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## Why #18275 anchors session-scoped `:cwd` and `:project_roots` grants to the request cwd before recording them for reuse. Relative deny glob entries need the same treatment. Without anchoring, a stored session permission can keep a pattern such as `**/*.env` relative, then reinterpret that deny against a later turn cwd. That makes the persisted profile depend on the cwd at reuse time instead of the cwd that was reviewed and approved. ## What changed `intersect_permission_profiles` now materializes retained `FileSystemPath::GlobPattern` entries against the request cwd, matching the existing materialization for cwd-sensitive special paths. Materialized accepted grants are now deduplicated before deny retention runs. This keeps the sticky-grant preapproval shape stable when a repeated request is merged with the stored grant and both `:cwd = write` and the materialized absolute cwd write are present. The preapproval check compares against the same materialized form, so a later request for the same cwd-relative deny glob still matches the stored anchored grant instead of re-prompting or rejecting. Tests cover both the storage path and the preapproval path: a session-scoped `:cwd = write` grant with `**/*.env = none` is stored with both the cwd write and deny glob anchored to the original request cwd, cannot be reused from a later cwd, and remains preapproved when re-requested from the original cwd after merging with the stored grant. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing policy_transforms` - `cargo test -p codex-core --lib relative_deny_glob_grants_remain_preapproved_after_materialization` - `cargo clippy -p codex-sandboxing --tests -- -D clippy::redundant_clone` - `cargo clippy -p codex-core --lib -- -D clippy::redundant_clone` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18867). * #18288 * #18287 * #18286 * #18285 * #18284 * #18283 * #18282 * #18281 * #18280 * #18279 * #18278 * #18277 * #18276 * __->__ #18867
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## Why `Permissions` should not store a separate `PermissionProfile` that can drift from the constrained `SandboxPolicy` and network settings. The active profile needs to be derived from the same constrained values that already honor `requirements.toml`. ## What changed This adds derivation of the active `PermissionProfile` from the constrained runtime permission settings and exposes that derived value through config snapshots and thread state. The app-server can then report the active profile without introducing a second source of truth. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all permissions_messages -- --nocapture` - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all request_permissions -- --nocapture` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18277). * #18288 * #18287 * #18286 * #18285 * #18284 * #18283 * #18282 * #18281 * #18280 * #18279 * #18278 * __->__ #18277
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## Why `PermissionProfile` is becoming the canonical permissions shape shared by core and app-server. After app-server responses expose the active profile, clients need to be able to send that same shape back when starting, resuming, forking, or overriding a turn instead of translating through the legacy `sandbox`/`sandboxPolicy` shorthands. This still needs to preserve the existing requirements/platform enforcement model. A profile-shaped request can be downgraded or rejected by constraints, but the server should keep the user's elevated-access intent for project trust decisions. Turn-level profile overrides also need to retain existing read protections, including deny-read entries and bounded glob-scan metadata, so a permission override cannot accidentally drop configured protections such as `**/*.env = deny`. ## What changed - Adds optional `permissionProfile` request fields to `thread/start`, `thread/resume`, `thread/fork`, and `turn/start`. - Rejects ambiguous requests that specify both `permissionProfile` and the legacy `sandbox`/`sandboxPolicy` fields, including running-thread resume requests. - Converts profile-shaped overrides into core runtime filesystem/network permissions while continuing to derive the constrained legacy sandbox projection used by existing execution paths. - Preserves project-trust intent for profile overrides that are equivalent to workspace-write or full-access sandbox requests. - Preserves existing deny-read entries and `globScanMaxDepth` when applying turn-level `permissionProfile` overrides. - Updates app-server docs plus generated JSON/TypeScript schema fixtures and regression coverage. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol schema_fixtures` - `cargo test -p codex-core session_configuration_apply_permission_profile_preserves_existing_deny_read_entries` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18279). * #18288 * #18287 * #18286 * #18285 * #18284 * #18283 * #18282 * #18281 * #18280 * __->__ #18279
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Why
Per-turn permission overrides should use the same canonical profile abstraction as session configuration. That lets TUI submissions preserve exact configured permissions without round-tripping through legacy sandbox fields.
What changed
This adds
permission_profileto user-turn operations, threads it through TUI/app-server submission paths, fills the new field in existing test fixtures, and adds coverage that composer submission includes the configured profile.Verification
cargo test -p codex-tui permissions -- --nocapturecargo test -p codex-core --test all permissions_messages -- --nocaptureStack created with Sapling. Best reviewed with ReviewStack.