Closed
Conversation
qwen3.5:9b
Member
|
We should hold on this until decisions are made about which models are best to use here. |
jessesanford
pushed a commit
to jessesanford/NemoClaw
that referenced
this pull request
Mar 24, 2026
Add `openclaw nemoclaw onboard` command
2 tasks
16 tasks
ericksoa
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Apr 7, 2026
… (#1305) ## Summary Fixes the four issues reported in #1114 — EACCES permission errors and missing gateway token when running inside the NemoClaw sandbox. ### Issue mapping | # | Reported error | Fix | |---|----------------|-----| | 1 | `EACCES: open '/sandbox/.openclaw/openclaw.json.*.tmp'` | `install_configure_guard` — intercepts `openclaw configure` with a clear error and directs users to `nemoclaw onboard --resume` on the host | | 2 | Same as #1 (different PID) | Same fix | | 3 | `EACCES: mkdir '/sandbox/.openclaw/credentials'` | Already resolved on main via #1519 (credentials symlink to `.openclaw-data/`) | | 4 | No WhatsApp QR code | Consequence of #3, also resolved by #1519 | ### Root cause (issues 1 & 2) OpenClaw's `configure` command performs atomic writes — it creates a temp file (`openclaw.json.PID.UUID.tmp`) in the same directory as the config. Since `/sandbox/.openclaw/` is Landlock read-only at the kernel level, file creation is rejected with EACCES. This is by design: the sandbox config is intentionally immutable at runtime. Rather than weakening Landlock (security regression), we intercept the command in the sandbox shell and guide users to the correct host-side workflow. ### Changes **1. `install_configure_guard()`** — Writes a shell function wrapper to `.bashrc`/`.profile` that intercepts `openclaw configure` and prints: ``` Error: 'openclaw configure' cannot modify config inside the sandbox. The sandbox config is read-only (Landlock enforced) for security. To change your configuration, exit the sandbox and run: nemoclaw onboard --resume This rebuilds the sandbox with your updated settings. ``` All other `openclaw` subcommands pass through to the real binary. **2. `export_gateway_token()`** — Reads `gateway.auth.token` from `openclaw.json` and exports it as `OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_TOKEN`, so interactive sessions (`openshell sandbox connect`) can authenticate with the gateway. Persists to `.bashrc`/`.profile` using idempotent marker blocks and cleans stale tokens on revocation. **3. `_read_gateway_token()` helper** — Shared Python snippet used by both `export_gateway_token` and `print_dashboard_urls` (deduplication, uses `with open()` context manager). All three are called in both root and non-root startup paths. ## Security properties preserved - `/sandbox/.openclaw` remains root-owned, Landlock read-only - `openclaw.json` remains chmod 444 (immutable) - No new attack surface — token is read-only from existing config - `command openclaw` bypass preserves all non-configure functionality Fixes #1114 Signed-off-by: Dongni Yang <dongniy@nvidia.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Dongni Yang <dongniy@nvidia.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
gemini2026
pushed a commit
to gemini2026/NemoClaw
that referenced
this pull request
Apr 14, 2026
…IA#1114) (NVIDIA#1305) ## Summary Fixes the four issues reported in NVIDIA#1114 — EACCES permission errors and missing gateway token when running inside the NemoClaw sandbox. ### Issue mapping | # | Reported error | Fix | |---|----------------|-----| | 1 | `EACCES: open '/sandbox/.openclaw/openclaw.json.*.tmp'` | `install_configure_guard` — intercepts `openclaw configure` with a clear error and directs users to `nemoclaw onboard --resume` on the host | | 2 | Same as NVIDIA#1 (different PID) | Same fix | | 3 | `EACCES: mkdir '/sandbox/.openclaw/credentials'` | Already resolved on main via NVIDIA#1519 (credentials symlink to `.openclaw-data/`) | | 4 | No WhatsApp QR code | Consequence of NVIDIA#3, also resolved by NVIDIA#1519 | ### Root cause (issues 1 & 2) OpenClaw's `configure` command performs atomic writes — it creates a temp file (`openclaw.json.PID.UUID.tmp`) in the same directory as the config. Since `/sandbox/.openclaw/` is Landlock read-only at the kernel level, file creation is rejected with EACCES. This is by design: the sandbox config is intentionally immutable at runtime. Rather than weakening Landlock (security regression), we intercept the command in the sandbox shell and guide users to the correct host-side workflow. ### Changes **1. `install_configure_guard()`** — Writes a shell function wrapper to `.bashrc`/`.profile` that intercepts `openclaw configure` and prints: ``` Error: 'openclaw configure' cannot modify config inside the sandbox. The sandbox config is read-only (Landlock enforced) for security. To change your configuration, exit the sandbox and run: nemoclaw onboard --resume This rebuilds the sandbox with your updated settings. ``` All other `openclaw` subcommands pass through to the real binary. **2. `export_gateway_token()`** — Reads `gateway.auth.token` from `openclaw.json` and exports it as `OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_TOKEN`, so interactive sessions (`openshell sandbox connect`) can authenticate with the gateway. Persists to `.bashrc`/`.profile` using idempotent marker blocks and cleans stale tokens on revocation. **3. `_read_gateway_token()` helper** — Shared Python snippet used by both `export_gateway_token` and `print_dashboard_urls` (deduplication, uses `with open()` context manager). All three are called in both root and non-root startup paths. ## Security properties preserved - `/sandbox/.openclaw` remains root-owned, Landlock read-only - `openclaw.json` remains chmod 444 (immutable) - No new attack surface — token is read-only from existing config - `command openclaw` bypass preserves all non-configure functionality Fixes NVIDIA#1114 Signed-off-by: Dongni Yang <dongniy@nvidia.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Dongni Yang <dongniy@nvidia.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
jyaunches
pushed a commit
to jyaunches/NemoClaw
that referenced
this pull request
Apr 14, 2026
- Guard runArgv/runArgvCapture against shell:true to prevent security bypass (finding NVIDIA#1) — throws if a caller attempts to re-enable shell interpretation. Added 2 tests. - Document the intentional bash -c exception in getOllamaWarmupCommand explaining why it's safe (finding NVIDIA#2). - Remove dead getOpenshellCommand() from policies.ts (finding NVIDIA#3). - Remove unused shellQuote import from nim.ts (finding NVIDIA#4). - Fix brittle indexOf assertion in onboard-readiness test (finding NVIDIA#5).
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
3 participants
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Migrated from NVIDIA/openshell-openclaw-plugin#13 by @jacobtomlinson