  RCX: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     RDX: 00000000000017d9  RSI: ffff8812dc83f1f8  RDI: ffffffffa0b2c318
     RBP: ffff882ecc375d20   R8: ffff882ef6ecfa60   R9: ffff88301f272200
     R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffffffffffffffff
     R13: ffff8812dc83f4f0  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
  torvalds#7 [ffff882ecc375d28] ocfs2_check_meta_downconvert at ffffffffa0a7edbd [ocfs2]
  torvalds#8 [ffff882ecc375d38] ocfs2_unblock_lock at ffffffffa0a84af8 [ocfs2]
  torvalds#9 [ffff882ecc375dc8] ocfs2_process_blocked_lock at ffffffffa0a85285 [ocfs2]
assert is tripped because the tran is not checkpointed and the lock level is PR.

Some time ago, chmod command had been executed. As result, the following call
chain left the inode cluster lock in PR state, latter on causing the assert.
system_call_fastpath
  -> my_chmod
   -> sys_chmod
    -> sys_fchmodat
     -> notify_change
      -> ocfs2_setattr
       -> posix_acl_chmod
        -> ocfs2_iop_set_acl
         -> ocfs2_set_acl
          -> ocfs2_acl_set_mode
Here is how.
1119 int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
1120 {
1247         ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 1); <<< WRONG thing to do.
..
1258         if (!status && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
1259                 status =  posix_acl_chmod(inode, inode->i_mode);

519 posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode)
520 {
..
539         ret = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);

287 int ocfs2_iop_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, ...
288 {
289         return ocfs2_set_acl(NULL, inode, NULL, type, acl, NULL, NULL);

224 int ocfs2_set_acl(handle_t *handle,
225                          struct inode *inode, ...
231 {
..
252                                 ret = ocfs2_acl_set_mode(inode, di_bh,
253                                                          handle, mode);

168 static int ocfs2_acl_set_mode(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head ...
170 {
183         if (handle == NULL) {
                    >>> BUG: inode lock not held in ex at this point <<<
184                 handle = ocfs2_start_trans(OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb),
185                                            OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS);

ocfs2_setattr.torvalds#1247 we unlock and at torvalds#1259 call posix_acl_chmod. When we reach
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#181 and do trans, the inode cluster lock is not held in EX
mode (it should be). How this could have happended?

We are the lock master, were holding lock EX and have released it in
ocfs2_setattr.torvalds#1247.  Note that there are no holders of this lock at
this point.  Another node needs the lock in PR, and we downconvert from
EX to PR.  So the inode lock is PR when do the trans in
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#184.  The trans stays in core (not flushed to disc).
Now another node want the lock in EX, downconvert thread gets kicked
(the one that tripped assert abovt), finds an unflushed trans but the
lock is not EX (it is PR).  If the lock was at EX, it would have flushed
the trans ocfs2_ci_checkpointed -> ocfs2_start_checkpoint before
downconverting (to NULL) for the request.

ocfs2_setattr must not drop inode lock ex in this code path.  If it
does, takes it again before the trans, say in ocfs2_set_acl, another
cluster node can get in between, execute another setattr, overwriting
the one in progress on this node, resulting in a mode acl size combo
that is a mix of the two.

Orabug: 20189959
Signed-off-by: Tariq Saeed <tariq.x.saeed@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
chombourger pushed a commit to chombourger/linux that referenced this pull request Feb 16, 2021
…from increase_ipc_memory to processor-sdk-linux-4.19.y

* commit '1b430bd15bc7612371157d64f11ddffec4e484fe':
  TEMP: arm64: dts: ti: k3-am654-base-board: Increase reserve memory for RTOS IPC
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Mar 15, 2021
This commit fixes the following checkpatch.pl errors:

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#170: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:170:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_PowerOnSetting(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist);

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#171: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:171:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_InitHwConfig(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bWifiOnly);

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#172: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:172:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_InitCoexDm(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist);

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#173: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:173:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_IpsNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type);

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#174: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:174:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_LpsNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type);

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#175: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:175:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_ScanNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type);

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#176: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:176:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_ConnectNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type);

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#177: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:177:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_MediaStatusNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type);

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#178: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:178:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_SpecialPacketNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type);

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#180: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:180:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 *tmpBuf, u8 length

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#182: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:182:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_HaltNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist);

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#183: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:183:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_PnpNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 pnpState);

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#184: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:184:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_Periodical(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist);

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#185: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:185:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_DisplayCoexInfo(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist);

Signed-off-by: Marco Cesati <marcocesati@gmail.com>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Mar 16, 2021
This commit fixes the following checkpatch.pl errors:

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#170: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:170:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_PowerOnSetting(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist);

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#171: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:171:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_InitHwConfig(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bWifiOnly);

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#172: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:172:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_InitCoexDm(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist);

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#173: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:173:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_IpsNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type);

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#174: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:174:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_LpsNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type);

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#175: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:175:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_ScanNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type);

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#176: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:176:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_ConnectNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type);

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#177: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:177:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_MediaStatusNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type);

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#178: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:178:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_SpecialPacketNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type);

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#180: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:180:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 *tmpBuf, u8 length

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#182: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:182:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_HaltNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist);

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#183: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:183:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_PnpNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 pnpState);

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#184: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:184:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_Periodical(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist);

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#185: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:185:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_DisplayCoexInfo(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist);

Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco Cesati <marcocesati@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210315170618.2566-4-marcocesati@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mpe pushed a commit to mpe/linux that referenced this pull request Apr 13, 2021
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 7, 2021
Use the __string() machinery provided by the tracing subystem to make a
copy of the string literals consumed by the "nested VM-Enter failed"
tracepoint.  A complete copy is necessary to ensure that the tracepoint
can't outlive the data/memory it consumes and deference stale memory.

Because the tracepoint itself is defined by kvm, if kvm-intel and/or
kvm-amd are built as modules, the memory holding the string literals
defined by the vendor modules will be freed when the module is unloaded,
whereas the tracepoint and its data in the ring buffer will live until
kvm is unloaded (or "indefinitely" if kvm is built-in).

This bug has existed since the tracepoint was added, but was recently
exposed by a new check in tracing to detect exactly this type of bug.

  fmt: '%s%s
  ' current_buffer: ' vmx_dirty_log_t-140127  [003] ....  kvm_nested_vmenter_failed: '
  WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 140134 at kernel/trace/trace.c:3759 trace_check_vprintf+0x3be/0x3e0
  CPU: 3 PID: 140134 Comm: less Not tainted 5.13.0-rc1-ce2e73ce600a-req torvalds#184
  Hardware name: ASUS Q87M-E/Q87M-E, BIOS 1102 03/03/2014
  RIP: 0010:trace_check_vprintf+0x3be/0x3e0
  Code: <0f> 0b 44 8b 4c 24 1c e9 a9 fe ff ff c6 44 02 ff 00 49 8b 97 b0 20
  RSP: 0018:ffffa895cc37bcb0 EFLAGS: 00010282
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa895cc37bd08 RCX: 0000000000000027
  RDX: 0000000000000027 RSI: 00000000ffffdfff RDI: ffff9766cfad74f8
  RBP: ffffffffc0a041d4 R08: ffff9766cfad74f0 R09: ffffa895cc37bad8
  R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffffc0a041d4
  R13: ffffffffc0f4dba8 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff976409f2c000
  FS:  00007f92fa200740(0000) GS:ffff9766cfac0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 0000559bd11b0000 CR3: 000000019fbaa002 CR4: 00000000001726e0
  Call Trace:
   trace_event_printf+0x5e/0x80
   trace_raw_output_kvm_nested_vmenter_failed+0x3a/0x60 [kvm]
   print_trace_line+0x1dd/0x4e0
   s_show+0x45/0x150
   seq_read_iter+0x2d5/0x4c0
   seq_read+0x106/0x150
   vfs_read+0x98/0x180
   ksys_read+0x5f/0xe0
   do_syscall_64+0x40/0xb0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Fixes: 380e005 ("KVM: nVMX: trace nested VM-Enter failures detected by H/W")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
borkmann added a commit to cilium/linux that referenced this pull request Oct 4, 2022
Add a big batch of selftest to extend test_progs with various tc link,
attach ops and old-style tc BPF attachments via libbpf APIs. Also test
multi-program attachments including mixing the various attach options:

  # ./test_progs -t tc_link
  torvalds#179     tc_link_base:OK
  torvalds#180     tc_link_detach:OK
  torvalds#181     tc_link_mix:OK
  torvalds#182     tc_link_opts:OK
  torvalds#183     tc_link_run_base:OK
  torvalds#184     tc_link_run_chain:OK
  Summary: 6/0 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED

All new and existing test cases pass.

Co-developed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Co-developed-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
borkmann added a commit to cilium/linux that referenced this pull request Oct 4, 2022
Add a big batch of selftest to extend test_progs with various tc link,
attach ops and old-style tc BPF attachments via libbpf APIs. Also test
multi-program attachments including mixing the various attach options:

  # ./test_progs -t tc_link
  torvalds#179     tc_link_base:OK
  torvalds#180     tc_link_detach:OK
  torvalds#181     tc_link_mix:OK
  torvalds#182     tc_link_opts:OK
  torvalds#183     tc_link_run_base:OK
  torvalds#184     tc_link_run_chain:OK
  Summary: 6/0 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED

All new and existing test cases pass.

Co-developed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
gatieme pushed a commit to gatieme/linux that referenced this pull request Nov 24, 2022
ANBZ: torvalds#184

It seems no need to print bootstrap and blob_dir path since
they takes about ~2ms, which impacts boot speed of
light-weight containers:
{"msg":"[    1.092236] erofs: (device erofs): RAFS bootstrap_path /run/kata-containers/shared/containers/rafs/[..]/bootstrap/image.boot","level":"INFO","ts":"2021-12-21T08:53:12.178819781+08:00","subsystem":"dmesg"}
{"msg":"[    1.094299] erofs: (device erofs): RAFS blob_dir_path /run/kata-containers/shared/containers/rafs/[..]/blob_cache_dir","level":"INFO","ts":"2021-12-21T08:53:12.180775832+08:00","subsystem":"dmesg"}

Reviewed-by: Liu Bo <bo.liu@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeffle Xu <jefflexu@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com>
intel-lab-lkp pushed a commit to intel-lab-lkp/linux that referenced this pull request Nov 28, 2024
When executing mm selftests run_vmtests.sh, there is such error:

 BUG: Bad page state in process uffd-unit-tests  pfn:00000
 page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x0
 flags: 0xffff0000002000(reserved|node=0|zone=0|lastcpupid=0xffff)
 raw: 00ffff0000002000 ffffbf0000000008 ffffbf0000000008 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_FREE flag(s) set
 Modules linked in: snd_seq_dummy snd_seq snd_seq_device rfkill vfat fat
    virtio_balloon efi_pstore virtio_net pstore net_failover failover fuse
    nfnetlink virtio_scsi virtio_gpu virtio_dma_buf dm_multipath efivarfs
 CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 1913 Comm: uffd-unit-tests Not tainted 6.12.0 torvalds#184
 Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022
 Stack : 900000047c8ac000 0000000000000000 9000000000223a7c 900000047c8ac000
         900000047c8af690 900000047c8af698 0000000000000000 900000047c8af7d8
         900000047c8af7d0 900000047c8af7d0 900000047c8af5b0 0000000000000001
         0000000000000001 900000047c8af698 10b3c7d53da40d26 0000010000000000
         0000000000000022 0000000fffffffff fffffffffe000000 ffff800000000000
         000000000000002f 0000800000000000 000000017a6d4000 90000000028f8940
         0000000000000000 0000000000000000 90000000025aa5e0 9000000002905000
         0000000000000000 90000000028f8940 ffff800000000000 0000000000000000
         0000000000000000 0000000000000000 9000000000223a94 000000012001839c
         00000000000000b0 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 0000000000071c1d
         ...
 Call Trace:
 [<9000000000223a94>] show_stack+0x5c/0x180
 [<9000000001c3fd64>] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0xa0
 [<900000000056aa08>] bad_page+0x1a0/0x1f0
 [<9000000000574978>] free_unref_folios+0xbf0/0xd20
 [<90000000004e65cc>] folios_put_refs+0x1a4/0x2b8
 [<9000000000599a0c>] free_pages_and_swap_cache+0x164/0x260
 [<9000000000547698>] tlb_batch_pages_flush+0xa8/0x1c0
 [<9000000000547f30>] tlb_finish_mmu+0xa8/0x218
 [<9000000000543cb8>] exit_mmap+0x1a0/0x360
 [<9000000000247658>] __mmput+0x78/0x200
 [<900000000025583c>] do_exit+0x43c/0xde8
 [<9000000000256490>] do_group_exit+0x68/0x110
 [<9000000000256554>] sys_exit_group+0x1c/0x20
 [<9000000001c413b4>] do_syscall+0x94/0x130
 [<90000000002216d8>] handle_syscall+0xb8/0x158
 Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
 BUG: non-zero pgtables_bytes on freeing mm: -16384

On LoongArch system, invalid huge pte entry should be invalid_pte_table
or _PAGE_HUGE. And it need be the same with invalid pmd entry, since
pmd_none() is called by function free_pgd_range(), pmd_none() return 0
by huge_pte_clear(). So _PAGE_HUGE is treated as valid pte table and
free_pte_range() will be called in free_pmd_range().

free_pmd_range()
        pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
        do {
                next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
                if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
                        continue;
                free_pte_range(tlb, pmd, addr);
        } while (pmd++, addr = next, addr != end);

Here invalid_pte_table is used for both invalid huge pte entry and
pmd entry.

Fixes: 09cfefb ("LoongArch: Add memory management")
Signed-off-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
mj22226 pushed a commit to mj22226/linux that referenced this pull request Dec 4, 2024
When executing mm selftests run_vmtests.sh, there is such an error:

 BUG: Bad page state in process uffd-unit-tests  pfn:00000
 page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x0
 flags: 0xffff0000002000(reserved|node=0|zone=0|lastcpupid=0xffff)
 raw: 00ffff0000002000 ffffbf0000000008 ffffbf0000000008 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_FREE flag(s) set
 Modules linked in: snd_seq_dummy snd_seq snd_seq_device rfkill vfat fat
    virtio_balloon efi_pstore virtio_net pstore net_failover failover fuse
    nfnetlink virtio_scsi virtio_gpu virtio_dma_buf dm_multipath efivarfs
 CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 1913 Comm: uffd-unit-tests Not tainted 6.12.0 torvalds#184
 Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022
 Stack : 900000047c8ac000 0000000000000000 9000000000223a7c 900000047c8ac000
         900000047c8af690 900000047c8af698 0000000000000000 900000047c8af7d8
         900000047c8af7d0 900000047c8af7d0 900000047c8af5b0 0000000000000001
         0000000000000001 900000047c8af698 10b3c7d53da40d26 0000010000000000
         0000000000000022 0000000fffffffff fffffffffe000000 ffff800000000000
         000000000000002f 0000800000000000 000000017a6d4000 90000000028f8940
         0000000000000000 0000000000000000 90000000025aa5e0 9000000002905000
         0000000000000000 90000000028f8940 ffff800000000000 0000000000000000
         0000000000000000 0000000000000000 9000000000223a94 000000012001839c
         00000000000000b0 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 0000000000071c1d
         ...
 Call Trace:
 [<9000000000223a94>] show_stack+0x5c/0x180
 [<9000000001c3fd64>] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0xa0
 [<900000000056aa08>] bad_page+0x1a0/0x1f0
 [<9000000000574978>] free_unref_folios+0xbf0/0xd20
 [<90000000004e65cc>] folios_put_refs+0x1a4/0x2b8
 [<9000000000599a0c>] free_pages_and_swap_cache+0x164/0x260
 [<9000000000547698>] tlb_batch_pages_flush+0xa8/0x1c0
 [<9000000000547f30>] tlb_finish_mmu+0xa8/0x218
 [<9000000000543cb8>] exit_mmap+0x1a0/0x360
 [<9000000000247658>] __mmput+0x78/0x200
 [<900000000025583c>] do_exit+0x43c/0xde8
 [<9000000000256490>] do_group_exit+0x68/0x110
 [<9000000000256554>] sys_exit_group+0x1c/0x20
 [<9000000001c413b4>] do_syscall+0x94/0x130
 [<90000000002216d8>] handle_syscall+0xb8/0x158
 Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
 BUG: non-zero pgtables_bytes on freeing mm: -16384

On LoongArch system, invalid huge pte entry should be invalid_pte_table
or a single _PAGE_HUGE bit rather than a zero value. And it should be
the same with invalid pmd entry, since pmd_none() is called by function
free_pgd_range() and pmd_none() return 0 by huge_pte_clear(). So single
_PAGE_HUGE bit is also treated as a valid pte table and free_pte_range()
will be called in free_pmd_range().

  free_pmd_range()
        pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
        do {
                next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
                if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
                        continue;
                free_pte_range(tlb, pmd, addr);
        } while (pmd++, addr = next, addr != end);

Here invalid_pte_table is used for both invalid huge pte entry and
pmd entry.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 09cfefb ("LoongArch: Add memory management")
Signed-off-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
ptr1337 pushed a commit to CachyOS/linux that referenced this pull request Dec 14, 2024
commit 7cd1f5f upstream.

When executing mm selftests run_vmtests.sh, there is such an error:

 BUG: Bad page state in process uffd-unit-tests  pfn:00000
 page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x0
 flags: 0xffff0000002000(reserved|node=0|zone=0|lastcpupid=0xffff)
 raw: 00ffff0000002000 ffffbf0000000008 ffffbf0000000008 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_FREE flag(s) set
 Modules linked in: snd_seq_dummy snd_seq snd_seq_device rfkill vfat fat
    virtio_balloon efi_pstore virtio_net pstore net_failover failover fuse
    nfnetlink virtio_scsi virtio_gpu virtio_dma_buf dm_multipath efivarfs
 CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 1913 Comm: uffd-unit-tests Not tainted 6.12.0 torvalds#184
 Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022
 Stack : 900000047c8ac000 0000000000000000 9000000000223a7c 900000047c8ac000
         900000047c8af690 900000047c8af698 0000000000000000 900000047c8af7d8
         900000047c8af7d0 900000047c8af7d0 900000047c8af5b0 0000000000000001
         0000000000000001 900000047c8af698 10b3c7d53da40d26 0000010000000000
         0000000000000022 0000000fffffffff fffffffffe000000 ffff800000000000
         000000000000002f 0000800000000000 000000017a6d4000 90000000028f8940
         0000000000000000 0000000000000000 90000000025aa5e0 9000000002905000
         0000000000000000 90000000028f8940 ffff800000000000 0000000000000000
         0000000000000000 0000000000000000 9000000000223a94 000000012001839c
         00000000000000b0 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 0000000000071c1d
         ...
 Call Trace:
 [<9000000000223a94>] show_stack+0x5c/0x180
 [<9000000001c3fd64>] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0xa0
 [<900000000056aa08>] bad_page+0x1a0/0x1f0
 [<9000000000574978>] free_unref_folios+0xbf0/0xd20
 [<90000000004e65cc>] folios_put_refs+0x1a4/0x2b8
 [<9000000000599a0c>] free_pages_and_swap_cache+0x164/0x260
 [<9000000000547698>] tlb_batch_pages_flush+0xa8/0x1c0
 [<9000000000547f30>] tlb_finish_mmu+0xa8/0x218
 [<9000000000543cb8>] exit_mmap+0x1a0/0x360
 [<9000000000247658>] __mmput+0x78/0x200
 [<900000000025583c>] do_exit+0x43c/0xde8
 [<9000000000256490>] do_group_exit+0x68/0x110
 [<9000000000256554>] sys_exit_group+0x1c/0x20
 [<9000000001c413b4>] do_syscall+0x94/0x130
 [<90000000002216d8>] handle_syscall+0xb8/0x158
 Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
 BUG: non-zero pgtables_bytes on freeing mm: -16384

On LoongArch system, invalid huge pte entry should be invalid_pte_table
or a single _PAGE_HUGE bit rather than a zero value. And it should be
the same with invalid pmd entry, since pmd_none() is called by function
free_pgd_range() and pmd_none() return 0 by huge_pte_clear(). So single
_PAGE_HUGE bit is also treated as a valid pte table and free_pte_range()
will be called in free_pmd_range().

  free_pmd_range()
        pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
        do {
                next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
                if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
                        continue;
                free_pte_range(tlb, pmd, addr);
        } while (pmd++, addr = next, addr != end);

Here invalid_pte_table is used for both invalid huge pte entry and
pmd entry.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 09cfefb ("LoongArch: Add memory management")
Signed-off-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
staging-kernelci-org pushed a commit to kernelci/linux that referenced this pull request Dec 15, 2024
commit 7cd1f5f upstream.

When executing mm selftests run_vmtests.sh, there is such an error:

 BUG: Bad page state in process uffd-unit-tests  pfn:00000
 page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x0
 flags: 0xffff0000002000(reserved|node=0|zone=0|lastcpupid=0xffff)
 raw: 00ffff0000002000 ffffbf0000000008 ffffbf0000000008 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_FREE flag(s) set
 Modules linked in: snd_seq_dummy snd_seq snd_seq_device rfkill vfat fat
    virtio_balloon efi_pstore virtio_net pstore net_failover failover fuse
    nfnetlink virtio_scsi virtio_gpu virtio_dma_buf dm_multipath efivarfs
 CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 1913 Comm: uffd-unit-tests Not tainted 6.12.0 torvalds#184
 Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022
 Stack : 900000047c8ac000 0000000000000000 9000000000223a7c 900000047c8ac000
         900000047c8af690 900000047c8af698 0000000000000000 900000047c8af7d8
         900000047c8af7d0 900000047c8af7d0 900000047c8af5b0 0000000000000001
         0000000000000001 900000047c8af698 10b3c7d53da40d26 0000010000000000
         0000000000000022 0000000fffffffff fffffffffe000000 ffff800000000000
         000000000000002f 0000800000000000 000000017a6d4000 90000000028f8940
         0000000000000000 0000000000000000 90000000025aa5e0 9000000002905000
         0000000000000000 90000000028f8940 ffff800000000000 0000000000000000
         0000000000000000 0000000000000000 9000000000223a94 000000012001839c
         00000000000000b0 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 0000000000071c1d
         ...
 Call Trace:
 [<9000000000223a94>] show_stack+0x5c/0x180
 [<9000000001c3fd64>] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0xa0
 [<900000000056aa08>] bad_page+0x1a0/0x1f0
 [<9000000000574978>] free_unref_folios+0xbf0/0xd20
 [<90000000004e65cc>] folios_put_refs+0x1a4/0x2b8
 [<9000000000599a0c>] free_pages_and_swap_cache+0x164/0x260
 [<9000000000547698>] tlb_batch_pages_flush+0xa8/0x1c0
 [<9000000000547f30>] tlb_finish_mmu+0xa8/0x218
 [<9000000000543cb8>] exit_mmap+0x1a0/0x360
 [<9000000000247658>] __mmput+0x78/0x200
 [<900000000025583c>] do_exit+0x43c/0xde8
 [<9000000000256490>] do_group_exit+0x68/0x110
 [<9000000000256554>] sys_exit_group+0x1c/0x20
 [<9000000001c413b4>] do_syscall+0x94/0x130
 [<90000000002216d8>] handle_syscall+0xb8/0x158
 Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
 BUG: non-zero pgtables_bytes on freeing mm: -16384

On LoongArch system, invalid huge pte entry should be invalid_pte_table
or a single _PAGE_HUGE bit rather than a zero value. And it should be
the same with invalid pmd entry, since pmd_none() is called by function
free_pgd_range() and pmd_none() return 0 by huge_pte_clear(). So single
_PAGE_HUGE bit is also treated as a valid pte table and free_pte_range()
will be called in free_pmd_range().

  free_pmd_range()
        pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
        do {
                next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
                if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
                        continue;
                free_pte_range(tlb, pmd, addr);
        } while (pmd++, addr = next, addr != end);

Here invalid_pte_table is used for both invalid huge pte entry and
pmd entry.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 09cfefb ("LoongArch: Add memory management")
Signed-off-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
RevySR pushed a commit to revyos/th1520-linux-kernel that referenced this pull request Dec 15, 2024
commit 7cd1f5f upstream.

When executing mm selftests run_vmtests.sh, there is such an error:

 BUG: Bad page state in process uffd-unit-tests  pfn:00000
 page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x0
 flags: 0xffff0000002000(reserved|node=0|zone=0|lastcpupid=0xffff)
 raw: 00ffff0000002000 ffffbf0000000008 ffffbf0000000008 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_FREE flag(s) set
 Modules linked in: snd_seq_dummy snd_seq snd_seq_device rfkill vfat fat
    virtio_balloon efi_pstore virtio_net pstore net_failover failover fuse
    nfnetlink virtio_scsi virtio_gpu virtio_dma_buf dm_multipath efivarfs
 CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 1913 Comm: uffd-unit-tests Not tainted 6.12.0 torvalds#184
 Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022
 Stack : 900000047c8ac000 0000000000000000 9000000000223a7c 900000047c8ac000
         900000047c8af690 900000047c8af698 0000000000000000 900000047c8af7d8
         900000047c8af7d0 900000047c8af7d0 900000047c8af5b0 0000000000000001
         0000000000000001 900000047c8af698 10b3c7d53da40d26 0000010000000000
         0000000000000022 0000000fffffffff fffffffffe000000 ffff800000000000
         000000000000002f 0000800000000000 000000017a6d4000 90000000028f8940
         0000000000000000 0000000000000000 90000000025aa5e0 9000000002905000
         0000000000000000 90000000028f8940 ffff800000000000 0000000000000000
         0000000000000000 0000000000000000 9000000000223a94 000000012001839c
         00000000000000b0 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 0000000000071c1d
         ...
 Call Trace:
 [<9000000000223a94>] show_stack+0x5c/0x180
 [<9000000001c3fd64>] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0xa0
 [<900000000056aa08>] bad_page+0x1a0/0x1f0
 [<9000000000574978>] free_unref_folios+0xbf0/0xd20
 [<90000000004e65cc>] folios_put_refs+0x1a4/0x2b8
 [<9000000000599a0c>] free_pages_and_swap_cache+0x164/0x260
 [<9000000000547698>] tlb_batch_pages_flush+0xa8/0x1c0
 [<9000000000547f30>] tlb_finish_mmu+0xa8/0x218
 [<9000000000543cb8>] exit_mmap+0x1a0/0x360
 [<9000000000247658>] __mmput+0x78/0x200
 [<900000000025583c>] do_exit+0x43c/0xde8
 [<9000000000256490>] do_group_exit+0x68/0x110
 [<9000000000256554>] sys_exit_group+0x1c/0x20
 [<9000000001c413b4>] do_syscall+0x94/0x130
 [<90000000002216d8>] handle_syscall+0xb8/0x158
 Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
 BUG: non-zero pgtables_bytes on freeing mm: -16384

On LoongArch system, invalid huge pte entry should be invalid_pte_table
or a single _PAGE_HUGE bit rather than a zero value. And it should be
the same with invalid pmd entry, since pmd_none() is called by function
free_pgd_range() and pmd_none() return 0 by huge_pte_clear(). So single
_PAGE_HUGE bit is also treated as a valid pte table and free_pte_range()
will be called in free_pmd_range().

  free_pmd_range()
        pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
        do {
                next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
                if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
                        continue;
                free_pte_range(tlb, pmd, addr);
        } while (pmd++, addr = next, addr != end);

Here invalid_pte_table is used for both invalid huge pte entry and
pmd entry.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 09cfefb ("LoongArch: Add memory management")
Signed-off-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Taowyoo pushed a commit to fortanix/linux that referenced this pull request Apr 25, 2025
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2102118

commit 7cd1f5f upstream.

When executing mm selftests run_vmtests.sh, there is such an error:

 BUG: Bad page state in process uffd-unit-tests  pfn:00000
 page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x0
 flags: 0xffff0000002000(reserved|node=0|zone=0|lastcpupid=0xffff)
 raw: 00ffff0000002000 ffffbf0000000008 ffffbf0000000008 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_FREE flag(s) set
 Modules linked in: snd_seq_dummy snd_seq snd_seq_device rfkill vfat fat
    virtio_balloon efi_pstore virtio_net pstore net_failover failover fuse
    nfnetlink virtio_scsi virtio_gpu virtio_dma_buf dm_multipath efivarfs
 CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 1913 Comm: uffd-unit-tests Not tainted 6.12.0 torvalds#184
 Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022
 Stack : 900000047c8ac000 0000000000000000 9000000000223a7c 900000047c8ac000
         900000047c8af690 900000047c8af698 0000000000000000 900000047c8af7d8
         900000047c8af7d0 900000047c8af7d0 900000047c8af5b0 0000000000000001
         0000000000000001 900000047c8af698 10b3c7d53da40d26 0000010000000000
         0000000000000022 0000000fffffffff fffffffffe000000 ffff800000000000
         000000000000002f 0000800000000000 000000017a6d4000 90000000028f8940
         0000000000000000 0000000000000000 90000000025aa5e0 9000000002905000
         0000000000000000 90000000028f8940 ffff800000000000 0000000000000000
         0000000000000000 0000000000000000 9000000000223a94 000000012001839c
         00000000000000b0 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 0000000000071c1d
         ...
 Call Trace:
 [<9000000000223a94>] show_stack+0x5c/0x180
 [<9000000001c3fd64>] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0xa0
 [<900000000056aa08>] bad_page+0x1a0/0x1f0
 [<9000000000574978>] free_unref_folios+0xbf0/0xd20
 [<90000000004e65cc>] folios_put_refs+0x1a4/0x2b8
 [<9000000000599a0c>] free_pages_and_swap_cache+0x164/0x260
 [<9000000000547698>] tlb_batch_pages_flush+0xa8/0x1c0
 [<9000000000547f30>] tlb_finish_mmu+0xa8/0x218
 [<9000000000543cb8>] exit_mmap+0x1a0/0x360
 [<9000000000247658>] __mmput+0x78/0x200
 [<900000000025583c>] do_exit+0x43c/0xde8
 [<9000000000256490>] do_group_exit+0x68/0x110
 [<9000000000256554>] sys_exit_group+0x1c/0x20
 [<9000000001c413b4>] do_syscall+0x94/0x130
 [<90000000002216d8>] handle_syscall+0xb8/0x158
 Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
 BUG: non-zero pgtables_bytes on freeing mm: -16384

On LoongArch system, invalid huge pte entry should be invalid_pte_table
or a single _PAGE_HUGE bit rather than a zero value. And it should be
the same with invalid pmd entry, since pmd_none() is called by function
free_pgd_range() and pmd_none() return 0 by huge_pte_clear(). So single
_PAGE_HUGE bit is also treated as a valid pte table and free_pte_range()
will be called in free_pmd_range().

  free_pmd_range()
        pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
        do {
                next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
                if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
                        continue;
                free_pte_range(tlb, pmd, addr);
        } while (pmd++, addr = next, addr != end);

Here invalid_pte_table is used for both invalid huge pte entry and
pmd entry.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 09cfefb ("LoongArch: Add memory management")
Signed-off-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CVE-2024-56628
Signed-off-by: Koichiro Den <koichiro.den@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
@torvalds torvalds closed this Sep 22, 2025
intel-lab-lkp pushed a commit to intel-lab-lkp/linux that referenced this pull request Nov 12, 2025
xfs/286 produced this report on my test fleet:

 ==================================================================
 BUG: KFENCE: out-of-bounds read in memcpy_orig+0x54/0x110

 Out-of-bounds read at 0xffff88843fe9e038 (184B right of kfence-torvalds#184):
  memcpy_orig+0x54/0x110
  xrep_symlink_salvage_inline+0xb3/0xf0 [xfs]
  xrep_symlink_salvage+0x100/0x110 [xfs]
  xrep_symlink+0x2e/0x80 [xfs]
  xrep_attempt+0x61/0x1f0 [xfs]
  xfs_scrub_metadata+0x34f/0x5c0 [xfs]
  xfs_ioc_scrubv_metadata+0x387/0x560 [xfs]
  xfs_file_ioctl+0xe23/0x10e0 [xfs]
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x76/0xc0
  do_syscall_64+0x4e/0x1e0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

 kfence-torvalds#184: 0xffff88843fe9df80-0xffff88843fe9dfea, size=107, cache=kmalloc-128

 allocated by task 3470 on cpu 1 at 263329.131592s (192823.508886s ago):
  xfs_init_local_fork+0x79/0xe0 [xfs]
  xfs_iformat_local+0xa4/0x170 [xfs]
  xfs_iformat_data_fork+0x148/0x180 [xfs]
  xfs_inode_from_disk+0x2cd/0x480 [xfs]
  xfs_iget+0x450/0xd60 [xfs]
  xfs_bulkstat_one_int+0x6b/0x510 [xfs]
  xfs_bulkstat_iwalk+0x1e/0x30 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_ag_recs+0xdf/0x150 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_run_callbacks+0xb9/0x190 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_ag+0x1dc/0x2f0 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_args.constprop.0+0x6a/0x120 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk+0xa4/0xd0 [xfs]
  xfs_bulkstat+0xfa/0x170 [xfs]
  xfs_ioc_fsbulkstat.isra.0+0x13a/0x230 [xfs]
  xfs_file_ioctl+0xbf2/0x10e0 [xfs]
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x76/0xc0
  do_syscall_64+0x4e/0x1e0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1300113 Comm: xfs_scrub Not tainted 6.18.0-rc4-djwx #rc4 PREEMPT(lazy)  3d744dd94e92690f00a04398d2bd8631dcef1954
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-4.module+el8.8.0+21164+ed375313 04/01/2014
 ==================================================================

On further analysis, I realized that the second parameter to min() is
not correct.  xfs_ifork::if_bytes is the size of the xfs_ifork::if_data
buffer.  if_bytes can be smaller than the data fork size because:

(a) the forkoff code tries to keep the data area as large as possible
(b) for symbolic links, if_bytes is the ondisk file size + 1
(c) forkoff is always a multiple of 8.

Case in point: for a single-byte symlink target, forkoff will be
8 but the buffer will only be 2 bytes long.

In other words, the logic here is wrong and we walk off the end of the
incore buffer.  Fix that.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.10
Fixes: 2651923 ("xfs: online repair of symbolic links")
Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
torvalds pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 22, 2025
xfs/286 produced this report on my test fleet:

 ==================================================================
 BUG: KFENCE: out-of-bounds read in memcpy_orig+0x54/0x110

 Out-of-bounds read at 0xffff88843fe9e038 (184B right of kfence-#184):
  memcpy_orig+0x54/0x110
  xrep_symlink_salvage_inline+0xb3/0xf0 [xfs]
  xrep_symlink_salvage+0x100/0x110 [xfs]
  xrep_symlink+0x2e/0x80 [xfs]
  xrep_attempt+0x61/0x1f0 [xfs]
  xfs_scrub_metadata+0x34f/0x5c0 [xfs]
  xfs_ioc_scrubv_metadata+0x387/0x560 [xfs]
  xfs_file_ioctl+0xe23/0x10e0 [xfs]
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x76/0xc0
  do_syscall_64+0x4e/0x1e0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

 kfence-#184: 0xffff88843fe9df80-0xffff88843fe9dfea, size=107, cache=kmalloc-128

 allocated by task 3470 on cpu 1 at 263329.131592s (192823.508886s ago):
  xfs_init_local_fork+0x79/0xe0 [xfs]
  xfs_iformat_local+0xa4/0x170 [xfs]
  xfs_iformat_data_fork+0x148/0x180 [xfs]
  xfs_inode_from_disk+0x2cd/0x480 [xfs]
  xfs_iget+0x450/0xd60 [xfs]
  xfs_bulkstat_one_int+0x6b/0x510 [xfs]
  xfs_bulkstat_iwalk+0x1e/0x30 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_ag_recs+0xdf/0x150 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_run_callbacks+0xb9/0x190 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_ag+0x1dc/0x2f0 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_args.constprop.0+0x6a/0x120 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk+0xa4/0xd0 [xfs]
  xfs_bulkstat+0xfa/0x170 [xfs]
  xfs_ioc_fsbulkstat.isra.0+0x13a/0x230 [xfs]
  xfs_file_ioctl+0xbf2/0x10e0 [xfs]
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x76/0xc0
  do_syscall_64+0x4e/0x1e0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1300113 Comm: xfs_scrub Not tainted 6.18.0-rc4-djwx #rc4 PREEMPT(lazy)  3d744dd94e92690f00a04398d2bd8631dcef1954
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-4.module+el8.8.0+21164+ed375313 04/01/2014
 ==================================================================

On further analysis, I realized that the second parameter to min() is
not correct.  xfs_ifork::if_bytes is the size of the xfs_ifork::if_data
buffer.  if_bytes can be smaller than the data fork size because:

(a) the forkoff code tries to keep the data area as large as possible
(b) for symbolic links, if_bytes is the ondisk file size + 1
(c) forkoff is always a multiple of 8.

Case in point: for a single-byte symlink target, forkoff will be
8 but the buffer will only be 2 bytes long.

In other words, the logic here is wrong and we walk off the end of the
incore buffer.  Fix that.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10
Fixes: 2651923 ("xfs: online repair of symbolic links")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
RevySR pushed a commit to revyos/th1520-linux-kernel that referenced this pull request Nov 24, 2025
xfs/286 produced this report on my test fleet:

 ==================================================================
 BUG: KFENCE: out-of-bounds read in memcpy_orig+0x54/0x110

 Out-of-bounds read at 0xffff88843fe9e038 (184B right of kfence-torvalds#184):
  memcpy_orig+0x54/0x110
  xrep_symlink_salvage_inline+0xb3/0xf0 [xfs]
  xrep_symlink_salvage+0x100/0x110 [xfs]
  xrep_symlink+0x2e/0x80 [xfs]
  xrep_attempt+0x61/0x1f0 [xfs]
  xfs_scrub_metadata+0x34f/0x5c0 [xfs]
  xfs_ioc_scrubv_metadata+0x387/0x560 [xfs]
  xfs_file_ioctl+0xe23/0x10e0 [xfs]
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x76/0xc0
  do_syscall_64+0x4e/0x1e0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

 kfence-torvalds#184: 0xffff88843fe9df80-0xffff88843fe9dfea, size=107, cache=kmalloc-128

 allocated by task 3470 on cpu 1 at 263329.131592s (192823.508886s ago):
  xfs_init_local_fork+0x79/0xe0 [xfs]
  xfs_iformat_local+0xa4/0x170 [xfs]
  xfs_iformat_data_fork+0x148/0x180 [xfs]
  xfs_inode_from_disk+0x2cd/0x480 [xfs]
  xfs_iget+0x450/0xd60 [xfs]
  xfs_bulkstat_one_int+0x6b/0x510 [xfs]
  xfs_bulkstat_iwalk+0x1e/0x30 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_ag_recs+0xdf/0x150 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_run_callbacks+0xb9/0x190 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_ag+0x1dc/0x2f0 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_args.constprop.0+0x6a/0x120 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk+0xa4/0xd0 [xfs]
  xfs_bulkstat+0xfa/0x170 [xfs]
  xfs_ioc_fsbulkstat.isra.0+0x13a/0x230 [xfs]
  xfs_file_ioctl+0xbf2/0x10e0 [xfs]
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x76/0xc0
  do_syscall_64+0x4e/0x1e0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1300113 Comm: xfs_scrub Not tainted 6.18.0-rc4-djwx #rc4 PREEMPT(lazy)  3d744dd94e92690f00a04398d2bd8631dcef1954
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-4.module+el8.8.0+21164+ed375313 04/01/2014
 ==================================================================

On further analysis, I realized that the second parameter to min() is
not correct.  xfs_ifork::if_bytes is the size of the xfs_ifork::if_data
buffer.  if_bytes can be smaller than the data fork size because:

(a) the forkoff code tries to keep the data area as large as possible
(b) for symbolic links, if_bytes is the ondisk file size + 1
(c) forkoff is always a multiple of 8.

Case in point: for a single-byte symlink target, forkoff will be
8 but the buffer will only be 2 bytes long.

In other words, the logic here is wrong and we walk off the end of the
incore buffer.  Fix that.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10
Fixes: 2651923 ("xfs: online repair of symbolic links")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
mj22226 pushed a commit to mj22226/linux that referenced this pull request Nov 27, 2025
[ Upstream commit 678e1cc ]

xfs/286 produced this report on my test fleet:

 ==================================================================
 BUG: KFENCE: out-of-bounds read in memcpy_orig+0x54/0x110

 Out-of-bounds read at 0xffff88843fe9e038 (184B right of kfence-torvalds#184):
  memcpy_orig+0x54/0x110
  xrep_symlink_salvage_inline+0xb3/0xf0 [xfs]
  xrep_symlink_salvage+0x100/0x110 [xfs]
  xrep_symlink+0x2e/0x80 [xfs]
  xrep_attempt+0x61/0x1f0 [xfs]
  xfs_scrub_metadata+0x34f/0x5c0 [xfs]
  xfs_ioc_scrubv_metadata+0x387/0x560 [xfs]
  xfs_file_ioctl+0xe23/0x10e0 [xfs]
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x76/0xc0
  do_syscall_64+0x4e/0x1e0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

 kfence-torvalds#184: 0xffff88843fe9df80-0xffff88843fe9dfea, size=107, cache=kmalloc-128

 allocated by task 3470 on cpu 1 at 263329.131592s (192823.508886s ago):
  xfs_init_local_fork+0x79/0xe0 [xfs]
  xfs_iformat_local+0xa4/0x170 [xfs]
  xfs_iformat_data_fork+0x148/0x180 [xfs]
  xfs_inode_from_disk+0x2cd/0x480 [xfs]
  xfs_iget+0x450/0xd60 [xfs]
  xfs_bulkstat_one_int+0x6b/0x510 [xfs]
  xfs_bulkstat_iwalk+0x1e/0x30 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_ag_recs+0xdf/0x150 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_run_callbacks+0xb9/0x190 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_ag+0x1dc/0x2f0 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_args.constprop.0+0x6a/0x120 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk+0xa4/0xd0 [xfs]
  xfs_bulkstat+0xfa/0x170 [xfs]
  xfs_ioc_fsbulkstat.isra.0+0x13a/0x230 [xfs]
  xfs_file_ioctl+0xbf2/0x10e0 [xfs]
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x76/0xc0
  do_syscall_64+0x4e/0x1e0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1300113 Comm: xfs_scrub Not tainted 6.18.0-rc4-djwx #rc4 PREEMPT(lazy)  3d744dd94e92690f00a04398d2bd8631dcef1954
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-4.module+el8.8.0+21164+ed375313 04/01/2014
 ==================================================================

On further analysis, I realized that the second parameter to min() is
not correct.  xfs_ifork::if_bytes is the size of the xfs_ifork::if_data
buffer.  if_bytes can be smaller than the data fork size because:

(a) the forkoff code tries to keep the data area as large as possible
(b) for symbolic links, if_bytes is the ondisk file size + 1
(c) forkoff is always a multiple of 8.

Case in point: for a single-byte symlink target, forkoff will be
8 but the buffer will only be 2 bytes long.

In other words, the logic here is wrong and we walk off the end of the
incore buffer.  Fix that.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10
Fixes: 2651923 ("xfs: online repair of symbolic links")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mj22226 pushed a commit to mj22226/linux that referenced this pull request Nov 27, 2025
[ Upstream commit 678e1cc ]

xfs/286 produced this report on my test fleet:

 ==================================================================
 BUG: KFENCE: out-of-bounds read in memcpy_orig+0x54/0x110

 Out-of-bounds read at 0xffff88843fe9e038 (184B right of kfence-torvalds#184):
  memcpy_orig+0x54/0x110
  xrep_symlink_salvage_inline+0xb3/0xf0 [xfs]
  xrep_symlink_salvage+0x100/0x110 [xfs]
  xrep_symlink+0x2e/0x80 [xfs]
  xrep_attempt+0x61/0x1f0 [xfs]
  xfs_scrub_metadata+0x34f/0x5c0 [xfs]
  xfs_ioc_scrubv_metadata+0x387/0x560 [xfs]
  xfs_file_ioctl+0xe23/0x10e0 [xfs]
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x76/0xc0
  do_syscall_64+0x4e/0x1e0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

 kfence-torvalds#184: 0xffff88843fe9df80-0xffff88843fe9dfea, size=107, cache=kmalloc-128

 allocated by task 3470 on cpu 1 at 263329.131592s (192823.508886s ago):
  xfs_init_local_fork+0x79/0xe0 [xfs]
  xfs_iformat_local+0xa4/0x170 [xfs]
  xfs_iformat_data_fork+0x148/0x180 [xfs]
  xfs_inode_from_disk+0x2cd/0x480 [xfs]
  xfs_iget+0x450/0xd60 [xfs]
  xfs_bulkstat_one_int+0x6b/0x510 [xfs]
  xfs_bulkstat_iwalk+0x1e/0x30 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_ag_recs+0xdf/0x150 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_run_callbacks+0xb9/0x190 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_ag+0x1dc/0x2f0 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_args.constprop.0+0x6a/0x120 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk+0xa4/0xd0 [xfs]
  xfs_bulkstat+0xfa/0x170 [xfs]
  xfs_ioc_fsbulkstat.isra.0+0x13a/0x230 [xfs]
  xfs_file_ioctl+0xbf2/0x10e0 [xfs]
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x76/0xc0
  do_syscall_64+0x4e/0x1e0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1300113 Comm: xfs_scrub Not tainted 6.18.0-rc4-djwx #rc4 PREEMPT(lazy)  3d744dd94e92690f00a04398d2bd8631dcef1954
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-4.module+el8.8.0+21164+ed375313 04/01/2014
 ==================================================================

On further analysis, I realized that the second parameter to min() is
not correct.  xfs_ifork::if_bytes is the size of the xfs_ifork::if_data
buffer.  if_bytes can be smaller than the data fork size because:

(a) the forkoff code tries to keep the data area as large as possible
(b) for symbolic links, if_bytes is the ondisk file size + 1
(c) forkoff is always a multiple of 8.

Case in point: for a single-byte symlink target, forkoff will be
8 but the buffer will only be 2 bytes long.

In other words, the logic here is wrong and we walk off the end of the
incore buffer.  Fix that.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10
Fixes: 2651923 ("xfs: online repair of symbolic links")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
nandamajay added a commit to nandamajay/linux-kernel-internal that referenced this pull request Dec 1, 2025
* tick/sched: Fix bogus condition in report_idle_softirq()

In commit 0345691b24c0 ("tick/rcu: Stop allowing RCU_SOFTIRQ in idle") the
new function report_idle_softirq() was created by breaking code out of the
existing can_stop_idle_tick() for kernels v5.18 and newer.

In doing so, the code essentially went from this form:

	if (A) {
		static int ratelimit;
		if (ratelimit < 10 && !C && A&D) {
                       pr_warn("NOHZ tick-stop error: ...");
		       ratelimit++;
		}
		return false;
	}

to a new function:

static bool report_idle_softirq(void)
{
       static int ratelimit;

       if (likely(!A))
               return false;

       if (ratelimit < 10)
               return false;
...
       pr_warn("NOHZ tick-stop error: local softirq work is pending, handler #%02x!!!\n",
               pending);
       ratelimit++;

       return true;
}

commit a7e282c77785 ("tick/rcu: Fix bogus ratelimit condition") realized
ratelimit was essentially set to zero instead of ten, and hence *no*
softirq pending messages would ever be issued, but "fixed" it as:

-       if (ratelimit < 10)
+       if (ratelimit >= 10)
                return false;

However, this fix introduced another issue:

When ratelimit is greater than or equal 10, even if A is true, it will
directly return false. While ratelimit in the original code was only used
to control printing and will not affect the return value.

Restore the original logic and restrict ratelimit to control the printk and
not the return value.

Fixes: 0345691b24c0 ("tick/rcu: Stop allowing RCU_SOFTIRQ in idle")
Fixes: a7e282c77785 ("tick/rcu: Fix bogus ratelimit condition")
Signed-off-by: Wen Yang <wen.yang@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251119174525.29470-1-wen.yang@linux.dev

* drm/amd: Skip power ungate during suspend for VPE

During the suspend sequence VPE is already going to be power gated
as part of vpe_suspend().  It's unnecessary to call during calls to
amdgpu_device_set_pg_state().

It actually can expose a race condition with the firmware if s0i3
sequence starts as well.  Drop these calls.

Cc: Peyton.Lee@amd.com
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2a6c826cfeedd7714611ac115371a959ead55bda)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

* drm/amdgpu: Skip emit de meta data on gfx11 with rs64 enabled

[Why]
Accoreding to CP updated to RS64 on gfx11,
WRITE_DATA with PREEMPTION_META_MEMORY(dst_sel=8) is illegal for CP FW.
That packet is used for MCBP on F32 based system.
So it would lead to incorrect GRBM write and FW is not handling that
extra case correctly.

[How]
With gfx11 rs64 enabled, skip emit de meta data.

Signed-off-by: Yifan Zha <Yifan.Zha@amd.com>
Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8366cd442d226463e673bed5d199df916f4ecbcf)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

* drm/amdgpu/vm: Check PRT uAPI flag instead of PTE flag

This fixes sparse mappings (aka. partially resident textures).

Check the correct flags.
Since a recent refactor, the code works with uAPI flags (for
mapping buffer objects), and not PTE (page table entry) flags.

Fixes: 6716a823d18d ("drm/amdgpu: rework how PTE flags are generated v3")
Signed-off-by: Timur Kristóf <timur.kristof@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8feeab26c80635b802f72b3ed986c693ff8f3212)

* drm/amdgpu/ttm: Fix crash when handling MMIO_REMAP in PDE flags

The MMIO_REMAP BO is a special 4K IO page that does not have a ttm_tt
behind it. However, amdgpu_ttm_tt_pde_flags() was treating it like
normal TT/doorbell/preempt memory and unconditionally accessed
ttm->caching. For the MMIO_REMAP BO, ttm is NULL, so this leads to a
NULL pointer dereference when computing PDE flags.

Fix this by checking that ttm is non-NULL before reading ttm->caching.
This prevents the crash for MMIO_REMAP and also makes the code more
defensive if other BOs ever come through without a ttm_tt.

Fixes: fb5a52dbe9fe ("drm/amdgpu: Implement TTM handling for MMIO_REMAP placement")
Suggested-by: Jesse Zhang <Jesse.Zhang@amd.com>
Suggested-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <srinivasan.shanmugam@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Jesse Zhang <Jesse.Zhang@amd.com>
Tested-by: Jesse Zhang <Jesse.Zhang@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0db94da5a0a1cacda080b9ec8425fcbe4babc141)

* drm/amdgpu: Add sriov vf check for VCN per queue reset support.

Add SRIOV check when setting VCN ring's supported reset mask.

Signed-off-by: Shikang Fan <shikang.fan@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Lijo Lazar <lijo.lazar@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit ee9b603ad43f9870eb75184f9fb0a84f8c3cc852)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

* spi: cadence-quadspi: Fix cqspi_probe() error handling for runtime pm

Commit f1eb4e792bb1 ("spi: spi-cadence-quadspi: Enable pm runtime earlier
to avoid imbalance") relocated code but missed updating the error handling
path associated with it.

Prior to the relocation, runtime pm was enabled after the code-block
associated with 'cqspi_request_mmap_dma()', due to which, the error
handling for the same didn't require invoking 'pm_runtime_disable()'.

Post refactoring, runtime pm has been enabled before the code-block and
when an error is encountered, jumping to 'probe_dma_failed' doesn't
invoke 'pm_runtime_disable()'. This leads to a race condition wherein
'cqspi_runtime_suspend()' is invoked while the error handling path executes
in parallel. The resulting error is the following:

  clk:103:0 already disabled
  WARNING: drivers/clk/clk.c:1188 at clk_core_disable+0x80/0xa0, CPU#1: kworker/u8:0/12
  [TRIMMED]
  pstate: 600000c5 (nZCv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
  pc : clk_core_disable+0x80/0xa0
  lr : clk_core_disable+0x80/0xa0
  [TRIMMED]
  Call trace:
   clk_core_disable+0x80/0xa0 (P)
   clk_core_disable_lock+0x88/0x10c
   clk_disable+0x24/0x30
   cqspi_probe+0xa3c/0xae8
  [TRIMMED]

The error is due to the second invocation of 'clk_disable_unprepare()' on
'cqspi->clk' in the error handling within 'cqspi_probe()', with the first
invocation being within 'cqspi_runtime_suspend()'.

Fix this by correcting the error handling.

Fixes: f1eb4e792bb1 ("spi: spi-cadence-quadspi: Enable pm runtime earlier to avoid imbalance")
Signed-off-by: Siddharth Vadapalli <s-vadapalli@ti.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251119152545.2591651-1-s-vadapalli@ti.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>

* wifi: rtw89: hw_scan: Don't let the operating channel be last

Scanning can be offloaded to the firmware. To that end, the driver
prepares a list of channels to scan, including periodic visits back to
the operating channel, and sends the list to the firmware.

When the channel list is too long to fit in a single H2C message, the
driver splits the list, sends the first part, and tells the firmware to
scan. When the scan is complete, the driver sends the next part of the
list and tells the firmware to scan.

When the last channel that fit in the H2C message is the operating
channel something seems to go wrong in the firmware. It will
acknowledge receiving the list of channels but apparently it will not
do anything more. The AP can't be pinged anymore. The driver still
receives beacons, though.

One way to avoid this is to split the list of channels before the
operating channel.

Affected devices:

* RTL8851BU with firmware 0.29.41.3
* RTL8832BU with firmware 0.29.29.8
* RTL8852BE with firmware 0.29.29.8

The commit 57a5fbe39a18 ("wifi: rtw89: refactor flow that hw scan handles channel list")
is found by git blame, but it is actually to refine the scan flow, but not
a culprit, so skip Fixes tag.

Reported-by: Bitterblue Smith <rtl8821cerfe2@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wireless/0abbda91-c5c2-4007-84c8-215679e652e1@gmail.com/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.16+
Signed-off-by: Bitterblue Smith <rtl8821cerfe2@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ping-Ke Shih <pkshih@realtek.com>
Signed-off-by: Ping-Ke Shih <pkshih@realtek.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/c1e61744-8db4-4646-867f-241b47d30386@gmail.com

* scsi: sg: Do not sleep in atomic context

sg_finish_rem_req() calls blk_rq_unmap_user(). The latter function may
sleep. Hence, call sg_finish_rem_req() with interrupts enabled instead
of disabled.

Reported-by: syzbot+c01f8e6e73f20459912e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-scsi/691560c4.a70a0220.3124cb.001a.GAE@google.com/
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 97d27b0dd015 ("scsi: sg: close race condition in sg_remove_sfp_usercontext()")
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251113181643.1108973-1-bvanassche@acm.org
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>

* mptcp: fix ack generation for fallback msk

mptcp_cleanup_rbuf() needs to know the last most recent, mptcp-level
rcv_wnd sent, and such information is tracked into the msk->old_wspace
field, updated at ack transmission time by mptcp_write_options().

Fallback socket do not add any mptcp options, such helper is never
invoked, and msk->old_wspace value remain stale. That in turn makes
ack generation at recvmsg() time quite random.

Address the issue ensuring mptcp_write_options() is invoked even for
fallback sockets, and just update the needed info in such a case.

The issue went unnoticed for a long time, as mptcp currently overshots
the fallback socket receive buffer autotune significantly. It is going
to change in the near future.

Fixes: e3859603ba13 ("mptcp: better msk receive window updates")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Closes: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/594
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Geliang Tang <geliang@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-18-rc6-v1-1-806d3781c95f@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

* mptcp: avoid unneeded subflow-level drops

The rcv window is shared among all the subflows. Currently, MPTCP sync
the TCP-level rcv window with the MPTCP one at tcp_transmit_skb() time.

The above means that incoming data may sporadically observe outdated
TCP-level rcv window and being wrongly dropped by TCP.

Address the issue checking for the edge condition before queuing the
data at TCP level, and eventually syncing the rcv window as needed.

Note that the issue is actually present from the very first MPTCP
implementation, but backports older than the blamed commit below will
range from impossible to useless.

Before:

  $ nstat -n; sleep 1; nstat -z TcpExtBeyondWindow
  TcpExtBeyondWindow              14                 0.0

After:

  $ nstat -n; sleep 1; nstat -z TcpExtBeyondWindow
  TcpExtBeyondWindow              0                  0.0

Fixes: fa3fe2b15031 ("mptcp: track window announced to peer")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-18-rc6-v1-2-806d3781c95f@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

* mptcp: fix premature close in case of fallback

I'm observing very frequent self-tests failures in case of fallback when
running on a CONFIG_PREEMPT kernel.

The root cause is that subflow_sched_work_if_closed() closes any subflow
as soon as it is half-closed and has no incoming data pending.

That works well for regular subflows - MPTCP needs bi-directional
connectivity to operate on a given subflow - but for fallback socket is
race prone.

When TCP peer closes the connection before the MPTCP one,
subflow_sched_work_if_closed() will schedule the MPTCP worker to
gracefully close the subflow, and shortly after will do another schedule
to inject and process a dummy incoming DATA_FIN.

On CONFIG_PREEMPT kernel, the MPTCP worker can kick-in and close the
fallback subflow before subflow_sched_work_if_closed() is able to create
the dummy DATA_FIN, unexpectedly interrupting the transfer.

Address the issue explicitly avoiding closing fallback subflows on when
the peer is only half-closed.

Note that, when the subflow is able to create the DATA_FIN before the
worker invocation, the worker will change the msk state before trying to
close the subflow and will skip the latter operation as the msk will not
match anymore the precondition in __mptcp_close_subflow().

Fixes: f09b0ad55a11 ("mptcp: close subflow when receiving TCP+FIN")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-18-rc6-v1-3-806d3781c95f@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

* mptcp: do not fallback when OoO is present

In case of DSS corruption, the MPTCP protocol tries to avoid the subflow
reset if fallback is possible. Such corruptions happen in the receive
path; to ensure fallback is possible the stack additionally needs to
check for OoO data, otherwise the fallback will break the data stream.

Fixes: e32d262c89e2 ("mptcp: handle consistently DSS corruption")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Closes: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/598
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-18-rc6-v1-4-806d3781c95f@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

* mptcp: decouple mptcp fastclose from tcp close

With the current fastclose implementation, the mptcp_do_fastclose()
helper is in charge of two distinct actions: send the fastclose reset
and cleanup the subflows.

Formally decouple the two steps, ensuring that mptcp explicitly closes
all the subflows after the mentioned helper.

This will make the upcoming fix simpler, and allows dropping the 2nd
argument from mptcp_destroy_common(). The Fixes tag is then the same as
in the next commit to help with the backports.

Fixes: d21f83485518 ("mptcp: use fastclose on more edge scenarios")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Geliang Tang <geliang@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-18-rc6-v1-5-806d3781c95f@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

* mptcp: fix duplicate reset on fastclose

The CI reports sporadic failures of the fastclose self-tests. The root
cause is a duplicate reset, not carrying the relevant MPTCP option.
In the failing scenario the bad reset is received by the peer before
the fastclose one, preventing the reception of the latter.

Indeed there is window of opportunity at fastclose time for the
following race:

  mptcp_do_fastclose
    __mptcp_close_ssk
      __tcp_close()
        tcp_set_state() [1]
        tcp_send_active_reset() [2]

After [1] the stack will send reset to in-flight data reaching the now
closed port. Such reset may race with [2].

Address the issue explicitly sending a single reset on fastclose before
explicitly moving the subflow to close status.

Fixes: d21f83485518 ("mptcp: use fastclose on more edge scenarios")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Closes: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/596
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Geliang Tang <geliang@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-18-rc6-v1-6-806d3781c95f@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

* selftests: mptcp: join: fastclose: remove flaky marks

After recent fixes like the parent commit, and "selftests: mptcp:
connect: trunc: read all recv data", the two fastclose subtests no
longer look flaky any more.

It then feels fine to remove these flaky marks, to no longer ignore
these subtests in case of errors.

Reviewed-by: Geliang Tang <geliang@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-18-rc6-v1-7-806d3781c95f@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

* selftests: mptcp: join: endpoints: longer timeout

In rare cases, when the test environment is very slow, some endpoints
tests can fail because some expected events have not been seen.

Because the tests are expecting a long on-going connection, and they are
not waiting for the end of the transfer, it is fine to have a longer
timeout, and even go over the default one. This connection will be
killed at the end, after the verifications: increasing the timeout
doesn't change anything, apart from avoiding it to end before the end of
the verifications.

To play it safe, all endpoints tests not waiting for the end of the
transfer are now having a longer timeout: 2 minutes.

The Fixes commit was making the connection longer, but still, the
default timeout would have stopped it after 1 minute, which might not be
enough in very slow environments.

Fixes: 6457595db987 ("selftests: mptcp: join: endpoints: longer transfer")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Geliang Tang <geliang@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-18-rc6-v1-8-806d3781c95f@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

* selftests: mptcp: join: userspace: longer timeout

In rare cases, when the test environment is very slow, some userspace
tests can fail because some expected events have not been seen.

Because the tests are expecting a long on-going connection, and they are
not waiting for the end of the transfer, it is fine to have a longer
timeout, and even go over the default one. This connection will be
killed at the end, after the verifications: increasing the timeout
doesn't change anything, apart from avoiding it to end before the end of
the verifications.

To play it safe, all userspace tests not waiting for the end of the
transfer are now having a longer timeout: 2 minutes.

The Fixes commit was making the connection longer, but still, the
default timeout would have stopped it after 1 minute, which might not be
enough in very slow environments.

Fixes: 290493078b96 ("selftests: mptcp: join: userspace: longer transfer")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Geliang Tang <geliang@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-18-rc6-v1-9-806d3781c95f@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

* mptcp: fix address removal logic in mptcp_pm_nl_rm_addr

Fix inverted WARN_ON_ONCE condition that prevented normal address
removal counter updates. The current code only executes decrement
logic when the counter is already 0 (abnormal state), while
normal removals (counter > 0) are ignored.

Signed-off-by: Gang Yan <yangang@kylinos.cn>
Fixes: 636113918508 ("mptcp: pm: remove '_nl' from mptcp_pm_nl_rm_addr_received")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-18-rc6-v1-10-806d3781c95f@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

* selftests: mptcp: add a check for 'add_addr_accepted'

The previous patch fixed an issue with the 'add_addr_accepted' counter.
This was not spot by the test suite.

Check this counter and 'add_addr_signal' in MPTCP Join 'delete re-add
signal' test. This should help spotting similar regressions later on.
These counters are crucial for ensuring the MPTCP path manager correctly
handles the subflow creation via 'ADD_ADDR'.

Signed-off-by: Gang Yan <yangang@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: Geliang Tang <geliang@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-18-rc6-v1-11-806d3781c95f@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

* LoongArch: Use UAPI types in ptrace UAPI header

The kernel UAPI headers already contain fixed-width integer types, there
is no need to rely on the libc types. There may not be a libc available
or the libc may not provides the <stdint.h>, like for example on nolibc.

This also aligns the header with the rest of the LoongArch UAPI headers.

Fixes: 803b0fc5c3f2 ("LoongArch: Add process management")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>

* LoongArch: Consolidate CPU names in /proc/cpuinfo

Some processors have no IOCSR.VENDOR and IOCSR.CPUNAME, some processors
have these registers but there is no valid information.

Consolidate CPU names in /proc/cpuinfo:
1. Add "PRID" to display the PRID & Core-Name;
2. Let "Model Name" display "Unknown" if no valid name.

Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>

* LoongArch: Fix NUMA node parsing with numa_memblks

On physical machine, NUMA node id comes from high bit 44:48 of physical
address. However it is not true on virt machine. With general method, it
comes from ACPI SRAT table.

Here the common function numa_memblks_init() is used to parse NUMA node
information with numa_memblks.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>

* LoongArch: Mask all interrupts during kexec/kdump

If the default state of the interrupt controllers in the first kernel
don't mask any interrupts, it may cause the second kernel to potentially
receive interrupts (which were previously allocated by the first kernel)
immediately after a CPU becomes online during its boot process. These
interrupts cannot be properly routed, leading to bad IRQ issues.

This patch calls machine_kexec_mask_interrupts() to mask all interrupts
during the kexec/kdump process.

Signed-off-by: Tianyang Zhang <zhangtianyang@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>

* LoongArch: Don't panic if no valid cache info for PCI

If there is no valid cache info detected (may happen in virtual machine)
for pci_dfl_cache_line_size, kernel shouldn't panic. Because in the PCI
core it will be evaluated to (L1_CACHE_BYTES >> 2).

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiaxun Yang <jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>

* LoongArch: BPF: Disable trampoline for kernel module function trace

The current LoongArch BPF trampoline implementation is incompatible
with tracing functions in kernel modules. This causes several severe
and user-visible problems:

* The `bpf_selftests/module_attach` test fails consistently.
* Kernel lockup when a BPF program is attached to a module function [1].
* Critical kernel modules like WireGuard experience traffic disruption
  when their functions are traced with fentry [2].

Given the severity and the potential for other unknown side-effects, it
is safest to disable the feature entirely for now. This patch prevents
the BPF subsystem from allowing trampoline attachments to kernel module
functions on LoongArch.

This is a temporary mitigation until the core issues in the trampoline
code for kernel module handling can be identified and fixed.

[root@fedora bpf]# ./test_progs -a module_attach -v
bpf_testmod.ko is already unloaded.
Loading bpf_testmod.ko...
Successfully loaded bpf_testmod.ko.
test_module_attach:PASS:skel_open 0 nsec
test_module_attach:PASS:set_attach_target 0 nsec
test_module_attach:PASS:set_attach_target_explicit 0 nsec
test_module_attach:PASS:skel_load 0 nsec
libbpf: prog 'handle_fentry': failed to attach: -ENOTSUPP
libbpf: prog 'handle_fentry': failed to auto-attach: -ENOTSUPP
test_module_attach:FAIL:skel_attach skeleton attach failed: -524
Summary: 0/0 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 1 FAILED
Successfully unloaded bpf_testmod.ko.

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/loongarch/CAK3+h2wDmpC-hP4u4pJY8T-yfKyk4yRzpu2LMO+C13FMT58oqQ@mail.gmail.com/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/loongarch/CAK3+h2wYcpc+OwdLDUBvg2rF9rvvyc5amfHT-KcFaK93uoELPg@mail.gmail.com/

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f9b6b41f0cf3 ("LoongArch: BPF: Add basic bpf trampoline support")
Acked-by: Hengqi Chen <hengqi.chen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vincent Li <vincent.mc.li@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>

* smb: client: introduce close_cached_dir_locked()

Replace close_cached_dir() calls under cfid_list_lock with a new
close_cached_dir_locked() variant that uses kref_put() instead of
kref_put_lock() to avoid recursive locking when dropping references.

While the existing code works if the refcount >= 2 invariant holds,
this area has proven error-prone. Make deadlocks impossible and WARN
on invariant violations.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Henrique Carvalho <henrique.carvalho@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>

* cifs: fix memory leak in smb3_fs_context_parse_param error path

Add proper cleanup of ctx->source and fc->source to the
cifs_parse_mount_err error handler. This ensures that memory allocated
for the source strings is correctly freed on all error paths, matching
the cleanup already performed in the success path by
smb3_cleanup_fs_context_contents().
Pointers are also set to NULL after freeing to prevent potential
double-free issues.

This change fixes a memory leak originally detected by syzbot. The
leak occurred when processing Opt_source mount options if an error
happened after ctx->source and fc->source were successfully
allocated but before the function completed.

The specific leak sequence was:
1. ctx->source = smb3_fs_context_fullpath(ctx, '/') allocates memory
2. fc->source = kstrdup(ctx->source, GFP_KERNEL) allocates more memory
3. A subsequent error jumps to cifs_parse_mount_err
4. The old error handler freed passwords but not the source strings,
causing the memory to leak.

This issue was not addressed by commit e8c73eb7db0a ("cifs: client:
fix memory leak in smb3_fs_context_parse_param"), which only fixed
leaks from repeated fsconfig() calls but not this error path.

Patch updated with minor change suggested by kernel test robot

Reported-by: syzbot+87be6809ed9bf6d718e3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=87be6809ed9bf6d718e3
Fixes: 24e0a1eff9e2 ("cifs: switch to new mount api")
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Shaurya Rane <ssrane_b23@ee.vjti.ac.in>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>

* cifs: Add the smb3_read_* tracepoints to SMB1

Add the smb3_read_* tracepoints to SMB1's cifs_async_readv() and
cifs_readv_callback().

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Steve French <sfrench@samba.org>
cc: Paulo Alcantara <pc@manguebit.org>
cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>

* perf: Fix 0 count issue of cpu-clock

Currently cpu-clock event always returns 0 count, e.g.,

perf stat -e cpu-clock -- sleep 1

 Performance counter stats for 'sleep 1':
                 0      cpu-clock                        #    0.000 CPUs utilized
       1.002308394 seconds time elapsed

The root cause is the commit 'bc4394e5e79c ("perf: Fix the throttle
 error of some clock events")' adds PERF_EF_UPDATE flag check before
calling cpu_clock_event_update() to update the count, however the
PERF_EF_UPDATE flag is never set when the cpu-clock event is stopped in
counting mode (pmu->dev() -> cpu_clock_event_del() ->
cpu_clock_event_stop()). This leads to the cpu-clock event count is
never updated.

To fix this issue, force to set PERF_EF_UPDATE flag for cpu-clock event
just like what task-clock does.

Fixes: bc4394e5e79c ("perf: Fix the throttle error of some clock events")
Signed-off-by: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112080526.3971392-1-dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com

* xfs: fix out of bounds memory read error in symlink repair

xfs/286 produced this report on my test fleet:

 ==================================================================
 BUG: KFENCE: out-of-bounds read in memcpy_orig+0x54/0x110

 Out-of-bounds read at 0xffff88843fe9e038 (184B right of kfence-#184):
  memcpy_orig+0x54/0x110
  xrep_symlink_salvage_inline+0xb3/0xf0 [xfs]
  xrep_symlink_salvage+0x100/0x110 [xfs]
  xrep_symlink+0x2e/0x80 [xfs]
  xrep_attempt+0x61/0x1f0 [xfs]
  xfs_scrub_metadata+0x34f/0x5c0 [xfs]
  xfs_ioc_scrubv_metadata+0x387/0x560 [xfs]
  xfs_file_ioctl+0xe23/0x10e0 [xfs]
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x76/0xc0
  do_syscall_64+0x4e/0x1e0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

 kfence-#184: 0xffff88843fe9df80-0xffff88843fe9dfea, size=107, cache=kmalloc-128

 allocated by task 3470 on cpu 1 at 263329.131592s (192823.508886s ago):
  xfs_init_local_fork+0x79/0xe0 [xfs]
  xfs_iformat_local+0xa4/0x170 [xfs]
  xfs_iformat_data_fork+0x148/0x180 [xfs]
  xfs_inode_from_disk+0x2cd/0x480 [xfs]
  xfs_iget+0x450/0xd60 [xfs]
  xfs_bulkstat_one_int+0x6b/0x510 [xfs]
  xfs_bulkstat_iwalk+0x1e/0x30 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_ag_recs+0xdf/0x150 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_run_callbacks+0xb9/0x190 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_ag+0x1dc/0x2f0 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_args.constprop.0+0x6a/0x120 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk+0xa4/0xd0 [xfs]
  xfs_bulkstat+0xfa/0x170 [xfs]
  xfs_ioc_fsbulkstat.isra.0+0x13a/0x230 [xfs]
  xfs_file_ioctl+0xbf2/0x10e0 [xfs]
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x76/0xc0
  do_syscall_64+0x4e/0x1e0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1300113 Comm: xfs_scrub Not tainted 6.18.0-rc4-djwx #rc4 PREEMPT(lazy)  3d744dd94e92690f00a04398d2bd8631dcef1954
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-4.module+el8.8.0+21164+ed375313 04/01/2014
 ==================================================================

On further analysis, I realized that the second parameter to min() is
not correct.  xfs_ifork::if_bytes is the size of the xfs_ifork::if_data
buffer.  if_bytes can be smaller than the data fork size because:

(a) the forkoff code tries to keep the data area as large as possible
(b) for symbolic links, if_bytes is the ondisk file size + 1
(c) forkoff is always a multiple of 8.

Case in point: for a single-byte symlink target, forkoff will be
8 but the buffer will only be 2 bytes long.

In other words, the logic here is wrong and we walk off the end of the
incore buffer.  Fix that.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10
Fixes: 2651923d8d8db0 ("xfs: online repair of symbolic links")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>

* net: dsa: microchip: lan937x: Fix RGMII delay tuning

Correct RGMII delay application logic in lan937x_set_tune_adj().

The function was missing `data16 &= ~PORT_TUNE_ADJ` before setting the
new delay value. This caused the new value to be bitwise-OR'd with the
existing PORT_TUNE_ADJ field instead of replacing it.

For example, when setting the RGMII 2 TX delay on port 4, the
intended TUNE_ADJUST value of 0 (RGMII_2_TX_DELAY_2NS) was
incorrectly OR'd with the default 0x1B (from register value 0xDA3),
leaving the delay at the wrong setting.

This patch adds the missing mask to clear the field, ensuring the
correct delay value is written. Physical measurements on the RGMII TX
lines confirm the fix, showing the delay changing from ~1ns (before
change) to ~2ns.

While testing on i.MX 8MP showed this was within the platform's timing
tolerance, it did not match the intended hardware-characterized value.

Fixes: b19ac41faa3f ("net: dsa: microchip: apply rgmii tx and rx delay in phylink mac config")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251114090951.4057261-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

* l2tp: reset skb control buffer on xmit

The L2TP stack did not reset the skb control buffer before sending the
encapsulated package.

In a setup with an ath10k radio and batman-adv over an L2TP tunnel
massive fragmentations happen sporadically if the L2TP tunnel is
established over IPv4.

L2TP might reset some of the fields in the IP control buffer, but L2TP
assumes the type of the control buffer to be of an IPv4 packet.

In case the L2TP interface is used as a batadv hardif or the packet is
an IPv6 packet, this assumption breaks.

Clear the entire control buffer to avoid such mishaps altogether.

Fixes: f77ae9390438 ("[PPPOL2TP]: Reset meta-data in xmit function")
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118001619.242107-1-mail@david-bauer.net
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

* ata: libata-scsi: Add missing scsi_device_put() in ata_scsi_dev_rescan()

Call scsi_device_put() in ata_scsi_dev_rescan() if the device or its
queue are not running.

Fixes: 0c76106cb975 ("scsi: sd: Fix TCG OPAL unlock on system resume")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Yihang Li <liyihang9@h-partners.com>
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <cassel@kernel.org>

* ata: libata-scsi: Fix system suspend for a security locked drive

Commit cf3fc037623c ("ata: libata-scsi: Fix ata_to_sense_error() status
handling") fixed ata_to_sense_error() to properly generate sense key
ABORTED COMMAND (without any additional sense code), instead of the
previous bogus sense key ILLEGAL REQUEST with the additional sense code
UNALIGNED WRITE COMMAND, for a failed command.

However, this broke suspend for Security locked drives (drives that have
Security enabled, and have not been Security unlocked by boot firmware).

The reason for this is that the SCSI disk driver, for the Synchronize
Cache command only, treats any sense data with sense key ILLEGAL REQUEST
as a successful command (regardless of ASC / ASCQ).

After commit cf3fc037623c ("ata: libata-scsi: Fix ata_to_sense_error()
status handling") the code that treats any sense data with sense key
ILLEGAL REQUEST as a successful command is no longer applicable, so the
command fails, which causes the system suspend to be aborted:

  sd 1:0:0:0: PM: dpm_run_callback(): scsi_bus_suspend returns -5
  sd 1:0:0:0: PM: failed to suspend async: error -5
  PM: Some devices failed to suspend, or early wake event detected

To make suspend work once again, for a Security locked device only,
return sense data LOGICAL UNIT ACCESS NOT AUTHORIZED, the actual sense
data which a real SCSI device would have returned if locked.
The SCSI disk driver treats this sense data as a successful command.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ilia Baryshnikov <qwelias@gmail.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=220704
Fixes: cf3fc037623c ("ata: libata-scsi: Fix ata_to_sense_error() status handling")
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <cassel@kernel.org>

* ata: libata-core: Set capacity to zero for a security locked drive

For Security locked drives (drives that have Security enabled, and have
not been Security unlocked by boot firmware), the automatic partition
scanning will result in the user being spammed with errors such as:

  ata5.00: failed command: READ DMA
  ata5.00: cmd c8/00:08:00:00:00/00:00:00:00:00/e0 tag 7 dma 4096 in
           res 51/04:08:00:00:00/00:00:00:00:00/e0 Emask 0x1 (device error)
  ata5.00: status: { DRDY ERR }
  ata5.00: error: { ABRT }
  sd 4:0:0:0: [sda] tag#7 FAILED Result: hostbyte=DID_OK driverbyte=DRIVER_OK cmd_age=0s
  sd 4:0:0:0: [sda] tag#7 Sense Key : Aborted Command [current]
  sd 4:0:0:0: [sda] tag#7 Add. Sense: No additional sense information

during boot, because most commands except for IDENTIFY will be aborted by
a Security locked drive.

For a Security locked drive, set capacity to zero, so that no automatic
partition scanning will happen.

If the user later unlocks the drive using e.g. hdparm, the close() by the
user space application should trigger a revalidation of the drive.

Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <cassel@kernel.org>

* be2net: pass wrb_params in case of OS2BMC

be_insert_vlan_in_pkt() is called with the wrb_params argument being NULL
at be_send_pkt_to_bmc() call site.  This may lead to dereferencing a NULL
pointer when processing a workaround for specific packet, as commit
bc0c3405abbb ("be2net: fix a Tx stall bug caused by a specific ipv6
packet") states.

The correct way would be to pass the wrb_params from be_xmit().

Fixes: 760c295e0e8d ("be2net: Support for OS2BMC.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrey Vatoropin <a.vatoropin@crpt.ru>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251119105015.194501-1-a.vatoropin@crpt.ru
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

* vsock: Ignore signal/timeout on connect() if already established

During connect(), acting on a signal/timeout by disconnecting an already
established socket leads to several issues:

1. connect() invoking vsock_transport_cancel_pkt() ->
   virtio_transport_purge_skbs() may race with sendmsg() invoking
   virtio_transport_get_credit(). This results in a permanently elevated
   `vvs->bytes_unsent`. Which, in turn, confuses the SOCK_LINGER handling.

2. connect() resetting a connected socket's state may race with socket
   being placed in a sockmap. A disconnected socket remaining in a sockmap
   breaks sockmap's assumptions. And gives rise to WARNs.

3. connect() transitioning SS_CONNECTED -> SS_UNCONNECTED allows for a
   transport change/drop after TCP_ESTABLISHED. Which poses a problem for
   any simultaneous sendmsg() or connect() and may result in a
   use-after-free/null-ptr-deref.

Do not disconnect socket on signal/timeout. Keep the logic for unconnected
sockets: they don't linger, can't be placed in a sockmap, are rejected by
sendmsg().

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/e07fd95c-9a38-4eea-9638-133e38c2ec9b@rbox.co/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20250317-vsock-trans-signal-race-v4-0-fc8837f3f1d4@rbox.co/
[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/60f1b7db-3099-4f6a-875e-af9f6ef194f6@rbox.co/

Fixes: d021c344051a ("VSOCK: Introduce VM Sockets")
Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251119-vsock-interrupted-connect-v2-1-70734cf1233f@rbox.co
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

* timekeeping: Fix resource leak in tk_aux_sysfs_init() error paths

tk_aux_sysfs_init() returns immediately on error during the auxiliary clock
initialization loop without cleaning up previously allocated kobjects and
sysfs groups.

If kobject_create_and_add() or sysfs_create_group() fails during loop
iteration, the parent kobjects (tko and auxo) and any previously created
child kobjects are leaked.

Fix this by adding proper error handling with goto labels to ensure all
allocated resources are cleaned up on failure. kobject_put() on the
parent kobjects will handle cleanup of their children.

Fixes: 7b95663a3d96 ("timekeeping: Provide interface to control auxiliary clocks")
Signed-off-by: Malaya Kumar Rout <mrout@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251120150213.246777-1-mrout@redhat.com

* io_uring/cmd_net: fix wrong argument types for skb_queue_splice()

If timestamp retriving needs to be retried and the local list of
SKB's already has entries, then it's spliced back into the socket
queue. However, the arguments for the splice helper are transposed,
causing exactly the wrong direction of splicing into the on-stack
list. Fix that up.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Google Big Sleep <big-sleep-vuln-reports+bigsleep-462435176@google.com>
Fixes: 9e4ed359b8ef ("io_uring/netcmd: add tx timestamping cmd support")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

* sched_ext: Fix scx_enable() crash on helper kthread creation failure

A crash was observed when the sched_ext selftests runner was
terminated with Ctrl+\ while test 15 was running:

NIP [c00000000028fa58] scx_enable.constprop.0+0x358/0x12b0
LR [c00000000028fa2c] scx_enable.constprop.0+0x32c/0x12b0
Call Trace:
scx_enable.constprop.0+0x32c/0x12b0 (unreliable)
bpf_struct_ops_link_create+0x18c/0x22c
__sys_bpf+0x23f8/0x3044
sys_bpf+0x2c/0x6c
system_call_exception+0x124/0x320
system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec

kthread_run_worker() returns an ERR_PTR() on failure rather than NULL,
but the current code in scx_alloc_and_add_sched() only checks for a NULL
helper. Incase of failure on SIGQUIT, the error is not handled in
scx_alloc_and_add_sched() and scx_enable() ends up dereferencing an
error pointer.

Error handling is fixed in scx_alloc_and_add_sched() to propagate
PTR_ERR() into ret, so that scx_enable() jumps to the existing error
path, avoiding random dereference on failure.

Fixes: bff3b5aec1b7 ("sched_ext: Move disable machinery into scx_sched")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.16+
Reported-and-tested-by: Samir Mulani <samir@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Saket Kumar Bhaskar <skb99@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrea Righi <arighi@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Vishal Chourasia <vishalc@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

* dm: fix failure when empty flush's bi_sector points beyond the device end

An empty flush bio can have arbitrary bi_sector. The commit 2b1c6d7a890a
introduced a regression that device mapper would fail an empty flush bio
with -EIO if the sector pointed beyond the end of the device.

The commit introduced an optimization, that optimization would pass
flushes to __split_and_process_bio and __split_and_process_bio is not
prepared to handle empty bios. Fix this bug by passing only non-empty
flushes to __split_and_process_bio - non-empty flushes must have valid
bi_sector. Empty bios will go through __send_empty_flush, as they did
before the optimization.

This problem can be reproduced by running the lvm2 test:
make check_local T=lvconvert-thin.sh LVM_TEST_PREFER_BRD=0

Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Fixes: 2b1c6d7a890a ("dm: optimize REQ_PREFLUSH with data when using the linear target")
Reported-by: Zdenek Kabelac <zkabelac@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>

* selinux: rename task_security_struct to cred_security_struct

Before Linux had cred structures, the SELinux task_security_struct was
per-task and although the structure was switched to being per-cred
long ago, the name was never updated. This change renames it to
cred_security_struct to avoid confusion and pave the way for the
introduction of an actual per-task security structure for SELinux. No
functional change.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

* selinux: move avdcache to per-task security struct

The avdcache is meant to be per-task; move it to a new
task_security_struct that is duplicated per-task.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5d7ddc59b3d89b724a5aa8f30d0db94ff8d2d93f ("selinux: reduce path walk overhead")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: line length fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

* selinux: rename the cred_security_struct variables to "crsec"

Along with the renaming from task_security_struct to cred_security_struct,
rename the local variables to "crsec" from "tsec".  This both fits with
existing conventions and helps distinguish between task and cred related
variables.

No functional changes.

Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

* Bluetooth: btusb: mediatek: Fix kernel crash when releasing mtk iso interface

When performing reset tests and encountering abnormal card drop issues
that lead to a kernel crash, it is necessary to perform a null check
before releasing resources to avoid attempting to release a null pointer.

<4>[   29.158070] Hardware name: Google Quigon sku196612/196613 board (DT)
<4>[   29.158076] Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work [bluetooth]
<4>[   29.158154] pstate: 20400009 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
<4>[   29.158162] pc : klist_remove+0x90/0x158
<4>[   29.158174] lr : klist_remove+0x88/0x158
<4>[   29.158180] sp : ffffffc0846b3c00
<4>[   29.158185] pmr_save: 000000e0
<4>[   29.158188] x29: ffffffc0846b3c30 x28: ffffff80cd31f880 x27: ffffff80c1bdc058
<4>[   29.158199] x26: dead000000000100 x25: ffffffdbdc624ea3 x24: ffffff80c1bdc4c0
<4>[   29.158209] x23: ffffffdbdc62a3e6 x22: ffffff80c6c07000 x21: ffffffdbdc829290
<4>[   29.158219] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffffff80cd3e0648 x18: 000000031ec97781
<4>[   29.158229] x17: ffffff80c1bdc4a8 x16: ffffffdc10576548 x15: ffffff80c1180428
<4>[   29.158238] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 000000000000e380 x12: 0000000000000018
<4>[   29.158248] x11: ffffff80c2a7fd10 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000100000000
<4>[   29.158257] x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x6 : 2d7223ff6364626d
<4>[   29.158266] x5 : 0000008000000000 x4 : 0000000000000020 x3 : 2e7325006465636e
<4>[   29.158275] x2 : ffffffdc11afeff8 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffffffdc11be4d0c
<4>[   29.158285] Call trace:
<4>[   29.158290]  klist_remove+0x90/0x158
<4>[   29.158298]  device_release_driver_internal+0x20c/0x268
<4>[   29.158308]  device_release_driver+0x1c/0x30
<4>[   29.158316]  usb_driver_release_interface+0x70/0x88
<4>[   29.158325]  btusb_mtk_release_iso_intf+0x68/0xd8 [btusb (HASH:e8b6 5)]
<4>[   29.158347]  btusb_mtk_reset+0x5c/0x480 [btusb (HASH:e8b6 5)]
<4>[   29.158361]  hci_cmd_sync_work+0x10c/0x188 [bluetooth (HASH:a4fa 6)]
<4>[   29.158430]  process_scheduled_works+0x258/0x4e8
<4>[   29.158441]  worker_thread+0x300/0x428
<4>[   29.158448]  kthread+0x108/0x1d0
<4>[   29.158455]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
<0>[   29.158467] Code: 91343000 940139d1 f9400268 927ff914 (f9401297)
<4>[   29.158474] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
<0>[   29.167129] Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception
<2>[   29.167144] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
<4>[   29.167158] ------------[ cut here ]------------

Fixes: ceac1cb0259d ("Bluetooth: btusb: mediatek: add ISO data transmission functions")
Signed-off-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>

* Bluetooth: hci_core: Fix triggering cmd_timer for HCI_OP_NOP

HCI_OP_NOP means no command was actually sent so there is no point in
triggering cmd_timer which may cause a hdev->reset in the process since
it is assumed that the controller is stuck processing a command.

Fixes: e2d471b7806b ("Bluetooth: ISO: Fix not using SID from adv report")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>

* Bluetooth: hci_sock: Prevent race in socket write iter and sock bind

There is a potential race condition between sock bind and socket write
iter. bind may free the same cmd via mgmt_pending before write iter sends
the cmd, just as syzbot reported in UAF[1].

Here we use hci_dev_lock to synchronize the two, thereby avoiding the
UAF mentioned in [1].

[1]
syzbot reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mgmt_pending_remove+0x3b/0x210 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:316
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888077164818 by task syz.0.17/5989
Call Trace:
 mgmt_pending_remove+0x3b/0x210 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:316
 set_link_security+0x5c2/0x710 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:1918
 hci_mgmt_cmd+0x9c9/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1719
 hci_sock_sendmsg+0x6ca/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1839
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg+0x21c/0x270 net/socket.c:742
 sock_write_iter+0x279/0x360 net/socket.c:1195

Allocated by task 5989:
 mgmt_pending_add+0x35/0x140 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:296
 set_link_security+0x557/0x710 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:1910
 hci_mgmt_cmd+0x9c9/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1719
 hci_sock_sendmsg+0x6ca/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1839
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg+0x21c/0x270 net/socket.c:742
 sock_write_iter+0x279/0x360 net/socket.c:1195

Freed by task 5991:
 mgmt_pending_free net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:311 [inline]
 mgmt_pending_foreach+0x30d/0x380 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:257
 mgmt_index_removed+0x112/0x2f0 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:9477
 hci_sock_bind+0xbe9/0x1000 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1314

Fixes: 6fe26f694c82 ("Bluetooth: MGMT: Protect mgmt_pending list with its own lock")
Reported-by: syzbot+9aa47cd4633a3cf92a80@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=9aa47cd4633a3cf92a80
Tested-by: syzbot+9aa47cd4633a3cf92a80@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis <eadavis@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>

* Bluetooth: hci_core: lookup hci_conn on RX path on protocol side

The hdev lock/lookup/unlock/use pattern in the packet RX path doesn't
ensure hci_conn* is not concurrently modified/deleted. This locking
appears to be leftover from before conn_hash started using RCU
commit bf4c63252490b ("Bluetooth: convert conn hash to RCU")
and not clear if it had purpose since then.

Currently, there are code paths that delete hci_conn* from elsewhere
than the ordered hdev->workqueue where the RX work runs in. E.g.
commit 5af1f84ed13a ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix UAF on hci_abort_conn_sync")
introduced some of these, and there probably were a few others before
it.  It's better to do the locking so that even if these run
concurrently no UAF is possible.

Move the lookup of hci_conn and associated socket-specific conn to
protocol recv handlers, and do them within a single critical section
to cover hci_conn* usage and lookup.

syzkaller has reported a crash that appears to be this issue:

    [Task hdev->workqueue]          [Task 2]
                                    hci_disconnect_all_sync
    l2cap_recv_acldata(hcon)
                                      hci_conn_get(hcon)
                                      hci_abort_conn_sync(hcon)
                                        hci_dev_lock
      hci_dev_lock
                                        hci_conn_del(hcon)
      v-------------------------------- hci_dev_unlock
                                      hci_conn_put(hcon)
      conn = hcon->l2cap_data (UAF)

Fixes: 5af1f84ed13a ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix UAF on hci_abort_conn_sync")
Reported-by: syzbot+d32d77220b92eddd89ad@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d32d77220b92eddd89ad
Signed-off-by: Pauli Virtanen <pav@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>

* Bluetooth: btusb: mediatek: Avoid btusb_mtk_claim_iso_intf() NULL deref

In btusb_mtk_setup(), we set `btmtk_data->isopkt_intf` to:
  usb_ifnum_to_if(data->udev, MTK_ISO_IFNUM)

That function can return NULL in some cases. Even when it returns
NULL, though, we still go on to call btusb_mtk_claim_iso_intf().

As of commit e9087e828827 ("Bluetooth: btusb: mediatek: Add locks for
usb_driver_claim_interface()"), calling btusb_mtk_claim_iso_intf()
when `btmtk_data->isopkt_intf` is NULL will cause a crash because
we'll end up passing a bad pointer to device_lock(). Prior to that
commit we'd pass the NULL pointer directly to
usb_driver_claim_interface() which would detect it and return an
error, which was handled.

Resolve the crash in btusb_mtk_claim_iso_intf() by adding a NULL check
at the start of the function. This makes the code handle a NULL
`btmtk_data->isopkt_intf` the same way it did before the problematic
commit (just with a slight change to the error message printed).

Reported-by: IncogCyberpunk <incogcyberpunk@proton.me>
Closes: http://lore.kernel.org/r/a380d061-479e-4713-bddd-1d6571ca7e86@leemhuis.info
Fixes: e9087e828827 ("Bluetooth: btusb: mediatek: Add locks for usb_driver_claim_interface()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: IncogCyberpunk <incogcyberpunk@proton.me>
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>

* Bluetooth: SMP: Fix not generating mackey and ltk when repairing

The change eed467b517e8 ("Bluetooth: fix passkey uninitialized when used")
introduced a goto that bypasses the creation of temporary mackey and ltk
which are later used by the likes of DHKey Check step.

Later ffee202a78c2 ("Bluetooth: Always request for user confirmation for
Just Works (LE SC)") which means confirm_hint is always set in case
JUST_WORKS so the branch checking for an existing LTK becomes pointless
as confirm_hint will always be set, so this just merge both cases of
malicious or legitimate devices to be confirmed before continuing with the
pairing procedure.

Link: https://github.com/bluez/bluez/issues/1622
Fixes: eed467b517e8 ("Bluetooth: fix passkey uninitialized when used")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>

* net: atm: fix incorrect cleanup function call in error path

In atm_init(), if atmsvc_init() fails, the code jumps to out_atmpvc_exit
label which incorrectly calls atmsvc_exit() instead of atmpvc_exit().
This results in calling the wrong cleanup function and failing to properly
clean up atmpvc_init().

Fix this by calling atmpvc_exit() in the out_atmpvc_exit error path.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Sayooj K Karun <sayooj@aerlync.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251119085747.67139-1-sayooj@aerlync.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

* veth: reduce XDP no_direct return section to fix race

As explain in commit fa349e396e48 ("veth: Fix race with AF_XDP exposing
old or uninitialized descriptors") for veth there is a chance after
napi_complete_done() that another CPU can manage start another NAPI
instance running veth_pool(). For NAPI this is correctly handled as the
napi_schedule_prep() check will prevent multiple instances from getting
scheduled, but for the remaining code in veth_pool() this can run
concurrent with the newly started NAPI instance.

The problem/race is that xdp_clear_return_frame_no_direct() isn't
designed to be nested.

Prior to commit 401cb7dae813 ("net: Reference bpf_redirect_info via
task_struct on PREEMPT_RT.") the temporary BPF net context
bpf_redirect_info was stored per CPU, where this wasn't an issue. Since
this commit the BPF context is stored in 'current' task_struct. When
running veth in threaded-NAPI mode, then the kthread becomes the storage
area. Now a race exists between two concurrent veth_pool() function calls
one exiting NAPI and one running new NAPI, both using the same BPF net
context.

Race is when another CPU gets within the xdp_set_return_frame_no_direct()
section before exiting veth_pool() calls the clear-function
xdp_clear_return_frame_no_direct().

Fixes: 401cb7dae8130 ("net: Reference bpf_redirect_info via task_struct on PREEMPT_RT.")
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/176356963888.337072.4805242001928705046.stgit@firesoul
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

* ALSA: hda/realtek: add quirk for HP pavilion aero laptop 13z-be200

The laptop uses ALC287 chip (as shown in /proc/asound/card1/codec#0).
It seems that every HP pavilion laptop in the table uses the same quirk,
so I just copied them. I have verified that the mute LED on my laptop
works with this patch.

For reference, here's the alsa-info of my laptop:
https://alsa-project.org/db/?f=2d5f297087708610bc01816ab12052abdd4a17c0

Signed-off-by: Jacob Zhong <cmpute@qq.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/tencent_E2DFA33EFDF39E0517A94FA8FF06C05C0709@qq.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

* dm-verity: fix unreliable memory allocation

GFP_NOWAIT allocation may fail anytime. It needs to be changed to
GFP_NOIO. There's no need to handle an error because mempool_alloc with
GFP_NOIO can't fail.

Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>

* MIPS: mm: Prevent a TLB shutdown on initial uniquification

Depending on the particular CPU implementation a TLB shutdown may occur
if multiple matching entries are detected upon the execution of a TLBP
or the TLBWI/TLBWR instructions.  Given that we don't know what entries
we have been handed we need to be very careful with the initial TLB
setup and avoid all these instructions.

Therefore read all the TLB entries one by one with the TLBR instruction,
bypassing the content addressing logic, and truncate any large pages in
place so as to avoid a case in the second step where an incoming entry
for a large page at a lower address overlaps with a replacement entry
chosen at another index.  Then preinitialize the TLB using addresses
outside our usual unique range and avoiding clashes with any entries
received, before making the usual call to local_flush_tlb_all().

This fixes (at least) R4x00 cores if TLBP hits multiple matching TLB
entries (SGI IP22 PROM for examples sets up all TLBs to the same virtual
address).

Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@orcam.me.uk>
Fixes: 35ad7e181541 ("MIPS: mm: tlb-r4k: Uniquify TLB entries on init")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jiaxun Yang <jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com>
Tested-by: Jiaxun Yang <jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com> # Boston I6400, M5150 sim
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>

* MIPS: kernel: Fix random segmentation faults

Commit 69896119dc9d ("MIPS: vdso: Switch to generic storage
implementation") switches to a generic vdso storage, which increases
the number of data pages from 1 to 4. But there is only one page
reserved, which causes segementation faults depending where the VDSO
area is randomized to. To fix this use the same size of reservation
and allocation of the VDSO data pages.

Fixes: 69896119dc9d ("MIPS: vdso: Switch to generic storage implementation")
Reviewed-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>

* usb: storage: sddr55: Reject out-of-bound new_pba

Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.

new_pba comes from the status packet returned after each write.
A bogus device could report values beyond the block count derived
from info->capacity, letting the driver walk off the end of
pba_to_lba[] and corrupt heap memory.

Reject PBAs that exceed the computed block count and fail the
transfer so we avoid touching out-of-range mapping entries.

Signed-off-by: Tianchu Chen <flynnnchen@tencent.com>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/B2DC73A3EE1E3A1D+202511161322001664687@tencent.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

* xhci: dbgtty: fix device unregister

When DbC is disconnected then xhci_dbc_tty_unregister_device()
is called. However if there is any user space process blocked
on write to DbC terminal device then it will never be signalled
and thus stay blocked indifinitely.

This fix adds a tty_vhangup() call in xhci_dbc_tty_unregister_device().
The tty_vhangup() wakes up any blocked writers and causes subsequent
write attempts to DbC terminal device to fail.

Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Fixes: dfba2174dc42 ("usb: xhci: Add DbC support in xHCI driver")
Signed-off-by: Łukasz Bartosik <ukaszb@chromium.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251119212910.1245694-1-ukaszb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

* usb: dwc3: Fix race condition between concurrent dwc3_remove_requests() call paths

This patch addresses a race condition caused by unsynchronized
execution of multiple call paths invoking `dwc3_remove_requests()`,
leading to premature freeing of USB requests and subsequent crashes.

Three distinct execution paths interact with `dwc3_remove_requests()`:
Path 1:
Triggered via `dwc3_gadget_reset_interrupt()` during USB reset
handling. The call stack includes:
- `dwc3_ep0_reset_state()`
- `dwc3_ep0_stall_and_restart()`
- `dwc3_ep0_out_start()`
- `dwc3_remove_requests()`
- `dwc3_gadget_del_and_unmap_request()`

Path 2:
Also initiated from `dwc3_gadget_reset_interrupt()`, but through
`dwc3_stop_active_transfers()`. The call stack includes:
- `dwc3_stop_active_transfers()`
- `dwc3_remove_requests()`
- `dwc3_gadget_del_and_unmap_request()`

Path 3:
Occurs independently during `adb root` execution, which triggers
USB function unbind and bind operations. The sequence includes:
- `gserial_disconnect()`
- `usb_ep_disable()`
- `dwc3_gadget_ep_disable()`
- `dwc3_remove_requests()` with `-ESHUTDOWN` status

Path 3 operates asynchronously and lacks synchronization with Paths
1 and 2. When Path 3 completes, it disables endpoints and frees 'out'
requests. If Paths 1 or 2 are still processing these requests,
accessing freed memory leads to a crash due to use-after-free conditions.

To fix this added check for request completion and skip processing
if already completed and added the request status for ep0 while queue.

Fixes: 72246da40f37 ("usb: Introduce DesignWare USB3 DRD Driver")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Thinh Nguyen <Thinh.Nguyen@synopsys.com>
Acked-by: Thinh Nguyen <Thinh.Nguyen@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Manish Nagar <manish.nagar@oss.qualcomm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251120074435.1983091-1-manish.nagar@oss.qualcomm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

* usb: uas: fix urb unmapping issue when the uas device is remove during ongoing data transfer

When a UAS device is unplugged during data transfer, there is
a probability of a system panic occurring. The root cause is
an access to an invalid memory address during URB callback handling.
Specifically, this happens when the dma_direct_unmap_sg() function
is called within the usb_hcd_unmap_urb_for_dma() interface, but the
sg->dma_address field is 0 and the sg data structure has already been
freed.

The SCSI driver sends transfer commands by invoking uas_queuecommand_lck()
in uas.c, using the uas_submit_urbs() function to submit requests to USB.
Within the uas_submit_urbs() implementation, three URBs (sense_urb,
data_urb, and cmd_urb) are sequentially submitted. Device removal may
occur at any point during uas_submit_urbs execution, which may result
in URB submission failure. However, some URBs might have been successfully
submitted before the failure, and uas_submit_urbs will return the -ENODEV
error code in this case. The current error handling directly calls
scsi_done(). In the SCSI driver, this eventually triggers scsi_complete()
to invoke scsi_end_request() for releasing the sgtable. The successfully
submitted URBs, when being unlinked to giveback, call
usb_hcd_unmap_urb_for_dma() in hcd.c, leading to exceptions during sg
unmapping operations since the sg data structure has already been freed.

This patch modifies the error condition check in the uas_submit_urbs()
function. When a UAS device is removed but one or more URBs have already
been successfully submitted to USB, it avoids immediately invoking
scsi_done() and save the cmnd to devinfo->cmnd array. If the successfully
submitted URBs is completed before devinfo->resetting being set, then
the scsi_done() function will be called within uas_try_complete() after
all pending URB operations are finalized. Otherwise, the scsi_done()
function will be called within uas_zap_pending(), which is executed after
usb_kill_anchored_urbs().

The error handling only takes effect when uas_queuecommand_lck() calls
uas_submit_urbs() and returns the error value -ENODEV . In this case,
the device is disconnected, and the flow proceeds to uas_disconnect(),
where uas_zap_pending() is invoked to call uas_try_complete().

Fixes: eb2a86ae8c54 ("USB: UAS: fix disconnect by unplugging a hub")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Yu Chen <chenyu45@xiaomi.com>
Signed-off-by: Owen Gu <guhuinan@xiaomi.com>
Acked-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251120123336.3328-1-guhuinan@xiaomi.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

* spi: spi-fsl-lpspi: fix watermark truncation caused by type cast

't->len' is an unsigned integer, while 'watermark' and 'txfifosize' are
u8. Using min_t with typ…
nandamajay added a commit to nandamajay/linux-kernel-internal that referenced this pull request Dec 1, 2025
* tick/sched: Fix bogus condition in report_idle_softirq()

In commit 0345691b24c0 ("tick/rcu: Stop allowing RCU_SOFTIRQ in idle") the
new function report_idle_softirq() was created by breaking code out of the
existing can_stop_idle_tick() for kernels v5.18 and newer.

In doing so, the code essentially went from this form:

	if (A) {
		static int ratelimit;
		if (ratelimit < 10 && !C && A&D) {
                       pr_warn("NOHZ tick-stop error: ...");
		       ratelimit++;
		}
		return false;
	}

to a new function:

static bool report_idle_softirq(void)
{
       static int ratelimit;

       if (likely(!A))
               return false;

       if (ratelimit < 10)
               return false;
...
       pr_warn("NOHZ tick-stop error: local softirq work is pending, handler #%02x!!!\n",
               pending);
       ratelimit++;

       return true;
}

commit a7e282c77785 ("tick/rcu: Fix bogus ratelimit condition") realized
ratelimit was essentially set to zero instead of ten, and hence *no*
softirq pending messages would ever be issued, but "fixed" it as:

-       if (ratelimit < 10)
+       if (ratelimit >= 10)
                return false;

However, this fix introduced another issue:

When ratelimit is greater than or equal 10, even if A is true, it will
directly return false. While ratelimit in the original code was only used
to control printing and will not affect the return value.

Restore the original logic and restrict ratelimit to control the printk and
not the return value.

Fixes: 0345691b24c0 ("tick/rcu: Stop allowing RCU_SOFTIRQ in idle")
Fixes: a7e282c77785 ("tick/rcu: Fix bogus ratelimit condition")
Signed-off-by: Wen Yang <wen.yang@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251119174525.29470-1-wen.yang@linux.dev

* drm/amd: Skip power ungate during suspend for VPE

During the suspend sequence VPE is already going to be power gated
as part of vpe_suspend().  It's unnecessary to call during calls to
amdgpu_device_set_pg_state().

It actually can expose a race condition with the firmware if s0i3
sequence starts as well.  Drop these calls.

Cc: Peyton.Lee@amd.com
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2a6c826cfeedd7714611ac115371a959ead55bda)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

* drm/amdgpu: Skip emit de meta data on gfx11 with rs64 enabled

[Why]
Accoreding to CP updated to RS64 on gfx11,
WRITE_DATA with PREEMPTION_META_MEMORY(dst_sel=8) is illegal for CP FW.
That packet is used for MCBP on F32 based system.
So it would lead to incorrect GRBM write and FW is not handling that
extra case correctly.

[How]
With gfx11 rs64 enabled, skip emit de meta data.

Signed-off-by: Yifan Zha <Yifan.Zha@amd.com>
Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8366cd442d226463e673bed5d199df916f4ecbcf)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

* drm/amdgpu/vm: Check PRT uAPI flag instead of PTE flag

This fixes sparse mappings (aka. partially resident textures).

Check the correct flags.
Since a recent refactor, the code works with uAPI flags (for
mapping buffer objects), and not PTE (page table entry) flags.

Fixes: 6716a823d18d ("drm/amdgpu: rework how PTE flags are generated v3")
Signed-off-by: Timur Kristóf <timur.kristof@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8feeab26c80635b802f72b3ed986c693ff8f3212)

* drm/amdgpu/ttm: Fix crash when handling MMIO_REMAP in PDE flags

The MMIO_REMAP BO is a special 4K IO page that does not have a ttm_tt
behind it. However, amdgpu_ttm_tt_pde_flags() was treating it like
normal TT/doorbell/preempt memory and unconditionally accessed
ttm->caching. For the MMIO_REMAP BO, ttm is NULL, so this leads to a
NULL pointer dereference when computing PDE flags.

Fix this by checking that ttm is non-NULL before reading ttm->caching.
This prevents the crash for MMIO_REMAP and also makes the code more
defensive if other BOs ever come through without a ttm_tt.

Fixes: fb5a52dbe9fe ("drm/amdgpu: Implement TTM handling for MMIO_REMAP placement")
Suggested-by: Jesse Zhang <Jesse.Zhang@amd.com>
Suggested-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <srinivasan.shanmugam@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Jesse Zhang <Jesse.Zhang@amd.com>
Tested-by: Jesse Zhang <Jesse.Zhang@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0db94da5a0a1cacda080b9ec8425fcbe4babc141)

* drm/amdgpu: Add sriov vf check for VCN per queue reset support.

Add SRIOV check when setting VCN ring's supported reset mask.

Signed-off-by: Shikang Fan <shikang.fan@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Lijo Lazar <lijo.lazar@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit ee9b603ad43f9870eb75184f9fb0a84f8c3cc852)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

* spi: cadence-quadspi: Fix cqspi_probe() error handling for runtime pm

Commit f1eb4e792bb1 ("spi: spi-cadence-quadspi: Enable pm runtime earlier
to avoid imbalance") relocated code but missed updating the error handling
path associated with it.

Prior to the relocation, runtime pm was enabled after the code-block
associated with 'cqspi_request_mmap_dma()', due to which, the error
handling for the same didn't require invoking 'pm_runtime_disable()'.

Post refactoring, runtime pm has been enabled before the code-block and
when an error is encountered, jumping to 'probe_dma_failed' doesn't
invoke 'pm_runtime_disable()'. This leads to a race condition wherein
'cqspi_runtime_suspend()' is invoked while the error handling path executes
in parallel. The resulting error is the following:

  clk:103:0 already disabled
  WARNING: drivers/clk/clk.c:1188 at clk_core_disable+0x80/0xa0, CPU#1: kworker/u8:0/12
  [TRIMMED]
  pstate: 600000c5 (nZCv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
  pc : clk_core_disable+0x80/0xa0
  lr : clk_core_disable+0x80/0xa0
  [TRIMMED]
  Call trace:
   clk_core_disable+0x80/0xa0 (P)
   clk_core_disable_lock+0x88/0x10c
   clk_disable+0x24/0x30
   cqspi_probe+0xa3c/0xae8
  [TRIMMED]

The error is due to the second invocation of 'clk_disable_unprepare()' on
'cqspi->clk' in the error handling within 'cqspi_probe()', with the first
invocation being within 'cqspi_runtime_suspend()'.

Fix this by correcting the error handling.

Fixes: f1eb4e792bb1 ("spi: spi-cadence-quadspi: Enable pm runtime earlier to avoid imbalance")
Signed-off-by: Siddharth Vadapalli <s-vadapalli@ti.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251119152545.2591651-1-s-vadapalli@ti.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>

* wifi: rtw89: hw_scan: Don't let the operating channel be last

Scanning can be offloaded to the firmware. To that end, the driver
prepares a list of channels to scan, including periodic visits back to
the operating channel, and sends the list to the firmware.

When the channel list is too long to fit in a single H2C message, the
driver splits the list, sends the first part, and tells the firmware to
scan. When the scan is complete, the driver sends the next part of the
list and tells the firmware to scan.

When the last channel that fit in the H2C message is the operating
channel something seems to go wrong in the firmware. It will
acknowledge receiving the list of channels but apparently it will not
do anything more. The AP can't be pinged anymore. The driver still
receives beacons, though.

One way to avoid this is to split the list of channels before the
operating channel.

Affected devices:

* RTL8851BU with firmware 0.29.41.3
* RTL8832BU with firmware 0.29.29.8
* RTL8852BE with firmware 0.29.29.8

The commit 57a5fbe39a18 ("wifi: rtw89: refactor flow that hw scan handles channel list")
is found by git blame, but it is actually to refine the scan flow, but not
a culprit, so skip Fixes tag.

Reported-by: Bitterblue Smith <rtl8821cerfe2@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wireless/0abbda91-c5c2-4007-84c8-215679e652e1@gmail.com/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.16+
Signed-off-by: Bitterblue Smith <rtl8821cerfe2@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ping-Ke Shih <pkshih@realtek.com>
Signed-off-by: Ping-Ke Shih <pkshih@realtek.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/c1e61744-8db4-4646-867f-241b47d30386@gmail.com

* scsi: sg: Do not sleep in atomic context

sg_finish_rem_req() calls blk_rq_unmap_user(). The latter function may
sleep. Hence, call sg_finish_rem_req() with interrupts enabled instead
of disabled.

Reported-by: syzbot+c01f8e6e73f20459912e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-scsi/691560c4.a70a0220.3124cb.001a.GAE@google.com/
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 97d27b0dd015 ("scsi: sg: close race condition in sg_remove_sfp_usercontext()")
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251113181643.1108973-1-bvanassche@acm.org
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>

* mptcp: fix ack generation for fallback msk

mptcp_cleanup_rbuf() needs to know the last most recent, mptcp-level
rcv_wnd sent, and such information is tracked into the msk->old_wspace
field, updated at ack transmission time by mptcp_write_options().

Fallback socket do not add any mptcp options, such helper is never
invoked, and msk->old_wspace value remain stale. That in turn makes
ack generation at recvmsg() time quite random.

Address the issue ensuring mptcp_write_options() is invoked even for
fallback sockets, and just update the needed info in such a case.

The issue went unnoticed for a long time, as mptcp currently overshots
the fallback socket receive buffer autotune significantly. It is going
to change in the near future.

Fixes: e3859603ba13 ("mptcp: better msk receive window updates")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Closes: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/594
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Geliang Tang <geliang@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-18-rc6-v1-1-806d3781c95f@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

* mptcp: avoid unneeded subflow-level drops

The rcv window is shared among all the subflows. Currently, MPTCP sync
the TCP-level rcv window with the MPTCP one at tcp_transmit_skb() time.

The above means that incoming data may sporadically observe outdated
TCP-level rcv window and being wrongly dropped by TCP.

Address the issue checking for the edge condition before queuing the
data at TCP level, and eventually syncing the rcv window as needed.

Note that the issue is actually present from the very first MPTCP
implementation, but backports older than the blamed commit below will
range from impossible to useless.

Before:

  $ nstat -n; sleep 1; nstat -z TcpExtBeyondWindow
  TcpExtBeyondWindow              14                 0.0

After:

  $ nstat -n; sleep 1; nstat -z TcpExtBeyondWindow
  TcpExtBeyondWindow              0                  0.0

Fixes: fa3fe2b15031 ("mptcp: track window announced to peer")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-18-rc6-v1-2-806d3781c95f@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

* mptcp: fix premature close in case of fallback

I'm observing very frequent self-tests failures in case of fallback when
running on a CONFIG_PREEMPT kernel.

The root cause is that subflow_sched_work_if_closed() closes any subflow
as soon as it is half-closed and has no incoming data pending.

That works well for regular subflows - MPTCP needs bi-directional
connectivity to operate on a given subflow - but for fallback socket is
race prone.

When TCP peer closes the connection before the MPTCP one,
subflow_sched_work_if_closed() will schedule the MPTCP worker to
gracefully close the subflow, and shortly after will do another schedule
to inject and process a dummy incoming DATA_FIN.

On CONFIG_PREEMPT kernel, the MPTCP worker can kick-in and close the
fallback subflow before subflow_sched_work_if_closed() is able to create
the dummy DATA_FIN, unexpectedly interrupting the transfer.

Address the issue explicitly avoiding closing fallback subflows on when
the peer is only half-closed.

Note that, when the subflow is able to create the DATA_FIN before the
worker invocation, the worker will change the msk state before trying to
close the subflow and will skip the latter operation as the msk will not
match anymore the precondition in __mptcp_close_subflow().

Fixes: f09b0ad55a11 ("mptcp: close subflow when receiving TCP+FIN")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-18-rc6-v1-3-806d3781c95f@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

* mptcp: do not fallback when OoO is present

In case of DSS corruption, the MPTCP protocol tries to avoid the subflow
reset if fallback is possible. Such corruptions happen in the receive
path; to ensure fallback is possible the stack additionally needs to
check for OoO data, otherwise the fallback will break the data stream.

Fixes: e32d262c89e2 ("mptcp: handle consistently DSS corruption")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Closes: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/598
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-18-rc6-v1-4-806d3781c95f@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

* mptcp: decouple mptcp fastclose from tcp close

With the current fastclose implementation, the mptcp_do_fastclose()
helper is in charge of two distinct actions: send the fastclose reset
and cleanup the subflows.

Formally decouple the two steps, ensuring that mptcp explicitly closes
all the subflows after the mentioned helper.

This will make the upcoming fix simpler, and allows dropping the 2nd
argument from mptcp_destroy_common(). The Fixes tag is then the same as
in the next commit to help with the backports.

Fixes: d21f83485518 ("mptcp: use fastclose on more edge scenarios")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Geliang Tang <geliang@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-18-rc6-v1-5-806d3781c95f@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

* mptcp: fix duplicate reset on fastclose

The CI reports sporadic failures of the fastclose self-tests. The root
cause is a duplicate reset, not carrying the relevant MPTCP option.
In the failing scenario the bad reset is received by the peer before
the fastclose one, preventing the reception of the latter.

Indeed there is window of opportunity at fastclose time for the
following race:

  mptcp_do_fastclose
    __mptcp_close_ssk
      __tcp_close()
        tcp_set_state() [1]
        tcp_send_active_reset() [2]

After [1] the stack will send reset to in-flight data reaching the now
closed port. Such reset may race with [2].

Address the issue explicitly sending a single reset on fastclose before
explicitly moving the subflow to close status.

Fixes: d21f83485518 ("mptcp: use fastclose on more edge scenarios")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Closes: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/596
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Geliang Tang <geliang@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-18-rc6-v1-6-806d3781c95f@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

* selftests: mptcp: join: fastclose: remove flaky marks

After recent fixes like the parent commit, and "selftests: mptcp:
connect: trunc: read all recv data", the two fastclose subtests no
longer look flaky any more.

It then feels fine to remove these flaky marks, to no longer ignore
these subtests in case of errors.

Reviewed-by: Geliang Tang <geliang@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-18-rc6-v1-7-806d3781c95f@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

* selftests: mptcp: join: endpoints: longer timeout

In rare cases, when the test environment is very slow, some endpoints
tests can fail because some expected events have not been seen.

Because the tests are expecting a long on-going connection, and they are
not waiting for the end of the transfer, it is fine to have a longer
timeout, and even go over the default one. This connection will be
killed at the end, after the verifications: increasing the timeout
doesn't change anything, apart from avoiding it to end before the end of
the verifications.

To play it safe, all endpoints tests not waiting for the end of the
transfer are now having a longer timeout: 2 minutes.

The Fixes commit was making the connection longer, but still, the
default timeout would have stopped it after 1 minute, which might not be
enough in very slow environments.

Fixes: 6457595db987 ("selftests: mptcp: join: endpoints: longer transfer")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Geliang Tang <geliang@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-18-rc6-v1-8-806d3781c95f@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

* selftests: mptcp: join: userspace: longer timeout

In rare cases, when the test environment is very slow, some userspace
tests can fail because some expected events have not been seen.

Because the tests are expecting a long on-going connection, and they are
not waiting for the end of the transfer, it is fine to have a longer
timeout, and even go over the default one. This connection will be
killed at the end, after the verifications: increasing the timeout
doesn't change anything, apart from avoiding it to end before the end of
the verifications.

To play it safe, all userspace tests not waiting for the end of the
transfer are now having a longer timeout: 2 minutes.

The Fixes commit was making the connection longer, but still, the
default timeout would have stopped it after 1 minute, which might not be
enough in very slow environments.

Fixes: 290493078b96 ("selftests: mptcp: join: userspace: longer transfer")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Geliang Tang <geliang@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-18-rc6-v1-9-806d3781c95f@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

* mptcp: fix address removal logic in mptcp_pm_nl_rm_addr

Fix inverted WARN_ON_ONCE condition that prevented normal address
removal counter updates. The current code only executes decrement
logic when the counter is already 0 (abnormal state), while
normal removals (counter > 0) are ignored.

Signed-off-by: Gang Yan <yangang@kylinos.cn>
Fixes: 636113918508 ("mptcp: pm: remove '_nl' from mptcp_pm_nl_rm_addr_received")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-18-rc6-v1-10-806d3781c95f@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

* selftests: mptcp: add a check for 'add_addr_accepted'

The previous patch fixed an issue with the 'add_addr_accepted' counter.
This was not spot by the test suite.

Check this counter and 'add_addr_signal' in MPTCP Join 'delete re-add
signal' test. This should help spotting similar regressions later on.
These counters are crucial for ensuring the MPTCP path manager correctly
handles the subflow creation via 'ADD_ADDR'.

Signed-off-by: Gang Yan <yangang@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: Geliang Tang <geliang@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-18-rc6-v1-11-806d3781c95f@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

* LoongArch: Use UAPI types in ptrace UAPI header

The kernel UAPI headers already contain fixed-width integer types, there
is no need to rely on the libc types. There may not be a libc available
or the libc may not provides the <stdint.h>, like for example on nolibc.

This also aligns the header with the rest of the LoongArch UAPI headers.

Fixes: 803b0fc5c3f2 ("LoongArch: Add process management")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>

* LoongArch: Consolidate CPU names in /proc/cpuinfo

Some processors have no IOCSR.VENDOR and IOCSR.CPUNAME, some processors
have these registers but there is no valid information.

Consolidate CPU names in /proc/cpuinfo:
1. Add "PRID" to display the PRID & Core-Name;
2. Let "Model Name" display "Unknown" if no valid name.

Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>

* LoongArch: Fix NUMA node parsing with numa_memblks

On physical machine, NUMA node id comes from high bit 44:48 of physical
address. However it is not true on virt machine. With general method, it
comes from ACPI SRAT table.

Here the common function numa_memblks_init() is used to parse NUMA node
information with numa_memblks.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>

* LoongArch: Mask all interrupts during kexec/kdump

If the default state of the interrupt controllers in the first kernel
don't mask any interrupts, it may cause the second kernel to potentially
receive interrupts (which were previously allocated by the first kernel)
immediately after a CPU becomes online during its boot process. These
interrupts cannot be properly routed, leading to bad IRQ issues.

This patch calls machine_kexec_mask_interrupts() to mask all interrupts
during the kexec/kdump process.

Signed-off-by: Tianyang Zhang <zhangtianyang@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>

* LoongArch: Don't panic if no valid cache info for PCI

If there is no valid cache info detected (may happen in virtual machine)
for pci_dfl_cache_line_size, kernel shouldn't panic. Because in the PCI
core it will be evaluated to (L1_CACHE_BYTES >> 2).

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiaxun Yang <jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>

* LoongArch: BPF: Disable trampoline for kernel module function trace

The current LoongArch BPF trampoline implementation is incompatible
with tracing functions in kernel modules. This causes several severe
and user-visible problems:

* The `bpf_selftests/module_attach` test fails consistently.
* Kernel lockup when a BPF program is attached to a module function [1].
* Critical kernel modules like WireGuard experience traffic disruption
  when their functions are traced with fentry [2].

Given the severity and the potential for other unknown side-effects, it
is safest to disable the feature entirely for now. This patch prevents
the BPF subsystem from allowing trampoline attachments to kernel module
functions on LoongArch.

This is a temporary mitigation until the core issues in the trampoline
code for kernel module handling can be identified and fixed.

[root@fedora bpf]# ./test_progs -a module_attach -v
bpf_testmod.ko is already unloaded.
Loading bpf_testmod.ko...
Successfully loaded bpf_testmod.ko.
test_module_attach:PASS:skel_open 0 nsec
test_module_attach:PASS:set_attach_target 0 nsec
test_module_attach:PASS:set_attach_target_explicit 0 nsec
test_module_attach:PASS:skel_load 0 nsec
libbpf: prog 'handle_fentry': failed to attach: -ENOTSUPP
libbpf: prog 'handle_fentry': failed to auto-attach: -ENOTSUPP
test_module_attach:FAIL:skel_attach skeleton attach failed: -524
Summary: 0/0 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 1 FAILED
Successfully unloaded bpf_testmod.ko.

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/loongarch/CAK3+h2wDmpC-hP4u4pJY8T-yfKyk4yRzpu2LMO+C13FMT58oqQ@mail.gmail.com/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/loongarch/CAK3+h2wYcpc+OwdLDUBvg2rF9rvvyc5amfHT-KcFaK93uoELPg@mail.gmail.com/

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f9b6b41f0cf3 ("LoongArch: BPF: Add basic bpf trampoline support")
Acked-by: Hengqi Chen <hengqi.chen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vincent Li <vincent.mc.li@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>

* smb: client: introduce close_cached_dir_locked()

Replace close_cached_dir() calls under cfid_list_lock with a new
close_cached_dir_locked() variant that uses kref_put() instead of
kref_put_lock() to avoid recursive locking when dropping references.

While the existing code works if the refcount >= 2 invariant holds,
this area has proven error-prone. Make deadlocks impossible and WARN
on invariant violations.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Henrique Carvalho <henrique.carvalho@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>

* cifs: fix memory leak in smb3_fs_context_parse_param error path

Add proper cleanup of ctx->source and fc->source to the
cifs_parse_mount_err error handler. This ensures that memory allocated
for the source strings is correctly freed on all error paths, matching
the cleanup already performed in the success path by
smb3_cleanup_fs_context_contents().
Pointers are also set to NULL after freeing to prevent potential
double-free issues.

This change fixes a memory leak originally detected by syzbot. The
leak occurred when processing Opt_source mount options if an error
happened after ctx->source and fc->source were successfully
allocated but before the function completed.

The specific leak sequence was:
1. ctx->source = smb3_fs_context_fullpath(ctx, '/') allocates memory
2. fc->source = kstrdup(ctx->source, GFP_KERNEL) allocates more memory
3. A subsequent error jumps to cifs_parse_mount_err
4. The old error handler freed passwords but not the source strings,
causing the memory to leak.

This issue was not addressed by commit e8c73eb7db0a ("cifs: client:
fix memory leak in smb3_fs_context_parse_param"), which only fixed
leaks from repeated fsconfig() calls but not this error path.

Patch updated with minor change suggested by kernel test robot

Reported-by: syzbot+87be6809ed9bf6d718e3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=87be6809ed9bf6d718e3
Fixes: 24e0a1eff9e2 ("cifs: switch to new mount api")
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Shaurya Rane <ssrane_b23@ee.vjti.ac.in>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>

* cifs: Add the smb3_read_* tracepoints to SMB1

Add the smb3_read_* tracepoints to SMB1's cifs_async_readv() and
cifs_readv_callback().

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Steve French <sfrench@samba.org>
cc: Paulo Alcantara <pc@manguebit.org>
cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>

* perf: Fix 0 count issue of cpu-clock

Currently cpu-clock event always returns 0 count, e.g.,

perf stat -e cpu-clock -- sleep 1

 Performance counter stats for 'sleep 1':
                 0      cpu-clock                        #    0.000 CPUs utilized
       1.002308394 seconds time elapsed

The root cause is the commit 'bc4394e5e79c ("perf: Fix the throttle
 error of some clock events")' adds PERF_EF_UPDATE flag check before
calling cpu_clock_event_update() to update the count, however the
PERF_EF_UPDATE flag is never set when the cpu-clock event is stopped in
counting mode (pmu->dev() -> cpu_clock_event_del() ->
cpu_clock_event_stop()). This leads to the cpu-clock event count is
never updated.

To fix this issue, force to set PERF_EF_UPDATE flag for cpu-clock event
just like what task-clock does.

Fixes: bc4394e5e79c ("perf: Fix the throttle error of some clock events")
Signed-off-by: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112080526.3971392-1-dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com

* xfs: fix out of bounds memory read error in symlink repair

xfs/286 produced this report on my test fleet:

 ==================================================================
 BUG: KFENCE: out-of-bounds read in memcpy_orig+0x54/0x110

 Out-of-bounds read at 0xffff88843fe9e038 (184B right of kfence-#184):
  memcpy_orig+0x54/0x110
  xrep_symlink_salvage_inline+0xb3/0xf0 [xfs]
  xrep_symlink_salvage+0x100/0x110 [xfs]
  xrep_symlink+0x2e/0x80 [xfs]
  xrep_attempt+0x61/0x1f0 [xfs]
  xfs_scrub_metadata+0x34f/0x5c0 [xfs]
  xfs_ioc_scrubv_metadata+0x387/0x560 [xfs]
  xfs_file_ioctl+0xe23/0x10e0 [xfs]
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x76/0xc0
  do_syscall_64+0x4e/0x1e0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

 kfence-#184: 0xffff88843fe9df80-0xffff88843fe9dfea, size=107, cache=kmalloc-128

 allocated by task 3470 on cpu 1 at 263329.131592s (192823.508886s ago):
  xfs_init_local_fork+0x79/0xe0 [xfs]
  xfs_iformat_local+0xa4/0x170 [xfs]
  xfs_iformat_data_fork+0x148/0x180 [xfs]
  xfs_inode_from_disk+0x2cd/0x480 [xfs]
  xfs_iget+0x450/0xd60 [xfs]
  xfs_bulkstat_one_int+0x6b/0x510 [xfs]
  xfs_bulkstat_iwalk+0x1e/0x30 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_ag_recs+0xdf/0x150 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_run_callbacks+0xb9/0x190 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_ag+0x1dc/0x2f0 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_args.constprop.0+0x6a/0x120 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk+0xa4/0xd0 [xfs]
  xfs_bulkstat+0xfa/0x170 [xfs]
  xfs_ioc_fsbulkstat.isra.0+0x13a/0x230 [xfs]
  xfs_file_ioctl+0xbf2/0x10e0 [xfs]
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x76/0xc0
  do_syscall_64+0x4e/0x1e0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1300113 Comm: xfs_scrub Not tainted 6.18.0-rc4-djwx #rc4 PREEMPT(lazy)  3d744dd94e92690f00a04398d2bd8631dcef1954
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-4.module+el8.8.0+21164+ed375313 04/01/2014
 ==================================================================

On further analysis, I realized that the second parameter to min() is
not correct.  xfs_ifork::if_bytes is the size of the xfs_ifork::if_data
buffer.  if_bytes can be smaller than the data fork size because:

(a) the forkoff code tries to keep the data area as large as possible
(b) for symbolic links, if_bytes is the ondisk file size + 1
(c) forkoff is always a multiple of 8.

Case in point: for a single-byte symlink target, forkoff will be
8 but the buffer will only be 2 bytes long.

In other words, the logic here is wrong and we walk off the end of the
incore buffer.  Fix that.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10
Fixes: 2651923d8d8db0 ("xfs: online repair of symbolic links")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>

* net: dsa: microchip: lan937x: Fix RGMII delay tuning

Correct RGMII delay application logic in lan937x_set_tune_adj().

The function was missing `data16 &= ~PORT_TUNE_ADJ` before setting the
new delay value. This caused the new value to be bitwise-OR'd with the
existing PORT_TUNE_ADJ field instead of replacing it.

For example, when setting the RGMII 2 TX delay on port 4, the
intended TUNE_ADJUST value of 0 (RGMII_2_TX_DELAY_2NS) was
incorrectly OR'd with the default 0x1B (from register value 0xDA3),
leaving the delay at the wrong setting.

This patch adds the missing mask to clear the field, ensuring the
correct delay value is written. Physical measurements on the RGMII TX
lines confirm the fix, showing the delay changing from ~1ns (before
change) to ~2ns.

While testing on i.MX 8MP showed this was within the platform's timing
tolerance, it did not match the intended hardware-characterized value.

Fixes: b19ac41faa3f ("net: dsa: microchip: apply rgmii tx and rx delay in phylink mac config")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251114090951.4057261-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

* l2tp: reset skb control buffer on xmit

The L2TP stack did not reset the skb control buffer before sending the
encapsulated package.

In a setup with an ath10k radio and batman-adv over an L2TP tunnel
massive fragmentations happen sporadically if the L2TP tunnel is
established over IPv4.

L2TP might reset some of the fields in the IP control buffer, but L2TP
assumes the type of the control buffer to be of an IPv4 packet.

In case the L2TP interface is used as a batadv hardif or the packet is
an IPv6 packet, this assumption breaks.

Clear the entire control buffer to avoid such mishaps altogether.

Fixes: f77ae9390438 ("[PPPOL2TP]: Reset meta-data in xmit function")
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118001619.242107-1-mail@david-bauer.net
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

* ata: libata-scsi: Add missing scsi_device_put() in ata_scsi_dev_rescan()

Call scsi_device_put() in ata_scsi_dev_rescan() if the device or its
queue are not running.

Fixes: 0c76106cb975 ("scsi: sd: Fix TCG OPAL unlock on system resume")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Yihang Li <liyihang9@h-partners.com>
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <cassel@kernel.org>

* ata: libata-scsi: Fix system suspend for a security locked drive

Commit cf3fc037623c ("ata: libata-scsi: Fix ata_to_sense_error() status
handling") fixed ata_to_sense_error() to properly generate sense key
ABORTED COMMAND (without any additional sense code), instead of the
previous bogus sense key ILLEGAL REQUEST with the additional sense code
UNALIGNED WRITE COMMAND, for a failed command.

However, this broke suspend for Security locked drives (drives that have
Security enabled, and have not been Security unlocked by boot firmware).

The reason for this is that the SCSI disk driver, for the Synchronize
Cache command only, treats any sense data with sense key ILLEGAL REQUEST
as a successful command (regardless of ASC / ASCQ).

After commit cf3fc037623c ("ata: libata-scsi: Fix ata_to_sense_error()
status handling") the code that treats any sense data with sense key
ILLEGAL REQUEST as a successful command is no longer applicable, so the
command fails, which causes the system suspend to be aborted:

  sd 1:0:0:0: PM: dpm_run_callback(): scsi_bus_suspend returns -5
  sd 1:0:0:0: PM: failed to suspend async: error -5
  PM: Some devices failed to suspend, or early wake event detected

To make suspend work once again, for a Security locked device only,
return sense data LOGICAL UNIT ACCESS NOT AUTHORIZED, the actual sense
data which a real SCSI device would have returned if locked.
The SCSI disk driver treats this sense data as a successful command.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ilia Baryshnikov <qwelias@gmail.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=220704
Fixes: cf3fc037623c ("ata: libata-scsi: Fix ata_to_sense_error() status handling")
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <cassel@kernel.org>

* ata: libata-core: Set capacity to zero for a security locked drive

For Security locked drives (drives that have Security enabled, and have
not been Security unlocked by boot firmware), the automatic partition
scanning will result in the user being spammed with errors such as:

  ata5.00: failed command: READ DMA
  ata5.00: cmd c8/00:08:00:00:00/00:00:00:00:00/e0 tag 7 dma 4096 in
           res 51/04:08:00:00:00/00:00:00:00:00/e0 Emask 0x1 (device error)
  ata5.00: status: { DRDY ERR }
  ata5.00: error: { ABRT }
  sd 4:0:0:0: [sda] tag#7 FAILED Result: hostbyte=DID_OK driverbyte=DRIVER_OK cmd_age=0s
  sd 4:0:0:0: [sda] tag#7 Sense Key : Aborted Command [current]
  sd 4:0:0:0: [sda] tag#7 Add. Sense: No additional sense information

during boot, because most commands except for IDENTIFY will be aborted by
a Security locked drive.

For a Security locked drive, set capacity to zero, so that no automatic
partition scanning will happen.

If the user later unlocks the drive using e.g. hdparm, the close() by the
user space application should trigger a revalidation of the drive.

Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <cassel@kernel.org>

* be2net: pass wrb_params in case of OS2BMC

be_insert_vlan_in_pkt() is called with the wrb_params argument being NULL
at be_send_pkt_to_bmc() call site.  This may lead to dereferencing a NULL
pointer when processing a workaround for specific packet, as commit
bc0c3405abbb ("be2net: fix a Tx stall bug caused by a specific ipv6
packet") states.

The correct way would be to pass the wrb_params from be_xmit().

Fixes: 760c295e0e8d ("be2net: Support for OS2BMC.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrey Vatoropin <a.vatoropin@crpt.ru>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251119105015.194501-1-a.vatoropin@crpt.ru
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

* vsock: Ignore signal/timeout on connect() if already established

During connect(), acting on a signal/timeout by disconnecting an already
established socket leads to several issues:

1. connect() invoking vsock_transport_cancel_pkt() ->
   virtio_transport_purge_skbs() may race with sendmsg() invoking
   virtio_transport_get_credit(). This results in a permanently elevated
   `vvs->bytes_unsent`. Which, in turn, confuses the SOCK_LINGER handling.

2. connect() resetting a connected socket's state may race with socket
   being placed in a sockmap. A disconnected socket remaining in a sockmap
   breaks sockmap's assumptions. And gives rise to WARNs.

3. connect() transitioning SS_CONNECTED -> SS_UNCONNECTED allows for a
   transport change/drop after TCP_ESTABLISHED. Which poses a problem for
   any simultaneous sendmsg() or connect() and may result in a
   use-after-free/null-ptr-deref.

Do not disconnect socket on signal/timeout. Keep the logic for unconnected
sockets: they don't linger, can't be placed in a sockmap, are rejected by
sendmsg().

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/e07fd95c-9a38-4eea-9638-133e38c2ec9b@rbox.co/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20250317-vsock-trans-signal-race-v4-0-fc8837f3f1d4@rbox.co/
[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/60f1b7db-3099-4f6a-875e-af9f6ef194f6@rbox.co/

Fixes: d021c344051a ("VSOCK: Introduce VM Sockets")
Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251119-vsock-interrupted-connect-v2-1-70734cf1233f@rbox.co
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

* timekeeping: Fix resource leak in tk_aux_sysfs_init() error paths

tk_aux_sysfs_init() returns immediately on error during the auxiliary clock
initialization loop without cleaning up previously allocated kobjects and
sysfs groups.

If kobject_create_and_add() or sysfs_create_group() fails during loop
iteration, the parent kobjects (tko and auxo) and any previously created
child kobjects are leaked.

Fix this by adding proper error handling with goto labels to ensure all
allocated resources are cleaned up on failure. kobject_put() on the
parent kobjects will handle cleanup of their children.

Fixes: 7b95663a3d96 ("timekeeping: Provide interface to control auxiliary clocks")
Signed-off-by: Malaya Kumar Rout <mrout@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251120150213.246777-1-mrout@redhat.com

* io_uring/cmd_net: fix wrong argument types for skb_queue_splice()

If timestamp retriving needs to be retried and the local list of
SKB's already has entries, then it's spliced back into the socket
queue. However, the arguments for the splice helper are transposed,
causing exactly the wrong direction of splicing into the on-stack
list. Fix that up.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Google Big Sleep <big-sleep-vuln-reports+bigsleep-462435176@google.com>
Fixes: 9e4ed359b8ef ("io_uring/netcmd: add tx timestamping cmd support")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

* sched_ext: Fix scx_enable() crash on helper kthread creation failure

A crash was observed when the sched_ext selftests runner was
terminated with Ctrl+\ while test 15 was running:

NIP [c00000000028fa58] scx_enable.constprop.0+0x358/0x12b0
LR [c00000000028fa2c] scx_enable.constprop.0+0x32c/0x12b0
Call Trace:
scx_enable.constprop.0+0x32c/0x12b0 (unreliable)
bpf_struct_ops_link_create+0x18c/0x22c
__sys_bpf+0x23f8/0x3044
sys_bpf+0x2c/0x6c
system_call_exception+0x124/0x320
system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec

kthread_run_worker() returns an ERR_PTR() on failure rather than NULL,
but the current code in scx_alloc_and_add_sched() only checks for a NULL
helper. Incase of failure on SIGQUIT, the error is not handled in
scx_alloc_and_add_sched() and scx_enable() ends up dereferencing an
error pointer.

Error handling is fixed in scx_alloc_and_add_sched() to propagate
PTR_ERR() into ret, so that scx_enable() jumps to the existing error
path, avoiding random dereference on failure.

Fixes: bff3b5aec1b7 ("sched_ext: Move disable machinery into scx_sched")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.16+
Reported-and-tested-by: Samir Mulani <samir@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Saket Kumar Bhaskar <skb99@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrea Righi <arighi@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Vishal Chourasia <vishalc@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

* dm: fix failure when empty flush's bi_sector points beyond the device end

An empty flush bio can have arbitrary bi_sector. The commit 2b1c6d7a890a
introduced a regression that device mapper would fail an empty flush bio
with -EIO if the sector pointed beyond the end of the device.

The commit introduced an optimization, that optimization would pass
flushes to __split_and_process_bio and __split_and_process_bio is not
prepared to handle empty bios. Fix this bug by passing only non-empty
flushes to __split_and_process_bio - non-empty flushes must have valid
bi_sector. Empty bios will go through __send_empty_flush, as they did
before the optimization.

This problem can be reproduced by running the lvm2 test:
make check_local T=lvconvert-thin.sh LVM_TEST_PREFER_BRD=0

Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Fixes: 2b1c6d7a890a ("dm: optimize REQ_PREFLUSH with data when using the linear target")
Reported-by: Zdenek Kabelac <zkabelac@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>

* selinux: rename task_security_struct to cred_security_struct

Before Linux had cred structures, the SELinux task_security_struct was
per-task and although the structure was switched to being per-cred
long ago, the name was never updated. This change renames it to
cred_security_struct to avoid confusion and pave the way for the
introduction of an actual per-task security structure for SELinux. No
functional change.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

* selinux: move avdcache to per-task security struct

The avdcache is meant to be per-task; move it to a new
task_security_struct that is duplicated per-task.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5d7ddc59b3d89b724a5aa8f30d0db94ff8d2d93f ("selinux: reduce path walk overhead")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: line length fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

* selinux: rename the cred_security_struct variables to "crsec"

Along with the renaming from task_security_struct to cred_security_struct,
rename the local variables to "crsec" from "tsec".  This both fits with
existing conventions and helps distinguish between task and cred related
variables.

No functional changes.

Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

* Bluetooth: btusb: mediatek: Fix kernel crash when releasing mtk iso interface

When performing reset tests and encountering abnormal card drop issues
that lead to a kernel crash, it is necessary to perform a null check
before releasing resources to avoid attempting to release a null pointer.

<4>[   29.158070] Hardware name: Google Quigon sku196612/196613 board (DT)
<4>[   29.158076] Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work [bluetooth]
<4>[   29.158154] pstate: 20400009 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
<4>[   29.158162] pc : klist_remove+0x90/0x158
<4>[   29.158174] lr : klist_remove+0x88/0x158
<4>[   29.158180] sp : ffffffc0846b3c00
<4>[   29.158185] pmr_save: 000000e0
<4>[   29.158188] x29: ffffffc0846b3c30 x28: ffffff80cd31f880 x27: ffffff80c1bdc058
<4>[   29.158199] x26: dead000000000100 x25: ffffffdbdc624ea3 x24: ffffff80c1bdc4c0
<4>[   29.158209] x23: ffffffdbdc62a3e6 x22: ffffff80c6c07000 x21: ffffffdbdc829290
<4>[   29.158219] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffffff80cd3e0648 x18: 000000031ec97781
<4>[   29.158229] x17: ffffff80c1bdc4a8 x16: ffffffdc10576548 x15: ffffff80c1180428
<4>[   29.158238] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 000000000000e380 x12: 0000000000000018
<4>[   29.158248] x11: ffffff80c2a7fd10 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000100000000
<4>[   29.158257] x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x6 : 2d7223ff6364626d
<4>[   29.158266] x5 : 0000008000000000 x4 : 0000000000000020 x3 : 2e7325006465636e
<4>[   29.158275] x2 : ffffffdc11afeff8 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffffffdc11be4d0c
<4>[   29.158285] Call trace:
<4>[   29.158290]  klist_remove+0x90/0x158
<4>[   29.158298]  device_release_driver_internal+0x20c/0x268
<4>[   29.158308]  device_release_driver+0x1c/0x30
<4>[   29.158316]  usb_driver_release_interface+0x70/0x88
<4>[   29.158325]  btusb_mtk_release_iso_intf+0x68/0xd8 [btusb (HASH:e8b6 5)]
<4>[   29.158347]  btusb_mtk_reset+0x5c/0x480 [btusb (HASH:e8b6 5)]
<4>[   29.158361]  hci_cmd_sync_work+0x10c/0x188 [bluetooth (HASH:a4fa 6)]
<4>[   29.158430]  process_scheduled_works+0x258/0x4e8
<4>[   29.158441]  worker_thread+0x300/0x428
<4>[   29.158448]  kthread+0x108/0x1d0
<4>[   29.158455]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
<0>[   29.158467] Code: 91343000 940139d1 f9400268 927ff914 (f9401297)
<4>[   29.158474] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
<0>[   29.167129] Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception
<2>[   29.167144] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
<4>[   29.167158] ------------[ cut here ]------------

Fixes: ceac1cb0259d ("Bluetooth: btusb: mediatek: add ISO data transmission functions")
Signed-off-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>

* Bluetooth: hci_core: Fix triggering cmd_timer for HCI_OP_NOP

HCI_OP_NOP means no command was actually sent so there is no point in
triggering cmd_timer which may cause a hdev->reset in the process since
it is assumed that the controller is stuck processing a command.

Fixes: e2d471b7806b ("Bluetooth: ISO: Fix not using SID from adv report")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>

* Bluetooth: hci_sock: Prevent race in socket write iter and sock bind

There is a potential race condition between sock bind and socket write
iter. bind may free the same cmd via mgmt_pending before write iter sends
the cmd, just as syzbot reported in UAF[1].

Here we use hci_dev_lock to synchronize the two, thereby avoiding the
UAF mentioned in [1].

[1]
syzbot reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mgmt_pending_remove+0x3b/0x210 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:316
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888077164818 by task syz.0.17/5989
Call Trace:
 mgmt_pending_remove+0x3b/0x210 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:316
 set_link_security+0x5c2/0x710 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:1918
 hci_mgmt_cmd+0x9c9/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1719
 hci_sock_sendmsg+0x6ca/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1839
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg+0x21c/0x270 net/socket.c:742
 sock_write_iter+0x279/0x360 net/socket.c:1195

Allocated by task 5989:
 mgmt_pending_add+0x35/0x140 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:296
 set_link_security+0x557/0x710 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:1910
 hci_mgmt_cmd+0x9c9/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1719
 hci_sock_sendmsg+0x6ca/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1839
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg+0x21c/0x270 net/socket.c:742
 sock_write_iter+0x279/0x360 net/socket.c:1195

Freed by task 5991:
 mgmt_pending_free net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:311 [inline]
 mgmt_pending_foreach+0x30d/0x380 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:257
 mgmt_index_removed+0x112/0x2f0 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:9477
 hci_sock_bind+0xbe9/0x1000 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1314

Fixes: 6fe26f694c82 ("Bluetooth: MGMT: Protect mgmt_pending list with its own lock")
Reported-by: syzbot+9aa47cd4633a3cf92a80@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=9aa47cd4633a3cf92a80
Tested-by: syzbot+9aa47cd4633a3cf92a80@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis <eadavis@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>

* Bluetooth: hci_core: lookup hci_conn on RX path on protocol side

The hdev lock/lookup/unlock/use pattern in the packet RX path doesn't
ensure hci_conn* is not concurrently modified/deleted. This locking
appears to be leftover from before conn_hash started using RCU
commit bf4c63252490b ("Bluetooth: convert conn hash to RCU")
and not clear if it had purpose since then.

Currently, there are code paths that delete hci_conn* from elsewhere
than the ordered hdev->workqueue where the RX work runs in. E.g.
commit 5af1f84ed13a ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix UAF on hci_abort_conn_sync")
introduced some of these, and there probably were a few others before
it.  It's better to do the locking so that even if these run
concurrently no UAF is possible.

Move the lookup of hci_conn and associated socket-specific conn to
protocol recv handlers, and do them within a single critical section
to cover hci_conn* usage and lookup.

syzkaller has reported a crash that appears to be this issue:

    [Task hdev->workqueue]          [Task 2]
                                    hci_disconnect_all_sync
    l2cap_recv_acldata(hcon)
                                      hci_conn_get(hcon)
                                      hci_abort_conn_sync(hcon)
                                        hci_dev_lock
      hci_dev_lock
                                        hci_conn_del(hcon)
      v-------------------------------- hci_dev_unlock
                                      hci_conn_put(hcon)
      conn = hcon->l2cap_data (UAF)

Fixes: 5af1f84ed13a ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix UAF on hci_abort_conn_sync")
Reported-by: syzbot+d32d77220b92eddd89ad@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d32d77220b92eddd89ad
Signed-off-by: Pauli Virtanen <pav@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>

* Bluetooth: btusb: mediatek: Avoid btusb_mtk_claim_iso_intf() NULL deref

In btusb_mtk_setup(), we set `btmtk_data->isopkt_intf` to:
  usb_ifnum_to_if(data->udev, MTK_ISO_IFNUM)

That function can return NULL in some cases. Even when it returns
NULL, though, we still go on to call btusb_mtk_claim_iso_intf().

As of commit e9087e828827 ("Bluetooth: btusb: mediatek: Add locks for
usb_driver_claim_interface()"), calling btusb_mtk_claim_iso_intf()
when `btmtk_data->isopkt_intf` is NULL will cause a crash because
we'll end up passing a bad pointer to device_lock(). Prior to that
commit we'd pass the NULL pointer directly to
usb_driver_claim_interface() which would detect it and return an
error, which was handled.

Resolve the crash in btusb_mtk_claim_iso_intf() by adding a NULL check
at the start of the function. This makes the code handle a NULL
`btmtk_data->isopkt_intf` the same way it did before the problematic
commit (just with a slight change to the error message printed).

Reported-by: IncogCyberpunk <incogcyberpunk@proton.me>
Closes: http://lore.kernel.org/r/a380d061-479e-4713-bddd-1d6571ca7e86@leemhuis.info
Fixes: e9087e828827 ("Bluetooth: btusb: mediatek: Add locks for usb_driver_claim_interface()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: IncogCyberpunk <incogcyberpunk@proton.me>
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>

* Bluetooth: SMP: Fix not generating mackey and ltk when repairing

The change eed467b517e8 ("Bluetooth: fix passkey uninitialized when used")
introduced a goto that bypasses the creation of temporary mackey and ltk
which are later used by the likes of DHKey Check step.

Later ffee202a78c2 ("Bluetooth: Always request for user confirmation for
Just Works (LE SC)") which means confirm_hint is always set in case
JUST_WORKS so the branch checking for an existing LTK becomes pointless
as confirm_hint will always be set, so this just merge both cases of
malicious or legitimate devices to be confirmed before continuing with the
pairing procedure.

Link: https://github.com/bluez/bluez/issues/1622
Fixes: eed467b517e8 ("Bluetooth: fix passkey uninitialized when used")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>

* net: atm: fix incorrect cleanup function call in error path

In atm_init(), if atmsvc_init() fails, the code jumps to out_atmpvc_exit
label which incorrectly calls atmsvc_exit() instead of atmpvc_exit().
This results in calling the wrong cleanup function and failing to properly
clean up atmpvc_init().

Fix this by calling atmpvc_exit() in the out_atmpvc_exit error path.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Sayooj K Karun <sayooj@aerlync.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251119085747.67139-1-sayooj@aerlync.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

* veth: reduce XDP no_direct return section to fix race

As explain in commit fa349e396e48 ("veth: Fix race with AF_XDP exposing
old or uninitialized descriptors") for veth there is a chance after
napi_complete_done() that another CPU can manage start another NAPI
instance running veth_pool(). For NAPI this is correctly handled as the
napi_schedule_prep() check will prevent multiple instances from getting
scheduled, but for the remaining code in veth_pool() this can run
concurrent with the newly started NAPI instance.

The problem/race is that xdp_clear_return_frame_no_direct() isn't
designed to be nested.

Prior to commit 401cb7dae813 ("net: Reference bpf_redirect_info via
task_struct on PREEMPT_RT.") the temporary BPF net context
bpf_redirect_info was stored per CPU, where this wasn't an issue. Since
this commit the BPF context is stored in 'current' task_struct. When
running veth in threaded-NAPI mode, then the kthread becomes the storage
area. Now a race exists between two concurrent veth_pool() function calls
one exiting NAPI and one running new NAPI, both using the same BPF net
context.

Race is when another CPU gets within the xdp_set_return_frame_no_direct()
section before exiting veth_pool() calls the clear-function
xdp_clear_return_frame_no_direct().

Fixes: 401cb7dae8130 ("net: Reference bpf_redirect_info via task_struct on PREEMPT_RT.")
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/176356963888.337072.4805242001928705046.stgit@firesoul
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

* ALSA: hda/realtek: add quirk for HP pavilion aero laptop 13z-be200

The laptop uses ALC287 chip (as shown in /proc/asound/card1/codec#0).
It seems that every HP pavilion laptop in the table uses the same quirk,
so I just copied them. I have verified that the mute LED on my laptop
works with this patch.

For reference, here's the alsa-info of my laptop:
https://alsa-project.org/db/?f=2d5f297087708610bc01816ab12052abdd4a17c0

Signed-off-by: Jacob Zhong <cmpute@qq.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/tencent_E2DFA33EFDF39E0517A94FA8FF06C05C0709@qq.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

* dm-verity: fix unreliable memory allocation

GFP_NOWAIT allocation may fail anytime. It needs to be changed to
GFP_NOIO. There's no need to handle an error because mempool_alloc with
GFP_NOIO can't fail.

Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>

* MIPS: mm: Prevent a TLB shutdown on initial uniquification

Depending on the particular CPU implementation a TLB shutdown may occur
if multiple matching entries are detected upon the execution of a TLBP
or the TLBWI/TLBWR instructions.  Given that we don't know what entries
we have been handed we need to be very careful with the initial TLB
setup and avoid all these instructions.

Therefore read all the TLB entries one by one with the TLBR instruction,
bypassing the content addressing logic, and truncate any large pages in
place so as to avoid a case in the second step where an incoming entry
for a large page at a lower address overlaps with a replacement entry
chosen at another index.  Then preinitialize the TLB using addresses
outside our usual unique range and avoiding clashes with any entries
received, before making the usual call to local_flush_tlb_all().

This fixes (at least) R4x00 cores if TLBP hits multiple matching TLB
entries (SGI IP22 PROM for examples sets up all TLBs to the same virtual
address).

Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@orcam.me.uk>
Fixes: 35ad7e181541 ("MIPS: mm: tlb-r4k: Uniquify TLB entries on init")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jiaxun Yang <jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com>
Tested-by: Jiaxun Yang <jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com> # Boston I6400, M5150 sim
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>

* MIPS: kernel: Fix random segmentation faults

Commit 69896119dc9d ("MIPS: vdso: Switch to generic storage
implementation") switches to a generic vdso storage, which increases
the number of data pages from 1 to 4. But there is only one page
reserved, which causes segementation faults depending where the VDSO
area is randomized to. To fix this use the same size of reservation
and allocation of the VDSO data pages.

Fixes: 69896119dc9d ("MIPS: vdso: Switch to generic storage implementation")
Reviewed-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>

* usb: storage: sddr55: Reject out-of-bound new_pba

Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.

new_pba comes from the status packet returned after each write.
A bogus device could report values beyond the block count derived
from info->capacity, letting the driver walk off the end of
pba_to_lba[] and corrupt heap memory.

Reject PBAs that exceed the computed block count and fail the
transfer so we avoid touching out-of-range mapping entries.

Signed-off-by: Tianchu Chen <flynnnchen@tencent.com>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/B2DC73A3EE1E3A1D+202511161322001664687@tencent.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

* xhci: dbgtty: fix device unregister

When DbC is disconnected then xhci_dbc_tty_unregister_device()
is called. However if there is any user space process blocked
on write to DbC terminal device then it will never be signalled
and thus stay blocked indifinitely.

This fix adds a tty_vhangup() call in xhci_dbc_tty_unregister_device().
The tty_vhangup() wakes up any blocked writers and causes subsequent
write attempts to DbC terminal device to fail.

Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Fixes: dfba2174dc42 ("usb: xhci: Add DbC support in xHCI driver")
Signed-off-by: Łukasz Bartosik <ukaszb@chromium.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251119212910.1245694-1-ukaszb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

* usb: dwc3: Fix race condition between concurrent dwc3_remove_requests() call paths

This patch addresses a race condition caused by unsynchronized
execution of multiple call paths invoking `dwc3_remove_requests()`,
leading to premature freeing of USB requests and subsequent crashes.

Three distinct execution paths interact with `dwc3_remove_requests()`:
Path 1:
Triggered via `dwc3_gadget_reset_interrupt()` during USB reset
handling. The call stack includes:
- `dwc3_ep0_reset_state()`
- `dwc3_ep0_stall_and_restart()`
- `dwc3_ep0_out_start()`
- `dwc3_remove_requests()`
- `dwc3_gadget_del_and_unmap_request()`

Path 2:
Also initiated from `dwc3_gadget_reset_interrupt()`, but through
`dwc3_stop_active_transfers()`. The call stack includes:
- `dwc3_stop_active_transfers()`
- `dwc3_remove_requests()`
- `dwc3_gadget_del_and_unmap_request()`

Path 3:
Occurs independently during `adb root` execution, which triggers
USB function unbind and bind operations. The sequence includes:
- `gserial_disconnect()`
- `usb_ep_disable()`
- `dwc3_gadget_ep_disable()`
- `dwc3_remove_requests()` with `-ESHUTDOWN` status

Path 3 operates asynchronously and lacks synchronization with Paths
1 and 2. When Path 3 completes, it disables endpoints and frees 'out'
requests. If Paths 1 or 2 are still processing these requests,
accessing freed memory leads to a crash due to use-after-free conditions.

To fix this added check for request completion and skip processing
if already completed and added the request status for ep0 while queue.

Fixes: 72246da40f37 ("usb: Introduce DesignWare USB3 DRD Driver")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Thinh Nguyen <Thinh.Nguyen@synopsys.com>
Acked-by: Thinh Nguyen <Thinh.Nguyen@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Manish Nagar <manish.nagar@oss.qualcomm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251120074435.1983091-1-manish.nagar@oss.qualcomm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

* usb: uas: fix urb unmapping issue when the uas device is remove during ongoing data transfer

When a UAS device is unplugged during data transfer, there is
a probability of a system panic occurring. The root cause is
an access to an invalid memory address during URB callback handling.
Specifically, this happens when the dma_direct_unmap_sg() function
is called within the usb_hcd_unmap_urb_for_dma() interface, but the
sg->dma_address field is 0 and the sg data structure has already been
freed.

The SCSI driver sends transfer commands by invoking uas_queuecommand_lck()
in uas.c, using the uas_submit_urbs() function to submit requests to USB.
Within the uas_submit_urbs() implementation, three URBs (sense_urb,
data_urb, and cmd_urb) are sequentially submitted. Device removal may
occur at any point during uas_submit_urbs execution, which may result
in URB submission failure. However, some URBs might have been successfully
submitted before the failure, and uas_submit_urbs will return the -ENODEV
error code in this case. The current error handling directly calls
scsi_done(). In the SCSI driver, this eventually triggers scsi_complete()
to invoke scsi_end_request() for releasing the sgtable. The successfully
submitted URBs, when being unlinked to giveback, call
usb_hcd_unmap_urb_for_dma() in hcd.c, leading to exceptions during sg
unmapping operations since the sg data structure has already been freed.

This patch modifies the error condition check in the uas_submit_urbs()
function. When a UAS device is removed but one or more URBs have already
been successfully submitted to USB, it avoids immediately invoking
scsi_done() and save the cmnd to devinfo->cmnd array. If the successfully
submitted URBs is completed before devinfo->resetting being set, then
the scsi_done() function will be called within uas_try_complete() after
all pending URB operations are finalized. Otherwise, the scsi_done()
function will be called within uas_zap_pending(), which is executed after
usb_kill_anchored_urbs().

The error handling only takes effect when uas_queuecommand_lck() calls
uas_submit_urbs() and returns the error value -ENODEV . In this case,
the device is disconnected, and the flow proceeds to uas_disconnect(),
where uas_zap_pending() is invoked to call uas_try_complete().

Fixes: eb2a86ae8c54 ("USB: UAS: fix disconnect by unplugging a hub")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Yu Chen <chenyu45@xiaomi.com>
Signed-off-by: Owen Gu <guhuinan@xiaomi.com>
Acked-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251120123336.3328-1-guhuinan@xiaomi.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

* spi: spi-fsl-lpspi: fix watermark truncation caused by type cast

't->len' is an unsigned integer, while 'watermark' and 'txfifosize' are
u8. Using min_t with typeof(watermark) forces bo…
morbidrsa pushed a commit to morbidrsa/linux that referenced this pull request Dec 1, 2025
xfs/286 produced this report on my test fleet:

 ==================================================================
 BUG: KFENCE: out-of-bounds read in memcpy_orig+0x54/0x110

 Out-of-bounds read at 0xffff88843fe9e038 (184B right of kfence-torvalds#184):
  memcpy_orig+0x54/0x110
  xrep_symlink_salvage_inline+0xb3/0xf0 [xfs]
  xrep_symlink_salvage+0x100/0x110 [xfs]
  xrep_symlink+0x2e/0x80 [xfs]
  xrep_attempt+0x61/0x1f0 [xfs]
  xfs_scrub_metadata+0x34f/0x5c0 [xfs]
  xfs_ioc_scrubv_metadata+0x387/0x560 [xfs]
  xfs_file_ioctl+0xe23/0x10e0 [xfs]
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x76/0xc0
  do_syscall_64+0x4e/0x1e0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

 kfence-torvalds#184: 0xffff88843fe9df80-0xffff88843fe9dfea, size=107, cache=kmalloc-128

 allocated by task 3470 on cpu 1 at 263329.131592s (192823.508886s ago):
  xfs_init_local_fork+0x79/0xe0 [xfs]
  xfs_iformat_local+0xa4/0x170 [xfs]
  xfs_iformat_data_fork+0x148/0x180 [xfs]
  xfs_inode_from_disk+0x2cd/0x480 [xfs]
  xfs_iget+0x450/0xd60 [xfs]
  xfs_bulkstat_one_int+0x6b/0x510 [xfs]
  xfs_bulkstat_iwalk+0x1e/0x30 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_ag_recs+0xdf/0x150 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_run_callbacks+0xb9/0x190 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_ag+0x1dc/0x2f0 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_args.constprop.0+0x6a/0x120 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk+0xa4/0xd0 [xfs]
  xfs_bulkstat+0xfa/0x170 [xfs]
  xfs_ioc_fsbulkstat.isra.0+0x13a/0x230 [xfs]
  xfs_file_ioctl+0xbf2/0x10e0 [xfs]
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x76/0xc0
  do_syscall_64+0x4e/0x1e0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1300113 Comm: xfs_scrub Not tainted 6.18.0-rc4-djwx #rc4 PREEMPT(lazy)  3d744dd94e92690f00a04398d2bd8631dcef1954
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-4.module+el8.8.0+21164+ed375313 04/01/2014
 ==================================================================

On further analysis, I realized that the second parameter to min() is
not correct.  xfs_ifork::if_bytes is the size of the xfs_ifork::if_data
buffer.  if_bytes can be smaller than the data fork size because:

(a) the forkoff code tries to keep the data area as large as possible
(b) for symbolic links, if_bytes is the ondisk file size + 1
(c) forkoff is always a multiple of 8.

Case in point: for a single-byte symlink target, forkoff will be
8 but the buffer will only be 2 bytes long.

In other words, the logic here is wrong and we walk off the end of the
incore buffer.  Fix that.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10
Fixes: 2651923 ("xfs: online repair of symbolic links")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
intersectRaven pushed a commit to intersectRaven/linux that referenced this pull request Dec 1, 2025
[ Upstream commit 678e1cc ]

xfs/286 produced this report on my test fleet:

 ==================================================================
 BUG: KFENCE: out-of-bounds read in memcpy_orig+0x54/0x110

 Out-of-bounds read at 0xffff88843fe9e038 (184B right of kfence-torvalds#184):
  memcpy_orig+0x54/0x110
  xrep_symlink_salvage_inline+0xb3/0xf0 [xfs]
  xrep_symlink_salvage+0x100/0x110 [xfs]
  xrep_symlink+0x2e/0x80 [xfs]
  xrep_attempt+0x61/0x1f0 [xfs]
  xfs_scrub_metadata+0x34f/0x5c0 [xfs]
  xfs_ioc_scrubv_metadata+0x387/0x560 [xfs]
  xfs_file_ioctl+0xe23/0x10e0 [xfs]
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x76/0xc0
  do_syscall_64+0x4e/0x1e0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

 kfence-torvalds#184: 0xffff88843fe9df80-0xffff88843fe9dfea, size=107, cache=kmalloc-128

 allocated by task 3470 on cpu 1 at 263329.131592s (192823.508886s ago):
  xfs_init_local_fork+0x79/0xe0 [xfs]
  xfs_iformat_local+0xa4/0x170 [xfs]
  xfs_iformat_data_fork+0x148/0x180 [xfs]
  xfs_inode_from_disk+0x2cd/0x480 [xfs]
  xfs_iget+0x450/0xd60 [xfs]
  xfs_bulkstat_one_int+0x6b/0x510 [xfs]
  xfs_bulkstat_iwalk+0x1e/0x30 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_ag_recs+0xdf/0x150 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_run_callbacks+0xb9/0x190 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_ag+0x1dc/0x2f0 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_args.constprop.0+0x6a/0x120 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk+0xa4/0xd0 [xfs]
  xfs_bulkstat+0xfa/0x170 [xfs]
  xfs_ioc_fsbulkstat.isra.0+0x13a/0x230 [xfs]
  xfs_file_ioctl+0xbf2/0x10e0 [xfs]
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x76/0xc0
  do_syscall_64+0x4e/0x1e0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1300113 Comm: xfs_scrub Not tainted 6.18.0-rc4-djwx #rc4 PREEMPT(lazy)  3d744dd94e92690f00a04398d2bd8631dcef1954
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-4.module+el8.8.0+21164+ed375313 04/01/2014
 ==================================================================

On further analysis, I realized that the second parameter to min() is
not correct.  xfs_ifork::if_bytes is the size of the xfs_ifork::if_data
buffer.  if_bytes can be smaller than the data fork size because:

(a) the forkoff code tries to keep the data area as large as possible
(b) for symbolic links, if_bytes is the ondisk file size + 1
(c) forkoff is always a multiple of 8.

Case in point: for a single-byte symlink target, forkoff will be
8 but the buffer will only be 2 bytes long.

In other words, the logic here is wrong and we walk off the end of the
incore buffer.  Fix that.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10
Fixes: 2651923 ("xfs: online repair of symbolic links")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
SpieringsAE pushed a commit to GOcontroll/linux that referenced this pull request Dec 1, 2025
[ Upstream commit 678e1cc ]

xfs/286 produced this report on my test fleet:

 ==================================================================
 BUG: KFENCE: out-of-bounds read in memcpy_orig+0x54/0x110

 Out-of-bounds read at 0xffff88843fe9e038 (184B right of kfence-torvalds#184):
  memcpy_orig+0x54/0x110
  xrep_symlink_salvage_inline+0xb3/0xf0 [xfs]
  xrep_symlink_salvage+0x100/0x110 [xfs]
  xrep_symlink+0x2e/0x80 [xfs]
  xrep_attempt+0x61/0x1f0 [xfs]
  xfs_scrub_metadata+0x34f/0x5c0 [xfs]
  xfs_ioc_scrubv_metadata+0x387/0x560 [xfs]
  xfs_file_ioctl+0xe23/0x10e0 [xfs]
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x76/0xc0
  do_syscall_64+0x4e/0x1e0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

 kfence-torvalds#184: 0xffff88843fe9df80-0xffff88843fe9dfea, size=107, cache=kmalloc-128

 allocated by task 3470 on cpu 1 at 263329.131592s (192823.508886s ago):
  xfs_init_local_fork+0x79/0xe0 [xfs]
  xfs_iformat_local+0xa4/0x170 [xfs]
  xfs_iformat_data_fork+0x148/0x180 [xfs]
  xfs_inode_from_disk+0x2cd/0x480 [xfs]
  xfs_iget+0x450/0xd60 [xfs]
  xfs_bulkstat_one_int+0x6b/0x510 [xfs]
  xfs_bulkstat_iwalk+0x1e/0x30 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_ag_recs+0xdf/0x150 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_run_callbacks+0xb9/0x190 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_ag+0x1dc/0x2f0 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk_args.constprop.0+0x6a/0x120 [xfs]
  xfs_iwalk+0xa4/0xd0 [xfs]
  xfs_bulkstat+0xfa/0x170 [xfs]
  xfs_ioc_fsbulkstat.isra.0+0x13a/0x230 [xfs]
  xfs_file_ioctl+0xbf2/0x10e0 [xfs]
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x76/0xc0
  do_syscall_64+0x4e/0x1e0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1300113 Comm: xfs_scrub Not tainted 6.18.0-rc4-djwx #rc4 PREEMPT(lazy)  3d744dd94e92690f00a04398d2bd8631dcef1954
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-4.module+el8.8.0+21164+ed375313 04/01/2014
 ==================================================================

On further analysis, I realized that the second parameter to min() is
not correct.  xfs_ifork::if_bytes is the size of the xfs_ifork::if_data
buffer.  if_bytes can be smaller than the data fork size because:

(a) the forkoff code tries to keep the data area as large as possible
(b) for symbolic links, if_bytes is the ondisk file size + 1
(c) forkoff is always a multiple of 8.

Case in point: for a single-byte symlink target, forkoff will be
8 but the buffer will only be 2 bytes long.

In other words, the logic here is wrong and we walk off the end of the
incore buffer.  Fix that.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10
Fixes: 2651923 ("xfs: online repair of symbolic links")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

Labels

None yet

Projects

None yet

Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

3 participants