general-audit: main @ 958e1ec (2026-04-28)

[intendednull]

Main @ 958e1ec6110e80e0c22104a7b18ed0fb4c60b723 (merge of #457). Prior audit @ 00aa515 (#437). Run via /general-audit.

Method

Per lessons #426 + #438 (orchestrator-direct default for small diffs, narrow agents only when justified, pre-fetch existing-issue lists, backfill timed-out concerns):

• 0 agents launched. 52-file diff right at threshold; orchestrator-direct sweep covered surface w/o context blow-up.
• Pre-fetched existing-issue lists for dedup: /tmp/audit-issues.txt (19 entries), /tmp/techdebt-issues.txt (21), /tmp/security-issues.txt (30) → 69 unique titles.
• Orchestrator ran cargo-audit directly (lesson Add deep-review skill for iterative code review #5). Clean vs CI ignore list (8 RUSTSEC IDs already tracked [DEP-01] rustls-webpki 0.103.10 has 3 open RUSTSEC advisories (name-constraint bypass + CRL panic) #223 [DEP-02] Three concurrent rand major versions + RUSTSEC-2026-0097 across all of them #246 [DEP-03] Workspace uses unmaintained bincode 1.3 for on-wire + on-disk serialization #247 [DEP-08] Unmaintained paste 1.0.15 (RUSTSEC-2024-0436) — not in CI ignore list #316 [DEP-09] Unmaintained proc-macro-error 0.4.12 (RUSTSEC-2024-0370) — not in CI ignore list #317 [DEP-10] Unmaintained atomic-polyfill 1.0.3 (RUSTSEC-2023-0089) — not in CI ignore list #318).
• Direct main-context sweeps for: unsafe, dbg!/eprintln!/todo!/unimplemented!, Arc<Mutex>/Arc<RwLock> w/o lock-ok, panic!/unwrap in lib prod, js_sys::eval/innerHTML, TODO/FIXME/HACK, anyhow:: in pure libs, vector caps in wire types, let _ = h.<method>().await swallow, swallowed errors in new code, docker pin/USER hardening.
• Diff @ 00aa515..958e1ec: 37 commits / ~20 PRs / 52 files / +3525 −319. Touches: state caps (SEC-V-07 RotateChannelKey + Event.deps + per-author pending), relay TopicAnnounce caps, agent ReadOnly join-links gate (AUD-2 from general-audit: main @ 00aa515 (2026-04-27) #437 — fixed by fix(agent): readonly scope must deny join_links resource #450), state_bridge SAFETY comment (AUD-1 from general-audit: main @ 00aa515 (2026-04-27) #437 — fixed by docs(web): SAFETY comment for DerivedStateActor #445), service_worker_bridge extracted from main.rs w/ kind discriminator + module-local stash (issue [SEC-W-06] Service-worker postMessage payload accepted without kind / origin check #244), invite topic-format validate, web error toast plumbing in handlers.rs ([GEN-07] All UI action handlers swallow errors with no toast / log #350), platform-aware key paths (chore(workers): platform-aware default paths #439), docker pin-by-digest + USER drop (DEP-02), workers untouched at root (chore(docker): drop root, run containers as willow user #434), in-browser test additions (+457 LOC), static_assets test (+164 LOC).

Concerns audited

Concern	Method	Result
security: input-validation/DoS	direct	strong (caps verified)
security: auth/permissions	direct	strong (AUD-2 closed)
security: web/WASM	direct	strong; F2 found
security: deps/supply-chain	orchestrator (cargo audit)	clean vs ignore; F1 found
tech debt	direct	stable; existing trackers cover (#332 #320–#330)
architecture (spec drift)	direct	lock-ok comments still compliant w/ docs/specs/2026-04-26-state-management-model-design.md
general	direct	F2
test coverage	direct sample	new tests landed alongside new code; existing tracker #418 #340 #341 covers gaps

Strong areas (re-verified, no findings)

• state crate purity: zero tokio / iroh / std::fs / SystemTime (rg "tokio::|std::fs|SystemTime|iroh::" crates/state/src still clean)
• wire deserialize defense-in-depth: MAX_DESER_SIZE = 256 KB + per-variant WireMessage::max_size
• event-DAG insert: signature + content-hash + new caps (MAX_EVENT_DEPS = 64, MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES = 128)
• pending-buffer cap: 10k total + per-author sub-cap (max_entries / N — landed in 5b78e61)
• relay caps: MAX_TOPICS = 10_000, MAX_TOPIC_LEN = 256, MAX_TOPICS_PER_ANNOUNCE = 64, MAX_TOPICS_PER_SIGNER = 100, MAX_CONCURRENT_BOOTSTRAP_CONNECTIONS = 1024, BOOTSTRAP_IO_TIMEOUT = 5s, BOOTSTRAP_DRAIN_BUFFER_CAP = 8 KiB
• agent scope gate: TokenScope::ReadOnly | Messaging deny willow://server/join-links (AUD-2 closed via fix(agent): readonly scope must deny join_links resource #450; new e2e test asserts filter pipeline matches gate)
• state_bridge SAFETY comment: documents Send invariant for DerivedStateActor (AUD-1 closed via docs(web): SAFETY comment for DerivedStateActor #445)
• service worker bridge: kind discriminator + module-local RefCell stash (no global window.__willowLastPush — closes [SEC-W-06] Service-worker postMessage payload accepted without kind / origin check #244)
• invite topic validation: topic_matches_server enforces {server_id}/ prefix + MAX_TOPIC_LEN = 256 + MAX_INVITE_CHANNELS = 1000 (closes earlier topic-confusion concern)
• platform-aware default key paths in replay/storage main.rs (dirs::config_dir() w/ /etc/willow fallback)
• docker images: digest-pinned rust:1.95-slim-bookworm + nginxinc/nginx-unprivileged:1.27-alpine, all containers USER willow/USER nginx (closes DEP-02 + chore(docker): drop root, run containers as willow user #434)
• lock-ok comments present on every legitimate lib-crate lock; new client/src/{lib.rs,listeners.rs,mutations.rs} sites annotated
• no unimplemented!() / todo!() / dbg!() / eprintln!() / FIXME / HACK in lib code
• web js_sys::eval sites: 1 user-input-interpolated ([WS-1] Web: js_sys::eval(format!()) for pinned-message scroll uses band-aid sanitization #425 [WS-1] tracked), rest static-string (window.__WILLOW_RELAY_URL read, setTimeout focus shim) — no new XSS surface

Findings (2 child issues)

#	Sev	Title
F1	low	Docker web.Dockerfile installs trunk unpinned — sibling of closed #319 (different scope: docker pipeline, not deploy.yml)
F2	medium	11 web component handlers swallow client mutation errors w/ let _ = h.<method>().await — sibling of closed #350 (different scope: components/, not handlers.rs)

Existing-issue overlap (not re-filed)

• AUD-1 (state_bridge SAFETY) → fixed by docs(web): SAFETY comment for DerivedStateActor #445 ✓
• AUD-2 (agent ReadOnly join-links) → fixed by fix(agent): readonly scope must deny join_links resource #450 ✓
• WS-1 (web js_sys::eval(format!()) for pinned scroll) → [WS-1] Web: js_sys::eval(format!()) for pinned-message scroll uses band-aid sanitization #425
• TD-14 (anyhow in lib crates) → [TD-14] anyhow used in 8 library crates contradicts CLAUDE.md convention #332
• SEC-V-06 (TopicAnnounce caps) → [SEC-V-06] TopicAnnounce.topics: Vec<String> has no element-count cap; enables relay CPU amplification + topic-slot exhaustion #235 (landed via 3ee8a98)
• SEC-V-07 (Event.deps + RotateChannelKey caps) → [SEC-V-07] RotateChannelKey.encrypted_keys + Event.deps vectors have no element caps #236 (landed via 7ee7e0a)
• DEP-02 (docker pin) → [DEP-02] Docker images use unpinned rust:latest / rust:slim / nginx:alpine tags #313 (landed via c479670)
• TD-08 (storage clock) → fixed via 87c1648
• All cargo-audit warnings → [DEP-01] rustls-webpki 0.103.10 has 3 open RUSTSEC advisories (name-constraint bypass + CRL panic) #223 [DEP-02] Three concurrent rand major versions + RUSTSEC-2026-0097 across all of them #246 [DEP-03] Workspace uses unmaintained bincode 1.3 for on-wire + on-disk serialization #247 [DEP-08] Unmaintained paste 1.0.15 (RUSTSEC-2024-0436) — not in CI ignore list #316 [DEP-09] Unmaintained proc-macro-error 0.4.12 (RUSTSEC-2024-0370) — not in CI ignore list #317 [DEP-10] Unmaintained atomic-polyfill 1.0.3 (RUSTSEC-2023-0089) — not in CI ignore list #318

Dropped findings (verified false during 2nd-pass grep)

None. Both surviving findings re-grep-verified before file:

• F1: grep -n 'cargo install trunk' docker/web.Dockerfile → 1 hit, .github/workflows/deploy.yml already uses pinned taiki-e/install-action@cf525cb...trunk@0.21.14
• F2: rg -n "let _ = h\.[a-z_]+\(.*\)\.await" crates/web/src/components/ → 11 hits across roles.rs (4), channel_sidebar.rs (4), settings.rs (2), sync_queue_view.rs (1)

Method change vs #437

• Agents launched: 0 (same as general-audit: main @ 00aa515 (2026-04-27) #437)
• Findings filed: 2 child + 1 master + 1 lessons = 4 issues (same shape as general-audit: main @ 00aa515 (2026-04-27) #437)
• Time-to-finding: minutes
• Diff was bigger (52 vs 4 files) but orchestrator-direct still scaled — lesson-2 threshold (50 files) held up.

Lessons follow-up issue describes outcome.