Tpmi based drivers backport from 6.11 by jiayingbao · Pull Request #1 · openvelinux/kernel-intel

jiayingbao · 2024-12-03T09:56:42Z

backport the update and fix for TPMI based drivers.
major version and minor version update,
debugfs added
important bugfix

Test:
build and test TPMI related sysfs
intel SST related function ok
uncore driver sysfs works as expected.

enable pull request checking workflow for 6.6-velinux branch

commit ace7b6f upstream. In intel_vsec_add_aux(), just return from the last call to devm_add_action_or_reset() instead of checking its return value. Intel-SIG: commit ace7b6f platform/x86/intel/vsec: Remove unnecessary return. Backport intel tpmi base driver update for 6.6 from 6.10 Suggested-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David E. Box <david.e.box@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231129222132.2331261-3-david.e.box@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> [ Yingbao Jia: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yingbao Jia <yingbao.jia@intel.com>

commit dbc01b0 upstream. In preparation for exporting an API to register Intel Vendor Specific Extended Capabilities (VSEC) from other drivers, move needed structures to the header file. Intel-SIG: commit dbc01b0 platform/x86/intel/vsec: Move structures to header. Backport intel tpmi base driver update for 6.6 from 6.10 Signed-off-by: David E. Box <david.e.box@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231129222132.2331261-4-david.e.box@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> [ Yingbao Jia: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yingbao Jia <yingbao.jia@intel.com>

commit 0a0a52a upstream. In preparation for exporting an API to register Intel Vendor Specific Extended Capabilities (VSEC) from other drivers, remove the pointer to platform_info from intel_vsec_device. This prevents a potential page fault when auxiliary drivers probe and attempt to dereference this pointer to access the needed quirks field. Instead, just add the quirks to intel_vsec_device. Intel-SIG: commit 0a0a52a platform/x86/intel/vsec: remove platform_info from vsec device structure. Backport intel tpmi base driver update for 6.6 from 6.10 Signed-off-by: David E. Box <david.e.box@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231129222132.2331261-5-david.e.box@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> [ Yingbao Jia: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yingbao Jia <yingbao.jia@intel.com>

commit 1d1b477 upstream. Use cleanup.h helpers to handle cleanup of resources in intel_vsec_add_dev() after failures. Intel-SIG: commit 1d1b477 platform/x86/intel/vsec: Use cleanup.h. Backport Intel_tpmi base driver for 6.6 from 6.10 Signed-off-by: David E. Box <david.e.box@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231129222132.2331261-6-david.e.box@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> [ Yingbao Jia: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yingbao Jia <yingbao.jia@intel.com>

commit 6dfc251 upstream. Instead of checking for a NULL parent argument in intel_vsec_add_aux() and then assigning it to the probed device, remove this check and just pass the device in the call. Since this function is exported, return -EINVAL if the parent is not specified. Intel-SIG: commit 6dfc251 platform/x86/intel/vsec: Assign auxdev parent by argument. Backport intel tpmi base driver update for 6.6 from 6.10 Signed-off-by: David E. Box <david.e.box@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231129222132.2331261-7-david.e.box@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> [ Yingbao Jia: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yingbao Jia <yingbao.jia@intel.com>

commit 4edbd11 upstream. Add and export intel_vsec_register() to allow the registration of Intel extended capabilities from other drivers. Add check to look for memory conflicts before registering a new capability. Since the vsec provider may not be a PCI device, add a parent field to intel_vsec_platform_info() to allow specifying the parent device for device managed cleanup. Intel-SIG: commit 4edbd11 platform/x86/intel/vsec: Add intel_vsec_register. Backport intel tpmi base driver update for 6.6 from 6.10 Signed-off-by: Gayatri Kammela <gayatri.kammela@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David E. Box <david.e.box@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231129222132.2331261-8-david.e.box@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> [ Yingbao Jia: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yingbao Jia <yingbao.jia@intel.com>

commit e97ec7f upstream. Some devices may emulate PCI VSEC capabilities in MMIO. In such cases the BAR is not readable from a config space. Provide a field for drivers to indicate the base address to be used. Intel-SIG: commit e97ec7f platform/x86/intel/vsec: Add base address field. Backport intel tpmi base driver update for 6.6 from 6.10 Signed-off-by: David E. Box <david.e.box@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231129222132.2331261-9-david.e.box@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> [ Yingbao Jia: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yingbao Jia <yingbao.jia@intel.com>

commit 701d40a upstream. intel_vsec_walk_header() is used to configure features from devices that don't provide a PCI VSEC or DVSEC structure. Some of these features may be unsupported and fail to load. Ignore them silently as we do for unsupported features described by VSEC/DVSEC. Intel-SIG: commit 701d40a platform/x86/intel/vsec: Remove nuisance message. Backport intel tpmi base driver update for 6.6 from 6.10 Signed-off-by: "David E. Box" <david.e.box@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240227190134.1592072-1-david.e.box@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> [ Yingbao Jia: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yingbao Jia <yingbao.jia@intel.com>

commit 8df012a upstream. Display read and write blocked status of each TPMI feature in addition to disabled and locked status. This will require reading of read/write blocked state from the hardware. Currently tpmi_read_feature_status(), doesn't provide this state. Define TPMI feature state as defined in the TPMI spec. Modify the function tpmi_read_feature_status() to update full feature state instead of just disabled and locked state. Intel-SIG: commit 8df012a platform/x86/intel/tpmi: Add debugfs support for read/write blocked. Backport Intel_tpmi base driver for 6.6 from 6.10 Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230925194219.966602-1-srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> [ Yingbao Jia: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yingbao Jia <yingbao.jia@intel.com>

commit 8874e41 upstream. Add defines to get major and minor version from a TPMI version field value. This will avoid code duplication to convert in every feature driver. Also add define for invalid version field. Intel-SIG: commit 8874e41 platform/x86/intel/tpmi: Add defines to get version information. Backport Intel_tpmi base driver. Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231003184916.1860084-2-srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> [ Yingbao Jia: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yingbao Jia <yingbao.jia@intel.com>

commit b87434f upstream. If some TPMI features are disabled, don't create auxiliary devices. In this way feature drivers will not load. While creating auxiliary devices, call tpmi_read_feature_status() to check feature state and return if the feature is disabled without creating a device. Intel-SIG: commit b87434f platform/x86/intel/tpmi: Don't create devices for disabled features. Backport intel tpmi base driver update for 6.6 from 6.10 Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231204221740.3645130-2-srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> [ Yingbao Jia: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yingbao Jia <yingbao.jia@intel.com>

…state commit 72dd14d upstream. Modify the external interface tpmi_get_feature_status() to get read and write blocked instead of locked and disabled. Since auxiliary device is not created when disabled, no use of returning disabled state. Also locked state is not useful as feature driver can't use locked state in a meaningful way. Using read and write state, feature driver can decide which operations to restrict for that feature. Intel-SIG: commit 72dd14d platform/x86/intel/tpmi: Modify external interface to get read/write state. Backport intel tpmi base driver update for 6.6 from 6.10 Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231204221740.3645130-3-srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> [ Yingbao Jia: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yingbao Jia <yingbao.jia@intel.com>

commit 046d7be upstream. Move TPMI ID definitions to common include file. In this way other feature drivers don't have to redefine. Intel-SIG: commit 046d7be platform/x86/intel/tpmi: Move TPMI ID definition. Backport intel tpmi base driver update for 6.6 from 6.10 Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231204221740.3645130-4-srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> [ Yingbao Jia: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yingbao Jia <yingbao.jia@intel.com>

commit 59eb081 upstream. Check the major version from TPMI information header and fail to load driver if the version is not supported. Intel-SIG: commit 59eb081 platform/x86/intel/tpmi: Check major version change for TPMI Information. Backport intel tpmi base driver update for 6.6 from 6.10 Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423204619.3946901-3-srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> [ Yingbao Jia: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yingbao Jia <yingbao.jia@intel.com>

commit 1192534 upstream. Align comments in kernel-doc for the struct intel_tpmi_plat_info. Intel-SIG: commit 1192534 platform/x86/intel/tpmi: Align comments in kernel-doc. Backport intel tpmi base driver update for 6.6 from 6.10 Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423204619.3946901-4-srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> [ Yingbao Jia: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yingbao Jia <yingbao.jia@intel.com>

commit c8405cc upstream. TPMI information header added additional fields in version 2. Some of the reserved fields in version 1 are used to define new fields. Parse new fields and export as part of platform data. These fields include: - PCI segment ID - Partition ID of the package: If a package is represented by more than one PCI device, then partition ID along with cdie_mask, describes the scope. For example to update get/set properties for a compute die, one of the PCI MMIO region is selected from the partition ID. - cdie_mask: Mask of all compute dies in this partition. Intel-SIG: commit c8405cc platform/x86/intel/tpmi: Add additional TPMI header fields. Backport intel tpmi base driver update for 6.6 from 6.10 Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423204619.3946901-5-srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> [ Yingbao Jia: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yingbao Jia <yingbao.jia@intel.com>

commit 4d1b7ef upstream. The PMT header is passed to several functions. Instead, store the header in struct intel_pmt_entry which is also passed to these functions and shorten the argument list. This simplifies the calls in preparation for later changes. While here also perform a newline cleanup. Intel-SIG: commit 4d1b7ef platform/x86/intel/pmt: Add header to struct intel_pmt_entry. Backport intel tpmi base driver update for 6.6 from 6.10 Signed-off-by: David E. Box <david.e.box@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231129222132.2331261-10-david.e.box@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> [ Yingbao Jia: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yingbao Jia <yingbao.jia@intel.com>

commit 416eeb2 upstream. Export symbols to allow access to Intel PMT Telemetry data on available devices. Provides APIs to search, register, and read telemetry using a kref managed pointer that serves as a handle to a telemetry endpoint. To simplify searching for present devices, have the IDA start at 1 instead of 0 so that 0 can be used to indicate end of search. Intel-SIG: commit 416eeb2 platform/x86/intel/pmt: telemetry: Export API to read telemetry. Backport intel tpmi base driver update for 6.6 from 6.10 Signed-off-by: David E. Box <david.e.box@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231129222132.2331261-11-david.e.box@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> [ Yingbao Jia: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yingbao Jia <yingbao.jia@intel.com>

commit da40828 upstream. Allowed level mask is a mask of levels, which are currently allowed to dynamically switch by the OS. Fused mask is a mask of all levels even if OS is not allowed to switch. Even if OS is not allowed to dynamically switch, it is still possible for user to boot to a level by using BIOS option. To decide which level to boot next time, user wants to check parameters (power, performance or thermal) of that level to decide. So, when passing the level mask for display to user space, use fuse enabled mask, which has all levels. Intel-SIG: commit da40828 platform/x86: ISST: Use fuse enabled mask instead of allowed levels. Backport Intel speed select ISST driver support on TPMI. Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231003163234.1856669-2-srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> [ Yingbao Jia: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yingbao Jia <yingbao.jia@intel.com>

commit a22d36e upstream. It is possible that SST level 0 or base level is not present in some configurations. So don't set level 0 mask in level_en_mask by default. Intel-SIG: commit a22d36e platform/x86: ISST: Allow level 0 to be not present. Backport Intel speed select ISST driver support on TPMI. Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231003163234.1856669-3-srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> [ Yingbao Jia: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yingbao Jia <yingbao.jia@intel.com>

commit 7525cea upstream. The driver is using 256 as the size while calling devm_ioremap(). The maximum offset can be obtained from isst_mmio_range. Add a field "size" to the isst_mmio_range and use it instead of hardcoding. No functional impact is expected. Intel-SIG: commit 7525cea platform/x86: intel_speed_select_if: Remove hardcoded map size. Backport Intel speed select ISST driver support on TPMI. Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231003163234.1856669-4-srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> [ Yingbao Jia: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yingbao Jia <yingbao.jia@intel.com>

commit 23f392e upstream. Replace devm_ioremap() with devm_ioremap_resource() by defining a resource. Intel-SIG: commit 23f392e platform/x86: intel_speed_select_if: Use devm_ioremap_resource. Backport Intel SST driver for 6.6 from 6.11 Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Suggested-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231003163234.1856669-5-srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> [ Yingbao Jia: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yingbao Jia <yingbao.jia@intel.com>

commit 07510a5 upstream. The hardware definition of every TPMI feature contains a major and minor version. When there is a change in the MMIO offset or change in the definition of a field, hardware will change major version. For addition of new fields without modifying existing MMIO offsets or fields, only the minor version is changed. Driver is developed to support SST functionality for a major and minor version. If the hardware changes major version, since offsets and definitions are changed, driver cannot continue to provide SST interface to users. Driver can still function with a minor version change as it will just miss the new functionality added by the hardware. The current implementation doesn't ignore any version change. If there is mismatch with the minor version, continue with an information log message. If there is mismatch with the major version, log error and exit. Intel-SIG: commit 07510a5 platform/x86: ISST: Ignore minor version change. Backport Intel SST driver for 6.6 from 6.11 Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231003184916.1860084-3-srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> [ Yingbao Jia: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yingbao Jia <yingbao.jia@intel.com>

commit 8bed9ff upstream. When a feature is read blocked, don't continue to read SST information and register with SST core. When the feature is write blocked, continue to offer read interface for SST parameters, but don't allow any operation to change state. A state change results from SST level change, feature change or class of service change. Intel-SIG: commit 8bed9ff platform/x86: ISST: Process read/write blocked feature status. Backport intel SST driver update for 6.6 from 6.11 Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231204221740.3645130-5-srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> [ Yingbao Jia: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yingbao Jia <yingbao.jia@intel.com>

…stems commit e8b4223 upstream. When HWP (Hardware P-states) is disabled, dynamic SST features are disabled. But user should still be able to read the current core-power state, with legacy P-states. This will allow users to read current configuration with static SST enabled from BIOS. To address this, do not call disable_dynamic_sst_features() when the request is for reading the state. Intel-SIG: commit e8b4223 platform/x86: ISST: Allow reading core-power state on HWP disabled systems. Backport intel SST driver update for 6.6 from 6.11 Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240229002659.1416623-1-srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> [ Yingbao Jia: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yingbao Jia <yingbao.jia@intel.com>

commit 8c5a689 upstream. Define a local variable for &auxdev->dev and use to shorten length of lines. No functional change is done. Intel-SIG: commit 8c5a689 platform/x86: ISST: Use local variable for auxdev->dev. Backport intel SST driver update for 6.6 from 6.11 Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Suggested-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423204619.3946901-6-srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> [ Yingbao Jia: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yingbao Jia <yingbao.jia@intel.com>

commit fe4211d upstream. Instead of long lines for assignment to tpmi_sst->power_domain_info, use a local variable pd_info and assign later. Also move the assignment of number of resources after the assignment of pd_info. No functional change is expected. Intel-SIG: commit fe4211d platform/x86: ISST: Shorten the assignments for power_domain_info. Backport intel SST driver update for 6.6 from 6.11 Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423204619.3946901-7-srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> [ Yingbao Jia: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yingbao Jia <yingbao.jia@intel.com>

commit 9d1d362 upstream. A partitioned system has two different PCI VSEC devices per package. A non-partitioned device has only one PCI VSEC device per package. The current implementation only supports non partitioned systems. Each partition maps a set of power domains. Other than reading from different MMIO regions, there is no change in the SST functionality. The scope of SST control is still per power domain. Hence user space does not need to be aware of existence of partitions. With partitions, existing per package information defined using struct tpmi_sst_struct is enhanced to store information for both partitions. A mapping function map_partition_power_domain_id() is introduced, which maps to correct partition and index. This mapping function is called in get_instance() and isst_if_clos_assoc(), before indexing into tpmi_sst_struct->power_domain_info[]. The TPMI core platform info provides partition id and compute die ID mask for each partition. Use this information to order power domains, so that compute dies are presented before IO dies to match hardware defined compute die ID for each CPU. Intel-SIG: commit 9d1d362 platform/x86: ISST: Support partitioned systems. Backport intel SST driver update for 6.6 from 6.11 Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423204619.3946901-8-srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> [ Yingbao Jia: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yingbao Jia <yingbao.jia@intel.com>

commit e4e365b upstream. Use in_range() macro to simplify range check. No functional impact is expected. Intel-SIG: commit e4e365b platform/x86: ISST: Use in_range() to check package ID validity. Backport Intel SST driver for 6.6 from 6.11 Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Suggested-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423204619.3946901-9-srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> [ Yingbao Jia: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yingbao Jia <yingbao.jia@intel.com>

…r=prctl commit 2f46993 upstream. Switch the kernel default of SSBD and STIBP to the ones with CONFIG_SECCOMP=n (i.e. spec_store_bypass_disable=prctl spectre_v2_user=prctl) even if CONFIG_SECCOMP=y. Several motivations listed below: - If SMT is enabled the seccomp jail can still attack the rest of the system even with spectre_v2_user=seccomp by using MDS-HT (except on XEON PHI where MDS can be tamed with SMT left enabled, but that's a special case). Setting STIBP become a very expensive window dressing after MDS-HT was discovered. - The seccomp jail cannot attack the kernel with spectre-v2-HT regardless (even if STIBP is not set), but with MDS-HT the seccomp jail can attack the kernel too. - With spec_store_bypass_disable=prctl the seccomp jail can attack the other userland (guest or host mode) using spectre-v2-HT, but the userland attack is already mitigated by both ASLR and pid namespaces for host userland and through virt isolation with libkrun or kata. (if something if somebody is worried about spectre-v2-HT it's best to mount proc with hidepid=2,gid=proc on workstations where not all apps may run under container runtimes, rather than slowing down all seccomp jails, but the best is to add pid namespaces to the seccomp jail). As opposed MDS-HT is not mitigated and the seccomp jail can still attack all other host and guest userland if SMT is enabled even with spec_store_bypass_disable=seccomp. - If full security is required then MDS-HT must also be mitigated with nosmt and then spectre_v2_user=prctl and spectre_v2_user=seccomp would become identical. - Setting spectre_v2_user=seccomp is overall lower priority than to setting javascript.options.wasm false in about:config to protect against remote wasm MDS-HT, instead of worrying about Spectre-v2-HT and STIBP which again is already statistically well mitigated by other means in userland and it's fully mitigated in kernel with retpolines (unlike the wasm assist call with MDS-HT). - SSBD is needed to prevent reading the JIT memory and the primary user being the OpenJDK. However the primary user of SSBD wouldn't be covered by spec_store_bypass_disable=seccomp because it doesn't use seccomp and the primary user also explicitly declined to set PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL+PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS despite it easily could. In fact it would need to set it only when the sandboxing mechanism is enabled for javaws applets, but it still declined it by declaring security within the same user address space as an untenable objective for their JIT, even in the sandboxing case where performance would be a lesser concern (for the record: I kind of disagree in not setting PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS in the sandbox case and I prefer to run javaws through a wrapper that sets PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS if I need). In turn it can be inferred that even if the primary user of SSBD would use seccomp, they would invoke it with SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW by now. - runc/crun already set SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW by default, k8s and podman have a default json seccomp allowlist that cannot be slowed down, so for the #1 seccomp user this change is already a noop. - systemd/sshd or other apps that use seccomp, if they really need STIBP or SSBD, they need to explicitly set the PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL by now. The stibp/ssbd seccomp blind catch-all approach was done probably initially with a wishful thinking objective to pretend to have a peace of mind that it could magically fix it all. That was wishful thinking before MDS-HT was discovered, but after MDS-HT has been discovered it become just window dressing. - For qemu "-sandbox" seccomp jail it wouldn't make sense to set STIBP or SSBD. SSBD doesn't help with KVM because there's no JIT (if it's needed with TCG it should be an opt-in with PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL+PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS and it shouldn't slowdown KVM for nothing). For qemu+KVM STIBP would be even more window dressing than it is for all other apps, because in the qemu+KVM case there's not only the MDS attack to worry about with SMT enabled. Even after disabling SMT, there's still a theoretical spectre-v2 attack possible within the same thread context from guest mode to host ring3 that the host kernel retpoline mitigation has no theoretical chance to mitigate. On some kernels a ibrs-always/ibrs-retpoline opt-in model is provided that will enabled IBRS in the qemu host ring3 userland which fixes this theoretical concern. Only after enabling IBRS in the host userland it would then make sense to proceed and worry about STIBP and an attack on the other host userland, but then again SMT would need to be disabled for full security anyway, so that would render STIBP again a noop. - last but not the least: the lack of "spec_store_bypass_disable=prctl spectre_v2_user=prctl" means the moment a guest boots and sshd/systemd runs, the guest kernel will write to SPEC_CTRL MSR which will make the guest vmexit forever slower, forcing KVM to issue a very slow rdmsr instruction at every vmexit. So the end result is that SPEC_CTRL MSR is only available in GCE. Most other public cloud providers don't expose SPEC_CTRL, which means that not only STIBP/SSBD isn't available, but IBPB isn't available either (which would cause no overhead to the guest or the hypervisor because it's write only and requires no reading during vmexit). So the current default already net loss in security (missing IBPB) which means most public cloud providers cannot achieve a fully secure guest with nosmt (and nosmt is enough to fully mitigate MDS-HT). It also means GCE and is unfairly penalized in performance because it provides the option to enable full security in the guest as an opt-in (i.e. nosmt and IBPB). So this change will allow all cloud providers to expose SPEC_CTRL without incurring into any hypervisor slowdown and at the same time it will remove the unfair penalization of GCE performance for doing the right thing and it'll allow to get full security with nosmt with IBPB being available (and STIBP becoming meaningless). Example to put things in prospective: the STIBP enabled in seccomp has never been about protecting apps using seccomp like sshd from an attack from a malicious userland, but to the contrary it has always been about protecting the system from an attack from sshd, after a successful remote network exploit against sshd. In fact initially it wasn't obvious STIBP would work both ways (STIBP was about preventing the task that runs with STIBP to be attacked with spectre-v2-HT, but accidentally in the STIBP case it also prevents the attack in the other direction). In the hypothetical case that sshd has been remotely exploited the last concern should be STIBP being set, because it'll be still possible to obtain info even from the kernel by using MDS if nosmt wasn't set (and if it was set, STIBP is a noop in the first place). As opposed kernel cannot leak anything with spectre-v2 HT because of retpolines and the userland is mitigated by ASLR already and ideally PID namespaces too. If something it'd be worth checking if sshd run the seccomp thread under pid namespaces too if available in the running kernel. SSBD also would be a noop for sshd, since sshd uses no JIT. If sshd prefers to keep doing the STIBP window dressing exercise, it still can even after this change of defaults by opting-in with PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH. Ultimately setting SSBD and STIBP by default for all seccomp jails is a bad sweet spot and bad default with more cons than pros that end up reducing security in the public cloud (by giving an huge incentive to not expose SPEC_CTRL which would be needed to get full security with IBPB after setting nosmt in the guest) and by excessively hurting performance to more secure apps using seccomp that end up having to opt out with SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW. The following is the verified result of the new default with SMT enabled: (gdb) print spectre_v2_user_stibp $1 = SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL (gdb) print spectre_v2_user_ibpb $2 = SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL (gdb) print ssb_mode $3 = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201104235054.5678-1-aarcange@redhat.com Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/AAA2EF2C-293D-4D5B-BFA6-FF655105CD84@redhat.com Acked-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/c0722838-06f7-da6b-138f-e0f26362f16a@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Liangyan <liangyan.peng@bytedance.com>

commit c0a4009 upstream. Synchronize the dev->driver usage in really_probe() and dev_uevent(). These can run in different threads, what can result in the following race condition for dev->driver uninitialization: Thread #1: ========== really_probe() { ... probe_failed: ... device_unbind_cleanup(dev) { ... dev->driver = NULL; // <= Failed probe sets dev->driver to NULL ... } ... } Thread #2: ========== dev_uevent() { ... if (dev->driver) // If dev->driver is NULLed from really_probe() from here on, // after above check, the system crashes add_uevent_var(env, "DRIVER=%s", dev->driver->name); ... } really_probe() holds the lock, already. So nothing needs to be done there. dev_uevent() is called with lock held, often, too. But not always. What implies that we can't add any locking in dev_uevent() itself. So fix this race by adding the lock to the non-protected path. This is the path where above race is observed: dev_uevent+0x235/0x380 uevent_show+0x10c/0x1f0 <= Add lock here dev_attr_show+0x3a/0xa0 sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x17c/0x250 kernfs_seq_show+0x7c/0x90 seq_read_iter+0x2d7/0x940 kernfs_fop_read_iter+0xc6/0x310 vfs_read+0x5bc/0x6b0 ksys_read+0xeb/0x1b0 __x64_sys_read+0x42/0x50 x64_sys_call+0x27ad/0x2d30 do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Similar cases are reported by syzkaller in https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ffa8143439596313a85a But these are regarding the *initialization* of dev->driver dev->driver = drv; As this switches dev->driver to non-NULL these reports can be considered to be false-positives (which should be "fixed" by this commit, as well, though). The same issue was reported and tried to be fixed back in 2015 in https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1421259054-2574-1-git-send-email-a.sangwan@samsung.com/ already. Fixes: 239378f ("Driver core: add uevent vars for devices of a class") Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Cc: syzbot+ffa8143439596313a85a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Ashish Sangwan <a.sangwan@samsung.com> Cc: Namjae Jeon <namjae.jeon@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Dirk Behme <dirk.behme@de.bosch.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240513050634.3964461-1-dirk.behme@de.bosch.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Shuan He <heshuan@bytedance.com>

@Dev-

commit 15fffc6 upstream. uevent_show() wants to de-reference dev->driver->name. There is no clean way for a device attribute to de-reference dev->driver unless that attribute is defined via (struct device_driver).dev_groups. Instead, the anti-pattern of taking the device_lock() in the attribute handler risks deadlocks with code paths that remove device attributes while holding the lock. This deadlock is typically invisible to lockdep given the device_lock() is marked lockdep_set_novalidate_class(), but some subsystems allocate a local lockdep key for @Dev->mutex to reveal reports of the form: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.10.0-rc7+ #275 Tainted: G OE N ------------------------------------------------------ modprobe/2374 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8c2270070de0 (kn->active#6){++++}-{0:0}, at: __kernfs_remove+0xde/0x220 but task is already holding lock: ffff8c22016e88f8 (&cxl_root_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x39/0x210 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&cxl_root_key){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x99/0xc30 uevent_show+0xac/0x130 dev_attr_show+0x18/0x40 sysfs_kf_seq_show+0xac/0xf0 seq_read_iter+0x110/0x450 vfs_read+0x25b/0x340 ksys_read+0x67/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x75/0x190 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #0 (kn->active#6){++++}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x121a/0x1fa0 lock_acquire+0xd6/0x2e0 kernfs_drain+0x1e9/0x200 __kernfs_remove+0xde/0x220 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x5e/0xa0 device_del+0x168/0x410 device_unregister+0x13/0x60 devres_release_all+0xb8/0x110 device_unbind_cleanup+0xe/0x70 device_release_driver_internal+0x1c7/0x210 driver_detach+0x47/0x90 bus_remove_driver+0x6c/0xf0 cxl_acpi_exit+0xc/0x11 [cxl_acpi] __do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x181/0x260 do_syscall_64+0x75/0x190 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e The observation though is that driver objects are typically much longer lived than device objects. It is reasonable to perform lockless de-reference of a @driver pointer even if it is racing detach from a device. Given the infrequency of driver unregistration, use synchronize_rcu() in module_remove_driver() to close any potential races. It is potentially overkill to suffer synchronize_rcu() just to handle the rare module removal racing uevent_show() event. Thanks to Tetsuo Handa for the debug analysis of the syzbot report [1]. Fixes: c0a4009 ("drivers: core: synchronize really_probe() and dev_uevent()") Reported-by: syzbot+4762dd74e32532cda5ff@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Closes: http://lore.kernel.org/5aa5558f-90a4-4864-b1b1-5d6784c5607d@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp [1] Link: http://lore.kernel.org/669073b8ea479_5fffa294c1@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com.notmuch Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ashish Sangwan <a.sangwan@samsung.com> Cc: Namjae Jeon <namjae.jeon@samsung.com> Cc: Dirk Behme <dirk.behme@de.bosch.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/172081332794.577428.9738802016494057132.stgit@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Shuan He <heshuan@bytedance.com>

commit 0315a07 upstream. Commit 719c571 ("net: make napi_disable() symmetric with enable") accidentally introduced a bug sometimes leading to a kernel BUG when bringing an iface up/down under heavy traffic load. Prior to this commit, napi_disable() was polling n->state until none of (NAPIF_STATE_SCHED | NAPIF_STATE_NPSVC) is set and then always flip them. Now there's a possibility to get away with the NAPIF_STATE_SCHE unset as 'continue' drops us to the cmpxchg() call with an uninitialized variable, rather than straight to another round of the state check. Error path looks like: napi_disable(): unsigned long val, new; /* new is uninitialized */ do { val = READ_ONCE(n->state); /* NAPIF_STATE_NPSVC and/or NAPIF_STATE_SCHED is set */ if (val & (NAPIF_STATE_SCHED | NAPIF_STATE_NPSVC)) { /* true */ usleep_range(20, 200); continue; /* go straight to the condition check */ } new = val | <...> } while (cmpxchg(&n->state, val, new) != val); /* state == val, cmpxchg() writes garbage */ napi_enable(): do { val = READ_ONCE(n->state); BUG_ON(!test_bit(NAPI_STATE_SCHED, &val)); /* 50/50 boom */ <...> while the typical BUG splat is like: [ 172.652461] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 172.652462] kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:6937! [ 172.656914] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 172.661966] CPU: 36 PID: 2829 Comm: xdp_redirect_cp Tainted: G I 5.15.0 openvelinux#42 [ 172.670222] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0014.082620210524 08/26/2021 [ 172.680646] RIP: 0010:napi_enable+0x5a/0xd0 [ 172.684832] Code: 07 49 81 cc 00 01 00 00 4c 89 e2 48 89 d8 80 e6 fb f0 48 0f b1 55 10 48 39 c3 74 10 48 8b 5d 10 f6 c7 04 75 3d f6 c3 01 75 b4 <0f> 0b 5b 5d 41 5c c3 65 ff 05 b8 e5 61 53 48 c7 c6 c0 f3 34 ad 48 [ 172.703578] RSP: 0018:ffffa3c9497477a8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 172.708803] RAX: ffffa3c96615a014 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff8a4b575301a0 < snip > [ 172.782403] Call Trace: [ 172.784857] <TASK> [ 172.786963] ice_up_complete+0x6f/0x210 [ice] [ 172.791349] ice_xdp+0x136/0x320 [ice] [ 172.795108] ? ice_change_mtu+0x180/0x180 [ice] [ 172.799648] dev_xdp_install+0x61/0xe0 [ 172.803401] dev_xdp_attach+0x1e0/0x550 [ 172.807240] dev_change_xdp_fd+0x1e6/0x220 [ 172.811338] do_setlink+0xee8/0x1010 [ 172.814917] rtnl_setlink+0xe5/0x170 [ 172.818499] ? bpf_lsm_binder_set_context_mgr+0x10/0x10 [ 172.823732] ? security_capable+0x36/0x50 < snip > Fix this by replacing 'do { } while (cmpxchg())' with an "infinite" for-loop with an explicit break. From v1 [0]: - just use a for-loop to simplify both the fix and the existing code (Eric). [0] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20211110191126.1214-1-alexandr.lobakin@intel.com Fixes: 719c571 ("net: make napi_disable() symmetric with enable") Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> # for-loop Signed-off-by: Alexander Lobakin <alexandr.lobakin@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jesse Brandeburg <jesse.brandeburg@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211110195605.1304-1-alexandr.lobakin@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Feng Zhou <zhoufeng.zf@bytedance.com>

commit 76dd072 upstream. The global 'raw_v6_hashinfo' variable can be accessed even when IPv6 is administratively disabled via the 'ipv6.disable=1' kernel command line option, leading to a crash [1]. Fix by restoring the original behavior and always initializing the variable, regardless of IPv6 support being administratively disabled or not. [1] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffffffffc8 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 173e18067 P4D 173e18067 PUD 173e1a067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 3 PID: 271 Comm: ss Not tainted 6.0.0-rc4-custom-00136-g0727a9a5fbc1 #1396 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-1.fc36 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:raw_diag_dump+0x310/0x7f0 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> __inet_diag_dump+0x10f/0x2e0 netlink_dump+0x575/0xfd0 __netlink_dump_start+0x67b/0x940 inet_diag_handler_cmd+0x273/0x2d0 sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x317/0x440 netlink_rcv_skb+0x15e/0x430 sock_diag_rcv+0x2b/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x53b/0x800 netlink_sendmsg+0x945/0xe60 ____sys_sendmsg+0x747/0x960 ___sys_sendmsg+0x13a/0x1e0 __sys_sendmsg+0x118/0x1e0 do_syscall_64+0x34/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Fixes: 0daf07e ("raw: convert raw sockets to RCU") Reported-by: Roberto Ricci <rroberto2r@gmail.com> Tested-by: Roberto Ricci <rroberto2r@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220916084821.229287-1-idosch@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Rui Zhang <zhangrui.rod@bytedance.com>

commit 0a78cf7 upstream. Dae R. Jeong reported a NULL deref in raw_get_next() [0]. It seems that the repro was running these sequences in parallel so that one thread was iterating on a socket that was being freed in another netns. unshare(0x40060200) r0 = syz_open_procfs(0x0, &(0x7f0000002080)='net/raw\x00') socket$inet_icmp_raw(0x2, 0x3, 0x1) pread64(r0, &(0x7f0000000000)=""/10, 0xa, 0x10000000007f) After commit 0daf07e ("raw: convert raw sockets to RCU"), we use RCU and hlist_nulls_for_each_entry() to iterate over SOCK_RAW sockets. However, we should use spinlock for slow paths to avoid the NULL deref. Also, SOCK_RAW does not use SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, and the slab object is not reused during iteration in the grace period. In fact, the lockless readers do not check the nulls marker with get_nulls_value(). So, SOCK_RAW should use hlist instead of hlist_nulls. Instead of adding an unnecessary barrier by sk_nulls_for_each_rcu(), let's convert hlist_nulls to hlist and use sk_for_each_rcu() for fast paths and sk_for_each() and spinlock for /proc/net/raw. [0]: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000005: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000028-0x000000000000002f] CPU: 2 PID: 20952 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.2.0-g048ec869bafd-dirty #7 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:read_pnet include/net/net_namespace.h:383 [inline] RIP: 0010:sock_net include/net/sock.h:649 [inline] RIP: 0010:raw_get_next net/ipv4/raw.c:974 [inline] RIP: 0010:raw_get_idx net/ipv4/raw.c:986 [inline] RIP: 0010:raw_seq_start+0x431/0x800 net/ipv4/raw.c:995 Code: ef e8 33 3d 94 f7 49 8b 6d 00 4c 89 ef e8 b7 65 5f f7 49 89 ed 49 83 c5 98 0f 84 9a 00 00 00 48 83 c5 c8 48 89 e8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c 30 00 74 08 48 89 ef e8 00 3d 94 f7 4c 8b 7d 00 48 89 ef RSP: 0018:ffffc9001154f9b0 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000000005 RBX: 1ffff1100302c8fd RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000028 RSI: ffffc9001154f988 RDI: ffffc9000f77a338 RBP: 0000000000000029 R08: ffffffff8a50ffb4 R09: fffffbfff24b6bd9 R10: fffffbfff24b6bd9 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88801db73b78 R13: fffffffffffffff9 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 0000000000000030 FS: 00007f843ae8e700(0000) GS:ffff888063700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055bb9614b35f CR3: 000000003c672000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> seq_read_iter+0x4c6/0x10f0 fs/seq_file.c:225 seq_read+0x224/0x320 fs/seq_file.c:162 pde_read fs/proc/inode.c:316 [inline] proc_reg_read+0x23f/0x330 fs/proc/inode.c:328 vfs_read+0x31e/0xd30 fs/read_write.c:468 ksys_pread64 fs/read_write.c:665 [inline] __do_sys_pread64 fs/read_write.c:675 [inline] __se_sys_pread64 fs/read_write.c:672 [inline] __x64_sys_pread64+0x1e9/0x280 fs/read_write.c:672 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x4e/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x478d29 Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f843ae8dbe8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000011 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000791408 RCX: 0000000000478d29 RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000f477909a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 000010000000007f R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000791740 R13: 0000000000791414 R14: 0000000000791408 R15: 00007ffc2eb48a50 </TASK> Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:read_pnet include/net/net_namespace.h:383 [inline] RIP: 0010:sock_net include/net/sock.h:649 [inline] RIP: 0010:raw_get_next net/ipv4/raw.c:974 [inline] RIP: 0010:raw_get_idx net/ipv4/raw.c:986 [inline] RIP: 0010:raw_seq_start+0x431/0x800 net/ipv4/raw.c:995 Code: ef e8 33 3d 94 f7 49 8b 6d 00 4c 89 ef e8 b7 65 5f f7 49 89 ed 49 83 c5 98 0f 84 9a 00 00 00 48 83 c5 c8 48 89 e8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c 30 00 74 08 48 89 ef e8 00 3d 94 f7 4c 8b 7d 00 48 89 ef RSP: 0018:ffffc9001154f9b0 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000000005 RBX: 1ffff1100302c8fd RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000028 RSI: ffffc9001154f988 RDI: ffffc9000f77a338 RBP: 0000000000000029 R08: ffffffff8a50ffb4 R09: fffffbfff24b6bd9 R10: fffffbfff24b6bd9 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88801db73b78 R13: fffffffffffffff9 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 0000000000000030 FS: 00007f843ae8e700(0000) GS:ffff888063700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f92ff166000 CR3: 000000003c672000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Fixes: 0daf07e ("raw: convert raw sockets to RCU") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Reported-by: Dae R. Jeong <threeearcat@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/ZCA2mGV_cmq7lIfV@dragonet/ Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Rui Zhang <zhangrui.rod@bytedance.com>

commit 05703271c3cdcc0f2a8cf6ebdc45892b8ca83520 upstream. Before disabling SR-IOV via config space accesses to the parent PF, sriov_disable() first removes the PCI devices representing the VFs. Since commit 9d16947 ("PCI: Add global pci_lock_rescan_remove()") such removal operations are serialized against concurrent remove and rescan using the pci_rescan_remove_lock. No such locking was ever added in sriov_disable() however. In particular when commit 18f9e9d ("PCI/IOV: Factor out sriov_add_vfs()") factored out the PCI device removal into sriov_del_vfs() there was still no locking around the pci_iov_remove_virtfn() calls. On s390 the lack of serialization in sriov_disable() may cause double remove and list corruption with the below (amended) trace being observed: PSW: 0704c00180000000 0000000c914e4b38 (klist_put+56) GPRS: 000003800313fb48 0000000000000000 0000000100000001 0000000000000001 00000000f9b520a8 0000000000000000 0000000000002fbd 00000000f4cc9480 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000180692828 00000000818e8000 000003800313fe2c 000003800313fb20 000003800313fad8 #0 [3800313fb20] device_del at c9158ad5c #1 [3800313fb88] pci_remove_bus_device at c915105ba #2 [3800313fbd0] pci_iov_remove_virtfn at c9152f198 #3 [3800313fc28] zpci_iov_remove_virtfn at c90fb67c0 #4 [3800313fc60] zpci_bus_remove_device at c90fb6104 #5 [3800313fca0] __zpci_event_availability at c90fb3dca #6 [3800313fd08] chsc_process_sei_nt0 at c918fe4a2 #7 [3800313fd60] crw_collect_info at c91905822 #8 [3800313fe10] kthread at c90feb390 #9 [3800313fe68] __ret_from_fork at c90f6aa64 openvelinux#10 [3800313fe98] ret_from_fork at c9194f3f2. This is because in addition to sriov_disable() removing the VFs, the platform also generates hot-unplug events for the VFs. This being the reverse operation to the hotplug events generated by sriov_enable() and handled via pdev->no_vf_scan. And while the event processing takes pci_rescan_remove_lock and checks whether the struct pci_dev still exists, the lack of synchronization makes this checking racy. Other races may also be possible of course though given that this lack of locking persisted so long observable races seem very rare. Even on s390 the list corruption was only observed with certain devices since the platform events are only triggered by config accesses after the removal, so as long as the removal finished synchronously they would not race. Either way the locking is missing so fix this by adding it to the sriov_del_vfs() helper. Just like PCI rescan-remove, locking is also missing in sriov_add_vfs() including for the error case where pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device() is called without the PCI rescan-remove lock being held. Even in the non-error case, adding new PCI devices and buses should be serialized via the PCI rescan-remove lock. Add the necessary locking. Fixes: 18f9e9d ("PCI/IOV: Factor out sriov_add_vfs()") Signed-off-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Block <bblock@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali <alifm@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Julian Ruess <julianr@linux.ibm.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250826-pci_fix_sriov_disable-v1-1-2d0bc938f2a3@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Jinhui Guo <guojinhui.liam@bytedance.com>

commit 54d5cd4719c5e87f33d271c9ac2e393147d934f8 upstream. Usage of the intel_pmt_read() for binary sysfs, requires a pcidev. The current use of the endpoint value is only valid for telemetry endpoint usage. Without the ep, the crashlog usage causes the following NULL pointer exception: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:intel_pmt_read+0x3b/0x70 [pmt_class] Code: Call Trace: <TASK> ? sysfs_kf_bin_read+0xc0/0xe0 kernfs_fop_read_iter+0xac/0x1a0 vfs_read+0x26d/0x350 ksys_read+0x6b/0xe0 __x64_sys_read+0x1d/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x1bc8/0x1d70 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x110 Augment struct intel_pmt_entry with a pointer to the pcidev to avoid the NULL pointer exception. Intel-SIG: commit 54d5cd4719c5 platform/x86/intel/pmt: fix a crashlog NULL pointer access Backport PMT spec 3.0 support (Discovery driver and preparation for PMT AET) Fixes: 045a513 ("platform/x86/intel/pmt: Use PMT callbacks") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: David E. Box <david.e.box@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tejas Upadhyay <tejas.upadhyay@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Michael J. Ruhl <michael.j.ruhl@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250713172943.7335-2-michael.j.ruhl@intel.com Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> [ Zhang Rui: amend commit log ] Signed-off-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>

[ Upstream commit d9cef55ed49117bd63695446fb84b4b91815c0b4 ] BPF CI testing report a UAF issue: [ 16.446633] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000003 0 [ 16.447134] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mod e [ 16.447516] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present pag e [ 16.447878] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 16.448063] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPT I [ 16.448409] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G OE 6.13.0-rc3-g89e8a75fda73-dirty #4 2 [ 16.449124] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODUL E [ 16.449502] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/201 4 [ 16.450201] Workqueue: smc_hs_wq smc_listen_wor k [ 16.450531] RIP: 0010:smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159 0 [ 16.452158] RSP: 0018:ffffb5ab40053d98 EFLAGS: 0001024 6 [ 16.452526] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 000000000000030 0 [ 16.452994] RDX: 0000000000000280 RSI: 00003513840053f0 RDI: 000000000000000 0 [ 16.453492] RBP: ffffa097808e3800 R08: ffffa09782dba1e0 R09: 000000000000000 5 [ 16.453987] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffa0978274640 0 [ 16.454497] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffa09782d4092 0 [ 16.454996] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa097bbc00000(0000) knlGS:000000000000000 0 [ 16.455557] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003 3 [ 16.455961] CR2: 0000000000000030 CR3: 0000000102788004 CR4: 0000000000770ef 0 [ 16.456459] PKRU: 5555555 4 [ 16.456654] Call Trace : [ 16.456832] <TASK > [ 16.456989] ? __die+0x23/0x7 0 [ 16.457215] ? page_fault_oops+0x180/0x4c 0 [ 16.457508] ? __lock_acquire+0x3e6/0x249 0 [ 16.457801] ? exc_page_fault+0x68/0x20 0 [ 16.458080] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x3 0 [ 16.458389] ? smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159 0 [ 16.458689] ? smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159 0 [ 16.458987] ? lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x10 0 [ 16.459284] process_one_work+0x1ea/0x6d 0 [ 16.459570] worker_thread+0x1c3/0x38 0 [ 16.459839] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x1 0 [ 16.460144] kthread+0xe0/0x11 0 [ 16.460372] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x1 0 [ 16.460640] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x5 0 [ 16.460896] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x1 0 [ 16.461166] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x3 0 [ 16.461453] </TASK > [ 16.461616] Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(OE) [last unloaded: bpf_testmod(OE) ] [ 16.462134] CR2: 000000000000003 0 [ 16.462380] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 16.462710] RIP: 0010:smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x1590 The direct cause of this issue is that after smc_listen_out_connected(), newclcsock->sk may be NULL since it will releases the smcsk. Therefore, if the application closes the socket immediately after accept, newclcsock->sk can be NULL. A possible execution order could be as follows: smc_listen_work | userspace ----------------------------------------------------------------- lock_sock(sk) | smc_listen_out_connected() | | \- smc_listen_out | | | \- release_sock | | |- sk->sk_data_ready() | | fd = accept(); | close(fd); | \- socket->sk = NULL; /* newclcsock->sk is NULL now */ SMC_STAT_SERV_SUCC_INC(sock_net(newclcsock->sk)) Since smc_listen_out_connected() will not fail, simply swapping the order of the code can easily fix this issue. Fixes: 3b2dec2 ("net/smc: restructure client and server code in af_smc") Signed-off-by: D. Wythe <alibuda@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Guangguan Wang <guangguan.wang@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Alexandra Winter <wintera@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Dust Li <dust.li@linux.alibaba.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250818054618.41615-1-alibuda@linux.alibaba.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dongdong Wang <wangdongdong.6@bytedance.com>

[ Upstream commit c489f3283dbfc0f3c00c312149cae90d27552c45 ] syzbot reported the splat below. [0] This happens if we call ioctl(ATMARP_MKIP) more than once. During the first call, clip_mkip() sets clip_push() to vcc->push(), and the second call copies it to clip_vcc->old_push(). Later, when the socket is close()d, vcc_destroy_socket() passes NULL skb to clip_push(), which calls clip_vcc->old_push(), triggering the infinite recursion. Let's prevent the second ioctl(ATMARP_MKIP) by checking vcc->user_back, which is allocated by the first call as clip_vcc. Note also that we use lock_sock() to prevent racy calls. [0]: BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at ffffc9000d66fff8 (stack is ffffc9000d670000..ffffc9000d678000) Oops: stack guard page: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5322 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc4-syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:clip_push+0x5/0x720 net/atm/clip.c:191 Code: e0 8f aa 8c e8 1c ad 5b fa eb ae 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 55 <41> 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 83 ec 20 48 89 f3 49 89 fd 48 bd 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d670000 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 1ffff1100235a4a5 RBX: ffff888011ad2508 RCX: ffff8880003c0000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888037f01000 RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffffff8fa104f7 R09: 1ffffffff1f4209e R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff8a99b300 R12: ffffffff8a99b300 R13: ffff888037f01000 R14: ffff888011ad2500 R15: ffff888037f01578 FS: 000055557ab6d500(0000) GS:ffff88808d250000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffc9000d66fff8 CR3: 0000000043172000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> clip_push+0x6dc/0x720 net/atm/clip.c:200 clip_push+0x6dc/0x720 net/atm/clip.c:200 clip_push+0x6dc/0x720 net/atm/clip.c:200 ... clip_push+0x6dc/0x720 net/atm/clip.c:200 clip_push+0x6dc/0x720 net/atm/clip.c:200 clip_push+0x6dc/0x720 net/atm/clip.c:200 vcc_destroy_socket net/atm/common.c:183 [inline] vcc_release+0x157/0x460 net/atm/common.c:205 __sock_release net/socket.c:647 [inline] sock_close+0xc0/0x240 net/socket.c:1391 __fput+0x449/0xa70 fs/file_table.c:465 task_work_run+0x1d1/0x260 kernel/task_work.c:227 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xec/0x110 kernel/entry/common.c:114 exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:330 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work include/linux/entry-common.h:414 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode include/linux/entry-common.h:449 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x2bd/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7ff31c98e929 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fffb5aa1f78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001b4 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000012747 RCX: 00007ff31c98e929 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000001e RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007ff31cbb7ba0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000db5aa226f R10: 00007ff31c7ff030 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ff31cbb608c R13: 00007ff31cbb6080 R14: ffffffffffffffff R15: 00007fffb5aa2090 </TASK> Modules linked in: Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot+0c77cccd6b7cd917b35a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2371d94d248d126c1eb1 Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250704062416.1613927-4-kuniyu@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dongdong Wang <wangdongdong.6@bytedance.com>

commit 05703271c3cdcc0f2a8cf6ebdc45892b8ca83520 upstream. Before disabling SR-IOV via config space accesses to the parent PF, sriov_disable() first removes the PCI devices representing the VFs. Since commit 9d16947 ("PCI: Add global pci_lock_rescan_remove()") such removal operations are serialized against concurrent remove and rescan using the pci_rescan_remove_lock. No such locking was ever added in sriov_disable() however. In particular when commit 18f9e9d ("PCI/IOV: Factor out sriov_add_vfs()") factored out the PCI device removal into sriov_del_vfs() there was still no locking around the pci_iov_remove_virtfn() calls. On s390 the lack of serialization in sriov_disable() may cause double remove and list corruption with the below (amended) trace being observed: PSW: 0704c00180000000 0000000c914e4b38 (klist_put+56) GPRS: 000003800313fb48 0000000000000000 0000000100000001 0000000000000001 00000000f9b520a8 0000000000000000 0000000000002fbd 00000000f4cc9480 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000180692828 00000000818e8000 000003800313fe2c 000003800313fb20 000003800313fad8 #0 [3800313fb20] device_del at c9158ad5c #1 [3800313fb88] pci_remove_bus_device at c915105ba #2 [3800313fbd0] pci_iov_remove_virtfn at c9152f198 #3 [3800313fc28] zpci_iov_remove_virtfn at c90fb67c0 #4 [3800313fc60] zpci_bus_remove_device at c90fb6104 #5 [3800313fca0] __zpci_event_availability at c90fb3dca #6 [3800313fd08] chsc_process_sei_nt0 at c918fe4a2 #7 [3800313fd60] crw_collect_info at c91905822 #8 [3800313fe10] kthread at c90feb390 #9 [3800313fe68] __ret_from_fork at c90f6aa64 openvelinux#10 [3800313fe98] ret_from_fork at c9194f3f2. This is because in addition to sriov_disable() removing the VFs, the platform also generates hot-unplug events for the VFs. This being the reverse operation to the hotplug events generated by sriov_enable() and handled via pdev->no_vf_scan. And while the event processing takes pci_rescan_remove_lock and checks whether the struct pci_dev still exists, the lack of synchronization makes this checking racy. Other races may also be possible of course though given that this lack of locking persisted so long observable races seem very rare. Even on s390 the list corruption was only observed with certain devices since the platform events are only triggered by config accesses after the removal, so as long as the removal finished synchronously they would not race. Either way the locking is missing so fix this by adding it to the sriov_del_vfs() helper. Just like PCI rescan-remove, locking is also missing in sriov_add_vfs() including for the error case where pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device() is called without the PCI rescan-remove lock being held. Even in the non-error case, adding new PCI devices and buses should be serialized via the PCI rescan-remove lock. Add the necessary locking. Fixes: 18f9e9d ("PCI/IOV: Factor out sriov_add_vfs()") Signed-off-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Block <bblock@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali <alifm@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Julian Ruess <julianr@linux.ibm.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250826-pci_fix_sriov_disable-v1-1-2d0bc938f2a3@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Jinhui Guo <guojinhui.liam@bytedance.com>

commit a5ee9fe48fa51a79620b041b27a94a05e7ac75a0 upstream. The vma->anon_vma of the child process may be NULL because the entire vma does not contain anonymous pages. In this case, a BUG will occur when the copy_present_page() passes a copy of a non-anonymous page of that vma to the page_add_new_anon_rmap() to set up new anonymous rmap. ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at mm/rmap.c:1052! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 4 PID: 4652 Comm: test Not tainted 5.15.75 #1 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : __page_set_anon_rmap+0xc0/0xe8 lr : __page_set_anon_rmap+0xc0/0xe8 sp : ffff80000e773860 x29: ffff80000e773860 x28: fffffc13cf006ec0 x27: ffff04f3ccd68000 x26: ffff04f3c5c33248 x25: 0000000010100073 x24: ffff04f3c53c0a80 x23: 0000000020000000 x22: 0000000000000001 x21: 0000000020000000 x20: fffffc13cf006ec0 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffffdddc5581377c x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000011 x6 : ffff2717a8433000 x5 : ffff80000e773810 x4 : ffffdddc55400000 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffffdddc56b20000 x1 : ffff04f3c9a48040 x0 : 0000000000000000 Call trace: __page_set_anon_rmap+0xc0/0xe8 page_add_new_anon_rmap+0x13c/0x200 copy_pte_range+0x6b8/0x1018 copy_page_range+0x3a8/0x5e0 dup_mmap+0x3a0/0x6e8 dup_mm+0x78/0x140 copy_process+0x1528/0x1b08 kernel_clone+0xac/0x610 __do_sys_clone+0x78/0xb0 __arm64_sys_clone+0x30/0x40 invoke_syscall+0x68/0x170 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x80/0x250 do_el0_svc+0x48/0xb8 el0_svc+0x48/0x1a8 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8 el0t_64_sync+0x1a0/0x1a4 Code: 97f899f4 f9400273 17ffffeb 97f899f1 (d4210000) ---[ end trace dc65e5edd0f362fa ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception SMP: stopping secondary CPUs Kernel Offset: 0x5ddc4d400000 from 0xffff800008000000 PHYS_OFFSET: 0xfffffb0c80000000 CPU features: 0x44000cf1,00000806 Memory Limit: none ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception ]--- This problem has been fixed by the commit <fb3d824d1a46> ("mm/rmap: split page_dup_rmap() into page_dup_file_rmap() and page_try_dup_anon_rmap()"), but still exists in the linux-5.15.y branch. This patch is not applicable to this version because of the large version differences. Therefore, fix it by adding non-anonymous page check in the copy_present_page(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 70e806e ("mm: Do early cow for pinned pages during fork() for ptes") Signed-off-by: Yuanzheng Song <songyuanzheng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Guixiong Wei <weiguixiong@bytedance.com>

… error commit f5cacdc upstream. In __jbd2_log_wait_for_space(), we might call jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail() to recover some journal space. But if an error occurs while executing jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail() (e.g., an EIO), we don't stop waiting for free space right away, we try other branches, and if j_committing_transaction is NULL (i.e., the tid is 0), we will get the following complain: ============================================ JBD2: I/O error when updating journal superblock for sdd-8. __jbd2_log_wait_for_space: needed 256 blocks and only had 217 space available __jbd2_log_wait_for_space: no way to get more journal space in sdd-8 ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 139804 at fs/jbd2/checkpoint.c:109 __jbd2_log_wait_for_space+0x251/0x2e0 Modules linked in: CPU: 2 PID: 139804 Comm: kworker/u8:3 Not tainted 6.6.0+ #1 RIP: 0010:__jbd2_log_wait_for_space+0x251/0x2e0 Call Trace: <TASK> add_transaction_credits+0x5d1/0x5e0 start_this_handle+0x1ef/0x6a0 jbd2__journal_start+0x18b/0x340 ext4_dirty_inode+0x5d/0xb0 __mark_inode_dirty+0xe4/0x5d0 generic_update_time+0x60/0x70 [...] ============================================ So only if jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail() returns 1, i.e., there is nothing to clean up at the moment, continue to try to reclaim free space in other ways. Note that this fix relies on commit 6f6a6fd ("jbd2: fix ocfs2 corrupt when updating journal superblock fails") to make jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail return the correct error code. Fixes: 8c3f25d ("jbd2: don't give up looking for space so easily in __jbd2_log_wait_for_space") Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240718115336.2554501-1-libaokun@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Xin Yin <yinxin.x@bytedance.com>

…eback commit 3d5f3ba upstream. Every now and then I see this crash on arm64: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000f8 Buffer I/O error on dev dm-0, logical block 8733687, async page read Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000006 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x06: level 2 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006 CM = 0, WnR = 0 user pgtable: 64k pages, 42-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000139750000 [00000000000000f8] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000, pmd=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 96000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Buffer I/O error on dev dm-0, logical block 8733688, async page read Dumping ftrace buffer: Buffer I/O error on dev dm-0, logical block 8733689, async page read (ftrace buffer empty) XFS (dm-0): log I/O error -5 Modules linked in: dm_thin_pool dm_persistent_data XFS (dm-0): Metadata I/O Error (0x1) detected at xfs_trans_read_buf_map+0x1ec/0x590 [xfs] (fs/xfs/xfs_trans_buf.c:296). dm_bio_prison XFS (dm-0): Please unmount the filesystem and rectify the problem(s) XFS (dm-0): xfs_imap_lookup: xfs_ialloc_read_agi() returned error -5, agno 0 dm_bufio dm_log_writes xfs nft_chain_nat xt_REDIRECT nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip6t_REJECT potentially unexpected fatal signal 6. nf_reject_ipv6 potentially unexpected fatal signal 6. ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 CPU: 1 PID: 122166 Comm: fsstress Tainted: G W 6.0.0-rc5-djwa #rc5 3004c9f1de887ebae86015f2677638ce51ee7 rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss xt_tcpudp ip_set_hash_ip ip_set_hash_net xt_set nft_compat ip_set_hash_mac ip_set nf_tables Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 1.5.1 06/16/2021 pstate: 60001000 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT +SSBS BTYPE=--) ip_tables pc : 000003fd6d7df200 x_tables lr : 000003fd6d7df1ec overlay nfsv4 CPU: 0 PID: 54031 Comm: u4:3 Tainted: G W 6.0.0-rc5-djwa #rc5 3004c9f1de887ebae86015f2677638ce51ee7405 Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 1.5.1 06/16/2021 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn sp : 000003ffd9522fd0 (flush-253:0) pstate: 60401005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT +SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : errseq_set+0x1c/0x100 x29: 000003ffd9522fd0 x28: 0000000000000023 x27: 000002acefeb6780 x26: 0000000000000005 x25: 0000000000000001 x24: 0000000000000000 x23: 00000000ffffffff x22: 0000000000000005 lr : __filemap_set_wb_err+0x24/0xe0 x21: 0000000000000006 sp : fffffe000f80f760 x29: fffffe000f80f760 x28: 0000000000000003 x27: fffffe000f80f9f8 x26: 0000000002523000 x25: 00000000fffffffb x24: fffffe000f80f868 x23: fffffe000f80fbb0 x22: fffffc0180c26a78 x21: 0000000002530000 x20: 0000000000000000 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000001 x13: 0000000000470af3 x12: fffffc0058f70000 x11: 0000000000000040 x10: 0000000000001b20 x9 : fffffe000836b288 x8 : fffffc00eb9fd480 x7 : 0000000000f83659 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 0000000000000869 x4 : 0000000000000005 x3 : 00000000000000f8 x20: 000003fd6d740020 x19: 000000000001dd36 x18: 0000000000000001 x17: 000003fd6d78704c x16: 0000000000000001 x15: 000002acfac87668 x2 : 0000000000000ffa x1 : 00000000fffffffb x0 : 00000000000000f8 Call trace: errseq_set+0x1c/0x100 __filemap_set_wb_err+0x24/0xe0 iomap_do_writepage+0x5e4/0xd5c write_cache_pages+0x208/0x674 iomap_writepages+0x34/0x60 xfs_vm_writepages+0x8c/0xcc [xfs 7a861f39c43631f15d3a5884246ba5035d4ca78b] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 2064656e72757465 x12: 0000000000002180 x11: 000003fd6d8a82d0 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 000003fd6d8ae288 x8 : 0000000000000083 x7 : 00000000ffffffff x6 : 00000000ffffffee x5 : 00000000fbad2887 x4 : 000003fd6d9abb58 x3 : 000003fd6d740020 x2 : 0000000000000006 x1 : 000000000001dd36 x0 : 0000000000000000 CPU: 1 PID: 122167 Comm: fsstress Tainted: G W 6.0.0-rc5-djwa #rc5 3004c9f1de887ebae86015f2677638ce51ee7 do_writepages+0x90/0x1c4 __writeback_single_inode+0x4c/0x4ac Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 1.5.1 06/16/2021 writeback_sb_inodes+0x214/0x4ac wb_writeback+0xf4/0x3b0 pstate: 60001000 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT +SSBS BTYPE=--) wb_workfn+0xfc/0x580 process_one_work+0x1e8/0x480 pc : 000003fd6d7df200 worker_thread+0x78/0x430 This crash is a result of iomap_writepage_map encountering some sort of error during writeback and wanting to set that error code in the file mapping so that fsync will report it. Unfortunately, the code dereferences folio->mapping after unlocking the folio, which means that another thread could have removed the page from the page cache (writeback doesn't hold the invalidation lock) and give it to somebody else. At best we crash the system like above; at worst, we corrupt memory or set an error on some other unsuspecting file while failing to record the problems with *this* file. Regardless, fix the problem by reporting the error to the inode mapping. NOTE: Commit 598ecfb lifted the XFS writeback code to iomap, so this fix should be backported to XFS in the 4.6-5.4 kernels in addition to iomap in the 5.5-5.19 kernels. Fixes: e735c00 ("iomap: Convert iomap_add_to_ioend() to take a folio") # 5.17 onward Fixes: 598ecfb ("iomap: lift the xfs writeback code to iomap") # 5.5-5.16, needs backporting Fixes: 150d5be ("xfs: remove xfs_cancel_ioend") # 4.6-5.4, needs backporting Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Fengnan Chang <changfengnan@bytedance.com>

commit 50ea741 upstream. Syzbot reports a issue as follows: ============================================ BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffed11022e24fe PGD 23ffee067 P4D 23ffee067 PUD 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 0 PID: 5079 Comm: syz-executor306 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc5-g55027e689933 #0 Call Trace: <TASK> make_indexed_dir+0xdaf/0x13c0 fs/ext4/namei.c:2341 ext4_add_entry+0x222a/0x25d0 fs/ext4/namei.c:2451 ext4_rename fs/ext4/namei.c:3936 [inline] ext4_rename2+0x26e5/0x4370 fs/ext4/namei.c:4214 [...] ============================================ The immediate cause of this problem is that there is only one valid dentry for the block to be split during do_split, so split==0 results in out of bounds accesses to the map triggering the issue. do_split unsigned split dx_make_map count = 1 split = count/2 = 0; continued = hash2 == map[split - 1].hash; ---> map[4294967295] The maximum length of a filename is 255 and the minimum block size is 1024, so it is always guaranteed that the number of entries is greater than or equal to 2 when do_split() is called. But syzbot's crafted image has no dot and dotdot in dir, and the dentry distribution in dirblock is as follows: bus dentry1 hole dentry2 free |xx--|xx-------------|...............|xx-------------|...............| 0 12 (8+248)=256 268 256 524 (8+256)=264 788 236 1024 So when renaming dentry1 increases its name_len length by 1, neither hole nor free is sufficient to hold the new dentry, and make_indexed_dir() is called. In make_indexed_dir() it is assumed that the first two entries of the dirblock must be dot and dotdot, so bus and dentry1 are left in dx_root because they are treated as dot and dotdot, and only dentry2 is moved to the new leaf block. That's why count is equal to 1. Therefore add the ext4_check_dx_root() helper function to add more sanity checks to dot and dotdot before starting the conversion to avoid the above issue. Reported-by: syzbot+ae688d469e36fb5138d0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ae688d469e36fb5138d0 Fixes: ac27a0e ("[PATCH] ext4: initial copy of files from ext3") Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240702132349.2600605-2-libaokun@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Chuckyabc <lilintjpu@bytedance.com>

[ Upstream commit 23f00807619d15063d676218f36c5dfeda1eb420 ] Commit 30aad41 ("net/core: Add support for getting VF GUIDs") added support for getting VF port and node GUIDs in netlink ifinfo messages, but their size was not taken into consideration in the function that allocates the netlink message, causing the following warning when a netlink message is filled with many VF port and node GUIDs: # echo 64 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000\:08\:00.0/sriov_numvfs # ip link show dev ib0 RTNETLINK answers: Message too long Cannot send link get request: Message too long Kernel warning: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1930 at net/core/rtnetlink.c:4151 rtnl_getlink+0x586/0x5a0 Modules linked in: xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter overlay mlx5_ib macsec mlx5_core tls rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_uverbs ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm iw_cm ib_ipoib fuse ib_cm ib_core CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 1930 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.14.0-rc2+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:rtnl_getlink+0x586/0x5a0 Code: cb 82 e8 3d af 0a 00 4d 85 ff 0f 84 08 ff ff ff 4c 89 ff 41 be ea ff ff ff e8 66 63 5b ff 49 c7 07 80 4f cb 82 e9 36 fc ff ff <0f> 0b e9 16 fe ff ff e8 de a0 56 00 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffff888113557348 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 00000000ffffffa6 RBX: ffff88817e87aa34 RCX: dffffc0000000000 RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88817e87afb8 RBP: 0000000000000009 R08: ffffffff821f44aa R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff8881260f79a8 R11: ffff88817e87af00 R12: ffff88817e87aa00 R13: ffffffff8563d300 R14: 00000000ffffffa6 R15: 00000000ffffffff FS: 00007f63a5dbf280(0000) GS:ffff88881ee00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f63a5ba4493 CR3: 00000001700fe002 CR4: 0000000000772eb0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn+0xa5/0x230 ? rtnl_getlink+0x586/0x5a0 ? report_bug+0x22d/0x240 ? handle_bug+0x53/0xa0 ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x50 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? skb_trim+0x6a/0x80 ? rtnl_getlink+0x586/0x5a0 ? __pfx_rtnl_getlink+0x10/0x10 ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1e5/0x860 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 ? stack_trace_save+0x90/0xd0 ? filter_irq_stacks+0x1d/0x70 ? kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x40 ? kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 ? kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x21c/0x860 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 ? arch_stack_walk+0x9e/0xf0 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? lock_acquire+0xd5/0x410 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 netlink_rcv_skb+0xe0/0x210 ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_netlink_rcv_skb+0x10/0x10 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? __pfx___netlink_lookup+0x10/0x10 ? lock_release+0x62/0x200 ? netlink_deliver_tap+0xfd/0x290 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? lock_release+0x62/0x200 ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x95/0x290 netlink_unicast+0x31f/0x480 ? __pfx_netlink_unicast+0x10/0x10 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? lock_acquire+0xd5/0x410 netlink_sendmsg+0x369/0x660 ? lock_release+0x62/0x200 ? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 ? import_ubuf+0xb9/0xf0 ? __import_iovec+0x254/0x2b0 ? lock_release+0x62/0x200 ? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 ____sys_sendmsg+0x559/0x5a0 ? __pfx_____sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_copy_msghdr_from_user+0x10/0x10 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? do_read_fault+0x213/0x4a0 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ___sys_sendmsg+0xe4/0x150 ? __pfx____sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 ? do_fault+0x2cc/0x6f0 ? handle_pte_fault+0x2e3/0x3d0 ? __pfx_handle_pte_fault+0x10/0x10 ? preempt_count_sub+0x14/0xc0 ? __down_read_trylock+0x150/0x270 ? __handle_mm_fault+0x404/0x8e0 ? __pfx___handle_mm_fault+0x10/0x10 ? lock_release+0x62/0x200 ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x65/0x90 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 __sys_sendmsg+0xd5/0x150 ? __pfx___sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 ? __up_read+0x192/0x480 ? lock_release+0x62/0x200 ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x65/0x90 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f63a5b13367 Code: 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b9 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10 RSP: 002b:00007fff8c726bc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000067b687c2 RCX: 00007f63a5b13367 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007fff8c726c30 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007fff8c726cb8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000034 R10: 00007fff8c726c7c R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fff8c726cd0 R15: 00007fff8c726cd0 </TASK> irq event stamp: 0 hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffff813f9e58>] copy_process+0xd08/0x2830 softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffff813f9e58>] copy_process+0xd08/0x2830 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Thus, when calculating ifinfo message size, take VF GUIDs sizes into account when supported. Fixes: 30aad41 ("net/core: Add support for getting VF GUIDs") Signed-off-by: Mark Zhang <markzhang@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Maher Sanalla <msanalla@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Mark Bloch <mbloch@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250325090226.749730-1-mbloch@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Rui Zhang <zhangrui.rod@bytedance.com>

[ Upstream commit 3cb7cf1 ] Most qdiscs maintain their backlog using qdisc_pkt_len(skb) on the assumption it is invariant between the enqueue() and dequeue() handlers. Unfortunately syzbot can crash a host rather easily using a TBF + SFQ combination, with an STAB on SFQ [1] We can't support TCA_STAB on arbitrary level, this would require to maintain per-qdisc storage. [1] [ 88.796496] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 88.798611] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 88.799014] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 88.799506] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 88.799829] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 88.800569] CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 2053 Comm: b371744477 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1-virtme #1117 [ 88.801107] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 88.801779] RIP: 0010:sfq_dequeue (net/sched/sch_sfq.c:272 net/sched/sch_sfq.c:499) sch_sfq [ 88.802544] Code: 0f b7 50 12 48 8d 04 d5 00 00 00 00 48 89 d6 48 29 d0 48 8b 91 c0 01 00 00 48 c1 e0 03 48 01 c2 66 83 7a 1a 00 7e c0 48 8b 3a <4c> 8b 07 4c 89 02 49 89 50 08 48 c7 47 08 00 00 00 00 48 c7 07 00 All code ======== 0: 0f b7 50 12 movzwl 0x12(%rax),%edx 4: 48 8d 04 d5 00 00 00 lea 0x0(,%rdx,8),%rax b: 00 c: 48 89 d6 mov %rdx,%rsi f: 48 29 d0 sub %rdx,%rax 12: 48 8b 91 c0 01 00 00 mov 0x1c0(%rcx),%rdx 19: 48 c1 e0 03 shl $0x3,%rax 1d: 48 01 c2 add %rax,%rdx 20: 66 83 7a 1a 00 cmpw $0x0,0x1a(%rdx) 25: 7e c0 jle 0xffffffffffffffe7 27: 48 8b 3a mov (%rdx),%rdi 2a:* 4c 8b 07 mov (%rdi),%r8 <-- trapping instruction 2d: 4c 89 02 mov %r8,(%rdx) 30: 49 89 50 08 mov %rdx,0x8(%r8) 34: 48 c7 47 08 00 00 00 movq $0x0,0x8(%rdi) 3b: 00 3c: 48 rex.W 3d: c7 .byte 0xc7 3e: 07 (bad) ... Code starting with the faulting instruction =========================================== 0: 4c 8b 07 mov (%rdi),%r8 3: 4c 89 02 mov %r8,(%rdx) 6: 49 89 50 08 mov %rdx,0x8(%r8) a: 48 c7 47 08 00 00 00 movq $0x0,0x8(%rdi) 11: 00 12: 48 rex.W 13: c7 .byte 0xc7 14: 07 (bad) ... [ 88.803721] RSP: 0018:ffff9a1f892b7d58 EFLAGS: 00000206 [ 88.804032] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9a1f8420c800 RCX: ffff9a1f8420c800 [ 88.804560] RDX: ffff9a1f81bc1440 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 88.805056] RBP: ffffffffc04bb0e0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00000000ff7f9a1f [ 88.805473] R10: 000000000001001b R11: 0000000000009a1f R12: 0000000000000140 [ 88.806194] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff9a1f886df400 R15: ffff9a1f886df4ac [ 88.806734] FS: 00007f445601a740(0000) GS:ffff9a2e7fd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 88.807225] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 88.807672] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000050cc46000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 88.808165] Call Trace: [ 88.808459] <TASK> [ 88.808710] ? __die (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:421 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:434) [ 88.809261] ? page_fault_oops (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:715) [ 88.809561] ? exc_page_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:26 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:87 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:147 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1489 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1539) [ 88.809806] ? asm_exc_page_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:623) [ 88.810074] ? sfq_dequeue (net/sched/sch_sfq.c:272 net/sched/sch_sfq.c:499) sch_sfq [ 88.810411] sfq_reset (net/sched/sch_sfq.c:525) sch_sfq [ 88.810671] qdisc_reset (./include/linux/skbuff.h:2135 ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2441 ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3304 ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3310 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1036) [ 88.810950] tbf_reset (./include/linux/timekeeping.h:169 net/sched/sch_tbf.c:334) sch_tbf [ 88.811208] qdisc_reset (./include/linux/skbuff.h:2135 ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2441 ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3304 ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3310 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1036) [ 88.811484] netif_set_real_num_tx_queues (./include/linux/spinlock.h:396 ./include/net/sch_generic.h:768 net/core/dev.c:2958) [ 88.811870] __tun_detach (drivers/net/tun.c:590 drivers/net/tun.c:673) [ 88.812271] tun_chr_close (drivers/net/tun.c:702 drivers/net/tun.c:3517) [ 88.812505] __fput (fs/file_table.c:432 (discriminator 1)) [ 88.812735] task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:230) [ 88.813016] do_exit (kernel/exit.c:940) [ 88.813372] ? trace_hardirqs_on (kernel/trace/trace_preemptirq.c:58 (discriminator 4)) [ 88.813639] ? handle_mm_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:42 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:97 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:155 ./include/linux/memcontrol.h:1022 ./include/linux/memcontrol.h:1045 ./include/linux/memcontrol.h:1052 mm/memory.c:5928 mm/memory.c:6088) [ 88.813867] do_group_exit (kernel/exit.c:1070) [ 88.814138] __x64_sys_exit_group (kernel/exit.c:1099) [ 88.814490] x64_sys_call (??:?) [ 88.814791] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 (discriminator 1)) [ 88.815012] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) [ 88.815495] RIP: 0033:0x7f44560f1975 Fixes: 175f9c1 ("net_sched: Add size table for qdiscs") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241007184130.3960565-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Rui Zhang <zhangrui.rod@bytedance.com>

[ Upstream commit cff3bd0 ] nft_chain_validate already performs loop detection because a cycle will result in a call stack overflow (ctx->level >= NFT_JUMP_STACK_SIZE). It also follows maps via ->validate callback in nft_lookup, so there appears no reason to iterate the maps again. nf_tables_check_loops() and all its helper functions can be removed. This improves ruleset load time significantly, from 23s down to 12s. This also fixes a crash bug. Old loop detection code can result in unbounded recursion: BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at .... Oops: stack guard page: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 4 PID: 1539 Comm: nft Not tainted 6.10.0-rc5+ #1 [..] with a suitable ruleset during validation of register stores. I can't see any actual reason to attempt to check for this from nft_validate_register_store(), at this point the transaction is still in progress, so we don't have a full picture of the rule graph. For nf-next it might make sense to either remove it or make this depend on table->validate_state in case we could catch an error earlier (for improved error reporting to userspace). Fixes: 20a6934 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add netlink set API") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Rui Zhang <zhangrui.rod@bytedance.com>

[ Upstream commit 2eab454 ] syzbot reminds us that in6_dev_get() can return NULL. fib6_nh_init() ip6_validate_gw( &idev ) ip6_route_check_nh( idev ) *idev = in6_dev_get(dev); // can be NULL Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00000000bc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000005e0-0x00000000000005e7] CPU: 0 PID: 11237 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-00249-gbe27b8965297 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 06/07/2024 RIP: 0010:fib6_nh_init+0x640/0x2160 net/ipv6/route.c:3606 Code: 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b 64 24 58 48 8b 44 24 28 4c 8b 74 24 30 48 89 c1 48 89 44 24 28 48 8d 98 e0 05 00 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 38 84 c0 0f 85 b3 17 00 00 8b 1b 31 ff 89 de e8 b8 8b RSP: 0018:ffffc900032775a0 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 00000000000000bc RBX: 00000000000005e0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: ffffc90003277a54 RDI: ffff88802b3a08d8 RBP: ffffc900032778b0 R08: 00000000000002fc R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000000002fc R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88802b3a08b8 R13: 1ffff9200064eec8 R14: ffffc90003277a00 R15: dffffc0000000000 FS: 00007f940feb06c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000245e8000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ip6_route_info_create+0x99e/0x12b0 net/ipv6/route.c:3809 ip6_route_add+0x28/0x160 net/ipv6/route.c:3853 ipv6_route_ioctl+0x588/0x870 net/ipv6/route.c:4483 inet6_ioctl+0x21a/0x280 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:579 sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222 sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f940f07cea9 Fixes: 428604f ("ipv6: do not set routes if disable_ipv6 has been enabled") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614082002.26407-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Rui Zhang <zhangrui.rod@bytedance.com>

[ Upstream commit b01e1c0 ] syzbot found a race in __fib6_drop_pcpu_from() [1] If compiler reads more than once (*ppcpu_rt), second read could read NULL, if another cpu clears the value in rt6_get_pcpu_route(). Add a READ_ONCE() to prevent this race. Also add rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock() because we rely on RCU protection while dereferencing pcpu_rt. [1] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000012: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000090-0x0000000000000097] CPU: 0 PID: 7543 Comm: kworker/u8:17 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc1-syzkaller-00013-g2bfcfd584ff5 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024 Workqueue: netns cleanup_net RIP: 0010:__fib6_drop_pcpu_from.part.0+0x10a/0x370 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:984 Code: f8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 0f 85 16 02 00 00 4d 8b 3f 4d 85 ff 74 31 e8 74 a7 fa f7 49 8d bf 90 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 0f 85 1e 02 00 00 49 8b 87 90 00 00 00 48 8b 0c 24 48 RSP: 0018:ffffc900040df070 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000000012 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffffff89932e16 RDX: ffff888049dd1e00 RSI: ffffffff89932d7c RDI: 0000000000000091 RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000007 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000006 R12: ffff88807fa080b8 R13: fffffbfff1a9a07d R14: ffffed100ff41022 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b32c26000 CR3: 000000005d56e000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> __fib6_drop_pcpu_from net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:966 [inline] fib6_drop_pcpu_from net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1027 [inline] fib6_purge_rt+0x7f2/0x9f0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1038 fib6_del_route net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1998 [inline] fib6_del+0xa70/0x17b0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2043 fib6_clean_node+0x426/0x5b0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2205 fib6_walk_continue+0x44f/0x8d0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2127 fib6_walk+0x182/0x370 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2175 fib6_clean_tree+0xd7/0x120 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2255 __fib6_clean_all+0x100/0x2d0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2271 rt6_sync_down_dev net/ipv6/route.c:4906 [inline] rt6_disable_ip+0x7ed/0xa00 net/ipv6/route.c:4911 addrconf_ifdown.isra.0+0x117/0x1b40 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3855 addrconf_notify+0x223/0x19e0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3778 notifier_call_chain+0xb9/0x410 kernel/notifier.c:93 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xbe/0x140 net/core/dev.c:1992 call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2030 [inline] call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2044 [inline] dev_close_many+0x333/0x6a0 net/core/dev.c:1585 unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x46d/0x19f0 net/core/dev.c:11193 unregister_netdevice_many net/core/dev.c:11276 [inline] default_device_exit_batch+0x85b/0xae0 net/core/dev.c:11759 ops_exit_list+0x128/0x180 net/core/net_namespace.c:178 cleanup_net+0x5b7/0xbf0 net/core/net_namespace.c:640 process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1b60 kernel/workqueue.c:3231 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3312 [inline] worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf70 kernel/workqueue.c:3393 kthread+0x2c1/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 Fixes: d52d399 ("ipv6: Create percpu rt6_info") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240604193549.981839-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Rui Zhang <zhangrui.rod@bytedance.com>

commit f93431c upstream. Resurrect ubsan overflow checks and ubsan report this warning, fix it by change the variable [length] type to size_t. UBSAN: signed-integer-overflow in net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1489:19 2147479552 + 8567 cannot be represented in type 'int' CPU: 0 PID: 253 Comm: err Not tainted 5.16.0+ #1 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x214/0x230 show_stack+0x30/0x78 dump_stack_lvl+0xf8/0x118 dump_stack+0x18/0x30 ubsan_epilogue+0x18/0x60 handle_overflow+0xd0/0xf0 __ubsan_handle_add_overflow+0x34/0x44 __ip6_append_data.isra.48+0x1598/0x1688 ip6_append_data+0x128/0x260 udpv6_sendmsg+0x680/0xdd0 inet6_sendmsg+0x54/0x90 sock_sendmsg+0x70/0x88 ____sys_sendmsg+0xe8/0x368 ___sys_sendmsg+0x98/0xe0 __sys_sendmmsg+0xf4/0x3b8 __arm64_sys_sendmmsg+0x34/0x48 invoke_syscall+0x64/0x160 el0_svc_common.constprop.4+0x124/0x300 do_el0_svc+0x44/0xc8 el0_svc+0x3c/0x1e8 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x88/0xb0 el0t_64_sync+0x16c/0x170 Changes since v1: -Change the variable [length] type to unsigned, as Eric Dumazet suggested. Changes since v2: -Don't change exthdrlen type in ip6_make_skb, as Paolo Abeni suggested. Changes since v3: -Don't change ulen type in udpv6_sendmsg and l2tp_ip6_sendmsg, as Jakub Kicinski suggested. Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Wang Yufen <wangyufen@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220607120028.845916-1-wangyufen@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> [ Conflict due to f37a4cc ("udp6: pass flow in ip6_make_skb together with cork") not in the tree ] Signed-off-by: Abdelkareem Abdelsaamad <kareemem@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Feng Zhou <zhoufeng.zf@bytedance.com>

commit 04ccecf upstream. Blamed commit accidentally removed a check for rt->rt6i_idev being NULL, as spotted by syzbot: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 10998 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6-syzkaller-00208-g625403177711 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024 RIP: 0010:rt6_uncached_list_flush_dev net/ipv6/route.c:177 [inline] RIP: 0010:rt6_disable_ip+0x33e/0x7e0 net/ipv6/route.c:4914 Code: 41 80 3c 04 00 74 0a e8 90 d0 9b f7 48 8b 7c 24 08 48 8b 07 48 89 44 24 10 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 48 b9 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df <80> 3c 08 00 74 08 4c 89 f7 e8 64 d0 9b f7 48 8b 44 24 18 49 39 06 RSP: 0018:ffffc900047374e0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 1ffff1100fdf8f33 RCX: dffffc0000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff88807efc78c0 RBP: ffffc900047375d0 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: fffff520008e6e8c R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff520008e6e8c R12: 1ffff1100fdf8f18 R13: ffff88807efc7998 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88807efc7930 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b8900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020002a80 CR3: 0000000022f62000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> addrconf_ifdown+0x15d/0x1bd0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3856 addrconf_notify+0x3cb/0x1020 notifier_call_chain+0x19f/0x3e0 kernel/notifier.c:93 call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2032 [inline] call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2046 [inline] unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0xd81/0x1c40 net/core/dev.c:11352 unregister_netdevice_many net/core/dev.c:11414 [inline] unregister_netdevice_queue+0x303/0x370 net/core/dev.c:11289 unregister_netdevice include/linux/netdevice.h:3129 [inline] __tun_detach+0x6b9/0x1600 drivers/net/tun.c:685 tun_detach drivers/net/tun.c:701 [inline] tun_chr_close+0x108/0x1b0 drivers/net/tun.c:3510 __fput+0x24a/0x8a0 fs/file_table.c:422 task_work_run+0x24f/0x310 kernel/task_work.c:228 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:40 [inline] do_exit+0xa2f/0x27f0 kernel/exit.c:882 do_group_exit+0x207/0x2c0 kernel/exit.c:1031 __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1042 [inline] __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1040 [inline] __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3f/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1040 x64_sys_call+0x2634/0x2640 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:232 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f1acc77def9 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f1acc77decf. RSP: 002b:00007ffeb26fa738 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f1acc77def9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000043 RBP: 00007f1acc7dd508 R08: 00007ffeb26f84d7 R09: 0000000000000003 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: 00007ffeb26fa8e0 </TASK> Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:rt6_uncached_list_flush_dev net/ipv6/route.c:177 [inline] RIP: 0010:rt6_disable_ip+0x33e/0x7e0 net/ipv6/route.c:4914 Code: 41 80 3c 04 00 74 0a e8 90 d0 9b f7 48 8b 7c 24 08 48 8b 07 48 89 44 24 10 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 48 b9 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df <80> 3c 08 00 74 08 4c 89 f7 e8 64 d0 9b f7 48 8b 44 24 18 49 39 06 RSP: 0018:ffffc900047374e0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 1ffff1100fdf8f33 RCX: dffffc0000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff88807efc78c0 RBP: ffffc900047375d0 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: fffff520008e6e8c R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff520008e6e8c R12: 1ffff1100fdf8f18 R13: ffff88807efc7998 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88807efc7930 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b8900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020002a80 CR3: 0000000022f62000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Fixes: e332bc6 ("ipv6: Don't call with rt6_uncached_list_flush_dev") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240913083147.3095442-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: BRUNO VERNAY <bruno.vernay@se.com> Signed-off-by: Hugo SIMELIERE <hsimeliere.opensource@witekio.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Feng Zhou <zhoufeng.zf@bytedance.com>

[ Upstream commit 5830aa8 ] We had a report that iptables-restore sometimes triggered null-ptr-deref at boot time. [0] The problem is that iptable_nat_table_init() is exposed to user space before the kernel fully initialises netns. In the small race window, a user could call iptable_nat_table_init() that accesses net_generic(net, iptable_nat_net_id), which is available only after registering iptable_nat_net_ops. Let's call register_pernet_subsys() before xt_register_template(). [0]: bpfilter: Loaded bpfilter_umh pid 11702 Started bpfilter BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000013 PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 2 PID: 11879 Comm: iptables-restor Not tainted 6.1.92-99.174.amzn2023.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Amazon EC2 c6i.4xlarge/, BIOS 1.0 10/16/2017 RIP: 0010:iptable_nat_table_init (net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_nat.c:87 net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_nat.c:121) iptable_nat Code: 10 4c 89 f6 48 89 ef e8 0b 19 bb ff 41 89 c4 85 c0 75 38 41 83 c7 01 49 83 c6 28 41 83 ff 04 75 dc 48 8b 44 24 08 48 8b 0c 24 <48> 89 08 4c 89 ef e8 a2 3b a2 cf 48 83 c4 10 44 89 e0 5b 5d 41 5c RSP: 0018:ffffbef902843cd0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000013 RBX: ffff9f4b052caa20 RCX: ffff9f4b20988d80 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000064 RDI: ffffffffc04201c0 RBP: ffff9f4b29394000 R08: ffff9f4b07f77258 R09: ffff9f4b07f77240 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff9f4b09635388 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff9f4b1a3c6c00 R14: ffff9f4b20988e20 R15: 0000000000000004 FS: 00007f6284340000(0000) GS:ffff9f51fe280000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000013 CR3: 00000001d10a6005 CR4: 00000000007706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_trace_log_lvl (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:259) ? show_trace_log_lvl (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:259) ? xt_find_table_lock (net/netfilter/x_tables.c:1259) ? __die_body.cold (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:478 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:420) ? page_fault_oops (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:727) ? exc_page_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:40 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:75 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1470 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1518) ? asm_exc_page_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:570) ? iptable_nat_table_init (net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_nat.c:87 net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_nat.c:121) iptable_nat xt_find_table_lock (net/netfilter/x_tables.c:1259) xt_request_find_table_lock (net/netfilter/x_tables.c:1287) get_info (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:965) ? security_capable (security/security.c:809 (discriminator 13)) ? ns_capable (kernel/capability.c:376 kernel/capability.c:397) ? do_ipt_get_ctl (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1656) ? bpfilter_send_req (net/bpfilter/bpfilter_kern.c:52) bpfilter nf_getsockopt (net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:116) ip_getsockopt (net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1827) __sys_getsockopt (net/socket.c:2327) __x64_sys_getsockopt (net/socket.c:2342 net/socket.c:2339 net/socket.c:2339) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) RIP: 0033:0x7f62844685ee Code: 48 8b 0d 45 28 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 37 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 0a c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 15 09 RSP: 002b:00007ffd1f83d638 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000037 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd1f83d680 RCX: 00007f62844685ee RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 00007ffd1f83d670 R09: 0000558798ffa2a0 R10: 00007ffd1f83d680 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffd1f83e3b2 R13: 00007f628455baa0 R14: 00007ffd1f83d7b0 R15: 00007f628457a008 </TASK> Modules linked in: iptable_nat(+) bpfilter rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache veth xt_state xt_connmark xt_nat xt_statistic xt_MASQUERADE xt_mark xt_addrtype ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 nft_chain_nat nf_nat xt_conntrack nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_comment nft_compat nf_tables nfnetlink overlay nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel ena crypto_simd ptp cryptd i8042 pps_core serio button sunrpc sch_fq_codel configfs loop dm_mod fuse dax dmi_sysfs crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel efivarfs CR2: 0000000000000013 Fixes: fdacd57 ("netfilter: x_tables: never register tables by default") Reported-by: Takahiro Kawahara <takawaha@amazon.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Feng Zhou <zhoufeng.zf@bytedance.com>

[ Upstream commit b86762d ] syzbot caught a NULL dereference in rt6_probe() [1] Bail out if __in6_dev_get() returns NULL. [1] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00000000cb: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000658-0x000000000000065f] CPU: 1 PID: 22444 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-00383-gb8481381d4e2 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024 RIP: 0010:rt6_probe net/ipv6/route.c:656 [inline] RIP: 0010:find_match+0x8c4/0xf50 net/ipv6/route.c:758 Code: 14 fd f7 48 8b 85 38 ff ff ff 48 c7 45 b0 00 00 00 00 48 8d b8 5c 06 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 14 02 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 19 RSP: 0018:ffffc900034af070 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffc90004521000 RDX: 00000000000000cb RSI: ffffffff8990d0cd RDI: 000000000000065c RBP: ffffc900034af150 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 000000000000000a R13: 1ffff92000695e18 R14: ffff8880244a1d20 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f4844a5a6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b31b27000 CR3: 000000002d42c000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> rt6_nh_find_match+0xfa/0x1a0 net/ipv6/route.c:784 nexthop_for_each_fib6_nh+0x26d/0x4a0 net/ipv4/nexthop.c:1496 __find_rr_leaf+0x6e7/0xe00 net/ipv6/route.c:825 find_rr_leaf net/ipv6/route.c:853 [inline] rt6_select net/ipv6/route.c:897 [inline] fib6_table_lookup+0x57e/0xa30 net/ipv6/route.c:2195 ip6_pol_route+0x1cd/0x1150 net/ipv6/route.c:2231 pol_lookup_func include/net/ip6_fib.h:616 [inline] fib6_rule_lookup+0x386/0x720 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:121 ip6_route_output_flags_noref net/ipv6/route.c:2639 [inline] ip6_route_output_flags+0x1d0/0x640 net/ipv6/route.c:2651 ip6_dst_lookup_tail.constprop.0+0x961/0x1760 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1147 ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x99/0x1d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1250 rawv6_sendmsg+0xdab/0x4340 net/ipv6/raw.c:898 inet_sendmsg+0x119/0x140 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:853 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] sock_write_iter+0x4b8/0x5c0 net/socket.c:1160 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline] vfs_write+0x6b6/0x1140 fs/read_write.c:590 ksys_write+0x1f8/0x260 fs/read_write.c:643 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Fixes: 52e1635 ("[IPV6]: ROUTE: Add router_probe_interval sysctl.") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Xing <kerneljasonxing@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240615151454.166404-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Feng Zhou <zhoufeng.zf@bytedance.com>

…oy_rcu() [ Upstream commit dc21c6c ] syzbot reported that nf_reinject() could be called without rcu_read_lock() : WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-02060-g5c1672705a1a #0 Not tainted net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:263 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 2 locks held by syz-executor.4/13427: #0: ffffffff8e334f60 (rcu_callback){....}-{0:0}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:329 [inline] #0: ffffffff8e334f60 (rcu_callback){....}-{0:0}, at: rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2190 [inline] #0: ffffffff8e334f60 (rcu_callback){....}-{0:0}, at: rcu_core+0xa86/0x1830 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2471 #1: ffff88801ca92958 (&inst->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] #1: ffff88801ca92958 (&inst->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: nfqnl_flush net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:405 [inline] #1: ffff88801ca92958 (&inst->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: instance_destroy_rcu+0x30/0x220 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:172 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 13427 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-02060-g5c1672705a1a #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x221/0x340 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6712 nf_reinject net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:323 [inline] nfqnl_reinject+0x6ec/0x1120 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:397 nfqnl_flush net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:410 [inline] instance_destroy_rcu+0x1ae/0x220 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:172 rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2196 [inline] rcu_core+0xafd/0x1830 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2471 handle_softirqs+0x2d6/0x990 kernel/softirq.c:554 __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:588 [inline] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:428 [inline] __irq_exit_rcu+0xf4/0x1c0 kernel/softirq.c:637 irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:649 instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043 [inline] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa6/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043 </IRQ> <TASK> Fixes: 9872bec ("[NETFILTER]: nfnetlink: use RCU for queue instances hash") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Feng Zhou <zhoufeng.zf@bytedance.com>

[ Upstream commit b27055a08ad4b415dcf15b63034f9cb236f7fb40 ] struct geneve_opt uses 5 bit length for each single option, which means every vary size option should be smaller than 128 bytes. However, all current related Netlink policies cannot promise this length condition and the attacker can exploit a exact 128-byte size option to *fake* a zero length option and confuse the parsing logic, further achieve heap out-of-bounds read. One example crash log is like below: [ 3.905425] ================================================================== [ 3.905925] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nla_put+0xa9/0xe0 [ 3.906255] Read of size 124 at addr ffff888005f291cc by task poc/177 [ 3.906646] [ 3.906775] CPU: 0 PID: 177 Comm: poc-oob-read Not tainted 6.1.132 #1 [ 3.907131] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 3.907784] Call Trace: [ 3.907925] <TASK> [ 3.908048] dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x5c [ 3.908258] print_report+0x184/0x4be [ 3.909151] kasan_report+0xc5/0x100 [ 3.909539] kasan_check_range+0xf3/0x1a0 [ 3.909794] memcpy+0x1f/0x60 [ 3.909968] nla_put+0xa9/0xe0 [ 3.910147] tunnel_key_dump+0x945/0xba0 [ 3.911536] tcf_action_dump_1+0x1c1/0x340 [ 3.912436] tcf_action_dump+0x101/0x180 [ 3.912689] tcf_exts_dump+0x164/0x1e0 [ 3.912905] fw_dump+0x18b/0x2d0 [ 3.913483] tcf_fill_node+0x2ee/0x460 [ 3.914778] tfilter_notify+0xf4/0x180 [ 3.915208] tc_new_tfilter+0xd51/0x10d0 [ 3.918615] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x4a2/0x560 [ 3.919118] netlink_rcv_skb+0xcd/0x200 [ 3.919787] netlink_unicast+0x395/0x530 [ 3.921032] netlink_sendmsg+0x3d0/0x6d0 [ 3.921987] __sock_sendmsg+0x99/0xa0 [ 3.922220] __sys_sendto+0x1b7/0x240 [ 3.922682] __x64_sys_sendto+0x72/0x90 [ 3.922906] do_syscall_64+0x5e/0x90 [ 3.923814] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 [ 3.924122] RIP: 0033:0x7e83eab84407 [ 3.924331] Code: 48 89 fa 4c 89 df e8 38 aa 00 00 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 1a 5b c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 44 24 10 0f 05 <5b> c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 83 e2 39 83 faf [ 3.925330] RSP: 002b:00007ffff505e370 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 3.925752] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007e83eaafa740 RCX: 00007e83eab84407 [ 3.926173] RDX: 00000000000001a8 RSI: 00007ffff505e3c0 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 3.926587] RBP: 00007ffff505f460 R08: 00007e83eace1000 R09: 000000000000000c [ 3.926977] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007ffff505f3c0 [ 3.927367] R13: 00007ffff505f5c8 R14: 00007e83ead1b000 R15: 00005d4fbbe6dcb8 Fix these issues by enforing correct length condition in related policies. Fixes: 925d844 ("netfilter: nft_tunnel: add support for geneve opts") Fixes: 4ece477 ("lwtunnel: add options setting and dumping for geneve") Fixes: 0ed5269 ("net/sched: add tunnel option support to act_tunnel_key") Fixes: 0a6e777 ("net/sched: allow flower to match tunnel options") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250402165632.6958-1-linma@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tengteng Yang <yangtengteng@bytedance.com>

commit 1dae9f1 upstream. The kernel may crash when deleting a genetlink family if there are still listeners for that family: Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] ... NIP [c000000000c080bc] netlink_update_socket_mc+0x3c/0xc0 LR [c000000000c0f764] __netlink_clear_multicast_users+0x74/0xc0 Call Trace: __netlink_clear_multicast_users+0x74/0xc0 genl_unregister_family+0xd4/0x2d0 Change the unsafe loop on the list to a safe one, because inside the loop there is an element removal from this list. Fixes: b827357 ("genetlink: fix netns vs. netlink table locking (2)") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Anastasia Kovaleva <a.kovaleva@yadro.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Bogdanov <d.bogdanov@yadro.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241003104431.12391-1-a.kovaleva@yadro.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Tengteng Yang <yangtengteng@bytedance.com>

zhaogogyi and others added 30 commits August 29, 2024 11:24

Merge pull request #8 from hanning0511/ci-for-6.6-velinux

56d9ef6

enable pull request checking workflow for 6.6-velinux branch

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Tpmi based drivers backport from 6.11#1

Tpmi based drivers backport from 6.11#1
jiayingbao wants to merge 50 commits into
6.6-velinuxfrom
tpmi_based_drivers_backport_from6.11

jiayingbao commented Dec 3, 2024

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jiayingbao commented Dec 3, 2024

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