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This one is strange. From what I can tell, the site serves a broken certificate chain (cf. also Qualys), which means that it should not be included as it will cause potential breakage for Firefox users. Nonetheless, it appears to pass the fetch test, but in fact, the main reason for including the fetch test was to detect broken certificate chains, so this is very strange. @Hainish, was the fetch test logic changed recently in any way that could cause this to happen? If not, I suppose the issue lies with my own setup (tested on Debian Wheezy and Jessie), but I can not come up with any reason why that should be. If I run |
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Ah, the reason must be that the fetch test CA repository does not reflect what is used by the two Debian versions. Is this a bug in Debian? If not, the repository should be updated. |
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Though I don't get the error on Chrome, should this rule be disabled by default? |
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If this is purely due to an issue with the CA collection in Debian (which would not be the first one), then the ruleset is fine, but it really depends on whether or not Since Qualys also reports the chain as broken, I do imagine that there is an actual issue. In any case, I've contacted the webmasters to let them know about the problem; if they include the potentially missing certificate in the chain they serve, then everything is good for this ruleset (but not for our tests). |
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All four of the active targets work for me on Firefox on Windows 48.0.1. |
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Of course this also means that what I pondered about Debian above is not correct, and that this is indeed an issue with our tests. |
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If I create a fresh Firefox profile with I compared the certificate store ( From what I can tell this means that you are right and that somehow I got this intermediate certificate from somewhere. Do you have any idea where this came from? |
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I found this link very useful to understand this problem: https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:FAQ . I think I get it now. A website I visit prompts Firefox, behind the scenes without me knowing about it, to download an intermediate certificate if needed to check the actual certificate for the site. If the site is misconfigured, I won't get the intermediate certificate (see here). https://octopuspop.com is a site that is misconfigured that way. The reason it works on my regular profile is because I've previously visited some other site that also required the RapidSSL intermediate certificate that was configured correctly, so I already had the intermediate certificate installed. Does that sound right? |
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@jeremyn That's correct. If a valid intermediate is delivered when you visit site A, Firefox caches it in the Firefox certificate store. Then, when site B signed by the same intermediate delivers the certificate leaf node (but not the intermediate itself), Firefox will be able to build the entire cert chain because it has cached the intermediate previously with site A. If site B was visited first, you'd get the browser warning, because Firefox would not have all the necessary certificates to build the chain. |
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NSS, the TLS library used in Firefox and Chrome, builds the certificate chain in a non-deterministic way. Users that had previously visited sites which delivered the SHA-1 intermediate were getting that certificate cached, and then they would visit a site which delivered the intermediate signed with SHA-256. But since the same intermediate was already signed with SHA-1 and cached, users were getting browser warnings that indicated they were still offering a SHA-1 intermediate to users. |
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So anyone please tell me if I have to change the ruleset or not? |
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@Hainish's @luixxiul: We can not include the ruleset right now, and unfortunately not much can be done to safe it, as every target host might cause issues for Firefox users. I told octopuspop about the issue, so with a bit of luck they will fix the site, and this ruleset becomes applicable. |
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@fuglede OK I see., thanks for doing that 👍 |
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@Hainish Thanks for the information. |
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@jeremyn Historically, at least, we have not introduced new default_off rulesets (cf. e.g. #954 (comment)). |
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@fuglede That makes sense, but I don't want to keep a pull request open forever with no clear next step. What should we do with it? |
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Closing this for now. We can reopen it if they fix the site. |
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Thanks. |
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We have missed to include intermediate CA to certificate setting, and it was fixed. |
This is a follow-up to #6102 in which various parts of the site was covered, but in which some of them still had some issues. In the same pull request, the developer later notified us that those issues have now been fixed.


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